BRIDGING THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE: THE AMERICAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

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The purpose of this paper is to study the contemporary relations between transatlantic partners, USA and Europe, which represent the wealthiest and politically and militarily strongest part of the World, through consulting the relevant bibliography of American and European authors of different political orientation and worldview. The USA-Europe relations are characterized by continuous ups and downs caused by: huge differences in military and political power, different visions of international relations and international community and competition between American unilaterism and European multipolarism. The relations between transatlantic partners always influenced the process of European unification. The states that participated in this process were often divided between because of their relations with the USA. Division was clearly visible during the Iraqi crisis in 2002 and 2003, but it is also visible today. Where the division was especially visible was NATO, the main guarantee of European security and military-political organization with capabilities to act militarily. The election of B. Obama for President of the USA and a change in the White House became the key factors that direct the US policy towards the multilateralism and global leadership instead of global hegemony. The USA must again become a leader, and at the same time stop being a hegemon. That will positively affect its relations with Europe and the World in general.

Key words: The USA, American global policy, neoconservatives, Europe, transatlantic relations

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The Cold War Era definitely ended during the geopolitical transition of 1989-1991, which was characterized by the breakup of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and finally the breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. After the geopolitical transition from the Cold War geopolitical world order to the new geopolitical world order entered its final phase, the USA remained a "lonely superpower". It was the era of a swift change and turmoil. The USA and Europe, which are undoubtedly the wealthiest and the most powerful parts of the World, without real competitors, remained unified in their objectives and the means to fulfill them. They also remained unified in the values consisting of bringing peace, stability and prosperity to the eastern part of Europe, thus consequently ending the 45-year-long political, ideological, economical and military division of Europe.

The USA and Europe decided to keep what they gained by winning the Cold War and therefore decided to extend the zone of security to the European neighborhood, with prospects of extending it as far as they could, taking into consideration their assets and security demands of the time. They started to develop a broad security community, comprised of NATO and Partnership for Peace member, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Besides that, the USA and Europe had to review the foundations of their relationship. (Cornish, 1998)

The continuous American presence in Europe, since the Second World War, left a sense of security, protection and continuity in Europe. But the first notions started to indicate that the partnership was in crisis, because of the disappearance of the common enemy and rising disproportion of military and political power between the mighty USA and the weak and only formally unified Europe. (Stewart, 2002)

The NATO and the EU enlargements gave the USA an opportunity to restore the transatlantic unity. But that chance was definitely missed because of the transatlantic divide and divisions between NATO members in Europe. The period of the President Clinton administration, from 1993 to 2001, was actually a period of transition in the American-European relations, which was generally very good and based on mutual respect and equality, although the balance of power was completely on the US side. With the arrival of G. W. Bush to the White House in 2001, the American-European relations started to take a completely different path. Neoconservatives in the Bush administration came up with a completely new vision of the World and the role of USA in international relations. They introduced the doctrine of preventive warfare, which includes preemptive strikes against states that they designate as the spon-
sors of terrorism or states that are trying to develop weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{1} (Nye, 2006)

President G. W. Bush’s foreign policy seemed very arrogant and anachronistic to the Europeans.\textsuperscript{2} According to that policy, the USA wanted to defend or isolate itself from the World, and the only exceptions are the US military interventions through which they get intensely involved in World affairs. The continuation of Bush’s foreign policy as the implementation of the “Grand Strategy” guaranteed very limited success. The main objective of that policy should have been restoring security in a more dangerous world. But after the first four years of Bush’s presidency some midcourse corrections were definitely needed. Washington again remembered the "art of speaking softly" and the need for international legitimacy. (Gaddis, 2005) The US doctrine of pre-emptive and especially preventive warfare definitely needed to be abandoned, but happened only because of the financial burden,\textsuperscript{3} as well as the political burden that the war in Iraq put on the USA, not because of the change of dominant opinion and strategy among the neoconservatives in the Bush administration.

The main problem in the American-European relations, besides the disproportion in military power, is the difference in political programs and differences in the view of the World. Washington deals with rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (which did not actually exist in Iraq before the intervention), and the Europeans are concerned for the future of the Earth, especially regarding the global economy and climate change, the differences in wealth and the distribution of the world’s resources.

The traditional security challenges, oriented towards the state and its interests, should not be as important in this period of globalization as they have been before. Europe today is considering the development of its own military capabilities, although it is not able to increase its national defense spending and establish a genuine common foreign and security policy. The European Union is still fighting the challenges of globalization, its own enlargement and the challenges of unification, especially of the depth of integration of its members. The failure to establish a European constitution shows that Europe is not as unified as some Europeans would like it to be. Those with power in Brussels have still not gained legitimacy and those with legitimacy, as leaders of member states, have less power. It is a relevant example of the democratic deficit. (Tucker, 2003)

Globalization has even accelerated Europe’s consciousness of its specialty in the World, characterized by interdependence. France is a good example, since it is substantially independent in the political and military field since the sixties, although it
is a member of NATO since its foundation. France has gradually gotten close to its European partners and NATO at the field of security and the rest of Europe has gotten close to France’s views in the fields of ecology, culture and ethics.

The real differences inside Europe today exist between states of the Western, Central and Eastern Europe. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Americans today understand that flexible access to NATO is important for the long-term stability of the transatlantic partnership. The USA should let the Europeans prove themselves in the security field and wait to see if their degree of engagement is in accordance with their intentions. A strong and self-confident Europe is the condition of survival of the transatlantic partnership which will be a necessity in the future. The more secure Europeans are, the less they will be enthusiastic to solve their differences in an immature way. A stronger Europe also means a stronger NATO. The problem is the opinion that exists in Washington that an independent Europe would not be competent and could not function because of its dividedness. However, the Americans should become aware of the price of turning to themselves. Bringing out the democratic values, peace and stability to Eastern Europe and ensuring that Russia will not take the wrong and dangerous path of isolation and hostility are the objectives that can be reached only through a cooperation of the USA and Europe. The global age has not changed the fact that there can be no important international developments without the USA. On the other hand, multiplying new players in the international arena means that the USA alone can do very little. Therefore, the World must accept the USA and their leadership (but not their hegemony), and the USA has to start learning about the complex and problematic reality of the World. (Moisi, 2001)

The enlargement of NATO and the EU is also very important for the future of the transatlantic relations. The future EU membership and transfer of the part of their sovereignty was also a test for these states because they had to give a part of their justly gained sovereignty to supranational institutions in Brussels.

ORIGINS OF TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE

Before we start identifying the origins of the transatlantic divide between the USA and Europe, we have to remind ourselves that transatlantic relations have entered a new phase. The change occurred after a decade long period of transition and partnership with the inauguration of the president G. W. Bush to the White House in January 2001, and especially after the September 11th terrorist attack on the USA. Terrorism immediately became the no. 1 enemy of the USA, Atlantic Alli-
For the first time in history, NATO activated Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty, which is the foundation of the collective defense. The USA responded by attacking the regime in Afghanistan, which was undoubtedly sponsoring terrorism. After a successful change of the regime in Afghanistan, the US administration started to focus on Iraq, accusing the Iraqi regime for sponsoring terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction, although there was no evidence of it. The USA, together with their allies formed a "coalition of the willing" and attacked and occupied Iraq, although the UN weapons inspectors confirmed that the Iraqi regime did not have weapons of mass destruction. The attack was performed without the approval of the UN Security Council and without the support of NATO, whose members were divided about supporting the USA. (Roberts, 2003)

France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg took the side opposite to the USA's. Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands and the new members from Central and Eastern Europe supported the USA. This is the most important cause of the transatlantic divide, at least the most visible one. The real origins of the divide are deeper and more complex. The Iraqi crisis was a moment in history of the transatlantic relations in which they were at the lowest point. The division among the Europeans was at its peak.

After the attack on Iraq, American military power was at its zenith, and its political and moral authority was at the bottom. The great division became the characteristic of transatlantic relations, but it also started to characterize the relations among European allies, who were divided in two groups of states, colloquially called the "Old" Europe, which opposed the USA, and the "New" Europe, which supported it. The transatlantic division meant that NATO could become redundant, because it would lose the ability to act and the purpose of its existence. For the first time in the history of NATO, a consensus could not be applied and the ability of NATO to act was blocked. American-European relations, that were considered to be the most important foreign relations of both sides since the Second World War, and a testing ground for the foreign policy of the American presidents, were completely brought into question. (Nelson, 2002) No such differences and misunderstandings existed before, throughout the history of transatlantic relations and especially in NATO, which was always a prism that reflected the condition of transatlantic relations.

Bush's administration even failed in gaining support of the USA's closest allies, and it did not even want to consider European demands for a broad coalition against the regime in Iraq. The State of the Union speech, delivered by President G.
W. Bush at the beginning of 2002, did not focus on the Al-Qaeda and help that the USA got from the European Allies in Afghanistan. Instead it focused on the "axis of evil" in which Bush put Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the rogue states that were designated as the sponsors of terrorism. The fact that the European Allies and NATO partners provided 85 percent of ground troops in Afghanistan also was not mentioned. In Europe, the response to American unipolarism and hegemonic superpower was anti-Americanism, multipolarism and calls for the unification of Europe and creation of unified European defense forces, independent of NATO. Questions were raised about the real nature of the US military intervention in Iraq. Was it a quest for the control of over more than ten percent of the world’s oil reserves? Was it an operation for the establishment of a permanent US control over Iraq and the neighboring states and regions, in a region that contains almost two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves? Was it a demonstration of power and willingness to use it against the regimes that oppose the USA? These are all legitimate questions that we have to ask if we want to get an objective and comprehensive view of the new American global policy and geostrategy, summed up in the “Grand Strategy”.

Basically, theoretical hypotheses on the transatlantic divide in the Post-Cold War Era, and their proponents, can be divided into two different groups. The first group of international relations scientists and foreign policy experts considers the transatlantic divide to be a natural consequence of various factors, such as: disappearance of a common enemy that homogenized the USA and Europe and improved their not so ideal relations during some stages of the Cold War; huge gap in military power, between the USA and Europe, which is constantly increasing; different foreign policy priorities of the USA and Europe, although a significant degree of concurrence in the official foreign policy goals exists on both sides of the Atlantic. The second group of international relations scientists and foreign policy experts mainly considers the transatlantic divide to be a product of Europe’s divisiveness and disunity when it comes to foreign policy, especially considering relations with the USA and positioning towards the US policy regarding the Middle East region. According to some authors the European disunity is simply a logical product of the nature of the European Union, which is a supranational organization, and not a unified state. Others tend to blame the US neoconservatism, unipolarism and hegemonic tendencies that became the main characteristics of US foreign policy after September 11th, which they perceive as "casus belli" and a convenient momentum for the policy that was created long before in the minds of neoconservative intellectuals and policy-
American neoconservative intellectuals consider divided Europe to be a good thing for the USA and its foreign policy priorities, oriented towards global domination.

In this paper, we will therefore try to explore different and opposed theoretical approaches that are focused on the origins and nature of the present transatlantic divide.

At the peak of the transatlantic divide in 2002 and 2003, various hypotheses occurred about the relations between the USA and Europe, and they became a part of public debates. In Europe, many started to believe that it had much more similarities and common interests with Russia than with the USA, and that NATO existed only on paper. In the USA, many considered France and Germany to be the rivals of the USA, rather than allies. Divisions became even bigger after Germany and France in the North Atlantic Council failed to vote to help Turkey if it were attacked by Iraq as a response to the American attack on the Iraqi regime. They claimed that the attack on Iraq was carried contrary to NATO’s decision not to attack. So the question of Iraq was a question that could have led to the breakup of NATO. But it has never occurred and it is not likely to either. Tensions and problems that occurred in NATO were a consequence of the fact that NATO is an alliance of NATO that participates in the alliance of their own free will. Membership of the USA is important because of the military power that it represents, but the USA also need partners because they cannot govern world politics on their own.

Opposing opinions claimed that the transatlantic link was essential for both sides of the Atlantic, even more than before. The crisis in transatlantic relations was actually a result of the ruthless US unilateralism combined with the helpless European quasi autonomy. Bush’s administration has managed, through its unilateral and aggressive policy, to lose most of the sympathy and good will that the USA has received after September 11th and that has jeopardized the consensus that was reached on the wider and more important global role of NATO, achieved at the Prague summit in 2002. As a response to the US unilateralism, France called upon the EU to take a joint position against the American attack on Iraq and opposed the official role of NATO in Afghanistan.

In the USA, a bitter debate has taken place between hegemonists and globalists, in the intellectual but also in the political field. Hegemonists comprise the core of today’s ruling elite in the USA, and by that we particularly consider the neoconservatives. Hegemonists are right when they argue that power is the basis on which international relations are founded. Globalists want to establish Kantian eternal peace, which definitely does not seem realistic. Globalists claim that the USA is powerful, but it is not omnipotent, and it needs help
from its allies, in order to implement a successful foreign policy. For them, globalization is an irreversible and unstoppable process. Not even the mighty USA and their unipolar power can change it. Some problems, like for example global warming, cannot be solved in a unilateral way. Unipolar power can reduce terrorist threats, but it can not exterminate them. Besides that, cooperation can prolong the period of American domination. If the USA is unable to create the necessary conditions for prosperous and successful global governance, the risks to their security are rising, and the example of that are Iraq and the chaos there.

Europe has also gone through a strategic transformation, but not as dramatic as the USA. Europe is basically trying to prevent a conflict that would threaten the foundations of the European Union, and its strategic priorities are very different than those of the USA. The main problem is a huge power gap, particularly in military power, between the USA and Europe. But there is also the problem of different visions of international relations, especially in the willingness to use force in promoting its interests. Europe lacks the military power but more than that, it also lacks the unity and ability to use its power. Europe’s view of international relations at the global level is that they should be multipolar and globalized, and the view of the current US administration is hegemonic and unipolar. (Daalder, 2003) So, the perception of a threat, as well as what to do about it, is very different depending on how a nation views its place in the world.

The European Union’s attitude towards the rest of the world is characterized by three paradoxes. It is much easier for the Europeans to find a common view on external crises than on American policy, which divides them. The second paradox is that, while at the same time they have a common view of the world’s crises, the Europeans are divided on the topic of the role of EU in managing these crises. The third paradox is the fact that each time there is a risk of a crisis or even of separation from America, the Europeans manage to reconcile differences on new bases. (Gnesotto, 2003) This paradox has been a characteristic of the US-European relations since the fifties, but it was not so strong and visible during the Cold War. (Kaplan, 2004)

R. Kagan argues that the basic problem of transatlantic relations is a huge gap in military power between the USA and Europe, together with the political unity of the USA and political dividedness of Europe. When we add Europe’s inability to act as a united power as a result of a slow and complicated decision-making process in the EU, the differences become obvious. In a world where power is applied to maintain security and stability, fighting foes ranging from al Qae-
da to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the USA demonstrated the will to use force wherever and whenever it found it necessary. This is a world of Hobbes, a world described in his *Leviathan*, where state power, dominance and force are the primary tools. However, anarchy remains a predominant characteristic of the international system, and not even the USA has the right to represent itself as Leviathan, which should try to organize the anarchical system according to its will. Anarchy does not mean chaos, because the international system should function in accordance with the international law. The system comprises international institutions, which have to be the tools that imply the rule of law and ensure global governance.

There is also a different, more realistic and more conservative view of Europe's vision of world peace: The predominant strategic culture in Europe rejects power politics and relies on the USA to be the European guardian. They could continue to live in a Kantian universe of perpetual peace. Europe would enjoy its "post modern" zone of peace while acknowledging the need for "modern" American power to protect it and other regions from "pre-modern" threats. (Kagan, 2003) But the reality wasn't so black and white at a time when Kagan's book was published. Europe was completely divided. The UK, as a traditional ally of the USA, as well as new NATO and EU members gave support to the USA in dealings with Iraq. Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands also supported the USA, and the reasons were conservative Euro skeptic governments in all these countries. These governments went completely versus the public opinion during their decision-making process since the support for the intervention in Iraq was well below 50 percent in these countries. Public opinion support for sending troops to Iraq was even much lower.¹⁹ Decisions of these governments and the clear division in Europe about the US policy influenced the efforts to create a common foreign and security policy of the European Union. (Santini, 2006)

New NATO members had clear interests in supporting the USA, because they were dependent on the USA in terms of their security and defense. They also wanted to improve their status within NATO, which was possible only through support to the USA, which was symbolic, since they had no capabilities that would really help the USA in Iraq. Their support was and still is important to the USA in more than one way. New NATO and EU members can contribute by making the transatlantic partnership stronger, at a time when the relations between traditional transatlantic partners are showing a significant degree of uncertainty, although they have been improving since their lowest level in 2003. However, the support of the so-called "New" Europe should not be taken for
THE CURRENT STATE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

It is not very realistic to expect that transatlantic relations will return to the state they were before the Iraqi crisis. However, new transatlantic pragmatism has started to develop after the Istanbul Summit, held in June 2004. It opened the way to a better and stronger partnership on both sides of the Atlantic. This new pragmatism and improvement of relations, based on the reality of common security interests, continued after the Summit of Riga. The situation in Iraq is unstable and chaotic, and it threatens to destabilize the whole Middle East. Therefore, no European state can let this happen, no matter what it might think about the real nature and purpose of the American-British occupation of Iraq. Afghanistan also needs help on its way to become a real democracy, and not a base for terrorists. The foundation of transatlantic consensus is a common vision that the projection of stability outside the Euro-Atlantic area is important for the security of NATO members. This new consensus includes widening the area of interest and development of new capabilities, so that NATO would be able to fulfill its new missions outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

After the crisis in transatlantic relations, in the spirit of new pragmatism, Germany tried to improve its relations with the USA, but the real breakthrough happened after the government changed, and the chancellor Merkel started the initiative to improve the relations of the two countries. In France, real improvements related to the USA were possible only after the inauguration of President Sarkozy. The new leaders of Germany and France, from the center-right parties, had a different approach to the transatlantic relations than their predecessors. Germany even took the lead in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, together with The Netherlands. European support in the fight against terrorism was never questionable, the difference between the USA and Europe was in the way that this fight against terrorism should be fought. In the case of Iraq,
the Europeans accepted American and British occupation of that country as a fact, since there was nothing they could do about it.\textsuperscript{10}

What the USA and the EU should accomplish is a genuine partnership at a strategic level, and by doing that they would form a most powerful coalition that could resolve most of the World’s issues. The USA and the EU should make an agreement about three key aspects: economic partnership, security strategy and foreign policy. Enlargements of NATO and the EU have broadened the perspective for cooperation on a political, economic and military-security field, and it also created the opportunity for a complete integration of new members in the institutions of the West, as a test of transatlantic partnership. (Drozdiak, 2005)

At least two significant strategic challenges lie in front of the USA and Europe as well, and they demand transatlantic cooperation. The first strategic challenge is the transformation of states that are geographically located on the eastern borders of new NATO and EU members, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans. The most important examples are the stabilization of Ukraine, its improved democratization and stronger orientation to the West, and regime change, democratization and opening of Belarus to the West. The West also has to help Russia to continue its transformation into a democratic, modern, and western-oriented state, which would also be a strategic partner. The second strategic challenge is the development and implementation of a new strategy towards the states of Caucasus and Central Asia, former Soviet Republics, which face security and political challenges and economic difficulties. The success of the West in integrating the states of Central and Eastern Europe gave a certain hope to those states, that they have a chance for greater cooperation with NATO and the EU. Their aspirations should be supported, since the West needs a coherent strategy for the Black and Caspian Sea regions, together with Central Asia. The USA should try to relinquish its tradition to define states as sponsors of terrorism by its own free will, as well as they should try not to use force unilaterally. Europe should try to take its position as a unified political power about the kind of relations they want with the USA. The European Union today has a Foreign and Security Policy Representative, but it also has many other aspects of foreign relations, like trade, economic and monetary relations, which are under responsibility of the Commission. This kind of decision-making process is not very effective, so the EU remains a supranational organization, partially unified, and mostly governed by national leaders, which draw their power from national, and not the European institutions. (Moravcsik, 2003)
The USA should learn to be a hegemon without acting as one. If the US allies still believe that the American leadership is crucial for solving the most important international problems, the challenge put in front of them is expressing criticism in a way adequate for sincere debates among friends, and encouraging American-European cooperation. The truth is that the USA and Europe still need each other, and although the USA is capable of waging wars on their own, it needs European allies for peace-making and peace-keeping operations. Europeans need an ally that shares European values and interests. The USA will remain the closest ally of Europe, and international community needs this key partnership so that it could maintain the current level of stability. The USA and Europe have resources and capabilities to resolve the majority of international problems, when they act together.

In order to improve the current condition of transatlantic relations, a new consensus should be reached between the USA and Europe, which would express the idea of virtues and values that both sides of the Atlantic are continuing to share. The consensus would not be easy to reach, but without the true sense of common destiny and future, the USA will be weaker and even less predictable in their actions, and Europe will be less self-confident and secure. (Sloan, 2003)

The other major breakthrough that should be achieved is closing a gap in military capabilities between the USA and European Allies. NATO needs certain strategic capabilities, but European Allies should not try to duplicate military capabilities of the USA. A lack of efficient strategy that would help to create a democratic political alternative in the Arab world presents a much bigger problem. Europe can offer the most in this area. Therefore, a comprehensive initiative is needed for the Greater Middle East region, which would combine an effective defense against terrorist attacks with a political strategy oriented towards gradual democratization of the Islamic and Arab world. These important questions are crucial for the improvement of the American-European relations, because their differences are currently mostly focused at the way they respond to terrorism. They are also focused at the complete philosophy of international relations, on a global level, and at the level of the “Arc of instability”, that is comprised of the Middle East, Northern Africa, Central Asia, and Caucasus regions. (Jenkins, 2003)

The majority of skepticism in Europe about the speed of integration comes from the awareness that Europe’s defense is dependent on the USA. Security and defense policy cannot be put aside till other problems of European integration are resolved. Building a common European system of security and
defense by incorporating NATO’s achievements would be a significant breakthrough in convincing the European citizens that Europe is a genuine concept which deserves their support and participation. Europe should orient itself to its stability, participate in peacekeeping and peace-making missions and project its influence on the regions that it borders.11 Maybe the Europeans would even be more productive without the American help, but they are still not refusing it. Europe has a larger population than the USA, an economy of approximately the same size, a modern industrial and postindustrial base that is capable of competition, and it also has enough political and military experience. So Europe is really capable of taking care of its own security. So the survival of NATO is not a given thing, and if NATO becomes redundant, maybe it is something that should happen. Alliances are the products of political pragmatism and when that pragmatism comes to an end, it is time for a policy change. (Merry, 2004)

The next US administration should start to treat Europe as an equal partner again. Washington should also reaffirm its support for a strong, unified and Atlantic-oriented Europe, and abandon the policy of dividing Europe. The model of establishing "coalitions of the willing" and dividing Europe would definitely fail in the long-term. That was visible when NATO was unable to make decisions by consensus during the Iraqi crisis. It was also visible when the American-European relations got back on track, because even the White House of G. W. Bush realized that Europe as a whole cannot be made to implement the policy of official Washington. Part of Europe that opposed the US policy realized that the USA was the stronger partner and started to cooperate. We can also conclude that those Europeans did not have many options, considering the importance, longevity and depth of the American-European relations, as well as futile European resistance to geostrategic objectives of the USA and the willingness and ability to realize them. A lesson learned from the transatlantic divide after the Iraqi crisis was that any attempt to build a unified Europe on the basis of anti-Americanism had to fail and that it represented a path to the division of Europe. The issue of European integration and its relationship with NATO depends on the fact that the integration of Europe could never be fully complete until Europe takes the responsibility for its security and defense. Encouraging political development of the EU, while promoting security partnership with NATO, is the right way to build an efficient European security system.

NATO should continue to maintain its position of a contributing factor to transatlantic security architecture. NATO should remain a forum for open dialogue about important se-
curity, defense and political questions. Decisions must be an expression of consensus within NATO, and made after a full cooperation with international institutions and organizations. The challenge for NATO is its survival, but also its role as a key player in European security. The other view does not consider the crisis in NATO so benign because two groups of members in 2003, during the Iraqi crisis and blockade in NATO’s decision-making process, accused themselves for, on one side, ruining the principle of collective security and, on the other, the betrayal of principle of collective defense, which is one of NATO’s foundations, its cornerstone.12 (Barth Eide, Bozo, 2005)

EPILOGUE: THE FUTURE OF TRANSatlANTIC RELATIONS

The main question that we have to pose about the future of transatlantic relations, since the USA is clearly a much stronger partner, is: Will the USA be willing to accept the balance between the unilateral defense of its interests and the constructive cooperation with allies and friends in the international arena, inside the international institutions and through partnerships? Or will the USA simply implement its foreign policies by force; losing at the same time the moral authority that it used to have?

The answer to this question lies perhaps in the new paradigm that is called post-atlanticism. New pragmatic transatlantic relations may be perceived as an expression of post-atlanticism. The main causes of this new condition in transatlantic relations are: the disappearance of homogenic factors that the Soviet threat represented and the rising American military power and the willingness to use it, after September 11th. New relations, post-atlanticist, comprised of a different set of rules that are derived from hegemony and leadership, are pragmatically applied.13 According to these rules, the official Washington unilaterally decides and European Allies are expected to obey without expressing their opinion. (Vaisse, 2003) These kinds of relations characterize the transatlantic relations since September 11th. They seem to be completely natural and expected, according to the offensive realism international relations theory. (Mearsheimer, 2002; 2006)

The cultural proximity of the USA and Europe influenced the relations in a way that post-atlanticism did not become characteristic of relations between the USA and Europe even before. Post-atlanticist relations are possible since Europe, as a unified factor, simply does not exist. Common European foreign and security policy de facto exists only on paper. The EU is trying to establish this policy, and also perceives this autonomy as a positive impulse for the creation of European identity. The USA considers these efforts of the EU to be
downgradi ng the quality and meaning of transatlantic unity 
that NATO has symbolized for over half a century. However, 
the ability of Europe to compete with the USA is well beyond 
the capabilities of even unified Europe. In the future, the USA 
can expect a multidimensional NATO in which European sta-
tes will take their place in the American global strategy. The 
USA thinks that the Europeans should respect the fact that all 
Allies do have the same importance and that there are real dif-
ferences between them, according to the degree of cooper-
ation with the USA, and of course the differences in their own 
capabilities. The US policy towards Europe can only be divi-
sive, until a unified Europe with a unified position starts to 
exist, whether the USA would want to be divisive or not. More 
important is the level of this divisiveness. The USA could con-
tinue to take some European states, which agree with their pol-
icy, into the "coalitions of the willing", and this policy can be 
politically, militarily and economically successful and positive 
for the US interests. The USA has stopped treating Europe as 
a whole. According to that strategy, the USA should obviously 
be constantly involved in using the differences among the 
European states, so that no initiative that would be complete-
ly opposed to the US interests and policy could succeed. Eu-
rope that is organized in this way generally corresponded with the 
interests of the Bush administration policy.

There was also an opposite opinion that the future Euro-
pean integration, on the contrary, should not jeopardize the 
foundations of NATO, and the USA should continue to give 
stronger support to it. The USA needs a strong, self-confident 
partner that will bring its political, economic and military sig-
nificance into the struggle against common security challen-
ges. The European support also helps the American policy to 
gain the legitimacy that it needs and that makes it look more 
justified in front of the international community. The USA 
and the EU should remain unified and fight the common se-
curity challenges together and their alliance is inevitable. (Par-
si, 2003)

The conclusion that we can draw from different points of 
view about the future of NATO is that the Alliance will not be 
attractive for either side of the Atlantic if it does not continue 
its transformation. NATO should confront itself with new US-
EU relations and adapt to them or it will lose its importance, 
and finally, it will lose its purpose, and that could do irrepara-
ble damage to the transatlantic community. The politicization 
of NATO is not the solution. NATO should orient itself to its 
foundations and become again a central mechanism for stra-
tegic coordination between the USA and Europe. But this could 
only be done if both sides of the Atlantic want similar things.
If the USA continues to insist on unipolarism, hegemony and military interventions by its own free will, and if Europe continues to insist on too much autonomy and opposition to the USA in the field of security and defense, the future of NATO will be doomed. A consensus on the situations that demand military responses regarding out-of-area operations is needed, as well as a consensus about promoting democracy and human rights in the regions of Central and Southwestern Asia, as well as Northern Africa. These are the regions that form the before-mentioned "Arc of instability".

But the main questions for the future of transatlantic relations remain the following: Is the US hegemony of this volume and impact and the willingness to use military force wherever and whenever the Administration considers it necessary, an anomaly? Or is it a characteristic of the US global policy that could become permanently present in the future? We can also pose these questions in a more simple way: Is the current US hegemony and unilateral policy a product of September 11th and the policy of the Bush administration, or an expression of the US supreme hegemonic position and the belief in its own predominance and ability to be a world hegemon? The question about US power is not does it exist and is it the greatest in the World, but how to use it wisely and rationally so it does not antagonize the rest, or at least most of the World. The World should respect the USA, and be afraid of its hegemonic military and political power. And the USA should lead, not dominate the World. For the USA, a leadership without dominance and hegemony, and obeying of the international law and conventions should be the right global policy.

The end of the Bush era in Washington can be a decisive moment for the next decade and the redefinition of the US global policy, its interests, objectives and the means of fulfilling those objectives. A new US geostrategy and strategy of national security represent a necessity that should be written and implied in the next few years. The legacy of President Bush and his administration, as well as its "Grand Strategy" represents a heavy burden for his successor, B. Obama, the new President of the USA. There are basically three aspects in which the policy of President Bush has seriously failed and damaged the USA, its relations with Europe and the rest of the World. The first aspect is the economy, since the policy of complete deregulation of the financial sector is the main cause of the world's financial crisis (that became an economic crisis in a wide range) which spread from the USA to almost all parts of the World, especially to Europe and Asia. Relations with a number of Allies (members of NATO), the European Union, Russia, China, and many other states represent a second aspect in which Bush's administration caused serious damage,
It will take some time for the new US administration to contain the damage and then build new, cooperative relations and a new, more positive perception of the USA and the Americans in the eyes of the World. Violations of human rights and international laws and conventions represent the third aspect of the negative legacy of the Bush era, especially torture and holding of suspects in confinement indefinitely in the US Guantanamo base in Cuba. So the new US administration has a very difficult task, especially if we have in mind the difficult financial, military, political, as well as moral burden of the Bush era: military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The European Union will probably remain a federation of sovereign states, which will try to find a way to make its future more certain, although we cannot rule out the possibility that the project of European unification will stop at the current level. It is unlikely that Europe will transform itself into a voluntary federation whose internal relations would be deep enough to erase the centuries of development of the European Post-Westphalian system of sovereign and independent states, exported to the whole world. It is amazing enough that the legacy of centuries of wars and repression of stronger nations and states against the weaker ones was put aside, once the project of European unification had started. No doubt that the European Union will remain an important factor in transatlantic relations, but its importance will mostly depend on its level of unity (or disunity?) about the support to the US global policy. The character of US global policy, whether it will be unipolar or multipolar, will be a decisive factor that will influence the position of most of the large and important European states towards it. It will also influence the process of European unification, but in the way that it has done before, since the EU is unable to deepen the level of its integration. Considering the enlargement of European integration, it is slowly, but surely reaching geographic and capability limits. The EU itself suffers from "enlargement fatigue", after accepting twelve new members and its increasing financial and economic problems, which negatively influence its capabilities for future enlargements. However, this should remain an independent issue of the European Union, and not an American-European issue.

NOTES

1 The doctrine of pre-emptive and preventive warfare represents a breach of all legal acts of international law. There is not a single act of international law that would support this doctrine, which was first used by the Israelis in the Second (in 1956) and Third War (in 1967) against the Arabs, as well as in some later Israeli operations of lower intensity against the Palestinians. However, the Arab countries surround Israel, and its survival was seriously endangered more than once. So there are some justifications (to a certain degree) to
this Israeli preventive warfare. In the case of the USA, there are no justifications for the doctrine of preventive warfare. The world’s only superpower cannot claim that its survival is endangered. Terrorist attacks represent a national security threat, but the US territory is not threatened by any foreign power. The attack on the regime in Afghanistan was justified, since it was beyond any reasonable doubt a sponsor of terrorism and Afghanistan was a sanctuary for terrorists that attacked the USA. But the attack on the Iraqi regime, no matter how dictatorial and cruel that regime may have been, was not justified, since the USA was not threatened in any way by Iraq, and the attack did not have any support in the international law. Not even the NATO members supported it unanimously. It was the most visible cause of transatlantic divide.

2 It is very important to note that nobody in Europe seriously considered the use of the neoconservative model of government, which decisively influenced American president G. W. Bush, in a way that the conservative ideology that created a sort of revolution in the Reagan era inspired many conservative intellectuals in Europe and influenced the political decision-making processes.

3 To see what kind of financial burden the Iraq war put on the US economy we bring quotes from the book “The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict”, by J. Stiglitz and L. Bilmes: “There is no such thing as a free lunch, and there is no such thing as a free war. The Iraq adventure has seriously weakened the U.S. economy, whose woes now go far beyond loose mortgage lending. You can’t spend $3 trillion on a failed war abroad and not feel the pain at home.” “President Bush tried to sell the American people on the idea that we could have a war with little or no economic sacrifice. Even after the United States went to war, Bush and Congress cut taxes, especially on the rich – even though the United States already had a massive deficit. So the war had to be funded by more borrowing. By the end of the Bush administration, the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus the cumulative interest on the increased borrowing used to fund them, will have added about $1 trillion to the national debt.” “The United States will be paying the price of Iraq for decades to come. The price tag will be all the greater because we tried to ignore the laws of economics – and the cost will grow the longer we remain.”

4 Throughout the nineties, NATO had to encourage membership candidates to suppress their fears towards Russia. In 1999, three Central European states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) became NATO members. In 2004, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became NATO members. EU accepted all ten post-communist states that became NATO members, in 2004 and 2007. The post-Cold War EU enlargement was obviously a process that was complementary to the NATO enlargement, and it followed it. Of the 27 current members of the EU, and 26 members of NATO, 21 states are members of both organizations. Two states that were invited to NATO on the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Albania and Croatia, also want to join the EU. This is the fact that clearly shows the level of EU-NATO cooperation and ties at all levels.
5 The "Old" and "New" Europe represent the terms, which were used for the first time by the former US defense minister Rumsfeld in late 2002. The Old Europe related to the European states that opposed the USA and the New Europe mainly to the new members of NATO that supported US's global policy and intervention in Iraq.

6 The intellectual godfather of neoconservative philosophy is I. Kristol. His work dates to the fifties and sixties. Contemporary neoconservative intellectuals are gathered in three important think tanks: Project for the New American Century, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. The most prominent current neoconservative intellectuals in the field of international relations and foreign policy include R. Kagan and W. Kristol (co-founders of the Project for the New American Century), R. Zoellick, N. Podhoretz, C. Krauthammer. Project for the New American Century is a key association that gathered most prominent neoconservative intellectuals and policy-makers. The key policy determinant that they were promoting and turning into official US foreign policy is the world dominance or global hegemony by the USA, which is and should be an empire. The fundamental presumption is that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle. This should be done by maintaining US pre-eminence, thwarting rival powers and shaping the global security system according to US interests. Project for the New American Century in 1997 issued a Statement of Principles that drew four consequences from the American history that should be principles of global US policy for the future: 1) increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future; 2) strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; 3) promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; 4) accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles. Reference: http://www.newamericancentury.org/

7 In the neoconservative policy-makers which were/are tied or formed a key part of President G. W. Bush's administration we can count Vice-President of the USA R. Cheney, C. Rice, P. Wolfowitz and D. Rumsfeld. They are considered to be proponents of 'Neo-Reaganite' strategy and have a key role in the statecraft in the post-September 11 American Foreign Policy. On the lower levels of the Bush administration in various periods these neoconservatives could be found: R. Armitage, B. Jackson, Z. Khalilzad, J. Kirkpatrick, L. Libby, J. Moravecik, and R. Perle. Of course, there were and still are many other followers of neoconservative philosophy in the Bush administration. The neoconservative philosophy influenced and still influences President G. W. Bush more than any other political philosophy. Neoconservatives were the main architects of US military intervention in toppling Sadam Hussein's regime in Iraq and the occupation of Iraq that has lasted until the present day.

8 The first premise in Kagan's book "Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order" says: "It's time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the
world, or even that they occupy the same world”. Kagan is one of the most prominent neoconservative intellectuals today.

9 Discrepancy between the decisions of governments from the opinion of their own citizens in some European countries, on the issue of support for the US intervention in Iraq and sending troops to participate in the attack on Iraq and its occupation, was clearly visible. Public opinion polls showed it, during the Iraqi crisis. Besides that, America’s image in Europe then fell to its lowest levels. From late 2002 to mid-2003, according to the international poll (source: The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press) support for the USA in the UK, closest ally of the USA, fell from 75 to 48 percent, in Poland it fell from 80 to 50 percent, in Italy from 70 to 34 percent. In Spain only 14 percent have viewed the US policy positively! Parallel to this, support for greater European autonomy in foreign affairs increased to 48 percent in Britain, 67 percent in France, 52 percent in Germany, 63 percent in Italy and 60 percent in Spain. In the USA, support for greater European autonomy was 29 percent! From these numbers, we can conclude that the support for USA in Europe and the support for greater European autonomy are dependent variables – while one increases at the same time the other decreases. The main cause of this trend in Europe was American unipolar, militaristic and hegemonic global policy.

10 One of the main reasons of disagreement between the USA and most western European states is a perception of terrorism and the ways to fight it. The USA insists that military and security forces, no matter what the cost and means are, should fight the struggle against terrorism. The USA got involved in the occupation of Iraq, and the situation in Iraq today creates new terrorists, which simply did not exist in Iraq before the American occupation. At the same time, the European countries, through the cooperation of security, intelligence and police forces are breaking up terrorist networks and preventing terrorist attacks in Europe. The second problem is the US insisting that Europe should increase its defense spending, and buy American conventional weapons. Europeans see no substantial reason to do that because they do not have the enemy to use these weapons on, since they do not plan to invade and occupy Middle Eastern, Asian or African countries, and they do not agree that terrorism can be successfully repressed by using weapons like military aircrafts, aircraft carriers, rockets etc.

11 This concept is one concept of European security. The other two concepts are different, since they either want to keep NATO stronger and make the USA responsible for European security, or downgrade the role of NATO and the USA in European security and try to build up capabilities for Europe to take responsibility as well as some roles that the USA have today through building strategic capabilities for military interventions.

12 In a debate about the transatlantic divide, two authors, Barth Eide and Bozo expressed their opposing views about the crisis in transatlantic relations that occurred in 2002 and 2003.

13 An expression of new transatlantic relations was visible in the behavior of France, which would never express such opposition to US policy during the Cold War. Although since the sixties France led an independent policy and did not participate in the military structure
of NATO, France never vetoed any decision of NATO. The example of Germany is even more significant, because as a state that was, besides the UK, the closest ally of the USA during the Cold War and the first line of defense, with the biggest number of NATO troops on its soil, with France it took a strong opposing side to the USA during the Iraqi crisis. The USA deserves most credits for Germany’s independence after the Second World War, and its unification after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and this should not be forgotten. And yet Germany opposed the USA inside NATO over the issue of Iraq.

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Prevladavanje transatlantske podjele: odnosi SAD-a i Europe i njihov utjecaj na europsko ujedinjavanje

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Rad kroz konzultiranje relevantne literature američkih i europskih autora različite političke orijentacije i svjetonazora istražuje suvremene odnose transatlantskih partnera, SAD-a i Europe, koji su najbogatiji te politički i vojno najjači dio svijeta. Odnose SAD-a i Europe karakteriziraju stalni usponi i padovi, uzrokovani velikim razlikama u vojnoj i političkoj moći, razlici u vizijama međunarodnih odnosa i međunarodne zajednice te nadmeta-njem američkog unilateralizma i europskoga multilateralizma. Proces europskog ujedinjavanja oduvijek je bio obilježen odnosima transatlantskih partnera, a države koje su sudjelovale i sudjeluju u tom procesu često su se dijelile međusobno zbog vlastita odnosa prema SAD-u, što je u recentno vrijeme bilo vrlo izraženo prilikom iračke krize 2002. i 2003. godine, ali je prisu-tno i danas. Podjela je bila posebno vidljiva unutar NATO-a, vojno-političke organizacije s mogućnosti vojnoga djelovanja i glavnog aktera europske sigurnosti. Izbor B. Obame za pred-sjednika SAD-a i promjena u Bijeloj kući, postali su ključni čim-
benici koji politiku SAD-a usmjeravaju prema multilateralizmu i globalnom vodstvu, umjesto globalne hegemonije. SAD mora opet postati vođa, a istodobno prestati biti hegemon. Ovo će pozitivno utjecati na američke odnose s Europom i svijetom u cjelini.

Ključne riječi: SAD, američka globalna politika, neokonzervativci, Europa, transatlantski odnosi

Überwindung des transatlantischen Zwiespals: Die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Europa und ihre Auswirkung auf die Vereinigung Europas

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Schlüsselbegriffe: USA, US-amerikanische Außenpolitik, Neokonservative, Europa, transatlantische Beziehungen