

UDC 81'367.622.12'373.612.2

Original scientific paper

Received on 16.01. 2004.

Accepted for publication 23.06. 2004.

Antonio Barcelona

University of Murcia

Names: A metonymic “return ticket” in five languages

In recent years cognitive linguists have shown that many grammatical structures are motivated by metonymic principles. The goal of this article is to demonstrate the role of metonymy in the emergence of proper names and in their frequent grammatical reclassification as common nouns, drawing examples from English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. Proper names are often metonymic in origin, i.e., they refer to a circumstance or distinctive aspect closely linked to their referent. The name eventually becomes a rigid designator for its referent(s). The frequent (temporary or permanent) reclassification of proper names as common nouns is also often motivated by metonymy. Two instances of this phenomenon are discussed: names used as paragons (Lakoff 1987) and the phenomenon known as “partitive restrictive modification” of names (Quirk et al. 1985: 290). In both cases, the rules of grammar holding for names appear to be violated: they may occur with (in)definite determiners and plural morphemes. The paragonic use of names arises on the basis of a metonymy in which the paragon stands for a class. If the class, rather than an individual, is highlighted, its members can be counted and specific reference can be made to them. This metonymy operates on the basis of a “deeper” metonymy applied to the individual taken to be the model for the whole class. In partitive restrictive modification the whole stands for one or a set of its aspects or parts leading to the figurative reclassification of the referent as a class of *distinct* individuals that can be contrasted in the same sentence.

Key words: referential metonymy, reclassification of proper names as common nouns, partitive restrictive modification, paragon

1. Introduction

The original meaning of proper names, like many other linguistic meanings, is normally metonymic. Names often originate in descriptive noun phrases containing a common noun. These phrases have specific reference and they include, as their main descriptor, a circumstance closely connected with their referent, or an aspect of this referent. For instance, place names frequently originate in descriptive noun phrases

whose descriptor mentions a nearby geographical feature, like *Salt Lake City* (the referent is a city located near the Great Salt Lake) and *Merseyside* (the referent is the region surrounding the river Mersey), or a related historical/political circumstance, as in *Jerez de la Frontera* (‘Jerez on the Frontier’)—one of the many Spanish towns with that prepositional phrase as part of their name—that once were on the borderline between Christian Castile and the Moorish kingdoms. The descriptor of the place name may also make reference to people somehow related to it (*Washington*¹) or to some outstanding buildings and architectural features revealing its original function (*Chester*, from Latin *castrum* ‘military fortress’),² and to many other possible related circumstances.³

Surnames typically originate in the male parent’s name (*Johnson* ‘John’s son’, *Sánchez* ‘Sancho’s son’), or derive from the craft or profession of some possible ancestor (*Smith*), and are in a number of other circumstances directly or indirectly related to the bearer of the surname.⁴ The names of months and days often originate in names of divinities, kings, or stars associated with them: January (ultimately from Latin *Januarius mensis*, ‘Janus’ month’), March (from *Martius mensis*, ‘Mars’ month’); Monday (from Old English *monan daeg* ‘Moon’s-day’), Sunday (from *sunnon daeg* ‘day of the sun’). In the guatuso culture, a Chibcha culture in Costa Rica, most of the names of divinities are ascribed to the protection of a river, in whose source the divinity in question is believed to dwell; hence they bear such names as *God of the Nahriné (river) source*, or *Goddess of the Aoré source* (López García 1998: 390).

Thus it seems that names often originate as descriptions of a given entity on the basis of a different related entity or circumstance. This type of description constitutes a straightforward instance of metonymy. These descriptions eventually become rigid designators with unique reference (i.e. they become real names), and this semantic fact constrains their grammatical behavior to a greater or lesser degree in many languages, English among them. However, when their morphosyntactic behavior seems to violate these constraints, so that they approximate the behavior of common nouns, again a metonymic motivation can often be discerned, as we shall

¹ This is an example of a proper name originating in an official noun phrase such as *the city of Washington*, or *Washington City*. The people that gave the city its present name had such a phrase in mind, as it was given the last name of George Washington, the first president of the United States.

² The Old English word *ceaster* (which leads to Modern English *chester* and which originates in Latin *castra*), was used by Old English speakers, in an early metonymic extension, to designate any enclosed space intended for habitation, and was attached to many other place names like *Colchester*, *Gloucester*, *Dorchester*, etc. See Baugh (1959: 93).

³ This view resembles in some respects the theory of definite descriptions of Russell and others, and of the causal theory of Devitt and Sterelny (see Saeed 1997: 27-29), both of which stress the role of social knowledge about the initial referent, even though this knowledge may be very tenuous.

⁴ For metonymy and naming, see Jäkel (1999).

see later. In sum, there often is a metonymically induced change from common nouns to proper names and back to common nouns, hence a “metonymic return ticket”.⁵

This paper concentrates on the metonymic return tickets for the frequent trips that names take towards the region of common nouns. That is, I will investigate the exceptional grammatical behavior of certain names in English, Spanish, French, German and Italian that leads to their transient reclassification as common nouns.⁶ Two particular instances of such exceptional grammatical behavior are analyzed: the use of names as paragon, and the use of partitive restrictive modification on names.⁷

2. Types of metonymy

The concept of metonymy assumed in the present paper is similar to that of Kövecses and Radden (1998: 39). In Barcelona (2003) I propose four classes of metonymy progressively constrained in their range of membership: schematic, typical, prototypical and conventional metonymies. Only the two largest classes are relevant for this paper: schematic metonymies and typical metonymies. Schematic metonymies satisfy the minimal requirements for every conceptual metonymy: intra-domain mapping and activation of target by source. Typical metonymies are schematic metonymies in which the source and the target remain clearly distinct from each other

⁵ Langacker (1991: 58-60) argues that the cases in which names behave grammatically as common nouns, namely examples like *the Stan Smith who used to play professional tennis*, are due to the fact that they are semantically treated as common nouns. The head in the NP in these cases denotes a type (the set of people called *Stan Smith*), and the grounding expression (the article in this case) evokes an instance. This happens when the idealized cognitive model (ICM) that supports the existence of proper names (i.e. that a name is uniquely given to just one individual) is supplanted by a different model that admits the possibility of the same name being given to more than one individual. Thus it is semantic factors that determine the use of the same phonological structure as a proper or a common noun. Apart from the role of ICMs, I have argued elsewhere that metonymy plays a major role in the shift of proper to common nouns (Barcelona In press, and 2003a).

⁶ Such a reclassification may in some cases result in permanent additions to the set of common nouns; e.g. *Galen*, the famous Greek physician of the 2nd century A.D., whose name is used as a common noun to designate a physician in a jocular manner: *The two Galens arrived, ready to fight disease*.

⁷ French, Spanish, German and Italian examples were obtained by asking one or two native speakers with an excellent command of English to translate into their mother tongue a list of English examples of the two phenomena. They were encouraged to provide idiomatic translations and to add any relevant comments regarding their choice of translation. The Spanish and the French informants are professional linguists, unlike the others. None were informed of the purpose of the research.

(within the superordinate overall domain). Technical definitions of these metonymies are provided below.

- A schematic metonymy is a mapping, within one cognitive domain, of a cognitive (sub)domain, the source, onto another cognitive (sub)domain, the target, so that the target is mentally activated. (Barcelona 2003: 245)
- A typical metonymy is a schematic metonymy whose target is clearly distinct from the source, either because it is a non-central subdomain of the source or because it is not included in it.

An example of a purely schematic metonymy (i.e. not typical or prototypical at the same time) is (1):

- (1) My father has had a new window installed in his sitting room.

The verbal construction *have X installed* and the locational PP evoke the PHYSICAL OBJECT subdomain within the source domain or ICM (Barcelona 2003: 236-239) WINDOW. That is, the whole WINDOW ICM is mapped onto its subdomain PHYSICAL OBJECT, which is thus mentally activated (the noun phrase *a window* is interpreted as referring to a window frame with or without its pane, rather than to the sum of the window frame and the whole in the wall). However, this is just a “peripheral” instance of metonymy, since the source and the target are often conceptually very close, the target being a “primary” subdomain (in Langacker’s sense; see Langacker 1987: 165) within the source.

Examples of typical metonymies are (2) and (3), the latter also being prototypical (see below):

- (2) He walked *with drooping shoulders*. He had lost his wife.
- (3) *Paris* voted against sending troops to Iraq in the UN Security Council meeting.

The target in (2) is an emotional state (sadness). What is conventionally believed to be a behavioral effect of sadness (walking with drooping shoulders) activates its cause (the emotion itself), so that an automatic inference is that the person exhibiting this bodily behavior is sad. The source and the target are both in the causation frame, and are not clearly included into each other (emotional concepts may be argued to include their effects, but if so the latter would not be primary subdomains within the former anyway). In (3), the LOCATION activates the GOVERNMENT located in it, and indirectly, the representative of that government in the UN Security Council. The concepts PARIS and FRENCH GOVERNMENT are closely linked in experience to each other, but neither concept is necessarily presupposed by the other, i.e. it is not a primary domain in it. Most of the metonymies that I will be claiming to motivate the

grammatical behavior of names are *typical* metonymies, which are relatively “clear” cases of metonymy.

Some typical metonymies are at the same time “prototypical” metonymies. Purely schematic, typical, and prototypical metonymies, when linguistically manifest, may eventually become conventional metonymies, with purely schematic metonymies displaying the lowest likelihood of becoming conventional.⁸

In view of this notion of metonymy, it should be easy to understand why names are normally metonymic in origin: The referent (usually symbolized by the grammatical head) of the original—implicit or explicit—descriptive noun phrase is mentally activated, as the metonymic target, by a circumstance or an aspect closely connected with it, which is grammatically symbolized by the original descriptive modifier. This grammatical modifier then becomes the proper name.⁹

3. Metonymy in grammar

Metonymy is regarded by cognitive linguists as a fundamental cognitive model, together with metaphorical, image-schematic and propositional models (Lakoff 1987: 77-90, 154). All of these models play a crucial role in the semantic structure and the grammar of languages, as cognitive linguistics has shown. The grammatical relevance of metonymy has only recently begun to be explored.

Ronald Langacker (1993: 33-35) says that metonymy and what he calls “active zone/profile discrepancy” overlap to a large extent. In chapter 6 of *Grammar and Conceptualization* (Langacker 1999: 200-201), a revised version of Langacker (1993), he makes it clear that active zone/profile discrepancy is a kind of metonymy.¹⁰ Langacker (1993: 33-35) claims that the form and/or the meaning of a large number of grammatical phenomena is motivated or constrained by this semantic discrepancy: topic constructions, certain nominal subjects or objects (like *a novel*,

⁸ Prototypical metonymies are those typical metonymies with individuals as targets and as referents (they are the “classical” instances of metonymy; e.g. *That Buick is a criminal – He almost ran me over* (‘the driver of that Buick’). Example (3) illustrates a prototypical metonymy (the NP *Paris* is referential and the target is a collective entity). Conventional metonymies are metonymies that are socially sanctioned in virtue of a number of cognitive, social and cultural parameters. An unconventional metonymy is illustrated by the sentence *I bought a Rosenberg yesterday*, where the speaker refers to an obscure violinmaker called Rosenberg, unknown to the hearers. (This contrasts with *I bought a Stradivarius yesterday*.) Examples (2) and (3) include conventional metonymies.

⁹ The lexicogrammatical manifestation of this metonymic understanding of the referent reaches the extreme when no trace is left of the grammatical head, as in surnames like *Peters* (originally implying ‘Peter’s son’), or in place names like *Washington*.

¹⁰ In Langacker (1991) the identification of active zone/profile discrepancy and metonymy is only suggested indirectly in the subject index.

standing for the relation “X write/read a novel” in *Zelda began a novel*), certain descriptive adjectives (like *fast* in *Therese is fast*, where the woman profiled by *Therese* “can only be interpreted as *fast* with respect to some covert process in which she participates, such as running, solving puzzles, or doing brain surgery”), raising constructions (treated in Langacker 1991: 189-201, and Langacker 1995; see below), and relative-clause constructions. Langacker (1999: 67) claims that though “usually regarded as a semantic phenomenon, metonymy turns out to be central and essential to grammar,” and that grammar is “a rich source for the investigation of metonymy. At the same time, a recognition of its prevalence and centrality is critical not just for describing grammar but also for a realistic assessment of its basic nature.”

Panther and Radden (1999) contains a number of studies showing how metonymy motivates various aspects of grammar. Among them, the paper by René Dirven on the metonymic basis of conversion, the one by Richard Waltreit on the metonymic motivation of the privileged status of the direct object and the one contributed by Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda Thornburg on the crucial role of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in speech acts and associated grammatical phenomena. To quote but an example drawn from this collection of studies, Dirven (1999) shows that noun-verb conversion in English depends on three major sets of metonymies: PATIENT, INSTRUMENT, or MANNER FOR ACTION; GOAL FOR MOTION; and CLASS MEMBERSHIP FOR DESCRIPTION (or, to use Dirven’s term, class membership for the whole “essive schema”). Here are some of Dirven’s examples:

- (4) a. He was *angling*. (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION)
 b. The plane was forced to *land* in Cairo. (GOAL FOR MOTION)
 c. Mary *nursed* the sick soldiers. (CLASS MEMBERSHIP FOR DESCRIPTION)¹¹

Still in the area of conversion, Clark and Clark (1979) note that there are eight preferred types of denominal verbs whose nominal root typically denotes the following aspects or participants of a process: the “locatum” (*I will blanket the bed*), the location (*He porched the newspaper*), the duration (*He summered in Paris*), the agent (*She authored the book*), the experiencer (*I witnessed the accident*), what they call the “goal”, which is equivalent to the result (*You must powder the aspirin*), and what they call the “source”, which is equivalent to an essential part of a whole (*He worded the sentence*), and finally the instrument (*She bicycles to town daily*).

¹¹ That is, the agent in this example is identified via her class membership. Another example is the causative *They knighted him*, in which the action is conceptualized through the resultant class membership of the patient. Most of the verbs resulting from conversion in what Dirven calls the “essive schema” are at the same time actional verbs. Perhaps, then, this set of conversion-inducing metonymies should be included in the first set of those established by Dirven, namely the set of metonymies with action as target. If so, the metonymy in these examples could be called CLASS MEMBERSHIP OF AGENT/PATIENT FOR ACTION.

Kövecses and Radden (1998: 60) argue quite persuasively that at least part of the motivation for the conversion of these eight types of verbs is metonymic, so that the first type is motivated by the metonymy OBJECT OF MOTION FOR THE MOTION; the second type, by the metonymy DESTINATION OF THE MOTION FOR THE MOTION; the third type, by the metonymy TIME PERIOD FOR A CHARACTERISTIC ACTIVITY DURING THAT TIME PERIOD, and so on.

Many other word-formation processes are metonymy-based. An example from compounding is *bellbird* (designating various types of distinct birds remarkable for their clear ringing tone). As for derivation, Panther and Thornburg (2002) demonstrate the role of metonymy in the meaning and form of *-er* derived nominals.

Panther and Thornburg (2000) have studied the grammatical relevance of the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy in English grammar. They provide ample evidence that a subtype of this metonymy, namely, RESULT FOR ACTION, is systematically grammaticalized in English. For instance, states and events can occur in dynamic grammatical frames if they are interpretable as results of previous (unmentioned) actions:

- (5) *How to be rich in one week* (i.e. “How to act in such a way so as to become rich in one week”)

Langacker (1995) argues that raising constructions are metonymy-based. The metonymic active zone of the referent of the main clause subject or object in these constructions is another relation in which it participates, a relation that is symbolized by the subordinate clause. That is, *Don* activates the relations ‘Don come’ in *Don is likely to come* and ‘Don leave’ in *I expect Don to leave*, whereas *Mary* activates the relation ‘X please Mary’ in *Mary is easy to please*. According to Langacker, another essential requirement for the acceptability of these constructions is that the “raising predicate” (*likely, expect, easy*) be used in a slightly different sense, so that its “trajector” is a salient “thing” (*Don, Mary*) involved in a schematic process. In a clausal subject construction such as *That Don will leave is likely*, the process (‘Don leave’) is the trajector of *likely*, which is used in its basic sense, since probability scales are mapped onto events or relations, not onto entities or “things”.

In Barcelona (1988; not written within the framework of cognitive grammar) it was also noted that “modal” predicates like *advisable* or *convenient* can be used in this special sense, with the subject metonymically activating an unspecified relation in which it participates, as in (6a), but that it is not conventional to use these predicates in a *Tough* construction, as in (6b):¹²

¹² *Tough Movement* was the name given at a point in the development of generative grammar to the transformational rule also called *Object-to-Subject Raising*; the name derives from the frequent illustration of the rule with sentences containing the predicate *tough*, as in *John is tough to please*.

- (6) a. That book is advisable/convenient. (‘To read/buy, etc. that book is advisable/convenient’)
 b. ?*That book is advisable/convenient to read/buy, etc.

A possible reason may be that the active zone of a book with respect to a scale of convenience or advisability is normally contextually given, so that its explicit mention by means of the infinitive clause is unnecessary. But it could be made explicit, if need be, by means of other resources, as in (7):

- (7) As an investment, that book is advisable, but not as reading stuff.

Generic NPs often induce an active-zone metonymic reading, especially when used in a copular clause with a modal or attitudinal predicate:

- (8) A computer is essential today. (‘Having/using a computer is essential today’)

Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (in press) study the role of metonymy in the contrasts between English and German, Croatian and Hungarian, in the area of the grammatical polysemy of predicative adjectives, among them “raising” adjectives. Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez Hernández (2001) investigate the wide-ranging interaction between metonymy and grammar, in particular the metonymic motivation of anaphora, grammatical recategorization, and the development of specialized constructions.

This brief survey is just a small sample of the numerous structures whose metonymic motivation has recently been uncovered by cognitive linguists. Additional studies on metonymic motivation are included in this special issue.

4. Grammatical constraints on proper names in English and other languages

As a general rule, in English and other languages, single proper nouns may not occur in the plural, with determiners, or restrictive modifiers.

Consider the data in (9):

- (9) a. Paris *the Paris *a Paris ?I like the beautiful Paris, but not the ugly one
 b. Paris *le Paris *un Paris ?J’aime le beau Paris, mais pas le laid
 c. Paris *el Paris *un Paris ?Me gusta el Paris bello, pero no el feo
 d. Paris *das Paris *ein Paris ?Ich mag das schöne Paris, aber nicht das häßliche.

Analogous limitations apply to phrasal names:

-
- (10) a. The Hague *Hague *a Hague
 *I love the good Hague, and I hate the bad Hague
- b. La Haye *Haye *Une Haye
 *J'aime la bonne Haye, mais je déteste la mauvaise Haye.
- c. La Haya *Haya *una Haya
 *Me gusta la Haya buena, pero odio la Haya mala
- d. Den Haag *Haag *ein Den Haag
 *Ich liebe das gute Den Haag aber nicht das schlechte.

These limitations are due to the fact that proper names have unique reference. However, standard grammars, such as Quirk et al. (1985: 288-297) for English, cite numerous cases in which the above constraints are violated. The same applies to the other languages discussed herein. I will concentrate on two of these cases, namely the use of names as *paragons* and the phenomenon of *partitive restrictive modification* on names, and I will attempt to show their metonymic motivation. In Barcelona (In press), I claim that *all* of the other violations of the constraints also have a metonymic motivation.

Table 1 summarizes the treatment of these two cases by two standard grammars of English.

1. Use of a famous name to mean the type that made it famous:

There were no Shakespeares in the nineteenth century [example paraphrased by Quirk & Greenbaum as "...writers who towered over contemporaries as William Shakespeare did over his", and by Quirk et al as "authors like Shakespeare"]. Similarly, *Lu Xun is revered as the Chinese Gorki* or *Every large city should have a Hyde Park*.

2. Names subject to modification:

Uses due to "partitive restrictive modification": *In the England of Queen Elizabeth / In the Denmark of today / The Chicago I like / The young Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in Ulysses*.

Uses due to nonrestrictive modification, either colloquial and stereotyped (*Poor old Mrs Fletcher*) or formal and often stylized (*The fondly remembered John F. Kennedy*).

Table 1. Two exceptions to constraints on names
(adapted from Quirk & Greenbaum 1990 and Quirk et al 1985)

Quirk et al. (1985: 290) explain the term 'partitive restrictive modification' as follows: "cataphoric *the* with restrictive modification can have the effect of splitting up the unique referent of the proper noun into different parts or *aspects*" [my italics]. Therefore, they classify this as a type of partitive meaning. Both grammars point out that in these cases names are reclassified as common nouns.

5. Metonymic analysis of the grammar of paragon names in five languages

A paragon is an individual (or a set of individuals) that "represents either an ideal or its opposite" (Lakoff 1987: 87-88). This ideal is, according to Lakoff, a type of metonymic prototype for a category. For instance, Babe Ruth is a baseball-playing paragon. The "use of a famous name to mean the type that made it famous" (Table 1) is a paragonic use of a name. As Lakoff says, paragons are "made use of in constructions in the language":

- (11) A regular Babe Ruth, another Willie Mays, the Cadillac of vacuum cleaners.

Some of the grammatical range of paragons is displayed below, on the basis of the *Shakespeare* example offered by the two standard grammars.

- (12) *Indefinite determiner + plural N in a subject NP*
- a. There were no Shakespeares in the nineteenth century.
 - b. *Il n'y avait pas de Shakespeares au dix-neuvième siècle. / *Il n'y avait pas de Molières au dix-neuvième siècle.
 - c. No hubo Shakespeares en el siglo XIX. / *No hubo ningunos Shakespeares en el siglo XIX. / No hubo ningún Shakespeare en el siglo XIX.
 - d. Es gab keine Shakespeares im neunzehnten Jahrhundert.
 - e. Non ci sono stati Shakespeare nel diciannovesimo secolo.¹³

The construction in (12) does not seem to function in French. This limitation may have to do with the choice of the *imparfait* or with negation. In Spanish, the combination of plural and negative determiner does not seem to work either. The singular name with a negative determiner is all right. The fact that two of my Italian informants gave me examples with a zero determiner seems to indicate that its use is common in these cases, with a plural subject in a negative existential construction.

- (13) *Indefinite determiner + singular N in a predicate NP*

¹³ This is one of the translations suggested by one of the three native speakers of Italian. Another native informant offered the translation *Non ci furono Shakespeare nel XIX secolo*, again without a determiner before *Shakespeare* (which, as a foreign name, cannot be pluralized, even though the verb form *sono stati* is plural). The third informant accepted my alternative translation (with a plural partitive article before *Shakespeare*) *Non ci sono stati degli Shakespeare nel diciannovesimo secolo* and suggested a further alternative translation with a negative determiner (but in this case, necessarily in the singular): *Non c'è stato nessun Shakespeare nel diciannovesimo secolo*. This alternative translation emphasizes more strongly the negative polarity of the sentence.

- a. Lope de Vega was not a Shakespeare.
- b. *?Lope de Vega n'était pas un Shakespeare. / Lope de Vega n'est pas un Shakespeare
- c. Lope de Vega no fue un Shakespeare.
- d. Lope de Vega war kein Shakespeare.
- e. Lope de Vega non e' stato uno Shakespeare.

In French, the present tense seems to increase acceptability.

(14) *Indefinite determiner + "hedging" modification in a predicate NP*

- a. Lope de Vega was not a real Shakespeare.
- b. ?Lope de Vega n'était pas un vrai/véritable Shakespeare.
- c. ?Lope de Vega no fue un auténtico Shakespeare.
- d. Lope de Vega war kein wirklicher Shakespeare.
- e. Lope de Vega non e' stato un vero Shakespeare.

In French, the hedging seems to favor acceptability, but again the present tense makes it more acceptable. My Spanish informant found this sentence odd, though I, also a native speaker of European Spanish, find it acceptable; it would be improved, however, by substituting *verdadero* for *auténtico*.

(15) *Definite determiner + modifier + singular N in a predicate NP*

- a. Lope de Vega was not the Spanish Shakespeare.
- b. ?Lope de Vega n'était pas le Shakespeare espagnol / Lope de Vega n'est pas le Shakespeare espagnol.
- d. Lope de Vega no fue el Shakespeare español.
- e. Lope de Vega war nicht der spanische Shakespeare.
- f. Lope de Vega non fu il Shakespeare spagnolo / Lope de Vega non e' stato lo "Shakespeare" spagnolo.

In French, again, the construction is more acceptable in the present tense.

The special use of these names can be accounted for by:

- (a) a conceptual model of the standard referent of the paragon name, i.e. Shakespeare the writer, which presents Shakespeare as a writer endowed with immense literary talent. This model of Shakespeare is a stereotypical model of this individual, and, as a stereotypical model, it is a metonymic model.
- (b) the process consisting of the mental creation of a class of individuals characterized by one or more of the relations and properties imported from conceptual model (a). In this case, the common relation in which all the members of the class participate is HAVING IMMENSE LITERARY

TALENT. This class includes one (possibly more) ideal member(s), as Shakespeare is socially seen as an ideal—a paragon—for the class of immensely talented writers.

- (c) a metonymy (a conceptual process) that connects model (a) as the source domain to class (b) as the target domain. This metonymy arises on the basis of the fact that Shakespeare is socially regarded as an ideal for the class and that membership in the class depends on how close a particular writer comes to the ideal of immense literary talent set by Shakespeare.

Figure 1 represents all of the conceptual factors involved in the use of *Shakespeare* as a common noun.

The upper box (A) represents the mapping of Shakespeare as endowed with his characteristic properties onto the rest of our knowledge network about him. This mapping results in a stereotypical model of Shakespeare as primarily, in fact exclusively, a writer with immense literary talent.

The lower box (B) represents the mapping of this stereotypical view of Shakespeare onto the class of writers with immense literary talent. Both are metonymic mappings and are symbolized by the arrows. Both mappings are connected by the fact that the conceptual model of Shakespeare resulting from the first metonymy is the source in the second: The line connecting the big box in (A) with the small box in (B) indicates that the stereotypical model of Shakespeare, which highlights the characteristic salient relation ‘Shakespeare having immense literary talent’, corresponds to the source in the metonymy, which creates a metonymic model of the mental class WRITERS WITH IMMENSE LITERARY TALENT.

Thus, the combination of processes (a), (b) and (c) motivates the existence of paragon names and their grammatical behavior as common nouns. In the rest of this section I will attempt to justify this claim.¹⁴

The existence of paragons depends, first of all, on the conceptual network associated with the individual that names the paragon. In the example under discussion, this conceptual network is constituted by Shakespeare’s known biographical data, by his literary production, his activity as a playwright and actor, etc. However, what is paramount in our common knowledge about William Shakespeare, even to many people that have never read his works, is his IMMENSE LITERARY TALENT. In other words, there exists a stereotypical model of Shakespeare on the basis of this prominent, characteristic property. We might call the metonymy responsible for this stereotypical model of Shakespeare CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY FOR INDIVIDUAL (a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy).

¹⁴ For a more detailed study of the grammar of paragon names in English, see Barcelona (in press).




Figure 1: Conceptual processes motivating the use of *Shakespeare* as a paragon name.

A property is always the potential basis for a class (i.e. the class constituted by entities bearing the property). In this case, Shakespeare’s stereotypical property is used as the basis for setting up a figurative class of individuals who are characterized, according to the speaker and/or conceptualizer, as displaying the same property. We might call this class the class of “immensely talented writers.”

But this figurative class is itself normally understood in terms of a stereotypical model, too. The stereotype of the class, i.e. its paragon, is Shakespeare himself. This stereotypical understanding of the class is due to a PART FOR WHOLE metonymic mapping of the “Shakespeare network” onto the whole figurative class of immensely talented writers (MEMBER/SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY). This is the metonymy that *directly* motivates, on the syntagmatic plane, the use of Shakespeare’s name as the name of a class, that is, as a common noun.¹⁵

Once the class is activated, it is possible to count its members, which is evidenced in number contrast; and to make specific reference to some of them, by means of the use of determiners and/or restrictive modifiers, as in some of the above examples, or (in English and German) by the use of pre-head genitive NP’s, as in (16):

- (16) a. Cervantes is Spain’s Shakespeare.
b. Cervantes est le Shakespeare des Espagnols.

¹⁵ Kövecses and Radden say that the phenomena studied in this paper are based on just one metonymy, which they call CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY, whereby well-known individuals “are metonymically recategorized as a class on the basis of their defining, stereotypical property. Thus, in calling a person a *Judas*, we are describing him or her as ‘treacherous’, and in referring to an upcoming star in linguistics as a *second Chomsky*, we have in mind his or her intellectual brilliance” (Kövecses & Radden 1998: 54). In my view, they oversimplify the complex conceptual connections operating in these cases. Their very description of the functioning of this metonymy makes it clear that the well-known individual in question is recategorized as a class on the basis of his defining property. But this can only be done by *first* stereotypically (hence metonymically) mapping this defining property (or rather, this characteristic property) onto the individual (and, in a way, “downplaying” all of his/her other properties). This is done by what I call CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY OF AN INDIVIDUAL FOR THE INDIVIDUAL. The stereotypical model of *Judas*, like that of Shakespeare, is stored paradigmatically in people’s “knowledge base”. When the same property is discovered in other people, a mental class is created. *Only then* does that property become a defining property for the mental class (in the *Judas* example, the defining or characteristic property would be “treacherous member of a group”). Since *Judas* is one of the social ideals for this class, it can act as a metonymic reference point for the whole class (IDEAL MEMBER FOR CLASS); as I claimed above, it is this metonymy that *directly* licenses, at the syntagmatic level, sentences like *He was a Judas* (i.e. ‘he was a treacherous person’). But the target of this metonymy is not the defining or characteristic property “treacherous member of a group” itself, but the class TREACHEROUS PEOPLE, which is characterized by that property.

- c. Cervantes es el Shakespeare de España / Cervantes es el Shakespeare español.
- d. Cervantes ist Spaniens Shakespeare.
- e. Cervantes è il Shakespeare spagnolo / Cervantes è lo “Shakespeare” spagnolo.

French and Spanish use an equivalent *of*-like prepositional phrase, with the same restrictive role. Italian uses an adjective, a possibility also open to Spanish (my native Spanish informant seems to reject this latter option, but, as a native speaker, I find it fully acceptable).

Of course, a paragon name can appear in NPs with generic reference:

- (17)
- a. A real Shakespeare would never use those trite images.
 - b. Un vrai Shakespeare n'utiliserait jamais ces images rebattues.
 - c. ?Un auténtico Shakespeare nunca usaría esas imágenes tan trilladas.
 - d. Ein wirklicher Shakespeare würde solch abgegriffenen Bilder niemals benutzen.
 - e. Un vero Shakespeare non userebbe mai certe immagini così trite.

My Spanish informant found the Spanish translation odd; I also find it somewhat inadequate in the meaning intended. Perhaps the problem comes with the selection of *auténtico* as a hedging adjective, which, in connection with the noun *Shakespeare*, evokes the notion of authenticity (of a manuscript), which in turn clashes with the personal agent required by the verb. A better option might be *Un verdadero Shakespeare nunca usaría esas imágenes tan trilladas*.

As mentioned above, in (17) and in (14) the fit between the referent of the argument NP and the paragon is measured by means of a hedge like *real*. This shows that the category is conceived as having ideally defined membership criteria. An interesting aspect, thus, of the application of the MEMBER/SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY metonymy to paragons is that the target (the class) can be construed more or less rigidly. The use of hedges like *real* attests to a rigid construal of the class, as I have just pointed out. In other words, saying that X is a Shakespeare may mean either that X is a very great writer or that X is a very great writer with some of the specific features that characterized Shakespeare as a writer (i.e., not just *any* great writer, but a great writer who “towered” over his contemporaries as Shakespeare did).

If the construal of the category does not evoke the rigid stereotypical model, then saying that X is a Shakespeare is interpreted as meaning simply that X has immense literary talent. In this case, Shakespeare would be just one of the various conventional paragons for the whole class of immensely talented writers, together with Austin, Dante, Virgil, etc.

In its use as a paragon, the individual referent Shakespeare is not really *split up* into a number of entities to construct the figurative class (i.e. Shakespeare is not figuratively split up into a class of “Shakespeares” each embodying several aspects of the historical individual Shakespeare), but mapped, as a model, onto a class of distinct individuals, of which he is the most prominent member, and to which he, furthermore, lends his name. This is an important difference from partitive restrictive modification, as we shall see later.

The *cross-linguistic conclusions* that can be drawn from this brief analysis of paragon names in the five languages are the following:

- (i) Names can be used as paragons on the basis of the encyclopedic knowledge network associated with each name and on the basis of the same metonymy: CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY FOR INDIVIDUAL.
- (ii) These paragon names temporarily become a class label, hence a common noun, on the basis of the metonymy (IDEAL) MEMBER/ SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY.
- (iii) Despite minor cross-linguistic differences, these names display the typical grammatical behavior of common nouns.
- (iv) These three facts are probably universal.¹⁶
- (v) The differences among the five languages are no doubt due to the peculiarities of their respective grammatical systems. English and German apparently impose fewer constraints on the grammatical reclassification of paragon names as common nouns than French, Spanish and Italian. The detailed study and explanation of these limitations requires further research.

6. Metonymic analysis of names with partitive restrictive modification

Partitive restrictive modification, like the use of names as paragons, is evidence that names are often understood against the background of an experience-based conceptual network, which bears on their use and interpretation. The conceptual network underlying a name can be evoked and certain subdomains of it can be focused on and singled out for specific conceptual purposes. In partitive restrictive modification, the referent of the noun phrase headed by the name, which is regularly construed as a unitary entity, is figuratively “split up” (hence the term ‘partitive’) and re-categorized as a class of entities, and then the restrictive modifier narrows down the referential scope of that NP to just one member or a subset of the figurative class. How are this partition and recategorization achieved? In my view, metonymy plays a key role here. The following is an example of partitive restrictive modifica-

¹⁶ I am unaware, however, of any widespread crosslinguistic study of the grammar paragon names.

tion drawn from Quirk and Greenbaum (1990: 88), with its corresponding translations into other languages:

- (18) a. The young Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be fulfilled in *Ulysses*.
b. Le jeune Joyce portait déjà les signes du génie qui se révélerait dans *Ulysses*.
c. El joven Joyce ya dio señales de la genialidad que iba a culminar en *Ulysses*.
d. Der junge Joyce zeigte bereits Anzeichen des Genies, welches in *Ulysses* verwirklicht werden sollte.
e. Il giovane Joyce mostrava già i segni del genio che si sarebbe rivelato nell' *Ulisse*.

In this example, the prominent subdomain in the knowledge network associated with the individual James Joyce, the writer, is that of AGE (YOUTH in this case). The activation of this subdomain is possible thanks to an active zone metonymy, which leads to the mapping of the cognitive domain JOYCE onto one of its possible active zones, namely, JOYCE WHEN YOUNG. Since the active zone is in this example a relation—in Langacker's (1987: 214-217) sense of the term *relation*—in which the entity profiled by the name is involved, this type of metonymy may be termed ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE RELATION. The name *Joyce* in this sentence is, thus, understood as referring to 'Joyce when young', not to a neutral, holistic notion of Joyce independent from any specific circumstance affecting him. Note that the paraphrase provided by Quirk and Greenbaum for this example is 'Even while he was young, James Joyce...'. See Figure 2.

An inherent component of the domain of AGE is a measurement scale with several discrete points (the various age phases in life). This domain and its associated scale is activated every time that a certain point on the age scale is mentioned by a restrictive modifier:

- (19) a. The young Joyce was already very bright.
b. Le jeune Joyce était déjà très brillant.
c. El joven Joyce ya era muy brillante.
d. Der junge Joyce war bereits sehr brilliant.
e. Il giovane Joyce era già molto brillante.
- (20) a. The mature Joyce reached the peak of his genius.
b. Le Joyce de la maturité atteignit le sommet de son génie.
c. El Joyce de la madurez llegó a la cima de su genio / El Joyce maduro alcanzó la cumbre de su genialidad.
d. Der reife Joyce erreichte den Gipfel seiner Genialität.

- e. Il Joyce della maturità arrivò alla cima del suo genio.
- (21) a. The aging Joyce was still convinced of his genius.
 b. Le Joyce vieillissant était toujours convaincu de son génie.
 c. El Joyce de la vejez seguía convencido de su genialidad. / El Joyce anciano estaba todavía convencido de su genialidad.
 d. Der alternde Joyce war noch immer von seiner Genialität überzeugt.
 e. Il Joyce della vecchiaia rimaneva convinto della propria genialità.




Figure 2: Metonymic basis of partitive restrictive modification in example 18.

In (18)-(21) the overall cognitive domain JOYCE is mapped onto its AGE subdomain, which constitutes the active zone of the noun *Joyce* in this sentence. The ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE RELATION metonymy is a WHOLE FOR PART conceptual metonymy which is manifested by the modifier *young*, so that we could paraphrase *The young Joyce* in examples (18) and (19 as ‘When he was young, Joyce (already showed signs...).’ This type of name modification makes it semantically and grammatically possible to treat what is an individual in the mental space of reality as a collection of individuals in a counterfactual space. The partition is only implicit if examples (18)-(21) are taken separately, but it is quite explicit in (22):

- (22) a. The young Joyce had not reached yet the literary craftsmanship of the Joyce that wrote *Ulysses*.
 b. Le jeune Joyce n’avait pas encore atteint la dextérité littéraire du Joyce qui écrivit *Ulysses*.
 c. El joven Joyce aún no había alcanzado la maestría literaria del Joyce que escribió el *Ulysses*.
 d. Der junge Joyce hatte noch nicht die literarische Kunstfertigkeit des Joyce erreicht, der *Ulysses* geschrieben hatte.

- e. Il giovane Joyce non aveva ancora raggiunto la maestria letteraria del Joyce che scrisse *l'Ulisse*.

That is, the grammar of these examples treats JOYCE as a counterfactual class of *distinct* individuals. In the realm of reality, there is only one unitary referent of *Joyce*, whereas in paragon names, we had different real-world referents of *Shakespeare* constituting a figurative class. The conceptual partition of the unitary entity is achieved by metonymically focusing upon different aspects i.e. sub-domains, of the same entity. See Figure 3.




Figure 3. A fragment of the figurative counterfactual class of JOYCES highlighting various semantic relations in which JOYCE participates in examples 19-22 based on encyclopedic knowledge about Joyce and on the metonymy in figure 2.

One may object to the *active zone* analysis that the metonymic target domain (AGE) is already explicit thanks to the early occurrence of the modifier *young*. Langacker (1999: 62-67) claims that, in the normal situation, the active zone of a profiled entity with respect to a given relation is not explicitly mentioned. However, he himself admits that, under certain circumstances, the active zone may be made explicit. For (22), one of the reasons for mentioning the active zone may lie in the fact that such circumstances as age or profession are less automatically activated than other facets as active zones of a profiled entity. Cf. the automaticity of such active zones as body parts with respect to such relations as biting (mouth), hitting (fist, hand), kicking (foot), etc., as shown by Langacker's classic example *Your dog bit my cat*.

This objection is important if it is assumed that metonymy has to be regarded as a relation in which the target remains *linguistically* implicit. However, metonymy, like metaphor, is primarily a *conceptual* operation; thus the objection loses at least part of its force. The expression (*James*) *Joyce*, in its neutral understanding, simply profiles the concept JAMES JOYCE, that is, the holistic conception of this well-known individual, without highlighting any of his facets. But, like most other concepts, when this concept is combined in a relation with other concepts, one or more of its facets is highlighted at the expense of others. This brings about, on the linguistic plane, a discrepancy between the regular profile of the corresponding expression conventionally symbolizing this concept (the expression *James Joyce*) and the facet that is now highlighted. This facet is very often a different relationship in which the entity is involved. This is what Langacker (e.g. 1999: 63-67) calls *profile/active zone discrepancy*, which, in his view, is a type of metonymy. The fact that such discrepancies are the rule rather than the exception does not make them any less metonymic.

Langacker (1995) also uses the notion of active zone metonymies in connection with raising constructions like *John is easy to please*, where *John* is used metonymically to profile, as its active zone, not just JOHN, but a relation in which JOHN is involved. The active zone relation in this case is the relation informally expressed as X PLEASE JOHN and it is JOHN's active zone with respect to the relation, profiled by the matrix clause, and informally expressed as JOHN (BE) EASY. Note that the fact that the active zone relation is made explicit through the words *John* and *please* does not prevent Langacker from saying that the concept JOHN is conceived metonymically as a reference point for its active zone.

Langacker's treatment of raising involves more than metonymy (it also claims that when *easy*, as in the above example, is a raising predicate, it has a slightly different meaning from the one it has when it is not a raising predicate). But his partially metonymic account of raising inspires my own partially metonymic account of partitive restrictive modification. In my view, what makes it possible for an English speaker to violate the constraints on the combination of determiners and restrictive modifiers with proper names in the above Joyce examples is a combination of the following:

- (a) There is a metonymic mapping of the concept JOYCE onto an active zone relation, namely JOYCE (BE) YOUNG by virtue of the metonymy ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE RELATION. This active zone can be manifested linguistically in several ways: *As a young man, Joyce already showed signs...*, *When he was a young man, Joyce showed signs...*, *The young Joyce already showed signs...*. This mapping is purely conceptual and may simply remain in the conceptualizer's mind, or it may, additionally, be expressed linguistically.

Note that if someone simply said *John is easy*, (s)he would normally be asked to specify in what sense he means that John is easy (with respect to pleasing him? With respect to persuading him? Or with respect to talking to him?); that is, the speaker

would be asked to specify the active zone with respect to which (s)he claims that John is easy.¹⁷ This is so because the person saying simply *John is easy* would have already *mentally* performed the conceptual mapping of JOHN onto a pertinent active zone, even if that speaker had not reflected this mapping linguistically by adding *to please*. So if a speaker says *Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be revealed in Ulysses*, (s)he would probably have performed a mental mapping to the relevant active one: the relation JOYCE (BE) YOUNG. Note that the adverb *already* would require a specification of the temporal circumstance that it implies, if the context had not specified it. The linguistic forms *The young Joyce...*, or *As a young man, Joyce*, in the sentences *The young Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be revealed in Ulysses*, or *As a young man, Joyce already showed signs of the genius that was to be revealed in Ulysses* simply make this conceptual mapping linguistically explicit.

- (b) There is an analogy with regular, non-partitive, restrictive modifier constructions like *The young Johnson*, when used to distinguish two different men with the same name, for instance a man and his father. The grammatical patterns of restrictive modification and definite determination allow a speaker to make unique reference to the members of a class, consisting in this case of the fact that its members bear the same surname.

Metonymic highlighting is a way of mentally “disintegrating” a conceptual entity into some of its facets, thus of converting it into a mental class or category. In this case, the entity JOYCE is mentally converted into an imaginary, counterfactual class by having it metonymically profile, on the conceptual plane, the active relationship JOYCE (BE) YOUNG, which automatically evokes in turn other age points and biographical facts, so that we can have, as category members JOYCE BEING YOUNG, JOYCE BEING OLD, JOYCE AGING, JOYCE WRITING *ULYSSES*, etc. The use of determination and restrictive modification allows unique reference to the members of this imaginary class: *The young Joyce* (vs. *The Joyce that wrote Ulysses*, etc.).

As I have admitted just a few lines earlier, my claim that metonymy motivates the partitive meaning of these modified names may be controversial, since a term evoking the metonymic target (*young, mature*, etc) is overtly expressed in examples like (17)-(22) above. I emphasize once again that this metonymic mapping is, in a sense, pre-linguistic. After all, metonymy is, essentially and primarily, a conceptual phenomenon, not an exclusively linguistic one. And whatever the ultimate value of my proposal, it is obvious that what makes these constructions possible is the focusing (which I claim to be metonymic) on a facet of the entity conventionally profiled by the proper noun, a facet which is available to the participants in the speech event

¹⁷ This request to specify a relevant active zone would not occur, of course, if the active zone is easily recovered from the discourse context. If, for instance, the preceding part of the conversation in which the utterance *John is easy* occurs has discussed the difficulties inherent in pleasing several people, John among them, then the relevant active zone is contextually given.

on the basis of their encyclopedic knowledge of that entity. For a more detailed argumentation of my position, see Barcelona (n.d.)

Part of the possible objections to my claim may also come from the analytical perspective adopted. If trying to account for the comprehension of the sentence by a *listener* or *reader*, it may not be adequate to claim that metonymy operates here, since *young* already identifies the active zone for the listener. But if one tries to explain why the construction is used by a speaker, and what motivates it and makes it conventional, one probably has to mention the above two factors (a) and (b), even if one does not want to attach the label ‘metonymy’ to factor (a), and replace it by the labels “focusing” or “highlighting” (of a relevant facet).

As we have just seen, this grammatical construction treats JOYCE as a category. This figurative class of entities is bound together by the fact that its members are all aspects, active zones (i.e. subdomains) of the same real-world referent, and by the fact that they are given the very name (transiently reclassified as a common noun) of this unitary referent.

So far we have studied examples of partitive restrictive modification on names preceded by a definite determiner. When the determiner is indefinite, the noun phrase may lend itself in some cases to a paragon reading, as an alternative to its partitive reading. Take sentence (23):

- (23) a. ?/*Only a young Joyce could face such difficulties.¹⁸
 b. *Seul un jeune Joyce pouvait faire face à de telles difficultés. / Seul un jeune Hugo a pu écrire ces vers.
 c. Sólo un joven Joyce podría afrontar tales dificultades / Sólo un Joyce joven podría afrontar tales dificultades.
 d. Nur ein junger Joyce konnte solchen Schwierigkeiten ins Auge sehen.¹⁹
 e. Solo un giovane Joyce poteva affrontare tali difficoltà.

¹⁸ The question mark indicates that the native American English speaker considered this sentence odd though added that, if judged in isolation from any context, replacing *could* with *would* increases acceptability; still, she could imagine contexts in which *could* might be acceptable. The asterisk indicates unacceptability as determined by a native speaker of British English, who suggested (23a) could be made acceptable by replacing *could face* by *could have faced*. He further suggested that, since he had interpreted the sentence, both in its partitive and in its paragonic senses, as referring back to a past situation, he thought that the version with *could have* was more appropriate. But he admitted that, in a context in which the sentence would refer to a future situation (future in the past), the use of *could* might be acceptable. These reactions concern the grammatical behavior of past modal auxiliaries, not the possible interpretation of the clause. As we see below, both speakers (with the modifications suggested for the modals) accepted, with certain qualifications, both the partitive and the paragonic readings of the sentence.

¹⁹ One of the two native speakers of German that I consulted finds the use of the definite article (*Nur der junge Joyce...*) more appropriate.

The partitive interpretation ('Only when Joyce was young could he face such difficulties') was accepted by my two English language informants; one of them pointed out that this was a default interpretation for her. They also accepted the paragonic reading ('Only a young writer with a literary talent comparable to Joyce's could face such difficulties ...'); one of them pointed out that this would be a "possible" reading (i.e. a secondary interpretation), "perhaps requiring a more special context (discussing a writer other than Joyce himself)", by contrast with the partitive interpretation, which is directly accessible. Interestingly, the British informant added in a later comment that the paragon reading is favored by intonation change and stronger stress, i.e. by prosodic focus on *Joyce*, whereas the partitive reading is favored by prosodic focus on *young*. The partitive interpretation was also accepted by both of my German informants, but neither of them accepted the paragon reading.

Of the three native Italian speakers, one of them discarded the partitive interpretation, which was the only possible interpretation for the second informant, and the default interpretation for the third informant, who added that the paragon reading is possible only if it is clear from the context that we are not referring to James Joyce in person, but that we take him as a "category". These responses seem to indicate that the partitive reading is the primary reading for most Italian speakers and that the paragon reading requires special context.

As for French, unfortunately I only was able to find one native speaker of French. The reason why this informant rejected the sentence in (23b) with *Joyce* might be due to the use of the past tense (*imparfait*). In the past tense the sentence is possible in the partitive reading.²⁰ In Spanish, according to my informant, the pre-nominal position of the adjective (*Sólo un joven Joyce ...*) seems to favor the paragonic reading, whereas the post-nominal position of the adjective seems to favor the partitive reading. This is also my own interpretation as a native speaker of the language.²¹

The sentences in (23) can be interpreted as describing a behavior characteristically exhibited by Joyce in his youth or (in some of these languages) by the class of "Joyce-like" writers. Alternatively, it can be read as describing a behavior occasionally exhibited by either the young Joyce or by the class of "Joyce-like" writers (that is, it can be read as coding what the young Joyce or the paragon-based category later

²⁰ As the informant put it herself, the *Hugo* sentence is acceptable, "in the context where we have two verses of Hugo and try to determine in which period they were composed". This constraint is similar to the one pointed out by my British informant and commented on in an earlier note. As noted then, if the verb form is or is interpreted as a "future in the past" form, the sentence becomes acceptable. Unfortunately, I have not been able to test a sentence like *Seul un jeune Joyce pourrait faire face à de telles difficultés* (with the conditional form *pourrait*) with my French informant before submitting this paper, nor the acceptability of its partitive or its paragonic reading.

²¹ However, my informant suggests that the partitive reading is more straightforward, even with adjective postposition, with a definite article (*Sólo el Joyce joven... / El joven Joyce podría...*). Her suggestion seems reasonable to me.

did under the specific circumstances that the context would furnish). On the other hand, the sentences in (24) are exclusively about a *characteristic* behavior manifested by their subject’s referents, either in their partitive or in their paragon reading.

- (24) a. √/*A young Joyce would never write like that.²²
 b. *Un jeune Joyce n’écirait jamais de cette façon.²³
 c. Un joven Joyce nunca escribiría de esa manera / Un Joyce joven nunca escribiría de esa manera.
 d. Ein junger Joyce würde niemals so schreiben.²⁴
 e. Joyce non avrebbe mai scritto così, da giovane. / Un giovane Joyce non avrebbe mai scritto in tal modo.²⁵

The reactions to the sentences in (24) are as follows. The British consultant accepted both the partitive and the paragon interpretation, with the proviso that the verb phrase should be changed to *would never have written* (see the note on the English sentence in set (24)). He made the same remarks as with regard to (23) concerning the role of prosody in one or the other reading. The American consultant accepted the partitive interpretation (‘When Joyce was young’), but pointed out that this interpretation is more accessible with a definite article (*The young Joyce would never write like that*), whereas the paragon interpretation (‘A young writer with a literary talent comparable to Joyce’s’) is for her the default meaning of the English sentence in (24), since, according to her, the indefinite article seems to point to someone else in the category of “Joyce-like” writers. In my view, the greater saliency of the paragon reading of the English version of (24) is also due to the fact that it picks out a characteristic behavior or property of their subject’s referent, namely the inability to write “like that”. A characteristic property shared by category members evokes the whole category. The use of the indefinite article further reinforces this evocation of the category. Both factors then seem to account for the primacy of the paragon interpretation for this sentence.

²² Again, my British English informant judged the sentence unacceptable and suggested that the verb phrase should be *would never have written*, if the sentence referred to a past situation. The American native speaker had no trouble with the form of this sentence. The tick and the asterisk reflect the American and British speakers’ judgments, respectively.

²³ My French informant did not offer any reasons for the unacceptability of this sentence. She simply starred it as unacceptable. I have not been able to discuss these and other sentences later with this or other native speakers of French.

²⁴ Again, one of my two German informants accepted the sentence, though specifying that the indefinite article should be replaced by the definite article (*Der junge Joyce würde niemals so schreiben*).

²⁵ These were the translations suggested by two of my informants and accepted by a third informant.

Under the paragon interpretation of the English sentences in (23) and (24), the subject noun phrase is generic, not individuating. Rather than referring to an unspecified individual member of the class of “Joyce-like” writers, it refers to the class as a whole, by mentioning a representative instance of that class (Langacker 1999)—i.e. one that would face such difficulties, as in (23), or one that would never write in a certain way, as in (24). Generic reference is facilitated in both cases by the same factors that prime the paragon reading of both sentences, namely, by their interpretation in terms of a characteristic property or behavior of the subject, and by the use of the indefinite article.

Both of my German informants accepted the partitive reading of the corresponding sentence in (24), though neither of them accepted the paragon reading. One of them pointed out that this reading would be, in any case, very “far-fetched”, and added that the use of the adjective favors the interpretation “that we are talking about Joyce himself”, whereas with its omission, as in *Ein Joyce würde niemals so etwas schreiben*, “the interpretation ‘somebody comparable to Joyce in literary talent’ seems more natural”. These reactions clearly indicate, then, that the German sentence in (24) is almost exclusively interpreted partitively, i.e. as referring to Joyce when he was young. As for French, the sentence is simply unacceptable to my informant.

One of my Italian informants rejected the partitive reading of the corresponding sentence in (24) and accepted, as its only possible interpretation, its paragon reading, because of the use of the indefinite article *un*, “which refers to a generic person and not to Joyce himself”. Another informant accepted both interpretations, which, according to him, depended on an adequate context for their acceptability.²⁶ The alternative translation of the English sentence with *da giovane*, suggested by one of the informants, picks out exclusively the partitive reading, as the “dangling” prepositional adjunct profiles the relevant active zone of the subject.

As for Spanish, we find the same situation as in (23), with pre-nominal position of the adjective favoring the paragon reading, and post-nominal position favoring the partitive reading (which, regardless of the position of the adjective, is primed by the use of definite article).

The *cross-linguistic conclusions* that can be drawn from this brief study of the use of partitive restrictive modification on names in the five languages are the following:

- (i) Partitive restrictive modification on names is motivated in the five languages by the same conceptual factors:

²⁶ Unfortunately, I was not able to ask the third informant about the interpretation of this sentence. However, given that he admitted the partitive reading of (23) as the most natural one, and its paragon reading only if it is clear from the context that we take Joyce as a category, his reply would have been very similar as regards (24).

- a. The metonymic mapping ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE RELATION.
 - b. The analogy with *non-partitive* restrictive modifier constructions on names like *The young Johnson*, when used to distinguish two different men with the same name.²⁷
- (ii) The five languages admit partitive restrictive modification on names if the modifier evokes a culturally recognizable aspect or circumstance of the name’s referent. Judging from the reactions to the *Joyce* examples, the acceptability is greater when the noun phrase is definite, typically through the use of a definite article.
- (iii) In all of these languages, names with partitive restrictive modification just approach the typical grammatical behavior of common nouns. An important limitation to their use as common nouns is the fact that they cannot be pluralized in the partitive sense (**The young Joyces were more aggressive than the older Joyces*). Another limitation is their inability to be used generically on the basis of a partitive use. Hence, the sentence **Joyces were very bright* cannot be used as a sort of generic corollary in a discourse piece like this: *The young Joyce was bright. The mature Joyce reached the peak of his genius. The aging Joyce was no less creative. *In sum, Joyces were very bright.*
- (iv) There are a number of constraints affecting the productivity of this construction in the various languages, with English and German imposing fewer constraints than the three Romance languages studied. These are some of the constraints:
- a. In example (9), the five languages admit determiners, especially the definite article (*The ugly Paris*), if the name is followed (in some Romance languages) or preceded by an adjectival partitive restrictive modifier, especially *if the adjective can be conventionally interpreted as referring to an aspect or part of the referent*.²⁸ My Spanish, Italian and French informants suggested in their questionnaires that this partitive interpretation is further facilitated in these languages by the use of (normally postposed) adjectives in contrastive, adversative coordination and offered further examples such as *Me gusta el París antiguo, Mi piace la*

²⁷ In Barcelona (2003a, n.d.) I suggest that even this non-partitive modification on names is conceptually rooted in a different metonymy.

²⁸ The lack of conventionalization of this interpretation seems to explain why a number of sentences in examples (9) are odd: *?I like the beautiful Paris, but not the ugly one / ?J’aime le beau Paris, mais pas le laid / ?Me gusta el París bello, pero no el feo / ?Ich mag das wunderschöne Paris, aber nicht das häßliche.*

Parigi bella, ma non la brutta, J'aime le vieux Paris, mais pas le nouveau. In French, according to my French informant, both determiner and capitalized adjective would have to be postposed. Her example was *J'aime Paris la Belle, mais pas la Laide.*

- b. As far as the *Joyce* examples are concerned, some minor language-specific constraints were observed. French and Italian cannot express the active zone MATURITY (example (20)) of a personal name like *Joyce* by means of a partitive restrictive modifying adjective phrase, but by means of a partitive restrictive modifying prepositional phrase (*Le Joyce de la maturité... / Il Joyce della maturità....*). In Spanish this is also a strong tendency (*El Joyce de la madurez... vs. El Joyce maduro...*). Italian exhibits a similar constraint with AGING as an active zone (example (21)), as shown by the translation offered by one informant (*Il Joyce della vecchiaia...*).²⁹ Spanish wavers here between prepositional post-modification as the preferred option (*El Joyce de la vejez...*) and adjectival post-modification as a secondary option (*El Joyce anciano...*).
- (v) The behavior of the five languages with respect to the possible ambiguity of restrictively modified names between a partitive and a paragon interpretation (examples (23) and (24)) can be summarized as follows:
- a. In English, both readings are possible for both sentences, but whereas the partitive reading seems to be the default reading for (23), the paragon reading seems to be the default reading for (24). This is apparently due to the exclusive conceptual focus of this sentence on a characteristic property (of a class) and to the use of the indefinite article. Both factors also lead to a generic reading, thus further reinforcing the paragon interpretation. As these factors lose weight, the paragon reading becomes less likely, as in (23), which does not have to be read as being concerned with a characteristic of its subject's referent. In both sentences, prosodic focus on the modifier primes the partitive reading, whereas prosodic focus on the name primes the paragon reading. An

²⁹ Another informant did not even offer a modification structure to render the active zone. He used a clause-like adverbial phrase instead. His translation was *Anche in tarda eta' Joyce era sempre convinto del proprio genio*. My third Italian informant was not asked to translate this sentence.

- important factor in acceptability seems to be the time reference of the verb, as pointed out by the British informant.
- b. In German, the use of indefinite article is questioned by one of the informants; only the partitive interpretation is accepted by them.
 - c. In French, the time reference of the verb is a factor in acceptability. On the whole, the partitive reading is possible for (23), not the paragon reading. Sentence (24) is not acceptable. But these conclusions are based on just one questionnaire given to one native speaker, who did not answer my additional questions.
 - d. In Italian, both readings are possible for both sentences, with the partitive reading as the primary reading for (23), and with the paragon reading requiring a special context. This reading seems to be somewhat more accessible for (24).
 - e. In Spanish, both readings are possible, but prenominal position of the adjectival restrictive modifier favors the paragon reading, and postnominal position favors the partitive reading.

7. Conclusions

The grammatical reclassification of certain names as common nouns in five different languages has been claimed to be motivated in part by metonymy, which constitutes their “return ticket” to the region of common nouns.

The use of names as paragons is motivated by a chain of two metonymies: the first assigns a stereotypical property to a famous individual (CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY FOR INDIVIDUAL), thus facilitating the creation of a figurative class of *distinct* individuals having that same property, and the second activates that class from its ideal member (MEMBER/SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY). The five languages analyzed exploit the grammatical potentialities of this metonymic chain in varying degrees.

The partitive restrictive modification on names is motivated by a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, in which an entity is mapped onto one of its possible active zones (ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE RELATION) and by the analogy with non-partitive modification of names. Again, the five languages analyzed exploit the grammatical potentialities of the construction in varying degrees.

One of the most interesting aspects of this type of research is that it provides evidence for the claim that, contrary to a widespread assumption in semantics, names are not merely rigid unique designators whose meaning is disconnected from a con-

ceptual network (Michaux 1998: 755-765). Quite the opposite, the grammatical behavior of names is constantly governed by our rich knowledge network about their referents.

Author's address

Antonio Barcelona
Department of English
University of Murcia
E-30071, Spain
e-mail: abs@um.es

References

- Barcelona, Antonio (1988). *Tough movement* en inglés y en español. *Revista Española de Lingüística Aplicada* 4: 9-25.
- Barcelona, Antonio (2003a). La gramática de los nombres propios: un viaje con retorno (por buenos motivos). *Cognitive Linguistics in Spain at the Turn of the Century (II). (Metaphor and Metonymy)/La Lingüística Cognitiva en España en el cambio de Siglo (II). (Metáfora y Metonimia)*, ed. by Michael White, Honesto Herrera & Cristina Alonso, 7-30. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
- Barcelona, Antonio (2003b). Metonymy in cognitive linguistics: An analysis and a few modest proposals. *Motivation in Language: Studies in Honour of Günter Radden*, ed. by Hubert Cuyckens, Klaus-Uwe Panther & Thomas Berg, 223-255. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Barcelona, Antonio (In press). Metonymy behind grammar: The motivation of the seemingly "irregular" grammatical behavior of English paragon names. *Studies in Linguistic Motivation in Grammar*, ed. by Günter Radden & Klaus-Uwe Panther. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Barcelona, Antonio (n.d.). Metonymy behind grammar: The motivation of the grammar of English paragon and modified names. [Unpublished Ms.]
- Baugh, Albert C. (1959). *A History of the English Language*. Second Edition. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Brdar-Szabó, Rita, Mario Brdar (In press). Predicative adjectives and grammatical-relational polysemy: The role of metonymic processes in motivating cross-linguistic differences. *Studies in Linguistic Motivation in Grammar*, ed. by Günter Radden & Klaus-Uwe Panther. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Clark, Eve V., Herbert H. Clark (1979). When nouns surface as verbs. *Language* 55: 767-811.

- Dirven, René (1999). Conversion as a conceptual metonymy of event schemata. *Metonymy in Language and Thought*, ed. by Klaus-Uwe Panther & Günter Radden, 275-287. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Jäkel, Olaf (1999). Metonymy in onomastics. *Metonymy in Language and Thought*, ed. by Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden, 210-229. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Kövecses, Zoltán, Günter Radden (1998). Metonymy: Developing a cognitive linguistic view. *Cognitive Linguistics* 9.1: 37-77.
- Lakoff, George. (1987). *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1987). *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. I: Theoretical Prerequisites*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1991). *Concept, Image and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar*. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1993). Reference-point constructions. *Cognitive Linguistics* 4: 1-38.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1995). Raising and transparency. *Language* 71: 1-62. (Reproduced, with substantial revisions, as chapter 11 of Langacker 1999).
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1999). *Grammar and Conceptualization*. Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- López García, Angel (1998). El significado cognitivo de la mitología guatusa. *Estudios de lengua y cultura amerindias II. Lenguas, literaturas y medios*, ed. by Julio Calvo Pérez & Daniel Jorques Jiménez, 387-400. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia: Depto. de Teoría de los lenguajes.
- Michaux, Christine (1998). Dénominations et représentations conceptuelles. *Estudios de lingüística cognitiva II*, ed. by José Luis Cifuentes, 755-765. Alicante: University of Alicante, Spain.
- Panther, Klaus-Uwe, Günter Radden, eds. (1999). *Metonymy in Language and Thought*. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Panther, Klaus-Uwe, Linda Thornburg (2000). The EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy in English grammar. *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective*, ed. by Antonio Barcelona, 214-231. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Panther, Klaus-Uwe, Linda L. Thornburg (2002). The role of metaphor and metonymy in English *-er* nominals. *Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast*, ed. by René Dirven and Ralf Pörings, 279-319. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum (1990). *The Student's Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
- Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, Jan Svartvik (1985). *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
- Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco José, Lorena Pérez Hernández (2001). Metonymy and the grammar: Motivation, constraints and interaction. *Language and Communication* 21.4: 321-357.
- Saeed, John I. (1997). *Semantics*. Oxford - Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

IMENA: METONIMIJSKA “POVRATNA KARTA” U PET JEZIKA

Kognitivni su lingvisti posljednjih godina pokazali da su mnoge gramatičke structure motivirane metonimijskim načelima. Cilj je ovoga članka ukazati na ulogu metonimije u pojavi vlastitih imena te čestoj pojavi njihove reklasifikacije kao općih imenica na temelju primjera iz engleskog, francuskog, njemačkog, talijanskog te španjolskog. Izvori su vlastitih imena nerijetko metonimije, tj. imena se odnose na okolnosti ili neki osebujni aspekt usko vezan uz referenta. Ime naposljetku postaje rigidni označitelj svog referenta (ili svojih referenata). Pojava česte privremen ili stalne reklasifikacije vlastitih imena kao općih imenica također je motivirana metonimijom. U članku se razmatraju dva slučaja ove pojave: poraba imena kao paragona (Lakoff 1987) te pojava koju se naziva partitivnom restriktivnom modifikacijom (Quirk et al. 1985: 290). U obama se slučajevima čini da su povrijeđena gramatička pravila porabe vlastitih imena jer se pojavljuju uz neodređene determinatore te stoje u množini. Poraba imena kao paragona počiva na metonimiji gdje paragon zamjenjuje razred. Ako je naglasak na razredu, a ne na pojedincu, članovi razreda postaju brojivi te mogu imati specifičnu referenciju. Ta metonimija počiva na “dubokoj” metonimiji koja je primjenjiva na pojedinog člana razreda kada se uzima za model cijelog razreda. U partitivnoj restriktivnoj modifikaciji cjelina se rabi umjesto jednog aspekta ili sklopa osobina, odnosno jednog dijela, što dovodi do figurativne reklasifikacije referenta kao razreda *različitih* pojedinaca koje se može kontrastirati u istoj rečenici.

Ključne riječi: referencijalna metonimija, reklasifikacija vlastitih imena kao općih imenica, partitivna restriktivna modifikacija, paragon