THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF GREEK SECURITY POLICY: IS THERE A NEED FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL?

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Abstract

This article examines the institutional challenges that Greek security policy is facing and offers some suggestions regarding the mechanisms that are needed for a more effective security and crisis management policy. The inefficiency of Greek security policy derives among other things from the fact that the existing institutional structures are inadequate and poorly organized. The prospect of introducing a new institutional body, the National Security Council, will also be examined in order to demonstrate that such an institution although helpful should not be treated as a panacea.

Introduction

This article aims to analyse the deficiencies in Greek security policy and demonstrate that Greece falls short of advancing its institutions and coordination policy to adequately face the new security challenges in a rapidly changing international environment. The analysis will initially
refer to the security challenges and priorities that Greece is facing in the 21st century and identify the main factors that shape its security policy. Afterwards, the article will focus on the institutional factor, exhibit its inefficiency and examine the possibility of introducing a new institutional body, the National Security Council (NSC).

The Greek Security Context

The end of the Cold War has brought considerable changes in the international landscape, added new items in the global security agenda and altered old ones. Along with every other member of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Greece had to reformulate its foreign and defence policy priorities and adjust to the new security needs presented by an unstable and fluid international environment. Nevertheless, a closer look at the security context that emerged after the end of the Cold War, demonstrates that Greece’s ‘readjustment’ is rather unique and complex, since it combines elements of both change and continuity.¹

On the one hand, Athens had to adjust to the new security environment that emerged after the end of the Cold War. Being part of the Balkan peninsular and the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece is geographically located in an unstable zone. The disintegration of former Yugoslavia, political instability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the future status of Kosovo and Albanian nationalism clearly highlight the magnitude of the stakes that the new regional environment has brought about.² Greece, integrated into key Western institutions (EU and NATO), looks toward the Balkans, across the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to areas, where security threats are becoming more complex.³ The world has entered a new era


where ‘new security threats’ like the proliferation of mass destruction, international terrorism, trans-national crime, drug trafficking, religious extremism, migration and environmental pollution can not be addressed effectively on a purely national basis, but demand bilateral and multilateral cooperation, like intelligence sharing and police cooperation. Greece’s two year-term (2005-2006) as a member of the United Nations Security Council vividly demonstrate its commitment to respond to global challenges and broaden its security agenda.

On the other hand, Athens had to deal with ‘traditional’ threats as well. For most European countries, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union triggered a profound change in their security policies. Greece has been the exception to this rule, because for decades Greek security policy considerations have been dominated by the threat from Ankara, not that posed by Moscow. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey still remains the main security concern for Athens.

Over the 1990s, Greece and Turkey have witnessed several bilateral crises. In 1994, Greece and Cyprus declared a Joint Defence Doctrine (JDD), which is a defensive initiative with two military objectives: (a) reducing Cyprus’ vulnerability and increasing the cost of any offensive move; (b) preventing any territorial change through the use of force. In this context, any attack against the Republic of Cyprus would constitute a casus belli for Greece. Since October 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which calls for a territorial waters width of up to 12 nautical miles, the Turkish National Assembly publicized a Resolution of no legal authority, stating that such an extension by Greece would be considered a casus belli. Other examples of tension between the two countries are the violations of Greek airspace by Turkish aircrafts and the challenges to the sovereignty status of Aegean islets. In addition, the

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6 Dimitris Keridis and Dimitris Triantafyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Washington DC: Brassey’s, 2001); Mustafa Aydin and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Turkish-Greek Relations: Escaping from the Security Dilemma in the Aegean (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002).
8 Indicative of the tension that is created during the dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter jets is the incident that occurred on March 23,
deployment of the surface to air missiles S-300 in Cyprus, which put into question the JDD, the Imia/Kardak Crisis in 1996, which introduced the ‘grey zones’ in the Greek-Turkish agenda and the way Greek actors of dubious official legitimacy handled the Öcalan Affair, exhibit that occasionally the level of tension between the two countries can be high.9

For many years, Greece relied mainly on international law, international agreements and the mediating role of the United States regarding Greek-Turkish relations. This strategy proved rather ineffective in the past. Over the last years Athens has made a U-turn in its foreign policy by initiating a rapprochement policy towards Turkey (the so called ‘earthquake diplomacy’) and relying more on its relations with the EU, but also placed emphasis on internal balancing by reforming its armed forces. The latter creates the need for costly armament projects that constitute a serious economic burden for the Greek economy.10

After the EU Summit of Helsinki in December 1999, Greece has initiated a long-term strategy of stabilising its relations with Turkey by accepting the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey and endorsing the opening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the Union. Although this might seem as a rational decision in terms of strategic perspective, it is important to point out that in common with NATO and the U.S in the past, the EU can not provide Greece with credible security guarantees.11 The current rapprochement between Athens and Ankara remains fragile, since neither country has shifted the agenda from ‘low’ to high’ politics. As a result and despite the various Confidence Building Measures, there is no progress on any

2006, when a Greek and a Turkish F-16 collided about 15 miles south-southeast of the island of Karpathos and the Greek pilot Costas Iliakis was killed.

9 In the 1980s and mid 1990s Turkey has been conducting military operations in its south-eastern region with the Kurdistan’s Worker Party (PKK) with thousand of casualties for both sides. In the past Turkey has accused Greece for allegedly supporting Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK, by training Kurdish fighters and financing its operations. As a result the capture of Öcalan in Kenya caused a great diplomatic crisis among Greece and Turkey.


of the issues related to the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus problem remains unresolved.

To conclude, the challenge for the Greek policy-makers after the end of the Cold War was to formulate a security policy that would be in accordance with Greece’s obligations as a member of the EU and NATO and its geopolitical context and at the same time promote its traditional national interests.

**Greek Security Policy: The Defining Factors**

In an attempt to further interpret Greece’s security policy, certain factors can be identified. In every policy making system there are various political, cultural, institutional and psychological factors that influence the policy-making process. These factors are both endogenous and exogenous and reflect recent but also long-standing trends in a country’s security policy. The progressive Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy, the continued uncertainty that characterises the Greek-Turkish relations, the dominant role of personalities in the decision making process and the lack of an institutional body that would provide long-term assessment on a broad range of security issues and assist/coordinate the crisis management mechanisms, are the dominant factors that shape Greek security policy.

Participation in the EU and more particularly in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has inevitably expanded the portfolio of Greece's foreign policy. Rather than dealing exclusively with so-called 'national issues', Greece now has a broadened policy agenda, both geographically (Latin America, Asia, Africa) and thematically ('low politics issues', trade, environment, technology, peacekeeping operations etc). The process of 'Europeanization', meaning the adaptation to European norms and practices - has also forced Greek foreign policy to adopt a new style for conducting policy, one that is more compatible with the European model.\(^\text{12}\) Mainly after 1996, Greece shifted from a rhetorical, symbolic and nationalistic style to a more pragmatic and issue-oriented one. Participation in the EU

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has forced Greece to abandon its ‘hellenocentric’ approach to foreign policy and diplomacy, understand the importance of building alliances and has legitimized the concepts of negotiations and compromise. Europeanization has also had an impact on policy-making structures. For instance, the 1998 reforms within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed on the one hand to create a new structure that would deal successfully with low politics issues, given the thematic and geographic broadening of Greece’s foreign policy, and on the other hand to improve its performance by establishing new structures like the Centre for Policy Analysis and Planning (CPAP) and the Permanent Crisis Management Units (PCMUs).  

As mentioned above, Turkey still poses the main threat against Greece. Since 1974, the perception that Turkey constitutes a potential military threat has been reflected not only on public opinion, but also on the political leadership. Despite differences in style and rhetoric, both of the major parties in Greece have shown remarkable continuity in their national security agenda. In all the recent policy choices (the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey’s EU accession), both major political parties have adopted more or less the same approach. Both the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement and the New Democracy party favour the current rapprochement, and support Turkey’s EU candidacy, but surprisingly enough neither has developed an alternative policy for moving from ‘low’ to ‘high politics’ issues or dealing with the Cyprus problem in the post Annan Plan period. This continuity might offer a consensus, but at the same time the lack of adaptability and alternative scenarios turns out to be counterproductive. The decision makers seem reluctant to apply alternative scenarios and question the rationale behind certain issues. Echoing Byron Theodoropoulos, there are a number of questions worth asking. Does the Greek air defence really need an air-space of 10 miles? What benefits does Greece expect from extending her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles? Does the Aegean continental shelf have any significance?

Such questions are rarely addressed in the various institutions in both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. An important characteristic and a cause

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of Greece’s diplomatic inefficiency is the limited role of institutions and bureaucratic structures in the policy outcomes. The reason is not so much the lack of a constitutional framework or the absence of legally established organs, but the fact that the existing institutions offer little to the actual policy-making process. The institutions are weak, ineffective and operate in a loose manner. They rarely submit alternative policy scenarios to the political leadership, but rather view their role as that of implementing policy choices already made by the political leadership.

The main institutional bodies responsible for foreign and defence policy - the Cabinet and the Governmental Council on Foreign and Defence Matters (GCFDM) - do not produce alternative policies. They hardly ever meet and when they do, they implement and legitimize the choices already made by the Prime Minister and a small group of Ministers. Despite the fact that a number of initiatives were undertaken in recent years - such as the creation of a Foreign Policy Council (FPC) and the establishment of PCMUs - Greece still lacks the proper coordination policy to face the challenges of an unstable regional and international environment. The FPC consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, members of all Greek parties represented in Parliament and a number of experts. The Council aims to reach a consensus in foreign policy issues and offer ‘continuity and consistency’. The sole role of the Foreign Policy Council is to offer advice on foreign policy issues and not coordinate the other bodies or get involved in the crisis management field. The jury is still out as to whether the establishment of a new institutional body is enough to cover this inefficiency on its own.

The inefficiency of the institutions places individuals, the Prime Minister and Ministers, at the centre of the policy-making process. The record shows that the major political choices on security policy (Greek-Turkish rapprochement and support of Turkey’s EU accession), were taken and implemented by the Prime Minister and a small group of

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Ministers and not by collective bodies. The record is even more marked and worrying in the crisis management field. The Imia crisis, the S-300 crisis and the Öcalan case demonstrated that the leaders were averse to submitting their authority to any institutional discipline or collective body of policy-making and instead formed small *ad-hoc* groups that they could control. In a political system, in which leading policy makers operate without a strong and effective institutional framework, failures will inevitably occur.

As a result, any major effort to reform the security policy should have a strong institutional element and aim to provide institutional discipline to the leader’s decision-making process. All factors analysed above are important and under constant play, but the institutional factor is one that is both susceptible to change and able to influence all the others. The introduction of a new institution or better coordination of the existing ones will take advantage of the positive developments that the 'Europeanization' brought about and counterbalance the negative developments deriving from the dominant role of personalities. The establishment of a body that will function as a policy oriented think-tank would challenge well established beliefs rooted in both society and the ruling elite and provide a better understanding of the new security environment.

### The Institutional Dimension of Greek Security Policy

In a parliamentary democracy such as Greece, decisions are reached in a collective manner. In particular, the main institutions responsible for the security policy are two: the Cabinet and the GCFDM (an *ad hoc* Council, a smaller Cabinet), both chaired by the Prime Minister. Although both institutions have the right to deal with foreign and defence issues, the former has entrusted expanded responsibilities to the latter and therefore the GCFDM is the main instrument responsible for the national security policy. It is composed of the Prime Minister (Chair), the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Interior, Development, National Economy, Environment and the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs. Depending on the issue at stake other ministers and the Chief of the National Defence General Staff may also participate. The GCFDM is responsible for shaping the national defence and national security policy, reaching decisions about foreign policy and defence matters, deciding

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18 Ioakimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece”, pp.149-54.
about the structure of the armed forces, the promotion of high-rank officers and defence procurement issues, setting the country in a state of partial or total mobilisation of its means and resources and finally organising a crisis management body.\footnote{For a detailed analysis of the structure and role of the Governmental Council on Foreign and Defence Matters see George Papastamkos, Vasilios Gikas and Petros Liacouras, \textit{National and European Security and Crisis Management} (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoula, 2002), pp.42-47, 146-155 (in Greek).}

The \textit{ad hoc} creation of a crisis management body within the GCFDM is a paradox. The latter lacks the proper physical infrastructure, a support mechanism that would coordinate the crisis management strategy and provide alternative scenarios. The physical infrastructure that is needed to monitor the evaluation of crises in real time, the gathering of officials and experts that are scattered in various ministries and organisations is a time consuming and complex task that can not be accomplished on an \textit{ad hoc} basis.\footnote{Ioannis Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council in Greece,” \textit{Defensor Pacis}, Issue 17 (2005), pp.168-169.} Despite repeated pledges for the creation of a Secretariat, the GCFDM still lacks one, thus coordination in both times of peace and especially crisis can only be limited; it depends on the respective Ministers’ \textit{ad hoc} institutional cooperation.\footnote{Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, \textit{National and European Security and Crisis Management}, p.81.}

During a crisis, the GCFDM must coordinate the existing instruments in the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, like the CPAP and the PCMUs, both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Strategic Studies Directorate (SSD), which is a civilian crisis management unit in the Ministry of Defence. The CPAP and the PCMUs are not directly involved in the policy making process, but are rather more academically oriented. Indeed despite its name the latter is not a crisis management instrument, since its responsibility is to conduct simulations and prepare the Ministry of Foreign Affairs response in a crisis situation. Therefore the PCMUs have only an advisory role and they do not actually ‘manage’ the crisis.\footnote{Ibid, 52.} The issue of coordination gets even more complicated if we take under consideration that most crises involve more than just the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The GCFDM (or any other institution) should also be able to coordinate the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Hellenic, the
Coast Guard (for which the Ministry of Mercantile Marine is responsible) and the Ministry of Press and Mass Media.

As a result of the above, the GCFDM is unable to actually provide critical advice to the nation’s leadership during a period of crisis. Surprisingly, the members of the GCFDM who are responsible for reaching decisions about the crisis management strategy are unaware of crisis management principles, rules of engagements, the military jargon and technical details involving military operations. The fact that decision-makers should participate in crisis-management simulations and exercises, a common practice in other countries, does not seem to apply in the Greek case.

Low-intensity conflicts that took place the last decade demonstrate vividly the inability of Greek security and crisis management mechanisms. The Imia/Kardak Crisis was (mis)handled not by the GCFDM as it should be, but by a small ad hoc group, where the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Defence monopolized the decision making process and made no use of the relevant institutional bodies. More striking is the fact that this idiosyncratic team could not establish a channel of communication with the Turkish side; the negotiations regarding the settlement of the crisis were actually achieved through the involvement of the USA.\(^{23}\) The Öcalan case was again managed by an ad hoc team, consisting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior, the Secretary of the Cabinet (working as a link to the Prime Minister) and the Director of the NIS. The Greek government denied providing asylum to the Kurdish guerrilla leader, since that would have added unwanted tension in Greek-Turkish relations. The decision to send the PKK leader in Kenya, where a large number of US intelligence officers where placed after the terrorist attacks that took place in the U.S Embassy, was wrong both in political and operational terms.\(^{24}\)

Based on the above, the need for a new institution that will be able to coordinate the existing bodies scattered in various ministries, offer sound and timely advice on a wide


\(^{24}\) On the Öcalan case see Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas, Shaping National Strategy and Crisis Management (Athens: Defence Analyses Institute, 2004), pp.85-87 (in Greek).
range of issues, establish a strict crisis management mechanism, and oversee each step of the policy-making and crisis management policy is worth examining.

National Security Council: The Missing Element?

Establishing an institution like the NSC would provide better coordination of the existing institutions (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior etc), assist the crisis management mechanism and contribute in shaping Greek security policy. The idea for creating a NSC is not new in Greece. Indeed, the NSC existed on paper during the period 1986-1996. There was a resolution by the Cabinet in 1986 referring to its creation, but in practice it was never established and in 1996 it was abolished. Diplomatic mishandlings, and the recent establishment of new institutions within the MFA and MoD as mentioned above, gave new momentum to an already existing idea. The present legal framework allows for the creation of a coordinative and consultative body within the GCFDM.  

The proposals about the establishment of a National Security Council outline an institution of coordinative and consultative nature that will assist the GCFDM and will come under the Prime Minister’s power.  

The establishment of a NSC is needed in order to provide a detailed evaluation of threats to national security, to assist the leadership in shaping the national foreign and defence policy, to draft scenarios concerning possible threats, to coordinate the activities of other crisis management bodies and offer a synthesis of the views expresses by the various ministries and committees and finally to function as a leadership training centre.  

Based on the international practise, the NSC reports to and is controlled by the head of the state. Keeping in mind that the NSC in its original form is designed to serve the presidential model, certain legislative reforms will have to be adopted to ensure on the one hand that the Prime Minister will be at the centre of the process and on the other hand

that the government will not lose its collective action ability. Therefore, uncritically applying the ‘NSC model’ that is used in the US’s governmental system is not an option.\textsuperscript{28}

A critical issue is the (competitive) relation between the GCFDM and the NSC in times of both crisis and peace. The parallel activation of the NSC should not undermine the ability of the GCFDM to make decisions, but rather provide flexibility by coordinating the various parts and offer alternative policies. Therefore a critical link between the decisive instrument (GCFDM and Prime Minister) and the consultative one (NSC) should be established. This role can only be undertaken by the National Security Advisor (NSA).\textsuperscript{29} The latter should basically ensure the intermediate role of the NSC - among the various decentralized units and the GCFDM.\textsuperscript{30} The National Security Advisor should preserve the NSC from turning into a hyper-institution that will end up being stiff and causing rivalry among its various parts.

The synthesis of the NSC should be similar to that of the GCFPD, but also broader. Apart from the Prime Minister (chairing) and the ministers that already participate in the GCFPD, actors like the NSA, the Director of the NIS and the Chief of the Hellenic Defence General Staff should also participate. The National Security Council should be staffed by military personnel, diplomats, higher officers from other services, specialists and technocrats. Having a ‘mixed’ staff will allow the NSC to develop a military/civil culture that will allow it to reach broader consensus, gain flexibility, cope with by-ministerial antagonism and understand better the complex international environment.

Although there is no agreement on its exact structure, the majority of analysts suggest that the Greek NSC should consist of the following: (a) the Secretariat that will be responsible for the administrative support, (b) the Strategic Analysis & Planning Centre that will analyse all aspects that are related to the national security policy, (c) the Crisis Management Centre that will coordinate the efforts of all the other bodies, centres and services and assist the leadership during a crisis,\textsuperscript{31} (d) the Intelligence Unit that will evaluate

\textsuperscript{28} Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security and Crisis Management, pp.166-168.
\textsuperscript{31} The prime responsibilities of a Crisis Management Centre should be technical support, information fusion, data base management, indicators and warning analysis, and development of doctrine and procedures on crises. It should have close links with appropriate operational elements
and combine the information provided by the ministries and other crisis management bodies, and (e) the Political Communication Unit that will be responsible for public diplomacy and perception management.32

Key to the success of the NSC is to create a small, coherent and flexible unit that will assist the Prime Minister and the GCFDM and not replace them. Nevertheless, without the sufficient political will, the NSC might actually produce new problems. In particular, the Prime Minister might manipulate the NSC. The prospect of turning the NSC into an instrument that will mainly serve the Prime Minister is obviously a negative prospect within a parliamentary democracy. In addition, balancing the technocratic and political character of the council poses another great challenge. Institutional rivalry between the NSA and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the tendency of the former to become a hyper-minister with increased powers, should also be taken under consideration.33 Turf wars between the NIS and the Intelligence Unit about the intelligence product, or tension between the Crisis Management Centre and other bodies that are scattered in the ministries might also occur.

Conclusions

The review of the Greek security policy illustrates the deficiencies of its institutional dimension. This inefficiency derives not only from the fact that the existing structures are inadequate and poorly organized, but also from the fact that the current political culture does not favour a strict and effective institutional framework that will assist the decision makers and even control the outcomes of the policy-making process. Indicative of the above is the fact that the Greek political leadership was reluctant to use the available institutions during recent crises. The NSC, as every bureaucratic institution will have problems regarding its

33 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security and Crisis Management, pp.129-134.
organization, role and coordination policy but then again the planners of such an institution will have the benefit of learning from others that have introduced similar bodies in their policy-making structure. As a result, it can be argued that the missing element is not only the establishment of a new institution, but also the need to accompany the establishment of such an institution with the proper political culture. Therefore, adding simply a new institution is not the solution. A new institutional body like the NSC might provide flexibility and better coordination, but it will not solve problems that are inherent to the Greek political system, like the dominant role of the Prime Minister, or the reluctance of the political elite to receive advice.

Simply establishing the NSC or a similar institution should not be seen as a panacea for Greek security policy, but rather as the first necessary step towards a more organized and effective national security policy. Creating an instrument that will adjust to the current institutional framework, make the most of the existing apparatus and confront its endogenous shortcomings is probably a rational action that can be taken. Building an institutional system of policy-making will contribute in ‘shaping’ a political culture that will allow old and new institutions to function synergistically, that will aim for systematic and rigorous decision-making and that will be willing to receive advice and examine alternative policy scenarios.