Return and Reintegration of Minority Refugees: The Complexity of the Serbian Returnees Experiences in the Town of Glina*

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Summary

This paper explores the reintegration challenges Serbian refugees face as they attempt to return to local Croatian communities. It provides a comparison between the modes of cooperation, levels of trust and social networks that existed before the war in the 1990s with those that have developed upon their return. Furthermore, this paper explores the returnees’ perceptions of public institutions, and more specifically their incentives for return and integration.

Reintegration cannot be understood as a singular process that results in one absolute returnee experience. Rather, this study will analyse reintegration as a set of complex processes, decisions and perceptions resulting from varying conditions and experiences. In order to successfully evaluate these experiences, this paper will focus on ‘practical categories’, and how they gain or lose meaning in public and private environments. Utilizing this approach, this paper will argue that the setting to which a Serbian refugee returned affected his or her experience, producing both feelings of inclusion and exclusion.

* Paper presented at the Central European Political Science Association conference on Europeanization of National Politics, 2nd to 5th October, Opatija, Croatia. The paper is based on the data gathered for the purposes of dissertation for the degree MSC in Forced Migration, at Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, at the academic year 2006/07. The author wants to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms, comments and suggestions, most of which have been incorporated to this paper. The limited scope of the research and date available has prevented the author from including all of the comments into the paper. These, however, will be taken into account during future research and further development of the argument. The author also wishes to thank prof. Roger Zetter, Selma Porobić, Marko Grdešić, Krešimir Petković, Andrea Purdeková and Ognjenka Manojlović for their invaluable comments and criticisms during the research and writing process. All possible shortcomings and errors in the paper are the sole responsibility of the author.

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Introduction

The 1990s were among the most turbulent times in the history of southeastern Europe. The dissolution of former Yugoslavia resulted in the separation of the previously federated republics into sovereign states. In most cases, however, violent conflicts ensued. Nationalist ideologies, the key catalyst of the emerging wars, advocated for the alignment of national borders and ethnically homogeneous nations. The enveloping conflicts created hundreds of thousands of forced migrants, whose ethnic membership made them victim to nationalist opportunism.

Croatia witnessed two major flows of forced migration. In 1991, a large number of ethnic Croats were displaced from territories occupied by Serbian separatists. In 1995, the military Operations “Flash” and “Storm,” which resulted in Croatia re-seizing its territory, drove more than 200,000 Serbs from their homes. In the following years, the national government was slow to implement legislation to facilitate their return. It was not until 1998, following the introduction of the Program for Return, that significant, but still very low numbers of Serbian refugees began to return. Local Croatian communities, however, were often a very unfriendly environment. A number of social and institutional obstacles prevented Serbs from having an easy reintegration. This paper will focus on the experiences and perspectives of the Serbian refugees who decided to return.

The study seeks to explore the complexity of the refugees’ return experiences, including the economic hardships associated with post-conflict societies, the negative public images of their roles in the conflict, hostility at the social level, and the institutional practices of a discriminatory state. A key part of the analysis will examine how returnees expressed their agency in such contexts, and the reintegration outcomes associated within them.

Reintegration cannot be understood as a singular process that results in one absolute returnee experience. Rather, this study will analyse reintegration as a set of complex processes, decisions and perceptions resulting from varying conditions and experiences. In order to successfully evaluate these experiences, this paper will focus on ‘practical categories’ (Brubaker 1996: 65-66; Brubaker 2006: 11-12), and how they gain or lose meaning in public and private environments. Using this approach, this paper will argue that the
setting to which a Serbian refugee returned affected his or her experience, producing both feelings of inclusion and exclusion.

Data collected from the town of Glina during December 2006 and January 2007 will support this argument. The major findings of this research are that the perceived degrees of re-integration for the Serbian returnees to Glina vary depending on 1) the institutional contexts within which they act and 2) their specific demographic variables such as age and occupation. Encounters with institutional actors, including state officials and bureaucrats, led many Serbian returnees to perceive high levels of alienation and low degrees of integration into Croatian society. Yet in everyday and non-formal settings, reintegration experiences differ across the returnee population, depending on the particular demographic features and category memberships of a community. These disparities reveal that reintegration is a complex process, largely dependent on a returnee’s perceived freedom of agency associated with different social contexts.

This argument will be developed in four sections. The first part will analyse returnee and reintegration literature and suggest questions for a future analysis of Serbian returnees. In this section, Brubaker’s analytical framework for studying ethnicity and nationality will be adapted to the experiences of Serbian returnees. The second section will provide information on the historical, contextual and political issues surrounding Serbian returnees in Croatia in order to help understand the conditions of return faced by Serbian returnees. The third and fourth sections will examine the results and analysis of the data provided from the aforementioned town of Glina.

1. Returnees and return: does the experience of returnees matter?

Geopolitical changes in the post-Cold War era have produced a discourse in which repatriation is most often considered the most desirable solution of the refugee problem. Recently, however, this notion has been challenged by scholars of forced migration. Many experts now question the refugee’s desire to return (Harrell-Bond 1989), the latent interests hidden in repatriation policies and legislative language (Chimni 1993; Chimni 1999), whether return amounts to the end of the refugee experience (Black and Koser 1999; Chimni 2002, Hammond 1999). Yet the pertinent issue most often neglected is what reintegration means to returnees.

According to Chimni (1999), the history of desirable solutions toward the refugee problem can be divided in two periods. Until the mid-1980s, resettlement was considered the key objective. Later, however, refugee discourse became dominated by the promotion of various types of repatriation (volun-
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tary, safe and imposed). Chimni argues that it is often unclear who benefits
the most from these so-called desirable solutions. In most cases, these poli-
cies were enacted in the interests of host states, rather than the refugees
whose improved conditions were the supposed aim (1999: 10).

The explanation for the above-mentioned policies can be found in the
discourse which, *inter alia*, Malkki calls the “pathologization of uprooted-
ness in the national order of things” (1992: 33). According to this under-
standing, nations and cultures are considered to be naturally connected to a
particular territory, consequently ‘rooting’ individuals and their identities in
particular places (1992: 26). Malkki notes that biological terms, which are
strongly associated with this approach, provide powerful images of normal-
ity connecting *an* identity and *a* territory of origin (1992: 26). This allows
states the ability to continue repatriation policies by claiming that, ‘for many
refugees the strongest hope is to return home,’ (GCIP 2002: 247), as well as
present their policies as the natural order in a world in which national and
cultural boundaries are understood to follow clearly demarcated lines and
definable territories (Malkki 1992 :27).

Finally, one can argue that, in addition to these policies that promote
resettlement, particular historical events in the 1990s led to the perception
that a return home is ‘desirable.’ First, as Black and Gent argue, the reasons
for a growing interest in repatriation must be seen in light of the post-Cold
War ‘peace dividend’ (2004: 5), which made plausible the idea that refugees
could return home. As well, many of the wars in the 1990s were followed by
a violent period of ethnic cleansing in pursuit of political goals. By promot-
ing repatriation, the international community sought to mitigate ethnic clean-
sing, and to right the wrong by encouraging or forcing minority refugee
populations to return to their areas of origin (Phoung, 2000).

Yet what happens to refugees after their return has not been adequately
covered in major academic or policy debates (Hammond 1999; Chimni
2002; Black and Gent 2004; Kibreab 2002; Black and Koser 1999). The ex-
periences of refugees upon their return must be seriously considered as re-
settlement is not necessarily, as policy makers simplistically assume, “the
logical end of the refugee cycle” (Koser and Black 1999: 5). Rather, the idea
of return raises a number of obstacles and challenging tasks, including ad-
aptation, development, and change regarding new or unfamiliar conditions
(Zetter 1988: 101). As Zetter notes, the absence of root causes of refugee
flow is not a sufficient determinant for which to judge a sustainable return
(1988: 100). Hammond (1999) further argues that, in many cases, return is
nothing like a traditional homecoming for refugees. The social, economic,
and political conditions that existed before the return rarely resemble those
encountered by refugees upon their return. Return is rarely a reintegration
into old ways of living, but instead the beginning of a new chapter of adaptation to a set of completely new circumstances (1999: 229).

The social contexts in which returnees find themselves may be either very formal and institutionalized, or informal. Zetter’s (1991) classic article on labelling reveals the power of bureaucracy to form, transform and politicise identities of refugees dependent on the provisions associated with a label (1991: 40). More analysis is needed, however, to show the extent to which such labelled identities influence a returnee population’s methods in dealing with everyday situations. This may be especially important in cases where the refugee flux is an outcome of nation-state formation (Arendt 1985; Zolberg 1983). As Zolberg (1983) noted, these processes were not the outcomes of rational economic goals or calculations of the nation-states. On the contrary, emerging states were readily prepared to sacrifice their economic interest for mere political and ideological goals, driving out portions of their population even though it might be against their economic interests (Zolberg 1983: 33). This is particularly relevant to those states that emerged in the late twentieth-century.

In such cases, the ideology of ethnic homogeneity does not always result in ethnic cleansing and peace treaties. Instead, many emerging nation-states simply perpetuate discriminatory policies and practices towards a particular group of ethnic returnees long after the conflict has ended (Phoung 2000: 171-172). It remains to be seen whether the exclusion and limitation of particular categories of returnees from public settings will be reproduced in private settings, where the former refugees encounter their pre-war neighbours and attempt to (re)-establish cooperation and contact with them. The existing literature provides competing answers to this question. These theories generally depend on the causes of the refugee flux in a particular case study.

Kibreab’s study identifies positive cooperation outcomes between those who stayed and returnees (2002). He concluded that Eritrean returnees were usually welcomed warmly by those who had stayed behind. In fact, returnees were often perceived as the triggers of development, bringing skills and trans-national social networks back to their communities (2002: 61-69). In this case, however, the variable responsible for mediating between those who stayed and returnees was a belief that both groups exercised resistance against a common external enemy, ultimately creating the opportunity for an independent state (2002: 59-60). Nevertheless, the situation for returnees is rarely so favourable in multi-ethnic societies where war played a part in state formation. Rather, as Blitz argues, “Returnees may be associated with previous regimes and attached to former ethnic and political elite structures, and thus be the subject of hostility and jealousy” (2006: 242).

The case of Serbian returnees to Glina proves to be useful in accessing the impacts of the above-mentioned reintegration challenges, strategies, and
policies. As it will be shown, the environment of Glina for Serbian returnees posed two primary impediments for their reintegration. On the state and public level, a number of discriminatory policies were implemented to impede returnee’s reintegration into Croatian society. On the societal level, returnees were often met with animosity. This hostile environment often prevented returnee’s from establishing their former private lives. The results from Glina contribute to the argument of scholars like Hammond (1999), who emphasize the importance of refugees’ agency and their capabilities in assessing the situation and adjusting their actions accordingly (239). Glina also substantiates the arguments of scholars who highlight the importance of bureaucratic practices and the refugee’s subsequent dependency on such institutionally formed labels (Zetter). Faced with ethnic animosity and exclusion at the social-level and discriminatory practices at the state-level, Serbian returnees developed various modes of communication with their fellow townsmen and made adjustments to their new living conditions, resulting in different reintegration outcomes over the course of time.

In order to appropriately assess the Serbian returnee’s reintegration to Glina, one must keep in mind that nationality and ethnicity often remained central to the basic environmental conditions, as well as the political language of elites long after a conflict ended. If the nationality or ethnicity of refugees were associated with the ‘other’ sides in the conflict, the manner in which they are presented in the political sphere in a post-conflict environment usually poses a problem for successful reintegration.

The foremost scholars on nationalism, such as Gellner, Smith and Anderson, provide valuable analytical frameworks for identifying the causal relations between historical processes (Gellner 2006, Anderson 1983), myths and symbols (Smith 1986) and ways of developing a sense of belonging to a community (Anderson 1983). Yet for the analysis proposed in this research, it is necessary to examine ethnicity and nationality in an everyday context, in order to analyse its relevance to the reintegration experience of a particular ethnic minority in Croatia.

Brubaker’s approach provides an adequate framework for this task (1996; 2004; 2006). He opposes the ‘taken for granted “groupist” constructivist paradigm’ in the study of nationalism and ethnicity (2006: 7). A groupist approach, although it emphasizes that nation and ethnicity are constructed phenomena, assumes that ethnic groups are the main social actors (2006: 8). This results in using groups as units of analysis, easily attributing their identity, agency and will to pre-constructed notions and “neglects the everyday contexts in which ethnicity and national categories take on meaning and the processes through which ethnicity actually “works” in everyday life” (2006: 9). Rather, he argues for an alternative approach, introducing a
distinction between ‘categories’ and ‘groups’ as its central device (1996; 2004; 2006).

Brubaker defines groups as “mutually interacting, recognizing collectivises with a sense of solidarity, corporate identity and capacity of concerted action” (2006: 11), while maintaining these categories as a potential basis for group formation, or what he refers to as ‘groupness’ (2006: 9). The approach treats ethnicity and nationality as practical categories. This allows for an exploration of the processes and ways in which people use them in everyday settings to create their meanings of social context, and adjust their actions accordingly. Therefore, nationalism and ethnicity can be perceived as interpretative frames that help us make sense of social reality. Brubaker, however, acknowledges that these are not the only such frames:

Ethnicized ways of experiencing and interpreting the social world can only be studied alongside a range of alternative, non-ethnicized ways of seeing and being (2006: 15).

An analysis viewing ethnicity and nationality as categories, and which treats ‘groupness’ across these categories as something that happens (rather than exists) in various social settings, we can better understand the realities and meanings of reintegration from the perspective of the refugee. This allows us to consider how other practical categories shape these realities and guides the feelings and actions of returnees. This approach also allows us to study the declining curves of “groupness” across the category in situations where social settings give greater significance to other practical categories (Brubaker 2004: 19). These insights can be applied to the case of Serbian returnees in Croatia in order to evaluate and analyse the different reintegration outcomes within the particular locality.

2. Political background on the Serbian returnees to Croatia

After the five year period of Serbian occupation of Croatian territory, and the break down of several negotiations to peacefully resolve the conflict, Croatian armed forces began Operation Flash in May 1995. Flash’s success resulted in Croatia’s reclaiming UN Sector West (Western Slavonia). This was followed by Operation Storm in August, which secured UN Sectors North and South (Banija and Krajina). During and after Operation Storm, approximately 250,000 Serbs left Croatia and sought refuge in bordering countries, mainly Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, due to gross human rights violations against the Serbian population in the territories reclaimed by the Croatian military and police forces (HHO 2001: 20). Croatian officials did invite Serbs to stay in their homes and welcome the Croatian army, but the situation in the field largely negated this as a viable option. The number of Serb refugees soon climbed to an estimated 300,000 (OSCE
and over the last decade the return of Serbian refugees has become one of the most controversial issues in Croatian politics.

The war in Croatia raised several issues regarding the nature of the struggle, which must be taken into account in order to understand the social context Serbs faced at the time of their return. A number of scholars have even suggested that the outcomes, policies and actions of politicians before, during and after the war, raise legitimate concerns that ethnic cleansing was not just the outcome of war, but instead its intended aim (Žunec 1998; Banac 2006).

During the war, Žunec argues (1998: 111) that the rational logic of war to reach a particular goal was often replaced by an irrational desire to destroy targets. The purpose of such fighting was to create powerful symbols¹ that have potential long-term ideological effects on local communities. Similarly, Banac (2006) argues that ethnic cleansing and the idea of national homogenization should be considered as the real aims of the Balkan wars. As such, they developed from an idea shared equally by all parties in the conflict: that stability of the state is possible only if the statehood is constituted in the polity without national minorities (Banac 2006: 30).

According to Županov (1995) the main characteristic of local communities in the former Yugoslavia was the intentionally developed networks of primary social relationships between members of different ethnic groups (1995: 36). These networks existed in the institution of the “neighbourhood,” present throughout Yugoslav history. Violence was never perceived to come from within the community, but as something imposed from outside. In such situations neighbours would protect each other by providing shelter or help in escape (1995: 36). The destruction of these practices was the cornerstone of nationalist politics. As Žunec argues (1999), the primary aim of the war was the destruction of infrastructure and primary social relations, in order to make any future cooperation impossible. The war in the Balkans destroyed these primary networks and the trust associated with them, because in this war “it is the neighbour who kills, plunders and dislodges his neighbour” (Županov 1995: 39).

During the immediate aftermath of Operations Flash and Storm, the Croatian media perpetuated negative images of Serbs as anti-Croatian state elements, with whom it will never be again possible to share lives (IHO 1998: 39). It is important to note that these messages were not delivered by

¹ In his study on inter-ethnic relations in the town of Vukovar, Kardov (2002) represents a symbolic significance of this town. In academic and popular literature, Vukovar is presented as a “symbol of suffering,” a “symbol of victory”, a “Town Hero,” etc. (Kardov 2002: 99-100).
the marginal actors of Croatian political space, but from the highest political authorities.\(^2\)

In addition to the media, the population’s memories of the recent atrocities committed against Croats created a hostile environment for the return of Serbian refugees at the community-level. The Croatian government also contributed to the animosity. During the 1990s, a number of policies and legislation were enacted that created greater obstacles for the return of Serbian refugees. Human Rights Watch designated these practices as ‘Bureaucratic Ethnic Cleansing’ (1996: 29). These policies were particularly relevant to issues of citizenship, housing, reconstruction and constitutional rights.\(^3\)

Institutional policies improved following the 2000 elections, when a new centre-left government was elected. The newly elected president, Stjepan Mesić, and Prime Minister Ivica Račan stated that return and reintegration was a key priority of the new government. The social and economic aspects of return were later detailed in the ‘Knin Conclusion’ (US State Department 2002; Blitz 2005: 369). Legislation was soon thereafter enacted to provide equal minority representation in political bodies and education in minority languages. As well, the Housing Action Plan on repossession 2001-2002 was soon adopted into law (HRW 2003: 4, OSCE 2004).

Three years later, the right-wing HDZ party replaced the centre-left coalition; Ivo Sanader became the new Prime Minister. The government sur-

\(^2\) Croatian President Franjo Tudjman made particularly infamous statements in which he openly expressed his relief that the Serbs left Croatia: “Even the Croatian President openly says that Croatia’s future was not safe, while they [the Serbs] were living in Knin. Tudjman did not hide his relief at the fact that the Serbs had left Krajina, stressing that his appeal to the Serbian population during the Storm military operation was made only for the world’s sake. He compared Serbs to cancer destroying the Croatian national being at the very heart of Croatia and concluded that there is no return to the past” (IHO 1998: 39).

\(^3\) Probably the most appropriate illustration of such discriminatory practices could be found in housing legislation. The Law on Temporary Take Over and Administration of Certain Property (LTTO) enacted in 1995, and The Law on Areas of Special State Concern (LASSC), 1996, established a framework within which the Croatian government could legally seize the property of Serbian refugees in Croatia. The rationale behind these laws was to protect abandoned property, but in practice expropriated the Serbs from ownership of their homes. According to LTTO, owners had a right to reclaim their property within 90 days, and if this right was not exercised the special law was to regulate the ownership questions (HRW 1996: 31). However, because of difficult procedures and security obstacles to return, many Serbs could not practice this right. Their property was later allocated mostly to Croatian refugees from Bosnia, Croatian IDPs and Croats from Vojvodina (HRW 1999:16). Similar impediments were enacted regarding the ownership on tenancy rights. (HRW 1999; Blitz 2005: 368). Detailed information on other legislation producing impediments to return can be found in the following sources: on the legislation on citizenship in Croatia in 1991 (HRW 1996; 1999; Blitz 2003); on impact of the Reconstruction Act (HRW 1999: 38-41), on the temporary suspension of The Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and The Rights of National Minorities (Petričušić 2004; HRW 1996).
prised the public by forming a coalition with representatives of Serbian minorities in parliament. Following the country’s admission to begin membership negotiations with the EU, Croatia established full cooperation with ICTY and continued to progress on returnee issues, although at a slow pace (European Commission 2006). These positive changes were followed by the trilateral Sarajevo agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY in 2005, obliging its signatories to solve their refugee issues by the end of 2006 (OSCE 2006b).

The policies enacted during the 1990s dramatically illustrate the demographic picture of Croatia. Before the war Serbs amounted to 12.5% of Croatia’s population, but at the time of the last census this figure had fallen to 4.54% (DZS 2001). Improvements in policies came too late for many refugees, and from the estimated 300,000 Serbian refugees who left Croatia during the 1990s (OSCE 2005), only 123,642 have returned (MMTPR 2006).

These figures raise a series of questions regarding Serbian reintegration experiences in Croatia. What were the prospects of reintegration in such an environment? Are there possibilities for the restoration of trust between Serbs and Croats after the return, and in what circumstances do returnees cling to ethnic category to shape their perceptions of reintegration? Finally, what effects did the legislative policies have on the perceptions of Serbian returnees regarding their ability to reintegrate and “belong” to Croatian society? How (if at all) did these perceptions change in 2000 with the election of a new government?

3. Serbian returnees in Glina

3.1. Methodology

The data presented in this article was collected while conducting research in Zagreb and Glina in December 2006 and January 2007. It consists of five group and fourteen individual interviews. Twenty-seven individuals in total were interviewed. All interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions; this allowed for a “qualitative description of the life world of the subject with respect to interpretation of their meaning” (Kvale 1996: 124). While most interviews were taped, several individuals requested the recorder to be turned off. Thus, four interviews were documented via handwritten notes. All taped interviews were transcribed. NGO representatives, local and national politicians and Serbian and Croatian returnees were all recognised as relevant actors for this research.

Interviews with officials and NGO representatives were conducted in order to document the relevant background information on current return poli-
cies and administrative obstacles. Interviews with Serbian returnees were conducted in order to gain insight into their perceptions of return and reintegration. Interviews were also conducted with Serbian residents of Glina who chose to stay during the war. Their insight was useful in gaining their perspective of the returnees. Serbian returnees were contacted via the Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF) office in Zagreb. An SDF employee in Glina provided me with contacts of various educational backgrounds, occupations, sex and age.

Croats in Glina were contacted via the recommendations of interviewed Serbian returnees and through contacts established with the local municipality. Yet, where four interviews were arranged via the latter channel, only two actually took place. Although we can only speculate on the reasons for the two cancelations, it is important to note that their decision was made after they received information regarding the main focus of the study.

The interview process itself raised several practical and ethical challenges. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, interviews were organized in a comfortable environment which would encourage interviewees to talk openly about their experiences (Michell 1999: 36). In most cases, interviews took place at the interviewee’s homes. Two were conducted at their work place and one at a local café.

In order to establish rapport, I engaged an informal discussion with the contacts prior to asking their permission to record the conversation. This allowed participants to ask questions about the research itself, and decode the researcher’s interest in Serbian returnees. Informal conversations usually lasted from one to two hours. At their conclusion, I asked participants if they would be willing to participate in a more formal interview. The taped sessions lasted between fifty minutes and two hours. The questions were open-ended, which allowed interviewees to focus on themes of their choosing. When a topic or theme in one conversation appeared for the first time it would be added to a list of topics to be addressed with the next participant.

One of the main concerns of this style of analysis relates to the presentation of the data in order to capture the difficulties, challenges and realities of return experiences as a whole. All recorded interviews were transcribed, and together with the notes from non-recorded interviews, data was coded by identifying the leading themes and grouping them according to the chronological order of their appearance. Following Brubaker’s framework, I noticed that some practical categories had been replaced by others, while other categories grew or diminished in significance over the course of time. Therefore, I decided to present data in chronological order regarding important periods through which returnees’ present experiences have been shaped. All interviewees were classified as anonymous in order to assure their confidentiality.
3.1. Approaching Glina

Glina’s Official website provides a comparison of the ethnic structure before and after the war. In 1991, 23,040 people lived in the area; 60.6% were Serbs and 34.90% Croats. Glina itself had 6,933 inhabitants, of which 1,448 were Croats. The site emphasises that these conditions have changed since ‘The Homeland War.’ The last census records a population of 9,868, out of which 68.01% are Croats and 28.66% Serbs. A 2006 survey conducted by SDF on the employment of ethnic minorities in the public service sector shows that of 357 employees only four were Serbs (SDF 2006).

Local and (some) private television stations with national broadcast regularly raise the atrocities committed against Croatian civilians in Glina. The OSCE notes that such broadcasts “contained elements of hate speech, violation of ethical codes and media bias” (OSCE 2006a: 1).

The town witnessed two major forced migration flows during the war. In 1991, after Serbs took control, Croats were submitted to ethnic cleansing. The second flow occurred during Operation Storm. At this time, the vast majority of Serbs left to seek refuge in Bosnia and Serbia. When the first group of Serbian refugees attempted to return in 1996, a prominent local politician led a group of Croat citizens in stoning their bus. He later sent an official note to the government that Serbs are not welcome in Glina (HHO 2001: 289).

Whereas in towns such as Vukovar (Kardov 2002) war produced an environment of spatial division between Serbs and Croats, no such situation exists in Glina today. There is no separation of local cafés, stores or markets along ethnic lines. Furthermore, over the last several years no serious inter-ethnic incidents have been recorded, even though many nationalist parties try to exploit the ‘Homeland War’ and ‘Serbian threat’ in the months before elections.

3.2. Decision to leave; experience of exile; and decision to return

In order to understand the prospects of return and reintegration for the Serbian refugees, one must first assess the experiences of flight and exile. During the war, Serbian elites presented Serbia as a parent body of all Serbs and after the war were given a chance to show their solidarity. For many refugees, however, the reality of exile revealed that common ethnicity was not sufficient to secure acceptance by Serbs in Serbia.

When talking about their feelings during the flight, Serbian returnees often used terms like dehumanization, deprivation, insecurity, desperation, fear, and being cheated to describe the emotions that accompanied their departure. Yet upon reaching their final destination, most were unable to se-
cure more human conditions. The Serbian Government perpetuated their agony by first holding them on the borders and later directing them to Kosovo. Most of the interviewed returnees reflect with despair on these events, and emphasize that often such actions were followed by attempts of military and paramilitary officials to forcibly recruit the male population and send them to the front-lines. Interviewed returnees perceived such treatments as shifting from one life-threatening condition to another.

During exile they experienced numerous problems, including economic hardship, a lack of employment, uncertainty of the future, and the denial of citizenship. As well, local Serbs were often hostile to the new transplants. Most were welcomed with hostility, let alone accepted as friends. Although individual exceptions were named, the general impression from all interviewed returnees was that they were perceived by local populations as primitives, people of lower value, traitors and a threat to the local community’s economy.

Shared ethnicity was not a basis for cooperation or solidarity between refugees and locals. Local Serbs perceived refugees according to their territorial and cultural “roots.” In such conditions, the desire to return to Glina was even stronger. Many interviewees expressed that they made their decision to return during their first days of exile. The quality of life they had in Glina before the war was also particularly important in their desire to return.

3.3. Reality of return; first encounter with home and old neighbours

For those Serbs who longed for their former life in Croatia, return meant entering a new hostile environment. The impression of the vast majority of respondents was that Croats perceived them as enemies and held them responsible for everything negative that had happened during the war. This resulted in discrimination in various social settings and various types of abuses, ranging from personal insults to physical attacks. One of the interviewees’ house was bombed on three occasions after his return.

A significant numbers of Serbian returnees emphasized that verbal attacks were part of their everyday life. When entering a store, one might hear, “Go back to Serbia, Chetniks!” or “Now you are returning, and when you were killing us and burning our houses, where were you then?” This resulted in fear and avoidance of public places.

Meeting old Croat neighbours was another source of disappointment. Although individual exceptions were mentioned (as they say: “who was normal before, stayed normal after the war as well”), the vast majority of respondents stated that their pre-war friends refused to help or talk to them during the worse cases of physical threat, for example. In such an environment, so-
cial cooperation between Croats and Serbs was very limited, if present at all. Many interviewees noted, however, that they knew that many of their old friends wanted to re-establish a relationship but were afraid of the reaction of ‘the others.’ The interviewees believed that for Croats, socializing with Serbs may result in social exclusion.

Yet for several returnees, these conditions resulted in a higher awareness of their role in society and their responsibility towards other Serbs still in exile, who might want to return. As the Serbian returnee whose house was bombed on several occasions said,

“I knew that I was the first one who returned, and I knew what was the attempt of the attacker … if I take my things and flee back to Serbia, I knew that not a single Serb would return” (Interview 4 2006).

Serbian returnees developed different coping strategies. Some of them established a mode of action whereby they were prepared for the insults and learned not to react, but wait for emotions to settle before re-establishing social relations. Others stated that these events taught them they should never trust or be friends with people who received them with so much anger, hate and animosity.

3.4. Reality of return: social networks and everyday life today

There is a significant variation between the responses of the perceived situation in Glina today. They range from feelings of perpetual exclusion from society, to proud statements of survival given their ability to re-establish their place in the community.

Regarding personal safety, all respondents said that they no longer feel physically threatened. According to a significant number of returnees, cooperation on a day-to-day basis has begun. The ways in which cooperation, solidarity, and closer societal link develop is perceived differently by various individuals.

Younger Serbian returnees stated that they do not pay attention to the ethnicity of others. One returnee mentioned that in 2000, as there were no places for young people to socialize in Glina, they organized parties at one private house, and the young people, regardless of their ethnicity or taste in music, have participated in these. Politics was never a topic of their conversation, and it would never happen that Serbs would decide not to come because of the presence of Croats or vice versa. A young Serbian couple expressed that they do not see their friends as often as they used to, but it is not an ethnic problem, as much as it is a lack of time. The younger generation seems to be more concerned with issues of economic insecurity and the poor material conditions found in Glina rather than ethnicity.
After surviving the first years of reintegration, the returnee whose house was bombed, took out construction loans, invested in cattle, and stabled a successful farm. As a farmer he emphasizes the need to cooperate closely with Croats, which led to the re-establishment of some old friendships. In fact, sharing everyday experiences, especially at work, has been a common way to overcome the divisions of ethnicity. The former teacher comfortably stated that those who are causing problems are those who do not know or like to work.

On the contrary, there are a significant number of returnees who still have not managed to re-establish trust with Croats. In response to one question about problems with Croatian neighbours, one Serbian returnee stated:

“I don’t have any problems with them … the only thing is that this social contact has not been established… I don’t argue with him, nor fight … we just ignore each other … I tried to greet him once, he refused … So I don’t even try any more … why should I force something which is not meant to happen” (Interview 7 2006).

Often the problem is not because of the Croats’ unwillingness to cooperate with the Serbians. One Serbian woman stated that she will never be able to trust again the people who turned their back on her when she needed them the most.

It is interesting to note that for those Serbian returnees who still feel a sense of social exclusion, and who have not managed to re-establish their modes of cooperation with Croats, life in Glina is seen as one divided along ethnic lines. For them, social cooperation is an exception, rather than the rule. Further, they still feel that there is pressure from other Croats on those who do socialize with Serbs. The result is that even though some Croats visit Serbs, they may ignore or act ignorantly towards Serbs in public places.

The Croatian responses on the presence of Serbian returnees varied as well. There are those who, despite having experienced great family loses, do not hesitate to cooperate with Serbs. Others recognise that the region’s economic underdevelopment is a problem common to both Serbs and Croats and cooperation is inevitable. Nevertheless, there are those who think that it is not appropriate to establish close relations with Serbs:

“With those who openly participated in rebellion, trust cannot ever be established again … I can see them on the street and ignore them, but friends with them I can never be again. I teach my children not to hate, but never to forget what happened” (Interview 14 2007).
3.5. Perception of public institution, town symbols and media representation of the Serbs and events in 1990s

Most returnees shared similar stories about the treatment they receive from public institutions, the media and town symbols. One response typifies these sentiments: “Serbs have all rights and no rights at all.” Others expressed that they were “second rate citizens,” and that there is no place for Serbs in this Croatian state. They were particularly concerned with the following issues: employment, access to public services, the politicisation of town symbols, and their mostly negative portrayal in the media.

Serbian returnees perceive that there are no employment opportunities for them in public institutions. A returnee who held a high position in Glina’s public sector during the occupation provided a personal example; he was rejected for a position in the public sphere for not passing ‘the security criteria’. Although there were no other candidates he could not get a single vote from the hiring commission.

Almost all of the interviewed Serbian returnees stated that they hesitate to apply for other jobs; they don’t want to embarrass themselves by being refused again. These concerns often centred on state policies and practices regarding reintegration. The impressions of a significant numbers of returnees is that all the deadlines for tenancy rights, reconstruction, pensions and property return were impossible to meet. Returnees were either never provided with the full information, or documents and information would arrive only after deadlines expired.

Access to services such as water, electricity, sewage and main roads were another question of concern, and source of resignation and frustration. Many Serb-majority villages around Glina do not have access to these services. The town mayor’s only response, however, is that there is no funding for such services.

Another source of irritation is Glina’s decision to remove the town monument dedicated to the victims of the WWII ‘ustasha’ regime replace it with a cultural home honouring Croatian customs and traditions. Those interviewed believe that such occasions are clear signs of disrespect toward the Serbian victims of WWII and an attempt to belittle the fact that Serbs have lived in Glina for several centuries.

Returnees often cited harsh treatment from local radio and private TV stations with national broadcast. Many accused these media outlets of portraying events in the 1990s and in Glina in a way that imposed a collective responsibility on all Serbs who stayed during the occupation. Serbian returnees do acknowledge that Serbian troops committed horrible atrocities against Croatian civilians during the occupation; however they state that the media
never reports stories about Serbs who helped Croats to survive, or escape from paramilitary militias.

Both Serb and Croat interviewees emphasized the Serbian delegation’s visit to the Josevica memorial site where a large number of Croatian civilians were massacred by a Serbian paramilitary militia. This event was recognized as a further step towards reconciliation and normalization of conditions in Glina. Nevertheless, Serbian returnees would like to receive the same acknowledgement from Croats for their losses after Operation Storm.

4. Analysis

What seems to be apparent from the findings is that, although Serbian returnees encounter similar issues associated with particular social settings, the variety of responses challenges the existence of a single, common Serbian returnee experience. The academics in the field of forced migration have often called for an approach to refugee research that applies a “general and comparative perspective which sees certain consistencies and patterns in the refugee experience” (Stein 1981: 330). Yet the findings above seem to suggest that instead of searching for a unique and robust ‘refugee experience’, we must adopt a more cautious approach to analyzing the reintegration experiences of Glina.

According to the narratives detailed above, even in cases where returnees share attributes of several category memberships (common ethnicity, territory of origin, and levels of education or similar occupations) we recognize varying experiences. To assume that the Serbian returnees have a single returnee experience is to assume that there is a strong feeling of ‘groupness’ (Brubaker 2006: 13) across the ethnic category, the basic denominator of how a refugee experiences his or her return and reintegration into society. This replaces the agency of the individual with the agency of the group (Brubaker 2006: 8); thus, we implicitly see refugees as a “homogenous mass of needy and passive victims” (Turton 2003: 7). Instead of searching for common experiences, we should instead analyze the settings. How and across which categories do the similarities of experiences appear? Is the feeling of exclusion in one setting going to have a spill-over effect on returnees’ actions and feelings in other areas of everyday life? What are the challenges for re-establishing old and creating new modes of cooperation?

4.1. Public Settings and the hidden label

Serbian returnees seem to develop a high feeling of membership to one particular group when discussing the following circumstances: the treatment of state institution and access to public services, media presentation, and the
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The notion of ethnicity and thus lead a returnee to conceive the world to be constructed in ethnic terms. In Brubaker’s words, these settings are producing a high level of ‘groupness’ (2004: 11, 2005: 13, 2006: 9); “ethnicity is invoked to account for action or stance” (2006: 362). Consequently, we can see returnees developing the sense of ‘we’ (the Serbs) as a reaction to being denied a particular set of rights and services, comparing to ‘them’ (the Croats).

Also significant are the circumstances in which ethnicity has been (indirectly) institutionalized over the last decade. If we compare this research with Zetter’s work on the power of bureaucratic labels (Zetter 1991), we can suggest that the modified term, ‘the hidden label,’ can appropriately describe the position of Serbian returnees in relation to state institutions. While in Zetter’s study the delivery of services and attribution of rights was connected to labels designed for the purposes of bureaucratic practices (1991: 40), the position of Serbian returnees develops from the inability to access these services, and bureaucratic practice which, over the last decade, has discouraged their return and reintegration.

The outcome of these policies was that Serbian returnees accepted the role for which these settings were designed in the first place. Today most Serbian returnees do not even consider applying for positions in public institutions, and consider only with great scepticism the possibilities of gaining access to already denied public services. This is evident in statements such as: “I will never apply again for the position as there is no way that a Serbian can get it.”

It is important to recognize, however, that Serbian returnees are not only concerned with their individual inability to secure employment, but also with the wider impact that these structures have on social networks from which they could benefit. As several returnees stated: “there is no ‘our’ people working in public institutions.” The concern is therefore related to an inability to count on informal support or help which would be possible if more Serbs worked in these institutions.

Media and politicisation of town symbols were the other two settings in which ‘groupness’ along ethnic lines occurs. The outcomes of perceived ‘groupness,’ however, varied between these settings. Hate speech and accusations of war crimes against local Serbs produced feelings of insecurity: “you never know when the next Serb can become a target of such an accusation.” On the other hand, the politicisation of town symbols, such as the replacement of the WWII Memorial with the “Croatian Home,” results in feelings of disappointment. Serbs perceive their historical contributions to be neglected. This results in a shared feeling of exclusion, and perception that the state is foreign to them.
In all these cases, it seems that belonging to the Serbian ethnic group is perceived by returnees as a primary label imposed on them in communication with authorities. Many consider their freedom of agency to represent themselves across other categories as very limited within the context of formal institutions. The examples, like the well-educated man who applied for a high position in the local municipality and was later rejected due to his Serbian ethnicity, (even though there were no other applicants for the job), remain strongly embedded in the shared memories of the Serbian returnees. Over the long term, such stories further contain Serbian returnees in the lens of group membership. Within such context, the prevailing returnee perception is that “this is Croatian state in which there is no place for Serbs.” This further expresses returnee’s disappointment with their limited possibilities of agency in public settings. Hence, their perception is that regardless of their deeds, the media and public authorities will always judge them according to ethnicity, thus they cannot count on any support. This results with strong feeling of alienation which goes hand in hand with a strong feeling of ‘groupness’ across their ethnic category.

This raises a further challenge for our analysis. Can we expect that emotions and identities associated to institutionalised settings of everyday life will influence how one constructs the image of his or her role, and the potential actions of others? The narratives of Serbian returnees provide several competing interpretations of reintegration when the discussion moves from public to private settings. On the one hand, some returnees feel that exclusion on the grounds of ethnicity is highly present. Others emphasise full inter-ethnic cooperation and perceive their private relations in non-ethnic terms.

4.2. Spatial Category and Economic Development as Promises for Cooperation

Once basic physical security is established, returnees find themselves able to re-establish the role they enjoyed prior to exile and develop varying coping strategies to adjust to the new challenges of the post-conflict environment. Time, accompanied by the overall economic and material conditions of Glina, allowed the interpretation of everyday realities to shift beyond ethnic terms.

Glina’s underdevelopment paradoxically seemed to have a mediating role in relaxing tensions between Croats and Serbs, and transforming the level of groupness across ethnic lines. Both Serbs and Croats mentioned that economic ‘hardship’ is a problem shared by every citizen of Glina, regardless of ethnicity. In these conditions, several Croats stated that Serbs no longer present a threat in Glina. These problems were stated in non-ethnic
terms, and instead focused on the lack of state investments and high levels of corruption in the local municipality. As a result, this increased cooperation between Croats and Serbs often evolved into the restoration of old friendships and bonds. Consequently ethnic categories have been replaced with other categories that develop feelings of belonging. As emphasized by one interviewee, the shared experience of hard work brings people together. For this individual, most everyday situations are now constructed in non-ethnic terms; individuals prone to nationalist feelings provocations are an exception and he simply ignores them. Those whom he socializes with (regardless of their ethnicity) react in the same manner. These acquaintances are, in his words, “those who work don’t have time to be bored with such stupid things as nationalism.” Such a statement reveals that in these setting, returnees perceive the freedom to act according to their will, and are responsible for the outcomes of their actions, regardless of ethnic membership, which in turn opens venues for other lines of identification.

For younger Serbian returnees, ethnicity does not represent an obstacle for cooperation with Croats. Rather, again, the underdevelopment of Glina and the lack of entertainment produce additional settings for cooperative actions, such as the organisation of private parties. Ethnicity thus becomes a less relevant category, and does not perpetuate a feeling of exclusion from society. Most talk about the general economic hardship in the Glina area as the key obstacle to normal life. In such conversations it became clear that age and common generational problems worry the younger interviewees, rather than those marked by ethnic colour.

These examples challenge the often obvious reconciliation-reintegration nexus. Chimni (2002) argues that for return to be sustainable, reconciliation must precede the reintegration (2002:168). He views reconciliation as the ‘consolidation of social relations between different groups of the population’, and reintegration as “a process which enables formerly displaced people...to enjoy a progressively greater degree of physical, social, legal and material security” (2002:168). According to the limited data of this research, it is possible to assume that for a significant number of Serbian returnees in Glina things developed the other way around. The consolidation of social relations slowly evolved once the physical threat had been removed.

Following these trends, many Serbian returnees emphasise territoriality and the traditional culture of cooperation in Glina as a basic category across which they form their identity. Further, this enables them to find new paths for successful cooperation with their fellow townsmen. It can be assumed according to the data that territoriality was also important for the Serbian returnees during exile, which in their case had a more salient position in comparison to ethnicity.
While in exile, the local Serbs did not express much ethnic solidarity toward the refugees. Instead, local Serbs were more concerned with the territoriality and cultural stereotypes associated with it. Valcic’s (2005) study of the spatial reconfiguration of belonging in Serbia raises some interesting points from which some comparison with the returnees in Glina can be made. She analyses the development of an emerging urban identity among young Belgrade elites, citing that “it is an instrumental move of positive self presentation that is based on a false dichotomy between urban, cosmopolitan vs. rural Serbia” (2005:641). Part of this urban identity was the adoption of “deterministic city rhetoric in arguing against rural nationalism” (2005: 646), accompanied by widespread animosity against the Serbs from Krajina (2005: 651).

Her study also suggests that lays in similarities develop between the Belgrade elites and Serbian returnees in terms of spatial belonging. When reflecting on war crime atrocities, many Belgradians emphasise their urban identity and express a reluctance to bear any responsibility for the atrocities committed by Serbs or Croats (2005: 653). The similarity between the utility of these two spatial identities is interesting. In Glina’s case, the role of urban identity is replaced with the WWII partisan tradition, while in both cases it is used to retreat from the individual responsibilities of war crimes. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that in Glina’s case this means more than avoiding any responsibility for the events of the 1990s. By connecting the horrors of war to exogenous forces and emphasizing the culture of solidarity that formerly existed in Glina, residents aim to restore the trust destroyed by the war.

Regarding the cooperation and positive reintegration outcomes that a number of Serbian returnees perceive to be occurring in non-formal setting, one additional concluding remark can be made. These settings, excluding public institutions and the media, allow returnees a higher freedom of agency; they can act according to the designations they decide for themselves. In such circumstances, they will avoid identifying themselves primarily according to their ethnicity, and instead stress those other categories which can help them integrate and feel a part of the community. Thus, a greater perceived freedom of agency, combined with shared memories of exile and the particular social and economic conditions in Glina, seem to have contributed to the possibility for some returnees to construct their everyday lives in non-ethnic terms.

4.3. Coexistence without Cooperation

Yet this paper does not intend to minimize the experiences of those Serbs who continue to perceive ethnic tensions, where membership in an ethnic category represents the key denominator for micro-level social actions in
Glina. We can neither neglect the responses of those Croats who have spoken openly against cooperating with Serbs, or those who expressed that, although they do not object to cooperation with Serbs, there remains pressure from other to continue to exclude Serbs. Moreover, given the still existing levels of distrust and animosity in social settings, it is interesting to see what meanings are ascribed by those Serbian returnees that have little or no contacts with Croats. What are the causes of their experiences? The aim here is not to provide an ultimate response, but to reflect on the variations of experiences and the logics of the process of exclusion itself.

According to the data, the social exclusion experienced by many Serbian returnees has a dual nature. It is simultaneously the outcome and producer of ethnic tension. As the outcome, exclusion was the consequence of the highly hostile environment Serbian returnees faced on their initial return. These conditions have resulted with at least three versions of explanations of why the social networks and trust were not restored in the years after the return. In the example of the woman neglected by her old friend, this negative experience has stayed vivid in her life even after many years. Her first encounter with pre-war fellow townsmen led her to construct the meaning of the community in which ethnicity remained the key category according to which she associates trust, and consequently makes future decisions. As Županov (1995) suggests, such experience leads victimised individuals to question whether the cooperation was ever genuine or if it was just a façade of deeper animosity (1995: 38-39). Consequently, she simply does not want to engage in any restoration of cooperation, even when the chance arises, thus she keeps contact to a minimum.

Cooperation may also be rejected as the opportunity materialises. First approaches to neighbours may have been met with ignorance, and many returnees, instead of seeking re-establishment of cooperation, have assumed that cooperation will never be resumed. As one returnee mentioned, they continue their separate lives without forcing something that is not meant to happen. Such individuals perceive Glina to be divided into two separate worlds, the members of each accepting the rules of his and the other’s world as normal. Neighbours continue living nearby, but without any contact.

Finally there are the responses of those who share barely any contact with their pre-war neighbours, but would like to do so. Among these individuals are those who held prominent public positions in Glina before and during the war, but have lost those positions and cannot re-establish them due to aforementioned conditions of indirect discrimination. For such individuals, exclusion resulting from hidden labels is in accordance with personal experiences in other settings, thus creating the perception of Glina as not just a divided town, but also one in which silent conflict between ethnic groups is present.
For the returnees who expressed these experiences, ethnicity remains an interpretative frame for perceiving social relationships in Glina. Nationalist messages, thought marginal compared to other towns, are conceived by these returnees as a source of irritation and possible threat. Whether these conditions can be changed, and how the different variables over time will affect the nature of such relations remains an open question. The data presented, however, highlights the complexity and challenges of reintegration experiences of Serbian returnees today.

**Conclusion**

The main objective of this paper is to represent the realities of reintegration for Serbian returnees in the town of Glina, Croatia. This paper argues that this returnee group deserves particular attention as they represent a minority population in a newly formed state whose formation was marked by inter-ethnic war. Nationalist politics in Croatia continued long after the fighting ended, purposefully impeding the return of thousands of Serbian returnees. These policies and events posed two main obstacles for the reintegration of Serbian returnees: hostility of their fellow townsmen and discrimination from public institutions. Yet given these complex conditions, both in the private and public sphere, the returnees do not react with one unique experience of reintegration.

Reintegration after return can only be understood by the analysis of different social milieus in which individuals interact. While one might perceive themselves as excluded in one setting, they can feel fully integrated in another. The analysis of data collected made use of Brubaker’s analytical devices. Focusing on the work of various categories used in constructing social realities helped explore how and under what conditions a returnee develops their understandings of various social settings and how he constructs his role in each of these. The narratives analysed suggest that whether individuals feel integrated or not depends on their perception of freedom of agency; the ability not only to make choices but act, effectively, upon them.

The research undertaken suggests that discriminatory practices during the 1990s did indeed result in perceptions of a state distant from the needs of its Serbian returnees. This hidden label raises several concerns for returnees and certainly guides their expectations and actions in regard to public institutions. This exclusion, however, did not inevitably translate into alienation from other settings of the return environment. Other settings have their own dynamics, and with time, different issues will allow fellow townspersons to cooperate together. On the other hand, a number of Serbian returnees interviewed still had little or no contact with Croats. The answer to the important question of why these conditions allowed for the integration for some, and
segregation for others is difficult to answer, considering the limitations of this research. Yet some preliminary conclusions can be proposed, and as always, further research is invited.

Economic conditions in Glina seemed to have relaxed tensions and distrust felt by some returnees. In responding to shared economic conditions, a growing number of Glina residents began to perceive the main threats in Glina in non-ethnic terms. Nevertheless, for those Serbian returnees still without contact with Croats, Glina remains deeply divided along ethnic lines. Why the immediate climate of hostility during return continues to structure the experience and cognition of only some returnees in such an acute fashion remains a difficult question, perhaps one for the future studies.

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