High-level modal metonymies in English and Spanish

The underlying metonymic motivation of language use and structure has been brought to the fore in recent works by Thornburg and Panther (1997), Panther and Thornburg (1999), Radden and Kövecses (1999), Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2001), and Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002) among others, where the authors analyze the grammatical import of high-level or generic metonymies. This paper explores the metonymic basis of several expressions of modality in English and Spanish. More specifically, we focus on two types of metonymic mapping: (i) OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE (called NECESSITY FOR MOTIVATION in Thornburg and Panther 1997), which underlies the understanding of expressions like I must go, where the modal verb is used to express an obligation that comes from the speaker; and (ii) POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, which motivates English expressions such as I can see the Thames from my window (‘I see the Thames from my window’) or I can hear well (‘I hear well’). We have observed that both metonymies are productive in Spanish as well, but their exploitation in this language is subject to certain peculiarities. On the one hand, Spanish is sensitive only to the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in those cases in which a verb carrying a commissive element is involved. On the other hand, regarding the OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE mapping, there is a clear asymmetry between Spanish and English. An example like I must speak to you, please is better rendered into Spanish as Tengo que hablar contigo, por favor (‘I have to speak to you, please’). In this sentence, the

1 Financial support for this research has been provided by the DGI (Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology), grant no. BFF2000-0934.
Spanish modal expression *tener que* is only formally equivalent to the English modal *have to*, but unlike its English counterpart it conveys internal (or self-imposed) obligation. Finally, we note that, in the domain of epistemic modality, meaning shifts from probability to usuality, and we argue for a non-metonymic implicational correlation between these two modality scales both in English and Spanish.

**Key words**: high-level metonymy, deontic modality, epistemic modality, potentiality, motivation, cross-linguistic analysis

### Introduction

The underlying metonymic motivation of language use and structure has been brought to the fore in recent work by Thornburg and Panther (1997), Panther and Thornburg (1999), Radden and Kövecses (1999), Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2001), Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002), and Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2003), among others, where the authors analyze the grammatical import of high-level or generic metonymies. This paper focuses on the metonymic basis of several expressions of modality in English and Spanish. More specifically, we compare the exploitation of two high-level metonymies that have already been identified by Panther and Thornburg, namely, OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE and POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY. In spite of the fact that both English and Spanish make use of these metonymic mappings in the expression of some modal distinctions, our analysis reveals that there exist interesting differences between them, first, in the way these metonymies are realized linguistically (through different constructions) and, second, in their respective degrees of productivity. Our analysis—still at a fairly programmatic stage—suggests that English and Spanish make different conventional exploitations of the same underlying social conventions.

### Areas of modality

Modality has traditionally been dealt with in relation to the analysis of semantic information associated with the speaker’s attitude and/or opinion about what is said. The most common distinction is between *epistemic* and *deontic* modality. Epistemic modality has to do with the speaker’s assessment of the actuality of a state of affairs in terms of his knowledge; deontic modality is related to the speaker’s evaluation of a state of affairs in terms of social, moral, or legal norms. This distinction has been taken over and developed by functional linguists like Dik (1989) and Halliday (1994). Dik, who bases his observations on previous work by Hengeveld (1987, 1988), proposes three sub-areas of modality: (1) inherent modality, which defines relations like ‘ability’ and ‘willingness’ between a participant and the realization of the state of affairs in which he is involved; (2) objective modality, which ex-
presses the speaker’s evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence of a state of affairs (in terms of certainty or obligation); (3) subjective modality, which signals the speaker’s personal commitment to the truth of what he says (he may either take personal responsibility for his assessment or may base it upon external evidence, like inference, personal experience, or reports from other people).

Halliday (1994: 357) differentiates objective modality types further. Thus, epistemic modality (what he calls modalization) expresses either probability (‘may be’) or usuality (‘sometimes’); deontic modality (which he labels modulation) conveys either obligation (‘is wanted to’) or inclination (‘wants to’). Modalization is typically realized as indicative, while modulation is typically realized as imperative. Ability/potentiality is one further category that lies outside the epistemic-deontic system and that corresponds to inherent modality in Dik’s division. In our study we have been able to find nearly parallel metonymic activity in the areas of deontic and inherent modality (potentiality), while epistemic modality does not seem to lend itself to this kind of activity for reasons that will be given below (cf. section 5).

Deontic modality and metonymy

Let us begin our discussion by considering the following sentences in English, which contain the modal verb must:

(1)

(a) I must go.
(b) You must go.

In (1a) and (1b) the modal verb must expresses an obligation that comes from the speaker. These two examples are different cases of the high-level metonymy OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE (called NECESSITY FOR MOTIVATION by Thornburg and Panther 1997). More specifically, example (1a) illustrates the metonymy OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION, while example (1b) illustrates the related metonymy OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE THAT THE ACTION BE CARRIED OUT. By virtue of the first of these two metonymies, I must go conveys the meaning ‘I want to go because I feel I have an obligation to’. The second metonymy allows us to interpret You must go as ‘I want you

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2 We think our alternative label has the advantage of making explicit the connection between the two areas of deontic modality, which, as Halliday (1994: 357) notes, convey either ‘obligation’ (‘is wanted to’) or ‘inclination’ (‘wants to’). ‘Probability’ and ‘usuality’ belong to the domain of epistemic modality, and ‘ability’ (or ‘potentiality’) lies outside the epistemic-deontic system.
to go because I feel you have an obligation to’. Unless these two metonymies are postulated, the full semantic import of (1a) and (1b) may not be captured. Thus, as evident from the paraphrases we have offered, must in these sentences is more than just an expression of imposed obligation. In fact, once the metonymic shift has been performed the notion of ‘obligation’ becomes secondary to the notion of ‘desire’. Note that the rationale behind the metonymy lies in the fact that it would be strange to think of a person committing himself to doing something that he does not really want to do. We observe that this metonymy also operates in Spanish:

(2)

(a) Tengo que irme.  
have-to.1SG.PRES that go.INF-me  
‘I must go’

(b) Tienes que ir.  
have-to.2SG.PRES that go.INF  
‘You must go’

Although the difference between internal and external obligation is not so clear-cut in Spanish, it is true that there is a tendency to use tener que, like must in English, to indicate internal obligation, while deber suggests an external imposition. That this is the case is supported by the strangeness of using deber in (3a) and (3b) below, where it is clear that the speaker has a strong desire to achieve his goal:

(3)

(a) Tengo que (¿debo) lograr subir a esa montaña; quiero hacerlo.  
have-to.1SG.PRES that achieve.INF climb.INF to that.FEM.SG mountain.FEM.SG; want.1SG.PRES do.INF-it  
‘I must climb up that mountain; I want to do it’

(b) Tengo que (¿debo) leer ese libro que dices; parece muy interesante.  
have-to.1SG.PRES that read.INF that.M.SG book.M.SG that says.2SG.PRES; seem.3SG.PRES very interesting  
‘I must read that book you’re telling me about; it looks very interesting’

Or consider the infelicity of using tener que in (4a) in the context of an external imposition and of deber in (4b) where the duty of studying for the exam is self-imposed.
Whatever its formal realization, it is clear from all the examples above that the metonymy OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE underlies the use of modals expressing obligation. The metonymy is based upon the existence of a deontic (or obligation) frame, according to which:

- People may have obligations.
- Obligations may be externally or internally imposed.
- Typically, external obligations are not desired.
- Typically, internal obligations are desired.
- An obligation on a person presupposes the person’s capacity to do as desired.

The notions ‘desire’ and ‘capacity’, which are crucial to our understanding of the deontic frame, are dependencies of the notion ‘obligation’, and as such, they may be regarded as subdomains of it.

Figure 1. OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE
The OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE metonymy also underlies expressions with the modal *needn’t* in English, as in (5) and (6) below:

(5) I needn’t go.

(6) You needn’t go.

By virtue of this metonymy, *I needn’t go* is mapped onto ‘I don’t want to go because I feel I have no necessity (i.e. obligation) to go’, and *You needn’t go* is understood as ‘I don’t want you to go because there is no necessity (i.e. obligation) for you to go’. Lack of ‘obligation’ in these examples is best seen as a combination of external factors that make it evident to the speaker that there is no good reason why the addressee should act as specified, i.e. go.

The Spanish renderings of these sentences typically make use of the periphrases *hacer falta* and *ser necesario*:

(7) No hace falta/no es necesario que vaya.
    ‘I needn’t go’

(8) No hace falta/no es necesario que vayas.
    ‘You needn’t go’

It is not possible, however, to use the Spanish modal *necesitar* (‘need’) with the same meaning (i.e. ‘lack of desire to perform an action’) as the English *need* in sentences (5) and (6):

(9) No necesito ir.
    ‘It is not necessary for me to go’

(10) No necesitas ir.
    ‘It is not necessary for you to go’

The exploitation of the OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE metonymy in both languages allows us to use sentences with *must* and *tener que* as requests. Consider the following example, where the obligation that the speaker imposes on himself depends on the addressee for its fulfillment:

(11) I must speak to you, please.

In (11) the speaker’s desire and the obligation that he has imposed on himself cannot be fulfilled unless the addressee cooperates and agrees to maintain a conversation with the speaker. Examples of this kind are better rendered into
Spanish as (12) below. The Spanish modal expression *tener que* is only formally equivalent to the English modal *have to* but, just like English *must*, it conveys an internal obligation imposed on the speaker:

(12) Tengo que hablar contigo, por favor.

‘I must speak to you, please’

In fact, translating (11) into Spanish with the verb *deber* would hardly be possible:

(13) ???Debo hablar contigo, por favor.

‘I must speak to you, please’

We argue that an adequate explanation of the illocutionary value of (11) and (12) depends on our understanding of the activation of a pragmatic strategy based on what we call the *politeness convention*, which is based on the notions of cost and benefit:

**Politeness Convention**

Other things being equal, a person who intends to conform to the expectations of polite behavior is expected to:

(i) bring about any state of affairs that is beneficial to others, and

(ii) change non-beneficial states of affairs in such a way that they become beneficial to others.

Both English and Spanish make use of a politeness strategy that exploits part (i) of this convention. In examples (11) and (12) the internal obligation expressed by the modal auxiliaries stands for the speaker’s desire that a certain state of affairs holds. Satisfying a person’s desires is at least subjectively beneficial for that person (it may be deemed as non-beneficial by others), so by the application of the Politeness Convention, the addressee is expected to cooperate in order to bring about the state of affairs which is the object of the speaker’s desire. Thus, making evident a desire counts as an indirect request.

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3. Note that *Debo hablar con usted, por favor*, where *usted* indicates social distance, is possible. In this case, the *deber* form is preferable to the *tener que* form since the conventional contexts in which this sentence is produced usually require an external obligation component.
It goes without saying that this interpretation would not be possible without the underlying activity of the metonymy OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE.

From the constructional point of view, the OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE metonymy is associated with the first person (singular or plural) of the present tense of the modal auxiliaries. In English, the past and future tenses make use of the modal have to (e.g. I had to go; I will have to go). In Spanish, the past tense is constructed with tener que (e.g. Tuve que estudiar porque me obligaron), which cancels out the deber/tener que distinction in terms of external-internal obligation. However, the distinction, unlike in English, is preserved in the future tense (e.g. Tendré que subir a esa montaña; Deberé estudiar porque me obligan; Tendré que estudiar porque quier aprobar).

**Potentiality and metonymy**

Outside the areas of epistemic and deontic modality, we find expressions of ability and/or potentiality. In this connection, Panther and Thornburg (1999) have identified the metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, which motivates English expressions such as (14)-(17):

(14) I can see the Thames from my window. (‘I see the Thames from my window’)
(15) I can hear well. (‘I hear well’)
(16) She could feel the pain in her knee. (‘She felt the pain in her knee’)
(17) I can understand what you say. (‘I understand what you say’)

In these examples the ability/potentiality for physical or mental perception stands for the actual perception. Thus, I can see is synonymous with ‘I see’, I
can hear with ‘I hear’, and so on. The logic of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is that in order to actually perceive something, one must have the ability to do so. In other words, the perceptual event is a consequence of one’s previous potential, where conceptually the latter is a subdomain of the actual event, as represented in figure 2 above.

In English, the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is not only productive in the domain of physical and mental perception, but it is also used when the actor commits himself to some course of action or personally guarantees the truthfulness of what he says:

(18) I can promise (‘I promise’) that your complaint will be considered.
(19) We can assure (‘we assure’) you that this won’t happen again.
(20) Our company can guarantee (‘guarantees’) the quality of its products.

This connection is not surprising if we take into account that perception is usually regarded as evidence of factuality (we believe more easily in what we see, hear, touch, etc.) and that a commissive speech act is a strong guarantee that something will be the case on the basis of the speaker’s personal involvement. Note in this connection that expressing ability to perform an action can only stand for the action if it is evident that the protagonist is really willing to perform the action. For example, I can climb that mountain may only mean ‘I will climb that mountain’ in a context in which it is manifest to both speaker and addressee that if the speaker can climb the mountain, he is very likely to be willing to do so. In much the same way, in (14) above the use of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY focuses upon the set of conditions that allows the speaker to actually see the Thames if he wants to. In (18) the ability to promise is in fact an indication that the speaker is willing to make the promise come true. Similar ways of reasoning may be applied to the rest of the examples of perception and commissive verbs given above.

An important feature of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy with regard to perception verbs modified by can is that it needs a specific complement for the perception predicate. Note that in the absence of such a complement, the metonymic interpretation is not available:

(21) I can hear (‘I’m able to hear’) vs. I can hear the noise (‘I hear the noise’)
(22) I can smell anything (‘I’m able to smell anything’) vs. I can smell the smoke (‘I smell the smoke’)

In sum, the metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY is activated in English by means of a construction displaying the following semantic and grammatical features:

- **Grammatical features**: use of modal *can*, use of specific complement
- **Semantic features**: main verb is either a perception verb (e.g. *hear*, *smell*, etc.), or a speech act verb that commits the speaker to some course of action or to the truthfulness of what he says (e.g. *guarantee*, *promise*, *testify*, etc.).

Other expressions of ability with *can* that do not comply with the semantic and grammatical requirements mentioned above do not seem to trigger this metonymy, as shown by the following examples:

(23) I can (‘I’m able to’) read.
(24) I can (‘I’m able to’) do 100 push-ups without stopping.
(25) Birds can (‘are able to’) fly.

In these examples there is no target sense of actuality: the speaker expresses his capacity to perform an action, which does not mean that he is going to do it or that he wants to do it (cf. *I can swim but I don’t feel like it now*).

In Spanish, the metonymic shift from potentiality to actuality is subject to greater restrictions. Spanish seems to be sensitive to this metonymy only in those cases in which a verb with a commissive element is involved. Examples (14)-(17) above are coded in Spanish without the modal auxiliary:

(26) Veo el Támesis desde mi ventana.  
see.1SG.PRES the.M.SG Thames from my window  
‘I see the Thames from my window’

(27) Oigo bien.  
hear.1SG.PRES well  
‘I hear well’

(28) Sentía el dolor en la rodilla.  
feel.3SG.PAST the.M.SG pain.M.SG in the.FEM.SG knee.FEM.SG  
‘She felt the pain in her knee’

(29) Entiendo lo que dices  
understand.1SG.PRES it that say.2SG.PRES  
‘I understand what you say’

None of these Spanish sentences makes use of the metonymy under consideration. In contrast, sentences (18)-(20), where the main verb commits the
speaker to the truthfulness of what he says (e.g. guarantee, promise, testify, etc.) do have a counterpart in Spanish as can be seen below:

(30) Te puedo prometer (‘te prometo’) que tu queja se tendrá en cuenta.  
(I can promise (‘I promise’) that your complaint will be considered’)

(31) Te podemos asegurar (‘te aseguramos’) que esto no volverá a pasar otra vez  
(We can assure (‘we assure’) you that this won’t happen again’)

(32) La compañía le puede garantizar (‘le garantiza’) su seguridad  
(The company can guarantee (‘guarantees’) your safety’)

The ability of a commissive element to license the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in Spanish is related to two other characteristics of Spanish constructions with the modal poder. One characteristic concerns the degree to which the purportedly desired action affects the speaker or his degree of involvement in the state of affairs. For example, contrast (27) above with (33) and (34) below:

(33) Puedo oir bien.  
(I am able to hear well’)

(34) No puedo oir (nada).  
(‘I can’t hear (anything)’)

While (33) focuses on the speaker’s hearing capabilities, in (34) the focus is shifted through entailment from perceptual ability to (lack of) occurrence of the relevant perceptual event: the speaker is not actually hearing anything because he is unable to (since ‘I cannot hear’, it follows that ‘I do not hear’). A similar meaning may be expressed without making use of the entailment connection:
(35) No oigo (nada) not hear.1SG.PRES (nothing) ‘I can’t hear (anything)’

However, there is a subtle difference between (34) and (35) since in (35) the speaker’s inability to hear is only implicated: we know that the speaker can’t hear anything so we infer that there is something that prevents him from hearing. In (34) it is not the speaker’s inability to hear but the fact that he cannot hear at a certain time and place that needs to be inferred. Furthermore, the use of the modal in (34) suggests that the speaker is trying to hear, i.e. that there is effort on his part. What this means is that the degree of speaker’s involvement (i.e. his personal commitment) in bringing the potential state of affairs into actuality is greater in the case of (34) than in (35). It may be argued that by highlighting the speaker’s (fruitless) involvement within an action scenario, we have access to the whole (negated) scenario from the perspective of the speaker’s efforts. This is a metonymic relationship that somehow seems to run parallel to the entailment relationship mentioned above.

The second characteristic is related to the fact that the activation of the metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY in Spanish is strongly favored by the overt expression of a beneficiary of the speaker’s action. This is not the case in English. Compare:

(36) I can promise you that this won’t happen again.
(37) I can promise that this won’t happen again.
(38) I promise that this won’t happen again.

(39) Te puedo prometer que esto no ocurrirá nunca jamás.
you.DAT can.1SG.PRES promise.INF that this.M.SG not happen.3SG.FUT never again

(40) ?Puedo prometer que esto no ocurrirá nunca jamás.
can.1SG.PRES promise.INF that this.M.SG not happen.3SG.FUT never again

(41) Prometo que esto no ocurrirá nunca jamás
promise.1SG.PRES that this.M.SG not happen.3SG.FUT never again

The presence of a beneficiary reinforces the commissive element of the poder construction. The lack of such an element explains the slight oddity of example (40).

One last observation is in order. Sometimes, a can construction would seem to invoke a different kind of metonymy implying willingness to act.
Consider examples (42) and (43) and their Spanish counterparts in (44) and (45):

(42) I can get rid of her if you want me to. (‘I’m willing to get rid of her’)
(43) I can make your dreams come true. (‘I want to make your dreams come true’)

(44) Me puedo librar de ella si usted quiere.

(45) Puedo hacer que tus sueños se hagan realidad.

On the basis of these examples, one might be tempted to postulate the existence of the metonymy ABILITY FOR WILLINGNESS. However, we feel that this is not the case. Examples (42)-(45) contain the commissive element that licenses the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy: the speaker is giving guarantees that the state of affairs will obtain because he has the capacity to make that happen. By implication, as with promises, we assume that the speaker is actually willing to carry out the action if required to do so, which indeed is the case. In this connection, it must be noted that these examples are to be interpreted in the context of an explicit offer (‘if you want me to’) and that the potentiality element is the potential to carry out whatever is offered. In these circumstances, within the context of an offer I can do means ‘I can commit myself (to a certain course of action)’, which, by the application of POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, is in turn interpreted as ‘I commit myself (to a certain course of action)’.

We may compare this situation, in which the speaker has an external motivation for action, with cases of desire where the motivation is internal as in I must go/Tengo que ir. In the latter cases, the interpretation of the expression as a desire is part of the expression itself through the operation of the OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE metonymy. In contrast, a can construction may not express desire directly but by implication in connection with a context (the hearer’s wanting the speaker to carry out an action). In the case of (42) and (44), the contextual clue originates in the expression if you want me to / si usted quiere. In (43) and (45) it is the result of a default reading. In both cases, the implication may thus be cancelled out, which supports our view that the desire interpretation is not part of the sense of the construction:
I can (‘I’m able to’) get rid of her any time since I know how to deal with her.

I can (‘I’m able to’) make your dreams come true but I won’t.

However, the attempt to neutralize the desire interpretation of expressions with *I must* results in odd expressions:

?I must find a way out of this problem, but I don’t want to.

?I must speak to you, but I don’t want to.

?I must take care of my little baby but I don’t want to.

The oddity of these expressions is evidence that there is an underlying OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE metonymy whereby *I must* is interpreted as ‘I want to’. However, shifts from ability to willingness are not the result of a direct metonymic operation, but are mediated by the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy.

### Epistemic modality

The question remains whether metonymy plays any role in the area of epistemic modality, which, following Halliday (1994: 356), has to do with external non-personal assessment of probability and usuality. Thus, we might wonder whether a metonymic shift from probability to usuality is possible. This does not seem to be the case either in English or Spanish, which anyway make use of different linguistic resources to express epistemic modality. Let us first consider two probability auxiliaries in English, *may* and *will*:

John may go to Church, since it’s Sunday morning.

Peter will go to Church, since it’s Sunday morning.

Example (51) implies that John sometimes goes to Church on Sunday mornings, and (52) that Peter regularly (or perhaps always) attends Church on Sunday mornings. The relationship is one of inference where there is an evident correlation between degree of probability and degree of frequency. Probability and usuality do not stand in a domain-subdomain relationship, which rules out the possibility of a metonymic mapping from one to the other.

In order to further substantiate our point, consider sentence (54) below where there is an apparent shift from predictability/probability to usuality in relation to (53):
(53) (Probably/predictably) he’ll sneak into my room and steal some money from my purse.

(54) When he thinks nobody’s looking, he’ll sneak into my room and steal some money from my purse (‘he often/always sneaks into my room and steals some money from my purse when he thinks nobody’s looking’).

The modal auxiliary *will* is typically used to express a prediction or a medium degree probability value. These are the default readings of (53). In (54) the interpretation is that the speaker is talking about the protagonist’s repeated or habitual behavior. Since predictability and probability are entailed by usuality, and, the other way around, the greater the likelihood of an event, the greater its degree of usuality, there is no metonymic reading of (54). Observe that metonymy involves a stand-for relationship between two elements, but no entailment. From the point of view of a logical analysis, the truthfulness of ‘he often sneaks in’ follows from the truthfulness of ‘it is probable that he’ll sneak in’; conversely, if ‘it is probable that he’ll sneak in’ were false, ‘he often sneaks in’ would be false too (cf. Leech 1981: 74, for this test of entailment relationships). So, probability and usuality mutually entail each other.

In Spanish, probability is explicitly marked adverbially or by means of embedding clauses like *es probable que* (‘it is probable that’) and *puede que* (‘it may be that’). Just like in English, there is no shift in the meaning of these devices from probability to usuality or the other way around. Instead, both notions stand in an entailment relation with each other.

**Conclusion**

This paper has demonstrated the strong impact of high-level metonymic activity on the expression of modality in English and Spanish. The contrast between the two languages evinces important areas of coincidence in the use of modal auxiliaries and in the consequent generation of metonymic shifts involving such auxiliaries. Postulating high-level mappings has allowed us to account for relevant aspects of the meaning of very common English and Spanish expressions carrying modal auxiliaries; such aspects might otherwise have been missed. We have been able to discuss the different linguistic realizations in both languages of the OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE and POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymies, each of them being attributable to different exploitations of the same underlying pragmatic conventions. Thus, we have accounted for the difference between the English *must/have to* and the Spanish *deber/tener que* pairs by looking into the way they make use of different aspects of the deontic frame. We have explained the activity of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in relation to an event frame where
potentiality is a subdomain of actuality. We have observed that English uses this metonymy with perception verbs and with commissive speech acts; in this connection, we have hypothesized that the metonymy applies in these two cases because they share a factuality element that can be accessed from the point of view of the potential to make something happen. We have also described the grammatical features associated with the production of the two metonymies in question. Among the most significant differences between English and Spanish in this respect, we have observed that the overt expression of a beneficiary of the speaker’s action favors the use of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in Spanish but not in English. Finally, we have examined the possibility of having metonymic links within the area of epistemic modality. Our conclusion is that the implicational connections between probability and usuality are better described as relationships of mutual entailment in the two languages.

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OPĆE MODALNE METONIMIJE U ENGLESKOM I ŠPANJOLSKOM

Metonimijski temelji jezične porabe i strukture u žarištu su novijih radova poput Thornburg i Panther (1997), Panther i Thornburg (1999), Radden i Kövecses (1999), Ruiz de Mendoza i Pérez (2001) te Ruiz de Mendoza i Otal (2002), u kojima se analizira značaj općih ili generičkih metonimija u gramatici. U ovom se radu istražuju metonimijski temelji nekoliko tipova modalnih izraza u engleskom i španjolskom. Pozornost se usmjerava na dva tipa metonimijskih preslikavanja: (i) OBavezna umjesto želje (koju Thornburg i Panther (1997) nazivaju nužnost umjesto motivacije), pomoću koje se razumijevaju izražaji poput *I must go*, gdje se modalni glagol rabi za izražavanje obaveze čiji je izvor u govorniku te (ii) Potencijalno za ostvareno, pomoću čega se mogu motovirati izražaji poput *I can see the Thames from my window* (u smislu ‘I see the Thames from my window’) ili *I can hear well* (u smislu ‘I hear well’). Opazivamo da su obje metonimije produktivne i u španjolskom, no njihova je poraba podložna specifičnim ograničenjima. Kao prvo, španjolski pribjegava metonimiji tipa potencijalno za ostvareno kada se radi o glagolu s elementom obećanja. U slučaju metonimije tipa nužnost umjesto motivacije zamjećujemo jasnu asimetriju između španjolskog i engleskog. Primjeru poput *I must speak to you, please* u španjolskom najbolje odgovara *Tengo que hablar contigo, por favor* (čemu bi u engleskom na prvi pogled odgovaralo ‘I have to speak to you, please’). Španjolski je modalni izraz tener que samo formalno ekvivalentan engleskom modalu have to, no za razliku od engleskog, španjolski izraz označava unutarnju (samonametnutu) obavezu. Na kraju, u domeni epistiemičke modalnosti opazivamo značajne pomake od mogućnosti prema uzualnosti te argumentiramo da se radi o nemetonimijskoj implikacijskoj korelaciji između tih dvaju modalnih skala kako u engleskom tako i u španjolskom.

Ključne riječi: generičke metonimije, deontička modalnost, epistemička modalnost, potencijalnost, motivacija, međujezična analiza