

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF MILITARY AND POLICE INSTITUTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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Summary

Fulfilling expectations is the shortest definition of any institution's role in society, and the same applies to the military and police. It means dealing with pressing problems. The pressing problems of the 21st century are perennial problems, but now those threats are our own created monsters: terrorism, which has almost replaced the conventional type of warfare; the international organized crime, whose leaders were created by different "special needs" of particular governments, and later used the tax-payers' money to built their own underworld empires; and environmental destruction, which is turning into destruction of life on Earth. These are just some of many problems and threats to the world's future which must be solved, and the key institutions which will be able to neutralize those threats are the military and police.

Making and presenting the government's decisions about using the military and police to neutralize those threats, and making them acceptable to others (to the citizens who have empowered them; to the strategic partners) will not be possible by using the same way of thinking which produced those threats in the past.

To neutralize future threats to human beings, social institutions – especially the military and police, as well as governments – must switch from the traditional (hard) use of power, aimed at achieving special (selfish) interests, to the "soft" use of power, aimed at creating the common good.

Keywords: social institutions, military, police, global threats, use of power, soft use of power instead of hard use of power, responsible and irresponsible strategic decisions

INTRODUCTION

Fulfilling expectations means dealing with pressing problems. The pressing problems of the 21st century are well known – they are threats to the survival of human beings. Today those threats are our own created monsters.

Terrorism – organized use of violence against civilians aimed at achieving political goals – has almost replaced the conventional type of warfare. It has got out of control, perhaps as a result of the calculated evil of some politicians in the 1940s, during the Cold War period, when terrorist activities carried out by friends of one of the superpowers were supported as “fight for freedom”, or, alternatively, as “fight for democracy”.

A similar kind of threat is the international organized crime. Many of its leaders were created by different “special needs” of particular governments, and later used the tax-payers’ money to build their own underworld empires.

As a result of the same way of thinking, environmental destruction and its consequences are becoming a serious threat to life on Earth. Manipulating life and nature, which are intrinsically not under human control, and at the same time are much important than human wishes for more money, more power and more success, has been the chief reason for the systematic destruction of life on Earth.

These are just some of many similar problems and threats to the world’s future which must be solved. The military and police are two institutions whose potentials could be better used in future to prevent and neutralize some of those threats. Are they ready for those challenges regarding their internal organization, their members’ and leaders’ level of education and way of thinking, in short, regarding their own “subculture” or “corporate culture”?

What kind of change can members of the military and police make in order to become prepared for participating in the making of strategic decisions that will lay the groundwork for overcoming those problems and threats?

Another problem is the fact that the past behavior of the governments and others who had most power in their hands is what has created these threats in the first place.

Because the military and police are under the civil governments’ control, the global success of their mission depends on those governments (the real people that they are made of) and their ability to use the power and the money with which the citizens have entrusted them wisely and responsibly in order to solve some very serious problems.

Would it be possible to neutralize those threats using the same way of thinking that has produced them in the first place? Surely not! Those threats have not been created by themselves. They are the consequences of a political way of thinking that has produced the “four big moral political liabilities of our time – hunger and poverty in the third world, torture and continuous violations of human dignity in autocratic regimes, increasing unemployment and disparities of social wealth in Western industrial nations, and finally the self-destructive risks of the nuclear arms race” (Habermas, 1991.:209).

Finally, it is imperative to understand how the present decisions become acceptable to others: to the citizens who have entrusted the decision makers with some very serious duties and have empowered them to work for the common good; as well as to the strategic partners who do not expect the joint activity to be based on selfish and particular interests which can produce short-term solutions but which, in the global sense, could deepen the problem even further.

This paper will provide answers to the following questions:

1. What is the role of the military and police in the globalized, civilian and democratic world of the future? How can the military and police co-exist constructively in a desirable civilian, democratic, globalized human society, offering mutual support, a clear strategy of action, and behaving responsibly towards citizens?

Social institutions – especially the military and police, as well as governments – should switch from the use of power aimed at destruction, repression and domination to the use of power that will neutralize threats, alleviate the consequences of past conflicts and destruction, and help raise the overall quality of life.

The traditional use of power means utilizing the instruments of power to maintain authority, employing the economic and military power to achieve domination over the citizens of a particular state and over other nations, or using those instruments for fulfilling the expectations of particular interest groups at the expense of all other citizens and of the environment. It may have been termed the “traditional” use of power because it tends to be predominant.

On the other hand, there is the use of power aimed at creating the common good, which presupposes the notion of ‘state’ as serving all citizens. This means using power to build democracy and uphold human rights for all the citizens of a particular state and of the world. It also means using the economic power to support sustained growth, to improve the quality of life, and to preserve the global environment. In this context, military and police skills and potentials are employed to uphold those values. Finally, this means that the armed forces are used only to neutralize direct threats against human lives and the common good.

Part One of this paper addresses these issues.

2. What should be the basis for strategic decision-making – especially regarding those decisions that have to do with the use of the military and police – that will be acceptable to other sections of society (at the state, national and global levels)?

The two ways of using power mentioned above are based on two ways of strategic decision-making. The traditional use of power, in general, is based on strategic decisions which care only about achieving political and economic purposes. Because of their blatant disregard of the often irreparable consequences they have for people’s lives and health, and for the environment, we can call those decisions *irresponsible strategic decisions*. Generally speaking, any decisions which result in human suffering in the name of materialistic and political interests can be described as irresponsible decisions. Suffering of a certain number of people is acceptable only if it prevents the suffering of a larger number of people, or if it refers to those

responsible for past crimes. Sacrificing human lives in the name of materialistic and political interests is in itself a crime.

On the other hand, strategic decisions can be guided by goals aimed at the common good. They show consideration for people, their lives and health, their human rights, and they are oriented towards building and upholding those values. For this reason we can call them *responsible strategic decisions*.

Part Two deals with these issues.

PART ONE

Stabilization of military and police institutions in social environment

The rise of institutions always depends on common goals, which can be very different and basically depend on recognizing the same, or similar, needs and interests. At the beginning, recognizing common problems is sufficient for the definition of, and agreement on, joint goals. The permanence of some common necessities requires a long duration of similar actions, but for successful and lasting operations it becomes more necessary than recognizing common problems. It is more than enough to reinstate a stable arrangement of common rules or norms, which is possible in two main ways, although they never appear in a pure form.

The first is habitualization. The process of habitualization supports stabilization of mutual relationships between elements of an institution. "The processes of habitualization precedes any institutionalization... Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. Put differently any such typification is an institution. What must be stressed is the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only the actions but also the actors in institutions. The typifications of habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones. They are available to all the members of the particular social group in question, and the institution itself typifies individual actors as well as individual actions. Institutions further imply historicity and control. Reciprocal typifications of actions are built up in the course of a shared history. Institutions always have a history of which they are the product. It is impossible to understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced. They also by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would theoretically be possible. In actual experience institutions generally manifest themselves in collectivities containing considerable numbers of people" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967.:54).

The second is social contract, a concept developed by Thomas Hobbes. A social contract is a solution when, once one has reached a contractual agreement with another, he grants his approval to the obligations and the correlative rights that

accrue to him and to his partner on the basis of this agreement. On the level of social structure, individuals (status and roles) and groups who try to achieve similar goals make efforts to find, for all of them, acceptable ways of mutual communication, and ways of conducting mutual activities, because they make a contract about the basis of their work: mutual relationships; useful instruments, and hierarchy of goals. With time, arranged norms become obligatory in any individual case, and in accordance with this, become indisputably the basis of any activities. Habitualization and social contract are two essential conditions in the process of stabilizing institutions.

At same time the process of legitimization of institution toward outside social reality continues: "The function of legitimization is to make objectively available and subjectively plausible the 'first order' objectivations that have been institutionalized. While we define legitimization by this function, regardless of the specific motives inspiring any particular legitimating process, it should be added that 'integration' in one form or another, is also the typical purpose motivating the legitimators" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967.:92).

"Legitimatization is not necessary in the first phase of institutionalization, when the institution is simply an act that requires no further support either intersubjectively or biographically; it is self-evident to all concerned. The problem of legitimization inevitably arises when the objectivations of the new historic institutional order are to be transmitted to a new generation" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967.:93).

John Rawls (1999.) emphasizes justice as the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. Society is well ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. That is, it is a society in which

1. everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and
2. the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles.

He also explains the well-ordered peoples' right to war: "No state has a right to war in the pursuit of its rational, as opposed to its reasonable, interests. The Law of Peoples does, however, assign to all well-ordered peoples (both liberal and docent), and indeed to any society that follows and honors a reasonably just Law of Peoples, the right to war in self-defense. When a liberal society engages in war in self-defense, it does so to protect and preserve the basic freedoms of its citizens and its constitutionally democratic political institutions" (Rawls, 1999.:91).

The role of *social institutions* is to meet social needs. Sociologists define the role in terms of expectations: groups of norms and values that individuals and institutions must be able to achieve.

- This world and its citizens need security: a life without war, without terrorism, without crime, without poverty, and without threat of contaminated air, water, earth, flora and fauna;
- such a world may be built only with respect for the phenomena of life (this has the highest value because it is irretrievable), mutual respect, dignity, cooperation, a sense of justice and solidarity (economic, educational, cultural; other institutions also have the role of caring about human needs);
- on the other hand, there always exists a need for more selfish success, more power, more control and more manipulation of people and their property (the military and police are institutions whose role is to prevent this).

Max Weber (1978.) studied the role of military services throughout human history and compiled a list of services that this type of institution performs in the life of society. "Discipline as the basis of warfare, gave birth to patriarchal kingship among the Zulus, where the monarch, however, was constitutionally limited by the power of the army commanders – similar to the (manner in which) the Spartan (kings were checked by the) ephors. Similarly, discipline gave birth to the Hellenic polis with gymnasia. When infantry drill was perfected to the point of virtuosity (as in Sparta), the polis had inevitably an aristocratic structure; when cities resorted to naval discipline, they had a democratic structure (Athens). Military discipline was also the basis of Swiss democracy, which in heyday of the Swiss mercenaries was very different from the Athenian but controlled – in Greek terms – territories with inhabitants of limited rights (*perioeci*) or with no rights (helots). Military discipline was also instrumental in establishing the rule of the Roman patriciate and, finally, the bureaucratic states of Egypt, Assyria and modern Europe. (Weber, 1978.:1152)... The well-trained Spartan Army, the organization of the other Hellenic and Macedonian and of several Oriental military establishments, the Turkish quasi-prebendal fiefs, and finally the feudal fiefs of the Japanese and Occidental Middle Ages – all of these were stages of the economic decentralization which usually goes hand in hand with the weakening of discipline and the rise of individual heroism. From the disciplinary aspect, just as from the economic, the seigneurial vassal represents an extreme contrast to the patronomial or bureaucratic soldier. And the disciplinary aspect, is a consequence of the economic aspect... Military discipline gives birth to all discipline" (Weber, 1978.:1154)

In this capacity the institutionalization of military and police serves society. Always, in any past or future cases, the first and main role of these types of institutions is providing safety to other people. Problems exist and will probably always exist about different interpretations regarding the instruments this role includes, and what circumstances must exist for complete moral justification of the use of force in protecting people without arms and without bad intentions, against individuals and groups with arms and with bad intentions.

The role of military and police services (institutions) in the global, civilian and democratic world of the future

We now turn to the ways in which the military and police can constructively co-exist in a civilian, democratic and global human society: offering mutual support, a clear strategy of action, and behaving responsibly towards citizens.

As we have said, social institutions are structured answers to basic needs of human society. They originate, develop, and live as long they present the best way to solving real social problems, or as long those problems exist in social environment.

Some needs, such as individual and social need for safety, have never changed, and so we are witnesses of continually developing ways in which human societies respond to the many threats to human existence. During the history of civilization, the military and police institutions have changed their shape (their level and forms of organization), but they have existed in every society, regardless of its level of development. After states broke up or regimes changed, the first institutions that arose faster than others were, usually or very often, those two.

The reason for the changes in the military and police institutions has been the loss of orientation of action, but never the purpose of their existence. When they became instruments of conquest instead of defense; instruments of violence instead of keeping the peace; instruments used against the citizens (within a state or outside of it) instead of protecting their rights, stability and safety, they either broke down or changed, sometimes immediately, sometimes after a number of years, but they invariably did.

Today, at the beginning of a new millennium, the purpose of their existence is changing: threats are becoming different, the environment is becoming different and, consequently, the military and police must follow the rhythm of those changes.

The processes of globalization have transformed the ways of living and ways of thinking. Particular goals, interests and responsibilities, those of particular states or countries, have ceased to exist whether they want it or not, and common goals, interests and responsibilities have taken over.

We are witnesses that the processes of globalization in many cases have their own laws and do not depend on people's wishes. Interestingly, threats spread faster than the opportunities and resources for neutralizing them: global terrorism almost has replaced the conventional warfare among states; the international organized crime (gun-running, drug-and human trafficking) has prevailed instead of the usual types of crime; and environmental destruction has taken the shape of destruction of life on Earth. Sometimes it seems that the "institutions" of the world crime are becoming global faster and easier than the institutions that must stop them.

The common interests of neutralizing threats to the present and future require only one goal: building institutions, both military and police, that would be able to protect global safety. It means life without terrorism, without war, without crime,

without poverty created by injustice, and without ecological catastrophes caused by a blind wish for more profit.

How can those institutions meet this challenge? It seems logical and obvious that neutralizing the threats to the world's citizens will require institutions that are not limited by state borders, but are able to solve global problems. *In these new circumstances, the classic concept of national (state) armed forces would not be able to neutralize global threats.* The right answer to those problems must also be global. This means that *the military and police institutions have to transform themselves as soon as possible, not only to become more civilian and democratic, but also more globalized.*

Among the contemporary papers focusing on relationships between military services and society, an important study is "The Armed forces and Society" by Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster and Andrew Cottey (2002.), who provide a survey of recent literature on this subject, citing Martin Edmonds, James Gow, Christopher Dandeker, Charles Moskos, Frank Wood and Martin Shaw.

Edmonds suggests that the nature of the military's task – where personnel are expected to have 'unlimited liability' and the prospect of being killed is almost a 'definitional' aspect of service – does make it different from other institutions in society such as the police or the civil-service. These tasks, he argues, necessitate the transfer of individual values to those of the group, and require the maintenance of particularly high levels of moral and discipline. As a result, Edmonds suggests that the 'armed services fulfil a highly specialized function, the effect of which is to separate them entirely, and geographically to a great extent, from civil society'.

Gow takes a different approach, identifying *legitimacy* as the key element in the relationship between the military and society. Gow argues that military legitimacy has both functional and socio-political bases. The functional basis of military legitimacy derives from its 'military mission' – which he defines as the protection of the state from external threat. The socio-political bases of military legitimacy are more complex, and stem from the nature of the military's relationship with political authority, its role as a symbol of political unity and national pride (informed by military traditions and past military activities), its contribution to the socio-economic infrastructure of the state, and its role as an instrument of education and socialisation. This military legitimacy is the basis of a 'social contract' between soldiers and the socio-political community, and for Gow, 'support [for the military] will be forthcoming if [it] performs effectively, in accordance with its functional and socio-political bases of legitimacy, or if there is some attachment to those bases that overarch poor performance'.

Christopher Dandeker notes that while the armed forces share 'institutional qualities' – such as the need for teamwork, leadership and loyalty to the organisation – with other civilian organisations, their war-fighting role necessitates a level of coercion in military discipline which sets them apart. Thus, he observes that 'the functional imperative of war ensures that the military will always stand apart from civilian society'. Dandeker also addresses the second military and society debate. He observes that despite the demands of the military's functional imperative, a series of challenges have emerged to military culture and its 'right to be different' which

amount to 'new times' for the military. These include, first, a changed *strategic* context – which in the west entails an end to immediate threats to national security and a more 'globalised' world where challenges to state sovereignty have come from both above from supranational organisations and below from regionalism and a globalisation of social and cultural relationships. Second, a changed *societal* context in which the supporting framework for core military values is increasingly challenged by a more individualistic, egalitarian and litigious society. Finally and partly as a result of the changed strategic context, increasing *cost pressures* which have led to the *civilianisation* of many traditionally military jobs such as logistical support. Charles Moskos and Frank Wood have suggested that societal pressures are leading western militaries to shift from an institutional structure to a more civilianised organizational one. Moskos et al argue that these changes are significant enough to be considered a new, postmodern phase of military organisation and military-society relations. For them, the postmodern military is characterised by an increasing interpenetrability between civilian and military spheres; a diminution of differences within the military itself, particularly between different ranks and services; non-traditional military operations such as peacekeeping; the increasing importance and prevalence of supranational or multinational command structures or at least legitimisation for military operations; the internationalisation of the military themselves. Martin Shaw argues his twin conceptions of post-military and common risk society. For Shaw, the Cold War period in much of the industrialised world was characterized by the militarisation of society through the necessity for mass armies and conscriptions. Moreover, in many states such as France, this militarisation was reinforced by a conception of society which emphasised a contract between the state and its citizens. Thus, in return for their rights, citizens were expected to provide service to the state through conscription. Shaw argues that geopolitical changes coupled with economic growth and a revolution of rising expectations are increasingly undermining this militarisation leading to a post-military society where military service and experience are the exception rather than the norm. Shaw has refined this theme, arguing that the militarisation along national lines so characteristic of the Cold War period has been replaced by a common risk society, in which perceptions of threat from problems such as global warming are perceived to be increasingly transnational. In conjunction with the changes associated with the post-military society, this shift of perception has resulted in the replacement of traditional military symbols and places in national cultures with spectator sport militarism, where societal engagement with the military is limited to passive observance through the media.

The building this type of institution requires deep deliberation about the basic idea of serving common interests, based on unconditional respect for human life and dignity as irretrievable values; on the other hand, it means avoiding inhibited factors as particular, special and, with increasing frequency, states' interests.

On the strategic level of concrete activity, it requires changes in the use of power in social institutions (especially military, police and governments) from the traditional

use of power to achieve special (selfish) interests, to the use of power to create the common good for the citizens. There are many examples (from ancient to recent history) that would show that the traditional use of power for achieving particular interests becomes dissipation of energy, and finally makes existing problems even worse. Just several very tragic examples: the indulgence of Adolph Hitler, Mohamed Farrah Adeed, or Slobodan Milošević as a result of some powerful politicians and governments behaving with short-term and short-range interests in mind at the beginning, which created an irrevocable tragedy afterwards.

The conclusion is that tolerating and allowing the violation of basic principles of humanity and democracy always leads to a complete loss of control subsequently, which has proved to be a social and historical fact. The only logical solution is to create institutions that would be able to operate on the same rules and principles to prevent any individual case, anywhere.

Some such institutions already exist, but their activities could be improved to support particular states, interest groups and individuals.

The role of what could be described as a common government could be built on the idea of the United Nations if all the states concerned invested more of their own instruments of power and sovereignty in such a joint governing body. Those decisions would be possible if they were based on free will and a clear vision about the benefits that would result from such a move. Only then would the UN be able to direct the joint power to improve our co-existence.

NATO is an organization which comes close to this way of thinking and operating. But the necessary level for overcoming the global threats is hindered by the organization's particular and isolated interests. In NATO's case, the lack of vision and the orientation towards particular states' interests is not associated with military professionals, but with political decision makers. For example, in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, decisions on the type of engagement hinged on political compromises. Again and again, mixing political interests with expert knowledge creates results which are bad, or at least not good enough. However, NATO has the capacity to become an institution capable of bringing together the skills and knowledge necessary for using joint power to neutralize threats and protect the common good. The focus of NATO's future use or, more generally, of the ways of using power, depends on strategic decisions. It depends on the decision makers, their visions and interests.

PART TWO

What should be the basis for strategic decisions: especially those regarding the use of the military and police force, that will be acceptable to other sections of society (at the state, national and global levels)?

The first line of battle for neutralizing and stopping the threats we have mentioned belongs to the military and police (each of them, in society, has a special area of action), but what they will do and what type of action will be used depends on political decisions. Because threats are global, action must be global, too. Many of these threats, directly or indirectly, are a result of earlier political decisions that have been made without adequate consideration about the consequences. Most such decisions have been described and analyzed by political scientists and experts on history (Kissinger, 1994. and 1999.). The level of responsibility can be assigned according to the level of power and the degree of advancement of the basic principles of liberal democracy.

World citizens (regardless of their local circumstances, whether they live in liberal democracy or not) expect global threats to be defeated. Is this possible, and how? The most responsible institutions are those which have the duty and the means for making strategic decisions for other institutions and segments of society (governments, parliaments and heads of states).

Those institutions have power in their hands and only two ways of making decisions on how to use it (which can be assessed in light of the consequences): *responsibly* or *irresponsibly*; and only two main goals: *to realize common interests* or *to realize some other (special, particular, selfish...) interests*. What actual combinations of these extreme alternatives can be observed in everyday life?

The orientation for achieving common interests is usually connected with the responsible decisions. As we said at the beginning, common interests are produced by real social needs, and the first step is to recognize them. They could have existed since a long time ago as a result of natural individual needs, but many of them exist (completely or partially) as a result of prior traditional use of power guided by irresponsible decisions, and present very serious problems, such as the threats we stressed earlier. They need to be solved faster than the others, because their existence jeopardizes people's lives and society in general. In any case, the government has to work to recognize common interests, establish congruent goals, seriously consider the ways and means to achieve them, deliberate every possible consequence, make decisions with acceptable consequences, and finally present and explain the decisions to its citizens (and strategic partners, if they need them, usually on an international level of action) requiring their support. This is a responsible way of making decisions, and, importantly, the outcome is positive and usually does not continue to exist as a new problem or threat. In reality, there are many individual examples of this way

of thinking and acting, but in very few cases is it possible to give credit to the whole government.

The orientation for achieving some other (ideological, special, particular or selfish) interests usually goes hand in hand with irresponsible strategic decisions. This refers to decisions and actions that take into account not the real social needs, but rather the interests that they wish to achieve, regardless of real problems and threats to people's lives and society in general. Explicitly it means avoiding social role and duties, and it always tricks citizens and fails their legitimate expectations. Usually the actors try to present their goals as common to all citizens. The results and consequences of this way of governing are distressing, and a lot of time is needed for healing society: to reverse the consequences and set in order the interior and exterior conditions, and finally for a revival of trust in the possibility of existence of democratic rules. This orientation can be associated with particular individuals in power, but the likelihood that a complete administration might resort to it is usually restricted to fundamentally undemocratic regimes.

In the real world today, there are governments whose terms in office are marked by responsible and altruistic, as well as irresponsible, egoistic, or even criminal decisions at the same time. The deal of liberal democracy overcomes this latter way of thinking and behavior. There are two fundamental conditions that must be realized at a very high level, which can counteract any undemocratic influence. The first, most frequently mentioned notion is **human rights**. Blandine Kriegel (1995.:34) believes that three conditions are necessary for a doctrine of human rights. First, the human being as such must be recognized as a having value. Second, this recognition must be given legal expression. Finally, this legal status must be guaranteed by political authorities. The next most important concept is **the rule of law** among persons and among peoples. John Rawls (1999.:37) cites several authors who made lists similar to the principles of international law: peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples; peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings; peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them; peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention; peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense; peoples are to honor human rights; peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war; peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.

In short, if any decisions, especially strategic ones, are based on the rule of law and show respect for the human rights of all those persons that will bear the consequences of these decisions, there is a strong possibility that the results will be far-reaching and positive. On the contrary, making decisions without respect for human rights and the rule of law will always produce bad consequences, which creates new problems and threats, with their own unpredictable laws.

On what does the quality, duration, and legitimacy of strategic decisions depend?

Considering the decision-making process, especially regarding those decisions governing the organized types of social activities, we can identify three kinds of logic, that is, three kinds of interests that go into the creation of strategic decisions. These three kinds of logic are ***bureaucratic***, ***political*** and ***expert***, since every level of strategic decision making (within a state, at the state level and at the international level) includes those three groups of people, and those three ways of thinking. Each one of them has a very important role, but problems emerge if any of them pretends to play the key role in the decision-making process.

Bureaucratic logic is based on misgivings about any changes, especially those done quickly, and bureaucratic vision is always based on tradition. Usually, tradition is the main reason and has the advantage of critical consideration about usefulness or purposefulness. *Political* logic is usually guided by political success, which must be evident, quick and useful in increasing the popularity of a particular political party. This kind of purpose is usually the main reason in the reaching of decisions. *Expert* logic is based on empirical validity. It includes all established information connected with a certain problem. This logic tries to discover the roots, because they are the best answers about the nature of the problem. Serious consideration about all possible predictable consequences is a very important part of expert decision-making. The problem with this way of thinking is usually connected with yielding in duels with political and administrational authorities on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with their feeling of superiority, which often causes them to ignore some very serious common problems.

The best (ideal) decisions start when the persons chosen by citizens in elections – the politicians – recognize real social needs and problems, and prioritize them with the help of experts (depending on the kind of threat and the predictable bad consequences that can arise if the threat is ignored). Experts then suggest solutions, means, and all possible ways for solving the problem, and list all predictable consequences. The bureaucratic segment takes care of supporting them by background (literature, similar cases in tradition), public feedback, and whether the measures considered usually work, most importantly regarding the normal administration and state life. At the same time, every proposal is checked in light of human rights and the rule of law. The final decision is a result of a concerted effort, and enjoys strong support by non-governmental agencies, which are involved to offer special advice on human rights. If the presentation of the decision and the request for support of the citizens and all interested parties (the international partners, organizations and citizens) includes illustrating the whole decision-making process with all the efforts it involved, universal support is almost guaranteed.

Which influence was greater than necessary is usually clear from the consequences. As we have said, responsible decisions are recognized as being long-term, right, legitimate and enjoying the support of the citizens. If those qualities are lacking,

there is not much chance for fixing the situation, because the bad consequences have already created even more serious problems.

This is still the main approach. Although most world leaders pledge to uphold the principles of liberal democracy (human rights and the rule of law), their concrete decisions are still based on a very primitive use of power. The reasons for it are obvious. Depending on power always means and requires an investment in power. Standing by those principles is very expensive. If a lot of money and reputations are invested in a certain decision, or a number of decisions, which then prove to have been erroneous, admitting this fact would be very difficult and risky. A more convenient solution is to bend the facts to suit the current situation. This means persistently defending the wrong way, with more and more deposits of power and money. Politics that are based on this kind of idea can bring together many clever and educated people in order to explain and exculpate a certain orientation, who would create political theories based on twisted truths. It can even become a dominant way of political thinking and educate many generations of political thinkers. They can even create the public opinion that this is the only real strategy in global politics. It is possible to defend any policy by using force, but this policy, if it is based on irresponsible decisions, always produces injustice, violence and new threats. With time it creates a critical amount of displeasure and animosity, and breaks down, but unfortunately bad consequences remain. They are often irreparable or require a lot of good will and sacrifice to be rectified.

How is it possible to continue doing the wrong thing when all facts that argue to the contrary are so evident? Does anyone strongly believe that the same way of thinking that has caused many of today's and future threats in the first place can now create the right solutions for neutralizing them?

"Policymakers are forever tempted to wait for a case to arise before dealing with it; manipulation replaces reflection as the principal policy tool. But the dilemmas of foreign policy are not only – or perhaps even primarily – the by-product of contemporary events; rather they are the end-product of the historical process that shaped them. Modern decision making is overwhelmed not only by contemporary facts but by the immediate echo which overwhelms perspective. Instant punditry and the egalitarian conception that any view is as valid as any other combine with a cascade of immediate symptoms to crush a sense of perspective" (Kissinger, 1999.:1075).

CONCLUSION

As we have pointed out, no threat has ever proved to be as globally dangerous as are today's threats, because the world has never been so "small" before. Things are now so closely connected that any incident that happens anywhere in the world leads to dramatic effects somewhere else. This fact has resulted in many tragic decisions and, consequently, actions. In the past few years, circumstances have changed drastically, with every unconsidered decision backfiring immediately, especially on the strategic (governmental) level.

Throughout the known history, power has belonged to groups and peoples who had control over resources and weapons. Under these circumstances, the general opinion was that the responsibility for peace and global stability rested with very few states. This was until a handful of unidentified persons made a decision which resulted in the deaths of several thousand people in the WTC and in the long term affected the world's several billion citizens. That moment showed the weaknesses of the world order based on the balance of power and fear among the few superpowers or, recently, on the economic interests of only one superpower. It has obviously demonstrated the failure of the traditional use of power and of irresponsible strategic decisions.

Nevertheless, there is one indisputable fact: great power always goes hand in hand with great responsibility. The responsibility for the quality of strategic decisions on how to use power still rests with the few leaders of the most powerful states. But at the same time, the globalization of democratic ideas and the spreading of critical opinions among the citizens has created a social atmosphere in which responsibility becomes not only the leaders' desirable characteristic, but also their duty and obligation. In the end, the neutralization of global threats depends on their decision to take joint global action. Through such institutions as the UN and NATO, this action could be institutionalized and channeled into regular activities and become a generally accepted approach to solving common problems in our common world of the future.

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VOJSKA I POLICIJA KAO DRUŠTVENE INSTITUCIJE I NJIHOVA ULOGA U 21. STOLJEĆU

Renato Matić

Sažetak

Ispuniti društvena očekivanja – najkraće je objašnjenje uloge bilo koje društvene institucije. Ispuniti očekivanja znači uspješno riješiti društvene probleme i otkloniti društvene prijetnje. Najveće prijetnje na početku 21. stoljeća prijetnje su opstanku ljudi i životu na planetu. Većina tih prijetnji "čudovišta" su koja smo mi, ljudi stvorili: terorizam je preuzeo ulogu ne samo klasičnom ratovanju već gotovo svakom dijalogu; međunarodni organizirani kriminal, čiji su lideri vrlo često bili usko povezani s nacionalnim vladama, da bi poslije novcem opljačkanim od građana stvarali svoja podzemna carstva; uništenje okoliša, koje polako ali sigurno postaje uništenje života na Zemlji.

To su samo neki od prisutnih problema i prijetnji na koje globalno društvo mora uspješno odgovoriti. Među glavne institucije od kojih se očekuje neutralizacija prijetnji svakako pripadaju policijske i vojne snage.

Odluke pojedinih vlada država o uporabi oružanih snaga za postizanje zajedničkih ciljeva, trebaju biti prihvatljive i razumljive vlastitim građanima, kao i strateškim partnerima. Stoga više nije moguće koristiti onu logiku koja je u prošlosti prouzročila najveće prijetnje današnjice.

Da bi se uporabom vojnih i policijskih snaga uspješno neutralizirale prijetnje čovječanstvu i životu uopće, potrebno je prekinuti s tradicionalnim razmišljanjem o sili koja služi zastrašivanju drugih i postizanju posebnih, uglavnom sebičnih interesa, a započeti s uporabom potencijala za ostvarenje zajedničkih ciljeva tj. općeg dobra.

Ključne riječi: društvene institucije, vojska, policija, globalne prijetnje, primijena sile, primijena sile za pomoć, primijena sile za razaranje, odgovorne i neodgovorne strateške odluke