Abstract

In the 1st part authors investigate Wittgenstein as the morphologist. They explicate his notion of overview and seeing connections (PI: 122, and related texts and commentaries) as his description of the method and they also make a few notes on authors which influenced him on this matter (Goethe and Spengler). Besides that they summarise some places from Wittgenstein and commentaries regarding his morphological method and some of the obvious applications of it. The main goal is to comment on PI: 122 and GB: 133. Perspicuous presentation seems to be a conceptual investigation which consists in finding similarities and analogies between many and at first glance completely different and disconnected cases (of usage of words) which is in fact morphology as a method.

In the 2nd part authors investigate Wittgenstein as the morphologist. They discuss the nature of morphology regarding grammar, customs and institutions and try to make sense of advantages and disadvantages of morphology regarding the method of philosophical inquiry. Acknowledging the role of morphology helps us to better understand the later Wittgenstein. It gives us perspicuous presentation of (at least some parts) of PI. In the paper they also try to come up with an answer to few important objections to the morphological method by quoting Wittgenstein. That which is morphologically important is organisation of phenomena, their pattern which should be seen in order to be understood. There is also the distinction within the notion of morphology, namely morphology as a method, when it is applied and the morphology as a structure or organisation, when it is explicated from the phenomena.

Key words
analogy, forms, grammar, morphology, overview, patterns, similarity, survey, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Introduction

In these two parts we will investigate Wittgenstein’s philosophical morphology. In the first we will affirmatively answer the question – is perspicuous presentation in fact morphology. In the second part we will answer the questions – what is morphology as a method and why it is better then other methods. General argument is the following:

● If the world is not given ideally but as it is given in our daily experiences, then Wittgenstein’s philosophical morphology is the best method of representing the world (2nd part).
● The world is not given ideally in our daily experience; it isn’t flat as it is suggested by sciences. What is more, it is corrugated in a way (2nd part).
● Therefore, Wittgenstein’s philosophical morphology, as a method of making overview of “use of our words” of a certain form of life and as a structure of a form of life (phenomena) by investigating analogies and disanalogies is the best method of representing the world (1st part).
1. Analysis of PI: 122, and GB: 133

In the passage relevant for our present purpose i.e. in PI: 122 (and in GB: 133) Wittgenstein wrote:

(1) “A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view [übersehen], Glock’s translation is “survey” 1996:279, also PI: 125] of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation [Die übersichtliche Darstellung, J. Floyd following Cavell suggests that “presentation” is better translation] produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’ [Zusammenhänge sehen]. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. [connecting links GB: 133] The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)” (PI: 122, trans. By Anscombe) “… (A kind of “World–view” as it is apparently typical of our time. Spengler.)” (GB: 133)

It should be noticed that the adjective “perspicuous” isn’t used attributively, i.e. it is not a feature of representation, but is rather a characterisation of its function. (Baker 2004:42) Therefore, a representation of X makes X perspicuous for someone to whom it is represented. It can be claimed that, regarding “us” and “them”, when Wittgenstein says “us” he probably means “a certain cultural tradition” or a Weltanschauung he belongs to (Baker, Hacker 2005:320). But, when he criticises that indexical “we” and “in our time” lack perspicuity, he in fact criticises Western civilisation (European and American civilisation, CV: 8). Therefore, by “our” and “we” he is probably referring to our civilization. Philosophy is a consequence of non-surveyability of our grammar. So, before asking about “we” at the end of PI: 122 we must ask about “we” at the beginning. What does it mean that “our grammar is lacking in … perspicuity”: “we” do not have it (and “they” have it), or “we” need it (and “they” don’t)? PI: 122 is unclear; “we” are different because we lack what “they” have, or we lack what “they” neither have nor need. Setting this issue aside, there are some remarks that are accepted as useful commentary on (1). Here are some of them.

(1.1) What is of our interest isn’t scientific data or experiment (especially developmental hypothesis), or the essence of things. Rather phenomena, like words and their grammar. “Don’t look for anything behind the phenomena; they themselves are the theory.” (Goethe 1998: § 575, Spengler 1932:156, RPP I: 889)

(1.2) “Crystalline purity of logic” is replaced with “perspicuous (re)presentation” as the new method that should be applied to language–games, grammar and even to actions and forms of life (RPP and OC). Perspicuous representation need not be a representation of our grammar; it can also be a representation of religious ceremonies, magical rites, (Baker 2004:42–44) and the whole of culture as we will suggest later (this in combination with the Goethe’s quotation above in 1.1 gives rise to the new method regarding investigating cultures in the sense of ethnology or cultural anthropology).

(1.3) The result of the application of this new method is that we can “see connections” i.e. “analogies and disanalogies” (PI: 66). One example of the perspicuous representation is that of colours, (PR: 51–2, ROC) but there are also other attempts (perhaps of proof in RFM, of certainty and
belief in OC, of aspect–seeing as the core of perspicuous representation in PI and RPP).

(1.4) The notion of surveyability is prominent in all of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (PR, GB, BT: 89, concerning the very nature of philosophy as its main goal, RFM, etc. regarding the translation and the basic analysis see Baker, Hacker 2005:307–334, and regarding the “archaeology” of texts see Baker 2004).

\[\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
\text{phenomena} \rightarrow \text{perspicuous representation} \rightarrow \text{understanding} \rightarrow \text{form of our account} \\
\text{\hspace{1cm} \rightarrow \text{the way we look at things}} \\
\text{\hspace{1cm} \rightarrow \text{investigating}} \\
\text{\hspace{1.5cm} analogies} \\
\text{\hspace{1.5cm} and similarities} \\
\hline
\end{array}\]

It seems to be important, at least in some cases, to acknowledge that perspicuous representation includes a kind of conversion to the new world-view, world-picture. As R. Monk explicates it, “The understanding that consists in seeing connections, one might say, is the understanding that results from a change of aspect.” (Monk 1991: 508) In short, perspicuous representation (Übersicht, survey, overview) is in fact a kind of:

(2) Clear description of phenomena

In this new method the logic of TLP is somehow “substituted” with grammar of PI, but still clarity/perspicuity/surveyability is requested (“For me on the contrary, clarity, perspicuity is an end in itself.” CV: 9). Wittgenstein introduced the term in the context of methodological reflections on anthropology (GB 130–133), namely by contrasting the morphological method with “a scientific” method applied by Frazer. Therefore, it seems that with introducing the notion of perspicuous representation Wittgenstein tried to replace:

\[\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{developmental} \\
\text{hypothesis (GB: 131)} \\
\text{logic} \\
\text{explanation} \\
\text{scientific method} \\
\text{with} \\
\text{providing a schema” and} \\
\text{arranging facts in} \\
\text{“overview” (GB: 133)} \\
\text{grammar} \\
\text{description} \\
\text{morphological method} \\
\text{(Glock 1996:278-283).} \\
\hline
\end{array}\]

(2.1) In other words, perspicuous representation seems to be a conceptual investigation which consists in finding similarities and analogies between many and at first glance completely different and disconnected cases (of usage of words), which is in fact morphology as a method. “Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains, nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.” (PI: 126)

Baker and Hacker gave clear-cut description of the overview:

(3) “When one has an overview of a conceptual field, one knows one’s way around. Knowing ones’ way around a conceptual field consists in ability to specify connections, exclusions, analogies and disanalogies (PI: 130) that make it possible to dissolve and resolve philosophical problems.” (Baker, Hacker 2005: 309) The method essentially consists in “observing” the phenomena and finding analogies and disanalogies, and the result of application of this method is “seeing connections”. “Consider for
example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. […] What is common to them all? – Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’.[…] For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! […] And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.” (PI: 66)

The idea of a morphology as a method fits in properly between language–games and forms of life only when it is recognised that Wittgenstein borrowed these ideas from Goethe, Spengler, Boltzmann and Hertz. There are many places in which this influence is obvious, but it seems to us that the following quotations show it suitably regarding morphology (in the case of influence of Goethe and Spengler).

(3.1) “What is it that a conceptual investigation does? Does it belong in the natural history of human concepts? – Well, natural history, we say, describes plants and beasts. But might it not be that plants had been described in full detail, and then for the first time someone realized the analogies in their structure, analogies which had never been seen before? And so, that he establishes a new order among these descriptions. He says, e.g., ‘compare this part, not with this one, but rather with that’ (Goethe wanted to do something of the sort) and in so doing he is not necessarily speaking of derivation; nonetheless the new arrangement might also give a new direction to scientific investigation. He is saying ‘Look at it like this’ – and that may have advantages and consequences of various kinds.” (RPP I: 950)

So, morphology isn’t something just opposite to the scientific method or methods of scientific investigation; rather it is something that is in a way (conceptually) prior to scientific investigation, since it can “give direction to it” by suggesting different perspectives to investigated phenomena.

(3.2) “Spengler could be better understood if he said: I am comparing different periods of culture with the lives of families; within the family there is a family resemblance, while you will also find a resemblance between members of different families; family resemblance differs from the other sort of resemblance in such & such ways etc. What I mean is: We have to be told the object of comparison, the object from which this approach is derived, so that prejudices do not constantly slip into the discussion. Because then we shall willy nilly ascribe what is true of the prototype of the approach to the object to which we are applying the approach as well, & we claim ‘it must always be…’ This comes about because we want to give the prototype’s characteristics a foothold in the approach. But since we confuse prototype & object we find ourselves dogmatically conferring on the object properties which only the prototype necessarily possesses. On the other hand we think the approach will lack the generality we want to give it if it really holds only of the one case. But the prototype must just be presented for what it is; as characterizing the whole approach and determining its form.” MS 111 119: 19.8.1931 (CV: 21–2)

Moreover, Wittgenstein once said in a lecture (lectures 1946/7):

(3.3) “What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression.” (Malcolm 1984:43)
Goethe was interested in “recognizing living forms as such to see in context their visible parts, to perceive them as ‘manifestations’ of something within [...] not by looking for mathematical regularities and causal laws, but by seeing the connections...” (Monk 2005:66–67) His idea of morphology was applied to cultures by Spengler who wrote “The means whereby to identify dead forms is Mathematical Law. The means to identify living forms is Analogy.” (quoted in Monk 2005:66–67) According to Joachim Schulte 1990, 2002 and related to Wittgenstein’s known quotation of Goethe “And so the chorus points to a secret law” (GB: 133) it must be stressed that

(3.4) “What appeared to be a chorus of facts turns out to embody a law.” (Schulte 2002:63) Here, law isn’t particular natural law like in natural sciences; rather it is conceived as some kind of abstract law–like regularity. (Schulte 2002)

The fact that Wittgenstein was strongly influenced by Goethe and Spengler isn’t something we are going to investigate here. We will presuppose it on the basis of known investigations (by Klagge, Monk, Nordmann, Rowe, Schulte, and others). What is of our particular interest is that he was influenced by the method which he applied not to plants and animals like Goethe, or to cultures like Spengler, but to language, grammar, and maybe even to practices. Nonetheless, in order to understand the proceeding of the method it would be necessary to explicate some of Wittgenstein’s interesting examples, such as PI: 66 or BB: 87 in order to “see” the morphological method at work. Besides that, it must also be investigated how the method is applied, and of course its advantages and disadvantages in comparison to other methods. In such an investigation we must bear in mind that morphology is applied to a philosophical field, not to a scientific, and that the result isn’t a theory or a prediction, but grammar, perspicuous presentation, overview. Nevertheless, this is a task for a different paper.

2. Wittgenstein’s morphpology

While in the first part of the paper we explicated some of Wittgenstein’s passages (mainly from PI and GB) regarding the idea of morphology and mentioned some of the relevant and standard commentaries, in this part we will try to expand Wittgenstein’s morphology following his examples from the obvious ones (like language–games), to the not so obvious ones (like colour, rites, certainty). To continue with the previous explications, it seems to be interesting to look at the proclamation that there is nothing “behind the phenomenon” (RPP I: 889, here 1.1.), and that the “chorus points to a secret law” (GB: 133). From the combination of these two quotations (from Goethe and also used by Wittgenstein), it can be concluded that the law isn’t “hidden”, but still it is “secret” since there is no “depth” and the secret law can only be situated in “organisation” of the phenomenon. (Breithaupt 2002:73–89). In other words, the issue is about “organisation” or “structure” (perhaps even about grammar) of phenomena, not about something “hidden” within them or behind them. We will illustrate this distinction with a story which should be not considered an evolutionary “explanation”, but a language–game for a particular purpose.

● Humans want to survive and in order to succeed in that they need pictures (world–view), “rough ground”. They survive when they “see” the world–view (to “see” here is like “but don’t you see?” in PI: 231), and use language to describe the world, but that picture is wrinkled and rumpled.
As such the picture stops them in their ontological attempts, so they try over and over again to flatten the picture, to make it smooth and what they see then is that it is a drawing, a sketch (certain geometry, law–like regularity). They then have a model, but there is no world–view any more. In such a flat drawing they no longer recognise things, facts, and events. What they see is only a pile of lines on the map which doesn’t make sense to “them” any more.

In this sense TLP is like walking on ice, but what humans need is rough ground (PI: 107), because they then can see the picture, their world–view, and they need that, since pictures are, although wrinkled, also practical, useful, and above all, used in certain ways in their “wrinkled world”. However, if a change of ecological configuration occurs in the life of a certain tribe (or culture or society), morphologists are precisely the people who are capable of “saving the tribe” from an inefficient theory. Only morphologists see the theory just as it is: only a theory. They do so by means of overview or perspicuous representation and they achieve that without a theory, without a hypothesis, because they know when the new theory is needed. They know that causality is quite appropriate for survival most of the time, but also that on occasion such as this, i.e. the severe change of ecological configuration, there are no causes and effects that can be known and used. Nonetheless, something must stay constant and that which is constant is form (pattern).

(4) Morphology is contrary to the theory, because form is contrary to the cause. Form is abstention (refraining) from the very idea of a cause, or of a theory (hypothesis). Forms are models in which certain variables can be fixed for practical purposes. (“praktische Zwecke”, RFM: 1, 139, p. 42) We talk about good descriptions which are often used as an “explanations”, but a good description which isn’t used as an explanation is in fact morphology.

Whatever it is, morphology cannot be something simple or something easily explainable, for then it could be called by other names. Therefore, the question is, is morphology something complicated or is it something difficult to explain. Is it something like a poem in PI 531? But on the other hand, morphology is similar to a theory because both “form” and “cause” are relations. Maybe morphology is also a certain “perspective” on things, since in previously mentioned unfortunate state of a tribe their theories became ruins, that is to say useless for practical purposes, and by means of overview a morphologist can say that x is a theory and y isn’t, or that x is more useful then z.

(5) Form (as a pattern) is a certain ruffle, corrugation, (folded, creased), a perspective (or an aspect). That which is corrugated cannot be stated ideally. Moreover, what is ideal doesn’t need perspective or maybe it has a kind of “view from nowhere”. Nonetheless, morphology is appropriate for everyday life, for practical purposes. Our ability of face–recognition, for example, is amazing. No wonder that we want to expand it to other fields of forms because face recognition, face-reading, physiognomy is morphology par excellence. (In spite of Shakespeare’s words: “There’s no art to find the mind’s construction in the face.”, Macbeth, 1.4)

How do we know that “the world” is ruffled, wrinkled, corrugated? The only way for a world to be, if we are going to set any kind of rules, is ruffled way. Therefore, the world cannot be flattened, and we “know” that the world is ruffled, but this is a kind of know–how since there is no rule outside of a case,
or out of a particular practice. That our world is ruffled Wittgenstein suggests in PI: 125:

(6) “The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules. This entanglement in our own rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).”

There are at least four types of morphology (including those which influenced Wittgenstein):

(7) Regarding living forms i.e. plants and animals (Goethe)
(8) Regarding scientific investigation (Hertz, Boltzmann)
(9) Regarding myth, history and culture (Ernst, Spengler)
(10) Regarding:

(10.2) and everyday practices, customs, institutions, forms of life (Wittgenstein GB, Baker 2004)

Here it seems worthy to mention that there is no such thing as the morphology of grammar, of surveyable representations, or of forms of life since they already are forms i.e. their morphology manifests itself through phenomena and as such can be appropriately investigated only by morphology as a method. Since the first meaning of morphology applied by Wittgenstein is well investigated, we will try to make some sense of the second one, namely of the morphology of human practices, customs, institutions, cultures, forms of life by making a few notes. Maybe there is a difference between:

(11) morphology as a method of making overview of “use of our words” of a certain form of life and especially its language–games, and
(12) morphology as a structure of the form of life (phenomena) which manifests itself, and can be clearly explicated by applying the method of morphology (from the first case), (suggested by Baker 2004).

We can summarize these aspects of morphology (10 – 12) in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morphology as a method (11)</th>
<th>Morphology as a structure (10.1, 10.2, 12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applied – “seeing connections” as identification of various similarities, analogies</td>
<td>Explicated – “seeing connections” as explication of the best similarities, analogies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A is similar to B</td>
<td>Certain relation between A and B is identical to certain relation between C and D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, by making an overview of a certain language–game we in fact produce an overview of one part of a certain form of life which in principle includes more then just certain language–games, but also certain routines, practices, customs, institutions, etc. (“institution of language and all its sur-
roundings” PI: 540) Take as an example 58th language–game from the “Brown Book”.

- “In a certain tribe contests are held in running, putting the weight, etc., and the spectators stake possessions on the competitors. The pictures of all the competitors are placed in a row, and what I called the spectator’s staking property on one of the competitors consists in laying this property (pieces of gold) under one of the pictures. If a man has placed his gold under the picture of the winner in the competition he gets back his stake doubled. Otherwise he loses his stake. Such a custom we should undoubtedly call betting, even if we observed it in a society whose language held no scheme for stating ‘degrees of probability’, ‘chances’ and the like. I assume that the behaviour of the spectators expresses great keenness and excitement before and after the outcome of the bet is known. I further imagine that on examining the placing of the bets I can understand ‘why’ they were thus placed. I mean: In a competition between two wrestlers, mostly the bigger man is the favourite; or if the smaller, I find that he has shown greater strength on previous occasions, or that the bigger had recently been ill, or had neglected his training, etc. Now this may be so although the language of the tribe does not express reasons for the placing of the bets.” (BB: 58)

Is it the core of morphology of a certain custom, practice, or “standard procedure” that it is the “background” and the “rough ground” of morphology of one of its language–games? We must bear in mind that language–games already are morphology. After all, what do we consider to be a confirmation of a child, for example, correctly responding to an order such as “Sit down!” if not that a child sits down? Wittgenstein’s morphology (together with Goethe’s and Spengler’s), as M. W. Rowe pointed out, tried to “make vivid and immediate what has become stale and abstract” … and … “inquiry ends when the pattern is seen” (Rowe 1991:289, 302). But if all humans are so to speak “morphologists by nature” (since we are “ordinary men living in the natural world”, Rowe, op. cit.), then all of us are trying precisely that.

Objections and Replies

It seems impossible to differ between these kinds of morphology (11, 12) in spite of the fact which says that language–games are (proper) parts of forms of life. The core of morphology is the analogy between parts of phenomena (we look at phenomena, but we see only parts of it). Here we will end this paper by stating a few interesting questions and give possible answers by quoting Wittgenstein.

(13) How do we know that this analogy is better then that one?

(13.1) “We are able to look at this custom in the light of that one. This may serve, e.g. as a heuristic principle.” (RPP I: 321)

(13.2) “But the prototype must just be presented for what it is; as characterizing the whole approach and determining its form.” (CV: 21–2 and I, 3.2)

(14) What is the criterion of being “better analogy”?

(14.1) “Through custom these forms become a paradigm; they acquire so to speak the force of law. (‘The power of custom?’)” (RPP I: 343)
(15) Why analogies and overviews (namely as descriptions) are better then hypotheses and developmental theories in any respect?

(15.1) “But then can the rule not be replaced by an empirical proposition saying that rulers are made in such and such ways, that people do this with them? One might give an ethnological account of this human institution.” (RFM VII: 2)

(15.2) They are better since they can establish “new order among descriptions”, and because “the new arrangement might also give a new direction to scientific investigation.” (RPP I: 950 and here 3.1)

If we cannot answer these questions differently or even better, or if we take Wittgenstein’s answers (i.e. what we present as “his answers”) to be unconvincing, then we cannot advance morphology over theory and science, holism over reductionism and elimination, at least regarding Wittgenstein’s own standpoint. Naturalists dislike Wittgenstein and not for his “linguistic turn” but for his “morphological turn”. By affirming morphology Wittgenstein dissolves two things at the same time; what he considers to be “metaphysics” on one hand, and “natural philosophy” on the other. An affirmation of morphology means affirmation of “natural history”. This implies “distinctive conception of philosophy” which is condensed in PI: 122 (Baker 2004:22), but “Though clearly important, Wittgenstein’s concept of a perspicuous representation is not itself perspicuous.” (Baker 2004:23) Nevertheless, this investigation can be understood as part of a greater project of showing not only how acknowledging the influence of Goethe’s idea of morphology on Wittgenstein helps us to understand better later Wittgenstein’s philosophy (an idea propounded most notably by Joachim Schulte), but, more radically, of showing how some ideas implicit in the notion of scientific and philosophical morphology (as developed from Goethe’s premises) can be put into the service of explicating philosophy of later Wittgenstein. Even more, by studying Wittgenstein’s notion of morphology, we can better understand the recent developments of scientific and non-scientific morphology. The next thing to do would be to explicate some applications and results of morphological method in Wittgenstein, and generally as a philosophical method.

Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Jim Klagge, and Anja Weiбер, for valuable comments and suggestions.

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Kristijan Krkač, Josip Lukin  

**Wittgenstein – morfolog I**

**Sažetak**

U prvome dijelu autori istražuju Wittgensteina kao morfologa. Objašnjavaju njegov pojam preglednog prikaza i veza viđenja (FI: 122 i povezane tekstove i komentare) kao njegov opis metode, a također daju neke bilješke o autorima koji su na njega utjecali po tim stvarima (Goethe i Spengler). Pored toga, autori sazimaju neka mjesta iz Wittgensteina i komentara glede njegove morfološke metode i neke očigledne primjene iste. Glavni je cilj komentirati FI: 122 i GB: 133, a jasno shvatišta prezentacija izgleda da je pojmovno istraživanje koje se sastoji u pronaženju sličnosti i analogija između mnogih, te na prvi pogled posve različitih i nepovezanih slučajeva (upotrebe riječi), što u stvari znači morfološku metodologiju.

U drugome dijelu autori istražuju Wittgensteina kao morfologa. Raspravljaju narav morfološke glede gramatike, običaja i institucija, te pokušavaju učiniti smislenim prednosti i nedostatke morfološke glede metode filozofskog istraživanja. Priznavanje uloge morfološkog pomaže nam bolje razumjeti kasnog Wittgensteina. To nam daje jasno shvatišto predstavu (baren nekih dijelova) FI. U ovome članku, autori također pokušavaju izići na površim mjesta iz FI: 122 i GB: 133, a jasno shvatljiva prezentacija izgleda da je pojmovno istraživanje koje se sastoji u pronaženju sličnosti i analogija između mnogih, te na prvi pogled posve različitih i nepovezanih slučajeva (upotrebe riječi), što u stvari znači morfološku metodologiju.

**Ključne riječi**
analogija, forme, gramatika, morfologija, pregledni prikaz, obrasci, sličnost, pregled, Ludwig Wittgenstein

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**Kristijan Krkač, Josip Lukin  

Wittgenstein als Morphologe I**

**Zusammenfassung**


**Schlüsselwörter**

Analogie, Form, Grammatik, Morphologie, Muster, Ähnlichkeit, Übersicht, Ludwig Wittgenstein
Résumé
Dans la première partie, les auteurs étudient Wittgenstein en tant que morphologue. Ils expliquent son concept de vue synoptique et de connexions (Investigations philosophiques : 122, textes et commentaires liés) et offrent quelques notes sur les auteurs l’ayant influencé (Goethe et Spengler). En outre, les auteurs résument certains points chez Wittgenstein ainsi que certains commentaires à propos de sa méthode morphologique et de son application. L’objectif est de commenter les Investigations philosophiques : 122 et les Remarques sur Le Rameau d’or de Frazer : 133 : la présentation, claire et compréhensible, semble être une étude conceptuelle qui consiste à trouver des similitudes et des analogies parmi de nombreux cas (d’emploi des mots) différents et d’apparence disparate, ce qui désigne la morphologie comme une méthode.

Dans la deuxième partie, les auteurs étudient Wittgenstein en tant que morphologue. Ils débattent de la nature de la morphologie à l’égard de la grammaire ou des institutions, et tentent de formuler ses avantages et ses inconvénients par rapport à la méthode de recherche philosophique. La reconnaissance du rôle de la morphologie nous aide à mieux comprendre la phase tardive de Wittgenstein. Ceci offre un aperçu clair, du moins de certaines parties, des Investigations philosophiques. Les auteurs tentent également, en citant Wittgenstein, d’en finir avec certaines objections importantes à la méthode morphologique. Ce qui est important du point de vue morphologique est l’organisation des phénomènes et leur modèle qui doit être vu afin d’être compris. On peut distinguer la morphologie comme méthode de morphologie comme structure et organisation, lorsqu’elle s’explique à partir des phénomènes.

Mots-clés
analogie, grammaire, morphologie, vue synoptique, modèles, similitude, aperçu, Ludwig Wittgenstein