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Pyrrhonism and Relativism

Filip Grgić


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 438 Kb

str. 823-841

preuzimanja: 2.007

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Sažetak

In this paper an attempt is made to show that there is a kind of relativism that can be seen as compatible with Sextus Empiricus’ scepticism. It is argued that in PH I.217–219, Protagoras is not treated as alethic or epistemic relativist, but as a relativist in a minimal sense of the word, and that such a position is not at odds with Sextus’ characterisation of Pyrrhonism in PH I. It is then shown that recognising this aspect of Pyrrhonism can help us explain the otherwise problematic relativistic conclusions in Sextus’ works, esp. in M XI.

Ključne riječi

Sextus Empiricus; Protagoras; Pyrrhonian scepticism; relativism; appearances; beliefs

Hrčak ID:

19712

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/19712

Datum izdavanja:

28.1.2008.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 3.458 *