Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 22 No. 2, 2007.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain
Julian Kiverstein
; University of Edinburgh, Department of Philosophy, Edinburgh, UK
Sažetak
This paper explores the possibility of a neuroscientific explanation of consciousness, and what such an explanation might look like. More specifically, I will be concerned with the claim that for any given experience there is neural representational system that constitutes the minimal supervenience base of that experience. I will call this hypothesis the minimal supervenience thesis. I argue that the minimal supervenience thesis is subject to two readings, which I call the localist and holist readings. Localist theories seek to identify the minimal supervenience base for specific experiences. They sideline questions about the nature of creature consciousness, treating the neural basis of creature consciousness as merely a causally necessary background condition for a particular conscious experience. Holists on the other hand prioritise creature consciousness and argue that we can only account for particular states of consciousness in the context of an account of creature consciousness. I argue that any scientific explanation of consciousness must account for what I will call a minimal sense of self that is intrinsic to every conscious state. Holist theories are best able to accommodate this feature. I end by arguing that the Dynamic Sensorimotor (DSM) account of consciousness can be combined with a holist account of the neural basis of consciousness. Such a combination of views corrects for the opposition to the minimal supervenience thesis found in some prominent defenders of the DSM account (e.g. Alva Noë and Evan Thompson). It also provides a framework for developing a neuroscientific account of the minimal sense of self.
Ključne riječi
neural correlates of consciousness; state consciousness; Creature Consciousness; minimal sense of self; pre-reflective self-awareness; sensorimotor dynamics
Hrčak ID:
23580
URI
Datum izdavanja:
15.2.2008.
Posjeta: 2.487 *