About the Possibility of a Proper Philosophy of Globalization

Abstract

The notion of globalization is used in different contexts and in different meanings; the notion mixes fact and fiction – existent and non-existent. The notion of globalization refers to, for example, economic, political and cultural processes which exceed nation-state borders. There is no philosophical, i.e. conceptual foundation of globalization. Western philosophical metanarratives are interpreted locally; there is no global interpretation of the metanarratives. Etymologically, ‘understanding’ means standing between differences, for example, between fact and fiction. Logic of expertise is logic of standing between hopes and reality – between non-existent and existent. The logic of expertise is a general theory of realizing. As a truly general theory, the logic of expertise is boundary-crossing-global. Therefore, logic of expertise formulates a foundation of a philosophy of globalization.

Key words

foundation, fundament, metanarrative, fact, fiction, understanding, logic of expertise

Introduction

The common truism says that we are living in the era of globalization. In philosophical and also in scientific discussion, among other things, we have to consider the (possible) deeper meaning of the common truisms. The reason is not that we would be sceptical about the basic message behind the truism, but that in scientific and especially in philosophical discussion, the task is to clarify and explicate the notions and the topic under discussion. In the case of discussion about globalization, the present discussion is not clear enough; there is a real need for further discussion.

New business models are needed because of globalization; new education models and systems are needed because of globalization; new political models are needed because of globalization; new sociological approaches are needed because of globalization; new international legal order is needed because of globalization, and so on. Therefore, it looks like there are several different globalizations – economic, political, educational, sociological, legal etc. – going on in the world. How are these related to each other? Is there a single process called globalization going on or several different, but possibly related processes? What is this thing called globalization? How can we understand it or them? What kind of reason is globalization? How can we characterize globalization? These questions formulate the challenge of globalization: a challenge to formulate a conceptual and philosophical foundation such that globalization could be understood.
The fact that the term 'globalization' is used in different contexts implies that it is also used in different meanings. Of course, the fact that a term is used in a single context does not imply that it would have only one meaning in its different occurrences. The notion of meaning is an intentional notion. That is, the semantic analysis of the notion of meaning is supposed to consider at the same time several different possibilities. Therefore, the semantic analysis (of a word, sentence or language) is not a simple task to do. The use of language is not possible without semantic knowledge about the language used: the semantics gives a kind of background in which we use the language. However, in this sense, at the same time, semantics gives a kind of knowledge for language users. The semantic knowledge contains truths about the meanings of expressions in our language, conceptual knowledge. This conceptual knowledge is closely related to our factual knowledge. However, such conceptual knowledge is a priori in relation to the factual topic under consideration.

We have to consider more closely the nature of such conceptual knowledge and its role more generally in human knowledge acquisition. At the same time, we get information that helps us understand the discussion about globalization. Let us consider more closely the interplay of factual and conceptual knowledge. Here semantic knowledge is the conceptual knowledge we are especially interested in. The conceptual knowledge gives us information about the references of words. That can be seen as the first task for semantics. However, the semantic knowledge should also give us information on how to identify the entities in different uses of the notion, that is, knowledge that shows us how the same entity may take place in two different situations. This is a kind of functional knowledge that maps the possible situations to referents of the given words. This formulates an identification system that constitutes an essential aspect of the a priori knowledge.

Therefore, semantic knowledge performs two different tasks that are closely related. In the case of pure descriptive cases, the referential aspect is in a dominating role. However, even descriptive use of language is not merely descriptive in a referential sense. The non-descriptive use of language becomes explicit when language is used in a modal mood. In this case the identification criteria – how to identify entities in different applications of a given word – become more central. This emphasizes the functional character of semantics. Therefore, the characterization of the very nature of the identification system becomes a central task. The identification system may be of a different kind. For example, perceptual information can be achieved through (at least) two different identification systems. The first one is perceptual. This means that the perceiver perceives something as something – whether true or not. Therefore, the perceiver identifies something perceptually. This is, by definition, subjective or perceiver relative identification. However, this does not imply that there would not exist some objective or, rather, inter-subjective criteria for success. The other type of identification is factual identification, which implies a kind of objective identification. For example, the perceiver perceives the president of Finland. In the experimental setting this is the intended identification system.

However, semantic knowledge is not mere semantic knowledge but is used in structuring and building up factual knowledge. Therefore, the semantic knowledge is a priori knowledge relative to ongoing factual research. The semantic knowledge is not eternal but changing knowledge. However, the changes are not, and cannot be, directly connected to the evidence, because the evidence is interpreted on the basis of this semantic knowledge.
fore, how this semantic knowledge can be changed is not clear enough. The changes are, and should be, connected to the factual knowledge, but what is the relationship? The role of semantic knowledge is especially important in cases like globalization. The reason for this is that the notion of globalization is a new notion in scientific discussion – the meaning of the notion is, by definition, not well defined. This implies that the characterization of the notion is to some extent metaphorical; the characterization seems to be narrative.\(^7\)\(^8\)

The term ‘globalization’ refers to several different things, but, moreover, the notion of globalization is used as a reason for incompatible things. There is nothing wrong with the first of these facts, but the second seems to be much more problematic. How can one thing be a reason for two incompatible things, how can globalization be a reason for loss of work and the increase of work? We will not consider the question more closely, but it must be recognized that the answer that the losses take place somewhere and the increase somewhere else is a problematic one if we take the notion of globalization seriously.

Current discussion about globalization is very difficult to grasp. The whole discussion seems a little curious. Is there some conceptual tension in phrases like ‘The globe is globalizing’? What was the size of the globe before globalization?\(^9\) The globe is, and has always been global. Questions like ‘In what sense has the globe globalized in recent times?’ show that there is a need for philosophical analysis of the discussion about globalization. That is, there is a need for proper global philosophy, i.e. a philosophy that would be based on properly global concepts and ideas. The current discussion shows the lack of such philosophy. In fact, the lack of proper global philosophy can be seen from the conceptual tension in current discussion.\(^10\)\(^11\)

The whole scale of the problem of globalization is a problem of great interest. For example, when talking about the global health problems, what are we talking about? AIDS is, of course, in a sense, a global problem. However, the disease does not appear as a similar problem in different parts of world. For some countries the problem appears as serious health problem for the whole population (for example, in African countries); for some countries the problem is to prevent the disease from arriving in the country (for example, in

\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^4\) J. Hintikka, *Socratic Epistemology*.
\(^6\) J. Hintikka, *Socratic Epistemology*.
\(^9\) Compare this to the following quotation from Heiskanen (2006): “If the globe is indeed becoming global, as it is said, or if the world is indeed becoming worldwide, only now, what size has the globe been before, how wide the world? Has the globe not always been global? Has the world not always been worldwide?”
European countries). However, the health problem is not a separate problem; it is connected in several ways, for example, to economic problems.\textsuperscript{12,13}

**Global system**

Globalization is not a single event that would take place in a specific time and space. Globalization is – or, rather, seems to be – something holistic. This holistic totality is something we cannot escape. In this sense, globalization is the framework in which we exist. In this sense, globalization could be said to be a system. A system in this sense is something that cannot be totally grasped. Moreover, the whole system of globalization is not something that one meets; one meets some aspects of the system – some subsystem of the whole system. Therefore, in a clear-cut sense, it is a system of different systems: a system of economy, a system of sociology, and so on. Each of these systems is very complicated, but still systemic. The complexity refers to the multiplicity of actors, goals and factors. Therefore, in a sense, globalization is a system of systems.\textsuperscript{14}

To understand the nature of globalization better, we should look at the principles of system building. Are there any principles that the building and planning has been based on? To answer this question we have to deliberate the functionality of the system: first is the character, structure of the system, and second is the intended function of the system. These two have to be orchestrated to play together. In fact, in actual systems or multiples of systems, like all global systems, the actual structure and functionality are not planned to function as a global system at all.\textsuperscript{15,16}

Let us think about, for example, the economy. In Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (1987), the notion is characterized as follows: “An economy is a system to which the money, industry, and trade of a country or region are organized”. Here the notion refers to a country or region, so the meaning is local. Moreover, the same dictionary gives the following characterization “Economy is careful spending or the careful use of things in order to save money”. The notion refers to the (abstract) use of things, which still is not global but local in a very clear sense. The historical roots of the notion refer to caring for the family. Therefore, the basic meanings of the notions are local rather than global. Moreover, the most fundamental theoretical and conceptual basis of economy is local. The national economy, the consumer, or the producer, all these are of local nature.\textsuperscript{17,18} However, we know that the current economy and business\textsuperscript{19} is global – but in what sense? The fact that companies cross the borders of countries and regions may be true, but this fact does not change the conceptual and theoretical basis. Even if a company crosses the borders of a nation it does not mean that the company would be of global character. Therefore, the question of whether we have a proper global philosophy or theoretical framework of globalization is worth asking.\textsuperscript{20}

The current discussion about globalization is metaphorical rather than factual. Of course, human communication assumes metaphors. However, metaphor is assumed to convey the message, not to be the message. That metaphoricity implies that the current discussion cannot be understood literally: but how can, or should, it be understood? The answer is that it must be understood figuratively, not literally.\textsuperscript{21}

To get a better grasp, let us consider the problem of a global system more closely. The current discussion, in politics and in research, takes global systems as given – the globe is globalizing, “as we all know” someone might
add. However, this is neither philosophically nor theoretically acceptable. To take one step backwards, let us consider the following quote:

“Suppose the institutional memory of the international system were suddenly lost, by accident or because of a deliberate attempt to reboot the system by pushing the button. How should one react? Should one try to recover the legacy system as is, or as it existed prior to the system failure, or should one rather start from scratch and design a novel system of global governance? Would an attempt to recover the legacy system be technically feasible in the first place? Would it be desirable, politically or otherwise, even if technically feasible? If not, how should a novel system of global governance look like? What should be philosophy and conceptual basis of its design? What should be its performance criteria and general user requirements?”

In the quotation, Heiskanen forces us to consider the very foundational principles of the global legal system. If the current system were lost, what should we do? Of course, we would need a system, but what kind of system would we like or need to have? The principles that would govern the rebuilding should be explicated carefully. Those principles would, at the same time, give birth to the leading principles of the forthcoming system. Our knowledge about the current system is not complete; the system is something already given, and we are part of it whether we like it or not. We have to consider the basic principles of the system in order to grasp the architecture of the system. The basic principles tell – or should tell – us about the base of the system, but, at the same time, they must tell us about the primary function the system is intended to fulfil.

The characterization of the performance, effectiveness, or efficiency, of the system plays a central role in evaluating the system. To do this, one cannot consider the system in itself but must consider the system for us, for the user. That is, to evaluate the old and the new system we cannot take systems as such, but must take the systems within a context. The context determines the general (conceptual) framework which then gives the meaning – general performance criteria for the systems. The framework in which the old system

14 Ibid.
19 NB The meaning of the word ‘business’. The basic dictionary characterization is quite similar as the characterization of the word ‘economy’: “Business is work relating to the production, buying, and selling of goods or services. (…) [Business is] the activity of buying, selling, or exchanging goods in deals with people or companies”.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
was built up is different from the present framework. Moreover, the framework of the old system has been renewed over the course of time.\textsuperscript{25,26} This gives us a deep philosophical and conceptual problem. The general framework cannot be built up empirically – all empirical support or evidence would be interpreted by the general framework. The problem considers the roots of the framework – where it comes from – and its identification. That is, we have to specify the semantic knowledge which formulates the framework for the whole approach.\textsuperscript{27,28} The knowledge needed is \textit{a priori} relative to the system and system building.\textsuperscript{29}

The notion of the general user is a very central and important, but, at the same time, very difficult notion. Who is the general user of a global system? The question is, in a sense, unanswerable. As we characterized above, we are all included in the global system. The user has to be outside the object he or she uses. Therefore, there are no users of the global systems. Hence, there can be no general user either. But within the system all the actors do not play the same role – some of the players have more active and strategic roles than others, even if no one can determine the strategic architecture of the global system.\textsuperscript{30,31}

Narrativity

Even if there is no general user, or other users of the global system, there are still actors within the global system. The actor we are talking about is not a strategic actor but a (kind of) general actor. To characterize this actor, we have to characterize the human being – human well-being. To do this, we have to formulate a generalized picture. This generalized picture cannot contradict the localized pictures, as otherwise the picture does not represent anything real but only something fictional, something non-existent. In literature, there is a method of anecdotes that was developed for this task. Unfortunately, the method was developed only in literature, in poetry, and not in science or in philosophy.\textsuperscript{32} Fortunately, the method can be used in understanding globalization.

The notion of the general user is at least partially fictive; there is no such human being. This fictiveness covers the scope of the notion only partially. To be fruitful, a fictive notion may not express mere fiction. The fictive aspects must be anchored somehow to reality – to some real characters of the object. Unfortunately, there is no general rule or advice on how this should be done or how to evaluate the given metaphorical characterizations. In this sense, there is open competition as to which fiction becomes dominant.\textsuperscript{33,34}

More generally, no globalized being is an actual being but an idealized being. Each actual being is a being in a situation – a situationized or localized being. The structure here is such that, on one hand, we have some basic ideas and, on the other hand, we have some intentions. The foundation of the basic ideas is local and situational, but the very intention is global. There is a difference between the conceptual levels at which the basic ideas and the intentions operate. The characterization of the basic ideas has to emphasize factual aspects and the characterization of the intentions – by definition – emphasize fictive aspects. So, the characterization becomes not (only) factual but (also) figurative or metaphorical.\textsuperscript{35,36}

The metaphorical aspect is of narrative character. The narratives connect several different metaphors together so that they form a single story – a metanarrative. The metanarrative tells us how we would like to interpret things.
a metanarrative has – obviously – some normative power. In fact, philosophically speaking, such metanarratives are conceptually necessary: the conceptual basis cannot be (conceptually or otherwise) transparent. A characterization of, for example, a human being cannot be based on a fully transparent conceptual basis. The characterization must be based on some conceptual basis – the basis is a priori relative to the characterization. Not all basic notions can be fully characterized.37,38,39,40

Metanarratives give a general, strategic conceptual orientation. However, there are several different, competing metanarratives. Unfortunately, there, by definition, cannot be objective criteria to evaluate these which implies that the competition between metanarratives should be diaphanous. In Western philosophical tradition there are two metanarratives – Liberalism and Enlightenment. However, there are only local interpretations of the metanarratives. But this implies that there is no global interpretation of the metanarratives. Then the understanding of the globalization becomes a real problem.41,42

Understanding

We have a strong belief that the author of a text has a message that he or she intends to convey via the text he or she produces. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that the message will ever be understood. The belief is that the lite-

26 Y. Engeström, Developmental Work Research: Expanding Activity Theory in Practice.
27 J. Hintikka, Socratic Epistemology.
28 J. Hintikka, Logic, Language-Games and Information: Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic.
29 J. Hintikka, Socratic Epistemology.
30 T. Bonsall, More Than They Promised: The Studebaker Story.
31 Y. Engeström, Developmental Work Research: Expanding Activity Theory in Practice.
33 V. Heiskanen, “Architexture: An Outline of an Philosophy of Global Governance”.
35 M. Klinge, Poliittinen Runeberg.
37 Compare the Padoa principle in the theory of definitions. (See Evert Beth, Formal Methods: An Introduction to Symbolic Logic and to the Study of Effective operations in Arithmetic and Logic, D. Reidel, 1962.)

A. Mutanen, About the Possibility of a Proper Philosophy of Globalization
The literal interpretation of the text means that the text would be literally grasped—grasping the message. The literal interpretation is not an interpretation but just repeating the text. However, to interpret a text implies a kind of change, saying it in other words. Therefore, interpreting the text is, and must be, a kind of translation of the text. The translation we have in our mind is not a translation between two (natural) languages, but a translation between literal and non-literal interpretations of the text: the literal interpretation refers to the factual aspects of the text, and the non-literal interpretation refers to figurative aspects of the text. Hence, there is no direct conceptual link between grasping the message and the interpretation of the text.

The translation is still factually linked to grasping the message. Interpretation is an act in which one attempts to make the message visible (or in oral translation hearable). However, this is just trying to understand the text. In this sense, understanding is just an activity between literal and non-literal interpretations of the text: understanding is acting between the two. This interpretation can be motivated also etymologically: etymologically ‘understanding’ means standing between differences, for example, between fact and fiction.

Grasping the text may be understood as getting so much new knowledge about the topic that one can connect the knowledge in the beginning and the knowledge needed to grasp the text. This characterization implies that the notion of grasping is relative to the grasper. However, this is just true: the grasper must grasp by himself or herself; no one else can do it for him or her. But then there is no possibility to guarantee that the message intended by the author would ever be grasped.

Scientific inquiry is the best human way to acquire knowledge. This can be justified both theoretically (conceptually) and factually (empirically). Knowledge is the final goal of scientific inquiry. Before the inquiry achieves its final goal, the scientific inquiry process has several difficulties that have to be won. Winning in the game of inquiry is not an easy task to do. As the name of the book by Isaac Levi from 1967 expresses, inquiry is ‘Gambling with Truth’. This means that an inquirer has to make several difficult and uncertain decisions during a process of inquiry. In methodology, basic intention is to characterize the whole inquiry process so that the difficult decisions based on incomplete information could be based on a certain, justified strategic approach.

Levi separates two kinds of justification in science. A globalist wishes to justify the totality of beliefs held at the given time. That is, a globalist is trying to justify the whole web of beliefs—a kind of holistic justification. However, there is a less demanding notion of justification, called local justification, which arises in the context of specific inquiries. Local justification concerns specific statements whose evidential status varies during the inquiry process. Modern experimental science is connected to the local justification, which implies that local justification is the justification we are concerned with in science.

Empirical science is a paradigmatic example of modern science. Therefore, by characterizing the logic of experiments we at the same time characterize the very nature of experimental science and, more generally, of modern science. The logic of experiments is just the logic of local questions. However, this logic of local questions emphasizes the art of making strategically well-formulated questions. Even if empirical science is of local nature, the strategic nature of questioning allows the results of the local inquiry to overrun the borders of local experimental settings. The questions that the inquirer
formulates during the inquiry process are small, operational questions. Moreover, the main question that the inquiry process searches for an answer to is also a “small” how-question. To arrive at answers to “big” or fundamental principal questions, one has to proceed step-by-step, generalizing answers to small operational questions. The idea in experimental science is to find out informative and true answers to well specified questions and thus to enlarge the field of knowledge step-by-step.

In searching for more general – less local – answers, science formulated specialization for a strategic principle of all science. Specialization restricts the scope of science, and, hence, in a sense, localizes it. Therefore, paradoxically to delocalize in one sense, the strategy takes localization in another sense as a strategic principle. The history of modern (experimental) science shows the success of this strategy.

43 Compare Plato’s critique of the written text in his dialogue Faidros.
46 Ibid.
47 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar.
53 A. Mutanen, From Computation to Truth via Learning.
54 Arto Mutanen, Formal Methodology, Logical Investigations, Moscow, forthcoming.
56 Ibid.
57 J. Hintikka, Socratic Epistemology.
61 Ibid.
62 J. Hintikka & J. Bachman, What If ...? Toward Excellence in Reasoning.
63 Ibid.
64 I. Niiniluoto, “Inquiries, Problems, and Questions: Remarks on Local Induction”.
65 Ibid.
66 I. Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism.
Even if scientific inquiry is the best way to acquire knowledge, it does not help us in understanding the problems of globalization. The idea of a transparent web of concepts is certainly a good and acceptable methodological rule. The history of science shows the strength of that strategy. However, in the case of globalization the very problem was that the framework is not well specified. The scientific theories give only a – strategically chosen – segment of the whole problem. As we have argued, this is not good enough if we are searching for a proper philosophy of globalization. Moreover, in globalization the primary task is not knowing but doing or acting.

**Acting**

Human acting is a difficult object to analyze. The intentionality of acting makes it intentional. That is, acting cannot be characterized merely by characterizing the behavior of a human being. Let us consider the following simple example. Opening a window is changing the state of the window. At the beginning the window is closed and in the end the window is open. To make the action possible, the environment has to be convenient for the act. For example, a window that is already opened cannot be opened. Moreover, a window that opens automatically cannot be opened either. Opening something is a kind of change that can be made. Closing the window is the dual of the opening the window. The actor actively changes the state of reality. To characterize an act we have to have a language in which we make the characterization. By changing the language we may, just the same, change the characterization of the act in an essential way.

Acting is changing reality, not reality as a whole but the situation in which the actor is located. So, acts in the sense above are small changes to states of affairs. The identity of an action is determined by the following three conditions:

(i) the state of the world at the beginning of act (initial state);
(ii) the state of the world at the end of the act (end state);
(iii) the state of the world if the agent does not act.

The changes of states of affairs are also conceptually tied to the act. The result of the act takes place by conceptual necessity: if I open the window, then, by definition, the window will be opened after the act. If this would not be the case then we should use different characterizations, such as that I tried to open the window. Besides the direct changes, there are several consequences that follow from an act. However, it is not easy task to characterize which of these consequences are intended. Some of them were not foreseen before the act. However, not even every foreseen consequence is intended.

Behind the discussion about globalization, there seems to be an assumption that some acts have, more or less directly, nonlocal, i.e. global consequences; maybe even the goal is a global one. This is not easy to grasp. What kinds of acts could be global in a clear cut sense? Maybe the acts that have global consequences, like some acts in a business context. However, it is hard to formulate such single act which would have properly global consequences. Maybe it is, rather, intended that such global acts are collective acts, i.e. acts that are done by several different actors. For an act to be a collective act there should be some kind of collective intention to do the act collectively. In fact, acts in a business context can usually be understood as separate acts rather than collective ones. Each of the actors is playing a game of his own. The
collective result cannot be understood as an act in the sense meant in action theory.\textsuperscript{77,78,79}

To arrive at a singular collective act these singular acts should be bound together somehow. Here we will see the role of the narratives. The narratives are needed to do just this binding task. The role of narratives has been just this. There are several well argued examples of such uses of narratives.\textsuperscript{80} However, the problem in the case of globalization is that there are no properly global narratives. The present narratives that are used in globalization discussion come mainly from the contexts of business or technology; maybe they come from local philosophy, like the Enlightenment or Liberalism. However, fundamentals of these narratives are local, not global. So, the problem remains: where can we get a proper philosophy of globalization?

**Expertise**

Act and action imply changes in reality. To change reality also means changes in the environment of humans. When the environment is changed, life conditions will be changed. Usually, of course, changes are so small that the humans need not dramatically change their ways of life. Sometimes changes are more powerful. For example, the development of computers has changed the environment so much that it has caused problems for humans and human societies to follow and react to the changes. The working life is no longer the way it was before. All this makes acts and activity ethic-laden notions.\textsuperscript{81,82,83}

The state of affairs, either realized or not realized, can be evaluated. Usually the evaluation is done by evaluating it either as good or bad by some utility. That is, whether or not it causes (or seems to cause) some benefit to some-


\textsuperscript{69} Jaakko Hintikka, *The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities*, Reidel, Dordrecht 1975.


\textsuperscript{71} A. Mutanen, “Deliberation – Action – Responsibility: Philosophical Aspects of Professions and Soldiership”.

\textsuperscript{72} G. H. von Wright, *Norm and Action*.

\textsuperscript{73} G. H. von Wright, *The Varieties of Goodness*.


\textsuperscript{75} A. Mutanen, “Deliberation – Action – Responsibility: Philosophical Aspects of Professions and Soldiership”.


\textsuperscript{77} G. H. von Wright, *Norm and Action*.

\textsuperscript{78} Raimo Tuomela, *Cooperation*.


\textsuperscript{80} M. Klinge, *Poliittinen Runeberg*.


\textsuperscript{82} G. H. von Wright, *The Varieties of Goodness*.

\textsuperscript{83} Y. Engeström, Developmental work research: expanding activity theory in practice.
body – usually to the evaluator himself or herself. That evaluation explicates the axiological object of the act or of the intention behind the act.84 Such an evaluation is easy to grasp, if the object of evaluation is small enough. However, in the global context, what is the object of evaluation and how can it be evaluated? The picture of the object is given via the chosen metanarrative, even if the metanarrative is of local character. So, the picture becomes figurative rather than factual.85 The characterization of a global context is necessarily incomplete in an obvious sense. That implies that each characterization includes several presuppositions that are not explicitly mentioned. These presuppositions include, for example, assumptions about the most probable lines of development, such as assumptions about the development of the economy, and assumptions about the most influential factors such as technology and economic development in the US. However, these assumptions need not be the most influential ones, and some other factors, maybe ones that are not so important, may cause remarkable changes to the expected states of affairs.86 That is, localization of the general picture includes several theoretical assumptions that cannot be justified. The reason is that the localization includes determining the values of several factors that cannot be measured precisely.87 However, this does not – necessarily – imply any changes to the language used in the characterizations. The characterizations may be used in a descriptive mood. However, even contra-factual conditions do not essentially change the situation here.88,89 The reason is that the factual and fictional are mixed so that they cannot be separated by using any fixed method. The separation of fact and fiction is a creative act of understanding. This can be actualized as specification and determination of the factors. This means training and education to specify the contexts of discourses or, rather, to specify general pictures about (past and present) reality and possibilities for (future) reality. The pictures of present cases may be thought of as well-specified pictures, i.e. pictures that Wittgenstein called portraits. However, usually these are pictures that Wittgenstein called genre pictures. In particular, all the pictures of (future) possibilities are so called genre pictures. These genre pictures include several different pictures, possible pictures. In a sense, they remain recipes for constructing a possible state of events rather than a singular picture.90,91,92 A person who has the competence to characterize genre pictures and to actualize an intended future possibility can be called an expert. An expert is a person who has skills in some field of expertise. A scientist can be seen as an expert, but here we would like to separate an expert from a scientist. The idea in this separation is that the field of an expert is within practical knowledge – the knowledge that characterises the actor’s deliberation, which then “results in decision which initiates the step-by-step realisation of the aim”.93 The goal of such deliberation is action. In such action, the actor unifies his or her action skills and knowledge into a single unique entity.94 An expert stands between hopes and reality – between the non-existent and the existent. The understanding becomes factual when the expert realizes the hopes. Intentionality includes both the factual aspect and the non-factual aspect. The factual aspect of intention includes the characterization of the present state of affairs. The non-factual aspect includes all the hopes and fears that an agent has. Moreover, this non-factual aspect also includes an evaluation of preferences. As we saw, this evaluation is closely connected to (actual and non-actual) states of affairs. Therefore, in general we can say that the logic of expertise is a general theory of realizing intentions.95 As a truly general theory, the logic of expertise is boundary-crossing; it realizes the understanding discussed above.96
In physics, we have the idea of a Theory of Everything. Even if the Theory of Everything has somewhat ironic connotations, in present theoretical physics it has a more serious, scientific content. The Theory of Everything would subsume all the known forces of physics under the same theoretical framework. The notion of force is a very central notion in modern physics. Therefore, by unifying the different notions of force under the same theoretical framework we would have a much better understanding about reality. In that way, the Theory of Everything would be scientifically well justified. When characterizing globalization we should search for similar general principles that would help us to interconnect systematically different aspects of the phenomenon. As we have seen, one step in such process could be to unify different aspects of understanding and, maybe, knowledge and action. However, the general logic of expertise seems to be a promising approach for acquiring these. So, maybe the logic of expertise could be seen as a first, preliminary step in the search for such general theory of globalization.

Arto Mutanen

O mogućnosti odgovarajuće filozofije globalizacije

Sažetak

Ključne riječi utemeljenje, osnova, metanarativ, činjenica, fikcija, razumijevanje, logika stručnosti

84 G. H. von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness.
87 Ibid.
90 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar.
91 J. Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.
92 W. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs.
93 J. Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.
95 A. Mutanen, “Deliberation – Action – Responsibility: Philosophical Aspects of Professions and Soldiership”.
Zusammenfassung


Schlüsselwörter
Grundlegung, Basis, Metanarrativ, Tatsache, Fiktion, Verstehen, Logik des Sachwissens

Arto Mutanen
La possibilité d’une philosophie de la mondialisation

Résumé

La notion de mondialisation est utilisée dans différents contextes et a des sens différents ; elle mêle les faits et la fiction, l’existant et le non-existant. La notion de mondialisation renvoie à des processus économiques, politiques et culturels qui dépassent les frontières des États-nations. Il n’y a pas de fondement philosophique, c’est-à-dire conceptuel, de la mondialisation : les méta-récits occidentaux sont interprétés au niveau local ; il n’y a pas d’interprétation globale du méta-récit. D’un point de vue étymologique, « l’entendement » implique une position entre les divergences, par exemple, entre les faits et la fiction. La logique de l’expertise est une logique se situant entre l’espoir et la réalité, entre l’existant et le non-existant. La logique de l’expertise est une théorie générale de l’entendement. En tant que théorie générale, la logique de l’expertise dépasse les frontières au niveau global. Ainsi, la logique de l’expertise forme le fondement de la philosophie de la mondialisation.

Mots-clés
fond, fondement, méta-récit, fait, fiction, entendement, logique de l’expertise