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Prolegomena : journal of philosophy, Vol.3 No.2 December 2004.

Original scientific paper

Presuppositions, Logic, and Dynamics of Belief

Slavko Brkić

Fulltext: english, pdf (154 KB) pages 151-177 downloads: 340* cite
Brkić, S. (2004). Presuppositions, Logic, and Dynamics of Belief. Prolegomena : časopis za filozofiju, 3(2), 151-177. Retrieved from

In researching presuppositions dealing with logic and dynamic of belief we distinguish two related parts. The first part refers to presuppositions and logic, which is not necessarily involved with intentional operators. We are primarily concerned with classical, free and presuppositonal logic. Here, we practice a well known Strawson’s approach to the problem of presupposition in relation to classical logic. Further on in this work, free logic is used, especially Van Fraassen’s research of the role of presupposition in supervaluations logical systems. At the end of the first part, presuppositional logic, advocated by S.K. Thomason, is taken into consideration. The second part refers to the presuppositions in relation to the logic of the dynamics of belief. Here the logic of belief change is taken into consideration and other epistemic notions with immanent mechanism for the presentation of the dynamics. Three representative and dominant approaches are evaluated. First, we deal with new, less
classical, situation semantics. Besides Strawson’s theory, the second theory is the theory of the belief change, developed by Alchourron, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM theory). At the end, the oldest, universal, and dominant approach is used, recognized as Hintikka’s approach to the analysis of epistemic notions.

Epistemic logic; presuppositions; common/mutual/joint knowledge; presupposition-based relation of inference; belief change; belief revision


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