Abstract

It is a common place in the large literature on globalisation that concepts of the ‘space’, ‘time’ and ‘self’ have radically changed in the last decades, during the process of globalisation. My lecture offers an analysis of a few topics, using these words metaphorically. At first, my analysis will be focused on Manuel Castells’ famous terms ‘space of flow’ and ‘timeless time’, and on a more classical term, Hannah Arendt’s ‘selflessness’. By analysing the uses of these terms in writings of the mentioned authors and their followers, I will try to demonstrate: (1) these terms are too obscure ones to use them as scholar concepts, and they are acceptable ones in a mere metaphoric sense only; (2) they are not the special terms of the globalisation, being rooted in a well-known discourse of the literature of the classical modernity. The last author analysed in my lecture is a 19th century Scottish professor, Andrew Ure. He is a part of the discourse of the classical modernity, using the vocabulary for describing his world that is similar to that of Castells’ and Arendt’s mentioned terms, with a radically different evaluation.

Key words

social structure of space, social structure of time, changing concept of the ‘self’, critics of globalisation, Industrial Revolution

The analyses of the process of globalisation often contain large chapters on the essential changes of the structure of the space, the time and the selves of the human beings living in the globalised world. Of course, these terms are central topics of philosophy in every time, but every epoch has its own approach to these concepts. It is interesting to see that ancient texts of the history of philosophy about these problems have revitalised in the last two decades, not independently from the discourse upon the process of globalisation. For instance, in my student-years the name and works of John M. E. McTaggart, amongst them his The Unreality of Time, published in 1908, one hundred years ago, were just dead and meaningless data for our courses of history of philosophy, him having some importance only as a predecessor of the first British analytical philosophers. McTaggart and his approach to time became a cultivated field again, probably because they fit to new models of time of globalisation, emphasizing dissolution of our common-sense ideas about the time, and a kind of virtuality. In the context of globalisation, the emphasis is not on these terms of the self, space and time themselves, but on the supposed changes in their structure.

* This text is an enlarged version of my lecture in the “Philosophy and Globalisation” conference, organised by the Croatian Philosophical Society, 21st-24th September 2008, Cres, Croatia.
In the following lecture, I will quote a few opinions upon these terms in the context of globalisation. However, first a haphazard list of authors and texts will be seen, linked only by a too large topic, and, I hope, in the very end of my lecture, I will demonstrate the relevant connection. Amongst the authors I will quote, Manuel Castells is the only one whose field of work is the process of globalisation in the narrow sense of this term. It is known that a peculiar analysis of the space and time of our globalised world has a fundamental role in his thought. Another author I quote, Hannah Arendt, is not a part of our contemporary canon of “the great critics of globalisation”. My lecture will concern her famous notes on the changing selves of the people living in a totalitarian system; only. I hope I can demonstrate a similarity of the Castellsian and Arendtian approaches, based upon an old-fashioned criticism of modernity, and not on a new-model analysis of the globalised world. However, Arendt’s and Castells’ thoughts are very different ones regarding their fields, epochs and cultural backgrounds; I supposed a similarity amongst the differences. Both of them are immigrants in America with a strong impact of Continental theoretical traditions in their thought, speaking for an audience of another, Anglo-Saxon or special American, tradition. I will show an instance of a peculiar “cultural translation” between the traditions of Arendt’s audience and herself in her texts. The third author is a Scottish thinker, Andrew Ure, a 19th century professor of the Anderson College, University of Glasgow, and the most characteristic writer of the British debate on the factory acts from the pro-industrial and pro-manufactural side. I will quote Ure’s book and the representative text of his contemporary Continental reception, expressing Ure’s very practical ideas in the frame of concepts of the Continental theoretical tradition. In the last part of my lecture, I will try to show that the structure of conceptual networks used by Ure and the critics of globalisation nowadays, are very similar, and to show the difference of the evaluations of the analysed situation based mainly on the authors’ rhetoric qualities and their personal choices, not on their analysed data.

1. Manuel Castells’ Space and Time

Probably the ‘space of flows’ and the ‘timeless time’ are the most often cited terms of the first volume of Manuel Castells’ masterpiece, The Information Age – Economy, Society and Culture. The concept of the space is the most detailed and the deepest-rooted term in his oeuvre; consequently we can easily analyse the development of Castellsian thinking in the mirror of the history of this term in his texts. ‘Space of flows’ has an important role in Castells’ writings from the early eighties. The first loci where the ‘space of flows’ and the empirical instances of the later works were mentioned are the parts of the mainstream sociology of city based on new researches (for example on the spatial structure of the Silicon Valley in California, or the neighbouring regions near Hong Kong in South China, with some autobiographical notes on Belleville, near Paris, the first place of his emigration in the early sixties and his personal experiences about the structure of the social space of this suburb). Another element of his spatial vocabulary is a usual metaphoric of social life: above and below, in and out, centre and periphery, and so on, all as metaphors of the social space. In the concluding chapters of his The Rise of Network Society, Castells uses these elements, amongst them the term of ‘space of flows’, as tools of description of his model of the new, globalised state of the world. His definitions became more general, but more obscure and emptier, without the empirical background of sociology. A characteristic definition of this volume is:
“I propose the idea that there is a new spatial form characteristic of social practices that dominate and shape the network society: the space of flows. The space of flows is the material organization of time-sharing social practices that work through flows.”

In another quotation, we can see the ambiguity of the meaning of spatial terms. Sometimes we do not know whether he speaks about physical spaces, used by structured societies, or about the metaphorical spaces of the social world.

“In short: elites are cosmopolitan, people are local. The space of power and wealth is projected throughout the world, while people’s life and experience are rooted in places, in their culture, in their history.”

These metaphoric Castellsian statements on the space often use expressions concerned with the time, both the physical and the social. The “space of flows”, as that of the cosmopolitan elite, is “ahistorical”, in opposite of the people’s historical “space of places”; or, with a more general statement: “space is crystallized time”.

The development of his concept of time is a similar process. The concept of ‘timeless time’ has its roots in the data of empirical sociology, researching the changes of the time-structure of the everyday life in the last decades, and in a historical overview of the social time. The claim of generalisation is stronger in the case of time than it was in the case of space. Castells declares that he speaks about the social time only, but he quotes the models of time of the contemporary theoretical physics and the Leibnizian definition of time on the same page. At the end, in the concluding chapters of his book, the concept of time overrules the concept of space. His statement is problematic because we have more, but not enough, information about his concept of space. It seems Castells is painting with grey on grey on these pages. He has summarized the relationship between space and time by this statement:

“Timeless time belongs to the space of flows, while time discipline, biological time, and socially determined sequencing characterize places around the world, materially structuring and destruc-
turing our segmented societys.”

His concluding sentence is a mere metaphorical statement, without any concrete interpretation:


3 Belleville was the topic of the first serious work of the young Castells in his career in the early seventies.


6 Ibid., p. 411.

7 Ibid., p. 465.
"Timelessness sails in an ocean surrounded by time-bound shores, from where still can be heard the laments of time-chained creatures." 18

Castells’ aim with the new definitions of social space and time is a forecast of the future of the self. In this volume, he expresses it in an enigmatic form:

“When the Net switches off the Self, the Self, individual or collective, constructs its meaning without global, instrumental reference: the process of disconnection becomes reciprocal, after the refusal by the excluded of the one-sided logic of structural domination and social exclusion.” 19

Castells’ poetic, but obscure statement can have only one clear, concrete meaning: Selves are deprived beings in the global world, and this deprivation is the main problem of this world, expressed in the structure of the use of space and time of these selves. 10 This investigation is similar to some earlier approaches, out of the globalisation discourse. Amongst them, I have chosen a characteristic text, Hannah Arendt’s totalitarianism book, and its known adjective, selflessness.

2. Hannah Arendt’s ‘Selflessness’

Arendt’s term ‘selflessness’ and her book, containing this word, are not a part of the literature of globalisation in its narrow sense. The term has two different roots, by its meaning and by its form. By its meaning, it is a special expression of a criticism of modernity, mixed with Arendt’s sympathies with antiquity, and her preferences about a special meaning of political community, connected with her peculiar concept of ‘publicness’. By its form, this term is a typical expression of a German intellectual immigrant in America, who searches, or creates English words for her familiar Continental vocabulary, partly unknown over the Ocean. 11

The first appearance of the term is in the chapter of her totalitarianism book. It is an analysis of the new epoch of the European modernity, named “the breakdown of class society”, but in a deeper meaning, it is a criticism of the modernity itself, with an original approach of the well-known topic of the atomised individuals. She introduces her term in the following form:

“...In this atmosphere of the breakdown of class society the psychology of the European mass man developed. (...) Self-centeredness, (...) went hand in hand with a decisive weakening of the instinct for self-preservation. Selflessness, in the sense that oneself does not matter, the feeling of being expendable, was no longer the expression of individual idealism but a mass phenomenon.” 12

Later, in the analysis of the totalitarian systems, the term loses its historically-sociological background, and becomes a special adjective of human beings of totalitarian systems forever.

“(...) the elite’s lack of a sense of reality, together with its perverted selflessness, both of which resemble only too closely the fictitious world and the absence of self-interest among the masses.” 13

Arendt’s term was a great problem in interpretations of her totalitarianism book. In secondary sources, this word was usually written between quotation marks or with italics, everyone spoke about “its special meaning”, without a probable definition of it. The term was rooted in Arendt’s German philosophical culture, with a more strange word, thoughtlessness, in her book on Eichmann. 14 As thoughtlessness does not refer to the characteristic of a man who is not careful, also selfless person is not an unselfish human being in the
special Arendtian meaning of these words. The consequence was expressed for the first time by Roy T. Tsao: “In this new formulation of her theory, the ‘selflessness’, attributed to the adherents of the movement, is quite literally a loss of self.”

Arendt’s term of ‘selflessness’ is an approach to see the origins of the totalitarian systems, rooted in the process of modernity; and her analysis of totalitarian man, in its roots, is an analysis of the man of modernity. In descriptions of Castells’ book on the selves “switched off by the Net”, we can realise Arendt’s description on the “selfless” people of totalitarianism, or, actually, individuals with a special selflessness, produced by the late modernity, and able for the totalitarianism. Both of the Arendtian and Castellian selves are the products of a form of the European modernity, and are able to be a part of an evil: totalitarianism or fundamentalism. Arendt and Castells emphasise that their topics, totalitarianism and globalisation, are unique, new ones in the history, but both of them research the roots, or origins of their topics and have found them in the history of modernity. Their analyses seem to be the parts of a type of hypotheses, finding the roots of every wrong in the essence of modernity, by its any meaning.

This is the point where we should be interested in the thinking on the same concepts – space and time in their social meaning and the self – in the middle of the “origin of every wrong”, in the time of the Industrial Revolution. I will quote a nowadays relative unknown thinker, Andrew Ure, whose reputation was in his own epoch comparable with that of Castells and Arendt in our time.8

8 Ibid., p. 466.

9 Ibid., p. 25.

10 This problem is the antecedent of the topic of the next volume of his above-mentioned trilogy, titled The Power of Identity.


13 Ibid., p. 335.


16 Ure was the best-known author of the typical 19th century British genre called factory guide. He was often quoted by Engels—in his Condition of the working class in England, 1845—and Marx—in his The Poverty of Philosophy, 1847; and in the 1st and 3rd volumes of his Capital, 1867—as their main “bourgeois opponent” and in the same time their main source by his data of technology and statistics. (It must be mentioned here, that Marx used a contemporary, maybe not too precise, French translation of Ure’s work.) The literature of the social history of the British Industrial Revolution usually discusses Ure’s and Marx’s descriptions of the early industrial society as counterparts, as the most important, but contradictory, interpretations of the processes of the British society. For a representative interpretation or the problem
3. Andrew Ure and his Continental Readers on the Space, Time and Selves of the Modernity

Andrew Ure (1778–1857), as a Scotsman and as a professor of the Glasgow University, was a typical inheritor of the Scottish Enlightenment. Some publications about his experiments with the nervous system of a hanged outlaw, in 1818, have offered a scientific basis for Mary Shelley’s famous novel, *Frankenstein*, published in the same year. However, the perfectibility of men – close to the meaning of Hume’s *refinement* – was not an alien idea for him; the highway of this perfection was not the medical praxis but the civil society in his writings, with the area of economy and its newest field, the system of manufacturing industry. His main work, famous in his century, was published in 1835, with the title *The Philosophy of Manufactures, or an Exposition of the Scientific, Moral and Commercial Economy of the Factory System of Great Britain*. This book had an important role in the British political and intellectual life in the time of the debates on the factory reform, the poor acts in the British Parliament and in the civil society. Ure was well-informed about the technology of the contemporary industry, as we can understand it from the detailed technical descriptions and illustrations of his book, but the main aim of his *Philosophy of Manufactures* was to offer an analysis of the (good) social consequences of the Industrial Revolution. From the point of view of our time, we can summarise his argumentation in three statements, appearing in the pages of his detailed description *passim*.

The first statement refers to the social and economic use of places. He speaks about the optional place of steam engines, in opposite of mills on the water, and the economical use of space within the factory. Another part of the benefits of the manufacture in the use of space is to liberate the field to feed human beings:

“They leave thousands of fine arable fields free for the production of food of man, which must have been otherwise [without steam engines] allotted to the food of horses.”

Social and economical use of places plays an important role in his description of technological processes and their social consequences. Let us now see the abundant pictorial material of his book and the paragraphs interpreting them. The first type of the pictures shows factory halls of different branches of the British industry. All the halls are large ones; their measurement is very different from the human one. We can see a few human figures only; they are almost meaningless elements of the composition, and that of the process of production. The second type of the pictures shows moving components of the engines, or that of the producing process (they are usually different forms of factory elevators, rotating pieces of a spinning mule, and so on). In the third type of the pictures, we can see microscopic images of different textile fibres, showing the role of the modern scientific instruments in the process of production. All the pictures and their interpretations in the text are far from the human measurement. People work amongst too big and too fast engines, with too small textile fibres, in too large distance from each other to communicate.

The second statement refers to the social and economic use of time. It means the productivity of the manufacture-system, the optional time of the work, then the production in opposite of the ancient industry and depending on other sources of energy. All his statements about the novelties of science and technology have a consequence in a relationship with the social time, a special freedom of human activity: seasons, parts of day, temporality of weather, and the human ages have lost their economic importance in factory system. A task can be complied both in summer and in winter, on day or at night, in dry or...
rainy weather, by a young women or an old man. The social (use of) time, incarnated in the productive process, becomes free from the time determined by the physical circumstances, and depends on the human nature only.

The third statement refers to the people, the workers as workers and as humans, and their (changing) nature. Ure’s description is a counterpart of the well-known reports about the conditions of the 19th-century British working class. By Ure’s opinion, the workers’ food, accommodation, and the circumstances of their workplace are better than those of a contemporary worker in the agriculture, or those of an industrial worker of earlier times. By Ure’s description, the workers’ welfare was rooted in the new-model use of place and time, analysed above, based on the scientific and technological novelties of his epoch. Workers, protected from the nature by science and technology, in a form change their morals, moreover, their nature or their selves, living in a scientific and technological environment. The new self of the industrial humans appears in simple signs: they are following the watch instead of state of the sun on the sky, and they are familiar with their giant engines and microscopic crude materials. They are more precise and responsible people because of their different social structure of place and time than their ancestors in the agriculture or in the pre-industrial handicraft were.

We can see how all statements are readable as an old-fashioned paraphrase (or a strange predecessor) of the above-mentioned Castellsian and Arendtian texts. The topic is the same – changing human nature in the changing world of technology; but the evaluations are opposite ones: we can see optimistic and pessimistic descriptions and forecasts. It may be that Ure’s pedestrian technological descriptions seem too far from these very general implications, concerning the social conditions. However, professor Ure’s book was titled The Philosophy of the Manufactures because of its very pragmatic system of

see Mohinder Kumar, “Karl Marx, Andrew Ure and the Question of Managerial Control”, Social Scientist 12 (9/1984), pp. 63–69. The origins of the thesis of Ure’s bias for the “new class of manufacturers” we can find in Engels’ above-mentioned work. I think of his statements, such as “Ure is not a half, but a perfect bourgeois”; “Ure is a chosen slave of the bourgeoisie”, etc., being passim in his book. A characteristic (and funny) sign of the image of “Ure the bourgeois ideologist” in the modern texts, rooted in Marx’s and Engels’ opinions is the abundance of typographical errors in references concerning his masterpiece, Philosophy of Manufacturers, instead of Philosophy of Manufactures.

However, the hypothesis of the connection of Ure’s experiments and the Frankenstein-story has not solid philological evidences; it is a widespread opinion. If there is any connection, Doctor Ure’s experiments were not the only source of this novel – Mary Shelley’s basic ideas were rooted in the German ghost-stories and other similar types of the fiction – but later, because of his ideas about the automatisation of industry and the perfectibility of humans, he was often discussed in connection with Frankenstein as a symbol of his age. For an analysis of the connection of Frankenstein as a symbol and the society of the Industrial Revolution, see: Iwan Phys Morus, Frankenstein’s Children. Electricity, Exhibition, and Experiment in Early-nineteenth-century London, University Press, Princeton 1998; for Ure’s role see especially p. 158. Nowadays, in the popular culture and in the tourism industry Ure became “the real Frankenstein”.

17 Andrew Ure, The Philosophy of Manufactures, or an Exposition of the Scientific, Moral and Commercial Economy of the Factory System of Great Britain, Charles Knight, Ludgate-street, London 1835. It was known on the Continent mainly in its French translation, published the next year. Ure’s work has a new reception amongst the historians of the Industrial Revolution from the last years of the sixties, especially after its four English reprints published between 1967 and 1969.

18 Ibid., p. 29.

We can see Ure’s typical 19th-century scientific optimism on the first page of his Preface, quoting and using the Baconian axiom: “Knowledge is Power” – in the manufactural industry, too.

SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA
ideas but its technical language was not a philosophical work on the Continent. Therefore, I can quote an instance of the Continental and philosophical interpretation of this work, which is a good Hungarian schoolmaster’s article from 1837, based on Ure’s book, and on the debate about this book in the Edinburgh Review.21 Our schoolmaster, a philosopher with a Schellingian background, made a Continental philosophy of the British industry, based on empirical data of Ure’s volume.22 Statements from the original volume about the economical, technical use of place and time, in his article became the rule for the humankind over the space and time in general. The notes about the characteristics of the manufacture-workers, referring their relationship with the time, became the signs of a new, more perfect species of the humankind. Marx and his posterity often ironically named Ure “the Pindar of the (automatic) factory”.23 His Central-European reviewer can be named “the Pindar of the industrial people”, or that of the industrial humankind of the future; with new species of humankind, characterised by a new, more precise and scientific use of space and time, and a new morality, a new structure of their selves. Ure’s technological vision of the automatic factory and his reviewer’s vision of the industrialised human beings constitute a perfect positive utopia. The conceptual network of this positive utopia, rooted in an interpretation of a 19th-century Scottish thinker by a Continental interpreter, is very similar to the network of concepts outlined above. Both of them are characterised by the structures of space and time under the rule of the manufactures, but free from natural and biological factors. New human beings with new selves, new morals are produced by the science, technology and the factories, similarly to professor Ure’s “Frankensteinian” experiments. 

We can see two similar pictures of the two visions. One of them is painted with black, the other one with white, but the figures in it are the same. Whether our decision is a question of style only, or the common conceptual network – “the space and time of the human beings with changing selves” – is not able to formulate a good ethical question. If the above-analysed genre of the criticism of the process of globalisation depends on mere judgement of taste, or on mere rhetoric instead of arguments, we can search for another, more modest, but more useful conceptual framework for the investigation of the process of globalisation.

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Prostor i vrijeme u globalnom svijetu

Sažetak


Ključne riječi
društvena struktura prosta, društvena struktura vremena, mijenjanje koncepta ‘sebstva’, kritičari globalizacije, industrijska revolucija
Béla Mester

Raum und Zeit in der globalisierten Welt

Zusammenfassung


Schlüsselwörter

Soziale Raumstruktur, soziale Zeitstruktur, Wandel des ‘Selbst’-Konzeptes, Globalisierungskritiker, Industrielle Revolution

Béla Mester

L’espace et le temps dans un monde global

Résumé

Nombre d’ouvrages sur la mondialisation affirment habituellement que les concepts d’« es- pace », de « temps » et de « soi » ont radicalement changé ces dernières décennies au cours du processus de mondialisation. Mon texte propose une analyse de quelques sujets de débat, en prenant ces mots au sens métaphorique. L’analyse se focalise d’abord sur les termes marquants de « l’espace du flux » et de « temps intemporel » de Manuel Castells, puis sur un terme plus classique, celui de « perte de soi » de Hannah Arendt. En analysant l’utilisation de ces termes dans l’œuvre de ces deux auteurs, ainsi que dans l’œuvre de leurs adeptes, je tenterai de démontrer que : 1/ les termes en question ne sont pas suffisamment clairs pour être considérés comme des termes scientifiques et ne sont acceptables qu’au sens métaphorique ; 2/ ces termes sont fondés dans le discours, bien connu, des ouvrages de modernité classique et par consé- quent ne sont pas spécifiques à la mondialisation. Le dernier auteur que j’analyse dans mon texte est Andrew Ure, professeur écossais ayant vécu au XIXe siècle. De par le vocabulaire qu’il utilise pour décrire son monde, il fait partie du discours de modernité classique comportant une évaluation entièrement différente.

Mots-clés

structure sociale de l’espace, structure sociale du temps, changement du concept de « soi », critiques de la mondialisation, révolution industrielle

István Nyiri, “Az angol műipar philosophiája (A Philosophy of the English Manufactural Industry)”, Tudománytár (2/1837), new series, pp. 264–293. I am sure; my Hungarian instance is an average phenomenon in the 19th-century Continent, at least in Central Europe. Andrew Ure’s book in English, in French translation and by the reviews in the contemporary pe- riodicals, published in national languages of Central Europe, was a well-known work in Europe. I suppose, one can find similar reflec- tions everywhere in Central Europe.

István Nyiri was the professor of philosophy of the Calvinist College of Sárospatak, in this time a cultural and educational centre of the North-East part of Hungary.

Marx named Ure as a “Pindar of the facto- ries” at first in his The Poverty of Philosophy. Later this expression became a common place in the texts concerning Ure.