In what follows, I am proposing a critical re-examination of the idea of democracy as discussed by two contemporary thinkers: the Brazilian-American pragmatist philosopher Roberto Mangabeira Unger and French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Following their idiosyncratic proposals for democratic change I will try to put both philosophers into dialogue. By calling them “two prophets of democracy” and by invoking also their intercultural potential I shall argue for a new platform of political and ethical thinking that is on the one hand underpinned by a conception of moral and political thought which, in the words of Unger, “cannot be the privileged possession of any civilization of any time”,¹ and on the other is complemented also with Irigaray’s thought on Eastern (Indian) philosophy. In the concluding section I will summarize my positions by invoking the possibilities for the so-called “politics of sympathy/sentiment/love”.

Which useful links connect pragmatist and poststructuralist thought in the domain of politics and ethics? In her most recent book *Transpositions* Rosi

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Braidotti has urged us to consider a path beyond moral philosophy and, more importantly, a path transcending both the “liberal and humanistic view of the subject”. For Braidotti, as a poststructuralist and a posthumanist, it is of vital importance for us to nourish a spirit of “progressive transformation”, this being the decisive point for solving numerous paradoxes of contemporary (global) political liberalism. Looking for a new programme, and following Alain Touraine’s book Beyond Neoliberalism, Braidotti calls for “renewed social criticism” and new “active spaces of resistance”. Being of a materialist and nomadic pedigree and character, her project in philosophy clearly wishes to posit an alternative framework for political action “in the service of a sustainable future”. Although disagreeing with some of her ideas and principles for political action, I emphatically support the overall spirit of her book, namely the principle of transpositions as an impulse or “yearning for changes in a positive and creative manner”. In this gesture (later on I will discuss ethical gestures in this paper) I clearly recognize a basic pragmatist mode for positing change as a vital component of our traditional habits and signal towards new constructive proposals and ideas, to ultimately, and most importantly, anticipate change to result in practice. This poststructuralist principle qua “pragmatist” impulse can be achieved, as Todd May has aptly formulated:

“[b]y undercutting the pretensions of humanist, poststructuralists hope to draw our attention to the many small, contingent and often dispersed practices that contribute to who we are and to our concept of ourselves as primarily self-constituting beings.”

Among others (of course, Deleuze is in the forefront, alongside Foucault and Derrida), Braidotti also draws heavily on Luce Irigaray, labelling her as a critic of liberal individualism and characterizing her as a thinker whose

“… proper object of ethical inquiry is not the subject’s moral intentionality, or rational consciousness, as much as the effects of truth and power that his or her actions are likely to have upon others in the world. This is a kind of ethical pragmatism, which is attuned to the embodied materialism of a non-unitary vision of the subject.”

This “pragmatist” impulse in poststructuralism is therefore in line with the classical American pragmatism of Peirce, James and Dewey as well as with their neopragmatist variation in Rorty and Unger’s radicalized form of pragmatism. According to Rorty, the principle question in pragmatism is: “For what purposes would it be useful to hold that belief?” It is the priority of practical effects upon the life of (global) society as a whole that marks the pragmatist’s account of “truth”. I therefore find dialogic exchange between the poststructuralists and pragmatists extremely important for the current debate in ethics and will turn to this point in the concluding section of my paper.

What then, we might ask, is needed in the time of globalization and universalisation of culture, when “this globality and universality are now ungovernable and beyond our control, making us divided and torn between differing certainties, opinions, dreams or experiences”? What will rescue many men, women, and children from the unjust conditions of contemporary world order? How will our relation to nature be revitalized? How will our lost sense of community be reborn? For Irigaray it seems most appropriate to return to our most intimate needs, expressed by our common and intimate world of sharing, care and love. But let me first turn to, in my view, one of the most significant contemporary voices in American pragmatism, contemporary American pragmatist philosopher, Roberto Mangabeira Unger and discuss his pragmatist vision of the future of democracy.
In his last three books – *Democracy Realized* (1998), *What Should the Left Propose* (2005), and *The Self Awakened* (2007) – Unger’s philosophical thought seems to run along two avenues: firstly, he is developing his own progressive and alternative theory of democracy in *Democracy Realized* by using various arguments from economics, politics, law and social science; secondly, he is proposing his own political philosophy in *The Self Awakened*. In *Democracy Realized*, Unger pragmatistically argues for “democratic experimentalism” which he sees as a set of practices required for a progressive change in the world. In forming credible alternatives to the neoliberal program after the collapse of communism and demise of socialist alternative politics (and even after the alternative social democratic projects in parts of Europe, e.g. Scandinavia, have been overpowered by neoliberal forces), Unger proposes a new method of democratic experimentalism. In line with the democratic tradition in American pragmatism (Dewey), Unger is pleading for an alternative set of conditions of practical progress in conjunction with individual emancipation. It is for a new (political) realm of opportunities and liberties “deepening our central experience of freedom” that he as a pragmatist is hoping. Besides many economic and political aspects of this book which I shall leave aside, Unger is also arguing for our capacity (ability?) for love and solidarity: it is our ability “to recognize and to accept the otherness of other people”. I find this acknowledgment of love and solidarity, alongside Unger’s clear statement that democratic experimentalism as such “draws


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p. 2.

5 Ibid., p. 4.

6 Ibid., p. 9.


10 L. Irigaray, *I Love to You* (tr. by A. Martin), Routledge, New York and London 1996, p. 129. Cf. also the “hybridization” of cultures – see Rorty’s paper “Philosophy and the Hybridization of Cultures”, in: Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock (eds.), *Educations and Their Purposes: A Conversation among Cultures*, University of Hawai‘i Press and East-West Philosophers Conference, Honolulu 2008, pp. 41–53. In this paper Rorty is stating that the notion of cultural difference might soon “be obsolete” (p. 41) precisely because West and East are indeed “in the process of creating a hybrid culture” (Ibid.).

11 Roberto M. Unger, *Democracy Realized*, Verso, London 2001, p. 5ff. In this work, Unger develops – on the basis of the American pragmatist method proposed by W. James and J. Dewey – a visionary, although by no means simply utopian philosophy of democratic experimentalism. His method strives to identify the most pressing problems of contemporary democratic societies (social non-cohesion, economic and social differences), while avoiding ideological labels that hindered considerations of the experience of democratic coexistence in the traditional social and political thought. Unger thus strives to create conditions and room for credible alternatives to the neo-liberal economic and political system at a time when in political discourse the old and traditional divisions to the left and right are yielding to a utilitarian politico-economic reality. With his theory Unger refers to countries that have cultivated or developed their democratic tradition on the basis of the Western liberal tradition (USA, Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia).

12 Ibid., p. 7.

13 Ibid., p. 9. This is precisely the point where his and Irigaray’s thought converge.
energy and meaning from concerns outreaching politics and economics"\textsuperscript{14} a gateway to the transformative praxis (or \textit{transpositions} in Braidotti) needed for the world we inhabit.

Even more relevant for this aspect is his most recent book \textit{The Self Awakened}.\textsuperscript{15} In this book, Unger brings to the fore his pragmatist philosophy, comprising such vast areas as nature, mind, society, politics and religion. Across the pages of his book resounds “the idea of the infinity of the human spirit”,\textsuperscript{16} an idea that can not only be strongly related to pragmatism but one which does not exclusively belong to any philosophical school. Later on, when Luce Irigaray will be discussed, I will show a deep resemblance of her prophetic tone to Unger’s message. Both belong to the new space in philosophy yet to be inhabited by philosophers. To return to pragmatism – if there is a single point in pragmatism upon which all pragmatists agree, it is a spirit of democracy. But Unger’s project of deepening democracy activates this potential with a renewed vigour. By putting the pragmatist \textit{credo} into the very core of contemporary world he gives the greatest prominence to “the empowerment of individual” on the one side, and “the deepening of democracy” and “the creation of forms of social life”\textsuperscript{17} on the other, and thus he is offering a fresh programmatic account both for the future of philosophy as well as for the future of society. By exposing the naturalistic and other fallacies in the multiple strands of classical American pragmatism of Peirce, James and Dewey, Unger espouses a radicalized pragmatism as a guide to transformative action and as thinking beyond past “illusions of a naturalistic superscience”.\textsuperscript{18} Let me now turn to the most interesting part of Unger’s proposal as expressed in two “diggessions” towards the end of his book.

In his search for a credible ethical alternative, Unger offers two analyses: in the “First digression” (“Nature in Its Place”) he proposes to rethink anew the relations between (global) civilization and nature, in the second (“The Universal Grid of Philosophy”) he is offering an alternative view of practical philosophy of politics and ethics. Both analyses are about the kind of world we will inhabit, both naturally and socially. Let me cite from the prologue of the “First digression”:

“At first, we needed nature so much that we worshipped it. Now we need it less and less. We cannot undo the consequences of this liberation; we can go only forward, further and further away from the need that once obsessed us toward the freedom that now disorients us. Civilization is the antidote to our dependence on nature.”\textsuperscript{19}

In a world of the estrangement of men and women from nature it is of vital importance to reconstruct the space of proximity between us. On the other hand, we are now “able to question the effects of our actions on the animate and inanimate nature surrounding us”.\textsuperscript{20} We share our world with numerous beings. In search for ethics, we have to find a balance between two major initiatives of the human mind: humanity’s progress characterized with the capacity to remain open to the future by making and remaking the institutions etc., and the call for humanity which orients us more towards what we have in us, e.g. our natural capacities and dispositions. Under democracy both impulses can exist in harmony and men and women can show more wisdom than power. We have to direct and control an enduring conflict in the world that surrounds us. According to Unger, it is with the effort toward more inclusive fellow feeling that we can reach this goal. I will return to this point in the concluding section.

Even more important is Unger’s “Second digression”. It is about practical philosophy, dealing “with social life and human action: politics and ethics”.\textsuperscript{21}
Let me first analyse this digression and then give an interpretation by way of a transition to Luce Irigaray’s ethics. In the text, Unger gives a short history of the evolution of metaphysical thought in the West (including also a discussion of its non-Western counterparts – i.e. Chinese and Indian philosophy) to characterize it as an antipode to practical philosophy. The latter is practically designated by the pragmatist criteria of a cumulative change, both in the world of a philosopher as well as in his philosophy respectfully. Metaphysics for Unger is metahumanity. It is an attempt to see ourselves from the outside, to become a God. Now, what does the path of practical philosophy consists of? Clearly it is closely related to political theory, to the question of “hold[ing] society together,” of the high trust, fellow feeling and, ultimately, love. But is it self-evident that in pursuing this goal we cherish exactly those expressions (and not power and “justice”) of a relation between men and women? For Unger the idea of democracy consists precisely of social bonds, poised between basically “warm” postulates (seen as extreme ends of a spectrum) of coercion and love. When cooled down, coercion (or authority/violence) is turned into the “institutionalized practice and legal order” (the rule of law). Love, on the other hand, is cooled down into “the ability to trust strangers rather than just other members of a group united by blood”. It “shades into our faith in one another”. Contrary to the classical antagonism of Western political thought between the political and ethical planes, or the enemy/friend antagonism qua dualism in Carl Schmitt (the political as a whole represents the arena of authority), Unger’s path is designated by the term ‘cooperative experimentalism’. There is however a third element enabling this “dual” scheme to work. It is the idea that both postulates are sustained by the “natural” division of society into classes and castes. In my opinion, with the third element Unger, giving its dues to Marxism, among others, is indirectly critically referring to the basic postulates of Rawlsian liberal theory. Clearly, the social division

14 Ibid., p. 10.
17 Ibid., p. 27f.
18 Ibid., p. 48. The main objection of Unger to Dewey’s pragmatism consists in his claim that it is impossible to know that we are natural beings while attempting at the same time “to provide a full account of our human experience in naturalistic language” (p. 47). It is an argument that resembles Rorty’s justified criticism of the “metaphysical” Dewey in his Consequences of Pragmatism (see R. Rorty’s essay “Dewey’s Metaphysics”, in: Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972–1980, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1982). On a defence of the non-metaphysical character in Dewey’s philosophy of experience see my paper “Pragmatism and Social Ethics: An Intercultural and Phenomenological Approach”, Contemporary Pragmatism 5 (1/2008), pp. 121–146.
19 R. M. Unger, The Self Awakened, p. 239.
20 Ibid., p. 240.
21 Ibid., p. 243.
22 Unger rightly contends that, metaphysically speaking, the Western and non-Western philosophies are closely structurally related (of course, the closest structural analogies being between the “Indo-European” Greek and Indian philosophies).
23 Ibid., p. 249.
24 With clear reference to the “enemy/foe” as a political concept.
of labour (class, caste) has been the vehicle of social “progress”. But this progress has always generated – and still is – grave problems and huge inequalities all over the world. Nonetheless,

“[the class organization of society – which, in its weakened, contemporary form, continues to be reproduced by the hereditary transmission of economic and educational advantage through the family – is not, according to the new idea, a natural or invariant fact. Its content at any given time and in any given place depends on the nature of the established institutions and the prevailing beliefs.”

Never before in the history of the world has this been more evident than it is in our age. It is therefore a principal task of a future “democratic civilization” (Unger) not to suppress the vast reservoir of talents among the children, men and women: according to him, the “ordinary men and women can lift themselves up and change the world”. Pragmatically, it is our task to equip our institutions with better ideas, leading to better cooperative practices. How is this to be achieved? Between the above mentioned warm extremes firstly the idea of cooperative experimentalism based on “capability-enhancing economic and education endowments” has to be achieved. It discloses its imaginative potential and brings us new and alternative institutional designs. Next, by ‘institutional imagination’ (Unger), the pragmatists refer to the broadest possible horizontal plane of social actions (as innovative and cooperative interconnections), making the change “internal to social life”. Experimenting with practices, institutions and methods, new ideals are anticipated that will outgrow our past interests.

On the ethical plane (moral theory), vulnerability gradually takes over from serenity: Unger characterizes both simply by “staying out or getting into trouble”. This change emanates from “another vision of human life and its possibilities”. The pragmatist maxim of an “unlimited demand for the unlimited” comes to the forefront of our ethical concerns:

“The goal is no longer composure. It is to live a larger life, for ourselves and for others. To this end, we must change the world – or, at least, part of our immediate world – the better to change ourselves. We must look for trouble (…) The good we gain from such sacrifices and adventures, and from choosing lead over gold, is priceless: life itself, the ability to continue living and to escape the many small deaths until we die all at once.”

In this, we gain life not only for and in ourselves, but for and in the world we share with others. It is in the progress of democracy that this goal is mirroring itself most brightly. Of course, we can abide by, say, Kantian or various religious ideals (moral theory being one root of this process). The other root is a democratic one, and when adhering to this second root it is our common democratic ideals we are effectively cherishing. But according to Unger, it is the entanglement/engagement of both roots that we are faced with in the contemporary world. Interestingly, Unger does not think of any firm demarcation line between different civilizations in this regard. The pursuit of democracy in a pragmatist sense (being detached from any concrete political or moral theory, but comprising their imaginative potentials toward better social practice) is thus reoriented and “cannot be the privileged possession of any civilization or any time”. Thus it is of universal value and expresses the spirit of humanity. I find this contention to be extremely significant. But the task of distinguishing “right” from “wrong” is not an easy one. Throughout history, this spirit of humanity has been variously contaminated by different cultures and individuals. Therefore, it is our task to

“… replace the fictions of the collective will to difference by institutions and practices that strengthen the collective ability to produce real differences: distinct forms of life, realized through
different institutional orders. It is to reinterpret the role of nation in a world of democracies as a form of moral specialization within humanity: the development of our powers in different direction and the realization of a democratic society in alternative sets of arrangements. It is to obey the law of the spirit, according to which we can possess only what we reinvent and reinvent only what we give up.\footnote{32}

Unger succinctly reaches the conclusion: “It is that we cannot become God and that we can become more godlike.”\footnote{33}

I find the prophetic spirit of this digression to be a necessary part of any future political and ethical theory. Moreover, I am inclined to say that it complements Irigaray’s ethical (and political) visions of democracy. I do not find any substantial disagreements between the two on the issues of democracy. In this context, Unger’s sympathetic critic Cornel West is positing his distinctive contribution as follows:

“The basic result of Unger’s fascinating effort is to stake out new discursive space on the contemporary political and ideological spectrum. Prophetic pragmatism occupies this same space. This space is neither simply left nor liberal, Marxist not Lockean, anarchist nor Kantian. Rather, Unger’s perspective is both post-Marxist and postliberal; that is, consists of an emancipatory experimentalism that promotes permanent social transformation and perennial self-development for the purposes of ever-increasing democracy and individual freedom.”\footnote{34}

But Unger’s project, according to West, “remains silent on the feminist and anti-racist dimensions of concrete progressive political struggles.” It also “pays little attention to the burning cultural and political issues in the everyday lives of ordinary people.”\footnote{35} I would support the first part of this observation and offer the reading of Irigaray as a natural complement and an ally to his thought on this. For the second part of the West’s criticism concerning the dimensions of “concrete political struggles” or different possible responses to “burning issues” of our everyday lives I would be inclined to stay within Unger’s pragmatist paradigm and extend its various political and ethical issues to Irigaray’s philosophic ideas and intuitions on democracy. Given West’s strong inclination towards political mobilization and political action (as proposed by Dewey, but even more directly by Gramsci, who was the West’s principal inspiration for the prophetic pragmatism project), including his critical voices against the traces of Leninist conceptions in Gramsci as well as his criticism of Gramscian allegiance to Marxist social theory, West is still sharing a Gram-

\footnote{25} Unger refers to the belief of the ancient Indo-European peoples as exemplified by Dumezil in his notion of a tripartite ideology of the Indo-Europeans.

\footnote{26} R. M. Unger, The Self Awakened, p. 249.

\footnote{27} Ibid., p. 250.

\footnote{28} Ibid., p. 251.

\footnote{29} Ibid., p. 253.

\footnote{30} Ibid.

\footnote{31} Ibid., p. 254.

\footnote{32} Ibid., p. 255f.

\footnote{33} Ibid.

\footnote{34} Cf. his important book The American Evasion of Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison (WI) 1989, pp. 214 and 222. In the concluding chapter of his book on “Prophetic Pragmatism”, West characterizes Unger’s project “as the most elaborate articulation of a third-wave left romanticism” (p. 214), a project, situated between the efforts of Jefferson, Emerson and Dewey on one side and Rousseau, Marx and Gramsci on the other.

\footnote{35} Ibid., p. 257.
scian view of a radical “cultural battle to transform the popular ‘mentality’”. 36
Against this conception of the politics in “prophetic pragmatism” I would argue for pragmatism as a gesture of love (ethical pragmatism as practical philosophy) – also by stressing some important and alternative intercultural consequences of such a proposal as indicated both in Unger’s and Irigaray’s writings.

Alongside Deleuze and his philosophy, Irigaray’s philosophy has already been characterized by Braidotti as “a kind of ethical pragmatism”. However, for Braidotti this is a discourse on “forces, desires and values”37 and thus not far in its understanding and character from what West understands with his notion of prophetic pragmatism. On the contrary, I find Irigaray more “pragmatist” and less “Deleuzian” in this respect. Which elements in her thought could prove supportive for my claims?

Within Unger’s “First digression” I already recognized an ethical “imperative” for inventing new pragmatist ways of reconstructing the space of proximity between us. In this effort, it is precisely the way of love as exemplified in Irigaray’s recent works that offers the practical model for the ethical pragmatism needed in our times. The newly found proximity of me and you, the carnal sharing and caressing are the key words of Irigaray’s way to democracy. They all are undoubtedly best exemplified in her books Democracy Begins Between Two (1994), Between East and West (1999), The Way of Love (2002) and Sharing the World (2008).38

Irigaray locates the “sites of resistance” to the dangers of sliding into a fragmented society in (a) sharing with nature and (b) exchange with others.39 In building the community of men and women, she thus argues for a path analogous to Unger’s efforts as exemplified in his two digressions. Recalling from our previous analyses, for Unger the common task of humanity is:

“… to live a larger life, for ourselves and for others. To this end, we must change the world – or, at least, part of our immediate world – the better to change ourselves. We must look for trouble…”40

It was also a new relation to nature in orienting us more towards what we have in us (our natural capacities and dispositions), opening the question of the effects of our actions on the animate and inanimate nature surrounding us.41 Both tasks are represented in Irigaray’s texts through her precise analysis of sexual difference, a feminist ethical account of the importance of mild gestures in our lives, i.e. gestures from which democracy can emerge. I therefore find in her proposals a necessary complement to Unger’s pragmatist (theoretical) writings and proposals, offering us guidance in practical matters – first in our language and ethics and later in the broader spheres of politics (democracy). The method of Irigaray is a “Levinasian” attempt to recognize the subject of her project as “always already affected by the existence of the other”42 (i.e. the other as an infinite demand). By not depriving the other of its transcendence, men and women enter the mysterious path of becoming, forming a world of human freedom, a democratic world. For Irigaray, the role of the feminine in this process is indispensable. First as a mother, and then as a woman, she is limiting herself in order to carry in herself “a place of hospitality for the other”.43 This mild gesture marks the priority of vulnerability over serenity, as exemplified by Unger in his “Second digression”. As Irigaray states,

“I am in some way pregnant with your desire, your love, your soul. Which lifts me up rather than weighing me down (…). Appropriation, property, possession, on which the family, indeed
society, were based, must then be overcome thanks to a mutual respect between different subjectivities.44

Now it is not at all self-evident to accept the other solely as a member of a class or caste, but rather it is my task to see her/him as my neighbour and close fellow, as a child, the woman in the mother, a man in the world we share, all in need of ethical recognition, a recognition that results from an ethical gesture coming from me.

Irigaray’s philosophy thus turned out to be a natural ally to contemporary pragmatist social and political thought. At the same time it is more than this—with her extreme patience and with her ethical sensibilities, Irigaray opens up a new ethical space, in which a possibility of mild ethical gestures arises within the broad intercultural contexts, bringing high hopes for a rebirth of a sense of community.

Lenart Škof
U dijalogu za demokraciju

R. M. Ungerova pragmatistička vizija demokratskog eksperimentalizma
i istraživanja demokracije kod Luce Irigaray

Sažetak
Članak se fokusira na R. M. Ungerovu pragmatističku viziju demokratskog eksperimentalizma i moguće primjene na suvremenu interkulturalnu filozofiju. Povezuje se polje političke i socijalne misli američkog pragmatizma (Dewey, Rorty, Unger) sa suvremenim gorućim pitanjima interkulturalne filozofije. U drugom je dijelu Ungerova filozofija stavljena u dijalog s filozofijom Luce Irigaray otvarajući tako novu platformu za etičko-političku viziju demokracije u eri globalizacije. Analiza demokratskog eksperimentalizma se, na taj način, sama uspostavlja kao alternativni projekt političke etike te kao Ungerov i Irigarayin projekt demokratskog eksperimentalizma u dobi globalizacije.

Ključne riječi
Roberto M. Unger, Luce Irigaray, pragmatizam, demokratski eksperimentalizam, interkulturalna filozofija, socijalna etika, globalizacija

39 L. Irigaray, Democracy Begins Between Two, p. 170.
41 Cf. ibid., p. 240.
42 L. Irigaray, Sharing the World, p. xv.
43 Ibid., p. xiv.
Im Dialog für die Demokratie

R. M. Ungers pragmatistische Vision des demokratischen Experimentalismus und der Demokratieforschung bei Luce Irigaray

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter
Roberto M. Unger, Luce Irigaray, Pragmatismus, demokratischer Experimentalismus, interkulturelle Philosophie, soziale Ethik, Globalisierung

En dialogue pour la démocratie

La vision pragmatique de l’expérimentalisme démocratique de R. M. Unger et l’étude de la démocratie chez Luce Irigaray

Résumé
L’article se focalise sur la vision pragmatique de l’expérimentalisme démocratique de R. M. Unger et sur sa mise en application possible dans le domaine de la philosophie interculturelle contemporaine. Le champ de la pensée politique et sociale dans le pragmatisme américain (Dewey, Rorty, Unger) est mis en relation avec des questions importantes de la philosophie interculturelle contemporaine. Dans la deuxième partie, la philosophie de Unger est mise en dialogue avec la philosophie de Luce Irigaray, ouvrant ainsi une nouvelle plate-forme pour une vision éthico-politique à l’ère de la globalisation. L’analyse de l’expérimentalisme démocratique se pose ainsi comme un projet alternatif d’éthique politique et comme le projet d’expérimentalisme démocratique de Unger et de Irigaray à l’ère de la globalisation.

Mots-clés
Roberto M. Unger, Luce Irigaray, pragmatisme, expérimentalisme démocratique, philosophie interculturelle, éthique sociale, globalisation