Discourse analysis and determination in the light of subjectification theory

The present paper bridges considerations characteristic of the domains of linguistic pragmatics, discourse analysis, as well as of cognitive linguistics and social psychology. It is claimed that, in specialist discourse analysis, a given discourse type is as such analytic determinant, i.e. one that dictates its own methods of investigation. These methods display a “more-bottom-up” or a “more-top-down” orientation (cf. Beaugrande 1997), depending on what kind of discourse is investigated. It is argued that certain discourse types which “include” the analyst (that is, where the analyst is part of depicted events or part of discourse audience) or are more “familiar” to him/her generate observations on their function and structure at a relatively early stage of their componential analysis, or even before it takes place. Once the global function of the text has been presupposed, the analysis proceeds “top-down”, i.e. toward all micro-data chunks supportive of the initial hypothesis. This happens, for instance, in the case of the discourse of advertising (cf. studies by Lutz 1990, Myers 1994; Goddard 1998, and many others). On the other hand, discourse analyses pursued in a “bottom-up” manner seem to result from an analyst having insufficient extralinguistic knowledge to postulate a priori claims about the text and its function. This constraint concerns analysts not being part of the reality investigated and, more often than not, undertaking a diachronic study or a study of highly-metaphoric discourse. The primary objective of the paper is to postulate, on the basis of investigation into a couple of different discourse types (language of politics and the media, advertising, and scientific argument), about the degree of analytic determinism pertaining to a given kind of text. In other words, it is to indicate which discourse types invite (or even dictate) which of the analytic approaches (i.e. “top-down” and “bottom-up”). The secondary goal is to suggest that the analysis of discourse determination can further benefit from the application of concepts which are normally part of Cognitive Grammar (CG) apparatus. It will be shown that CG can substantially contribute toward specification of the distance that holds between the analyst and the investi-
gated discourse. Addressed here will be Langacker’s concept of *subjectification* (cf. Langacker 1990b, 1999) and its relevance to considerations of the analyst’s status in discourse.

**Key words:** analytic conceptualization; deductive analysis; discourse determination; discourse of advertising; inductive analysis; political discourse; pragmatic-cognitive interface; scientific discourse; subjectification.

## 1. Introduction

In the standard, everyday process of text comprehension and interpretation, the interpreter’s prejudgements of meaning and function are progressively nuanced or even eliminated by the bottom-level analysis of textual detail (cf. e.g. Van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). How this dialectic operates depends on the functional transparency of the discourse type and on the interpreter’s literacy practices regarding the discourse type (in the sense that the interpreter’s degree of familiarity with the discourse constitutes a factor influencing the actual text interpretation). When it comes to specialist processes of discourse analysis, analysts need to be aware of what follows from the fact that they are inevitably normal text interpreters as well as specialist discourse analysts. The consequence and analytic jeopardy at the same time can namely be substituting normal text interpretation for specialist discourse analysis rather than treating normal text interpretation as part of the object of research in discourse analysis.

The primary point of this paper to account for the above danger from the perspective of specialist discourse analysis. It seems fair to assume that, in view of the unique status of the interpreter-analyst, it is more in the case of specialist discourse analysis than any other discourse analysis that a given discourse type is in itself analytic determinant, i.e. one that prescribes and dictates methods of its own investigation. The determination of the analyst by the discourse type consists in the effect generated by the distance which holds between the reality depicted in the discourse and the analyst’s past and present experience with this reality. Based on the degree of familiarity with a given type of discourse, the analyst selects and develops (often unconsciously) the methodology for building up the actual text interpretation. Such methodology can possess a “more-bottom-up” or a “more-top-down” orientation (cf. Beaugrande 1991, 1997), depending on what kind of discourse is investigated. A full account of discourse determination necessitates going beyond the traditional apparatus of discourse analysis and pragmatics, toward concepts which stem from the multi-faceted research into the cognitive grounding of language in general.
1.1. Discourse determination: preliminaries

Certain discourse types which “include” the analyst (that is, where the analyst is part of depicted events or part of discourse audience) or are more “familiar” to him/her generate observations on their function and structure at a relatively early stage of their componential analysis, or even before it takes place. Once the global function of the text has been presupposed, the analysis proceeds “top-down”, i.e. toward all micro-data chunks supportive of the initial hypothesis. This happens, for instance, in the case of the discourse of advertising. Analysts of the discourse of advertising (cf. Myers 1994; Goddard 1998, and others) tend to pose a strong and clear-cut hypothesis regarding the effect of a given subtype of advertising, and only later verify it against the actual lexical data. In fact, the more evident or plausible the hypothesis, the less data is used afterwards to verify it. Furthermore, the more evident the hypothesis, the less chance of its being reiterated in a thesis-like format after data description has been completed.

Conversely, discourse analyses pursued in a “bottom-up”, inductive manner seem to result from the analyst’s having insufficient extralinguistic knowledge to postulate a priori claims about the text and its function. This constraint concerns analysts not being part of the reality investigated and, more often than not, undertaking a diachronic study or a study of highly-metaphoric discourse. For instance, an analyst who is alien to cultural background of a text will normally be reluctant to formulate a function-oriented hypothesis, or at least he/she will choose to withhold such a claim until substantial investigation into text data has been completed (cf. Wilson 1990). Similarly, analyst of a metaphoric expression will hardly ever hypothesize about its pragmatic effect on the text before he/she first confronts, in a truly decompositional manner, all conceivable entailments of the source domain of the metaphor with those of the target domain (cf. MacCormack 1985).

1.2. Organization of the paper: The pragmatic-cognitive interface

The first part of the paper (sections 2.1-2.4) assesses, on the basis of investigation into a couple of persuasive discourse types (language of politics and the media, advertising, discourse of science), the degree of analytic determinism pertaining to a given kind of text. It indicates which discourse types invite which of the analytic approaches (i.e. “top-down” and “bottom-up”) in a more explicit manner. As has been mentioned before, the discourse of advertising seems to prompt, for the most part, a “top-down” approach. But on the other hand, the analysis of language of scientific argument, which relies heavily on continuous accumulation of macropropositional cues, is principally characterized by inductive, “bottom-up” processes.
The second part (section 3) suggests that the analysis of discourse determination can best be pursued with the application of concepts which have been developed as part of Cognitive Grammar (CG) apparatus (cf. Langacker 1987, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1999, 2001). It is shown that CG can substantially contribute toward specification of the distance that holds between the analyst and the investigated discourse. Viewed in this way, the biggest asset of CG’s apparatus is Langacker’s concept of *subjectification* (cf. Langacker 1990b, 1999, 2001) which shows direct relevance to considerations of the analyst’s status in discourse. The cornerstone of such relevance is the apparent correspondence between the dynamic status of the analyst in relation to the background of the analyzed text and the comparably dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the on-stage region (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of viewing arrangement of the stage in the process of predication. There exists a clear analogy between the Speaker’s/Conceptualizer’s assumption of place within the OS and/or within the scope of predication on the one hand, and the positioning of the analyst as part of the analyzed piece of discourse on the other. An acknowledgment of this analogy is a pre-requisite for application of Langacker’s model of subjectification to the measurement and illustration of the status of the analyst in relation to the analyzed discourse and hence, to the specification of the degree of “top-down” or “bottom-up” determination which underlies a study of a given discourse type.

2. Analytic determination of select types of persuasive discourse

2.1. *Determination of political discourse: deductive and inductive processes*

The analysis of political discourse is affected by a relatively balanced combination of deductive and inductive processes. This can be seen from the following sample analysis of the final decree of Afghan Islamic clerics (Ulema), on US demands for the handover of Osama bin Laden, the world number one terrorism figure, apparently responsible for the attacks on US Pentagon and World Trade Center which took place on September the 11th, 2001:

(1) Afghanistan’s Ulema is sad over the losses in the United States and hopes that the United States will not launch an attack on Afghanistan. Ulema hopes that the US will show patience and flexibility and will take more time to properly investigate the incident.
The Afghan Ulema demands the United Nations and the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) hold an inquiry into the incident in the United States to know who were behind the incidents and to prevent the killing of innocent people in the future.

The United Nations and the OIC should take note of the American president’s remarks, who said that the war will be a crusade.

In order to prevent such kind of incidents and that there should be no misunderstanding in the future, this Ulema council requests the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to persuade Osama bin Laden to leave Afghanistan and select a new place for himself.

If the United States attacks Afghanistan after these proposals, any US action will be against the sacred Islamic law. It will amount to an act against Islam. We have found it in all Islamic jurisprudence if the non-Muslims attack Muslim land, jihad is obligatory on the Muslims and Quran, Sayings of the Prophet and all the books of jurisprudence urge the Muslims to wage the jihad.

If the non-Muslim invades or attacks the land of Muslims, in this situation Muslims can seek assistance from the Muslims and non-Muslim governments but with the condition that the Islamic orders should remain supreme. This has been proven in the books of Islamic jurisprudence.1

The quoted text has a background as well as idiosyncratic properties which encourage analysis involving both “top-down” (deductive) and “bottom-up” (inductive) processes. The prompts for “top-down” study include primarily a uniform perception of the background, i.e. the terrorist attack which has been denounced worldwide, providing a broad understanding for and expectation of a retaliatory action against a country harboring the perpetrators. In view of a prospective US intervention, the Ulema statement could be seen as a move to avoid war by promising a handover of chief terrorist Osama bin Laden. However, since such move would discredit the Ulema and the ruling Taliban group in the eyes of some of the more radical Arab audience, a safer presupposition about the text would be that it stands open to interpretation rather than any direct reading. In other words, the delicacy of the situation in which the text was written could make an analyst postulate its flexibility with the fulfilment of expectations of all addressee groups. This in turn means that the analyst could safely presup-

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1 Translation from Pashtu by the Associated Press.
pose about the occurrence of specific language forms and logical formulae in
the text, such as implicature, impersonalization, or ambiguity of reference of
some deictic expressions.

Also, the Ulema statement invites “top-down” approach on account of the ex-
tended text length which makes feasible the hypothesis-data-thesis formula. The
length and structure of the text sample prevents an inductive computation of
meaning since, as we shall see in a moment, the major inferential cues are ran-
domly scattered across the text. Additionally, there are text elements which have
no “cue” status whatsoever, and this encourages selectivity in data presentation.

The fact that the status of macropropositional cues in the text calls for a “top-
down” analysis follows from little possibility of interpreting them relative to
any immediate context. For instance, should take note of may be judged (gener-
ally) to constitute a directive, but whether its (specific) function is to simply de-
nounce the remarks or possibly draw some share of importance by identifying
with them cannot be successfully inferred from the text surrounding. From the
deductive standpoint, it seems logical to assume the former interpretation and
this is what an analyst is prompted to do, given the knowledge of the Taliban at-
titude to Americans. A similar problem arises with single words such as were in
the second paragraph or select in the fourth paragraph. The use of were rather
than ‘was’ could follow from an option provided by grammatical rules, yet it
could also imply that Osama bin Laden had, according to the Taliban, nothing to
do with the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the use of select could suggest that
there are multiple places in the world where Osama is welcome, but again, the
overall coherence of the passage is such that it cannot be determined which in-
terpretation should be the correct one. The loose connections between major
cues for the macroproposition encourage looking beyond the text to postulate
deductive, a priori claims about its function.

For all these “top-down” prompts, it would be a mistake to say that the Ulema
statement contains no text elements which fit the canons of “bottom-up” analy-
sis. In fact, albeit the loose connectedness holding between the particular sec-
tions of the text encourages a “top-down” approach, a corresponding lack of co-
herence within single sentences seems to prompt an inductive computation of
meaning, comparable to one which occurs in, say, the analysis of metaphor.
This can be readily observed from the structure of the first sentence in the
Ulema text which, though non-metaphoric in itself, invites speculation almost
identical to that generated in multiple metaphor studies (cf. MacCormack 1985).
The reason is the presence of the two apparently disparate thematic segments (is
sad over the losses and hopes that the United States will not launch an attack)
linked together by conjunction and. Since this structuring evokes natural bewil-
derment, there arises a temptation to search for the sentence function via estab-
lishing some common ground between the themes (as happens while comparing entailments of the source and target domain in a metaphor). In fact, having recognized little such ground, an analyst may ultimately define the speaker’s intention as one to present the threat of American intervention in terms of an action rather than (justified) reaction. Yet whatever the specific conclusion, such kind of analysis as a whole should be considered manifestation of “bottom-up” processes, as the latter clearly underlie the analyst’s investigation of analogies and disanalogies holding between the themes.

Also, an analyst investigating the Ulema statement must leave a margin for ‘the unexpected’. In other words, a text motivated by the political situation so complex as in the Taliban case (being, however, no more complex than in the case of the majority of political discourse) can hardly be judged on the basis of sole anticipation of meaning. For instance, if in actuality Osama bin Laden is harbored in Afghanistan, an expectation of the Taliban trying to buy time by their response seems perfectly logical. Consequently, a phrase such as requests (...) to persuade (...) to leave can be approached as a manifestation of this strategy, linguistically expressed in infinitive duplication (cf. Halliday 1985). If, however, the above condition does not hold and bin Laden has his shelter elsewhere, the expectation of the time-buying strategy is nothing but wrong and the fact that the infinitive has been duplicated is, for the analyst, quite unlikely to testify to such function. As a result, the phrase is going to be either completely ignored in analysis or, possibly, associated with some other function. But considering that the analyst is unaware of bin Laden’s whereabouts, he or she is likely to approach the cue without a ready-made conclusion at hand and hence devote more attention to its linear investigation. This again entails more time to be spent on the “bottom-up” componential analysis, thoroughly grounded in the study of all the lexical items involved.

This last “bottom-up” prompt might indeed show that the methodological hazards which are consequential for the ultimate meaning interpretation are more likely to occur in studies of primarily inductive orientation and less likely in deduction-based analyses, but a more important conclusion is that in the case of most political texts both these approaches will merely complement each other. It seems that situations in which an analyst would be exposed to, say, a hundred percent figurative text, being at the same time ignorant of its background (which would invite a solely inductive analysis), or, for instance, to a text which fully reiterates his or her daily experience (which would invite a solely deductive analysis) are non-representative of a vast majority of the standpoints underlying analyses of political discourse. This leaves us with the following conclusion (henceforth referred to as (a)) about the methodological determination of political discourse analysis:
(a) Political discourse analysis invites a combination of analytic induction following from analyst’s ignorance of audience predispositions and/or analyzability of text regardless of its background, and of analytic deductivism following from awareness of contextual factors or being part of depicted events and/or impossibility of carrying out an autonomous analysis of text due to its idiosyncratic properties.

2.2. Determination of the discourse of advertising: hypothesis and deduction

Although constituting only a small portion of the post-war research into the discourse of advertising, studies such as by Ogilvy (1964), Leech (1966), Turner and Pearson (1966), Goffman (1976), Williamson (1978), Dyer (1982), Schudson (1984), Vestergaard and Schroeder (1985), Chapman (1986), Lutz (1990), Myers (1994) and Goddard (1998) give a fair picture of the analytic attitude to the rhetoric of advertising which has developed over the past fifty years. All these analyses and case studies demonstrate a tendency to presuppose a priori about the manipulative character of advertisements, allegedly reflected in a clever application of several standard features, such as the use of alliteration/assonance, rhyme, reiteration of weasel words, unfinished comparisons, parity claims, etc. Consequently, practically all of the undertaken research into these features turns to account for the mere distribution of macropropositional cues, rather than any reciprocal interaction thereof. This analytic inclination follows, presumably, from the relative easiness of developing a hypothesis concerning the function of advertising, which the latter is commonly (and by no means truthlessly) seen as a quasi-deceptive tool to make the addressee pursue an action (i.e. buy a product) or develop some kind of favorable mental state toward an action (i.e. admit possibility of buying a product at a later date). The point is, however, that although this hypothesis is probably true, the readiness of developing it seriously hinders further investigation into the many consistently-structured, homogeneously grammatical elements which underlie such effective advertising.

In fact, little needs to be said about why analysts should be so prone to postulate a priori claims concerning language of advertising. Over years, as world markets have come to be dominated by same product brands, so have the marketing and advertising outlets. A Coca-Cola ad is nowadays much more likely to attract (in the same form) worldwide attention than it used to, say, thirty years ago. And since majority of language analysts are exposed to similar advertising
experience, with similar products, in similar time, it comes hence as little surprise to see similar analytic layouts pursued worldwide.

One of the most striking manifestations of the “top-down” determination affecting the studies of the discourse of advertising is the placement of thesis statement prior to data analysis. This can be best seen from the works by Lutz (1990) and Goddard (1998). The data analysis is hardly ever (occasionally in Lutz) followed by any reiteration of the thesis, since the thesis is considered too evident to pose a need for reiteration. The assumption of clarity and straightforwardness of the thesis further affects data presentation, in the sense that data components are shown to occur randomly, rather than interact with one another. In other words, the analysis adheres predominantly to the visibility of the text/image sample, at the expense of an autonomous investigation of the lexis/grammar used.

These tendencies are most radically exemplified in Goddard’s (1998) study, where thesis statements about advertisements are all voiced in the “Introduction” (and never reiterated later), while the question of the definition of advertisement is first tackled (in, arguably, somewhat trivialized manner) in “Chapter 1”, with a sample analysis (or rather simple description of an ad) following yet later in “Chapter 2”:

Make no mistake: advertising works [...]. It is not difficult to see that and why advertisers should want to make their texts capture our attention. The whole aim of the copywriters is to get us to register their communication either for purposes of immediate action or to make us more favourably disposed in general terms to the advertised product or service. (1998:2, “Introduction”)

Advertising is so familiar to modern readers that it may seem odd to ask what an advertisement is [...]. At the root of the word ‘advertisement’ is the Latin verb ‘advertere’, meaning ‘to turn towards’ [...]. Often, though, classifications [of advertisements] are more a question of degree rather than of absolutes. For example, clothing in its broadest sense can be seen as advertising ideas about the wearer, but manufacturer’s labels on clothing are a direct strategy of getting free publicity. Therefore, central to the idea of an advert appears to be the factor of conscious intention behind the text, with the aim of benefiting the originator... . (:7, “Chapter 1”)

[...] One attention-seeking strategy [...] is the startling image, combined with emotionally stirring text. The Benetton clothing company, for example, showed a series of large-scale hoardings which featured real scenes of life and death - a baby being born, covered in blood from the mother’s womb, a man on his deathbed, some of them shockingly coupled with a sequence of universally-appealing, emotion words... . (:13, “Chapter 2”)
It seems from Goddard’s study that an approach so radical, in terms of the formulation of hypothesis about the function of the text, might strongly affect the whole complexity of the build-up of subsequent analysis, or, in yet other words, any analytic activity involving the quantity and sequencing of data and theory.

In turn, Lutz’s study (1990) offers what might be called a ‘deductive catharsis’ in advertising analysis. Lutz is apparently the first analyst to pose an ultra-clear set of hypotheses concerning the language of advertising (“advertisers try to wrap their claims in language that sounds specific and objective, when in fact the language of advertising is anything but”, “Unfinished comparisons abound in advertising since they create a possibility of filling the claims differently by different addressees”, “The biggest weasel word used in advertising is ‘help’; once the advertisement starts with ‘help’, it can develop to make whatever (insincere) promise or claim, because ‘help’ qualifies all the follow-up of the sentence” (1990: 85-89), and many more), to limit data’s function to \textit{a posteriori} presentation, and to go to the final extreme of almost ignoring data analysis after its presentation. As a result, Lutz’s analysis turns into a series of exemplification chunks, each looking more or less in the following way:

\textbf{HYPOTHESIS}

(e.g.)

One of the most powerful weasel words is “virtually” [...]. “Virtually” is used in advertising claims that appear to make specific, definite promises when there is no promise. (Lutz 1990: 88)

\textbf{DATA}

(ctd. from the same example)

In 1971 a federal court rendered its decision on a case brought by a woman who became pregnant while taking birth control pills. She sued the manufacturer for breach of warranty. The woman lost her case. Basing its ruling on a statement in the pamphlet accompanying the pills, which stated that, “When taken as directed, the tablets offer virtually 100\% protection,” the court ruled that there was no warranty, expressed or implied, that the pills were absolutely effective. In its ruling, the court pointed out that, according to \textit{Webster’s Third New International Dictionary}, “virtually” means “almost entirely” and clearly does not mean “absolute” (\textit{Whittington} versus \textit{Eli Lilly and Company}, 333 F. Supp. 98). (1990: 88)
THESIS
(ctd. from the same example)

[...] So whenever one encounters an ad claim that uses the word “virtually”, one should translate that claim into its real meaning, which is “in essence or effect, although not in fact.” (1990: 88)

However, in an attempt to keep the addressee constantly preoccupied with his (hypo)thesis claims, Lutz uses a massive number of examples, each needing or in fact just naturally entailing a hypothesis-thesis wrap-up of the kind quoted above. By comparison, Goddard (1998) is quite reluctant to use multiple examples, especially if they should concern everyday commercial advertising. Whatever the reason (reluctance of mental plagiarism?; fear of triviality?), this seems to prove that with the ‘hypothesis space’ almost filled up (here: by authors such as Lutz), the analyst is tempted to take all the established pre-conceptions about the function of the analyzed discourse ‘for granted’, voice them out concisely, and possibly look for some atypical instances of this discourse, which have not yet been accounted for. And this is what is clearly manifested in Goddard’s writing, as she makes up for the limited hypothesis space with an inflated data-analysis space - yet never concerning the principal issue of commercial advertising, but an apparently marginal subject of non-profit advertising (this tendency is especially provoking in the light of Goddard’s “Introduction”, in which there is no hint whatsoever as to her being interested in this subtype of ad discourse).

Overall, the inherent analytic determinism of the discourse of advertising can be summed up by the following observation (b):

(b) Analysis of the discourse of advertising is liable to an excessive application of deduction-based hypothetical claims, to the treatment of hypothesis and thesis in like terms, to the underrepresentation of relevant data or the use of data atypical of the hypothesis, and finally, to the selection of data reflecting predominantly cognitive-visual experience.

2.3. Determination of the discourse of science: induction from data amassment

In this necessarily longer section the analysis of the discourse of scientific argument is illustrated with a sample study of the language of medical argumentation. As is the case with a majority of scientific language, the discourse analysis of medical argument is rather underrepresented in relevant literature (with the exception of fragmentary studies in Johnson 1998, Mayer 2001, Sager 1987, and
Wagner 1998) and this is reflected in the structuring of the present section, esp. in comparison to what has been demonstrated in sections 2.1 and 2.2. In its opening part (subsection 2.3.1), there is a quotation of an original text sample. The later subsections 2.3.2-5, give a half-critical, half-methodological analysis of the sample, testing it for particular argumentation and persuasion patterns, as well as their distribution and interaction with the remaining lexical data. Finally (subsection 2.3.6), on a strictly methodological note, a number of claims are made regarding possible alterations to the analysis which might occur as a result of different degrees of the analyst’s expert competence in the field.

2.3.1. Text of an article Tumor marker terrorism by Dieter K. Hossfeld (1996)

(1)

In this contribution, only serological tumor markers will be addressed. Serological tumor markers are substances of protein, lipid or carbohydrate character which occur in or on tumor cells and which are associated with origin, growth, progression, and therapy-related changes of tumors.

(2)

The ideal tumor marker should be specific, sensitive, and should have an absolute correlation with the extent (stage) of the disease. Such a tumor marker would be instrumental in the detection of cancer in an asymptomatic, seemingly healthy population (screening), in diagnosis and staging, in the evaluation of therapeutic measures, and in the documentation of relapse.

(3)

To date, no such tumor marker exists. The main reason for this is that all serological tumor markers are also produced by normal cells; thus, interpretation of assay results depends on the quantitative value reported and not merely on the presence or absence of the substance. Another reason why tumor markers so far failed in screening is the low prevalence of any cancer at a given point in time.

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2 Consecutive paragraphs have been numbered for the sake of analysis in 2.3.2-5.
The low impact of serological tumor markers on screening has been demonstrated, for instance, in ovarian cancer. Even for prostate cancer, a widespread population screening could not be recommended, although prostate-specific antigen (PSA) is nearly an ideal tumor marker due to its organ specificity. Yet, PSA is not cancer-specific; it is expressed equally by normal, benign, hyperplastic prostate glands. The mean PSA value in patients with benign prostatic hyperplasia is 3.4 mg/ml, not significantly different from mean values found in patients with stage A prostatic cancer. With regard to ovarian cancer, screening of 1082 women revealed elevated CA 125 levels in 36, one of whom had ovarian cancer. The situation is similar for other tumor markers (CEA, CA 15-3, CA 19-9, AFP, beta-HCG), so that their low specificity and sensitivity in addition to a low prevalence of cancers should prevent clinicians considering them useful tools to detect a malignancy in an asymptomatic population.

With the exception of PSA, the usefulness of serum tumor markers in the diagnosis of a malignant disease is also limited. Apart from low tumor sensitivity and specificity this is related to a low organ specificity. The list of malignancies in which CEA, CA 125, CA 15-3, etc. can be elevated, is rather long. There is also a long list of benign diseases in which increased amounts of these substances can be measured in the serum. It is realized that benign conditions are rarely a cause of extreme marker elevation. Yet, for most tumor markers, a positive correlation exists between tumor mass and marker level; in early stage colon cancer (Dukes A), just 28% of the patients exhibit a slightly elevated CEA value. In patients with stage I breast cancer, CA 15-3 is increased in less than 5% of the patients.

Thus, serum tumor markers did not live up to the initially high expectations that they would enable diagnosis of early stage cancer and thereby would result in improved prognosis. In symptomatic patients, tumor markers are rarely needed to make the diagnosis. Only in prostatic cancer and in extragonadal germ cell tumors the diagnostic value of serum tumor markers cannot be questioned.
Monitoring the course of the disease following tumor resection or radiochemotherapy has been considered the main indication for the use of serum tumor markers. Tumor markers which do not normalize following an operation point to persistent disease. A postoperative rise of markers indicated a recurrence or metastatic spread. A persisting or increasing marker in a patient under chemotherapy suggests resistant disease.

Ample evidence exists that the measurements of serum tumor markers in the follow-up of patients with breast and colon cancer, but also other cancers, lead to earlier diagnosis of relapse. The lead time between detection of relapse by tumor marker assay and discovery by clinical means is commonly 3-8 months. However, there is no proof that the earlier diagnosis of relapse results in a generally improved prognosis. The lack of curative therapy, particularly for metastatic disease, accounts for this situation. The few patients with an operable local recurrence or an isolated liver or lung metastasis do not contribute to recommend serial tumor marker determinations in the follow-up of patients with a large variety of epithelial tumors.

There are only two malignancies where the value of tumor markers in the follow-up is unquestioned, and these are gonadal and extragonadal germ cell tumors in males and trophoblastic tumors in females.

Considering what has been known for years now about the role of serum tumor markers in screening, diagnosis and follow-up, the question arises why physicians continue to ask for them and why there is an ever-increasing number of new marker tests offered by the industry. Besides the enormous economic burden - in some hospitals the money spent on tumor marker assays amounts to US$ 500 000 annually - our main concern should be directed to our patients. With regard to screening, it is not acceptable for a woman or man who feels healthy to be suspected of having a cancer, to be investigated extensively and then to be told that nothing has been found. Even worse, it is almost cynical to perform serial tumor marker measurements during follow-up and, once ‘early’ recur-
rence or metastatic disease has been discovered, only to inform the patient that a curative approach is no longer available.

(11)

To measure tumor markers without asking whether it is good for the patient resembles terrorism. It is realized that not rarely patients insist on tumor marker determinations and some of them even ask for a whole battery of markers not knowing that a healthy person who undergoes 13 tumor marker tests has, by chance alone, a probability of only 51% of being classified as ‘normal’. It is also acknowledged that it may have medicolegal consequences to withhold tumor marker tests if the outcome of the disease is fatal. This is so because it is widely believed that the more diagnostics are done the, better the patient is taken care of, and if, under these conditions, the disease ends fatally, then nobody can be blamed. This situation reflects the other side of tumor marker terrorism.

2.3.2. Amassment of data

In comparison with the text types studied in sections 2.1 and 2.2, Hossfeld’s text demonstrates an exceptionally high (though not for its genre) number of data claims. These claims, mostly statistical in nature, occur continually prior to enactments of the main thesis. If we accept that the main thesis of Hossfeld’s argument is that measurement of tumor markers is ineffective from a curative standpoint and that it should be abandoned for both moral and economic reasons, and furthermore that the situation as of today is morally abhorrent, then the elements of the thesis are to be found in para. 4 (end), 6, 10, and the full thesis segment is available from para. 11. In all these places the text that precedes an element of thesis is dense in empirical data which is inherently indisputable. With an element of thesis to be suggested for the first time (cf. end of para. 4), the density of factual data is the greatest. This follows from the need for a strong enactment of credibility at a place where the addressee’s perception of the speaker has not yet been (favorably) established. The placement of indisputable data prior to a (controversial) thesis claim also applies to those chunks of text where the thesis is implied by means of randomization of an apparently anti-thesis observation. This can be seen from para. 8 and 9, where para. 9 contains (conventional) implicature to the effect that tumor marker measurement is ineffective (There are only...) and the bulk of statements in para. 8 give factual data which is, in a sense, anticipatory of this implicature. The same correlation holds between the data-(implied)thesis chunks in para. 5 (whole) and para. 6 (last sentence) respectively. Altogether, there are over 30 simple sentences and subordi-
nate clauses carrying empirical data, a number quite remarkable considering the overall length of the text sample.

It is not only, however, the mere amassment of indisputable data occurring prior to thesis that lies at the root of Hossfeld’s ‘persuasion through credibility’ or, in other words, of ethos of the text. It is also, if not mainly, a diligent arrangement of data within itself that makes such amassment effective. It can be readily observed from the text that figure-based factual data nearly always precedes data which is given in a simple assertion form, with no statistics attached. A classic example of that is the interplay of paragraphs 4 and 5, in which former there is much more statistical data than in the latter. Such structuring reflects a set-up of credibility which normally takes place once thesis is interpreted relative to data; in Hossfeld it is also a chunk of data as such that derives credibility from another, earlier provided one. Altogether, Hossfeld’s persuasion demonstrates a rhetorical continuum, whereby more controversial points undergo constant neutralization by the precedent, unequivocal claims.

This last observation holds true (partly, at least) for the internal structure of the last paragraph, which, in addition to synthesizing all thesis points in first two sentences, reveals a mechanism that is just as much analytically baffling as representative of a majority of medical persuasion texts. Namely, it seems from the last sentence as if Hossfeld is trying to extend the thesis to cover yet another claim, to the effect that it is also medical industry that is to blame for continuous practice of pursuing inefficient measurements of tumor markers. But if Hossfeld’s point is really to foster such understanding, then a question arises why no neutralization device has been applied to prepare the addressee for so radical a claim, in a way the addressee has been prepared for other thesis elements. This leads us to consideration of the claim made in the last sentence in terms of an element functioning irrespective of the main thesis. A synchronic look at a variety of medical persuasion texts justifies such approach: there is a vast number of texts having the structure of the last paragraph nearly identical to Hossfeld’s. Moreover, if there is a written response (by another author) to the thesis voiced in the last paragraph, such response almost always ignores the ‘by-thesis’.

This, however, does not mean that the claim made in the last sentence of para. 11 is

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3 Cf. e.g. Billig 1987; Cockcroft and Cockcroft 1992; Cap 1999a and 2002. These works, among others, offer a feasible merger of theories of credibility based on psychological consistency, and both classical and modern studies in rhetoric of persuasion.

4 A sample proof of this regularity is available from, e.g., the book of proceedings of 21st ESMO (European Society for Medical Oncology) Congress in Vienna (1996), in which several contributors question Hossfeld’s argument; yet, without referring to the observation made in the closing sentence.
simply irrelevant; in fact it interacts with the thesis within a neutralization frame similar to the global frame of continuum of indisputable data followed by controversial thesis. The difference is, however, that here the claim detracts from possible unacceptability of the main thesis by offering a novel look, which is digressive and forward-oriented, and whose function is to shift the addressee’s attention onto another thematic domain, at the ‘expense’ of belaboring with controversies included in the thesis. The ‘by-thesis’ about the workings of medical industry does not prepare the thesis in the sense of pre-neutralizing controversy; it neutralizes the effect of the thesis post factum, and only in that sense it belongs to the overall argumentative continuum adopted by Hossfeld.

2.3.3. Acknowledgement of opposition

If we look at the structures which have been discussed in terms of their being triggers of conventional implicature (cf. 2.3.2), such as the only-phrases in para. 6 and 9, we find that it is also the very mention of the underrepresentation of these counter-examples that makes up another persuasive ploy in Hossfeld’s text. By building up a wobbly counter-argument which only apparently jeopardizes the principal thesis, Hossfeld enters into what Billig (1987) first called “dialogic discourse in monologue of persuasion”, a rhetorical strategy aimed at, again, establishing or enhancing speaker’s credibility. While applying this strategy, the speaker presents himself as a person who is able to anticipate controversy and, hence, to behave accordingly. The enactment of ‘I’ve been over it’ attitude adds to the speaker’s being perceived as competent and credible. In medical persuasion, one could also talk of an application of dialogic discourse in relation to expert knowledge, and the rhetorical consequences of this relation. In fact, what the speaker does by singling out such specific ‘counter-data’ as in Hossfeld’s text is not only the mere performance of his/her own expert skills and knowledge; it is also request for addressee’s share in this knowledge. In his paper and by the use of the quoted phrases in particular, Hossfeld invites a certain bond of intellectual intimacy which is to be set between him and the addressee. This bond, which bears indelible marks of rhetorical flattery, relies on recognition of a chunk of expert knowledge by both parties involved. Therefore, it can be claimed that dialogic discourse in Hossfeld (and in medical persuasion in general) means somewhat more than it does in the case of other types of persuasive discourse. It is not only that the speaker underlines his competence by acknowledging controversy; it is also that the speaker may use this occasion to build up a more direct and attractive appeal to the mind-set of the addressee (with an intention of changing it, though).
The extended view on dialogic discourse in medical language, in the form it has been proposed above, needs a digressive comment from the perspective of political language, where manifestations of dialogic discourse in monologue persuasion have long been considered as something standard (cf. Billig 1987; Cockcroft and Cockcroft 1992). In political language, dialogic discourse is usually manifested in the speaker’s addressing an indefinite party, by words which impose agreement on account of the fact that (i) the suggested idea is vague and therefore difficult to approach attitudinally, and (ii) there is a strong lexical backup of agreement from modality of the text, whereby the message is, in a sense, ‘framed into’ addressee’s predispositions. For instance:

(2) On the experience and analysis of the first wave of the reforms, anyone will agree that the proposed measures have proved ineffective; one will not deny that the program is not even a remedy, let alone a cure.

But as much as these sample words do acknowledge the existence and handling of controversy and thereby enact speaker’s competence, they obviously contain little that could foster ‘intellectual closeness’ of the speaker and his/her addressee. This is so because of the limited specificity of the message; there is virtually no common ground where expert knowledge of the speaker and the addressee could possibly meet. In medical persuasion, the degree of specificity of the message is invariably higher, and so is the chance that the addressee will find it ‘attractive’. And this is what marks the principal difference that justifies the extended look on dialogic discourse in medical texts.

2.3.4. Direct preparation of thesis paragraph

We have seen from the discussion in 2.3.2 that the major points constituting the thesis of Hossfeld’s argument are all synthesized in the last paragraph of the text (para. 11). This adds to the importance of (an analysis of) the claims which are made in the paragraph immediately preceding the thesis paragraph. As if in line with some unwritten rule that holds for medical persuasion texts, paragraph 10 takes up a role of preparing the final thesis paragraph by a swift change in lexical register. Unlike para. 1-9 and 11, which conform to all norms of formal language of scientific argument, para. 10 contains lexical structures which not only stand to verification by the mere reasoning but which are also emotionally-appealing. Unlike elsewhere, in para. 10 Hossfeld uses a handful of phrases whose function is to give his claims a humanly dimension. This is done by targeted personalization (‘a woman or man’), by setting up the common ‘agent(physician)-experiencer(patient)’ activity domain into which the ad-
dressee is indiscriminately included (‘our main concern should be directed to our patients’), and, among other ploys, by the application of lexis which in itself is to be interpreted from a subjective standpoint (cf. the use of inverted commas in ‘early’). Moreover, in para. 10 there is a whole array of lexical expressions that stand in paradigmatic relation to their formal-language equivalents which can be found elsewhere in the text. For instance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>para. 10</th>
<th>para. 1-9 and 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>told</td>
<td>informed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>healthy</td>
<td>asymptomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feels healthy</td>
<td>reports no symptoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a woman</td>
<td>patient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) man</td>
<td>patient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>found</td>
<td>diagnosed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nothing</td>
<td>no indication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘early’</td>
<td>belated³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for a woman or man</td>
<td>in patients</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Lexical equivalence of para. 10 items

Such structuring of the preparatory paragraph 10 draws, again, upon an aspiration to establish a scope of common, intimate insight which should in turn bring concrete persuasion benefits for the speaker. As the speaker chooses to adopt a register which is atypical in the given context, the dressee is naturally forced to speculate why such register should be applied and hence how it interplays with the rest of the speaker’s argument. By presupposing co-operation from the speaker, the dressee is prompted to consider the atypical chunk as a valid part of argument, but what is really important is that the dressee, while searching for clues that would dispel his perplexity, works out an intellectual closeness to the speaker. This closeness makes the dressee recognize the speaker as a valid discussion partner, which increases the chances of the speaker’s claims being approached more favorably later in the text.

Of course, another way in which para. 10 enacts the speaker’s credibility is by an increasingly radical reiteration of unquestionable points, amassing into

³ This equivalent has been provided by myself. Hossfeld’s text does not contain the word ‘belated’, though it seems that some longer chunks in the argument are reducible to phrases which ‘belated’ could be part of.
continuum described in 2.3.2. The thematicity of para. 10 is particularly beneficial for a successful enactment of such points, as the speaker brings up claims which simply must be accepted given the situation where both speaker and addressee subscribe to the same principles dictated unequivocally by their profession (‘our main concern should be directed to our patients’).

2.3.5. Lacunas of uninterpreted form

Finally, a comment should be made on those argumentation and persuasion strategies which rely on the speaker’s use of ‘unfinished meaning’, a meaning which is designated to be worked out by the addressee according to his/her preferences. A number of interesting observations is available from a comparison of paragraphs 10 and 11, the former being relatively specific as to the reference of meaning, and the latter, quite conversely, packed up with structures (single words and phrases) carrying multiple manifestations of conventional and conversational implicature. A classic example of this discrepancy is the different structure of the ask-sentences which, incidentally, both tackle the same issue of the feeble effectiveness of tumor marker measurement (‘the question arises why physicians continue to ask for them [tumor markers]’ in para. 10, versus ‘To measure tumor markers without asking whether it [=tumor markers] is good for the patient resembles terrorism’ in para. 11). In para. 10, the predicate ask has its subject and is followed by a prepositional phrase. The agentive-objective elaboration determines the specificity of the claim; there is little meaning left for an extra interpretation by the addressee. In fact, there seems to be no need for any ‘dilution’ or neutralization of the principal meaning as the message resembles a rhetorical question, devoid of any major illocutionary force. In para. 11, ask has been virtually nominalized (or, precisely, turned into a gerundive form), at the expense of its principal subject/agent. Of course, the most probable and plausible agent remains ‘the physician’, but there are also other interpretations that are possible, for instance, all parties involved in the practice: physicians, medical administration, pharmaceutical industry, etc. The lacuna of uninterpreted form in para. 11 invites an addressee’s own interpretation, according to whatever he/she considers desirable. The claim is therefore relatively easy to accept, even though it finishes with a highly radical comparison. What adds to the acceptability of the claim is also the impersonal character of the immediate context: the infinitival subject in the main clause and the passive form in the following sentence. Altogether, the initial sentence of para. 11 has a clear status of implicature whereby the radicalism of the claim gets neutralized by the imposition of a vast spectrum of interpretations concerning its agentive elaboration.
From the overtone of the later writings by Hossfeld, it appears that the primary intention behind the implicature in the first sentence of para. 11 has been to criticize fellow practitioners, and not the whole medical industry as such. This, of course, does not detract from the power of the implicature in the present sample as there is no cancellation of the mistaken interpretation elsewhere in the text; in fact, there is even little space for it. An interesting generalization about medical persuasion is that implicatures used in argumentative texts such as Hossfeld’s indeed tend to target at the primary, close-reaching interpretation, even when offering multiple peripheral possibilities. In so doing, they function as neutralizers of the attached claims, rather than providers of novel ideas or extended spectrum views. But this function cannot be determined from an analysis of a single argumentative text as there is usually no cancellation of any of the implicata within it.

2.3.6. Methodological remarks

In general, medical texts such as Hossfeld’s tend to prompt a primarily “bottom-up” inquiry. There are few language analysts who can claim expert knowledge within a medical domain and probably still fewer physicians who can be labelled as ‘linguists’. But even if a discourse analyst is supported in his/her investigation by in-field consultations, it is the very structure of medical persuasion that imposes an inductive work-out of the text’s function. This is because the main thesis is not revealed fully until the closing stages of the argument; even though the thesis is usually signalled in the title, it takes a laborious analysis of the consecutive segments of data to get it successfully elucidated. In Hossfeld, the amassment and the foregrounding of data, which dominates paragraphs 1-10, testifies to an informative function of the text. It is, however, the closing paragraph that turns it persuasive, to the specific effect coherent with the text’s title. It is also the last paragraph that fully explains the function of other thesis-oriented claims which are scattered within paragraphs 1-10 (as in, for instance, first sentences of para. 5 and para. 10). Generally, the function of precisely targeted persuasion which the text involves cannot be inferred unless linear processing of data has been completed by the addressee and/or the analyst.

This major characteristic (or rather, an analytic entailment) of medical persuasion and indeed of a majority of scientific discourse applies not only to (an analysis of) the function of entire texts, but also to the function of the many minor chunks within them. For instance, in Hossfeld’s text the interaction that holds between data and thesis globally at text level is reflected in the more local interaction between data and implied thesis in para. 10, and the principal thesis in para. 11. The local arrangement of the argument entails just as much induc-
Discourse analysis and determination

tive effort from the addressee and/or the analyst as it is the case with the entire
text, no matter how ‘egocentric’ is the analyst’s viewing of the discourse context
in general. This last observation only adds to the essence of the following con-
clusion (c):

(c) The analysis of scientific discourse is liable to the total absence or
underrepresentation of hypothesis, to the amassment of ‘interactive’
data prior to thesis, and to the delayed manifestation of the thesis.

2.4. Conclusions from the analytic assessment of persuasive discourse
and a CG extension of analysis

If one attempts to classify discourse analyses (a)-(c) according to the degree of
determination by the source discourse, there emerges the following polarity:
analysis of the discourse of advertising seems most affected by deductive ap-
proach and least affected by inductive approach, and the analysis of the dis-
course of science is affected precisely vice versa, i.e. it is overdetermined by in-
ductive approach and underdetermined deductively. Analysis of political dis-
course seems in turn to position itself somewhere in between the two poles. The
position of a given discourse type on the determination axis depends, as is re-
lected in most of the observations within (a)-(c), on the analyst’s closeness to
the discourse under investigation. To put it somewhat simplistically, being part
of the discourse context, the analyst undergoes overdetermination by deductive
processes and, conversely, being out of the discourse context he/she produces a
study that is overdetermined inductively. Therefore, in order to account more
fully for the differences in the degree of (persuasive) discourse determination it
seems worthwhile to look exactly at the anchoring of the analyst in discourse
and his/her conceptualization of the scope of analysis. Quite obviously, the ap-
paratus of the mainstream discourse analysis and linguistic pragmatics appear
insufficient for a genuine success of such task.

However, substantial reinforcement and elaboration on the conceptual aspects
of (persuasive) discourse analysis seems to be at hand from Langacker’s (1987,
model. Thus, it is the primary goal of the next section to postulate substantial
congruence of conclusions drawn from the mainstream models of discourse
analysis applied in subsections 2.1-3 with an analysis of the same persuasive
discourse types pursued according to Langacker’s cognitive apparatus. The ob-
jective is necessarily modest and the discussion tentative, targeting at mere ac-
knowledgement of existing analogies and thus comment-like, as attempts at
bringing Cognitive Grammar and discourse analysis together are still a very re-
Recent time phenomenon (cf. Langacker 2001). Such an apparent lack of contact seems somewhat astonishing since, while the grounding of all language in discourse and social interaction is central to the functionalist tradition and most discourse studies, the latter is certainly no less true for cognitive linguistics. Furthermore, as Langacker argues (cf. Langacker 2001), cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar make more than evident relationship with discourse through the basic assumption that all linguistic units are abstracted from *usage events*, that is, actual instances of language use.

There exist multiple analogies between the mechanisms which govern the analysis of a given discourse type and which have been described as such by mainstream discourse theories, and the mechanisms of conceptualization which, as part of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar apparatus, have thus far been addressed predominantly in the explanation of such phenomena as structure of grammatical categories, predication or the Speaker/Conceptualizer-Hearer relation. The latter have not, however, been adequately applied in the study of natural discourse nor, of course, in the elucidation of the complexities pertaining to the determination of discourse analysis. At least one such analogy can be brought up for satisfactory description of the status of an analyst facing the task of persuasive discourse investigation. It consists in the apparent logical correspondence between the dynamic status of the analyst confronting the background of the analyzed text (i.e. his/her distance to/from the actual scene of events) and the equally dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the on-stage region (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of *viewing arrangement* of the stage in the process of predication (cf. Langacker 1987). Analogous to the situation whereby the analyst becomes part of the investigated discourse is namely the process that Langacker (1990b, 1999) terms *subjectification* and that involves the Speaker’s/Conceptualizer’s assumption of place within the OS and/or within the scope of predication, a move which marks the change of *viewing arrangement* of the OS from objective (*Objective Viewing Arrangement – OVA*) to egocentric (*Egocentric Viewing Arrangement – EVA*). Although the difference remains that in CG model *subjectification* involves the conceptualizing party and not the discourse-analyzing one, this does not detract from the logical similarity of the process itself, as long as it is acknowledged that in the ‘analytic subjectification’ the OS encompasses the analyzed discourse area and that such concepts as *trajector* and *landmark*, originally being the main elements of the OS, now turn subordinate to the Speaker entity and the Hearer entity, both of which thus become part of the newly-created ‘discourse stage’. Hence it is the discussion of the analytic value stemming from an application of Langacker’s *subjectification* characteristics to the description of the status of a discourse analyst confronting a persuasive text that constitutes the core of the next section.
3. Analyst’s status in discourse in the light of Langacker’s subjectification theory

Before elucidating the relevance of subjectification to the analytic construal of (persuasive) discourse, one needs to look at, first, how subjectification works (in its classic CG form) and second, how it relates to some other root concepts of CG, which, as was claimed before, have thus far been of little concern for a majority of discourse analysts. These involve the afore-mentioned notions of the two viewing arrangements OVA and EVA, as well as the shifting degree of asymmetry between the ground (consisting, in Langacker’s terms, of the conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject, the setting and circumstances of the verbal event, and the participants of the event⁶), and the OS region and/or the scope of predication.

3.1. Construal of the on-stage region and the mechanism of subjectification

At the root of Langacker’s concept of subjectification is the asymmetry (or the lack thereof) that holds between the conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject, and the on-stage region and/or the scope of predication in the process of construing the stage of a verbal event. As Langacker (1990b) points out, the process is similar to that in which a person looks at or through a pair of glasses. In the first case, i.e. when a person looks at the glasses, they are merely a part of the entire viewing frame of this person. Such situation is an example of the objective construal of the on-stage region (to which the glasses evidently belong). If, however, a person decides to put the glasses on and look through them, they become part of a cognitive apparatus of the person; in other words, they are construed subjectively from the person’s standpoint. In the latter case, the asymmetry that normally exists between the conceptualizer and the on-stage region in an objective construal of the stage disappears. The conceptualizing subject (or, in this case, rather a conceptualized one⁷) enters the on-stage region and is no longer construed objectively by the conceptualizer.

In order to apply these observations to a verbal event, let us work with the following sentence:

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⁶ Cf. Langacker 1990b.

⁷ The term “conceptualizing” would much better fit an actual verbal situation involving the construction of a sentence where glasses would function as an active subject element, e.g. The glasses are on the table, etc. In a theoretical discussion (such as Langacker’s) of a non-verbal situation, the passive form seems to my mind more appropriate.
(3) BMW is doing better than Mercedes.

Let us first account for the situation in which sentence (3) is uttered by a third party, such as, for instance, a representative of another car manufacturer. The viewing arrangement of the stage and the relation between the Speaker/Conceptualizer and the on-stage region will then look as follows (Figure 1):

![Diagram of Objective Viewing Arrangement (OVA)](image)

In example (3) the elements of the ground (G) such as the Speaker/Conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject BMW, and the Hearer remain beyond the scope of predication of the sentence. At the same time, they are positioned off-stage (outside of the OS ellipsis), as the Speaker/Conceptualizer has not elected himself to be part of the communicated message and hence has not applied the conceptualizing subject BMW to create such effect. The vertical line is thus a symbol of an objective construal of the verbal event occurring in (3) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer and the Hearer. It relates the ground elements to a horizontal axis which connects the trajector (tr) with the landmark (lm). These are the two basic figures profiled by the subject-predicate relation in sentence (3), the trajector being the most salient entity (BMW) and the landmark (indicated by doing better than Mercedes) serving as point of reference for locating the trajector. The range of the horizontal axis also involves elements X and Y (indicated...
in verbal terms by ‘BMW’ and ‘Mercedes’ respectively) which stand within an objective relation to each other. This kind of relation holding between X and Y on the one hand and between the trajector and the landmark on the other makes the horizontal axis the objectification axis. The fact that the latter is connected with the vertical line signifies the potential within the capacity of the Speaker/Conceptualizer to become part of the communicated message. This potential can be realized through a change in such elements of the ground as the setting or the circumstances of the verbal event (for instance, a change in professional background of the Speaker).

In order to further elucidate the objective construal of the verbal event occurring in (3), let us attempt to turn Langacker’s spatial configuration into a linear one:

\[ \text{OVA(3)} = \text{G} \{[(BMW_x)_{tr} \text{ is (doing better than Mercedes}_y)_{lm}]_{\text{OS}}\}_{\text{scope}} \]

By integrating a symbolic portrayal of the construing relation with its verbal manifestation, this linear configuration offers some additional insight into the mutual correspondence of elements of the ground and the stage. It is clear that the ground is a category that is ‘superordinate’ toward both the stage and the scope of predication, in the sense that some of its elements (the Speaker/Conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject) govern the degree of asymmetry between G and the OS. As we shall see, it is the Speaker/Conceptualizer that decides whether to become part of the on-stage region or merely part of the scope of predication. This choice affects in turn the linguistic form of the verbal event; in the case of an utterance such as (3), the Speaker/Conceptualizer will either enter the OS by explicitly stating the identity relationship with the conceptualizing subject (e.g. by means of a determiner) or enter the scope alone, by presupposing such relationship. The dominance of the ground in evoking the dynamics of G-OS interaction might now seem a trivial observation, but in actuality it is going to matter much to the later considerations concerning ‘analytic subjectification’.

So let us imagine now that the claim in (3) is to be made by a person in some way associated with the entity indicated by the conceptualizing subject. The person might then state the association explicitly or leave it presupposed. This renders the form of sentence (3) into a couple of related forms, such as e.g.:

---

8 In his description of OVA, Langacker (1990b) uses a vertical arrow, not a vertical line. This is, to my mind, insufficient to illustrate the closeness of interaction between elements of the ground and the on-stage region (albeit it works elegantly in the description of the process of subjectification alone).
(4) (Our company) BMW is doing better than Mercedes.

The parenthesis serves to mark the option the person has in deciding whether to be explicit about his/her status toward the subject or not. This choice affects, in Langacker’s terms, the position of the ground elements in relation to the stage and the scope of predication. If the Speaker/Conceptualizer chooses to voice his status toward the conceptualizing subject explicitly and thereby affect the language form used, the ground gets positioned within both the on-stage region and the scope of predication. Langacker (1990b) terms such move subjectification I. If, however, the Speaker/Conceptualizer takes it for granted that his status toward the subject is clear for the Hearer and hence merely presupposes his identity, the ground assumes its position within the scope of predication of the sentence though not within the OS. In the latter case, one talks of the so-called subjectification II (cf. Langacker 1990b). The essence of the change in construing relation remains identical in both situations; the Speaker/Conceptualizer is no longer an objective commentator on the verbal event as his viewing of the OS and/or the scope of predication turns largely egocentric. Yet his movement along the vertical axis or, hence, subjectification axis (cf. Fig. 1) may be of a different degree and depth. This kind of difference is reflected in an evident contrast between Fig. 2 which depicts subjectification I, and Fig. 3 which illustrates subjectification II:

---

In Langacker 1999 there is what seems like an implicit return to a more uniform approach to the two kinds of subjectification, both seen primarily as the relative increase in the prominence of the grounding relationship as a result of the ‘fading away’ of elements of the objectively construed relationship.
3.2. ‘Analytic subjectification’

As has been suggested in 2.4, Langacker’s model of subjectification has a potential which allows an extension beyond its primary scope of application. The cornerstone of this extension is the apparent correspondence between the dynamic status of the analyst in relation to the background of the analyzed text and the comparably dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the on-stage region (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of viewing arrangement of the stage in the process of predication. In other words, there exists an analogy between the Speaker’s/Conceptualizer’s assumption of place within the OS and/or within the scope of predication on the one hand, and the positioning of the analyst as part of the analyzed piece of discourse on the other. Although in the former case the subjectification involves the conceptualizing party and in the latter the discourse-analytic party, the two processes are intrinsically similar and so are the initial, objective viewing arrangements which underlie them. Namely, as a pre-requisite for the process of ‘analytic subjectification’, the range of the OS extends over the analyzed discourse area and the concepts such as trajector and landmark, which in the source model of subjectification are the main elements of the OS, in the discourse-analytic model turn subordinate to the Speaker’s party and the Hearer’s party. Accordingly, both the Speaker and the Hearer become part of thus created ‘discourse stage’.
The analyst’s objective viewing arrangement (OVA) of the discourse stage and his/her potential for the accomplishment of the egocentric viewing arrangement (EVA), through the process of the analytic subjectification discussed above can be depicted as follows (Fig. 4; “An” indicates “Analyst”):

![Analytic OVA](image)

Thus, if a claim such as (3) BMW is doing better than Mercedes was to constitute, say, a speaker’s piece of argument in a larger discourse structure aimed at affecting the addressee/hearer in some way, whether mental or physical, then any attempt to provide the resulting linear configuration of the objective viewing arrangement adopted by the analyst of such discourse structure would necessitate turning Fig. 4 into the following complex transcription:

\[
\text{OVA}_{\text{analysis (3)}} = \text{An}\{G[S_{il}(BMW_{tr,x} \text{ is (doing better than Mercedes)}_{lm})H_{perl}]\}_{\text{analytic scope}}^{10}
\]

The proposed linear version may seem an intricate one, however, the relations of subordination and superordination indicated by the sophisticated bracketing cast much light upon the complexities following from the supra-status of the analyst depicted in Fig. 4. The positioning of the categories of S, H, and the message-bound categories of tr and lm inside of the main brace reflects in the vast range

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10 ‘Il’ indicates ‘illocutionary force’; ‘perl’ indicates ‘perlocutionary effect’. 
of options the analyst has in entering the stage in the process of the analytic subjectification. Namely, the analyst may become part of the OS by assuming the H’s position, or the S’s position, or both. Furthermore, the analyst may become part of the OS by demonstrating the expert knowledge of the message formula as such, with no clear attachment to, or identification with, the Hearer’s party or the Speaker’s party. As we shall see, all those options have their anchoring in the nature of the particular types of discourse discussed in subsections 2.1-3. The potential of the analytic subjectification can thus be best described by a triangular area (cf. Fig. 5) whose in-ground part specifies the region of the egocentric viewing arrangement (EVA) of the stage by the the analyst, the remaining part marking the analyst’s distance to/from the investigated discourse and the broken lines indicating patterns of directionality (toward H, toward S, or toward message only) from the objective viewing arrangement (OVA) to the egocentric one:

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 5: Analytic subjectification

### 3.3. Subjectification in the analysis of persuasive discourse

In what follows, we shall make use of the basic arrangement in Fig. 5 to elaborate on these many issues of methodological determination of persuasive discourse which pertain to the mechanism of the analytic subjectification. As has
been observed in 2.4, the position of a given discourse type on the axis of the deductive-inductive determination depends, to a large extent, on the analyst’s closeness to the discourse under investigation. This translates into the claim that by being part of the discourse context, the analyst undergoes overdetermination by deductive processes and, conversely, by being out of the discourse context the analyst gets overdetermined inductively. Putting this claim into the context of subjectification schema indicated by Fig. 5 necessitates a redefinition and the resulting restructuring of the triangular configuration for each of the member types of persuasive discourse. This task will be covered in the following subsections 3.3.1-3. The chronology of the presentation will draw upon the (decreasing) degree of subjectification involved; we shall begin with the deduction-oriented analysis of the discourse of advertising, to end up with the study of the discourse of scientific inquiry, a type entailing little or no subjectification at all.

3.3.1 Discourse of advertising

The conceptualization of the on-stage region by a discourse-of-advertising analyst involves a substantial degree of subjectification. The subjectification is predominantly hearer-directed; the analyst derives the function of a particular discourse manifestation from the assumption of the hearer’s position on the dis-

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Fig. 5a. Field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of advertising
course stage. The role of analysis of the message body in evaluating the function is normally negligible, though the analyst may sometimes resort to provision of data atypical of the functional hypothesis. These regularities make the *int-elliptical region of the An-tr/lm-H triangle* the most genuine portrayal of the analyst’s field of conceptualization in the case of the discourse of advertising (cf. Fig. 5a). Since there is a clear contrast between the degree of subjectification ‘via Hearer’ on the one hand and ‘via message’ on the other, the An-H connection is represented by a continuous line, while the An-tr/lm connection remains symbolically ‘dotted’.

3.3.2. *Political discourse*

If one wishes to make a comparison between the fields of analytic conceptualization as determined by the discourse of advertising and the discourse of politics, the arrangement in Fig. 5a calls for two major alterations. First, since the discourse of politics entails a considerable dose of analytic inductivism, its field of conceptualization must reach beyond the boundaries of the on-stage region and the ground. Thereby, the process of subjectification can be portrayed in terms of a potential, rather than an analytic routine. Consequently, it is also the
configuration of the relationship holding between the analyst and the hearer/addressee that needs a substantial modification. It is quite clear that the analyst may enter the OS by identification with H, but it would be an unjustified exaggeration to claim that this should constitute an analytic norm. Furthermore, in some cases (e.g. of an analysis pursued by a linguist-political scientist or an analysis of a text whose function is prescribed by some cultural or institutional pre-conditions) it is virtually impossible to specify how much of the analytic subjectification occurs as a result of the sole assumption of the H’s position and how much (more) is enhanced by the possession of expert knowledge which does not necessarily follow from identification with the hearer/addressee. Therefore it is difficult to conceive of the An-H and An-tr/Im segments being represented differently. All these observations are reflected in the configuration offered by Fig. 5b below. It should be added that, as has been the case with the previous arrangement, the subjectification potential indicated by the An-tr/Im-S region remains as yet unfulfilled.

3.3.3. Discourse of scientific argument

Finally, let us attempt to provide a configuration of the field of conceptualization for a discourse which, as was indicated in 2.3, involves little analytic subjectification or, in a vast majority of cases, no subjectification at all. The discourse of scientific argument seems, on the one hand, antithetical to the discourse of advertising (cf. 3.3.1); while the latter positions the analyst inside of the on-stage region, the former positions him/her, clearly, outside of the OS and the ground. The important difference about these extreme manifestations of analytic determinism lies, however, in the directionality of (actual or potential) subjectification. In the analysis of the discourse of advertising, the subjectification, which is actual and almost necessarily present, targets predominantly at the Hearer’s party. On the other hand, in the case of scientific language analysis, though the process of subjectification is curbed by social reality constraints, its potential cannot be possibly described as, specifically, Hearer-, Speaker-, or message-directed. The absence of expert knowledge in the analyst is a fact that follows from the general absence of the analyst on the discourse stage, whichever segment of the S-H axis is talked about. One could in fact assume that a hypothetical minority of analysts who are at the same time part of the ‘Hearer’ domain is no bigger than that of the analysts who would belong to the ‘Speaker’ domain. Therefore, albeit the field of analytic conceptualization for the discourse of science remains outside of the ground boundaries, it simultaneously extends all over the area between the An-S and An-H directionality lines, with no clear attachment to either of them:
4. Conclusion

The present paper has been an attempt to define some of the methodological complexities related to (persuasive) discourse determination and, subsequently, to present them in terms of selected tenets of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar. It has been shown that at least one cornerstone concept normally associated with the CG apparatus, i.e. Subjectification, can feasibly apply to discussions of the anchoring of the analyst in discourse, his/her conceptualization of the scope of analysis, as well as the analyst’s processing of data and his/her formulation of methodological approach to the investigated text. Such a mediating task undertaken at a discourse-determination level would surely fail but for the pre-existence of some common ground between the CG and mainstream discourse theories at the basic level of a pragmatic analysis of text. Therefore, it needs to be stressed that linguistic pragmatics, discourse analysis and cognitive linguistics are all strongly grounded in functional linguistics. This is obviously no less true of the strands of cognitive linguistics which developed alongside with Langacker’s CG and found their manifestations in works by Lakoff (cf. 1987), Lakoff and Johnson (cf. 1980, 1999) or Fauconnier (cf. 1985, 1997). It is an undeniable fact that linguistic pragmatics and cognitive linguistics operate, at least for the time being, within different layers of linguistic explanation. While linguistic pragmatics and its application in discourse analysis is still most ‘ele-
gantly’ seen as a language component of a status comparable to syntax or semantics (cf. Kalisz 1993, 2001), cognitive linguistics has developed a theory (or rather a number of theories) universally applicable to a variety of phenomena involving syntax, semantics, pragmatics, phonology, and more. But since at the same time linguistic pragmatics is working on, producing, re-producing and re-formulating its own methodologies such as theories of implicature, illocutionary acts, face-management, etc., which all somehow relate, in different degrees, to these traditional components, the apparent gap between the explanatory status of cognitive linguistics and linguistic pragmatics is starting to shrink (cf. Kalisz 1993, 2001; Kalisz and Kubiński 1993; Kubiński and Stanulewicz 2001; Langacker 2001). This fact is in turn a recurrent prompt for implementation of models of cognitive linguistics into studies of discourse determination.

References


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**ANALIZA DISKURSA I DETERMINACIJA U SVJETLU TEORIJE SUBJEKTIFIKACIJE**

kako bi oformio apriorne stavove o tekstu i njegovoj funkciji. To je ograničenje analitičara koji nije dio stvarnosti koja se ispituje i koji se u pravilu bavi dijakronijskim istraživanjem ili proučava diskurs koji je izrazito metaforičan. Prvenstveni je cilj priloga, na temelju proučavanja nekoliko različitih tipova diskursa (jezika politike i medija, oglašavanja te znanstvene argumentacije), ukazati na mogućnost predviđanja stupnja analitičkog determinizma koji se vezuje uz određenu vrstu teksta. Drugim riječima, prilog treba pokazati koji tipovi diskursa navode na (ili čak diktiraju) određeni analitički pristup (tj. “odozgo prema dolje” ili “odozdo prema gore”). Sekundarni je cilj priloga sugerirati da analiza diskursa može profitirati od primjene pojmova koji su normalno dio pojmovnog aparata Kognitivne gramatike (KG). Pokazuje se da KG može priziti znatan doprinos utvrdivanju distance između analitičara i diskursa koji se proučava. Razmatra se Langackerov koncept subjektifikacije (usp. Langacker 1990b i 1999) te njegova relevantnost u razmatranju statusa analitičara unutar diskursa.

**Ključne riječi:** analitička konceptualizacija; deduktivna analiza; determinacija diskursa; diskurs reklama; induktivna analiza; politički diskurs; pragmatičko-kognitivni međusklop; znanstveni diskurs; subjektifikacija.