

MEMBERS OF THE PARTY OF RIGHT AND THE IDEA OF THE CROAT STATE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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The Party of Right, through its various activities, defined Croatian political history from the Party's beginnings in the 1860s to the end of the First World War; after 1918, a newly emergent geopolitical arena brought about by the demise of Austria-Hungary, the collapse of the Habsburg dynasty, and the predominance of Stjepan Radić's peasant ideology on the Croatian political scene relegated Starčević's 'Rightism' (*pravaštvo*) to a second rank, rendering it unable to play a leading role in the mass mobilization of members of the Croat national community within the new Yugoslavian monarchy. However, in the late 19th century, adhering to the idea of nationhood proposed by the two founders of the Party of Right, Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik, many modernists in Croatia held to the notion that it was vital to achieve greater independence on the basis of historical Croatian statehood. Considering the popularity of the ideas it proposed, the speed with which they spread, and the influence they had on various social classes, it is indisputable that the Party of Right was the most popular party among Croats during the second half of the 19th century. This is corroborated by the fact that the popularity of 'Rightism' gradually spread beyond the territory of Croatia-Slavonia to Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Istria, and even abroad.

The importance of the Party of Right lay in its continual promotion of Croatian state right and national consciousness ("a free, independent and united Croatia") buttressed by contemporary liberal principles (universal suffrage, civic rights, social liberties, and equality of taxation). As was said at the time, the Party «awoke the consciousness of Croatia». Thus it assured itself a key role in political life. Its goals took rather high aim and thus it is not at all surprising that they were in direct conflict with the reality of the dualistic organization of the Monarchy. Though Austria-Hungary was often in crisis, it remained one of Europe's Great Powers. As a result, the Party of Right did not follow a direct path. It had to accept political realities as they were, but just the same 'Rightist' ideology had to contain a reverence for its own history which meant in principle an adherence to Croatian state right. Tension between tradition and

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modernity created divisions within Rightism with far-reaching consequences. At the beginning of the 1890s, the Party sought to prepare a modern mass organization which resulted in factionalism, that is, the creation of a number of new 'Rightist' parties which appeared to be a natural evolution but in fact contributed to a long-term weakening of 'Rightism'. The first sign of internal division came with the exclusion of Rightists from Rijeka and the Croatian Littoral under the leadership of Erasmus Barčić. They supported a compromise with others in the Croatian opposition, the followers of Yugoslav ideology. This example is significant because in a later period 'Rightist' ideology was abandoned in areas which were subject to strong pressure from foreign national aspirations. Thus, 'Rightists' from Istria, Rijeka, and Dalmatia during the First World War openly supported Yugoslav ideology because they saw in it a defense against Italian irredentism, while 'Rightists' from Bosnia and Herzegovina saw in the Yugoslav formula a defense against Serbian nationalism. In the meantime, the fragmentation of 'Rightism' was taking place in Croatia.

The complexity of Ante Starčević's ideas at the time of the domination of dualism and the conflicting perspectives concerning their realization came into the open in Zagreb in 1895 when the first major split in 'Rightism' occurred. The newly established Party of Pure Right, which was supported by Ante Starčević, became a synonym for the radical wing of the party which stood for the old program and refused to enter a coalition with other parties. Historiography knows this party as the „Frankist“ (*frankovci*) party which got its name after the controversial politician and influential lawyer Josip Frank.¹

The „Frankists“ were characterized by the fact that they envisioned a solution to the Croatian question exclusively within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy and that they were not prepared to risk the idea of Croatian state right in favor of any other solution. The other part of the 'Rightists' were open to coalition and they quickly fused with the Independent Party of Right (*Neodvisna narodna stranka*), and later other parts of the Progressive Youth (*naprednjaci*), who believed that the idea of Croatian state right had to be subsumed within a wider South Slav politics. They confirmed this direction by entering the Croat-Serb coalition in 1905 and the later decision to jettison the 'Rightist' appellation in their party name (1910).² With this move, one part of the 'Rightists' willingly accepted the dropping of the 'Rightist' name, which allowed them to carry out an opportunistic politics and retain a position close to power because as members of the Croat-Serb Coalition they participated in the administration of Croatia-Slavonia. Nevertheless, their failure to achieve a majority in the Croatian Parliament (*Sabor*) and their interpretation of various political questions created a crisis within the „Frankist“ party.

¹ Stjepan Matković, *Čista stranka prava 1895-1903*. (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2001).

² See: Mirjana Gross, *Vladavina Hrvatsko-srpske koalicije 1906-1907*. (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1960), and Tihomir Cipek-Stjepan Matković, *Programatski dokumenti hrvatskih političkih stranaka i skupina 1842.-1914*. (Zagreb: Disput, 2006), pp. 638 - 642.

Following the parliamentary elections of 1908, a split took place among the «Frankists» (Starčević's Croat Party of Right, later Party of Right) and the Starčević Party of Right, or SSP (acronym for *Starčevićeva stranka prava*).³ Even though there were attempts to overcome the split, the divisions were too deep and this segment of the 'Rightists', who saw their starting point as the defense of the ideas of Starčević's, forever divided from the others on their interpretation of the ideas of the «father of the fatherland», Ante Starčević, and his notion of Croatian nationalism. It became altogether clear that the gathering around Mile Starčević was gradually abandoning the policy of waiting to make an agreement with the crown and was ever more open to other solutions, including the idea of creating a South Slav Monarchy on the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy. They were sharply critical of everything in the 'Rightist' program which characterized the Croatian question as amenable within the „framework of the Monarchy.“ From this it can be concluded that they were prepared to solve the Croat question outside of the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy.⁴ In this prewar period, they were always prepared to take a critical stance toward the Croat-Serb Coalition, claiming that it had an opportunistic stance toward Hungarian politics and the political system of dualism, but they also respected its strength in terms of the number of votes the Opposition received in parliamentary elections. The ambition to gather the greatest number of supporters under the banner of Mile Starčević by an appeal to authentic 'Rightism' and regain the initiative on the Croatian political scene was clear. On the other hand, the 'Frankists' insisted on the political legitimacy and loyalty to the dynasty. In this they were supported by the leading Slovene political party, the Slovene People's Party (*Slovenska ljudska stranka*), and the Bosnian Archbishop Josip Stadler. They also supported trialism, seeing in this a solution to the national question in the southern part of the Monarchy. According to them with a trialistic solution the danger of irredentism would fall away because the South Slavs would begin to gravitate around Croats instead of Serbs, to Zagreb, not Belgrade.

Many events had a further influence on the eve of the First World War. The Bosnian Annexation crisis, the suspension of Parliamentary life in Croatia, and the Balkan Wars contributed to the dissatisfaction of Croats in the Dual Monarchy, while the success of the Serbian army, first against the Turks and then against the Bulgarians, were a great boost to the notion of Serbia headed by the Karađorđević dynasty acting as a Balkan Piedmont gathering to itself the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. The influence of these ideas is particularly visible amidst the ranks of the younger 'Rightists', members of the „Young Croat“ movement, who in large part leaned toward Yugoslav idealism and assassination of leaders of the regime in Croatia.

³ Mirjana Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije*. (Zagreb: Institut za hrvatsku povijest Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1973), pp. 367-386.

⁴ Ivan Peršić, *Kroničarski spisi*. (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2002), p. 180.

Supporters of 'Rightism' thus entered the First World War divided among party factions. With the revival of parliamentary life in 1915 representatives returned to parliament and renewed their political strife.⁵ Among 'Frankists', the main figures were Ivo Frank, Aleksandar Horvat, Vladimir Prebeg, Vladimir Sachs and Fran Milobar, and in the Croatian Sabor they stood with the leaders of the Croat People's Peasant Party (*Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka*) under Stjepan Radić. From the Parliamentary benches they propounded their opposition to any kind of tie between Croatia and Serbia, and they especially opposed the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, because in the conditions that existed they saw it as the only guarantee that Croats "not become the victims of Italian aspirations or – what is equally evil – that Croat people do not become drowned in the sea of Great Serbianism, which is the same as Yugoslavism."⁶ Ivo Frank believed the Serb politicians of the Serbian Independent Party, the leading party in Croatia-Slavonia and in the Croat-Serb Coalition, which held a Parliamentary majority, to be serving entirely the propaganda of Belgrade whose aim was to collect all the Serbs around the Karađorđević dynasty. In other words, they supported the official policy of the Kingdom of Serbia ("for the Serbian Independent Party the only measure is the politics of Belgrade") which was "diametrically opposed" to Croatian politics. This opposition to Serbian politics, according to Frank, was because Serbia "aimed to annex Croat lands" and so for "the Croat people nothing good could arise" from cooperation with such an ally.⁷ This approach contained a hope other than the desire to expose the aim of Serbian politics. Frank vociferously claimed that within the Croat-Serb Coalition, which had a majority in the Sabor, the predominant party was played by Serbs, thereby insulting the Croat portion of that alliance, especially those who claimed an affiliation with 'Rightist' tradition, claiming that they should abandon the hypocritical alliance which would mean the collapse of the Coalition and the re-shuffling of political power in Croatian politics. Nevertheless, these 'Rightists' remained deaf to these calls and many of them played a leading role in clearing the path to a strong tie to Belgrade.

During the war, in the middle of 1918, strong 'Frankist' ties to the highest circles outside of Croatia led to allegations that in 1915 Ivo Frank and Aleksandar Horvat supported the suspension of Parliament and the introduction of a military commissariat on the part of the Croat-Serb Coalition.⁸ This affair was opened after the police search of a lead Frankist's apartment, and Frank and Horvat insisted that their signatures on the incriminating document were

⁵ For the best treatment, see Bogdan Krizman, *Hrvatska u prvom svjetskom ratu. Hrvatsko-srpski politički odnos*. (Zagreb: Globus, 1989).

⁶ Quoted from *Stenografski zapisnici Sabora Kralj. Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije, 1913-1918*, vol. 5, Zagreb 1917, p. 539. (session held on 8th August 1917).

⁷ B. Krizman, *Hrvatska u prvom svjetskom ratu*, p.70.

⁸ On this issue see Većeslav Wilder's pamphlet *Dva smjera u hrvatskoj politici. Otkriće urote protiv ustava*, (Zagreb, 1918).

forged. Specific sources certainly point to the fact that prominent Frankists had ties to the highest circles in the military.⁹ These ties were formed in an earlier period. Josip Frank had previously been on good terms with General Moritz von Auffenberg and Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf. With the latter Ivo Frank and Aleksandar Horvat discussed the possibility of introducing a military commissariat. The responsibility of Commissar would fall to an Austro-Hungarian general, and his most important function would be “the prevention of sabotage by Great Serbs in the south east of the Monarchy.”¹⁰ At issue was the political assessment that the aims of the Party of Right could be realized during wartime with the help of the military leadership. This conclusion is supported by the writing of another member of the Frankist party, Iso Kršnjavi, who wrote: “They believe (the leaders of the Party of Right) that they will become fit to rule; they are excited by the marching of the troops and they direct their hopes toward the Austrian generals. Potiorek, Conrad von Hötzendorf and Scheure are lead stars. They expect to be able to realize the unity of all Croat brothers under one military commissar.”¹¹ Developments lead to the conclusion that in those circumstances the leading military circles were entirely inferior to the civilian ones which clearly supported the Croat-Serb Coalition, or that that the loyal support of the Monarchy by the Frankists was neglected. The Dualist authorities did nothing to satisfy the Croats for their loyalty, while the attempt to tie themselves to the generals proved to be unjustified, for as Kršnjavi said “no one can know what their fortune (in war) will be.”

Of ties with important individuals outside of Croatia proof can be found in information which reveals Ivo Frank to be part of the Belvedere circle. This has to do with a group of politicians of various national affiliation grouped around the heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand who were making plans for his succession. For the time being, we are not sure of the details of the ideas represented by Frank, but his name is among those listed as part of the circle.¹² Following

⁹ This is supported by the notes of the French Foreign Minister, who wrote that the ‘Frankists’ support „Viennese Court and the Military authority“. Miro Kovač, *Francuska i hrvatsko pitanje 1914.-1929.* (Dom i svijet: Zagreb 2005), p. 127. In his notes Kršnjavi writes of the ‘Frankist’ ties to „politicized generals“. Iso Kršnjavi, *Zapisci, Iza kulisa hrvatske politike*, vol. 2. (Zagreb: Mladost, 1986), p. 786.

¹⁰ This report is made by Srđan Budisavljević in the book *Stvaranje Države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* (Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti: Zagreb 1958), p. 24. Budisavljević was a parliamentary representative for the Croat-Serb Coalition until 1918, when, with a few dissidents, he formed a grouping around the newspaper *Glas Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba*. These were supporters of Yugoslav unification.

¹¹ I. Kršnjavi, *Zapisci*, p. 737 (date: December, 23, 1914). The reference here is to Oskar Potiorek, the military commander of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Eugen von Scheure, the commander of the Zagreb Military District at the start of the First World War.

¹² Jean-Louis Thiériot, *François Ferdinand d'Autriche. De Mayerling à Sarajevo*. (Paris : Editions de Fallois, 2005), pp. 189 and 256. In Croatian historiography the most information on ties between ‘Rightists’ and the circle around Franz Ferdinand is provided by Mirjana Gross in the work on Croatian politics and the Greater Austrian circle around Franz Ferdinand, “Hrvatska

the violent murder of Franz Ferdinand, Frank continued to seek to realize the policies of the Party of Right and the solution to the Croatian question under the Habsburg dynasty. During the war he frequently traveled to Budapest and Vienna, trying to improve the situation of Croatia within the Monarchy by negotiation with Magyar and Austrian politicians. Together with party president Dr. Aleksander Horvat he had an audience with King Charles I(IV) in the spring of 1918. The intermediary for this audience was Friedrich Funder, the editor of the influential Viennese daily of Christian-Socialist persuasion, the *Reichspost*, which had regular ties to the “Frankist” leadership, seeing in the courageous supporters of Croatian autonomy within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy.¹³

Along with these fruitless attempts to find a solution to the Croatian situation in conjunction with the Court and Austrian statesmen, Frank attempted to hold the door open to discussions with Hungarian officials. His political opponents from Croatia-Slavonia point to Frank’s failure at the time of the nomination of the provincial government in the summer of 1917, when the short-lived Hungarian Minister President Móric Count Esterházy de Galantha supported the opportunistic Croat-Serb Coalition in their assumption of power.¹⁴ At the time, Frank argued in Budapest for the return of Pavao Rauch as Ban, but the leading Hungarian politicians decided differently. Rauch was known as a radical opponent of the Croat-Serb Coalition in the period 1908-1910, but his return was impossible given the existing constellation of Dualist power. Immediately prior to the violent death of Minister President Istvan Tisza (1918), Frank was invited to discussions in Budapest concerning support for the attempt to preserve the Habsburg Monarchy. He spoke with Tisza, who supposedly told him: “I realize, that we have committed great errors in our relations to Croatia.” Soon after, Tisza was murdered and Frank returned to Croatia after the proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs under the leadership of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, certainly full of doubt about the future since his political plans were crushed. The Party of Right did not take part in the formation of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs which took direction of South Slav politics in the Monarchy. At the Party conference on 11 October 1918, the leadership asked for recognition of the right to self-determination of the Croat people on the basis of Woodrow Wilson’s principles. At the conclusion of the conference it was suggested that as per the prewar decisions of the Croatian and Slovenian politicians in Ljubljana in 1912, that „by their free will brother Slovenes be

politika velikoavstrijskog kruga oko prijestolonasljednika Franje Ferdinanda”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, (1970), no. 2: 9-74. That article does not mention Ivo Frank’s role.

¹³ About that see more in: Friedrich Funder, *Vom Gestern ins Heute. Aus dem Kaiserreich in die Republik*. (Wien: Verlag Herold, 1952), pp. 576-577.

¹⁴ S. Budisavljević, *Stvaranje Države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, p. 66.

attached to this Croatian state¹⁵. Since it was clear that Austria-Hungary was in the process of disintegration, the „Frankists“ requested the severance of the Croatian-Hungarian Agreement of 1868. The next step would be the unification of all Croatian lands on the basis of Croatian state right. Nonetheless, since „Frankist“ politics had long been based on expressions of loyalty to the Habsburgs, who were no going under, their program could not compete with the proponents of Yugoslav unity behind whom stood the western Allies. This ‘Frankist’ program was in direct opposition to the other portion of the ‘Rightists’ who had joined the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. They were in favor of a break in all ties between Croatia and Hungary and Austria and the speedy formation of a tie with Serbia. This meant that they were also prepared to accept a unitary Monarchy under the Karađorđević dynasty.

During the First World War supporters of the Starčević Party of Right (SSP) were the first to come out in favor of the creation of a Yugoslav state. Their president, Mile Starčević, died in 1917 and afterward the road was open to cooperation with the Yugoslav Committee. The new president was the dentist Ante Pavelić. Under his leadership the party took up the direction that led to the acceptance of Yugoslav ideology and the creation of a common state with the Kingdom of Serbia.¹⁶ This direction was understandable because of the unconditional desire to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Habsburg dynasty. We are reminded of the one position of the SSP, presented in their inaugural Zagreb meeting of ‘Mile’s loyalists’ in the summer of 1908. A priest from Šestine borough and member of the Croatian Parliament, Matija Miletić, announced that of all the threats against national interests the least worrisome was the threat from Serbia, because it could not denationalize the Croats due to the similarity of the language, and that from the point of view of state power Serbia was not dangerous because the entire Habsburg Monarchy stood against it, and the Monarchy’s army will “certainly prevail against the army of little Serbia.”¹⁷ In comparison with the view from 1908, in mid 1917, the adherents of the SSP were more likely to publicly ask for a reform of the

¹⁵ „Konferencija stranke prava“, *Hrvatska*, no. 2163, October 12, Zagreb 1918, p. 1.

¹⁶ “It was obvious that Yugoslavism could be realized or that all Serbian and Croatian lands under Austrian-Hungarian control could be united, which no one wanted, or that they could become independent of Austria and form their own independent state. It was important to note about the Starčević Party of Right that Mile Starčević was ill from the beginning of the war, and thus more progressive elements came to have an influence, that is, Dr. Ante Pavelić, Dr. Živko Petričić, Professor Fran Barac and others. Dr. Pavelić announced already in Trieste his support of unity with Serbia.” That is the view of Milada Paulova in her study *Jugoslavenski odbor*, (Prosvjetna nakladna zaklada: Zagreb 1925), p.105. The same author wrote that Barac made a “private report” of Pavelić before Dr. Radovan Marković in Zagreb in which he stated that if he had to choose he would rather become a Serb than a servant of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but that he hoped that with the Serbs conditions would be such that one and the other, that is, both Croats and Serbs would be satisfied.” S. Budisavljević, *Stvaranje Države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, p. 107.

¹⁷ “Prva naša građanska večer”, *Hrvatska Sloboda*, no. 102, August 28, Zagreb 1908.

Monarchy, but secretly hope for its demise. This demise would raise the question of statehood. While in 1908 they felt that Croatian statehood was protected from foreign aspirants within the framework of the Monarchy, during the First World War the belief took shape that the Monarchy was unnecessary and that statehood could be protected by the equality of peoples in a new federation of nations, this time in conjunction with Serbia. Looked at pragmatically, it was believed that the position of Croatia would be settled more easily within a joint framework with 'little' Serbia that within the framework of a Great Power like Austria-Hungary.

In the name of the SSP, in a session of the Sabor on 5 June 1917, Pavelić proclaimed support of the May declaration which was made by the members of the Yugoslav Club at the Imperial Council. This declaration was especially important because one portion of the 'Rightists' of Starčević's orientation for the first time publicly stated their support for national oneness, which they had opposed prior to that point in time. One of the most prominent Serb politicians in Croatia, Srđan Budisavljević wrote: "In its proclamation of 5 June 1917 Starčević's Party of Right abandons its all-Croat principles and takes on the view that the Slovenes, Serbs and Croats are one people."¹⁸ The transformation of these 'Rightists' from proponents of Croatian statehood to Yugoslav statehood gains the foundation of a party programme.

I would here also emphasize the role of Dragutin Hrvoj, yet another member of the SSP.¹⁹ During the First World War, he belonged to a group of politicians who wished to combine the Yugoslav idea with the concept of Croatian State Right. Throughout the war years, he worked toward the establishment of ties with the Entente powers. He was especially concerned to foster good relations with France and Russia. He believed that these two powers could assist Croats the most in attaining statehood from the wreckage of Austria-Hungary. In other words, he held to the notion that the victorious powers would set forth the principle of freedom and a national state. Towards the end of the war he frequently referred to Wilson's Fourteen Points. It is important to mention that Hrvoj, in line with the Party of Right's traditional defense of Croatian historical statehood, was critical of the working premises of the Yugoslav Committee, especially of Supilo and Trumbić, who he felt were playing into the hands of strictly Serbian interests. For Hrvoj, Yugoslavism was appealing as a geographic concept, not as a political or national one. As the collapse of Austria-Hungary neared, he became convinced that Croatian politicians, including many of the members of his own party, were excessively compromising Croatian sovereignty. Hrvoj was opposed to the union of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia under the Karađorđević dynasty.

¹⁸ S. Budisavljević, *Stvaranje Države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, p. 32.

¹⁹ S. Matković, „Opsjenuti pravaš: Dragutin Hrvoj u hrvatskom političkom životu“, *Radovi Leksikografskog zavoda Miroslav Krleža*, 9 (2000): 153-165.

Dragutin Hrvoj in his personal papers left notes about Pavelić in which he turned attention to those individuals who had an influence on the views of the President of the SSP during the course of the First World War. According to Hrvoj, the strongest influences came from Srđan Budisavljević and Valerijan Pribičević, two politicians who in 1917 left the ranks of the Croat-Serb Coalition Club in the Croatian Sabor. In addition to these, the Dalmatian politicians Ivan Krstelj, Mate Drinković and Grga Angelinović also had an influence on him. Though adherents of 'Rightism', they were turning ever more toward the concept of Yugoslav integralism. The first two were his friends from student days. Finally, he also mentions a meeting between the Zagreb physician and free mason Dr. Roko Joković and Pavelić. After this private meeting, writes Hrvoj, Pavelić „from then on abandoned his views and opened a direct road to Pribičević.”²⁰ Researchers of Free Masonary describe Joković as an especially committed Yugoslav nationalist who had a strong aversion to Croatian statehood.²¹ If we take into consideration that at the time of the debates about the split of the “Frankist” party in 1906-1908, his opponents constantly emphasized that he was being influenced by the supporters of the Croat-Serb Coalition, then it appears that Pavelić at all key times made decisions of the basis of others advice. On the other hand, Pavelić at least displayed not only determination in taking over the main role in the SSP, but also ambition to lead the “national concentration” at the time of the demise of Austria-Hungary.

In the period leading up to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the leaders of the SSP played a prominent role in support of the union with the Kingdom of Serbia at all costs. Pavelić became the Vice-president of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs and thus traveled at the head to the delegation to Belgrade where on 1 December 1918 he read the proclamation of unification.²² Not long after the formation of the new state, the followers of SSP quickly left behind 'Rightism', faithfully supporting the development of the Yugoslav Monarchy. For them, the inheritance of Ante Starčević was something to be overcome. Thus it is not surprising that under Pavelić's presidency it was decided to “honorably bury” the SSP.²³

Thus, not long after the death of their leader Mile Starčević in 1917, the

²⁰ Dragutin Hrvoj, “Dr. Ante Pavelić podpredsjednik ‘Narodnog vijeća’”, *Hrvatski Zagorac*, no. 178, March 12, 1938.

²¹ Ivan Mužić, *Masonstvo u Hrvata (Masoni i Jugoslavija)*, fourth edition. (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1989), p. 242 and Zoran Nenezić, *Masoni u Jugoslaviji (1764-1980)*. (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1984). Both refer to the article by notable historian Ferdo Šišić, which he wrote about Joković in *Šestar*, no. 9-10 (Zagreb, 1938). According to Nenezić, three members of Starčević's Party of Right were Masons in Maksimilijan Vrhovac's lodge: Pavelić, Petričić i Angelinović.

²² S. Matković, “Politički put dr. Ante Pavelića (1869.-1938.) od početaka do kraja Prvoga svjetskog rata”, *Zbornik u čast Hrvoju Matkoviću*. (Zagreb: Hrvatski studiji Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2005), pp. 213-234

²³ Hrvoje Matković, “Hrvatska zajednica”, *Istorija XX. veka*, vol. V. (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1963), pp. 5-136, here p. 23.

«Mile loyalists» (*milinovci*) followed that tradition that held that the Croat side was too weak to combat all of its opponents and thus that an alliance in the form of a Yugoslav state was unavoidable, while the «Frankists» held more doggedly to the idea of Croatian statehood, but without success in the context of its realization within the Habsburg Monarchy because they did not find support among Dualist statesmen and the ruling dynasty, that is, they did not succeed in making Croatia a more important factor in the Monarchy. Thus it was revealed that among 'Rightists' there was no common understanding of the manner by which to solve the basic issue of Croatian statehood. Ideological conflicts influenced developments in Croatian society, directly revealing political divisions in the population. This called forth deep fissures, unreconcilable personal conflicts, and a lack of minimal consensus around the national question. The division between “Austro-Croatism” and “Yugoslavism” resulted in a situation that, following the collapse of the Monarchy, left 'Rightism' on the margins of Croatian politics, leaving the field open to Stjepan Radić to become the main interpreter of Croatian rights and needs. Moreover, 'Rightists' of Yugoslav orientation integrated themselves into parties in which 'Rightist' content was no longer important, while that portion of the 'Rightists' which continued to work under the banner of the Croatian Party of Right turned toward the waters of radical nationalism.

Die Mitglieder der Rechtspartei und die Idee der kroatischen Staatlichkeit während des Ersten Weltkrieges

Zusammenfassung

Autor untersucht das Profil der Anhänger der Rechtspartei nach dem Attentat auf den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand. Er vergleicht die Standpunkte verschiedener politischer Gruppen, die sich auf die Tradition der Rechtspartei stützen. Die von Ante Starčević gegründete Idee der kroatischen Staatlichkeit zeigte sich in der Praxis als nicht erfolgreich, so dass einige Anhänger von Ante Starčević später eifrige Befürworter des jugoslawischen Staates wurden. Eine Spaltung zwischen dem “Austro-Kroatentum” und dem “Jugoslawismus” rief die Situation hervor, in der nach dem Zusammenbruch der Habsburgermonarchie die Anhänger des Ideengutes der Rechtspartei am Rande der kroatischen politischen Szene blieben und so den freien Raum für die Tätigkeit von Stjepan Radić ließen, der bald zum wichtigsten Befürworter und Interpreten der kroatischen Rechte und Bedürfnisse wurde. Die jugoslawisch gesinnten ehemaligen Mitglieder der Rechtspartei schlossen sich sogar den Parteien an, in deren Programmen die ursprünglichen Ideen der Rechtspartei keine wichtige Rolle mehr spielten, während sich derjenige Teil der Mitglieder der Rechtspartei, die seine Tätigkeit unter der Fahne der Kroatischen Rechtspartei fortsetzten, zum radikalen Nationalismus zuwandte.