1. Introduction and Overview

Let me start off by saying that I have no special knowledge of music or musicology. The reasons for my participating in the conference at which a version of this article was read as a paper, are my interest in ideology theory, and, in line
with this, my past involvement in a (doctoral) research project undertaken by Martina Viljoen, the organizer of said symposium (on Critical Theories and Musicology).

I regard ideology theory, or rather a specific version of this theory, as an analytical tool that can be used for various purposes in various disciplines. In my view it is in fact part of a set of "matching" tools, some of the other tools being (specific versions of) a conceptual semantics; a figurative semiotics; a Foucauldian kind of "axis"-theory on themes such as knowledge, power and subjectivity; a socio-cultural structuring theory; a rationality theory; and a communication theory.

For some years now, I have tried (with the co-operation of others) to develop these and a few other theoretical tools, for the purpose of analyzing various kinds of discourse at various levels, endeavoring to trace the multiple and interconnected origins and determinations of what is "said" (in the broadest possible sense of the word, including moral, social and cultural "texts"). Such a project might be termed a kind of discourse archaeology. An archaeology of this nature is also a "critical theory", in so far as it allows not only for description and explanation, but also for critique. The latter is effected, in many instances, by taking into account various kinds of "balances" that the set of discourse-archaeological subtheories or tools assume to be ideal and normative (in some sense), and which these tools "test for" in individual discourses or practices.

What I propose to do in this article, is to apply three of these tools (or at least segments of them) to so-called critical theory and to musicology (and musicology's implementation of critical theory). The tools in question are ideology theory, rationality theory, and a theory of conceptual "key" formulas. My concern will be only with introductory perspectives, and with avoiding as far as possible technical-theoretical elaborations and excursions (though each of these tools does contain some intricate theoretical "wiring"). In fact, in the spirit of the tool metaphor perhaps, I will strive for near-pragmatistic clarity and simplicity of presentation, which of course brings with it the risk of over-simplification — regarding both one's own views and those that one is analyzing.

But for me, the tool metaphor also has some deeper implications that can be teased out — with a bit of imagination. For it can be brought in line with the view, which I share, that after an era of therapeutic "deconstruction", we can now begin

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1 Here is some (as yet) unpublished work that I have drawn on in this article. With a view to publication in article form, I am currently revising a manuscript entitled "The Games Philosophers Play", which offers an overview of DA theory, with the most detailed attention being given to "key theory" or "logosemantics". The most detailed elaboration of the ideology theory I am using in this article, is "The Name of the Game in Ideology Theory: John Thompson's Depth-Hermeneutics against the Topography of Ideological Culture" (Ms., 1994, University of the Free State, S. A.) The fullest (book length) description of the whole spectrum of DA is provisionally entitled: "Discourse Archaeology, Anthropology, Spirituality: a Posthumanist Critique" (forthcoming). Details of published work dealing with some of the individual DA theories are given below.
working on a "retooled" kind of philosophy. This means taking the lessons of the best types of deconstructionist analyses to heart, indeed building them into our analytical tools, while nevertheless taking a more positive attitude to "theory" (in the more systematic sense) than we find in radical deconstructionism.

My plan in this presentation is to, first of all, use the ideology and rationality tools to assess (what I will call) critical theory's "paradigm position" and "rationality rating". Then I will apply the conceptual-semantic tool to elucidate the different "key-formulas" one finds in critical theory and in possible musicological models. This is followed by some remarks on the special case of Derrida and deconstruction. Thereupon I return to the ideology theme, to evaluate critical theory's own approach to ideology theory. Finally, I would like to venture some tentative thoughts on music as ideology critique, and also on music's wider relation to the kind of reality that the combined use of many different philosophical tools (not just ideology critique) seems to disclose. In the next six subsections I will also attempt, by way of six end-summaries, to formulate a specific goal to which the self-criticism of the critical theorist (musicologist) can align itself, a goal that is directly related to the analysis undertaken in each particular subsection.

2. Critical Theory's Paradigm Position

Regarding the theme of "critical theory" as such, throughout this article I will be analyzing aspects of this approach in both the narrower and the wider sense of the term. The former sense I will take as referring to Marxist and especially neo-Marxist theory (particularly the Horkheimer/Adorno version); and the latter as referring to an assortment of theories that include (besides the "narrow" theory) inputs from for example structuralism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, new historicism, various feminisms, and so on. In what follows I assume some familiarity on the part of the reader with at least the basic import of (some of) these variants of critical theory.

However, my first point of criticism actually concerns the term "critical theory" as such. It is really not a good name for a theory or a collection of theories, for a number of reasons. Here are a few. (i) The stark tensions between the different paradigms constituting "wider" critical theory are sublimated this label, as is the fact that they often constitute outright critiques not only of culture and society, but of each other. (ii) None of the current uses of the name fit easily with for example John B. Thompson's work on ideology theory, which does in fact link up, in a very guarded way, with the "narrower" tradition; nor do these connotations cover the various interacting tools I will introduce here, though these tools can in fact be said to further the purposes of a critical theory of culture and society. (iii) On reflection, "critical" seems to be a rather nonsensical name for a theory. (iv) It is also a bit presumptuous, arrogating to itself a goal found in many areas of theoretical
reflection and realized in many different theories. (v) Besides, criticism, as important as it is, is only a partial function of the kind of theories we are critically in need of — together with «deconstruction» for example, the best kind of theory also brings with it the positive moment of «reconstruction», which has to rely on structural models of some kind, however tentative. In any case, with all these reservations in mind, I will continue to use the term «critical theory» (henceforth CT) here, specifying when the need arises the «narrower» or «wider» connotations, or individual theories or paradigms associated with these connotations.

The first tool that I want to apply to CT is a model of ideology theory (developed in the DA context), the technical details of which I have discussed elsewhere (VISAGIE 1996 and 2004). In the present context, I am only going to very briefly summarize a few salient points regarding a possible analysis of CT that emerges from the perspective of this model (to which I will simply refer as the «ideology tool»).

To begin with, the ideology tool makes a basic distinction between the possible truth content of paradigms or discourses or frameworks (such as CT), and their ideological aspect. (I use the term «ideological» in the negative sense, implying the classical elements of falseness, illusion, distortion, and the like; some elaboration on this will follow.) Furthermore, the ideology tool presumes (critically enough) that philosophical paradigms, as such, nearly inevitably have some ideological aspect to them (not excluding, in principle, the framework in which the ideology tool itself was devised). This allows the ideology theorist to «enter» or «index» these paradigms on a model of the «ideological field» or «landscape» (topography) of modernity. Assuming, then, that CT will indeed display such an aspect (which will become more apparent as we go along), we can then think of CT, as far as this aspect is concerned, as a given paradigm structure on the ideological landscape.

In this position, the ideology tool lets CT be surrounded, followed and preceded by other paradigms stretching back into the history of philosophy, such as analytical philosophy, existentialism, positivism, pragmatism, and so on. (Thus the temporal nature of these particular kinds of paradigms is underlined.) But it appears that CT occupies a rather unique position on this ideological landscape. This is because, in the narrower sense of the familiar neo-Marxist paradigm, CT is indeed comparable to something like existentialism or neo-positivism or neo-pragmatism, but in the wider sense it obviously comprises a variety of such paradigms. For the ideology analyst, CT in the wider sense is thus something of an artificial construct on the ideological landscape. In this latter position, CT is actually an assortment of paradigms (referred to above) amongst which various degrees of harmony and tension exist.

Not only is there conflict between, say, structuralism and post-structuralism, there are also paradigm-internal differences and divisions, even discrepancies between the various stages of a specific thinker. (These latter divisions and discrepancies may be the result of differing «key-formulas», the theme of section 3 below.) On the other hand there is what we can call analogical relations between
paradigms, where elements from one get transformed into parts of the other (as with structuralism and post-structuralism for example, think only of something like the functional autonomy of textuality). This enables the ›transforming‹ paradigm to criticize its predecessor (act as a ›critical theory‹ toward it), while simultaneously the structural indebtedness (to the predecessor) of elements of this very critique, becomes something of an embarrassment for the latter. Such relations also hold for CT in the narrower sense of the neo-Marxist paradigm, think for example of Horkheimer’s early sympathies toward existentialist thought — in direct conflict with the social agenda of Marxism (as Adorno fully realized). The same kind of relations of estranged kinship hold — more crucially and contentiously — for the two overarching paradigms called ›modern‹ and ›postmodern‹. Here, I should point out that the ideology model I am using still ›classifies‹ so-called postmodernism under the ideological topography of modernity. As many commentators have pointed out, modernity has hardly begun to develop the full range of its cultural steering potential: postmodernism (even in its strongest Derridean variants) only utilizes this potential in a very original way. (I return to this theme in section 5 below.)

All of this presents us with a kind of ideological-historical structure that (i) points to an ideological aspect pervading our most radical attempts at critique; (ii) makes us aware of the conceptual tensions fracturing the unified front of any paradigmatic theory (such as critical theory or a critical theory); and (iii) relativises the considerable distance that exponents of philosophical paradigms tend to place between themselves and their opponents.

It seems to me that a first self-critical objective for users of CT would be to practice the above (three-pronged) ideological ›deconstruction‹ on their theory, or theory-related viewpoint, thus critically interrogating the very identity of their critique.

I note in passing that a thinker like Adorno was certainly advanced in the practice of theoretical self-criticism, with his ›negative dialectics‹ in the end turning on itself. But interestingly, this self-criticism seems to me to concern the conceptual structure of theory as such, which Adorno regarded as a stumbling block (his own perspective on the ›identity‹ problem), and also the deplorable nature of the social conditions surrounding theory. But the problematic nature of critical reflection in terms of specifically the above issues (concerning the nature of paradigm structure), does not seem to get his attention.

3. Critical Theory’s Rationality Rating

The second tool that I want to bring to CT, is a model of rationality that specifically deals with the parameters of what I will call ›rationalism‹ and ›anti-rationalism‹. Again, without going into the internal details of this model, I will only
abstract and summarize some main features that are pertinent in the present context. This tool interprets rationalism as a highly selective and ideological focus on: structures, laws, norms, principles, universality, objectivity, science, logic, formalization, and other items that fit this kind of rationality ideal. According to the model, rationalism in this sense detracts from: factuality, subjectivity, individuality, singularity, process, event, the informal and aphoristic, the aesthetic and the historical. The model then posits all these (and similar) items as being redeemed, cultivated and celebrated in what is labeled as anti-rationalism. But the model indicates that anti-rationalism in this sense (there are some problems with this terminology; many who hold these «values» would not want to be labeled as being «against rationality») actually comes to represent a focus which is just as selective and ideological as rationalism. The tool assumes that ideally there is a «middle path» (not really a satisfactory term) to be chosen here, which should be thought of as «rationality» — a rationality that does not go in the direction of either of the two «isms», and which (at least) desires to do justice to both of the two dimensions at issue, not wanting to declare an inherent conflict between them, or favor one at the cost of the other.

By way of a side-remark, note how this tool complements the first one. Bringing it to the landscape of ideologies, it aids us in trying to determine how different paradigms approach the ideal of rationality. Moreover, its application across the history of paradigms gives us reason to think that this is indeed a major divisive issue in philosophical worldviews. The link between the two tools suggests the cautious use of rationalism/anti-rationalism as an ideology-internal method of distinguishing paradigms and their exponents according to certain criteria: along the lines sketched above. I say cautious use, because both ideological matrix-forms — namely rationalism and anti-rationalism — can actually be intricately intertwined within the same discourse — as in Wittgenstein or Foucault for example.

Now, if we bring this analytical tool to CT, there are some findings worth mentioning here. Firstly, CT in the narrower sense, specifically Adorno’s philosophy, can clearly be classified as anti-rationalist — and thus presenting us with a rather slanted perspective from the very beginning. Indeed Adorno goes so far as to postulate an irredeemable conflict between conceptuality as such (let alone scien-

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2 The model is partially indebted to a groundbreaking critique of both rationalism and «irrationalism» (as he termed it) developed by the neo-Calvinist Dutch philosopher, Hermann Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). My own development of the model uncouples some of Dooyeweerd’s (1953-58) distinctions from the religious-metaphysical framework that he used.

3 In the later Wittgenstein we find a rationalistic individualism (at odds with his anti-rationalist and somewhat mystical views on ethics and spirituality), and in Foucault the structuralist rationalism of his early period is linked to the ethical anti-rationalism of the final period. The nominalist appreciation for individuality, which marks the advent of modernity and the birth of science and technology (where such individuality is usually taken up in a rationalist framework), distinguished itself, in its early rationalist manifestations, from the Greek-medieval kind of realist metaphysics, with its universalistic (rationalist) ontology.
tific conceptualizing!) and individuality (the latter category intimately connected to his theory of music). Though I think he is right in distinguishing between »ultimate« individuality and the generalizing nature of concepts, there is from the point of view of the rationality tool no need to postulate an unbridgeable gulf between the two »orders«, where one is practically demonized and the other enshrined with a near mystical aura. The rationality »middle-path« holds (I would contend) that there is simply no way we can deal with individuality, or even honor it, without some form of conceptuality. If this is the case, then we need to distinguish between different kinds of concepts — rather than create an antagonistic dualism between suffering individuality and indifferent conceptuality.

Within the broader neo-Marxist paradigm (to which I now turn), Habermas correctly and effectively criticizes this basic and pervasive flaw in Adorno’s dialectics. But I think a strong case can be made that Habermas himself actually launches his critique of Adorno from a rationalist (in the above defined sense) position. This comes to the fore in for example his distinction between (what he terms) morality and ethics (universal versus individual), and his systematic interest in the former above the latter (see for example HABERMAS 1989, 1993). Of more relevance in the present context, is Habermas’s problematic differentiation of specifically reason to encompass not only science and technology, but also morality and law, and aesthetics. The question is whether his stress on the relative uniqueness of each of these »moments«, is enough to extricate him from what is perhaps a more refined kind of rationalism (where the usual senses of the latter term are still pertinent). Habermas’s refined rationalism actually establishes a link between himself and the »raw« rationalist overtones of original Marxian theory (the scientific pretensions, historical determinism, and so on). Except for Habermas, and moving to wider CT, I would say that typically rationalist approaches are also found in the first phase of Foucault’s writings (possibly mixed with their opposites, but with the former predominating).

However, in terms of CT in its wider sense, the rationalist posture seems to be the exception, and for some time now, virtually non-existent. The rationality tool seems to show that most of these theories tend rather to take the anti-rationalist position, post-structuralist ideology in general being a good example. (I will give examples of CT anti-rationalism in the following subsection.) As for art and music, one should be careful not to think that theories related to these phenomena are necessarily on the side of anti-rationalism. For one can theorize about art and music in a way that gives such precedence to the »structural«, that it can be termed rationalist in the above defined sense.

4 In the DA framework, rationality is but one philosophical »ground-structure«. Morality/ethics and aesthetics are others (together with for example creativity/work, language, and communication). From this it is apparent that these other structures are here not seen as different parts of rationality — although there is a technical-theoretical procedure to indicate that rationality itself may on occasion feature within, say, moral or aesthetic communication.
Let me conclude this section by listing a second objective for the self-critical critical theorist: this is to try and «deconstruct» the opposition between rationalism and anti-rationalism as it may infiltrate his or her own thinking. This kind of deconstruction, I venture to say, most probably will have serious repercussions for any committed critical theorist, as well as for the critics of CT. One of the major difficulties that one must confront here, is to realize that earnestly attempting such a therapeutic deconstruction, is no guarantee that one will actually achieve it. The sad fact of the matter (according to the combined prognosis of the rationality and ideology tools) is that all of us actually tend toward either one of these two «isms» (or a combination of them), and mostly need others (often from the opposite camp) to point this out to us. (This is perhaps a good example of the relative truth of post-structuralism’s celebrated turn to the «Other».)

A final remark: Anti-rationalist critical theorists or postmodernists will sometimes invoke «science» (in the form of, say, chaos theory or catastrophe theory, or complexity theory, or even relativity theory) to bolster their views. Nearly always they seem to misinterpret the actual theories they invoke in this way — as they are in fact bound to do, given the nature of their starting point. On the other hand, one must also be careful to distinguish between the scientific theories «in themselves», and the way they are used by scientists of a rationalistic bent in their war on postmodernists. In such confrontations, the poor scientific theory itself may actually be caught in a cross-fire between two equally distorted interpretations of rationality.

4. Key-formulas, Art and Critical Theory

The third tool that I want to bring to CT, is the analysis of conceptual «key-formulas». Again summarizing and simplifying, such formulas can be thought of as models of very basic ontological theories, where some or other X is postulated as holding some kind of power (Y) over a domain Z. (These three elements are consistent with the metaphor of a key that unlocks the door to knowledge, corresponding to the three structural parts of a key.) Discovering such formulas is in a sense what philosophy and the philosophical substructure of many different kinds of theories are all about.5

Classic examples of such formulas, that are also important in CT, are Marx’s socio-economic conditions as being in some sense foundational to various areas of culture and society; Nietzsche’s will to power as coming to expression in art, morality and truth; and Freud’s libidinal forces as being central to various aspects of human existence. These examples (from the so-called «masters of suspicion») give us some idea of what can count as a typical X, Y, or Z element. The various kinds

5 A much more detailed discussion of logosemantics or «key theory» (with reference to the work of Fritjof Capra) may be found in VISAGIE 1998. See also note 1 above.
of power that the Y-element represents, are found in depictions of an X as structuring, unifying, integrating, original, foundational, central, and so on, in relation to Z. The three philosophers who have (most) closely and critically studied the role that precisely this kind of conceptualization plays in philosophical discourse, are Dooyeweerd (see note 2), Heidegger and (famously) Derrida. Although the DA analysis of key formulas that I have just sketched in the broadest outlines is indebted to these thinkers, none of them approach this theme in the formal, category-based, conceptual-semantic way that I think this kind of analysis should be done (cf. the reference in note 5).

The relevance of this kind of analysis to art or musicology should be apparent. For example, if we have art/aesthetics in the X-position, we can abstractly imagine philosophical models where (i) art is the highest goal of culture and society or of individual human existence; or where (ii) the concern of human beings with, say, aesthetic form (already) comes to expression in all areas of public or private life; or where (iii) art mysteriously transcends the realms of, say, nature, power or knowledge.

On the other hand, if we have art in the Z-position, we can have models depicting in the X-position in one of the following (for example): (iv) bio-psychological impulses; (v) pure conceptual constructs; (vi) symbolizing or communicative competence; (vii) power constellations; (viii) social interaction; (ix) higher spiritual needs; (x) economic conflict. Each of these factors can thus be conceptualized as in some or other way determining art or aesthetics. I will not proceed here to match these formulas with specific and existing discourses, but it is clear that, for example, while the classic Marxist approach is based on (x), Adorno’s approach is anchored in some version of (iii).

But let us look at exactly how conceptions of music fit into key formulas of this kind. Let me just take note of one particular structural possibility in this regard. When we study key formulas closer, we see that typical XYZ relations can, recursively as it were, be embedded in larger key structures. For example, in Dooyeweerdian philosophy the X-concept of a multi-facetted metaphysical world order accords within itself a central and transcendent position to love (in the sense of the Christian commandment) within this order. In Habermas, on the other hand, we see rationality in the X-position being expressed in social relations — all three elements combining to form the larger X-structure. It is easy to see the same structure again underlying a version of, say, (iv) above, where specifically libidinal energy is supposedly at the centre of psychological needs and drives. Or take (vii) above: here one can have various candidates for an X-factor within the larger X-concept, for example psychological instincts as the «real» root or origin of power constellations (themselves).

Against this background it is easy to see the key structure of theories in which specifically music comes to the fore as, say, the very pinnacle of art, where the latter indeed enjoys X-status. Here again we are very close to Adorno’s exaltation...
of (certain kinds of) music. But music can, in principle, also assume X-status on the Z-side of the equation. (This is the kind of status Habermas ascribes to language on the Z-side: in relation to all the »spheres« of a differentiated society.) This will happen in any conception which has various articulations of, say, »culture« in the Z-position, but where music as such is seen to be (for some reason) either at the root of these articulations, or (again) transcending all of them. Evidently, ascribing this kind of transcendence to music, would be far from Adorno’s own conception of such transcendence.

Note that a good deal is dependent on how exactly the Y-element (the nature of the power X holds over Y) is conceptualized. For example, there is a significant difference between holding that economic relations of some kind is a kind of substratum for the creation of art in a differentiated society (which is a claim difficult to reject); and maintaining that the act of artistic creation — as such — is, say, an integral part (though disguised) of such relations. Typical key-formulas in fact tend to make more radical claims such as represented in the second alternative. This is somewhat understandable, for exactly herein lies the »surprising« significance that »revolutionary« or »radical« or »paradigm-shifting« thinkers usually want to claim for their discoveries.6

If we look at CT in the inclusive sense, we find typical key formulas all over the place. Think only of the (X-type) centrality accorded to language or significations or textuality (Lacan, Baudrillard, Derrida); or anonymous power networks (Foucault); or socio-economic group-conflict (various Marxist approaches); or art and the aesthetic (Adorno, Marcuse); or rationality and communication (Habermas); or gender (various feminisms); or cultural and social contextuality (many manifestations of postmodernism as such, also Rorty’s neo-pragmatism).7 If we take the first of these examples above, there are serious critical questions to be raised against selectively granting signification or textuality (as such) various kinds of Y-power over art in general, or music and musicology in particular. This leads to just that kind of conflation that, if I understand correctly, Christopher Norris is criticizing in his contribution to the present publication. On the other hand, I think it is true to say that music does cohere with — among other things — various kinds of signification (perhaps in the »substratum« sense referred to above), and can metaphorically be said to have — among other metaphorical attributes — a language of its own; something that Adorno for example emphasized.8

6 Within Marxist circles there is a still ongoing discussion as to exactly how the »Y-power« of material conditions is in fact to be understood. The »hardliners« tend to opt for the »enclosing« kind of power — which, to the »progressive« or »post« Marxist thinkers of various stripe, seems to be a downright ridiculous claim to make.

7 I am not differentiating here between different versions of a specific formula that a thinker may hold, or indeed between different formulas belonging to different stages of his/her thought.

8 Within the DA framework, a theoretical underwriting of both the uniqueness and coherence of things, functions as a kind of meta-tool: it is of direct relevance to just about all the other tools/subtheories. Critical metaphor analysis (and the uniqueness as well as coherence of metaphors) is one of these tools.
Of course, aside from the recursive structure of key formulas, there are all sorts of other complicating factors that should be taken into consideration here (when practicing this kind of analysis). Let me briefly mention two things by way of example. (i) It is not necessarily from only one key-formula that a discourse may be generated. In fact, there may be a kind of interaction taking place between, say, two or three or four formulas, possibly with primacy being allocated to one of them. (iii) In interacting formulas, one of them may represent a »negative« power as opposed to the »positive« power of the other one — for example a conception where, say, economic relations as such have their own (evil) structuring effect on the very domain (Z) over which aesthetic creativity (perhaps culminating in music in particular) holds (good, normative) power.

But let us look at another complication — one of major importance, involving the need to add something substantially different to the above described structure of key formulas. When a more or less philosophical discourse (or a collection of such discourses) is dealing with some kind of XYZ model, we usually find certain attributes qualifying the X and Z-elements. Here, I will attend only to the X-attributes. (To extend our metaphor: think of a philosophical »golden key« as coming with a little chain attached to it — the links representing chosen attributes.) In classical Greek thought such attributes were for example unity; constancy or changelessness; knowableness; necessity; universality. If we jump over the centuries to the discourses of postmodernism we tend to find exactly the opposite qualifications of whatever X-factor may be involved (sometimes presenting as the X-factor itself): multiplicity (for example of power, compare Foucault); flux (of signifiers for example); unknowableness (of some or other »Other«, compare also the supposed quality of Cixous’s feminist writing); contingency (explicitly extolled in Rorty for example); individuality (of Derrida’s »event« for example). In the prototype »post-structuralism« of Adorno one can already find the prominence of the individual and (therefore) unknowable (in terms of concepts). In this approach, music is what comes nearest to adequately giving voice to raw individuality beyond the realm of the conceptual. Often recurrent metaphors are invoked to carry the meaning of one or more of the attributes reviewed above: network, web and labyrinth for complexity and multiplicity; traveler-without-pause-or-destination (as in tourist against pilgrim, see BAUMAN 1998) for continuous changefulness, for example. Musicologists will certainly be aware of the way these privileged attributes and their accompanying metaphors feature in current theory and criticism.

If we compare the above notion of a chain of attributes with the previous tool, there is something they have in common. Note how the two sets of possible attribute options, exemplified in »classical« versus »postmodern«, seem to correspond to the opposition between rationalism and anti-rationalism. Of course, this can prompt the question of whether the stark opposition between attribute choices cannot be overcome in some way, similar to (and exemplifying) the »mediating rationality« posited by the previous tool. In my view, this overcoming of opposites
is indeed the best way to proceed here. But the matter is complicated, as there are various models («schematizations») for such reconciliation, and these have appeared throughout the history of philosophical thought. But I return to this theme in the following section.

At this stage, however, we can already formulate a third objective for a self-critical CT: to bring to reflective consciousness the «key» representations of its own philosophical unconscious. The «key» critical question here is: can any given X-factor really bear the enormous weight that is usually imposed on it (as a foundation, yes, but also as center, root, telos, origin, and so on)? And given postmodernism’s penchant for individuality, can the proposed utter individuality and uniqueness of the various elements over which an X-factor is called to rule, really be sustained under this rule? And can selected attributes really hold their own against their opposite numbers in the ceaseless war of the paradigms? Derridean deconstruction appears to have targeted precisely such keys and key-chains, showing by means of meticulous immanent criticism how key-logic tends to run up against inconsistencies and contradictions of various kinds. But let us look at this project a bit more closely.

5. The Special Case of Derrida and Deconstruction

It would be natural to ask if Derridean deconstruction does not, already, embody both the description and the critique of key formulas that was introduced in the previous section. But the answer to this question cannot simply be affirmative. Apart from the formal-technical aspects of «key» theory, a kind of analysis to which Derrida would be averse, there is another more substantive difference.

This has to do with the fact that, while key theory makes ample room for the critique of the content of key formulas, it does not hold that the very structure of key conceptualizations is in itself suspect. On the contrary, this XYZ-kind of conceptualization, with its built-in power relation or hierarchical configuration, is just part of the natural way that human beings think when they theorize. (With the recent advances of the cognitive sciences, it does not seem implausible to hold that, ultimately, this kind of structure must have some correlate in our brain biology.)9 Such key-constructs occur on various levels, from the way that technical ground-concepts relate to each other in scientific theories, to the «grand narra-

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9 The broader cognitive-scientific framework within which I think key theory can fruitfully be pursued is the conceptual semantics developed by Ray Jackendoff. See for example his 2002 book, which places conceptual semantics itself within a broad foundational framework, and also looks into the mind/brain context of conceptualisation. (My working hypothesis is that XYZ formulas represent a specific level of human conceptual-semantic competence.) Jackendoff, who is also a musician, has in fact attempted to apply the formal (generative) theoretical approach that he learned as a student from Chomsky, to music. See LERDAHL and JACKENDOFF 1983.
tives of philosophical worldviews. Regarding the latter, the trouble is not the fact that key formulas feature in a discourse; the problem only has to do with the value of the X-factor, the identity of the particular thing or phenomenon that is selected for the X-role. For, as indicated above, the trouble with such selections is precisely that: that they are selective. Thus, we can reason that if some kind of X were postulated that in fact counts as a very wide variety of interrelated factors from various levels of experience or reality (like for example the dharma networks of Buddhist philosophy, but even more varied), the usually legitimate »deconstruction« of X-identities (showing that a particular X cannot bear the enormous weight of serving as a foundation for various Z-functions) can in fact itself be successfully countered.10

But we know that this is not Derrida’s view. For him deconstruction is not only about content, but even about structure. (As indicated by the famous thesis of »logocentrism«.) But I think it is here where deconstruction goes over the top. For in fact it can be shown that Derrida, while going about the business of deconstruction, does himself have (to have) recourse to key conceptualizations. Time and again, we can isolate actual sentences in his writings that »fill in« XYZ structures. Let me give just one relatively recent example, taken from his interview with Giovanna Borradori (2003: 129): »Unconditional hospitality is transcendent with regard to the political, the juridical, perhaps even to the ethical.« I know that there is a usual defence for this, to the effect that the deconstructor is bound to certain possibilities for expression and can only attempt to transcend them from within. But in my view it simply won’t do to say that what is written there does not actually mean what it says. There is no interpretation of the above sentence that can magically spirit away its key structure; moreover, Derrida’s well-known deconstructing instruments, his neologisms and »non-concepts«, continue to invoke precisely such key structures. From his earlier concepts of »writing« and »différence«, to his later concepts of, say, justice or hospitality or messianicity, these all have typical key structures and functions. By the same token we find that writers extremely sympathetic to Derridean imperatives, like John Caputo for instance, are also forced to use typical key-formulations (featuring Y-relations like »transcend« for example) when they are describing Derrida’s thinking.

On a more abstract level, I would say (or guess) that the innermost identity of Derrida’s (primary or original) key formula can perhaps be found in something like: the conceptual/linguistic flux of »other-than-this« transcend or precede our efforts at stability in various domains of reality. (I note in passing that »precede« is a Y-term that features prominently in Derridean discourse — compare also his ongoing fascination with the concept of origin — and that Derrida seems to merge the concep-

10 One of the goals of DA theory is indeed to provide a theoretical »map« of reality, that accounts for enough features of our lifeworld, so as to be able to »take on the weight« of functioning as an X-point of reference.
tual and the lingual: here, it seems, »difference« is not so important.) Of course there is an element of truth to this formula: we indeed conceptualise by means of distinguishing something from something(s) »other« — the differences that surround and precede it. But the »other« pole of the process is... identification! Something is different from others in that it is what it is (sameness). Thus there is both a »positive« and a »negative« dimension to the process of conceptualisation and signification. But Derrida seems to focus on the latter dimension at the expense of the former, or wants to constitute (also a typical Y-term) the former through the latter. Furthermore, if my analysis of his primary key is anywhere near correct, the rather confined identity of the X-element is apparent: it is some very specific feature of the world (a world that includes human experience) that has a transcending and preceding power. But such specification, and this kind of power relation has always been a target for deconstruction. In any case, in terms of the development of Derrida’s thought, I think it is also possible that the key formula just described may have served as a kind of model for »otherness« in a wide variety of contexts.

To the problematic aspects just addressed, should be added the fact that Derrida is quite obviously partial to that chain of key attributes that I have linked above with contemporary anti-rationalism (the attributes of non-finite complexity, change, individuality, contingency, unknowableness). It is true that he has an ingenious way of attempting to escape being »pinned down« in this manner, though it is a tactic (often identified with deconstruction) that has been used throughout the history of philosophy. Basically, it comes down to this: while selecting an attribute like for instance changefulness or flux (call it »first order« flux), you interpret this flux in such a radical way, that you are in fact forced to keep on moving away from any temporary »location« whatsoever (continually changing places), even from the location of a (constant) concept like flux itself. In this way, it seems as if you really cannot be »pinned down«: you are not adhering to constancy (which is obvious), but also not to flux (at least this is what you maintain to those who want to »place« you there), nor even to a dialectical combination of the two. But, in reality, you do select flux to feature in the attribute chain — it is just a conceptually sophisticated »second order« concept of flux (fluctuating away from itself). This is pretty much the same way that the famous Buddhist philosopher, Nagarjuna, (a kind of fore-runner of Derrida, see MAGLIOLA 1984) interpreted the »everything changes« and »dependent co-arising« doctrines to avoid identifying himself with any view whatsoever. In the same way one can arrive at a second order concept of for example unity, which »deconstructs« any first order unity, on account of the implicit distinction involved (unity over and against multiplicity).

Note that this second order concept of flux also enables its exponents to speak on occasion positively — so it appears — about constancy and universality. What is actually happening is that, being »on the move«, one is not restricted to just speaking about flux or individuality — thus it is the very logic of the situation, as
it were, that leads one to speak of the »other« in dualities and polarities, while the same logic simultaneously keeps these »concessions« from being taken too seriously.

All of this does not mean that I do not admire the work of Derrida, or feel a deep affinity to this kind of anti-rationalist thinking. And, on another level, I think Derrida’s work aligns itself in an incomparable way to the unsettling truth that our best theories and our most advanced critical tools of the present simply will not hold up before the »other« knowledge of the future, an infinitely receding horizon. But still, we have no choice but to try our best at building such theories. Some of these theories can even help us to avoid using the wrong key formulas in describing the unsettling truth of our powerlessness before otherness. In any case, to sum up, a fourth objective for self-critical critical theorists would be to look out ceaselessly for those instances where the key concepts of the master of deconstruction (and his disciples) lend themselves to deconstruction.

6. Critical Theory, Ideology, and Music

Let us now return to the ideology tool. In section 2 above, the idea of an ideological landscape was introduced, with (the ideological aspects of) CT situated as a specific discursive formation on this landscape, amid other philosophical and theoretical paradigms. It is now time to place all of this in a much wider perspective.

I have argued elsewhere (in detailed analyses of which I am only providing the briefest summary here) that a comprehensive and integrated ideology theory should approach the phenomenon of ideology on two basic levels. Firstly, there is the useful and fruitful analysis of ideology in terms of what I will call discursive domination. This is where concepts, norms, values and goals dominate one another in a way that leads to hypostatization, distortion and »false consciousness«. For example when the norms of science dominate our conception of politics or art, or when the goal of national survival comes to dominate and distort generally accepted legal and moral norms. Such distorted perceptions can come to dominate peoples, cultures, and societies. It is even possible to map the main ideological preoccupations of modern Western culture (or »modernity«) as such. Secondly, there is the more familiar analysis (linked to the classic Marxian analysis) of ideology in terms of social or group domination. These two levels are closely interconnected, and it is easy to see, in terms of one of the above examples, how nationalist ideological discourse on the first level is linked with socio-political domination and repression on the second level (and with discourses that mediate such repression in various ways).

For details of the ideology theory I am applying here, see VISAGIE 1996 and 2004. See also note 1 above.
But we must differentiate further, on both of these levels. Regarding the first level of discursive domination, this kind distortion can be investigated in the sphere of (i) ordinary everyday life, as well as in the specialized spheres of (ii) theoretical discourse and (iii) art, criticism and aesthetics (not discounting the possibility of still other spheres of ideology). Thus, the remarks on CT in section 2 pertain to the second sphere, which is interconnected with the other two. It is in this second sphere that the ideology tool can also connect to that of key formula analysis. For theoretical paradigms, at the level of their philosophical contextualisation, are generated from such formulas.

Still staying with the first level, we can further differentiate internally between various levels of an ideological landscape on which the dynamics of discursive domination evolve. With regard to Western modernity, we can go from the macro-level of cultural steering powers like science, technology, political-administrative and economic rationality, through intermediate levels (where something like the culture of narcissism — also referred to as »selfism« — as well as some familiar political ideologies are situated), to the micro-level of individual behavior where goals and values regarding, say, personal power and prestige, or consumer materialism, or art, or morality, or knowledge, become manifest. On the intermediate levels there are also situated the ideological formations of the social movements, in so far as such movements tend to harbor (at some point in their discourse) some kind of ideological deformation. These social movements (the New Consciousness movement, feminism, the ecology movement, and so on), in their ideological aspect, are often in conflict with the ideological steering powers of society, which is an example of the relations of tension and contradiction that span the ideological landscape of modernity. Another kind of tension is one that marks the difference between an individual’s micro-level ideological commitments to, say, pleasure or art or knowledge; and the down-filtering »messages« of the macro-level steering powers. For in the reception that these micro-settings accord to macro-messages, the latter may be totally reinterpreted and even contradicted.

Regarding the second level of social domination, there is also a pluralistic structure to discern. This has to do with the various criteria for distinguishing social groups. Thus there are domination relations possible in terms of class, race, culture, nationality, religion, gender, age, and so on. On this second level we can also distinguish a kind of macro-micro orientation (just as in the case of discursive domination), where ideology analysis can move from large scale domination like for instance the relations obtaining between the political super powers and other countries, to the much less prominent forms of domination one can discover in for example institutions like hospitals or prisons (the kind of analysis Foucault practiced at a certain stage of his writings).

If we now compare this rough sketch of a reasonably comprehensive ideology theory, with the CT approach to power, domination and ideology, some deficiencies in the latter (CT in both the narrower and the wider sense) come to light.
Let me begin by briefly stating six such deficiencies with regard to CT in the narrower sense.

(i) In the Marxian model, there is the classic focus on the level of social domination, but at the expense of (what I have termed here) discursive domination.

(ii) There is a further particularization, in so far as it is specifically the class concept that is thematised.

(iii) The Horkheimer/Adorno model, on the other hand, does succeed in also having some regard for the discursive level of domination, but here it restricts itself to the macro-levels (the well-known complex of techno-scientific and administrative rationality, coupled with capitalist economic imperatives).

(iv) Furthermore, the Horkheimer/Adorno model views this kind of domination in terms of a «social cement» type of framework (emphasizing the homogeneous nature of a society in the grip of ideology), having no regard for the ideological conflicts and resistances evidenced by, for example, the «reception» contexts of the micro-levels (referred to above). And this is ironic, given for example, Adorno’s own commitment to knowledge and art (which I think does have an ideological side to it) constituting in his and doubtlessly other cases, an effective barrier to massive macro-ideological («top-down») integration. A side-remark here: it is in Adorno’s problematic requirement that the truth content of music be rendered in a knowledge-format (that of philosophical theory) that we also find an illustration of how the knowledge norm dominates aesthetic concerns (among other things) on the micro-ideological level (cf. ZUIDERVAART 1991: 286). Yet, the reverse (typical of ideological interactions) also occurs — Adornian theory itself comes to bow before aesthetic criteria, such as a certain «atonality» (of critical reflection) for example.

(v) Then there is the fact that the Horkheimer/Adorno model cannot really deal with something like Fascist or Nazi ideology (on the discursive domination level) on their own terms as typical statist and ethno-nationalist forms of value distortion; it has to handle these phenomena in the framework of macro-level forces, because the latter has become the ideological frame of reference. Which is not to say that there can be no links between different formations on the various levels of the ideological landscape, such as between the macro-complex and for example political ideologies like statism, ethno-nationalism, revolution ideology, socialism, liberalism. But establishing such links has to presuppose the individual discursive logic that is unique to each formation on the ideological landscape.

(vi) CT as embodied in Habermas’s model, on the other hand (which is really situated somewhere between narrower and the wider CT), avoids the «social cement» interpretation of ideology, while producing some fine analyses of how macro-level «systemic» imperatives centered on administrative and economic power can come to «colonize» the «lifeworld». This notion of colonization actually corresponds closely to what I have described as the mechanism of discursive domination. But Habermas fails to contextualize this particular complex of ideological
phenomena within the much wider and multi-leveled world of discursive domination (the ideological landscape) — which is a weakness that can be traced back to the Marxist orientation as such. He has also been criticized (by Axel Honneth and others) for not doing justice to the aspect of social group domination.

Coming now to CT in the wider sense, here and there we find analyses that can deepen our understanding of the ideological landscape (as depicted above). There is for example Foucault’s analysis of »pastoral power« or Lyotard’s »grand narratives« that can be utilized as (or at) specific levels of discursive domination;12 or Derrida’s analysis of how self-interest can discursively dominate a (moral) concept such as forgiveness (fitting in with the selfism ideology referred to above);13 or feminism’s critique of patriarchy on both the discursive and the social level. But nowhere do we find an approach where the goal is to develop a really comprehensive theoretical perspective in which all the ideology-critical insights that have come our way after Marx, can be accounted for, and which can serve as a systematic framework for the study of ideology. And even outside of CT (as the term is used here), an ideology model such as that developed by for example John B. Thompson, does a fine job in working out a pluralistic approach to ideology, also in relation to the concept of discourse, but the model consciously restricts itself to only the sphere of social (group) domination.

As for the theme of music and ideology, it should be clear that a comprehensive approach to ideology theory provides the broadest (and therefore the best) framework for tracing the many ways in which music can be ideologically infiltrated. The primary critical insight here is that an understanding of the complex landscape of ideology and its relation to equally complex social group dynamics, precludes a selective or one-sided approach to music and ideology (such as a fixation on socio-economic relations, or colonial domination, or even the political sphere in its widest sense, or technological and media imperatives for example). In the widest perspective, music is a product that traverses the length and breadth of the ideological landscape, and functions across the whole spectrum of group domination and the struggle for recognition. It is touched by constellations of discursive

12 Foucault’s analysis of »pastoral power« (cf. DREYFUS & RABINOW 1982) can without too much difficulty be appropriated at what I have elsewhere (in the cited literature) termed the ideological-topographical level of »protective power«. In the ideology theory that I use, the term »pastoral« comes up in the technical expression »pastoral havens« — that is the ultimate micro-level of the ideological topography, where individual-personal form is given to various kinds of discursive domination. It is on this level that one’s appreciation for art or music can turn into an ideological commitment. As for the well-known concept of »grand narratives«, in the detailed topography of ideological culture, I would apply this term to a level of discourse situated as it were just »below« the cultural steering powers on the macro-level. Here one would find the supporting discourses in which the conceptualization of these powers have been embedded in the history of Western culture. What I have in mind here are ideological representations of reason, nature, history, progress, happiness, and the like.

13 I first came across Derrida’s interpretation in an interview he gave while on a visit to South Africa. This was published in a journal (Fragmente 3, 1999) in the Afrikaans language. I have been unable to ascertain whether his view on this matter is expressed elsewhere, in more accessible form.
domination where many different ideological imperatives come to subject and subdue music in some or other way (much as for example technical rationality can subject and subdue morality, or education, or sexuality, etc.).

The ideological imperatives to which music and its interpretation may be subjected, range from technological, economic and media interests, to cultural ideals of self-expression, to ethno-nationalist or political protest goals, to »strong« multiculturalism’s invocation of recognition and respect, to lifestyle and subculture values, to the individual’s pursuit of prestige or possessions or morality — to just pick out arbitrarily some formations on the ideological landscape. And all of these ideological mechanisms are interrelated in various and complex ways. On top of which all of this is directly related to the many ways in which social groups pursue recognition and deal in domination (even on the level of avant-garde »elitism«). And then we have only spoken of the subjection of music, not of music itself (and of course art in general) in the role of ideological dominator.

Of course the ideology-critical musicologist does not have to deal with all of this in any particular analysis. But such an analysis should ideally be aware of the wider context (the complexity of the ideological world) in which it is situated. For concrete examples of how this kind of approach can be worked out in the analysis of a genre such as gospel rap music, I refer to the outstanding Ph. D. dissertation of Martina Viljoen.14

I will summarize this section by formulating my fifth objective for the self-critical critical theorist: to practice the necessary deconstructions of ideology critiques, as well as the necessary reconstructions of how music functions in the »real« ideological world.

7. Music as Ideology Critique: Contexts and Qualifications

Having looked at a framework for investigating the ideological functions of music, we can now turn this relationship around, as it were, and look at the possibility of music itself having an ideology-critical function. Like Adorno, I believe this is possible, but then with all the necessary qualifications implied in the previous sections above. Let me now draw some brief and very general conclusions in this regard.

Music, also in its potential critical function, can probably never be innocent, that is ideology-free. This means that »critical music« is always susceptible to carrying in itself the traces of ideological formations, not only in terms of the ordinary-everyday sphere of ideology, but also the art-aesthetic sphere, where forma-

14 In her work, Viljoen actually combines the tool of ideology theory with that of figurative semiotics, especially symbol, metaphor, and narrative. The strategy of combining such tools of criticism and critique obviously enhances the depth and power of a musicological analysis.
tions like for example »expressionism« (relevant to Adornian theory) are to be found. Furthermore, I think it is possible that such music, as a symbolic form, may on some level still be aiding the maintenance of some (perhaps refined) type of social domination. Given the inter-ideological tensions that pervade the ideological landscape, music may thus conceivably target some ideological complex while being produced from another. Ideology theory (as it is understood here) even allows for the possibility that music can oppose some ideological complex, while actually bearing imprints of the latter on its own structure.

The vast expanse of the ideological landscape sketched out in the previous section, makes the deformed and distorted reality to which critical music can relate, much larger and more complex than for example Adorno’s interpretation seems to assume. Not only the macro-level »system« is the cause of a dehumanized world, but also a network of cultural, social, institutional and personal ideologies that operate on »smaller« scales. What must also be taken into account is that the notion of critical music can, as such, also be ideologised. This happens when we expect the (highest) truth to which music can aspire, to be the truth about the ideological world. For then we forget that aesthetic truth also and even primarily resides in the way that music sets out to realise itself in »the Good« — namely in being, in some or other context, good music. Of course there are various ways in which we can try to encapsulate just what this excellence entails. But the fact of the matter seems to be that the critical potential of music, from the point of view of music, comes second to it being good music. Furthermore, it needs to be said that good music in any case also and already has some critical edge — related to the »mere« truth of its goodness or quality. For it represents an implicit, structural kind of criticism of what does not meet certain norms. On the other hand, good (and in this sense true) music may of course still be »marked« (somewhere along the line) by ideology and therefore by ideological falseness.15

This leads us to venture beyond the critical function of music. Up to now, in this section, I have looked at this function from the viewpoint of ideology theory. But ideology theory is just one of the tools used in this article in an attempt to re-evaluate certain paradigms of critique. In this sense, ideology theory, which lets us see how relative things are within a certain framework, needs to be, and is in fact, itself relativised by the other tools used in the present analysis. Naturally, it would be a good thing to have even more tools around to accomplish specific analytical tasks. Philosophy, as such, can be thought of as wielding a wide variety of tools, with outdated instruments in the process of being done away with, others being modified, and new ones in the making. Not all of these tools deal with the mechanics of cultural criticism or even criticism as such. Some of them are appropriate to exploring the nature of morality, or language, or creativity, or mind, or nature

15 In the views expressed here, I have also availed myself of the input of (a specific version of) truth theory — which I take to be yet another tool in the tool-kit of DA theory.
itself. And then there are also the tools (theories, models) used and being developed in many other fields and disciplines outside of philosophy.

Imagine the possible truth content of all these instruments put together, disclosing to us, bit by bit, a world in which everything is infinitely varied and relative (much more than even postmodernism allows), yet highly structured. And this holding also for the suffering that the world inflicts, as well as the joy and redemption that it grants. Imagine that a worldview centered on such a world, and in fact the experience of such a world, may one day become part of everyday life. Of course, such an understanding and experience of reality, if it were to happen, would occur initially only within certain contexts (new movements and literatures for example), and with some limitations (the ineradicable nature of ideology for example). To my mind, the theoretically-opened and culturally-disseminated understanding and experience of such a reality, even has all the potential to transform itself into a new kind of spirituality.

But imagine now the possible kinds of music and possible kinds of reception and interpretation that could be created from such a worldview, a view that would in some instances leave explicit signs of itself in the music, in other instances perhaps only implicit traces. Such music would then indeed be indicative of a »new age«. It would bear the marks (discernible by critical musicologists) of a »new critique« of human existence in the world, coming after metaphysical worldviews, post-metaphysical ideologies, and even postmodernist philosophies. With Adorno, I would like to think of current efforts at critique — directed also against critical theory — as »messages« addressed to such a future time (cf. JAY 1984: 54). In any event, the hope for this »other« of the present, can also function as a Kantian-Derridean kind of »regulative idea«.

This brings me to my final objective for the self-critical critical theorist: to contemplate, from the perspective of a worldview much more relativist than even postmodernism allows (the latter being continually caught up in its own absolutisations, as I have shown above), an »other« to what may currently count as the truth value and the critical function of music.

* * *

To end on a more personal note: For various reasons, I would like to imagine the above world-to-come as including a yet unknown body of music, an œuvre among others, but one that musicologists of the future will liken to a kind of enigmatic writing. Here one will find an exploration of the elements of existence on all levels, and their translation into something like a repertoire of musical signs or codes. I think of such work as being more or less the musical equivalent of Paul Klee’s paintings — especially in his final period. Klee indeed was driven to express »the whole« in and through its parts, by means of increasingly minimalistic
scriptural signs. Many commentators have remarked on Klee’s own relation to music (Bach and Mozart, Schönberg and Stravinsky), his looking to music as a kind of model, and the way that this is reflected in his painting.

It should be clear that the music-as-writing that I have in mind, is evidently not to be understood in the same sense as Adorno’s generalising comparison of artworks to hieroglyphic scripts. Beyond the latter comparison lies music’s own celebration of itself as language, as writing, including (more literally) the technical means of a note-alphabet.

I would imagine that alienation and suffering would be heard in this Klee-like music, at the depth of, say, Kafka’s symbols — the depth that someone like Adorno would require. The depth of this suffering would re-sound in a wholeness that (pace Adorno) brings its own kind of redemption.

But this very wholeness would actually also relativise the perspective from which Klee practiced his art: it would be critical of seeing in this perspective a normative model for »writing« as a gateway to reality. For Klee’s Wholeness is painted in a kind of key (in the technical sense) that constructs a dynamistic reality, elevating ceaseless flux and irreconcilable tension (between the various parts of reality) above all other attributes. And, in this, his worldview is structurally related to that of various postmodernist philosophies.

8. Conclusion

In this article three critical tools (amounting to theories or models of ideology, rationality and conceptual »key-formulas«) have been used diagnostically on critical theory and by implication its musicological use. The result was a number of introductory explorations, illustrating how both critical theory and musicology might be expanded beyond certain problematic parameters, so as to achieve more balanced forms of analysis and criticism. But these illustrations in the end point to the need for having these particular tools supplemented by, and integrated with, others. In the introduction to this article, and also later on, mention was made of some of these other tools. One such tool, for example, is anthropological theory (which is also critical of the reduction of this theory to »philosophy of mind«). Here, the social and cultural dimensions of music can be supplemented by themes

16 Note that I say »a« and not »the« gateway. This is because the relativity of reality as disclosed by our best theories, can, in a kind of totality perspective, be approached through various gateways. One is language or writing; another is ordinary-everyday experience (where we do not reflect on relativity but experience it); another is art; another is spirituality. Thus these and possibly other gateways are also relative in relation to each other.

17 The conceptual tension to which I am referring here, is part of the way certain key formulas are basically constructed. It has to do with the various options one has in »schematizing« (cf. the penultimate paragraph of section 4 above) the chain of attributes typically attached to key formulas.
such as the apparently innate competence of humans to experience (not only linguistic but also) aesthetic structures.

Of course, there is also the need for continuously improving these tools, or even abandoning (some of) them, if this should prove necessary. Such needs, and the ever-present risk of the wrong (ideologically tainted) use being made of even the best tools, keep the analysis of this article from pretending to any kind of closure regarding its findings.

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**Sažetak**

**PRIMJENJUJUĆI KRITIČKA SREDSTVA NA KRITIČKU TEORIJU. UZ NEKOLIKO PRIMJEDBI NA IMPLIKACIJE U MUZIKOLOGIJI**

U ovom članku pristupa se kritičkoj teoriji (KT) sa stajališta teorije arheološkog diskursa (teorija AD). Ova druga sastoji se od nekoliko isprepletenih podteorija. Od toga niza analitičkih sredstava za primjenu na KT odabran je troje: teorija ideologije, teorija racionalnosti i teorija pojmovnih ključnih formula.

Pretpostavka od koje započinje članak jest da će ova sredstva otkriti neke ključne manjke u KT te da će to imati neke važne implikacije za muzikološku upotrebu raznih modela KT. No kritička otkrića AD u odnosu na KT mogu se formulirati kao razne »dekonstrukcije« koje se trebaju izvesti na KT kao cjelini, ali i na pojedinim teorijama ili modelima kao što su Adornova estetička teorija ili Habermasov *system critique* ili sama Derridaina dekonstrukcija. Na kraju gotovo svih pododjeljaka ovoga članka tražene AD »dekonstrukcije« izrijekom su formulirane kao ciljevi ili namjere kritičkih teoretičara ili kritičkog muzikologa, koji je uistinu dovoljno kritičan da se upusti u radikalno kritičku samorefleksiju.

U procesu formuliranja takvih ciljeva uvodi se model ideološke teorije koji je daleko složeniji i sveobuhvatniji od postojećih pristupa. U svijetu toga modela složenost ideološke kulture postaje očitom, pa je upravo ova višeslojna »topografija ideološke kulture« ono o čemu se mora voditi računa kada se analizira odnos između glazbe i ideologije. Jedno od kritičkih otkriva u tom pogledu je da se čini da Adorno nije bio sasvim svjesan kako su njegova vlastita kritička estetika i njegovi pogledi na glazbu bili stvarno prisvojeni na »pastoralnoj« razini same ideološke kulture koju je tako snažno kritizirao. Valja istaknuti da ideološki model koji se ovdje predlaže ne smatra nijednu teoriju čistom i slobodnom od ideologije, a to se tiče AD kao cjeline i DA ideološke teorije posebno.
Što se teorije racionalnosti tiče, pokazano je kako je na primjer napetost koju je Adorno konstruirao između pojmovnosti i glazbenog iskustva tipična za antiracionalistički način mišljenja. Ali to se također vezuje s određenom razinom ideološke kulture i zapravo predstavlja pretjeranu iracionalnu reakciju protiv formalističkog racionalizma.

Uvođenje sredstva ključnih formula u KT pokazuje da razne teorije i svi modeli KT barataju nekom vrsti pojmovnog ključa za (kritičko razumijevanje) stvarnosti(i). Ali muzikolozi također pokazuju sklonost da se implicitno ili eksplicitno oslone na takve ključeve. Odlomak koji se bavi ovom temom objašnjava strukturu filozofskih ključeva i rasvjetljuje ulogu Derrida i dekonstrukcije u vezi s time. Potom se ilustrira stvarna funkcija tih ključeva na primjerima iz likovne umjetnosti, estetike i glazbe. Ispostavlja se da u najvećem broju slučajeva ključne formule proizvode iskrivljenu (grubo pojednostavljenu) sliku stvarnosti i da su zbog toga prijemljive za imanentnu kritiku ili »dekonstrukciju«.

Ključni i prožimajući problem koji se ističe ovim člankom — uz pomoć spomenutih sredstava — je to složenost postojećih stanja stvari i jedinstvenost i koherentnost stvari koje postoje unutar te mreže složenosti nije dovoljno shvatila nijedna od glavnih KT alternativa. One sve završavaju time što naglašavaju nešto do te mjere da to postaje privilegirano na način koji pruža iskrivljenu sliku onoga što je »stvarno« na kocki.

Samo naše iskustvo o glazbi moglo bi se promijeniti kada bi se različita vrsta svjetonazora uistinu dohvatila onih koji komponiraju, slušaju i kritički odgovaraju na glazbu. Bio bi to svjetonazor gdje bi se stvarno potvrdila radikalna relativnost postojanja na svim mogućim razinama, i to do krajnjih razmjera ili do razmjera koji bi bili barem znatno napredniji nego što je to trenutno slučaj.