A cryptanalytic attack on the LUC cryptosystem using continued fractions

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Abstract. The LUC cryptosystem is a modification of the RSA cryptosystem based on Lucas sequences. In this paper we extend the Verheul - van Tilborg and Dujella variants of the Wiener attack on RSA to the LUC cryptosystem. We describe an algorithm for finding a secret key \( d \) of the form \( d = rq_{m+1} \pm sq_m \), for some \( m \geq -1 \) and nonnegative integers \( r \) and \( s \), using continued fractions. We derive bounds for \( r \) and \( s \) using results on Diophantine approximations.

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1. Introduction

In 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [13] introduced the first practical public-key cryptosystem. This cryptosystem is called RSA. The modulus \( n \) of the RSA cryptosystem is the product of two different large primes \( p \) and \( q \). The public exponent \( e \) and the secret exponent \( d \) are related by \( ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)} \).

In 1993, Smith and Lennon [14] described a new public-key cryptosystem based on Lucas sequences. The public key is \( (n,e) \). The modulus \( n \) is the product of two different large primes \( p \) and \( q \), and the public encryption key \( e \) is relatively prime to the product \( (p-1)(q-1)(p+1)(q+1) \).

The public encryption key \( e \) and the secret decryption key \( d \) are related by

\[
ed \equiv 1 \pmod{S(n)},
\]

where there are four possible values for the function \( S(n) \):

\[
lcm(p-1,q-1), \ lcm(p-1,q+1), \ lcm(p+1,q-1), \ lcm(p+1,q+1).
\]

In 1990, Wiener [16] described a technique to use continued fractions in a cryptanalytic attack on an RSA cryptosystem with a small secret exponent, which is called the Wiener attack. Wiener showed that if \( d < n^{0.25} \), then this technique determines \( d, p \) and \( q \), since the secret number \( d \) is the denominator of some convergent \( p_m/q_m \) of the continued fraction expansion of \( e/n \). His result is based on the classical Legendre’s theorem on Diophantine approximations of the form \( |\alpha - \frac{a}{b}| < \frac{1}{2b^2} \).

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In 1999, Boneh and Durfee [3] described an attack on RSA with a small secret exponent \( d \) which works if \( d < n^{0.292} \). This attack is based on Coppersmith’s method [4] for finding small roots to polynomial equations, which is based on the LLL–lattice reduction algorithm. In 2001, Blömer and May [2] proposed a variant of the Boneh and Durfee attack.

In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg [15] extended the boundary of the Wiener attack on RSA. They propose a technique to raise the security Wiener’s boundary of \( n^{0.25} \) with exhaustive-searching for \( 2t + 8 \) bits, where \( t = \log_2 d - \log_2 n^{0.25} \). The candidates for the secret key \( d \) are of the form \( d = rq_{m+1} + sq_m \), for some nonnegative integers \( r \) and \( s \).

In 2004, Dujella [5] described a new variant of the Wiener attack on RSA. His attack is a modification of the Verheul and van Tilborg variant, and it is based on the Worley result on Diophantine approximations [17] of the form \( |\alpha - a/b| < c/b^2 \), where \( c \) is a positive real number. The candidates for the secret exponent \( d \) are of the form \( d = rq_{m+1} \pm sq_m \), for some nonnegative integers \( r \) and \( s \).

In 1995, Pinch [12] extended the Wiener attack to LUC and KMOV cryptosystems, and showed that both cryptosystems with 1024-bit modulus \( n \) are insecure for a 256-bit private key \( d \). Note that KMOV is also similar to RSA. This cryptosystem, proposed by Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone [10], uses elliptic curves over the ring \( \mathbb{Z}_n \), and its security is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers. KMOV cryptosystem with a 1024-bit modulus \( n \) is factoring-secure. Ibrahimpašić [7] showed that in this case, KMOV cryptosystem is insecure for a 270-bit private key \( d \).

In this paper, we generalize the above mentioned attacks which use continued fractions. We extend the Dujella variant of the Wiener attack to the LUC cryptosystem and describe an algorithm for finding a secret key \( d \), where \( d = rq_{m+1} \pm sq_m \), for some nonnegative integers \( r \) and \( s \). We will show that the LUC cryptosystem with a 1024-bit modulus \( n \) is insecure for a 270-bit private key \( d \). We derive bounds for \( r \) and \( s \) using results on Diophantine approximations [5, 17].

2. Lucas sequences

Let \( a \) and \( b \) are nonzero integers and \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) the roots of the equation

\[
x^2 - ax + b = 0.
\]

We have

\[
\alpha = \frac{a + \sqrt{\Delta}}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad \beta = \frac{a - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2},
\]

where \( \Delta = a^2 - 4b \).

Lucas sequences \((U_n)\) and \((V_n)\) \((n \geq 0)\) are given by

\[
U_n(a,b) = \frac{\alpha^n - \beta^n}{\alpha - \beta} \quad \text{and} \quad V_n = \alpha^n + \beta^n.
\]

In particular,

\[
U_0 = 0, \quad U_1 = 1, \quad V_0 = 2, \quad V_1 = a,
\]
and for \( n \geq 2 \) we have

\[
\begin{align*}
U_n &= aU_{n-1} - bU_{n-2}, \\
V_n &= aV_{n-1} - bV_{n-2}.
\end{align*}
\]

Note that if \( a = 1 \) and \( b = -1 \), then \( U_n (1, -1) \) are the Fibonacci numbers \((0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, \ldots)\), and \( V_n (1, -1) \) are the Lucas numbers \((2, 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 18, 29, 47, \ldots)\).

We have the following relationships [14] between the Lucas sequences \( V_n \), which are easy to prove using the definitions of \( U_n, V_n, \Delta, a \) and \( b \) in terms of \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \):

\[
\begin{align*}
V_{2n} &= V_n^2 - 2b^n, \\
V_{2n-1} &= V_nV_{n-1} - ab^n, \\
V_{2n+1} &= aV_n^2 - bV_nV_{n-1} - ab^n, \\
V_n^2 &= \Delta U_n^2 + 4b^n, \\
2V_{n+m} &= V_nV_m + \Delta U_nU_m, \\
2b^mV_{n-m} &= V_nV_m - \Delta U_nU_m.
\end{align*}
\]

In further work we need the following relationship [1, 14]

\[
V_n (V_k (a, b), b^k) = V_{nk} (a, b),
\]

which for \( b = 1 \) gives

\[
V_n (V_k (a, 1), 1) = V_{nk} (a, 1).
\]

3. LUC cryptosystem

The LUC cryptosystem is based on Lucas sequences, and it is developed in analogy with the RSA cryptosystem. Suppose \( n \) and \( e \) are two chosen numbers, where \( n \) is the product of two large different primes \( p \) and \( q \). The number \( e \) must be chosen so it is relatively prime to \((p - 1)(q - 1)(p + 1)(q + 1)\). Let \( M \) be a message which is less than \( n \) and relatively prime to \( n \). We obtain the ciphertext \( C \) by

\[
C = V_e (M, 1) \mod n.
\]

The public number \( e \) and the secret number \( d \) are related by (1) where

\[
S (n) = \text{lcm} \left( p - \left( \frac{C^2 - 4}{p} \right), q - \left( \frac{C^2 - 4}{q} \right) \right).
\]

The Legendre symbols are either +1 or −1 which imply that there are four possible values for \( S (n) = \text{lcm} (p \pm 1, q \pm 1) \).

Since the choice of public number \( e \) ensures that it is relatively prime to \( S (n) \), the secret number \( d \) can be found easily by the extended Euclidean algorithm. The decryption process is then the same as encryption, with \( e \) replaced by \( d \). We have

\[
M = V_d (C, 1) \mod n.
\]
By the definition of the Legendre symbol, we have \( \left( \frac{\Delta}{p} \right) = \left( \frac{\Delta U_2^2(M, 1)}{p} \right) \). Therefore, by (5) we obtain
\[
\left( \frac{M^2 - 4}{p} \right) = \left( \frac{\Delta}{p} \right) = \left( \frac{\Delta U_2^2(M, 1)}{p} \right) = \left( \frac{V_e^2(M, 1) - 4}{p} \right) = \left( \frac{C^2 - 4}{p} \right),
\]
which implies \([14, 11]\)
\[
U_{kS(n)}(C, 1) \equiv U_{kS(n)}(M, 1) \equiv 0 \pmod{n},
\]
\[
V_{kS(n)}(C, 1) \equiv V_{kS(n)}(M, 1) \equiv 2 \pmod{n}.
\]

Now, we can easily check that the inverse of the encryption function \( V_e(M, 1) \) is the decryption function \( V_d(C, 1) \) (see [14] for the details). Computation of \( V_e \) and \( V_d \) might look extremely long, for large values of \( e \) and \( d \). But, in [14] it is shown how this problem can be solved by a modification of the successive doubling technique (see [6, Algorithm 5] or [9, Chapter 4.6.3]).

4. Cryptanalysis of the LUC cryptosystem with a short secret exponent

The security of the LUC cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of finding the secret key \( d \). It was believed that finding a secret key \( d \) from public keys \( e \) and \( n \) is computationally equivalent to factoring a composite number \( n \).

In this paper we are only interested in attacks using continued fractions. Let \( \alpha = [a_0; a_1, a_2, \ldots] \) be the continued fractions expansion of a real number \( \alpha \). The convergents \( \frac{p_i}{q_i} \) of the continued fraction expansion of \( \alpha \), satisfy \( p_0 = a_0, q_0 = 1, p_1 = a_0a_1 + 1, q_1 = a_1 \) and \( p_i = a_ip_{i-1} + p_{i-2}, q_i = a_iq_{i-1} + q_{i-2} \), for \( i > 1 \).

In 1990, Wiener [16] proposed a polynomial time algorithm for breaking a typical RSA, where \( p \) and \( q \) are of the same size and \( e < n \). He showed that if \( p < q < 2p \), \( e < n \) and \( d < \frac{1}{2} n^{0.25} \), then \( d \) is the denominator of some convergent of the continued fraction expansion of \( e/n \), and therefore \( d \) can be computed from the public keys \( n \) and \( e \). In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg [15] proposed an extension of the Wiener attack, which can work well over Wiener’s boundary. The candidates for the secret exponent \( d \) are of the form \( d = r q_{m+1} + s q_m \), for some nonnegative integers \( r \) and \( s \).

In 2004, Dujella [5] described a modification of the Verheul and van Tilborg variant of the Wiener attack. This attack is very similar to the Verheul and van Tilborg attack, but instead of an exhaustive search after for finding the appropriate convergent, this variant also uses estimates which follow from Diophantine approximations [5, Theorem 1].

**Theorem 1** (Dujella, Worley). Let \( \alpha \) be a real number and let \( a, b \) be coprime nonzero integers, satisfying the inequality
\[
| \alpha - \frac{a}{b} | < \frac{c}{b^2},
\]
where \( c \) is a positive real number. Then \((a, b) = (rp_{m+1} \pm sp_m, rq_{m+1} \pm q_m)\), for \( m \geq -1 \) and for some nonnegative integers \( r, s \) such that \( rs < 2c \).
In 1995, Pinch [12] extended the Wiener attack to the LUC cryptosystem, and here we extend the Dujella variant of the Wiener attack to the LUC cryptosystem.

We assume that \( p < q < 2p \) and let \( d = D \cdot \sqrt{n} \). The following lemma can be easily proved.

**Lemma 1.** Let \( p, q \) be two distinct positive odd integers, such that \( p < q < 2p \), and \( n = pq \). Then

(i) \( 2\sqrt{n} < p + q < 2.1214\sqrt{n} \),

(ii) \( 1.9999 < q - p < 0.7072\sqrt{n} \).

4.1. Case \( S(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1) \)

From \( ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1)} \) there exists an integer \( K \) such that

\[
ed = K \cdot \text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1) + 1.
\]

If we let \( G = \gcd(p - 1, q - 1) \) and use the fact

\[
\text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1) = \frac{(p - 1)(q - 1)}{G},
\]

we get

\[
ed = \frac{K_G}{G} \cdot (p - 1)(q - 1) + 1.
\]

Let us define

\[
k = \frac{K}{\gcd(K, G)} \quad \text{and} \quad g = \frac{G}{\gcd(K, G)}.
\]

Then \( \frac{K}{G} < k \), \( g < k \) and \( \gcd(k, g) = 1 \). Also \( e < \frac{n}{G} \) and thus \( \frac{e}{n} < 1 \). Now we have

\[
ed = \frac{k}{g} \cdot (p - 1)(q - 1) + 1 \implies \quad edg = k(p - 1)(q - 1) + g, \quad (8)
\]

and we obtain

\[
\frac{k}{dg} - \frac{e}{n} = \frac{kn - edg}{ndg} = \frac{k(p + q) - k - g}{ndg} > \frac{k(p + q) - k - k}{ndg} > \frac{2k(\sqrt{n} - 1)}{ndg}.
\]

Since \( \frac{k}{dg} > \frac{e}{n} \cdot \frac{n}{n - 2\sqrt{n} + 1} \), we obtain

\[
\frac{k}{dg} - \frac{e}{n} > \frac{e}{n} \cdot \frac{n}{n - 2\sqrt{n} + 1} - \frac{e}{n} = \frac{e}{n} \cdot \frac{2(\sqrt{n} - 1)}{\sqrt{n} - 1} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{2\sqrt{n} - 1}{(\sqrt{n} - 1)^2} > \frac{2}{n\sqrt{n}}.
\]

In the opposite direction we have

\[
\frac{k}{dg} - \frac{e}{n} = \frac{kn - edg}{ndg} = \frac{k(p + q) - k - q}{ndg} < \frac{2.1214k\sqrt{n}}{ndg} < \frac{2.1214k}{dg\sqrt{n}}.
\]
We may assume that \( n > 10^8 \). Then we have
\[
\frac{k}{dg} - \frac{e}{n} < \frac{2.1214k}{dg\sqrt{10^8}} = 0.00021214k
\Rightarrow \frac{e}{n} > \frac{k - 0.00021214k}{dg} \\
\Rightarrow \frac{k}{dg} < \frac{e}{n} \frac{1}{1 - 0.00021214} < 1.00022 \frac{e}{n} \Rightarrow \frac{k}{dg} < \frac{e}{n} \frac{1}{1 - 0.00021214} \frac{1}{n\sqrt{n}}.
\]

Let \( m \) be the largest odd integer such that
\[
\frac{p_m}{q_m} > \frac{e}{n} + \frac{2.1219e}{n\sqrt{n}}.
\]

We have two possibilities depending on whether the inequality \( \frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} > \frac{k}{dg} \) is satisfied or not.

1. **CASE:** In the first case we assume that \( \frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} > \frac{k}{dg} \). We have
\[
\left| \frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{dg} \right| < \frac{2.1219e}{n\sqrt{n}} < \frac{2.1219}{G\sqrt{n}} = \frac{2.1219D^2g^2}{G} (dg)^2,
\]

and from Theorem 1 we conclude that
\[
\frac{k}{dg} = \frac{rp_{m+1} + sp_m}{rq_{m+1} + sq_m} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{k}{dg} = \frac{sp_{m+2} - tp_{m+1}}{sq_{m+2} - tq_{m+1}};
\]

where \( m \geq -1 \), and \( r, s \) and \( t \) are nonnegative integers satisfying inequalities \( rs < 4.2438D^2g^2 \) and \( st < 4.2438D^2g^2 \).

If we search for \( \frac{k}{dg} \) among the fractions of the form \( \frac{rp_{m+1} + sp_m}{rq_{m+1} + sq_m} \), we have the system
\[
k = rp_{m+1} + sp_m, \\
dg = rq_{m+1} + sq_m.
\]

The determinant of this system is \( p_m q_{m+1} - p_{m} q_{m+1} = -(-1)^{m+1} = -1 \), and therefore, the system has positive integer solutions:
\[
r = dg p_m - kg_m, \\
s = kg_{m+1} - dp_{m+1}.
\]

If \( r \) and \( s \) are small, then they can be found by an exhaustive search. Let us find upper bounds for \( r \) and \( s \). From [8, Theorem 9 and 13], we obtain
\[
r = dg p_m - kg_m < dg q_m \left( \frac{p_m}{q_m} - \frac{k}{dg} \right) < dg q_m \left( \frac{p_m}{q_m} - \frac{e}{n} \right) < dg q_m \frac{1}{q_m q_{m+1}} = \frac{dg}{q_{m+1}}.
\]

In the estimate for \( s \) we consider two possibilities. Assume first that
\[
\frac{e}{n} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} > \frac{2.1219e}{n\sqrt{n}}.
\]
Then
\[ s = kq_{m+1} - dp_{m+1} = dq_{m+1} \left( \frac{k}{dg} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \right) = dq_{m+1} \left( \frac{k}{dg} - \frac{e}{n} + \frac{e}{n} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \right) \]
\[ < 2dq_{m+1} \cdot \left( \frac{e}{n} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \right) < 2dq_{m+1} \cdot \frac{1}{q_{m+1}q_{m+2}} = \frac{2dg}{q_{m+2}}. \]

Since
\[ \frac{1}{q_{m+2}(a_{m+3} + 2)} < \frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} - \frac{e}{n} < \frac{2.1219e}{n\sqrt{n}} < \frac{2.1219}{G\sqrt{n}}, \]
(see [8, Theorem 13]) we have
\[ q_{m+2} > \frac{\sqrt{G\sqrt{n}}}{\sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+3} + 2)}}. \quad (9) \]

Putting all these estimates together, we obtain
\[ r < \frac{dg}{q_{m+1}} < \frac{dg}{q_{m+2}} = \frac{dg(a_{m+2} + 1)}{q_{m+2}} < \frac{dg(a_{m+2} + 1)\sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+3} + 2)}}{\sqrt{G}\sqrt{n}} < \sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+3} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \]
\[ s < \frac{2dg}{q_{m+2}} < \frac{2dg\sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+3} + 2)}}{\sqrt{G}\sqrt{n}} = 2 \cdot \sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+3} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \]
and finally
\[ rs < 4.2438(a_{m+3} + 2)(a_{m+2} + 1) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}. \quad (10) \]
Assume now that \( \frac{e}{n} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \leq \frac{2.1219e}{n\sqrt{n}} \). Then, analogously to (9), we obtain
\[ q_{m+1} > \frac{\sqrt{G\sqrt{n}}}{\sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+2} + 2)}} \quad \text{and} \quad r < \frac{dg}{q_{m+1}}, \]
which imply
\[ r < \frac{dg\sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+2} + 2)}}{\sqrt{G}\sqrt{n}} = \sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+2} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \]
\[ s = dq_{m+1} \left( \frac{k}{dg} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \right) < dq_{m+1} \left( \frac{p_m}{q_m} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \right) \]
\[ = dq_{m+1} \cdot \frac{pmq_{m+1} - p_{m+1}q_m}{q_mq_{m+1}} = dq_{m+1} \cdot \frac{1}{q_mq_{m+1}} = \frac{dg}{q_{m+1}} \]
\[ < \frac{dg}{a_{m+1} + 1} < \frac{dg(a_{m+1} + 1)}{q_{m+1}} < \frac{dg(a_{m+1} + 1)\sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+2} + 2)}}{\sqrt{G}\sqrt{n}} < \sqrt{2.1219(a_{m+2} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}. \]
In this case we obtain

$$rs < 2.1219 \left( a_{m+2} + 2 \right) \left( a_{m+1} + 1 \right) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

Inequalities (10) and (11) immediately give the bounds for the number of possible pairs \((r,s)\). However, the bounds can be improved by combining them with the previous estimate \(rs < 4.2428 \cdot \frac{D^2g^2}{G}\). This estimate and \(r = a_{m+2}s - t < a_{m+2}s\) imply

$$r < \sqrt{4.2438a_{m+2}} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

Also, we have that \(s \leq s_1\), where \(s_1 = \left\lfloor 2 \cdot \sqrt{2.1219 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right) \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}} \right\rfloor \) if \(\frac{e}{n} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \geq 2.1219\), and \(s_1 = \left\lfloor 2 \cdot 2.1219 \left( a_{m+2} + 2 \right) \left( a_{m+1} + 1 \right) \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}} \right\rfloor \) if \(\frac{e}{n} - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} \leq 2.1219\).

Let \(s_0 = \left\lfloor 4.2438 \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}a_{m+2}} \right\rfloor\). We have the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs \((r,s)\):

$$a_{m+2} \left( 1 + 2 + 3 + \cdots + (s_0 - 1) \right) + 4.2438 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} \left( \frac{1}{s_0} + \frac{1}{s_0 + 1} + \cdots + \frac{1}{s_1} \right)$$

$$< a_{m+2} \frac{s_0(s_0 - 1)}{2} + 4.2438 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} \left( 1 + \int_{s_0}^{s_1} \frac{dx}{x} \right) < a_{m+2} \frac{s_0(s_0 - 1)}{2} + 4.2438 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} \left( 1 + \ln \frac{s_1}{s_0} \right)$$

$$< 4.2438 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} \left( 1 + \ln \left( 0.7072 \max(A,B) \right) \right)$$

$$< 4.2438 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} \left( 1.1536 + \ln \left( \max(A,B) \right) \right),$$

where

$$A = 2\sqrt{a_{m+2} \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right)} \quad \text{and} \quad B = \sqrt{a_{m+2} \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right) \left( a_{m+1} + 1 \right)}.$$  

Let \(P(a_i = q)\) be the probability that the partial quotient \(a_i\), of the real number \(\alpha\), is equal to \(q\), when \(\alpha\) is chosen at random. Then we have the following formula [9, p. 368]

$$P(a_i = q) = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{1}{(q + 1)^2 - 1} \right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

We have that the success of this attack depends on the size of corresponding partial quotients \(a_{m+1}, a_{m+2} \text{ and } a_{m+3}\). From (12) we have that these partial quotients are usually small, but we can exclude the possibility that at least one of them is large.

We obtain the following experimental results (which are in good agreement with theoretical results which follow from (12), assuming that \(a_i\) are independent)

$$P(\max \{ A, B \} \leq 13) = 0.5135,$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

$$P(\max \{ A, B \} \leq 104) = 0.9002.$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

If we take 1000000 randomly chosen pairs of prime numbers \(p\) and \(q\), such that \(10^{10} < p, q < 10^{50}\), then we obtain the following results. In 50% cases we have \(G = 2\), and in 90% cases we have \(G \leq 18\). By these results and (13), in 25% cases
we have \( G = 2 \) and \( \max\{A, B\} \leq 13 \), which imply that in 25\% cases the upper bound for the number of possible pairs \((r, s)\) is \(31.5616D^2\). Also, in 81\% cases we have \( G \leq 18 \) and \( \max\{A, B\} \leq 104 \). Thus, in 81\% cases the upper bound for the number of possible pairs \((r, s)\) is \(442.8992D^2\).

We have the same upper bounds for the number of possible pairs \((s, t)\).

2. CASE: We assume \( \frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} \geq \frac{k}{dg} \). In this case we have

\[
\frac{k}{dg} = \frac{r'p_{m+3} + s'p_{m+2}}{r'q_{m+3} + s'q_{m+2}},
\]

and similarly to the first case we have

\[
\begin{align*}
  r' &= dg p_{m+2} - k q_{m+2}, \\
  s' &= k q_{m+3} - dg p_{m+3}.
\end{align*}
\]

Now we have

\[
\begin{align*}
  s' &= dg q_{m+3} \left( \frac{k}{dg} - \frac{p_{m+3}}{q_{m+3}} \right) \\
  &= dg q_{m+3} \cdot \frac{p_{m+2} - p_{m+3} + s'q_{m+2} - s'q_{m+3}}{q_{m+2}^2} \\
  &< \frac{dg}{\sqrt{G}} \cdot \frac{2.1219 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right)}{\sqrt{\sqrt{n}}} \\
  &= \sqrt{2.1219 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right)} \cdot \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}},
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
  r' &= dg q_{m+2} \left( \frac{p_{m+2} - k}{dg} \right) < dg q_{m+2} \left( \frac{p_{m+2} - \frac{e}{n} + \frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{dg}}{q_{m+2}^2} \right) \\
  &< \frac{0.061 dg q_{m+2} \left( p_{m+2} - \frac{e}{n} \right)}{a_{m+3} + 3 q_{m+2} q_{m+1}} < \frac{1}{q_{m+2}^2} \cdot \frac{0.061 \sqrt{G}}{\sqrt{\sqrt{n}}} \\
  &= \frac{0.061 \sqrt{2.1219 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right)} \cdot \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}}{a_{m+3}} < 0.1540 \cdot \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}.
\end{align*}
\]

Hence, we have the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs \((r', s')\)

\[
r's' < \frac{0.061 \cdot 2.1219 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right)}{a_{m+3}} \cdot \frac{Dg^2}{G} < 0.3884 \frac{Dg^2}{G}.
\]

We will now consider how one could test whether a guess of \( k \) and \( dg \) is correct. Since \( g < k \), from (8) we have that a guess of \((p - 1)(q - 1)\) is \( \left\lfloor \frac{ce}{\pi} \right\rfloor \), while a guess
of \( g \) is \( edg \mod k \). The guess of \((p - 1)(q - 1)\) can be used to create a guess of \( \frac{p + q}{2} \) using the following identity
\[
\frac{p + q}{2} = \frac{n - (p - 1)(q - 1) + 1}{2}.
\]

If the guess of \( \frac{p + q}{2} \) is not an integer, then the guess of \( k \) and \( dg \) is wrong. The guess of \( \frac{p + q}{2} \) can be used to create a guess of \( \left(\frac{q - p}{2}\right)^2 \) using the following identity
\[
\left(\frac{q - p}{2}\right)^2 = \left(\frac{p + q}{2}\right)^2 - n. \tag{15}
\]

If the guess of \( \left(\frac{q - p}{2}\right)^2 \) is a perfect square, then the original guess of \( k \) and \( dg \) is correct. The secret key \( d \) can be found by dividing \( dg \) by \( g \). Recall that \( g \) is the remainder on division of \( edg \) by \( k \). We can also recover \( p \) and \( q \) easily from \( \frac{p + q}{2} \) and \( \frac{q - p}{2} \), by
\[
p = \frac{p + q}{2} - \frac{q - p}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad q = \frac{p + q}{2} + \frac{q - p}{2}.
\]

**Example 1.** Let us take 25-digits number \( n = 1338871137782389210296931 \) and \( e = 106154303640063475571633 \). The first 16 partial quotients of the continued fraction expansion of \( e/n \) are
\[
[0, 12, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 982, 7, 1, 4, 18, \ldots ],
\]
and the first 14 convergents are
\[
0, \frac{1}{12}, \frac{13}{13}, \frac{25}{25}, \frac{38}{38}, \frac{63}{63}, \frac{164}{164}, \frac{227}{227}, \frac{391}{391}, \frac{618}{618}, \frac{1009}{1009}, \frac{991456}{991456}, \frac{6941201}{6941201}, \frac{7932657}{7932657}, \ldots
\]
We find that
\[
\frac{78609}{991456} < \frac{e}{n} < \frac{2.1219e}{n\sqrt{n}} < \frac{49}{618},
\]
and we have \( m = 9 \). We are searching for the rational number \( k/dg \) among the numbers
\[
\frac{80r + 49s}{1009r + 618s}, \quad \frac{78609s - 80t}{991456s - 1009t}, \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{550343s' + 78609s'}{6941201t' + 991456s'}. \]

By applying the above described test, we find that \( s = 209 \) and \( t = 2 \) gives the correct value for secret key \( d \) (i.e. for \( k \) and \( dg \)). We have \( d = 34535381 \), and \( p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407 \).

If we compare these numbers \( s \) and \( t \) with the numbers \( r \) and \( s \) obtained by an application of the Verheul and van Tilborg attack to the same problem, we have the same number \( s = 209 \), but the other number \( r = 205236 \) is much greater than the number \( t = 2 \).

**Example 2.** Let \( n = 881542675172451959659 \). Among 1000000 trials with a randomly chosen private key \( d \), such that \( \frac{1}{3}n^{0.25} < d < 10^9 \cdot \frac{1}{3}n^{0.25} \) we have the following results. In 991847 (99.18\%) trials we have that \( \frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} < \frac{k}{dg} \). The value of
min\{rs, st\} is equal to rs in 491974 (49.20%) cases, and it is equal to st in 499873 (49.99%) cases. The maximal value of these minimums is 78721198569929382 and it is attained for \(d = 56718771847943\). The average value of min\{rs, st\} is 8388052160310987713.27.

In 8153 (0.82%) trials we have that \(\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} \geq \frac{k}{dG}\). The maximal value of products \(r's'\) is 1081631134948304523, and it is attained for \(d = 38407030686079\). The average value of these products is 5611757083137645.76.

The maximal value of \(G \cdot \min\{rs, st\}\) is 4.0363 and it is attained for \(d = 56718771847943\). The average value of these minimums for \(d\) in the given interval is 0.8455.

4.2. Case \(S(n) = \text{lcm}(p + 1, q + 1)\)

Analogously to the previous section we have

\[
\frac{1.9997e}{n \sqrt{n}} < e - \frac{k}{dG} < \frac{2.1216e}{n \sqrt{n}}.
\]

Let \(m\) be the largest even integer such that

\[
\frac{p_m}{q_m} < \frac{e - \frac{2.1216e}{n \sqrt{n}}}{n \sqrt{n}}.
\]

As in Section 4.1, we have two possibilities depending on whether the inequality \(\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} \leq \frac{k}{dG}\) is satisfied or not. In the first case we can assume that \(\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} > \frac{k}{dG}\). If \(\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} - \frac{e}{n} > \frac{2.1216e}{n \sqrt{n}}\), then we have

\[
r < \sqrt{2.1216 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right) \left( a_{m+2} + 1 \right)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}},
\]

\[
s < 2 \cdot \sqrt{2.1216 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}},
\]

\[
rs < 4.2432 \left( a_{m+3} + 2 \right) \left( a_{m+2} + 1 \right) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\]

If \(\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} - \frac{e}{n} \leq \frac{2.1216e}{n \sqrt{n}}\), then we have

\[
r < \sqrt{2.1216 \left( a_{m+2} + 2 \right)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}},
\]

\[
s < \sqrt{2.1216 \left( a_{m+2} + 2 \right) \left( a_{m+1} + 1 \right)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}},
\]

\[
rs < 2.1216 \left( a_{m+2} + 2 \right) \left( a_{m+1} + 1 \right) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\]

Thus, we obtain the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs \((r, s)\), and also \((s, t)\)

\[
4.2432 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} \left( 1.1536 + \ln \left( \max (A, B) \right) \right).
\]
In the second case we assume that \( \frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} \leq \frac{k}{dg} \) and obtain
\[
\begin{align*}
  s' &< \sqrt{2.1216 (a_{m+3} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}} \\
  r' &< 0.061 \frac{\sqrt{2.1216 (a_{m+3} + 2)}}{a_{m+3}} \cdot \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}} < 0.1539 \cdot \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}.
\end{align*}
\]
The upper bound for the number of the possible pairs \((r',s')\) is
\[
rs' < 0.3883 \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\]

The guess of \((p + 1)(q + 1)\) is \(\left\lfloor \frac{edg}{k} \right\rfloor\), and of \(g\) is \(edg \mod k\). We can determine \(p\) and \(q\) from (15) and the identity
\[
\frac{p + q}{2} = \frac{(p + 1)(q + 1) - n - 1}{2}.
\]

**Example 3.** Let us take again \(n = 1338871137782389210296931\) and now \(e = 223201031770339258802723\). In this case we have \(m = 2, s = 947366288, t = 207\) (and \(r = 5684197521\)). We obtain the fraction \(k/dg\) in the form
\[
\frac{k}{dg} = \frac{3997 \cdot 947366288 - 666 \cdot 207}{23976 \cdot 947366288 - 3995 \cdot 207}.
\]

Finally, we obtain \(d = 22714053294123\) and \(p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407\).

**4.3. Case** \(S(n) = \text{lcm}(p + 1, q - 1)\)

In this case we have
\[
\frac{0.9999e}{n(n + 0.9999)} < \frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{dg} < \frac{0.7072e}{n\sqrt{n}}.
\]

Let \(m\) be the largest even integer such that
\[
\frac{p_m}{q_m} < \frac{e}{n} - \frac{0.7072e}{n\sqrt{n}}.
\]

Let \(\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} > \frac{k}{dg}\) and assume that \(\frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} - \frac{e}{n} > \frac{0.7072e}{n\sqrt{n}}\). We obtain
\[
\begin{align*}
r &< \sqrt{0.7072 (a_{m+3} + 2)} (a_{m+2} + 1) \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
s &< 2 \cdot \sqrt{0.7072 (a_{m+3} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
r s &< 1.4144 (a_{m+3} + 2) (a_{m+2} + 1) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\end{align*}
\]
If we assume \( \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}} = \frac{\varepsilon}{n} \leq \frac{0.7072e}{n\sqrt{n}} \), then we have

\[
\begin{align*}
    r &< \sqrt{0.7072 \left(a_{m+2} + 2\right)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
s &< \sqrt{0.7072 \left(a_{m+2} + 2\right) \left(a_{m+1} + 1\right)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
rs &< 0.7072 \left(a_{m+2} + 2\right) \left(a_{m+1} + 1\right) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\end{align*}
\]

The upper bound for the number of possible pairs \((r, s)\), and also \((s, t)\), is

\[
1.4144 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} \left(1.1536 + \ln \left(\max (A, B)\right)\right).
\]

Let \( \frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} \leq \frac{k}{dg} \). In this case we have

\[
\begin{align*}
    s' &< \sqrt{0.7072 \left(a_{m+3} + 2\right)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
r' &< 1.4566 \cdot \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}},
\end{align*}
\]

and we obtain the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs \((r', s')\)

\[
r's' < 0.7072 \cdot \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\]

The guess of \((p + 1)(q - 1)\) is \( \left\lfloor \frac{edg}{k} \right\rfloor \), and of \( g \) is \( edg \mod k \). Factors \( p \) and \( q \) can be obtained from

\[
\begin{align*}
    \frac{q - p}{2} &= \frac{(p + 1)(q - 1) - n + 1}{2}, \quad (16) \\
\left(\frac{p + q}{2}\right)^2 &= \left(\frac{q - p}{2}\right)^2 + n. \quad (17)
\end{align*}
\]

**Example 4.** Let us take again \( n = 1338871137782389210296931 \) and now \( e = 148338118876659391215397 \). In this case we have \( m = 4, s = 1009345869, t = 256 \) (and \( r = 1009345613 \)). Thus, we obtain the fraction \( k/dg \) in the form

\[
k = 75989 \cdot 1009345869 - 75834 \cdot 256 \]

\[
-685862 \cdot 1009345869 - 684463 \cdot 256.
\]

Finally, we obtain \( d = 346135900590775 \) and \( p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407 \).

**4.4. Case** \( S(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q + 1) \)

In this case we have

\[
\frac{1.9999e}{n(n - 1.9999)} < \frac{k}{dg} < \frac{e}{n} < \frac{0.7074e}{n\sqrt{n}}.
\]
Let $m$ be the largest odd integer such that
\[
\frac{p_m}{q_m} < \frac{e_n}{n + \sqrt{n}}.
\]
Let $\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} < \frac{k}{dg}$ and assume that $\frac{e_n}{n - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}}} > \frac{0.7074e}{n\sqrt{n}}$. Then we have
\[
\begin{align*}
r &< \sqrt{0.7074 (a_{m+3} + 2) (a_{m+2} + 1)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
s &< 2 \cdot \sqrt{0.7074 (a_{m+3} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
rs &< 1.4148 (a_{m+3} + 2) (a_{m+2} + 1) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\end{align*}
\]
If we assume $\frac{e_n}{n - \frac{p_{m+1}}{q_{m+1}}} \leq \frac{0.7074e}{n\sqrt{n}}$, then we have
\[
\begin{align*}
r &< \sqrt{0.7074 (a_{m+2} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
s &< \sqrt{0.7074 (a_{m+2} + 2) (a_{m+1} + 1)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
rs &< 0.7074 (a_{m+2} + 2) (a_{m+1} + 1) \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\end{align*}
\]
In this case we obtain the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs $(r, s)$, and also $(s, t), 1.4148 \frac{D^2g^2}{G} (1.1536 + \ln(\max(A, B)))$.
If we have $\frac{p_{m+2}}{q_{m+2}} \geq \frac{k}{dg}$, then we obtain
\[
\begin{align*}
s' &< \sqrt{0.7074 (a_{m+3} + 2)} \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}, \\
r' &< 1.4566 \cdot \frac{Dg}{\sqrt{G}}.
\end{align*}
\]
The upper bound for the number of possible pairs $(r', s')$ is
\[
r's' < 0.7074 \frac{D^2g^2}{G}.
\]
The guess of $(p-1) (q+1)$ is $\left\lfloor \frac{e dg}{k} \right\rfloor$, and of $g$ is $edg \mod k$. Factors $p$ and $q$ can be obtained from (17) and
\[
\frac{q - p}{2} = \frac{n - (p - 1) (q + 1) - 1}{2}.
\]
**Example 5.** Let us take the same $n = 1338871137782389210296931$ and now $e = 293598101817010770384145$. In this case we have $m = 17, s = 46041557, t = 120$ (and $r = 138124551$) and we obtain the fraction $k/dg$ in the form
\[
\frac{k}{dg} = \frac{343149 \cdot 46041557 - 89285 \cdot 120}{1564834 \cdot 46041557 - 407159 \cdot 120}.
\]
Finally, we obtain $d = 36023672473729$ and $p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407$. 

Example 6. Let \( n = 881542675172451959659 \). Among 1000000 trials with a randomly chosen private key \( d \), such that \( \frac{1}{3} n^{0.25} < d < \frac{1}{3} n^{0.25} \), we compare the obtained results in three cases, depending on function \( S(n) \). We consider function \( S \) in the form

\[ S(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q + 1), \text{lcm}(p - 1, q + 1), \text{lcm}(p - 1, q + 1), \text{lcm}(p - 1, q + 1) \]

respectively.

In 990587 (99.06\%) trials, 893373 (89.34\%) and 882391 (88.24\%) trials, we obtained \( k \) and \( dg \) with pairs \((r, s)\) and \((s, t)\). More precisely, \( \min\{rs, st\} \) is equal to \( rs \) in 488275 (48.83\%), 393932 (39.39\%) and 383390 (38.34\%) trials, and it is equal to \( st \) in 502312 (50.23\%), 499441 (49.94\%) and 499001 (49.90\%) trials. The maximal values of these minimums are

\[
721090380565428735 \quad (d = 342804871054489),
\]
\[
125268491259184839 \quad (d = 334161510529429)
\]

and

\[
326408359472540736 \quad (d = 56974579771127)
\]

The average values of these minimums are

\[
1425002034008237123.16, \quad 705703219014797180.45 \quad \text{and} \quad 15886594335277959.27.
\]

The maximal values of \( \frac{G_{\min\{rs, st\}}}{D^{2g^2}} \) are

\[
4.0330 \quad (d = 299225532498339),
\]
\[
0.8205 \quad (d = 329534695410043)
\]

and

\[
0.7977 \quad (d = 54342302187019),
\]

and the average values are 0.8561, 0.1899 and 0.1841.

In 9413 (0.94\%) trials, we obtained \( k \) and \( dg \) with pairs \((r', s')\). The maximal values of products \( r's' \) are

\[
1063899527763072894 \quad (d = 300078163615589),
\]
\[
124177863950097406 \quad (d = 104182591660513)
\]

and

\[
86705428719975975 \quad (d = 55869596982065),
\]

and the average values are 1425002034008237123.16, 705703219014797180.45 and 15886594335277959.27. The maximal values of \( \frac{Gr's'}{D^{2g^2}} \) are

\[
0.0708 \quad (d = 49908237142041),
\]
\[
0.2038 \quad (d = 278995224797287)
\]

and

\[
0.2218 \quad (d = 23630365395965),
\]

and the average values of these products are 0.0208, 0.0486 and 0.0500.
Note that the LUC cryptosystem with a 1024-bit modulus $n$ is factoring–secure. In this case, Pinch [12] showed that the LUC cryptosystem is insecure for a 256-bit $d$. We have implemented the attack described in this paper in the computer algebra system PARI/GP (on a 3.0GHz – Pentium under Windows XP). It works efficiently for $D \leq 2^{14}$. More precisely, an implementation of this attack needs on average around one hour for $D \leq 2^{13}$ and around 5 hours for $D \leq 2^{14}$. Thus, we conclude that our attack shows that the LUC cryptosystem, with a 1024-bit modulus $n$, is insecure for a 270–bit secret key $d$.

References


