GENERATING POLICY IN A CHANGING GOVERNMENTAL ENVIRONMENT: HOW TO STUDY SECURITY POLICY IN GENERATION?

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Summary The purpose of this paper is to deliberate the making of security policy in the EU-context, where national security discourse will increasingly face needs and demands to be melt together with a new kind of security discourse and policy of mainland Europe. By taking the viewpoint of a citizen of a modern nation-state, this paper wants to open the question of how citizens and their values are positioned in relation to the modern state and its security policy within this progress. In particular, as the two latter concepts are in motion towards some new essence. This article claims that the ongoing shaping of the new European security discourse, and values it is argued to contain, appears to citizens to be incoherence, and it seems to contain objectionable ends larger than the one of the original ideas of EU-integration, that is labelled as security through integration, which expression contains terms like stabilisation, co-operation and interdependency. Secondly, the trend concerning national security policy within the integration process seems to lead to architecture where policy-making is motivated by the purpose and political benefits of the state rather than the benefits of the citizens.

Keywords security policy, national security policy, national security policy of Finland, European security discourse, NATO

* The expression security through integration has become a general phrase when referring to past and future orientation of the EU, although there are several interpretations of what it contains. Europa Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland stresses features of stabilisation and security for integration. On the other hand, B. O. Knutsen notes that "The further the EU goes in building a common foreign and security policy, the less room there is for non-alignment and neutrality. It is therefore arguable that these two Nordic non-aligned countries [Finland and Sweden] to an ever greater extent link their security and defence policies to the overall EU integration process, thus following an orientation which could be labelled security through integration."
Security policy cannot be studied without the concept of state. The state is a key concept, primary in understanding the discourse of security of today. This concept of modern state has become more or less a worldwide standard. Since 1945 its status has also been legitimated in the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. The UN regards states as main units of international relations and, in its logic, the state is a necessary actor for implementation of the regulations and recommendation made by the UN. Our generation, living in the era of the modern state, regards this as quite an acceptable, natural and unavoidable situation, without seeing its constant movement.

Studies on security policy contain a landslide of theories concerning security in its strategic-political aspect developed among different cultures in the course of history. Most studies of western countries are based on rationality and sense of justice generated in ancient Rome. After a short period of ideological branch of study, throughout the 20th century theories concerning international relations have been dominated by realism in its several forms. To some extent, these realism-oriented studies have been guiding lines for the state the writer comes from. Studies concerning security policy are generally aiming to develop the policy by giving investigated information of high quality and advice on how rulers can promote the interests of the state. Leading politicians use this knowledge also with the purpose of simultaneously promoting economic and social welfare (Lagerstam, 2004: 9).

The huge amount of visible interests, which in that form are usually internationally accepted, and on the other hand the concealed interests of the rulers, make it hard to follow or anticipate how security policy really is generated. For promoting these abilities, it has been necessary to look for new kinds of methodological approach and possibilities for researchers to open new horizons, or at least new questions. In the last 20 years realism has been challenged by several new critical theories. Various schools of CASE (Critical Approaches to Security in Europe) have already united as regards their opposition to traditional approaches to security and strategic studies, but are still divided as to their epistemological, ontological and methodological foundations. Using various forms of critical theory, constructivism and post-structuralism, these approaches examine the production of insecurity as a political practice.

Following the ideas of Weber, who claims that there are no facts or truths (Weber, 1904: 146-214) that are not made by somebody from his/her standpoint, we can conclude that all facts generated with the approach of any theory are more or less opinions, and thus interpretative. Accordingly, one can also assume that if we were to follow the methods based on traditions of realism, we would not necessarily get new perspectives to security policy, but we would be continuing and repeating the same mode of thinking which somebody has already determined using the elements approved for him.

In the era of modern democratic constitutional state and new forms of international structures, and, especially in the present time, as individualism and globalism are simultaneously getting more space, there are more factors on stage. This opens possibilities also for individual and small groups to participate in
politics and apply policy or political actions – even worldwide – in both positive and negative ways, on many levels of activity. Therefore, in this spatial environment, it is difficult to find out what are the causes and consequences, or, in other words, what is happening. With this in mind, discourse analysis and rhetorical approach seems to offer a more citizen-orientated and sensitive approach for this study than strategic-political methodologies would do. It is nonetheless worth noticing that constructivism and realism still seem to play a major role in practice concerning security policy as well as international relations; thus, they are significant in forming the structural context.

Laclau (1985) defines discourses as systems of signifiers articulating practices, which will mould the identities of subjects and objectives. Eero Suoninen (1993) sees discourse rather as an unbroken totality of the relationships of meanings or horizon of meanings, which construct reality. Foucault (1972) sees discourses as practices, which will systematically mould the objects of their speech. His point of view is that the inner rules of discourse will define what is possible to say about a specific item or topic, and how to express it. Emilia Palonen (2007) comprehends discourse as a cluster of values and concepts, which always has its borders, and in which certain elements function as articulated signifiers and key meanings. Indeed, she sees that the essential content of politics is activity, which aims to create and demolish those value clusters named discourse (Palonen, 2007a: 6). Thus, security discourse can also be seen as an essential process of political activity, which offers, as such, possibilities to change or defend normative and legitimated concepts and political lines. When we speak about security discourse, we may think that it contains all that has been created under the term security, as well as the arguments that are regenerating it, and the way discourse, according to this mode of speaking, is defined. Still, it is reasonable to remark that shaping a discourse of the clusters of concepts and functions in question always simplifies and generalises the picture.

With the goals of discourse analysis one can perceive the totality contained within the security discourse of a state, and by analysing the elements of discourse using semantic figures offered by background theory, one could finally find an interpretation of what is possibly happening in the field of research. By analysing it, it seems to be possible to resolve what kind of elements are fundamentally tied to the discourse, and thus it could be defined what other elements are used to support them. In so doing researchers will possibly create new aspects/objects for the debate.

State and security policy

In a conceptual mode security policy traditionally refers to policy of the modern state,¹ most notoriously defined

¹ Developments of a modern state have been described from different horizons and contexts. Weber’s approach is based on thoughts of philosophers, but is most empirical. His political point, formed after WWI, is that, as a mean or instrument, the state can be used for a variety of ends, and the choice between them is the central subject of political struggle. Skinner is committed in his Foundations to write more on the history of ideologies. His main aim is a conceptual history of the formation of the modern concept of the state, which he sees as completely formed by the 16th century (see Palonen, 2003a).
by Max Weber and Quentin Skinner. In definitions of the modern state, the possible ways of controlling and using physical force in a certain area have a crucial role. In Weber’s view, the question of violence is even to be seen as fundamental to the concept of ‘state’: “If there were merely social formations, in which violence was unknown as a means, then the concept of ‘state’ would have disappeared. (...) violence is, of course, not the normal or sole means used by the state. There is no question of that. But it is the means specific to the state” (Weber, 1994 [1919]: 311). He argues that the monopoly of physical violence is the main source of legitimisation of political power in a state. The need of protection is the ultimate external cause why citizens accept to be ruled, and the ability and political maturity of the leaders to place the nation’s interest above all other considerations is in fact the only political justification for their existence (Weber, 1994 [1895]: 20).

Weber formulates the concept of state as follows: “the modern state is an institutional association of rule (Herrschaftsverband) which has successfully established the monopoly of physical violence as means of rule within a territory, for which purpose it unites in the hands of its leaders the material means of operation, having expropriated all those functionaries of ‘estates’ who previously had command over these things in their own right, and put itself, in the person of its highest embodiment, in their place” (Weber, 1994 [1919]: 316).

From Weber’s perspective, the state and nation have priority over citizens. Weber is a nationalist, there is no doubt of that, but even more he suggests to resist all attempts at basing state order on any ideology, which he sees to be dangerous for the unification of the nation. Even when he admits to being a nationalist, he stresses that, as regards military power, the only ethic he will accept is the ‘ethic of responsibility’ (ibid.: 359), and this means responsibility for the fatherland and its future. Although he was in some degree a democrat, this was more a principle of harmonisation between classes with the purpose of maintaining the status quo. Even when he prioritizes shared leadership (because it is impossible to find a single leader who fulfils the demands he sets) and equal rights to vote, he describes that only one class, at the time of the Prussian three-class structure and later on in Germany, had enough political maturity, especially during crises, to successfully lead the nation. All other classes, the bourgeoisie, the workers, and later the parties, have possibilities to strive for parliament places (Weber, 1994 [1917]: 107-109) by winning the votes of citizens. The only political role he leaves to the citizens is the role of voter.

We can see the first modern conceptualisations of the terms politics and policy during the 19th century. Classical presentations of the concept of ‘politics’, such as Max Weber’s Politik als Beruf (1919) and Carl Schmitt’s Der Begriff des politischen (1927/1932), offer a good reference point to compare and interpret past and recent definitions of politics in general. More noteworthy is the fact that politics was qualified by these books as an independent activity among other trades and practices of life and living.

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2 This refers to thoughts of Locke and Montesquieu.
3 Kari Palonen gives a most comprehensive description of the generation of the Finnish concept of politics in Palonen, 2003.
In Weber’s view, politics and policy in the modern state were tied to the concept of state and to the leadership of state government: “In our terms, then, ‘politics’ would mean striving for a share of power, or for influence on distribution of power, whether it be between states or between groups of people contained within a single state” (Weber 1994 [1919]: 311). In his vocabulary, ‘political’ corresponds to ordinary usage of the term ‘politics’ and, when he is defining ‘political’, he is simultaneously defining ‘policy’ in the frame of a modern state (see *ibid.*). With the shift of the conceptual horizon of ‘state’ and ‘politics’, Weber’s ‘policy’ clearly refers to a definition of an operational line of the state.

Skinner affirms Weber’s view that all political power requires some kind of legitimisation. He sees that the core of all ideologies consists of a vocabulary already normative within his society, a vocabulary which is capable of legitimating at the same time as describing. However, there are limits to their legitimating capacity, depending on how far they can be made acceptable in the prevailing context. Therefore Skinner emphasises the primacy of political life and an asymmetry of politics in the study in *The Foundations*, although he sees the ideologies and the ideas of the philosophers and political thinkers as having a most significant role in political life and thought. However, to change the distribution of power-shares is the constitutive moment of politics-as-activity. For Skinner, just as for Weber, the state is not a value, but a condition. For Weber it is a condition and an instrument which offers a possibility (chance) to increase the power of a nation. For Skinner it is a condition for politics and a politically acting society. Skinner presents four different preconditions for speaking of a state:

- that the sphere of politics should be envisaged as a distinct branch of moral philosophy, a branch concerned with the art of government (Skinner, 1978: 349);
- that the independence of each *regnum* or *civitas* from any external and superior power should be vindicated and assured;
- that the supreme authority within each independent *regnum* should be recognised as having no rivals within its own territories as law-making power and an object of allegiance (*ibid.*: 351);
- that political society is held to exist solely for political purposes (*ibid.*: 352).

Here Skinner perceives autonomy, sovereignty, monopoly and secularity as indispensable requirements that should be fulfilled if we are to speak of a political unit of state. In *The State* he adds to this list the independence of the state from the rulers and the ruled. When we take into consideration the position of the citizen, Skinner’s view is significant. With Weber he shares a similar perspective on the formation of the state as well as an acquisition of the value of political action of the citizen. What differs is that Skinner stresses the citizens’ ability to increase their freedom (to prevent...
oligarchy of the governing class) through political participation (Palonen, 2003a: 84, 85, 95, 98; see also Skinner 1989c).

From the perspective described above, an initial (still theoretical) security policy of the modern state can be defined as follows: the claims to statehood are claims to rule in a certain area, and therefore to resist by force the aspirations of anyone else to rule in the same area. All governmental preparations and means, especially military power, used to assert these claims and resist counter claims, are referred to as ‘national defence’. The apparent maintenance of this dominance and ability to resist other threats is called ‘national security’, which in turn is the result of ‘security policy’.

According to discourse theory, the initial security discourse will be formed with the addition of the essential principles of the state. State citizenship is voluntary and is based on nationality and acceptance of the fundamental law of the state, and this relationship will crucially legitimate rights and responsibilities of both state and citizen. The findings of Skinner’s conceptual studies offer objectives and qualities required for statehood, which the state has to maintain and defend: its own territory, government and society, independent law making and the citizens’ freedom of political life. The essential condition for state order is the principle of three separate actors, citizen, ruler and the state. Citizens and rulers have to be loyal to the state, which in turn they own together.

Hereby we can conclude that, when speaking about security discourse, we can assume that it contains all the essential preconditions, values and objectives related to protection and defence. Furthermore, it contains the normative and structural contexts that have been created parallel with the idea of the state under the term security, as well as the arguments that are regenerating it, and the way discourse is defined according to this mode of speaking and legislation.

National security discourse in mainland Europe

We already know that nationalism and other ideologies imply forms and still continuing consequences of anarchy between states and political groups, which will repeatedly demand new solutions to maintain peace. After WWI, it became even more obvious that nations are never alone with their security policy, and their security is always dependent on other countries, which all have their own particular national security solution. The search for the best security system produced the League of Nations, based on the main idea of Immanuel Kant (1989 [1795]). It is his view that the war between democratic countries is impossible, and thus the best solution could be an integration of countries with a unified legal order and democracy.

The utopian idea of the LN wasn’t supported with sufficient political and military power. After WWII, three main security solutions have been generated in the last century: balance of power between Nato and the Warsaw Pact using the idea of military alliance, integration in the EU, and collective security such as the UN and OSCE. They are regarded as solutions which are the main sources for policy-making by offering additional...
Constructing Policy Work... political and military power for national security.

During the Cold War the concept of security has been in motion and gradually expanded to contain individual, social, economic and environmental security aspects (see e.g. Patomäki, 2008). With the effective development of the UN the national security discourse also adopted principles of joint responsibility for human rights (Luoto, 1997: 73-79). Due to wide participation and co-operation within collective UN security organisations and institutes, and, in connection with this, the development of the EU with the purpose of promoting security through integration, European security seemed to be theoretically on firm ground. The adoption process of shared identification and interdependence had a promising development (in terms of positive impact on national security as well), which has acquired a widening substratum after the Cold War era (Penttilä, 1991).

In terms of socio-political, environmental and economic welfare and harmony of social life, the European Union has become, or at least strives to become, a new innovative governmental solution which offers to member states a possibility to control the phenomena of globalism and regionalism (Hakovirta, 2002: 50, 131). Harto Hakovirta (2002) defines elementary tendencies of the world order to be nationalism, regionalism and globalism, which are contesting the hegemony at the cost of each other. The motives of regionalism can be seen in the need of involved states to benefit of wider marketing areas and of co-operation with international political organisations and corporations. Ideal globalism is targeting a system where the politics of the actors involved is based not on national or regional argumentation or interest, but on the common interests of humankind. Although these tendencies are traditionally perceived to function as alternatives to each other, they can also be seen as constantly affecting each other through different mutual tensions, as well as on the basis of their own functional mechanisms (Figure 1).

In this perspective, unity or unionism can be seen as a fourth alternative, in addition to regionalism, globalism and nationalism, which offers to the nation-state a forum to respond and con-

**Figure 1.** Elementary tendencies of the world order (adapted from Harto Hakovirta, 2002).
control the influence of globalism, and to act globally on appropriate levels. One could say that the EU as a ‘polity’, arena and forum for deliberative rhetoric enlarges the international rhetorical space, and thus also has a role in increasing security between these elements in terms of cultural understanding.

One would expect, from the viewpoint of citizens, the policy-making of security politics to become more permeable and democratic, and, furthermore, the military approach to security policy to be challenged by a more democratic and participatory approach.

According to what has been described above, and to the text of the Treaty of the European Union, the initial European security discourse contains the following aspects:

- the main policy aimed at establishing and maintaining security lies in increasing interdependence, shared identity, common responsibility and a common foreign and security policy with inspiring confidence;
- the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950;
- member states are responsible of their national security, and they have possibilities to realise it according to their tradition (within Nato or independently).

The EU will develop a common foreign and security policy, which will lead to a common defence policy. The mentioned objectives are as follows:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to promote international co-operation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights.7

According to what has been announced in the Treaty, it is possible to define European security policy as being based on the effects of integration, realised by independent territorial defence of member states with commitments to collective regulations of the UN. This clearly contains the characteristics and principles of initial security policy of the modern state, as well as that which the EU has adopted during its social-political development. Here it is notable that human rights, international law and the UN are the fundamental bases for activity concerning domestic and foreign policies.

From the citizen’s viewpoint, these main principles are in accordance with unionism and they are mainly aligned to strengthen his political freedom and his position within the state. Provided, of course, that it is included in the objectives of initial national security that the common values and fundamental interests are only the matters already defined in the Treaty.

Challenges for security discourse

The future efforts to maintain the European security discourse described in EU documents, and the expectation it contains according to the traditions of the initial security discourse, will be faced with new challenges and pressures of international politics, which could affect fundamentally the principles and objectives it initially contained. Simultaneously this alternative progress will also challenge the national security policy of the member states.

We can locate these pressures as being consequences of several phenomena which partly emerged from the progress of social and economic political development, and partly as answers to the questions opened by the ending Cold War process and case nine-eleven in USA. The phenomena described below are based on constructive studies and are argued to form a new security logic (Raitasalo, 2008: 249).

1. Security discourse seems to develop more towards value-based principles.

Western states were faced with a predicament: how to conceptualise the emerging post-Cold War era security landscape? In addition to that, how to maintain and develop the armed forces of Nato and for what purposes? The answer to these questions was the reformation of Nato from a military alliance into a collective defence organisation with the purpose of crisis management. At the same time, the EU decided to abolish the WEU and to develop its security discourse with Nato (ibid.: 77).

Javier Solana described this relationship as follows: “The strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management is founded on shared values and on the indivisibility of the security dimension in the 21st century. Whereas NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has added to the range of instruments already at the EU’s disposal the capacity to conduct crisis-management operations independently.

NATO and the EU reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities: for NATO, reserving a stronger role for Europe will take the form of increased vitality, specifically in the field of crisis management.”

Despite the rhetorical turn of using in this mode of speaking the concept of ‘collective’ (in the same strain as already legitimated when speaking about the UN or OSCE), it is widely accepted that Nato still is a military alliance, in which the US has a great influence (Forsberg, 2002: 74). For instance, Nato as a military alliance still has an inter-group guarantee of safety (article 5), common tasks, threats and enemies.

2. The significance of the traditional collective security organisations (UN and OSCE) seems to be diminishing.

A strong will to preserve Nato, and the tendency to expand it to new participants and tasks, have led to the perception that the UN and OSCE are old-fashioned, slow and powerless in the face of new threats. The US and Nato are of the view that they represent the values of the UN and OSCE, and thus that they need not be subcontractors to the UN, but independent actors. The UN would then be
in charge of moral legalisation and civil crisis management with encouragement of human rights. This arrangement has been indicated and demonstrated by the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Several UN member states have adopted this practise, and the prestige of the UN threatens to collapse (ibid.).

3. New technology and concepts of warfare are stressing the role of the states and their right to interpret independently the UN rules.

Under US guidance, the notion of high-tech expeditionary operations was developed to guide the transformation of armed forces in order to cope with new threats in the uncertain post-Cold War era. Concepts such as “the revolution of military affairs”, “network-centric warfare”, “military crisis management”, and “new wars”, such as war against terrorism and asymmetric war without any frontiers, have characterised the reading of the contemporary nature of war and required the states’ rapid response capabilities. Furthermore, this and the increasing overcost of armament are requiring a deepening co-operation and military alliance (Raitasalo, 2008: 249).

4. Security discourse seems to develop towards interest-oriented and preventive principles of security policy.

The need to secure and defend the vital interest of the states (globally or regionally) is mentioned in the latest doctrines of most countries. The vital interests are articulated as a way of living and, accordingly, democracy, freedom, energy and raw material supply, free trading and movement of citizens. The new doctrine of preventive defence, together with point two (above), have made it possible for states to use military power in the name of human rights, democracy, peacekeeping, crisis management or fighting against terrorism. In combination with the tendency to interpret independently, without consulting the UN, this could lead to widening use of military power as a tool for politics.

These phenomena are indicating that military alliances and activities more often than not have political-value-based ambitions to define more or less hegemonic codes to interpret reality and a universal ethic. These characteristics of the changing security environment, together with the integration progress of the EU and Nato, are no doubt the most influential factors for member states concerning foreign and security policy. Due to a deepening connection with the EU and Nato, the member countries will be connected more closely to world politics as well.

This kind of possible development is stressing the significance of the state actor and the state interest. This stressing is getting citizens in a position where their only role is to support decisions and give their contribution in terms of human and monetary resources. On the other hand, this kind of development can be seen to lead towards a new kind of nationalism.

Debate concerning common European security policy, crisis management and Nato membership has been enlivened especially among the EU-countries which have a policy of neutrality. In order to find out how citizens perceive their position, how they react and respond to changes concerning these topics, and on what kind of arguments public opinion possibly rests, let us now study as an example case the security discourse of Finland.

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9 Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Malta.
Security discourse of Finland

As the people of Finland got their form of political unit, the development of its political and economic life was dependent on the governing body and “guarantee of safety” offered first by Sweden and later by Russia.10 Finland gained its independence in 1917 as a by-product of the Russian Revolution. A bloody civil war followed in 1918 between Reds and Whites, ending with the victory of the White forces. After WWII, Finland was in a situation where restriction and tight control were set as part of plans to set up a national defence system of Finland. Until the end of 1980, the Finnish security policy was lead autocratically11 by the president, and the main aim was to stay neutral between the two superpowers (despite of the Finnish – Soviet FCMA treaty).12 This was realised by achieving and maintaining a military ability of defence forces able to ensure that neither of the two superpowers or anybody else could use the Finnish territory for military purposes. Finland’s security policy was described by Kekkonen as neutral and resting on four pillars: 1) it is recognised by foreign powers; 2) the foreign powers have confidence in it; 3) it has the backing of the Finnish people; and 4) there exist in Finland readiness and capability to repel violations of neutrality (Penttilä, 1991).

Because of its very sensitive situation as an independent state between two superpowers, security policies were made in cabinets in secrecy. President Kekkonen proclaimed that the citizens had no maturity required to think these things through. Therefore, and in order to maintain a consistent outlook and external face of the state, he called upon the citizens, officials and politicians not to interfere in public sphere matters (ibid.). In this respect, the security policy of Finland was a very classical one until the beginning of the 1990s. Accordingly, it is quite natural that people could not recognise or perceive security policy as part of political life. They could not imagine that there could be room for alternatives or changes in security policy other than technical matters and in the theory of the art of warfare.

The support to defence forces and the willingness to defend the fatherland under any given circumstances were on a very high level during this period and up to the present. According to polls, people clearly ascribed ever greater value to their independence. Acceptance of soldiers was also appraised as a profession and as a hegemonic concept, bound to their crucial role of maintaining and preserving independence during WWII, which was the event that completed the unification of the nation (no doubt the general national service greatly influenced this phenomenon). Some politicians were even worried about the impact of this phenomenon during the process of joining the EU. Public debate concerning security policy during the long term of Kekkonen was slight, and it did not liven up until the beginning of the 1990s. Just a handful of academic

10 Finland was subordinate to Sweden (1200-1808) and to Russia (1809-1917) (Liikanen, 2003).
11 There was a Parliamentary Defence Committee operating since 1969, and its agenda included technical aims, but it still allowed politicians to gain more experience concerning security.
studies were published by the end of the 1980s (ibid.).

After the Cold War, the international situation changed, and the tension between the superpowers, which had set tight demands for security policy, ceased to exist. Finland joined the EU in 1995, and this was largely supported by people via plebiscite. According to polls, the main reason for the positive opinion was security in a comprehensive sense. The idea of security through integration in terms of interaction and interdependence was largely accepted because Finland had already adopted an active foreign policy, which contained similar elements.

During this development towards integration, it became most obvious that the interest in security policy grew enormously. Not due to lack of security, and not only because it was now possible to express one’s opinion. As regards politicians, the latter reason was true, because it also offered a new forum to promote political interests of their own. Security politics could be seen as part of building up the EU-Finland identity and western-oriented policy, and for decades this had been the guiding line of the political elite.

As regards the citizens, the EU-joining process, with the debates it contained, opened their eyes to the fact that they have a role and political influence concerning foreign and security policy. For changes in security matters and state order to be made, the people’s acceptance was required. This awareness was a consequence of the public political struggle during the joining process. Two of the three biggest political parties in Finland – the Central Party (Keskusta) and SDP – included in their political program the statement guaranteeing that they would not allow any significant changes of foreign and security policies against the will of the people. The Conservative Party (Kokoomus) proclaimed that people don’t have sufficient maturity in these matters, that the government should assume the responsibility of the leader, and that the parliament would decide. This refers mainly to the nationalist view of Weber. The requirement of the citizens’ acceptance of changes in the security line was later on announced also in all three Security and Defence Policy Reports by the government, which outline (after acceptance by the parliament) the policy of the state.

This episode was an important stimulus for public debate, because there were open questions, and there still are, concerning common security policy of the EU, participation forms in crisis management, and the issue of Nato. Now political parties and the security political elite need to inform, shape and affect public opinion.

A somewhat surprising phenomenon is the fact that ordinary people hardly participate in public debates and writings even after the opening process of security politics. Still, Finland has a long history of mapping out public opinion with regular polls. According to polls made during the 1990s, citizens seem to be unwilling to change neutrality into military alliance even now when it is possible to do it with the EU, or Nato, or

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15 Party programs of political parties.
both. The support for Nato-membership collapsed to its lowest point after the Kosovo war in 1999. This also was surprising to the security elite, which expected that this event would finally make clear that Nato was the organisation which would strengthen Finnish defence. This public opinion was supported by the polls directed at soldiers. There was great support for traditional peacekeeping operations with the mandate of the UN, but opinions regarding operations with the new status of crisis management and the issue of Nato membership were divided.

The interpretation of the security political elite was that the principles of crisis management and the New Nato were not familiar enough to citizens, that more information would have to be provided concerning these things, and that, on the other hand, the security architecture was too complicated for them. In the 1991-1998 period several publications were issued and the public security debate was given a lot of space in the media. Indeed, some of the researchers argued that people are not stupid, that they are able to understand the core things of security, and are carrying responsibly the values of the fatherland. Still, it became obvious that there were many difficulties connected with equalising the vocabulary and political understanding between common citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGO) with the text made by the authorities or politicians involved.

The objective elements in Finland's security discourse can be seen to take shape with the main concepts, in which content and meanings are the targets of political activity. The main concept, and the common denominator for the rest of the concepts in this field of research, is the concept of 'state' and, together with it (used synonymously but in a non-political way in public speech acts), the concept of 'fatherland'. Within these borders, shaped by the main concepts, there exists a group of concepts and other elements which are articulated in the public sphere, with some function or value in relation to the concepts of 'state' and/or 'fatherland'. As an example of this we can mention 'defence of the state', which in many official texts in Finland is called 'defence of the fatherland'. For instance, the constitutional law of Finland, 127§, states that every 'citizen' of the state of Finland has the responsibility to participate 'in the defence of the fatherland or to assist in its defence as stipulated by the laws. In other words, the concept of 'soldier' is very close to every citizen (male majority) and that is why the soldier's oath (that every male is supposed to take), which is directed to fatherland and constitutional law and the values it contains, such as republic, democracy, equality and justness, has been highly respected. This distinction between state and fatherland could be the one significant

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18 Polls carried out by the author in 1998 and 2000.
horizon for interpreting the opinion of the people considering security.

According to Clausewitz, the essential aspect in creating security is to define the threat that security activities should neutralise or prevent, and, in so doing, to produce the convincing material and linguistic description/story/illusion of safety within the state-controlled discourse named ‘security policy’. To define the ‘threat’ can thus be seen as the essential process of security policy.

The main concepts mentioned above are tightly bound together, and none of them can be changed without affecting the meaning of the others. One can consider as an empty signifier the concept of ‘threat’. In this role it is, in fact, the most tempting objective in discourse, either to be overloaded (stressing security risks) or underloaded (underestimating risks or defining other risks) with meanings. ‘Security’ can be seen as a ‘floating signifier’ or a ‘contested signifier’. In this role political actors and camps can be seen as competitors, which will reach the position of main security expert. On the other hand, both can be perceived in the public sphere of society as a holding point for cohesion of different coalitions, and thus they would have a role in the exercise of power according to the theory of securitisation of Ole Wæver (1995). Herein, political activity will either be promoted by securitization (for example, by arguing that because of the stabilising aim of a society it is a necessity to act like that...), or they will be prevented or suppressed by unsecuritization (for example, by arguing that stabilisation of a society requires coercive means or the grounding of some activity). E. Palonen (2007a) has pointed out that empty signifiers (things, thoughts or persons) are only ‘tendentially empty’, and this is the case with ‘security’ in this discourse. ‘Security’ is a signifier which has a strong status as a basic need, but can easily be loaded with quite opposite arguments and meanings. Security-need and security-deficiency both depend on the existing or the most possible and significant threats. For the same reason, ‘threat’ has the same kind of status as the empty signifier ‘security’.

Three former Security and Defence Policy Reports of the Cabinet, and the Government Agreement in 2007, direct our attention to the questions of alliance and independent defence policy. On the basis of these debates and articulations one can observe that two opposite camps have been formed, which represent their own policy lines. Between these two camps there exists, as a speciality of Finnish political debates, a broad camp of people who publicly represent the opinion of neutrality. People in the ‘Neutral’ camp refuse to give a straight opinion, but they are ready to take part in debates and mould the discourse, and thus they are involved in creating consensus concerning questions mentioned above. The opinion of this camp is a target for indoctrination, which will then be expressed via polls.

The first camp could be named the ‘Allied’. In their opinion, it would be for the benefit of the national defence of Finland if Finland was allied with the international western security organisations, with which Finland shares common values. Secondly, they believe that it is crucial for the national defence to participate in international crisis management with emergency troops in equal measure as other member countries of the alliance. The main claim of the ‘Al-
lied’ camp is that Finland should join Nato because it would strengthen Finland’s security and yield a more notable international status.

The second camp could be named the ‘Non-aligned.’ They are of the opinion that Finland should not ally with anybody, although international co-operation in some degree is considered appropriate, and in that way doors would just be kept open for various possibilities. Secondly, they are, much more than the ‘Allied,’ of the opinion that when they are speaking about security policy, they mean it in a wide mode that covers all threats, including climate change. The main focus concerning military dimensions and activity of national defence should, in their opinion, remain within the borders of their own country. On one level of this reasoning, they don’t find it economically possible for Finland to take care of all the aims presented in the opposite camp.

Concerning these claims, the ‘Neutral’ camp includes both those who as yet have not or never will define their attitudes and opinions, and those who actually already are defenders of the claims of one of the camps, but who, for the time being, have their reasons (e.g. officials, traders, position-seekers) for staying in the neutral zone of the public sphere. In a way, the ‘Neutral’ camp also offers protection from rhetorical counter-attacks, and this, in turn, opens up possibilities for more free backstage activity.

As the formulation of security discourse in the Finnish context depends on the opinion of the majority of the people, the public opinion is a significant part of the discourse, especially in respect of the matters related to constitutional law. Thus changes in security discourse depend on national logic, political mode of speaking/speech and the vocabulary in use at the time, as well as on the horizon of concepts and the playing field offered by a larger political context. For example, how much they are appraising sovereignty and independence of the state in proportion to possibilities to increase and have more influence on the international political and economic field.

Ever since the beginning of its membership, Finland as a state activator has made an active contribution to the development of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is committed to continued participation in the implementation of this policy. For this purpose it has adapted its Nato-based infrastructure and participated in two rapid response units operations. It should be remembered, however, that Finland and Sweden have always underlined the link between civilian and military management. This refers to a situation where Finland is participating, and in addition to this, it is taking responsibility for its own territorial national defence, while most countries in the EU leave this responsibility to Nato. The third responsibility for Finland is the PIP (Partnership for Peace)-activity with Nato, which is alleged to provide Finland with such possibilities in maintaining technological levels as to co-operate with other Nato-based crisis management organisations, and in addition, this opens up the option for Finland to join Nato. According to the main claims of the ‘Allied’ camp, it is said to be advantageous to join Nato and benefit from the co-operation.

Constructive studies have pointed out that one significant reason is really the need to have the possibility of assuring and affirming effectively the defence capability of the security system of Fin-
land. There is a logic which is following the warfare discourse. In the era of military crisis management discourse and developing high technology warfare, the participation in peacekeeping doesn’t affirm anyone anymore. In order to be believable today one has to participate in every event and operation that the EU and Nato find necessary and are carrying out (Raitasalo, 2008: 249-250).

To the same extent, the 'Non-aligned' camp finds the idea of concentrating military resources for crisis management abroad to be conflicting with the fact that, at the same time, the 'national defence', which aims to defend the Fatherland, suffers from a lack of adequate resources. In addition, the 'Non-aligned' camp has questioned the tendency itself, which is justified by international experience with crisis management. One question is: Does this development strengthen national security in the long run in terms of getting involved in increasing antitheses in situations when Finland defines threats and values differently? Perhaps the change in the nature and scale of crises to which the European Union will respond, and for which purpose it is targeting the common globally working crisis management army, will cause more violence and hate towards the EU and the member states. Another question, proposed for discussion, (Kiljunen, 2006) is the following: Is it reasonable to submit one's independence and sovereignty to someone who does not have the same view on the responsibility for the future of the nation and the national values?

According to polls carried out in 2007 and 2008, it is possible to conclude that public support to alliance is poor, and that crisis management without the mandate of the UN will get no acceptance. The acceptance and support for national defence are very strong, but the principle to defend the vital interest and values abroad will get little if any support. One example of this is the dispute between the labour-organization of officers and the state concerning the terms of agreement for working abroad, with the consequence that the Union of Officers decided to boycott these work tasks until they get an acceptable agreement. The main reasons were many – compensations and insurance related questions – but this, by extension of the debate, made it visible and clear that there were differences in opinions and definitions concerning the terms 'national defence' and 'patriotism'. Both terms are used in legislation as arguments, and are bound to the obligation of defending the fatherland.

An obvious sign of the trend opposite to the official plan is the fact that the government has increasing difficulties in recruiting officers for abroad service concerning crisis management. The lowering trend in willingness is apparent in the attitude of the young. According to polls, only 20% of the youngest group of officers supports Nato-membership, while, on the other hand, about 60% of the oldest group supports it. Nearly the same relation in figures applies to attitudes towards military action in crisis management.

Conclusion

One can perceive the deepening integration of the European security system as a logical continuity of the security and defence policy. The current valid policy is supported by the citizens, but there is an obvious antithesis between the plans and suggestions of the security political elite and the public opini-
on. By means of polls it is possible to locate matters which affect the formation of opinions. The loyalty of the citizens is directed to and bound with the concept of fatherland. Secondly, the adaptation to the wide concept of security stresses other threats more than military ones. The strong tradition and support of national defence and respect towards the position of the UN seem to be imperative just now.

According to this study, there are three findings that can be described from the perspective of a citizen of a militarily independent state. The ongoing and variable developments concerning the security policy of the EU is confusing citizens. Security discourses of some member states seem to have objectionable ends larger than the original fundamental idea of the EU, which is understood to be stabilisation of political life in the Euro-Atlantic area after WWII and the Cold War, by promoting security through integration of social and economic life and the UN.

Debates concerning security policy of the member states also seems to be motivated more by the purpose and political benefits of the state than those of the citizens. At present the citizens feel that it is not acceptable to give away to anybody more sovereignty of the state, in terms of military power, besides what is already mandated to the UN. It becomes apparent also that the citizens have an opposite opinion to that of the elite regarding the initial purposes of security politics, and this distinction has often become more visible and significant in the debates in a way which indicates that, in time, it is likely to affect the future development of security policy.

REFERENCES


SAŽETAK Cilj je ovoga rada razmatranje kreiranja sigurnosne politike Europske Unije – konteksta u kojem će se diskurs o nacionalnoj sigurnosti sve više suočavati s potrebama i zahtjevima koji će se morati stotiti s novom vrstom diskursa o sigurnosti i sigurnosne politike kontinentalne Europe. Zauzimaći stajalište građanina moderne nacionalne države, u ovom se radu nastoji otvoriti pitanje kako su u tom procesu pozicionirani građani i njihove vrijednosti u odnosu na modernu državu i njezinu sigurnosnu politiku. Konkretno, razmatra se kako dva navedena pojma poprimaju određeni novi smisao. U ovom se radu tvrdi da se novi europski diskurs o sigurnosti, koji je još uvijek u fazi oblikovanja, te vrijednosti za koje se tvrdi da ih obuhvaća, građanima čini nekoherentnim, te se čini da obuhvaća sporne ciljeve koji premašuju okvire izvorne ideje prikladne sigurnosne integracije. Drugo, čini se da trend koji se tiče nacionalne sigurnosne politike u procesu integracije dovodi do arhitekture u kojoj kreiranje politike više potiču ciljevi i političke koristi države nego građana.

KLJUČNE Riječi: politika sigurnosti, politika nacionalne sigurnosti, politika nacionalne sigurnosti u Finskoj, europski sigurnosni diskurs, NATO