MUSIC THEORY, ANALYSIS AND DECONSTRUCTION: HOW THEY MIGHT (JUST) GET ALONG TOGETHER

CHRISTOPHER NORRIS

Philosophy Department, ENCAP
Cardiff University
P.O. Box 94, CARDIFF CF10 3XB, Wales, UK
E-mail: norrisc@cardiff.ac.uk

Abstract — Résumé

This article criticises certain aspects of the ‘New Musicology’, in particular its somewhat promiscuous deployment of ideas from other disciplines such as literary theory and cultural studies. It argues that these cross-disciplinary ventures often run the risk of ignoring or de-valuing what is specific to the experience of music, i.e., its uniquely effective power of combining sensory-perceptual with analytically-informed and socio-politically aware modes of listener-response. However this power to challenge our acculturated (ideological) preconceptions can only be realised through better, more acutely trained musical perceptions and a willingness not to take refuge in doctrinaire theories which reject the very notion of ‘structural listening’, along with those of thematic integration, tonal development, and ‘the work’ as an object of duly perceptive and keen-eared formal analysis. I also make reference to recent ideas in cognitive psychology as a counter to the textu-alist bias of ‘deconstructive’ music theory which risks losing touch with whatever is most distinctive and potentially transformative in our experience of music.

Key Words: Adorno; analysis; cognitive psychology; critical theory; deconstruction; de Man; Derrida; formalism; New Musicology; structural listening.

I

It is now more than twenty years since Joseph Kerman published his much-cited essay ‘How we got into analysis, and how to get out’ (KERMAN 1980). Significantly enough, it appeared in the US journal Critical Inquiry, which adopted as one of its principal aims the encouragement of inter-disciplinary exchange across
the more usual, professionally defined boundaries of academic discourse. The emphasis was on textual-hermeneutic approaches that derived chiefly from post-1970 literary theory, but whose influence was then being felt in other fields, among them art-criticism, cultural history, and the social sciences. Kerman took up this challenge on behalf of the musicological profession, and in the process declared himself squarely at odds with most of its predominant values, priorities, and working methods.

Thus he called for a radical re-thinking of the roles of music ‘theory’ vis-à-vis music ‘criticism’; for the opening-up of criticism to a range of theoretical ideas far beyond its current, conservative remit; and — above all — for a critical questioning of ‘analysis’, one that would challenge its hegemonic status among theorists trained up on a naive (‘positivist’) conception of musical structure and form. That conception — he argued — goes hand-in-hand with a narrow and ideologically-determined view of the musical ‘canon’, a view that inevitably works to promote just the kinds of music that are best suited to analysis in terms of thematic development, motivic integration, and complex tonal structure (Kerman 1983). In particular it takes for granted the idea of ‘organic form’ as an absolute aesthetic value, that is to say, the premise that all great works — those that truly merit the analyst’s attention — should manifest a deep-laid unity of style and idea, whatever their apparent (surface) lack of any such unifying features. The result, according to Kerman, is a kind of vicious circle whereby analysts prove their worth through seeking out ever more recondite or depth-structural traits of organic form while the music in question retains (or acquires) classic status precisely in so far as it rewards their efforts. Yet why should we accept this organicist doctrine, grounded as it is in nothing more than a professional need — or an ideological imperative — to justify the analyst’s vocation by singling out those particular works that constitute the musical canon? All the more so since it has often led — notoriously in Schenker’s case — to a likewise ‘organicist’ conception of musical history which amounts to the same doctrine writ large, i.e., construed in terms of cultural as well as of formal (motivic-thematic) development. For there is a close connection between, on the one hand, Schenker’s attachment to ‘absolute’ musical-aesthetic values like that of organic form and, on the other, his contemptuous dismissal of any music — like Debussy’s — which failed to meet the required standard. (See Schenker 1973, 1979; also Beach [ed.] 1983; Blasius 1996; Forte and Gilbert 1982; Narmour 1977; Siegel [ed.] 1990; Yeston [ed.] 1977.)

Thus the vicious circularity of analysis takes on a yet more sinister aspect when it serves as an evaluative touchstone, a means of distinguishing the central from the marginal (or the authentic from the inauthentic) with respect to entire musical cultures. For it is a short step from this version of aesthetic ideology — the formalist imperative to seek out ‘evidence’ of large-scale thematic integration — to the belief that some (and not other) such cultures have a special claim to pre-eminent status in just that regard. Hence the privilege granted to a certain, presum-
tively classical line of descent whose great central figures were Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven. Then there were the various elective precursors going back through Bach to the Renaissance polyphonists and, arguably, certain more ‘developed’, i.e., forward-looking since tonally suggestive forms of liturgical plainchant. Thereafter the line was continued — with various ‘organic’ developments along the way — by composers such as Schubert, Schumann, (maybe) Mendelssohn, Brahms or Wagner (according to taste), Bruckner, Mahler, and of course Schoenberg and the Second Viennese School. After all, Schoenberg claimed to stand squarely within that tradition and indeed to have secured the cultural dominance of Austro-German music through his invention of the twelve-tone method as a means of imposing unity on the otherwise disintegrating language of tonal music in the post-Romantic era (SCHOENBERG 1984, 1995).

So Kerman’s argument is presented not merely as a corrective to the kinds of partial or distorting view that often result when analysts remain naively in the grip of their own favoured metaphors. Rather, there is a strong implication that the very practice of analysis — in so far as it draws upon Schenker’s organicist model — is to that extent bound up with some deeply prejudicial and politically suspect values. During the past two decades his challenge to mainstream musicology has been erected into a full-scale deconstructive programme by younger critics who routinely denounce the guilty liaison (as they see it) between ‘analysis’ in whatever guise and concepts of musical unity, development, or organic form. (See for instance BERGERON and BOHLMAN [eds.] 1992; KORSYN 1993; SOLIE [ed.] 1993; STREET 1989; SUBOTNIK 1996.) What I propose to do here is examine these arguments, along with their various source-texts, and enter some strong reservations with regard to the widespread turn against analysis in recent music theory. I shall argue — in short — that analytically-informed (or ‘structural’) listening is the only kind of musical experience that can put up resistance to ‘aesthetic ideology’, or enable us the better to perceive and understand those recalcitrant musical structures that don’t fit in with preconceived, habitual modes of listener response. Moreover I shall make the case that much of what passes — among music theorists — as a discourse radically opposed to ‘aesthetic ideology’ is one that operates at so a great a distance from our cognitive involvement with music that it becomes, in effect, a discourse not so much about music as about certain abstract theoretical issues that often have little or no bearing on our perception of musical works.

II

Of course these terms — ‘perception’, ‘cognition’, ‘experience’, the musical ‘work’ as a putative ‘object’ of analysis — have all been exposed to intense deconstructive scrutiny and treated as likewise complicit with a form of naïve aesthetical thinking. (See especially GOEHR 1992.) However, I suggest, this drastic
devaluation of the work-concept, along with the role of analysis in sharpening or heightening our powers of musical perception, is often carried so far that — ‘in theory’ at least — it leaves no room for any active, critically informed engagement with music. One is put in mind of Hermann Hesse’s prescient novel *The Glass-Bead Game* where an elite community of intellectuals devote their time to devising new mathematico-combinatorial possibilities on the basis of existing scores rather than do anything so vulgar as create, perform, or enjoy music like those outside their well-guarded retreat (HESSE 1990). Most probably this tale was intended as a satire on serialism and high modernist musical culture, as well as the sorts of purebred analytical approach that fostered such (as he saw them) untoward developments. However it can also be interpreted — in the present context — as a satire on those kinds of theoretical discourse that reject ‘analysis’ as the tool of an aesthetic ideology deeply in hock to organicist concepts and values. Indeed, this reading gains an added force in so far as analysis — perceptive and intelligent analysis — has the virtue of staying reliably in touch with the listener’s musical experience, whereas the discourse that purports to deconstruct such claims does so, very often, from the vantage-point of a theory that seems quite devoid of substantive perceptual or experiential content. So my argument will utilise certain ideas from recent cognitive psychology in the hope of providing a viable alternative to Kerman’s drastically revisionist proposal that music critics should get into theory as a means to get out of analysis. For there is no reason — academic prejudice aside — why analysis should not be thought of as always open to refinement through modes of theoretical critique, just as musical perceptions are open to refinement through modes of analytic commentary.

The main source here has been Paul de Man’s writings on ‘aesthetic ideology’, that is to say, his claim that such thinking results from a deep misconception concerning the relationship between subject and object, mind and nature, or language and phenomenal experience. (See especially de MAN 1984, 1986, 1996; also NORRIS 1988a and 1989) For de Man that relationship is most aptly figured by prosaic tropes like metonymy and allegory as opposed to quintessentially poetic tropes like metaphor and symbol. Where the latter suggest a power of language to transcend those vexing antinomies — to reconcile mind and nature through an act of creative imagination — the former manifest a stubborn resistance to such forms of delusory ‘totalising’ thought (de MAN 1983a, 1979). Their virtue is to keep us constantly aware of the impossibility that language might attain to a condition of transcendent communion with nature, the ‘one life within us and abroad’ that exerted such a powerful hold on the thinking of Goethe, Schiller, Wordsworth, Coleridge and other romantic poet-critics. Metonymy ‘undoes’ the claims of metaphor since it operates through chains of contiguous detail — or the associative linkage between them — and thereby draws the attention of a vigilant reader to metaphor’s ultimate reliance on just such prosaic devices. Allegory likewise ‘undoes’ the kinds of imaginative truth-claim vested in symbolic language since it
involves a codified system of interpretation which openly acknowledges its own artificial or conventional character, and thus works to deconstruct the idea of a consummate, quasi-mystical union between mind and nature (de MAN 1983a).

Moreover, the process of allegorical reading is one that unfolds through a temporal sequence of narrative events and which permits no escape into some realm of transcendent communion exempt from the inherently limiting conditions of our time-bound perceptual and cognitive experience. Thus it acts as a check upon the symbolist idea that poetry — or language at its moments of greatest expressive power — can somehow break free of those irksome constraints and hence achieve access to an order of timeless or eternal truths. Just as metaphor turns out — on closer inspection — to self-deconstruct into chains of metonymic displacement, so the language of symbolism likewise reveals its dependence on a temporal dimension (that of allegory) which shows such language to be still caught up in a linear, consecutive mode of reading that constantly belies its own more elevated claims. According to de Man, this is no mere exercise in textual gamesmanship but a powerful means of rhetorical demystification which makes all the difference between reading texts in a naïve, uncritical, or ideologically complicitous way and reading those same texts with an eye to their resistant or disruptive potential. As he puts it (no doubt with provocative intent): ‘[t]hose who reproach literary theory for being oblivious to social and historical (that is to say ideological) reality are merely stating their fear at having their own ideological mystifications exposed by the tool they are trying to discredit. They are, in short, very poor readers of Marx’s German Ideology (de MAN 1986: 11).

Thus de Man’s chief purpose in his later work is to foreground the moments of textual complication when these high claims for metaphor and symbol can be shown to involve a duplicitous recourse to the tropes of metonymy and allegory. By so doing we can best resist the appeal of an aesthetic ideology whose effect is not only to confuse our thinking about matters of literary theory but also to promote an organicist conception of language and art which — as de Man darkly warns — may come to exert a far-reaching and malign political influence. That is to say, such thinking all too readily consorts with the Heideggerian claim that certain languages have privileged access to a truth that other languages cannot express or even obliquely summon to remembrance (HEIDEGGER 1962). In part this has to do with de Man’s turning-away from a Heidegger-influenced ‘jargon of authenticity’ — to adopt Adorno’s telling phrase — which accords special status to just those languages (classical Greek and modern German) that can still, albeit at a distant remove, evoke some sense of a primordial mode of Being ‘covered over’ by the subsequent accretions of Western metaphysics (ADORNO 1973b; de MAN 1983b). But it also results from de Man’s conviction that aesthetic ideology — this potent mixture of mythical, linguistic, cultural, and quasi-historical themes — has in turn given rise an ‘aesthetisation of politics’ whose upshot can be seen in the fascist idea of the nation-state as kind of surrogate artwork expressing the
will of a visionary populist leader, one with the charisma to mobilise mass support for that same idea (de MAN 1984 and 1996; also LACOUE-LABARTHE and NANCY, 1988). And of course, in Heidegger’s case, this argument gains credence from the fact of his notoriously having declared himself a staunch supporter of the Nazi cause and having placed his philosophical project at the service of Nationalist Socialist aims and ideals (WOLIN 1990). Thus it is not, after all, such a wild or exorbitant claim that certain elements in the discourse of post-romantic aesthetics — in particular the stress on metaphor and symbol as figures transcending the prosaic conditions of everyday perceptual experience — have helped to engender an organicist conception of national culture that opened the way to a fascist politics of the spectacle. Nor is de Man exploiting this connection for merely dramatic or rhetorical effect when he writes that the ‘totalising’ power of such figures — their capacity to conjure delusions of aesthetic transcendence — is deeply complicit with their ‘totalitarian’ character, that is say, their potential deployment as a means of suasive mass-propaganda.

This is not the place for a detailed rendition of Heidegger’s readings of philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, Kant, and Husserl (HEIDEGGER 1962). Nor have I room for an adequate rehearsal of de Man’s deconstructive strategies, aimed as they are toward challenging the kinds of ideological ‘blindness’ that go along with this depth-hermeneutic drive, this quest for a primordial ground of Being and truth that supposedly precedes the modern (European) division of languages and cultures, but which none the less grants authoritative status to a certain — i.e., Graeco-German — line of cultural-linguistic descent (de MAN 1983). Sufficient to say that de Man pursues his critique of aesthetic ideology through a deconstructive reading of various texts — philosophical, poetic, fictive, and literary-critical texts — all of which display a marked tension between, on the one hand, a seductive rhetoric of transcendence characterised by the predominance of metaphor and symbol, and, on the other, a counter-rhetoric whose effect is to undo such delusory claims by revealing their constitutive dependence on tropes such as metonymy and allegory. Thus ‘Nietzsche’s final insight’, according to de Man, ‘may well concern rhetoric itself, the discovery that what is called »rhetoric« is precisely the gap that becomes apparent in the pedagogical and philosophical history of the term. Considered as persuasion, rhetoric is performative but when considered as a system of tropes, it deconstructs its own performance’ (de MAN 1979: 131). That is to say, a rhetorically-aware (critical or deconstructive) reading of texts is the only kind of reading that can muster resistance to the power of rhetoric in its other, more persuasive or ideologically beguiling forms. Elsewhere de Man makes a kindred distinction between rhetoric conceived ‘pragmatically’, i.e., as a matter of bringing about certain desired effects in the reader or listener, and rhetoric conceived as an ‘epistemology of tropes’, or a means of exposing the various mechanisms by which such effects are typically achieved (de MAN 1986: 18-19). In other words the term harbours within itself a crucial ambiguity — or semantic tension
— which he sees as having marked the entire history, from Aristotle down, of attempts to teach ‘rhetoric’ as an art of persuasion while also paradoxically promoting resistance to it by laying bare its manipulative techniques.

Hence his otherwise extravagant claims for the virtue of deconstruction as a mode of ‘rhetorical’ analysis that is uniquely effective in countering the kinds of naive or complicitous reading that would simply go along with a text’s ‘rhetorical’ design on the unsuspecting recipient. ‘To empty rhetoric of its epistemological impact’, he writes, ‘is possible only because its tropological, figural dimensions are being bypassed.’ (de MAN 1986: 18-19) The political connection is most explicit in an article on Heinrich Kleist’s strange essay ‘Über das Marionettentheater’ (‘Concerning the Puppet-Theatre’), which de Man reads in conjunction with Friedrich Schiller’s *Letters on Aesthetic Education* (de MAN 1984a; KLEIST 1947; SCHILLER 1967). What these texts have in common is a certain idea of the aesthetic as involving a degree of formal perfection most aptly figured in the metaphor of the dance as a pattern of co-ordinated movements and gestures. Thus — in Schiller’s words — ‘everything fits so skilfully, and yet so spontaneously, that everyone seems to be following his own lead, without ever getting in anyone’s way’ (SCHILLER 1967: 300). However Kleist’s essay brings out a more disturbing, even sinister aspect to this analogy, namely its suggestion that the ‘state’ here envisaged — the state of perfect harmonised accord between dancers moving in precise obedience to a sequence of minutely choreographed steps — is one that finds its highest embodiment in a purely mechanical contrivance such as the puppet-theatre. ‘The point’, de Man writes, ‘is not that the dance fails and that Schiller’s idyllic description of a graceful but confined freedom is aberrant. Aesthetic education by no means fails; it succeeds all too well, to the point of hiding the violence that makes it possible.’ (de MAN 1984a: 289.)

More than that: Schiller’s ideal of ‘aesthetic education’ is likewise premised on a notion of art as enabling the various human faculties — knowledge, reason, and imagination — to transcend their everyday dissociated state and achieve a kind of harmonious balance (or ‘freplay’) wherein such conflicts of interest or priority no longer exist. This is the condition of aesthetic grace, as de Man ironically describes it: ‘a wisdom that lies somehow beyond cognition and self-knowledge, yet can only be reached by ways of the process it is said to overcome’ (de MAN 1984a: 265). That is to say, if we read Schiller’s choreographic metaphor as it asks to be read, then we shall think of the dance as indeed presenting an image of formal perfection, but one that points beyond any sheerly mechanistic construal to a realm of aesthetic transcendence where the antinomy between freewill and determinism no longer has any hold. De Man is quite aware that such ideas have exerted, and continue to exert, a powerfully seductive (or ‘eudaimonic’) appeal since they play upon the natural desire to believe that the experience of dance, literature, or music might indeed grant access to this wished-for state of achieved reconciliation. However, he cautions, we can and should resist the desire to go
along with Schiller’s ideal of aesthetic education in so far as it involves a ‘totalising’ rhetoric that hides or dissimulates the ‘violent’ operations that make such a rhetoric possible. On the one hand these are the prosaic operations of a language whose basis in metonymy — in the image of the dance as a sequence of rigorously programmed moves from one position to the next — is sufficient to ‘violently’ undo or subvert the truth-claims vested in a language of metaphor and symbol. On the other it is the ‘violence’ of a metaphoric vision which strives to efface all the signs of that first violence in pursuit of an ideal that requires nothing less than total, uncritical compliance on the reader’s part.

Thus ‘[t]he state˙ that is here being advocated is not just a state of mind or of soul, but a principle of political value and authority that has its own claims on the shape and the limits of our freedom’ (de MAN 1984a: 264). And again: what the Kleist essay brings out when read in conjunction with Schiller’s (on the face of it) more sublime or elevated thoughts is ‘the trap of an aesthetic education which inevitably confuses dismemberment of language by the power of the letter with the gracefulness of a dance’ (ibid: 290). This sentence would bear a great deal of conceptual unpacking but I shall mention only those aspects of it which bear on our immediate concern with de Man’s conception of aesthetic ideology. When he refers to the ‘dismemberment of language by the power of the letter’ what he chiefly has in mind — so I take it — is a deconstructive reading that focuses intently on the letter of the text and is thereby enabled all the better to resist the blandishments of metaphor or symbol. At the same time de Man is ironically aware that this way of reading is itself ‘violent’ in so far as it conceives the text as obtruding a stubborn materiality — like the mechanised movements of Kleist’s puppet theatre — that blocks any recourse to consoling ideas of aesthetic transcendence. For it is precisely his point that such readings are sure to encounter resistance or provoke strong reactions since they go clean against the conventional wisdom about literature and literary criticism. That is, they counsel an attitude of extreme scepticism with respect to just those kinds of appreciative reader-response — like the pleasure taken in a telling metaphor or a powerfully suggestive symbol — which critics up to now have mostly accepted pretty much at face value. For de Man, on the contrary, such pleasures are by no means innocent and require the most strenuous efforts of critical vigilance if we are not to be seduced by a aesthetic ideology with its own design on ‘the shape and limits of our freedom’. Yet this self-denying ordinance carries certain costs, among them — not least — the violence involved in a deconstructive practice of textual ‘dismemberment’ which reduces metaphor to chains of metonymy and symbol to an allegory of its own perpetual undoing through the temporal condition of all language and experience.

In short, deconstruction ‘upsets rooted ideologies by revealing the mechanics of their workings; it goes against a powerful philosophical tradition of which aesthetics is a prominent part; it upsets the established canon of literary works and blurs the borderline between literary and non-literary discourse’ (de MAN 1986:...
This is why, as de Man mock-ruefully reflects, the resistance to deconstruction has run so high not only among more conservative scholars and critics but also among literary theorists of various other (e.g., formalist, structuralist, Marxist, or ‘New Historicist’) persuasions. For they also have a strong investment — so he claims — in a certain conception of literary language that cuts across these methodological divides and which entails the reduction of rhetoric either to a systematic taxonomy of tropes or to a function that places texts in the service of a naïve ‘phenomenalist’ (quasi-natural) relation between language and reality. Thus ‘[t]he resistance to theory ... is a resistance to language itself or to the possibility that language contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced to intuition’ (de MAN 1986: 12-13). So it is not just a matter of widespread institutional resistance — as with the ‘theory wars’ that have raged in many university departments of literature — but also (more crucially) a kind of internal, self-generated resistance that is sure to emerge once theory encounters the conflict between its systematic claims and the mechanisms of figural language as revealed by a deconstructive reading.

This is the point, de Man asserts, ‘at which literariness, the use of language that foregrounds the rhetorical over the grammatical and logical functions, intervenes as a decisive but unsettling element which, in a variety of modes and aspects, disrupts the inner balance of the model and, consequently, its extension to the non-verbal world as well’ (de MAN 1986: 14). To ignore that disruptive element is to run the risk of endorsing an aesthetic ideology whose pleasurable yield must be offset against its tendency to ‘aestheticise politics’ by extending an organicist conception of art to an organicist conception of culture, language, history, the nation-state, and the individual’s strictly subservient role vis-à-vis those transcendent values. Deconstruction thus serves — like Kleist’s parable as de Man reads it — to caution us against such delusory ideas of a higher freedom that consists in perfect submission to interests of state or the laws of historical development. Yet in order to perform this necessary task it is obliged ‘violently’ to dismember those texts and those habituated modes of reader-response that would otherwise appear to offer consolation — or the promise of aesthetic transcendence — in the face of such threats to our autonomy and freedom.

The most extraordinary statement of de Man’s ambivalence in this regard comes toward the end of his essay ‘The Resistance to Theory’ and takes the form of a series of wiredrawn paradoxical statements. Thus:

Technically correct rhetorical readings may be boring, monotonous, predictable and unpleasant, but they are irrefutable. They are also totalizing (and potentially totalitarian) for since the structures and functions they expose do not lead to the knowledge of an entity (such as language) but are an unreliable process of knowledge production that prevents all entities, including linguistic entities, from coming into discourse as such, they are indeed universals, consistently defective models of language’s impossibility to be a model language. They are, always in theory, the most elastic theoretical and dialectical model to end all models and they can rightly claim to contain within...
their own defective selves all the other defective models of reading-avoidance, referential, semiological, grammatical, performative, logical, or whatever . . . . Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this resistance. The loftier the aims and the better the methods of literary theory, the less possible it becomes. Yet literary theory is not in danger of going under; it cannot help but flourish, and the more it is resisted, the more it flourishes. (de MAN 1986: 19)

The reader might bear this passage in mind when I now go on to discuss in more detail the way that deconstruction has been applied to issues in music theory, especially the issue concerning ‘analysis’ and its supposed complicity with a suspect (ideologically contaminated) notion of ‘organic form’. For it seems to me that this way of thinking — already evident in Kerman’s 1981 essay — holds dangers of its own once erected into a wholesale anti-aestheticist creed with orthodox sanctions attached. That is to say, it calls for just the kind of critical ‘resistance’ that de Man constantly invokes, but which his followers often fail to apply when it comes to the more programmatic claims of deconstructive musicology.

III

Thus, to start with the most obvious question: is there is really such a close and disreputable link between ‘analysis’ as practised by music theorists from Schenker down and an ideology of organic form with such large (presumptively malign) implications for our thinking about history and politics? In fact there are three distinct questions here which have not been sufficiently disentangled by adherents to this line of argument. One has to do with the basic issue as to whether organicist conceptions in aesthetics, criticism, and music-historical discourse can indeed have such a crucial bearing — as de Man claims — on ‘the shape and limits of our freedom’. For it might well be argued that this claim derives from a literalization or over-extension of the metaphor which piles an absurd weight of significance onto what is, in its proper domain, a useful and critically productive way of thinking about music. (For a range of views see BENT and DRABKIN 1987; COOK 1989; DAHLHAUS 1981 and 1983; DUNSBY and WHITTALL 1988.)

Of course this rejoinder would not impress de Man who makes a virtue of respecting the stubborn ‘literality’ of texts and who regards any saving appeal to metaphor as itself complicit with aesthetic ideology in one or another guise. Still there is room to doubt whether every such use of the organicist metaphor must be thought of as somehow mortgaged in advance to a deeply conservative (indeed proto-fascist) mystique of linguistic, cultural, and national identity (de MAN 1996; also LACOUE-LABARTHÉ and NANCY 1988). I shall have more to say about this later on but would here just remark — with a glance toward Adorno — that the idea of musical works as exhibiting certain formal traits which make for a sense of long-range thematic or tonal integration is perfectly capable of going along with a
keen awareness of those other, more recalcitrant features whose effect is to disrupt or to complicate our usual expectations. (See especially ADORNO 1973a, 1997.) Indeed it is widely accepted among music theorists — even those with a strong analytic or formalist leaning — that without this resistance to simplified (stereotypical) ideas of ‘unity’ and ‘form’ no work could rise above the routine conventions of its time and achieve the kind of distinctive character that repays detailed analysis. At any rate there is something crudely reductive — almost, one might say, ‘totalitarian’ — about a theory that equates the very notion of formal coherence with an *echt*-Schenkerian drive to promote certain deeply suspect musical values and, along with them, a certain hegemonic conception of musico-historical development.

Whence the second question, one that has again received nothing like its due share of attention from the New Musicologists. This has to do with the relationship between ‘theory’ and ‘analysis’, a relationship nowadays conceived by many as involving a sharp conflict of interests, or a state of downright mutual antagonism. Kerman sounded the first note of this emergent hostility when he called for musicologists to embrace theoretical ideas from other disciplines — chiefly literary criticism — and thereby break the hold of those taken-for-granted values and priorities that formed the agenda of old-style analysis. Thus, Kerman advised, the best way forward for music criticism was to loosen its unfortunate ties with the workaday business of musical journalism and become theoretically informed to a point where it could undertake the task of deconstructing those hegemonic values that were broadly shared by analysts and music historians (KERMAN 1985). Chief among them — predictably enough — was the priority attached to notions of organic form, offering as they did a means to assimilate work-based judgements of aesthetic value to larger claims for the pre- eminent standing of a certain, narrowly exclusive musical tradition.

What seemed, at the time, a radical statement is now more likely to be viewed as a feather in the wind, or a moderate rendition of various ideas that were later to acquire orthodox status among the New Musicologists. Thus Kerman enlists the resources of ‘theory’ in order to expose what analysts are loath to admit, that is, the fact that their supposedly objective methods are in truth deeply wedded to a set of ideological values and imperatives. No doubt this case finds plentiful support when applied to Schenker and other analysts in the same line of descent whose particular understanding of ‘organic form’ goes along with a highly prescriptive (and restrictive) idea of what counts as ‘great’ music. Here again, de Man gives a diagnostic lead when he shows — in his early book *Blindness and Insight* — how literary critics tend to project their favoured notions of form, unity, structural coherence, and so forth, onto texts which very often turn out (on a closer reading) to resist any such blandly homogenising treatment (de MAN 1983). But there is still a fairly obvious sense in which de Man, like the New Musicologists, relies on ‘analysis’ to make his point and to challenge those prevalent ideological conceptions.
In his case the kind of analysis involved is a deconstructive reading of various literary or philosophical texts which foregrounds their rhetorical elements — what he calls the ‘epistemology of tropes’ — and which thereby seeks to subvert or undermine their other, more ‘totalising’ claims (de MAN 1979, 1986). Among the New Musicologists it takes the form of a resolute scepticism directed toward any work-based conception of unity, development, or thematic coherence that gives a hold for ‘analysis’ on the terms laid down by a prevalent musicological tradition. Yet here also there is simply no alternative but to put forward a different kind of analysis that singles out features of the work in hand — hitherto unnoticed or ‘marginal’ features — whose effect (once recognised) is to complicate our sense of what constitutes a structural or noteworthy element. Such approaches may indeed be more ‘theoretically’ informed in so far as they evince a greater awareness of the presuppositions and the value-laden character of musical perceptions or judgements. However they will surely count for nothing unless their claims are convincingly borne out through a cogent and detailed analytical account of why certain works elude or resist the best efforts of mainstream analysis (DEMPSTER and BROWN 1990; DUNSBY and WHITTALL 1988; POPE [ed.] 1994). In other words — as de Man often implies but is mostly (not always) too tactful to say — it is no use claiming to ‘deconstruct’ the canonical reading of this or that text unless one can demonstrate a keener grasp of precisely those recalcitrant details that have hitherto escaped critical notice. Thus if ‘nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this resistance’, then likewise there is no question of theory overcoming or discrediting the claims of analysis since analysis provides an indispensable means of showing how prevalent analytical paradigms fail to make good their own more ambitious or ‘totalising’ claims (de MAN 1986: 19).

So, to repeat, the second main question with regard to this dispute between ‘theory’ and ‘analysis’ is the question whether theory can ever dispense with the kinds of analytical approach — the detailed attention to the ‘words on the page’ or the ‘notes in the score’ — that alone give an adequate handle for comparison between different, organicist and deconstructive modes of critical engagement. And this connects in turn with the third question, namely the issue as to just what role theoretical ideas can be thought to play in our actual experience of literature or music, that is to say, our responses as readers or listeners when not primarily concerned with matters of high-level theoretical debate. For de Man, as we have seen, such intuitive responses are always suspect since they typically involve some seductive or ‘eudaemonic’ appeal to notions — such as that of aesthetic transcendence through the unifying power of metaphor or symbol — which should not be allowed to pass unchallenged since they render us susceptible to various forms of ideological blindness. According to the New Musicologists, likewise, we can only be deluded — in the grip of a naive organicist metaphor with suspect historico-political implications — if we listen to music in the way prescribed by advocates of mainstream analysis. For that whole approach is premised on the idea of certain
works as intrinsically capable of yielding the intuitive pleasure that results from a heightened perception of those various developmental structures — motivic, thematic, tonal, etc. — which thereby serve as a sure criterion of authentic musical worth. And from here, so the New Musicologists contend, it is no great distance — or no great stretch of that same organicist metaphor — to the Schenkerian idea of musical history as unfolding through a preordained process of development and growth wherein certain select national or cultural traditions are conceived as exerting a privileged claim to the analyst’s attention.

However, once again, this creates a large problem for the New Musicologists since they are placed in the awkward (contradictory) position of maintaining on the one hand that we need theory as a guard against the kinds of ideological delusion that result from naively intuitive modes of response, while on the other hand suggesting that theory itself — at least in its hitherto prevalent forms — has itself been the primary means of enforcing a dominant ideological consensus. Of course it is ‘analysis’, rather than ‘theory’, that is mostly singled out as the discourse responsible for producing this drastically narrowed focus on just the sorts of work that provide fit material for just that sort of approach. Hence the fallacy, as de Man describes it, which leads critics to project their favoured values — unity, coherence, organic form — onto texts which supposedly embody or exemplify such values, but which always turn out, on a closer (deconstructive) analysis, to resist or obstruct such delusory projections (de MAN 1983). However this applies just as much to ‘theory’ as to ‘analysis’ since, as I have argued, the distinction between them is one that breaks down as soon as one asks how theory could find any valid application apart from the detailed analysis of works, or again, how analysis could ever proceed except on the basis of certain theoretical presuppositions. In which case the question surely arises: what can be the source of that ‘resistance to theory’ (or resistance to analysis) that is supposed to play so crucial a role in unmasking the effects of aesthetic ideology?

For de Man such resistance can only be located in the stubborn ‘literality’ of texts, that is to say, in the sheerly ‘material’ resistance that reading encounters when it strives for a sense of aesthetic transcendence through figures like metaphor or symbol, but finds that desire constantly blocked or thwarted by prosaic tropes such as metonymy or allegory. Yet it is hard to see what de Man can mean by this appeal to linguistic ‘materiality’, given his claim that such rhetorical readings achieve their most decisive effect by offering strictly ‘irrefutable’ evidence that ‘language contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced to intuition’ (de MAN 1986: 10-11). And it is yet harder to conceive what music theorists might have in mind when they endorse de Man’s outright rejection of the claim that there exists some relationship between perceptual (or phenomenal) experience and whatever gives meaning or value to such experience (STREET 1989). For there is a certain plausibility to de Man’s argument that literary critics who make that claim are in the grip of a ‘cratylist’ delusion, that is to say, the idea — put forward by Cratylus
in Plato’s eponymous dialogue — that this relationship is one of natural affinity and not just a matter of the purely conventional (‘arbitrary’) link between signifier and signified (PLATO 1997). Thus: ‘[t]o the extent that Cratylism assumes a convergence of the phenomenal aspects of language, as sound, with its signifying function as referent, it is an aesthetically oriented conception’ (de MAN 1986: 9). But in the case of music this argument is much less plausible since here we have to do with a mode of perceptual experience which is also — inseparably — one that evokes whatever meaning or significance the music is taken to possess. In other words there is simply no room for a deconstructive ‘reading’ of music that would seek to expose the workings of aesthetic ideology by drawing attention to the non-coincidence between its ‘phenomenal aspects (as sound)’ and ‘its signifying function as referent’. Indeed this whole way of stating the issue must seem oddly off-the-point given that music has no ‘referent’, unless one subscribes to a naively mimetic or programmatic conception of musical ‘meaning’ that few if any music critics would nowadays endorse.

Indeed there is an earlier essay by de Man — on Rousseau and, more specifically, on Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Rousseau — where he makes this point with maximum emphasis (de MAN 1983c; DERRIDA 1976; also NORRIS 1987, 1992, 2000, 2002). What emerges from Rousseau’s writings on music despite and against their manifest intent is the ‘empty’ character of the musical sign, i.e., the fact that no mimetic or representationalist philosophy of music can possibly account for its capacity to ‘mean’ something more than could ever be put into words or spelled out in the form of a programme. (See also BARRY 1987; NORRIS 1989.) Thus music provides something like a deconstructive object-lesson for literary critics who are tempted to short-circuit the difficult business of formal analysis and press straight through to some ‘thematic’ interpretation that purports to explain what the text is all about. However there is an obvious problem with any claim that deconstruction presents a powerful challenge not only to certain prevalent ideas of musical form which figure in the discourse of mainstream musicology but also to the kinds of phenomenal (i.e., perceptual or cognitive) response that constitute our experience of music. For what could be the force of such a challenge — or whence its justification — if that experience is thought of as merely the product of those same illusory ideas? Or again: if we take it on de Man’s terms that aesthetic ideology results from a downright category-mistake — a ‘phenomenalist’ confusion between language and sensory perception — then it is hard to see how this argument could apply to music (or musicological discourse) in the same way that perhaps it applies to literary, philosophic, or other kinds of written text. For there is just no sense in which the experience of music — its phenomenal aspect — can be shown up, like the Cratylist error, as involving a naive metaphorical transference from the realm of natural processes and events to that of linguistic representations.
Of course this case looks a lot more plausible when directed against those ways of writing about music, or those approaches to musical analysis, which invoke notions of ‘organic form’, ‘germinal’ motifs, thematic ‘growth’, stylistic ‘evolution’, and so forth. At least it finds a measure of support, as I have said, in the various critiques that have lately been directed toward Schenkerian analysis and its clear affinity with certain forms of ‘national-aestheticist’ thinking. But de Man’s argument goes a lot further than that, as can be seen when he nominates music (along with these ways of conceptualising music) as no less subject to a deconstructive reading that would question its phenomenal attributes or properties. Thus, if ‘literature involves the voiding, rather than the affirmation, of aesthetic categories’, then ‘one of the consequences of this is that, whereas we have traditionally been accustomed to reading literature by analogy with the plastic arts and with music, we now have to recognise the necessity of a non-perceptual, linguistic moment in painting and music’ (de MAN 1986: 10). That is to say, the critique of aesthetic ideology requires that we remain on guard not only against those organicist metaphors which have captured the prevailing discourse of musical criticism but also against those perceptual modalities that we take — naively — to constitute the very nature of musical experience. For this idea is on a par (so de Man implies) with the Cratylist delusion which supposes all language to manifest a ‘natural’ link between signifier and signified, or a kind of generalised onomato-poëia whereby certain words are ‘naturally’ suited to evoke the experience of certain real-world objects, processes, and events.

Such is the fallacy of imitative form which few linguists or literary theorists would explicitly endorse but to which they are none the less committed — he thinks — through the aestheticist appeal to modes of heightened sensory perception that supposedly result from the power of poetry or music to renovate our otherwise jaded habits of perceptual response. Yet this is itself the merest of critical clichés, a metaphor that draws its suasive force from the standard (aesthetically grounded) conflation of linguistic and phenomenal realms. For ‘if literariness is not an aesthetic quality, it is not primarily mimetic, [since] mimesis becomes one trope among others, language choosing to imitate a non-verbal entity just as paronomasis «imitates» a sound without any claim to identity (or reflection on difference) between the verbal and non-verbal elements’ (de MAN 1986: 10). And with respect to music we are likewise mistaken — in the grip of a naive mimeticist doctrine — if we suppose that its ‘phenomenal’ or sensory-cognitive aspect could bear any other than an arbitrary relation to those meanings or significant structures that analysis seeks to reveal. No doubt there are works — or passages of works — that exhibit certain obvious mimetic effects, such as Haydn’s famous evocation of chaos in the opening bars of The Creation, or Beethoven’s episodes of scene-painting at various points in the Pastoral Symphony. However — so de Man’s analogy suggests — these should be treated as the equivalent of onomatopoeia in verbal language, that is to say, as strictly fortuitous or random effects which can have no place in any
adequate conception of musical language. To suppose otherwise — to accord them a more significant status — would be just another version of the old Cratylist delusion, or (in this case) the crude mimeticist idea that music has its origin and achieves its highest goal in the faithful ‘imitation’ of nature (NEUBAUER 1986).

IV

However there are problems with de Man’s argument that have not been sufficiently addressed by those — whether literary theorists or New Musicologists — who follow his lead in these matters. Most striking is the problem as to how language or music can be thought of as offering ‘resistance’ to aesthetic ideology if there is nothing in the nature of language or music — or in the nature of our responses to them — that could constitute the source of such resistance. To be sure, de Man makes a cardinal distinction between ‘materiality’ and ‘phenomenality’, where the former evokes the letter of the text — prior to any imposition of semantic values — while the latter has to do with those ‘aestheticised’ (hence delusory) modes of pseudo-cognition that conceive language by analogy with perceptual experience, itself conceived on the model of organic (natural) processes and events. Thus a ‘non-phenomenal linguistics’ would be one that redirected our attention to the ‘material’ aspect of language, i.e., to those functions that cannot be subsumed under any such erroneous model. Moreover, de Man claims, it would ‘free the discourse on literature from naive oppositions between fiction and reality, which are themselves the offspring of an uncritically mimetic conception of art’ (de MAN 1986: 10-11). For what is brought into question through a deconstructive reading is not ‘the referential function of language’ but rather ‘its authority as a model for natural or phenomenal cognition’ (ibid). And again, lest this point fail to register with critics who mistake deconstruction for some kind of wholesale anti-realist doctrine: ‘[l]iterature is fiction not because it somehow refuses to acknowledge >reality<, but because it is not a priori certain that language functions according to principles which are those, or which are like those, of the phenomenal world’ (ibid).

All the same one may reasonably doubt whether it makes sense to postulate a ‘material’ substrate of language that somehow exists — and puts up resistance to ‘naïve’ or ‘aberrant’ readings — quite apart from, or prior to, any ascription of semantic values. This claim is crucially important to de Man since it underwrites his notion of deconstructive reading as a practice that involves sedulous attention not only to the ‘words on the page’ but also to the very letter of the text as that which exerts a dislocating force on received (ideological) habits of thought. Hence — to repeat — his talk of the ‘violence’ or ‘dismemberment’ of language that often results from such a reading but whose salutary effect is to heighten our awareness of other, more coercive or insidious kinds of violence, such as that which masks behind idealist notions of aesthetic transcendence. However it is hard to compre-
hend how language construed in this ‘material’ way could possibly perform the kind of work that de Man requires of it, namely, the work of resisting or subverting such forms of aesthetic ideology. For ‘language’ so conceived is not yet language in any meaningful sense of the term, that is, any sense that would involve something more than the mute, asemic, non-signifying ‘matter’ of vocal sounds or written marks. Yet how could such sheerly material sounds or marks exert the least resistance to modes of reading which, no matter how ‘naïve’ on de Man’s account, take for granted the existence of meanings or semantic values which transcend this primitive (strictly pre-linguistic) level of materiality? Indeed the only way to interpret his claim is to take it as referring to just those kinds of merely accidental property — such as onomatopoeia — whose appeal to a mimetic (sensory-perceptual) mode of response is such as to exclude them from consideration as elements of ‘language’, properly so called. But in that case what becomes of de Man’s vaunted distinction between ‘phenomenality’ and ‘materiality’ as radically opposed ways of reading, the one falling in with aesthetic ideology in its various seductive forms, while the other resists such delusory ideas through its scrupulous attention to the letter of the text? For if a ‘material’ reading of this kind is one that steadfastly abjures any recourse to prior notions of semantic value then its resistance to those values can only come from our sensing or perceiving the existence of certain marks on the page, marks which can only register as such — only exert this supposed power to dislocate naturalised modes of response — in so far as they enter our field of phenomenal cognition. Yet of course this ‘phenomenalist’ conception of language that de Man is out to deconstruct since he considers it the chief and continuing source of that potent strain of ‘aesthetic ideology’ which may otherwise exert its malign pressure on ‘the shape and limits of our freedom’. (For further discussion see especially GASCHÉ 1998.)

This problem with de Man’s line of argument is still more acute when his terms are transposed to the discourse of musical criticism and theory. For here, as I have suggested, there is something highly implausible — even absurd — about the notion that we might break free from ‘phenomenalist’ conceptions of musical experience and hence utterly transform not only the ways in which we write or talk about music but also our very modes of perceptual-cognitive response. Of course this is not to maintain — just as absurdly — that our musical responses are ‘natural’ in the sense of involving some deep-laid, permanent repertoire of innate predispositions that lead us to assign certain meanings, emotions, or values to certain kinds of melodic feature or harmonic progression. Such a charge demonstrably misses its mark even when brought against a work like Deryck Cooke’s The Language of Music, which in fact — on closer reading — turns out to qualify this claim by making some allowance for the extent to which musical responses are informed by shifting cultural and theoretical expectations (COOKE 1962; also POPLE [ed.] 1994). So there is a sense — albeit a limited sense — in which de Man is clearly right to reject any approach that would naturalise those responses to the
point of denying their historically changeable character. However he goes way too far in the opposite direction when he claims that music, like literature, requires of us a resolutely deconstructive ‘reading’ whose effect is to break altogether with phenomenalist (or ‘aesthetically oriented’) modes of cognition. For here again the question arises as to how music could ever resist our more routine perceptual dispositions if not in virtue of its actually possessing certain salient features — melodic, harmonic, thematic, or structural features — which the acute listener is able to grasp against and despite her acquired knowledge of the background conventions that make up a musical genre or period style (MEYER 1967).

No doubt it may be said — on de Man’s behalf — that it is precisely those ‘material’ (i.e., non-phenomenal) elements that resist the imposition of preconceived meanings or patterns of significance and thereby enable listeners to withstand the seductions of aesthetic ideology. But this argument is no less problematical here — and indeed, one might think, even more so — than when applied to literary language. For with music there is just no escaping the fact that any details, structures, or formal attributes which can plausibly be thought of as mounting such resistance must surely be heard (or perceived) to do so, rather than playing some notional role in a deconstructive theory of music that on principle eschews all recourse to ‘naive’ phenomenalist categories. Perhaps it is the case, as de Man says, that in literary criticism the ‘resistance to theory’ is ‘a resistance to language itself’, or ‘to the possibility that language contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced to intuition’ (de MAN 1986: 10-11). But this is not to say — far from it — that the sole alternative to naive intuitionist, phenomenalist, or ‘aesthetic’ conceptions of literary language is a ‘materialist’ conception that voids such language of semantic or signifying content. On the contrary, this leaves us at a loss to explain how it could ever pose any credible challenge to received notions of literary meaning and form. And with music, likewise, it is a curious approach that stakes its claim to transform or radicalise our perceptions on a wholesale critique of aesthetic ideology which devalues the role of perceptual response to the point of theoretical negation.

What I think is going on in these passages of de Man is a justified reaction against certain, no doubt naive mimeticist assumptions, but one which, in the process, swings right across to the opposite extreme of a ‘linguisticist’ approach that rejects any appeal to perceptual experience as merely a product of ideological delusion. Thus the ‘linguistics of literariness’ becomes, for de Man, a veritable touchstone of authentic critical insight, as opposed to the kinds of blindness that result from critics’ attachment to phenomenalist metaphors or analogies. However there is good reason to doubt that this programme can be carried through without giving rise to problems more acute than de Man or his followers seem willing to acknowledge. Those problems are particularly striking when the New Musicologists adopt de Man’s critical apparatus and set it to work against established paradigms of music analysis or received ideas of the musical canon which they take to involve
an illicit conflation of aesthetic and historical categories (SOLIE [ed.] 1993). What often emerges is a strongly marked linguistic-constructivist bias, that is to say, a tendency to suppose — very much in line with de Man’s thinking — that any such appeal to modes of perceptual or cognitive experience can only be a product of the various ways in which that experience is described, analysed, or narrated.

Of course this bias is not so apparent in the field of literary theory since here — more than anywhere — we have to do with a meta-linguistic discourse whose object-domain is likewise linguistic and which thus lends credence to the argument that language (in some sense) goes all the way down, to the extent of ‘voiding’ those aesthetic values that de Man takes as his chief target. All the same, even here, it fails to explain how literary texts could muster the kind of ‘material’ resistance to aesthetic ideology which that argument crucially requires. And in the case of music it is yet more difficult to conceive how a sheerly materialist conception — one that somehow operates prior to all ascriptions of meaning or value — could provide the basis of an ideological critique that claims to deconstruct certain prevalent meanings and values. For the consequence of de Man’s anti-phenomenalist stance is to push criticism so far in the opposite direction — i.e., toward a linguistically-oriented approach — that his disciples in the musicological camp end up by talking not so much about music as about the kinds of language (or critical discourse) that supposedly constitute ‘music’ in so far as we can talk about it at all. Thus ‘organic form’ is no longer conceived — perish the thought! — as referring to features of the musical work that the critic might hope to reveal through perceptive, intelligent, and historically-informed analysis. Rather it is the product of a hegemonic discourse which foists that conception onto various canonical works and which of course finds its own methods and values perfectly mirrored thereby. In other words, as de Man argues, organic form is not so much a feature of the poem or the musical work as a result of the predisposed ‘intent at totality’ which typifies various (hitherto dominant) modes of critical discourse (de MAN 1983). But again this prompts the obvious question — ‘obvious’ from any but a linguistic-constructivist viewpoint — as to how music could muster resistance to the currency of ideological values at any given time. For if criticism is always, inevitably trapped in this hermeneutic circle — if there is nothing ‘in’ the work that might check or oppose our preconceived (ideologically motivated) habits of response — then such resistance can only be thought of as resulting from the kinds of linguistic or rhetorical aporia that figure so largely in the discourse of present-day musical theory. In which case the critique of aesthetic ideology is one that operates at a level so remote from the music itself (or from anything that analysis might hope to uncover) that it becomes entirely detached from its object and enters a realm of speculative theory devoid of any genuine critical purchase.

The trouble is that these commentators are often not clear as to just what target they have in view or just how far their more programmatic claims are supposed to extend. Thus when New Musicologists routinely denounce the notion of
‘organic form’ it is sometimes (one gathers) a certain type of discourse on music that they have in mind, but sometimes — more ambitiously — the very idea that music might manifest structural features that are aptly described in such terms. So likewise with various recent assaults on the notion of the musical canon, taken up by cultural-materialist critics who seek to deconstruct received ideas of (say) the ‘English Musical Renaissance’, or by feminist scholars who argue that the normative values of mainstream musicology are shot through with patriarchal or sexist attitudes (STRADLING and HUGHES 1993; BURNHAM 1996; DETELS 1994; McCLARY 1991; SOLIE [ed.] 1993). Some of these approaches seem chiefly out to challenge a certain prevalent discourse of canonical values, along with its favoured analytic techniques, while others seem bent upon rejecting any notion that music might possess the kind of intrinsic value that would justify our making comparative judgements with respect to its structural interest, thematic inventiveness, capacity to transform or renew our musical perceptions, and so forth.

Most often — as with Kerman — the argument proceeds without coming down firmly on either side and is thus able to retain some residual or qualified commitment to the merits of musical analysis while also professing a sympathy with critics who would call that whole enterprise into question. Elsewhere — especially among recent theorists — there is a constant oscillation between claims to deconstruct the discourse of mainstream musicology and claims (such as those of feminists like Susan McClary) to reveal how music enacts within itself the workings of an oppressive social or patriarchal order (McCLARY 1991). Or again, some theorists greatly influenced by de Man — including Alan Street in a well-known essay — make a case for ‘reading’ music allegorically as a perpetual reflection on the self-undoing of organicist models and metaphors through the covert operation of rhetorical figures that inherently resist such ‘totalising’ treatment (STREET 1989). However there is still some doubt as to whether this argument goes all the way with de Man’s iconoclastic talk of ‘dismemberment’, ‘disarticulation’, radical ‘materiality’, etc., and hence with the claim that musical works — as distinct from the discourse about them — can be shown to deconstruct under pressure of their own internal complications. For it is hard to see how this could be the case if we are to take Street at his deManian word and accept that such ‘allegorical’ reading is sufficient to undo not only the notion of organic form but also the naïve phenomenalist idea that particular features of the musical work can call forth particular kinds of intuitive (or sensory-cognitive) response.

Here again, this confusion results from the way in which a linguistically-oriented criticism starts out by shifting the focus of attention from music to musical-discourse, and then proceeds to treat musical works as nothing more than so many constructs or products of our various ways of talking about them. One version of the argument is that which holds that concepts such as ‘sonata form’ — and other such staples of mainstream analysis — can be shown to have entered the lexicon of music criticism only some century-or-so after composers were (suppos-
edly) producing works that embodied those same principles. So is it not a blatant anachronism and another plain instance of ‘aesthetic ideology’ when critics apply such concepts to the first movement of a Haydn string quartet, or a Mozart symphony, or a Beethoven piano sonata? Or again, are not analysts indulging a kind of retroactive teleological illusion when they claim to discover signs of an emergent ‘progressive tonality’ in works by composers (such as Beethoven or Bruckner) who wouldn’t have described their music in just that way? And of course the same argument is regularly applied to notions of ‘organic form’, extended as they are — very often — to periods, genres, or musical styles whose practitioners would scarcely have understood the term. (See BURNHAM 1996; COOK AND EVERIST [eds.] 1999; TREITLER 1989; also — for a useful source-text — DAMSCHRODER 1990.) However this thesis is no more convincing than the claim by some literary theorists that ‘literature’ has existed only since the time — somewhere around the late eighteenth century — when the term underwent a semantic shift from ‘printed material of whatever sort’ (or, at an earlier period, ‘the discourse of the cultivated, literate classes’) to its present, more specific association with works of a creative or imaginative kind (WILLIAMS 1976 and 1977). In both cases the argument rests on a linguistic-constructivist fallacy, namely the idea that it is senseless to talk of generic attributes that could have played no role in the language — or even the conscious awareness — of composers or writers whose works are now said to exhibit them. After all, the joke about Molière’s M. Jourdain is that he had been talking prose all that time without knowing it, rather than talking something else which he later (happily) mistook for ‘prose’ when the term entered his vocabulary.

Thus cultural theorists miss the point when they argue from the changed semantic currency of ‘literature’ to the notion that ‘literary’ attributes or values are really nothing more than the product of a certain, currently prevailing but historically short-term ideological discourse. And music theorists commit the same fallacy when they generalise from the claim that sonata-form cannot have existed before analysts came along and ‘invented’ the idea, to the claim that such notions are always just a figment of so-called ‘aesthetic ideology’. No doubt this is a crude version of the case when compared with de Man’s far subtler deconstructive variations on the theme or with some (not all) of the arguments put forward by New Musicologists. But it does share the basic presupposition that musical experience is always linguistically mediated, or that perceptual modalities — such as our capacity to register thematic, harmonic, or tonal structures — can only have to do with the language (or ‘discourse’) through which such perceptions achieve articulate form.

Now indeed there is an element of truth in this since our responses to music undoubtedly involve a great range of social experience, cultural knowledge, generic expectations, and so forth, in the absence of which we should simply not be hearing it as music (POPLE [ed.] 1994; SWAIN 1994). So de Man is quite right — and the New Musicologists also — in arguing that critics are apt to be misled by
that particular strain of organicist thought which purports to derive principles of meaning or value from the perceptual experience of music without making due allowance for these various, broadly ‘linguistic’ factors. As he puts it, in the context of literary theory, ‘[t]he phenomenality of the signifier, as sound, is unquestionably involved in the correspondence between the name and the thing named, but the link, the relationship between word and thing, is not phenomenal, but conventional’ (de MAN 1986: 10). That is to say — transposed to the musical context — it may well be allowed that our perceptual responses are responses to something in the nature of music (its tonal, harmonic, or structural properties) which constitute the basis of musical experience and which are, to that extent, phenomenally ‘given’ as a matter of sensory-cognitive grasp. Where ‘ideology’ comes in is with the further (illicit) move that metaphorically extends this natural condition of musical experience to a set of far-reaching evaluative claims for the intrinsic superiority of certain works — and certain musical traditions — as displaying quasi-natural forms of development, growth, or stylistic evolution.

This idea most often goes along — as in Schenker’s case — with the privilege attached to the Western tonal system as itself a kind of natural resource with its own developmental laws (SCHENKER 1977; also YESTON [ed.] 1997). Thus the history of music can be written as a progressive exploration of tonal possibilities which remain firmly within that system while moving into ever more adventurous regions of harmonic discovery. Even Schoenberg — as I have said — felt compelled to justify his break with established conventions by asserting that so-called ‘atonal’ music involved nothing more radical than an abandonment of clearly marked key-centres and a willingness to exploit tonal relationships which ventured farther out along the circle of fifths, i.e., the harmonic overtone-series that still provided a ‘natural’ grounding for his experiments in twelve-tone compositional technique (SCHOENBERG 1984, 1997). What’s more, he conjoined this legitimising ploy with the claim — ironically enough, given his personal predicament as an exile from Nazi persecution — to have thereby secured the continuing dominance of Austro-German musical tradition beyond the post-romantic ‘crisis’ engendered by the exhaustion of hitherto-existing tonal resources. So the New Musicologists do have a point when they argue for the link between ‘aesthetic ideology’ and a phenomenalist conception of music which exploits the vaguely analogical appeal to certain intrinsic ‘laws’ of musico-historical development grounded in the very nature of the overtone series. And this in turn goes along with a marked disposition, on the part of some analysts, to devalue or to marginalise any music which doesn’t fit in with an organicist conception of what constitutes musical greatness.

However the ‘linguisticist’ orientation of much New Musicological writing is itself a very definite parti pris and one with its own, highly selective way of addressing these issues. Thus what de Man (1986) calls ‘the voiding of aesthetic categories’ brought about by a ‘linguistics of literariness’ is here erected into a full-
scale doctrine that privileges theory — in its deconstructive mode — above any mode of analysis premised on ‘naïve’ (undeconstructed) values such as those of formal integrity, thematic development, harmonic complexity, long-range tonal progression, and so forth. More than that, it takes the Schenkerian approach as a cautionary instance of what is bound to happen when analysis becomes mixed up with certain kinds of aesthetically determined evaluative judgement and these, in turn, with a cultural politics whose end-point is ‘national aestheticism’ in its full-blown totalitarian form (LACOUE-LABARTHÉ and NANCY 1988). Yet there is something drastically reductive about this whole line of argument, suggesting as it does that all analysis must be headed in the same direction, or that any talk of ‘organic form’ is complicit with fascist ideology, or again — with the customary nod to de Man — that those among the old-style analysts or musicologists who reject that diagnosis are thereby manifesting a ‘resistance to theory’ with its own dark design upon the ‘shape and limits of our freedom’. What this amounts to is a highly prescriptive — even, one might say, coercive or ‘totalitarian’ — assertion of theory’s claim to legislate in all matters concerning the relationship between theory, analysis, and musical perception. And of course, given its strongly marked anti-phenomenalist bias, this priority of theory can only entail a devaluation of perceptual response in favour of a deconstructive (linguistically-oriented) approach that also finds little use for analysis in so far as the latter is presumed to involve a naïve supposition that musical structures are there to be perceived and analysed. Thus ‘theory’ comes out in sharp hostility to the kinds of justificatory argument often advanced on behalf of analysis: that it serves to heighten our conscious perception of details and structural relationships which we might hitherto not have noticed or perhaps been aware of only at a preconscious or intuitive level (COOK 1994 and 1996; DUNSBY and WHITTALL 1988). For if the theorists are right then this supposed ‘justification’ is in truth nothing more than a telling exposure of the way that analysis readily falls in with an ideologically loaded concept of ‘intuitive’ perceptions and responses.

There is an odd (paradoxical) sense in which this whole line of approach both overvalues the role of theory in offering resistance to established procedures of musical analysis and undervalues the extent to which theory can inform our intelligent (analytically educated) modes of musical response. (For further discussion from a range of viewpoints, see BAKER, BEACH and BERNARD [eds.] 1997.) The overvaluation involves the idea that theory does best — promotes such resistance most effectively — when it deconstructs the premises of mainstream analysis from a meta-linguistic standpoint which rejects any notion of analysis as answering to genuine musical perceptions that are not just products of ‘aesthetic ideology’. Hence the regular shift — as I have argued — from the idea of theory as a discourse in the service of sharpened musical perception to the idea of theory as a discourse that aims to discredit such delusory ways of thinking. Where the undervaluation appears is in the strange refusal to credit theory with any capacity to inform and en-
hance our musical responses as distinct from providing some alternative currency of musicological debate. However there is no good reason to think that these options exhaust the field, or that critics are faced with the stark choice between subscribing either to a naive ‘phemonenalist’ account of aesthetic experience or to a full-scale linguistic-constructivist approach that completely rejects such perceptual categories. For if this were indeed the case — pace Kerman and other promoters of the current theoretical line — then music criticism could hardly exist as such. That is to say, it would be ‘critical’ only to the extent that it deconstructed any grounds for claiming that the discourse on music had something to do with our intuitive modes of response. And, conversely, it would be ‘musical’ only in so far as it managed completely to ignore this critical challenge and thereby protect its belief that perceptive and intelligent analysis can have something of value to contribute to our better understanding of music. Neither option seems very attractive, on the face of it, so there might be some merit in considering alternative proposals.

V

One such alternative is that put forward by music theorists with an interest in certain areas of cognitive psychology. What has chiefly sparked this interest is the question as to whether — or just how far — our ‘intuitive’ responses are theoretically informed by various cultural inputs, such as our reading of musical analyses or our knowledge of music history. Mark DeBellis has taken a lead from the philosopher Jerry Fodor in suggesting this line of approach so I shall summarise the relevant arguments here and hope that readers will go on to consult the original sources (DEBELLIS 1995; FODOR 1976, 1983, 1990). Fodor’s central claim has to do with what he calls the ‘modularity of mind’, that is to say, his thesis that certain fairly basic cognitive functions are such as to require a rapid response under given ambient conditions (like that of avoiding some immediate physical threat) and have hence evolved in a way that entails no complex processing of data from a range of informational sources. These functions are relatively ‘encapsulated’ or ‘cognitively impervious’ (Fodor’s terms) since they work best — or most effectively ensure our survival — by avoiding any lengthy and complicated detours through neural networks that are specialised for other, more advanced or sophisticated purposes.

Thus, for instance, one would not expect a high level of complex inter-modular exchange for perceptions of rapidly-moving objects in our proximate visual field, or for tactile sensations of heat, since here what is required is a more-or-less reflex response that enables us to take evasive action or save ourselves from getting burnt. Also there are modules — like that concerned with language in its grammatical aspect — which likewise function to a large extent in isolation from other inputs since their main job is to facilitate communication (e.g., by allowing us to
talk straight ahead and get the grammar right) and not involve too much interpretative processing along the way. However the case is very different with language in its other (semantic or pragmatic) aspects since here there is a need to draw upon whole large areas of background information, cultural knowledge, interpersonal skills, contextual adjustments, and so forth, in order to make ourselves understood or to understand what others are saying. So the main challenge for cognitive psychology in this modularised form is (1) to describe the kinds and degrees of relative ‘encapsulation’, and (2) to explain how the theory works out when applied to more complex, i.e., cognitively ‘permeable’ modes of mental processing.

According to DeBellis, music provides an interesting test-case for the Fodor approach since musical perceptions — unlike more straightforward or reflex kinds of auditory response — do seem to change quite markedly in consequence of our learning to read a score, or to recognise complex patterns of thematic development, or to hear such patterns as a striking departure from established generic or stylistic norms (DeBELLIS 1995). So if indeed there is a ‘module’ specialised for musical perception then it must be one that exhibits only a limited degree of encapsulation, or that leaves enough room for inputs from various sources such as the listener’s progressive exposure to more refined forms of musical analysis or more extensive acquaintance with other works in the pertinent reference-class. Perhaps there are certain very basic perceptual capacities — like hearing a temporal (melodic) succession of notes or perceiving a vertical (harmonic) relationship between different notes in a chord — that equate, roughly speaking, with grammar in verbal language, or with the kinds of ‘hard-wired’ syntactic regularity that transformational grammarians take to underlie the surface features of different languages (CHOMSKY 1957). To this extent musical perceptions may be said to manifest a high degree of cognitive impermeability, or to operate in virtual isolation from that whole range of other, theoretically-informed or culturally acquired modes of response.

However, DeBellis argues, we shall not get far toward understanding the experience of music if we over-emphasise this ‘dedicated’ modular component and hence ignore the surely self-evident fact that our perceptions can be affected — sometimes in decisive ways — through the general process of music education, a process that includes (not least) our reading of analytic commentaries or works of musical theory. For there would otherwise seem little profit to be had from such reading except as a kind of mandarin distraction from the business of actually listening to music and allowing it to make its perceptual impact through the module specialised for just that purpose. In other words — though DeBellis doesn’t draw this lesson — we should end up in the position of those deconstructive theorists who raise the critique of ‘phenomenalism’ to a high point of abstract doctrine and who can thus conceive of no middle ground between naive, theoretically untutored habits of response and a discourse (their own) that lacks any genuine purchase on our modes of musical experience.
What this amounts to, in short, is a strong case for the inter-involvement of perceptual responses with conceptual categories, or of musical ‘intuition’ with all those sources of sharpened critical awareness which most listeners presumably seek from analysts, theorists, and musicologists. It is therefore a conception far removed from that relentless deconstructive hermeneutics of suspicion that entirely discounts the appeal to phenomenal (or quasi-phenomenal) modes of perception and which thus drives a wedge between listener-response and the kinds of counter-intuitive claim that characterise the discourse of present-day ‘advanced’ musical theory. As we have seen, this hostility also extends to the practice of musical analysis, at least in so far as that practice assumes (1) that certain works possess certain salient (perceptible) structural features, and (2) that analysis is best deployed in describing those features and making them more consciously available through the process of enhanced (analytically informed) listening. But there is something very odd — not to say perverse — about a theory that is committed to the outright denial of both these claims in the interest of promoting a resistance to forms of aesthetic ideology which could only be resisted — in so far as one accepts this general diagnosis — through a better, more acute, more musically perceptive understanding of the music itself. For it is hard to conceive how such resistance could arise from a discourse that stakes its radical credentials on a ‘voiding’ of all aesthetic categories along with all notions of musical structure that might offer any hold for detailed critical analysis.

This issue is posed with particular force in a well-known exchange between Alan Street and Jonathan Dunsby about Brahms’s sequence of piano Fantasies, Op. 116 (DUNSBY 1983; STREET 1989; DUNSBY 1981; also KORSYN 1993). Street takes the line — very much in keeping with his de Man-inspired deconstructive approach — that these pieces cannot (or should not) be heard as manifesting a degree of thematic coherence or interlinked ‘organic’ development that belies and transcends their seemingly small-scale, episodic character. So when other analysts — Dunsby among them — profess to detect such signs of coherence they must be in the grip of an aesthetic ideology that promotes a purely circular form of reasoning, i.e., from the ‘self-evident’ premise that organic unity is a prime aesthetic value to the equally ‘self-evident’ conclusion that Brahms’s music must exhibit that feature in the highest possible degree since plainly it is music of great aesthetic value. In which case — according to Street — it is the proper business of deconstruction to reveal this inherent circularity at work and thereby demonstrate how far the values of mainstream musical analysis are complicit with those of an organicist doctrine that doesn’t so much discover as project those favoured musical attributes.

De Man makes the point in a passage that is worth citing at length since it seems to have provided Street and others with the chief inspiration for such claims. ‘Literary »form«’, he writes,
is the result of the dialectic interplay between the prefigurative structure of foreknowledge and the intent at totality of the interpretative process. This dialectic is difficult to grasp. The idea of totality suggests closed forms that strive for ordered and consistent systems and have an almost irresistible tendency to transform themselves into objective structures. Yet, the temporal factor, so persistently forgotten, should remind us that the form is never anything but a process on the way to its completion. The completed form never exists as a concrete aspect of the work that could coincide with a sensorial or semantic dimension of the language. It is constituted in the mind of the interpreter as the work discloses itself in response to his questioning. But this dialogue between work and interpreter is endless.

(de MAN 1983: 31-2)

For Street, this indicates the fallacy involved in any sort of musical analysis which purports to identify perceptually salient features of the work ‘itself’, and which then proceeds to assimilate those features to a concept of organic form premised on just such naive objectivist assumptions. What is needed, rather, is an ‘allegorical’ reading in the de Manian mode whereby the analysis can be shown to self-deconstruct through its recourse to various ‘totalising’ metaphors that always break down, on closer inspection, into chains of merely contiguous metonymic detail or the temporal flux of discrete events. For Dunsby, on the other hand, such arguments are misconceived since they fail to acknowledge what should be audible to anyone with sufficiently acute musical perception and with the capacity for long-range structural grasp that comes of knowing the pieces well and listening for just such kinds of thematic inter-relationship. From this point of view Street has gone wrong by allowing his (potential) musical perceptions to be skewed or overridden by a theory — a deManian ‘allegory of reading’ — whose effect is to devalue our perceptual experience of music to the point where it becomes just a product of deep-laid ideological prejudice. As Street sees it such responses are predictably blind to their own motivating interests, that is, their investment in a mode of analysis that all too readily complies with the dictates of aesthetic ideology. Thus any such appeal to ‘experience’ or ‘perception’ must be thought to involve a naive metaphorical projection from the realm of natural processes and events onto the discourse of musical meaning or form. In which case the only proper antidote is a deconstructive reading of those texts — Dunsby’s among them — which espouse that delusive organicist idea, rather than a detailed counter-analysis that would pick out other (recalcitrant) features of the musical work but thereby confirm the self-same kinds of aesthetic value.

DeBellis’s approach via Fodor and debates within cognitive psychology seems to me to provide one useful alternative to this way of thinking. That is to say, it lends strong support to the case for treating our musical perceptions as ‘cognitively permeable’, and therefore as subject to progressive refinement — to ‘aesthetic education’ in a sense very different from de Man’s usage of the phrase — through our
reading of intelligent analytic commentaries or critically-informed scholarship. Moreover, it offers grounds for rejecting both the false idea that equates ‘phenomenalism’ with aesthetic ideology, and the equally false conception of analysis as always and everywhere complicit with a deep-laid conservative mystique of organic form. For this conception is based on a narrow understanding, one that takes Schenker’s very overt ideological bias as somehow built into the very practice of analysis. Yet it has surely been the experience of many listeners — myself included — that analysis can and often does provide an insight into processes of tonal development, thematic transformation, subtle cross-reference between movements, etc., which had perhaps registered already in some subliminal way but which achieve far greater impact and expressive power once raised to the level of conscious awareness. Nor are such analyses always premised on a notion of organic unity whose effect — as the deconstructionists argue — is to repress or to marginalise any recalcitrant detail that doesn’t fit in with their preconceived ‘totalising’ schema. Here again, this charge has a certain plausibility when brought against Schenker or analysts in the echt-Schenkerian line of descent, but amounts to no more than a wilful caricature if applied to ‘analysis’ in general. Thus, for instance, it is way off-beam with respect to Donald Tovey’s highly perceptive, intelligent, broadly formalistic but also (at times) decidedly anti-organicist essays in musical analysis (TOVEY 1949). Nor can the general charge be sustained if one thinks of Hans Keller’s more acerbic and shrewdly paradoxical reflections on music’s resistance to certain kinds of orthodox analytic approach (KELLER 1986, 1987, 1994). Indeed, one feature of any analysis worth reading — as likewise of any work that truly merits such treatment — is its capacity to foreground just those details or formal structures that don’t fall in with routine (naturalised) habits of listener-response. Of course it may be said — and has been said by theorists from Kerman down — that this is just the point of readings which challenge the very practice of analysis in so far as it (supposedly) lends support to such naive ‘phenomenalist’ assumptions. But then one has to ask what could possibly count as ‘resistance’ to aesthetic ideology if not our critically-informed perception of salient formal or structural elements which are there in the work — and available to analysis — rather than figuring merely as constructs of a certain theoretical discourse on music. For this latter approach marks a crucial shift from the kind of criticism that makes some claim to actually engage with our musical experience to the kind of linguistic (or meta-linguistic) theory that treats such claims as nothing more than a figment of naive organicist thinking. It is a shift clearly visible if one compares Adorno’s writings on music with the sorts of writing that have lately captured the high ground of music-theoretical thought. (See especially ADORNO 1991a, 1991b, 1998a, 1998b; also PADDISON 1993). To be sure, he sharply rejects any straightforward appeal to ‘perception’ or ‘experience’ that would treat such notions as somehow providing a solid basis for judgement as opposed to the giddy gyrations of abstract theory
(ADORNO 1982b). Thus if one thing typifies Adorno’s thinking about music, literature, and philosophy alike it is his relentless critique of the positivist idea that we could ever have ‘immediate’ perceptual acquaintance with those sense-data that supposedly constitute the very foundation of knowledge (ADORNO et al 1976). Hence his ‘negative-dialectical’ approach, derived from Hegel in so far as it insists on the culturally or socially-mediated character of perception, but rejecting Hegel’s premature appeal to a knowledge (that of ‘Absolute Reason’) that would finally transcend all such limiting perspectives (ADORNO 1974, 1997).

So to this extent Adorno is in agreement with the deconstructionists, that is to say, in his resolute refusal to countenance any notion of musical meaning or form that derives from the illicit (metaphorical) projection of naive phenomenalist categories. However he goes nothing like so far toward a purely linguistic or rhetorical approach that would treat all talk of musical ‘perception’ or ‘experience’ as resulting from a straightforward failure to acknowledge the discursively-constructed character of music and — moreover — the role of ‘analysis’ as a discourse that functions entirely in the service of aesthetic ideology. For it is Adorno’s leading contention that music (like language) possesses a certain stubborn particularity which cannot be subsumed under models or metaphors — such as that of ‘organic form’ — that derive from some preconceived interpretative schema. Of course de Man makes a similar claim for the ‘materiality’ of language in so far as this is conceived as a kind of non-signifying substance or substrate that precedes and (somehow) effectively resists the imposition of ideological meanings and values (de MAN 1986, 1996). However there is no making sense of such a claim if, as I have argued, it blocks the appeal to those language-constitutive (i.e., semantic) attributes that define what counts as an item of meaningful utterance, rather than a sequence of pre-articulate noises or senseless (purely ‘material’) textual inscriptions.

At any rate it is clear that Adorno has nothing like this in mind when he stakes his case for the capacity of music or literature to resist our ideological preconceptions on their harbouring of certain recalcitrant features that cannot convincingly be brought under some generalised conceptual scheme. Indeed this constantly reiterated stress on the tension between particular and universal is the driving force of Adorno’s negative dialectic and the chief justification of his claim for the emancipatory power of certain musical and literary works (ADORNO 1973a, 1974, 1997). Thus, despite his staunch Hegelian insistence that ‘immediacy’ is the merest of phenomenalist illusions, Adorno still holds out for the idea that our critically-informed experience of music must be responsive to something there in the work, even though — as he is equally at pains to remind us — such experience is always subject to complex forms of social and cultural mediation. For it would otherwise be sheerly nonsensical to argue that music has this capacity to challenge our acculturated habits of response and hence to resist various kinds of deeply-entrenched aesthetic ideology.
This is also why Adorno — unlike the New Musicologists — comes out strongly in defence of ‘analysis’ as a means of sharpening our musical perceptions, whether as listeners or performers. Indeed in one of his last published essays — transcribed from a radio talk — Adorno makes this point via a consideration of the way that ‘structural listening’ has become ever more crucial to the experience of music as composers have themselves been driven to explore ever more complex and demanding forms of musical expression (ADORNO 1982a). That is to say, any adequate (perceptive and intelligent) rendition of a Schoenberg quartet, or a work that resists our more accustomed intuitive modes of response, will necessarily involve a great deal of analysis, some of it no doubt at a preconscious level, which makes all the difference between just playing the notes and playing them with a grasp of this deeper structural logic. Analysis begins precisely at the point where conventional commentary ends, i.e., with the critically-informed perception of just those salient particularities of detail and structure that are strictly immanent to the work in hand and cannot be subsumed under broad generic concepts or notions of typical ‘period’ style. Above all it is Adorno’s contention that performers and listeners who manifest a grasp of such details are thereby exercising the kind of musical intelligence that the composer must already have exercised in relation to his or her inherited range of tonal, thematic, or developmental resources. In other words, ‘structural listening’ of this kind is not just one way of listening among others — perhaps (as some New Musicologists would claim) an elitist or culturally mandarin practice — but the means of coming as close as possible to a true understanding of the work. Nor does it betoken a falling-in with established, academically canonised conceptions of form, meaning, and value which reveal nothing more than the analyst’s professional self-interest or ideological complicity. Rather it provides the only hope of resisting those pressures of cultural commodification and regressive, fetishised musical perception which — according to Adorno — have well-nigh extinguished the capacity of listeners to engage with music at a level beyond the most banal and cliché-ridden habits of response (ADORNO 1991c).

VI

One characteristic of the New Musicology is its extreme ambivalence toward Adorno. This comes out most strikingly if one compares two books by Rose Rosengard Subotnik, the earlier of which (Developing Variations, 1991) bears clear marks of his influence, while the second (Deconstructive Variations, 1996) adopts a far more sceptical view, especially with regard to the idea of ‘structural listening’. Thus she now considers this to be merely an expression of Adorno’s narrowly formalist aesthetic values, his snobbish attachment to ‘high’ musical culture, and — worst of all — his downright contempt for any kind of music (or musical experience) that involves straightforward enjoyment, rather than a strenuous self-denye-
ing ordinance and effort of analysis on the listener’s part. For why should we suppose that the latter is any more valuable or that we ought to give up such simple satisfactions for the sake of some highly abstract idea of music’s critical-emancipatory power? Or again, what is the virtue of any approach — like Adorno’s — that would have us sternly reject those pleasures for the sake of a heightened analytical awareness that (supposedly) empowers us to resist the commodification of musical experience and the blandishments of the culture industry? In short, the idea of ‘structural listening’ is one that imposes its own criteria of what counts as genuine musical experience, namely the kind of culturally and socio-economically privileged experience that comes of a commitment to canonical values as enshrined in the ‘great tradition’ of Western art-music and the modes of analysis that have grown up around it. Much better — Subotnik now thinks — that we should jettison this whole elitist conception and accept the sheer variety of musical pleasures, including those that Adorno would doubtless regard as exposing their adherents to the worst, most degrading and manipulative forms of mass-cultural production (ADORNO 1991c).

If one wishes to explain this turn against Adorno in Subotnik’s later writing then it has to do mainly with two lines of argument that play a relatively low-key role in her earlier book but which emerge at full blast in *Deconstructive Variations*. One is the cultural-relativist idea that issues of musical form, structure, meaning, or value can be addressed only from some given social perspective or from within some particular ‘discourse’ which will always interpret those issues in keeping with its own ideological agenda. Thus Adorno’s commitment to analysis and structural listening is enough to mark him out as an upholder of cultural values that can have not the least purchase on other, less ‘complex’ but just as valuable modes of musical experience. Along with this goes Subotnik’s increasing scepticism with regard to the Adornian claim that certain works — and certain analytically describable features of them — might put up a resistance to dominant forms of ‘regressive’ listening or cultural commodification. In short, she has moved a long way toward endorsing the two chief tenets of deconstruction, at least as the New Musicologists conceive it: the discursively-constructed character of musical values and — closely allied to that — the fallacy of thinking that value-judgements could ever be grounded in veridical perceptions of musical structure or form. So — my examples, not hers — should any listener prefer (say) Michael Nyman to Beethoven, or Philip Glass to J.S. Bach, or Arvo Pärt to William Byrd, then we had better just say that these judgements are culture-relative (or listener-dependent) and in no way capable of ranking on a scale of perceptual acuity or structural grasp. For this would be to fall straight back into the trap of an aesthetic ideology that failed to acknowledge its own deep investment in prevailing ideas of what properly counts as a perceptive or musically-informed response to works whose self-evident canonical status requires nothing less.
At this point the reader may protest that I am talking not so much about deconstruction in a musicological context as about the much wider cultural phenomenon of postmodernism in so far as it has influenced recent debates on and around music (JAMESON 1991; KRAMER 1995; LOCHHEAD and AUNER [eds.] 2002; McClary 2000; Norris 1990, 1993). After all, if the term ‘postmodernism’ has any specific application here, then it must be taken to signify something very like the kinds of argument that I have summarised in the above few paragraphs. Thus to call oneself a musical postmodernist is presumably to endorse most of the claims put forward in Subotnik’s Deconstructive Variations. These are, in brief: (1) the obsolescence of ‘high’ modernist values such as those embodied in the music of Schoenberg and his disciples, along with the canonical tradition of great works to which Schoenberg claimed to stand as revolutionary heir and successor; (2) the irrelevance (or at any rate the strictly limited scope) of music analysis or ‘structural listening’ as criteria of aesthetic worth; and (3), following directly from this, the open multiplicity of styles, genres, listening practices, pleasures, socio-cultural contexts, and so forth, that cannot be brought under any such reductive or monolithic standard of value. To which might be added (4) the linguistic or narrative ‘turn’ in much postmodern theorising which rejects any single, privileged discourse or master-narrative — like that of mainstream musicology — and replaces it with the notion of multiple ‘first-order natural pragmatic’ narratives, each of them valid on its own terms, but none of them possessing any claim to ultimate authority (Lyotard 1984).

So when Subotnik (1996) intersperses her more ‘theoretical’ discussions with sundry illustrative anecdotes from her musical, professional, and personal experience this is very much a part of her wider attack on the governing norms of ‘serious’ academic discourse. (See also DeNora 2000; Detels 1994.) What she is out to deconstruct is precisely the idea — raised to a high point of doctrine by formalists or analysts — that such discourse has no place for such merely ‘extraneous’ narratives since its sole legitimate concern is with ‘the work’, or with structural features of the work that best ensure respect for its properly autonomous status. And the same applies to that organicist metaphor of musical ‘growth’ and ‘development’ which has lent credence to a certain prevalent musicological narrative, one that elevates just those works — and just those aesthetic values — that keep the analysts in business. So a further strategy for opening up the canon is by telling alternative stories (such as that of Subotnik’s repeated put-downs by the musicological establishment) that highlight her sense of increasing disenchantment with the kinds of academic discourse to which she had once (with whatever reservations) implicitly subscribed. Whence the postmodern-cultural-relativist claim that in the end there is nothing more to musical value or judgement than those various stories — or narrative constructions — that constitute the musical experience of various listeners (Solie [ed.] 1993). No doubt the analysts have their own favoured narrative, albeit one that admits of some disagreement as to just which composers,
works, or structural aspects should count as most ‘intrinsically’ valuable. But theirs
is a story that likewise involves certain culture-specific criteria, among them — not
least — the very idea of ‘intrinsic’ musical value and, along with it, the closely
associated notions of formal complexity, organic unity, and ‘developing variation’.
That this was Subotnik’s choice of title for her earlier (1991) book is a measure of
the distance that she has travelled from a qualified commitment to critical theory
in the Adornian mode to a full-fledged postmodernist approach that finds no room
for such ‘elitist’ conceptions of musical form and value.

So there is, to be sure, a sense in which my reader is right to protest that what
I have been describing in parts of this essay — especially the last few pages — has
more to do with musical postmodernism than with deconstructive musicology.
And I would grant that the work of de Man-inspired exegetes like Street has little
in common (superficially at least) with the kinds of postmodernist writing that
summarily reject any claim for analysis as conducive to modes of ‘structural listen-
ing’ that can actually enhance our appreciation of music. Still the main tendency of
deconstruction when carried across from the reading of verbal to non-verbal (e.g.,
musical) ‘texts’ is to lay great stress on the discursively-constructed character of all
perceptions and hence to minimise the role of music itself in contesting or subvert-
ing received analytical procedures. Here again Adorno provides the most instruc-
tive counter-example, insisting as he does on the ‘language-character’ of music,
that is, its ineluctable mediation by various discourses of meaning, value, and cul-
tural significance, but also on its power to challenge ideological preconceptions
through its stubborn particularity of detail and structure. This is also where Adorno
can be seen to come out in strong opposition to the kinds of modish value-relativ-
ism that leave no room for comparative judgement on grounds of thematic inte-
gration, harmonic resourcefulness, formal complexity, or long-range structural
development. Indeed one can readily imagine Adorno’s response had he lived on
to witness the current minimalist vogue or the respectful treatment mostly accorded
— even by ‘serious’ critics and reviewers — to the music of Philip Glass or Michael
Nyman. For he would surely have viewed such developments as further confir-
mation of his gloomy prognosis with regard to the ‘regressive’ or ‘fetishized’ char-
acter of musical perception in an age given over to the commercial dictates of mass-
cultural consumption (ADORNO 1991c).

It is worth recalling Kerman’s original plea — in that 1980 essay — for a music
criticism that would have the courage to expand its intellectual horizons, chiefly
by meeting the challenge of ideas from other ‘theoretical’ quarters, but also —
concomitant with that — by loosening the hold of a concept of ‘analysis’ deeply
bound up with suspect ideological values. That both wishes have since come true
(perhaps beyond Kerman’s wildest hopes) is a fact that cannot fail to strike anyone
who has followed debates in the more ‘advanced’ journals of music theory over
the past two decades. Still one may doubt that the resultant benefits have been
altogether what Kerman envisaged when he launched his reformist crusade. For
there has now grown up a kind of counter-orthodoxy, one that routinely presses so far in its critique of analysis and its ‘deconstruction’ of musical perceptions and judgements as to risk altogether losing touch with the music which provides its (increasingly notional) object domain. Of course it is the case — one borne out by any valid or convincing piece of analysis — that our perceptions can be changed quite decisively through the reading of texts that adopt a ‘theoretical’ line on some issue regarding the detailed structure of specific musical works. This applies just as much to deconstructive analyses — like Street’s — as to those, like Dunsby’s, which espouse a more ‘conservative’ idea of organic form. However there is a problem about any theory which purports to deconstruct the very idea that analysis can indeed sharpen our musical perceptions rather than promote an aesthetic ideology whose source is precisely that ‘phenomenalist’ appeal to modes of perceptual (no matter how refined or theoretically informed) experience.

I have suggested that certain recent developments in cognitive psychology might offer the best way out of this curious dilemma. Fodor himself suggests as much when he begins an essay with the engagingly upfront statement: ‘The thing is, I hate cultural relativism’ (FODOR 1990: 23). What he chiefly has in mind is the kind of relativist thinking that has resulted from certain ideas in post-empiricist philosophy of science, among them Thomas Kuhn’s influential claim that scientific theories are always ‘underdetermined’ by the best available evidence, and that evidence always ‘theory-laden’ to the extent of precluding any decision between rival hypotheses on the basis of straightforward empirical warrant (KUHN 1970). Fodor’s idea — as developed in The Modularity of Mind — is that this kind of fargone epistemic relativism can best be countered by drawing a distinction between, on the one hand, those faculties that are relatively ‘encapsulated’ or ‘cognitively impervious’ and, on the other, those that are open to a wider range of perceptual or cognitive inputs (FODOR 1983). So there is simply no need to take the Kuhnian paradigm-relativist path and conclude that every major episode of scientific theory-change involves such a drastic shift in the currency of knowledge that it must affect not only what counts as an observational datum but also what counts as a ‘basic’ theoretical truth or even — at the limit — a hitherto unquestioned axiom of logic. (See also QUINE 1961). Fodor finds this a wholly unacceptable conclusion since it fails to explain how we could ever have knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge. Thus he puts forward the modularity thesis as a means of distinguishing between those truths that are ‘hard-wired’ or integral to the nature of rational thought and those empirical findings that might just be subject to revision or modification under pressure of recalcitrant evidence. That is to say, it is the degree of cognitive ‘permeability’ that enables us to make such distinctions and thereby effectively hold the line against Kuhnian, Quinean, and other versions of the wholesale paradigm-relativist approach.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of Fodor’s arguments in epistemology and philosophy of science. However they do have a useful bearing on the
issue as to whether our musical perceptions are theoretically-informed or — as the cultural relativists would have it — ‘constructed’ through and through by various modes of discursive or narrative representation. On Fodor’s account (suitably modified) one can make a strong case for the veridical character of certain musical perceptions even though they are always, in some degree, informed by a knowledge acquired from various extra-perceptual sources, among them — not least — our reading of analytic commentaries or musico-historical studies. On the deconstructivist account, conversely, any such appeal to ‘perception’ must be thought to betray a lingering attachment to the values enshrined in aesthetic ideology and a refusal to acknowledge that language (or discourse) goes ‘all the way down’. This is the musicological equivalent of what Fodor has in mind when he excoriates cultural relativists for blithely endorsing a doctrine that would collapse every last distinction between truth and falsehood, knowledge and belief, or science and pseudo-science. Thus in both cases there is a failure to conceive that certain cognitive processes exhibit a high degree of ‘encapsulation’, i.e., of uniform functional role despite and across otherwise large differences of cultural, socio-historical, or idiosyncratic response. Such would be, for instance, the processes involved in relatively abstract mental operations like logical reasoning, mathematical thought, or the ability to use and to comprehend language in its syntactic as distinct from its semantic or pragmatic aspects. With regard to the latter — as Fodor remarks — there is always a need for regular inputs from a wide range of informational sources that are processed by other, more ‘cognitively pervious’ or context-sensitive modules, and which therefore require a more holistic approach. Where the relativists go wrong is in thinking that holism applies right across the board, that is, not only to matters of culturally-informed interpretation but also to functions — like logical reasoning or grammatical competence — whose distinctive nature is precisely their need to maintain this degree of insulation from other experiential inputs in order to do their specialised job. (See also FODOR and LePORE 1991.)

So when relativists standardly invoke Kuhn on the ‘underdetermination’ of theory by evidence and the ‘theory-laden’ character of observation-statements the best counter-argument (Fodor thinks) is one that deploys the modularity-thesis in order to explain why certain forms of conceptual reasoning and certain modes of perceptual response are exempt from such holistic treatment. And when music theorists likewise suggest that our perceptions are ‘constructed’ by various ideologically prevalent discourses then perhaps the best argument is one that stresses the relative ‘encapsulation’ of perceptual experience and the trans-cultural validity of certain analytic concepts and categories. On the other hand — as signalled by those words ‘perhaps’ and ‘relative’ — there are problems with any too direct application of Fodor’s approach in cognitive psychology to the sorts of issue that typically arise with respect to musical experience and judgement. For here, as I have said, there is a strong case for holding that perceptual responses are always
informed — albeit not wholly determined — by certain acquired theoretical concepts as well as by a range of cultural and socio-historical values. So it looks as if the modularity-thesis will need at least some modification or local tweaking if it is to offer much help with the issues presently at hand.

This problem will naturally seem least pressing if one accepts a theory — like that advanced by Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) — which explicates the structure of tonal music through a transformational-generative model derived from Chomskian linguistics, one with its source in just the kind of modular cognitive-psychological approach that Fodor also champions. For it is then not difficult to make the case for musical ‘competence’ — like our competence in verbal language — as primarily a matter of certain syntactic regularities which display the required degree of encapsulation, i.e., the functional capacity to operate at a ‘deep’ level sufficiently removed from surface variations of meaning and style. However, as is well known, this early-Chomskian approach soon ran into problems when it sought to account for those other (semantic and pragmatic) dimensions of linguistic competence which clearly played a more than ‘surface’ role in enabling speakers to distinguish grammatically well-formed from grammatically ill-formed sentences. (Cf. CHOMSKY 1957 and 1966.) Thus a good deal of Chomsky’s later work — and that of his like-minded colleagues in cognitive psychology — has been devoted to revising the unidirectional (‘syntax-first’) model and developing a theory of ‘generative semantics’ with the scope to accommodate just such cases. However this also has certain implications for the ‘strong’ modularity thesis, that is to say, for the functionalist idea of language — at any rate the syntactic component of language — as ‘encapsulated’ or ‘cognitively impermeable’. For that claim must be subject to more or less extensive revision depending on the degree to which speakers’ intuitions with regard to grammatical correctness are affected by the kinds of semantic or pragmatic knowledge that cannot be treated in any such ‘hard-wired’ modular terms. And this applies even more in the case of music since here, as I have said, there is something highly implausible about the notion of a grammar (or syntax) of musical response that functions independently of inputs from our wider, theoretically-informed or musically literate experience.

VII

All of which brings us back to Kerman and his shrewdly provocative phrasing of the question ‘how we got into analysis, and how to get out’. One is tempted — in view of developments since 1981 — to suggest that the question now be rephrased as ‘how we got into theory, and how to get out’. Nevertheless this temptation ought to be resisted given the extent to which ‘theory’, in one form or another, enters into all our musical experience and affects the very character of that experience, whether consciously or not. (See especially DeBELLIS 1995; also COOK 1993;

My own view — as should be clear by now — is that theory does best when it remains closely in touch with the findings of musical analysis, which in turn does best when it retains a respect (though not an uncritical reverence) for our intuitive musical perceptions. Any theory that rejects the claims of analysis — or ‘structural listening’ — as nothing more than a product of aesthetic ideology will be prone to over-estimate the role of theoretical discourse in promoting such resistance and, by the same token, to under-estimate music’s intrinsic capacity to challenge or unsettle our habituated modes of response. Indeed, this whole debate has tended to unfold very much along the lines that Kerman laid down when he offered critics a straightforward choice between established and newly emergent paradigms, as if getting ‘into’ theory were somehow the precondition — as well as the reward — for getting themselves ‘out’ of analysis. But there is nothing to be gained and a great deal to be lost by promoting such a downright manichean attitude. What is needed, rather, is a sensible acknowledgement that our understanding of music along with the kinds of ideological discourse that have grown up around it is best served through a joint application of theoretically-informed analysis and analytically-informed perception.

Here one might recall de Man’s paradoxical statement, in his essay ‘The Resistance to Theory’, that ‘technically correct’ [i.e., deconstructive] readings are at once ‘irrefutable’ in so far as they result from a rhetorically alert construal but also ‘potentially totalitarian’ in so far as they close down other, perhaps more rewarding possibilities. Thus (to repeat): ‘since the structures and functions they expose do not lead to the knowledge of an entity (such as language) but are an unreliable process of knowledge production that prevents all entities, including linguistic entities, from coming into discourse as such, they are indeed universals, consistently defective models of language’s impossibility to be a model language’ (de MAN 1986: 19). One way of grasping what has happened as a consequence of the deconstructive ‘turn’ in recent music theory is to run the fairly simple thought-experiment of substituting ‘music’ for ‘language’ (and ‘musical’ for ‘linguistic’) in the above-quoted passage. For it then becomes clear that the upshot of such theorising is not only to resist a certain kind of ideologically-motivated discourse about music — just the kind of discourse that de Man targets in his essays on literature and philosophy — but also to deprive music itself of any power to muster such resistance through its intrinsic structural features. After all, there is some plausibility to de Man’s claim that ‘phenomenalist’ readings are aberrant when applied to linguistic texts since ‘it is not a priori certain that language functions according to principles which are those, or which are like those, of the phenomenal world’ (de Man 1986: 11). Indeed — or so he would have us believe — this idea is just a variant of the ‘Cratylist’ delusion which posits some quasi-natural kinship or af-
finity between signifier and signified, and which thus gives rise to all manner of naive ‘organicist’ metaphors and concepts. But when applied to music the argument simply doesn’t work since here there is no escaping the fact that our musical experience must be perceptually grounded, even if — as also needs stressing — our perceptions can always be modified, refined or subject to challenge through exposure to analysis and theory.

Thus the ‘Cratylist’ charge has far less force in a context — that of music criticism — where it pertains only to the crudest sort of mimeticist thinking and not to the perfectly valid conception of music as involving a constant interplay between perceptual and analytically-informed modes of listener-response. For if pressed too hard then it is apt to leave the theorist with nothing very much to talk about, that is, with no theme upon which to practice her deconstructive variations apart from a well-nigh ubiquitous notion of ‘aesthetic ideology’ that offers a convenient pretext or foil for just this kind of meta-linguistic or arcane theoretical discourse. No doubt it is an excellent thing to keep open the channels of communication between disciplines, among them the disciplines of music criticism and literary theory. However, as I have argued, there are problems with any approach which carries this project to the point of denying that ‘analysis’ has anything of interest to contribute save an object-lesson in naïve ‘phenomenalist’ errors and a constant unwitting demonstration of its own ideological complicity.

REFERENCES


TEORIJA GLAZBE, ANALIZA I DEKONSTRUKCIJA: KAKO BI SE MOGLE (BAREM) SLAGATI

Ovaj članak nudi komparativni pregled i kritiku raznih recentnih pojava u ‘Novoj muzikologiji’ i njihov odnos spram djela u drugim disciplinama kao što su književna teorija, kulturni studiji i kognitivna psihologija. Posebno se usredotočuje na tvrdnje dekonstrukcijskih muzikologa da su se svojom mišlju probili kroz i dospjeli s onu stranu takvih navodno diskreditiranih pojmova kao ‘organska forma’, tematski razvitak ili glazbeno ‘djelo’ što posjeduju neku vrstu strukturne autonomije. Usporedo s ovime javlja se iroko raširen skepticizam u pogledu legitimiteta vrijednosnih sudova, uloge analize kao sredstva za bolje glazbeno razumijevanje i postojanja ‘velikih djela’ čiji bi — kako oni žele — kanonski status bio samo proizvod okamenjene ideološke predrasude koju podržavaju zahtjevi analize da se locira i objasni u ‘lemu’ se sastoji ta veličina. Sugeriram da je Nova muzikologija proizvela nekoliko valjanih i vrijednih interpretativnih uvida, ali i da riskira da postane samo jedna željezom okovana kritička ortodoksnost ukoliko je se gurne u te preopćenite, preskriptivne i teorijom poticane smjerove.

Osobito dovodim u pitanje tendenciju da se iz drugih područja uvezu teorijske ideje — kao što su dekonstrukcijski pristup u filozofiji ili književnoj kritici — a da se ne vodi odgovarajućeg računa o onim karakteristikama koje glazbeno iskustvo razlikuju od
djelatnosti čitanja i interpretiranja verbalnih tekstova. To u posljedici vrlo često dovodi do promašaja u bavljenju upravo onim aspektima glazbe koji bi se mogli upustiti u autentični — a ne samo apstraktni ili pojmovni — otpor ortodoksnim (ideološki nepopustljivim) načinima slušanja. Kao potvrdu ove tvrdnje navodim neke argumente iz područja kognitivne psihologije koji bi mogli pomoći u objašnjenju toga kako glazba postiže taj učinak putem naših zajedničkih perceptivnih i teorijski informiranih načina primalaštva. Iz istog razloga branim adornovsku ideju ‘strukturnog slušanja’, tj. pozornosti spram dalekosežnih oblika tematske, harmonijske i tonalitetske organizacije, od napada na tu ‘elitističku’ koncepciju insceniranih od strane zagovornika ‘dekonstrukcijske’ (odnosno čitaj: ‘postmodernističke’) muzikologije. Takvi pristupi ne samo da prodaju teoriju bez pokrića, isključujući iz njezina aktivnog, dijalektičkog angažmana specifične pojedinosti glazbene forme, nego također pogođuju — kako bi Adorno sigurno ubrzio primijetio — povećanom postvarenju glazbe kao još jednog objekta pasivne i nekritičke potrošnje.

Tako ovaj članak nema namjeru toliko diskreditirati Novu muzikologiju, koliko je želi odmaknuti od položaja bojovite opozicije spram ‘staromodne’ glazbene analize i ohrabriti produktivniji odnos između tih jednako vrijednih načina kritičkog diskursa. Ponad svega u njemu se odbacuje doktrinarna tvrdnja da je analiza uvijek — i samom svojom prirodom — partner vrijednostima hegemonističke kulture i glazbeni kanon koji odražava ili utjelovljuje same te vrijednosti. Suprotno tome, tvrdim da se analitički informirano slušanje može kombinirati s historijski i društveno-kulturno svjesnom znanošću o glazbi kako bi proizvelo vrlo snažan i usklađen izazov ustaljenim navikama u primalaštvu.