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THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUENT POWER

Peter Kielmansegg ; Sveučilište u Mannheimu, Mannheim, Njemačka

Sažetak

The author analyses the possibilities of a symbiosis of the democratic and the constitutional principle, the expression of the strain between the desire for popular sovereignty and the wish to establish the fundamental rules of political life as permanently as possible. Siéyès’ distinction between the constituting and the constituted power can easily link the idea of popular sovereignty with the idea of constitutional state, but cannot answer the question of the constituting power’s right to restrain the constituted power. Since its inception, the democratic constitutional state has been a dyadic entity i.e. a democratic and constitutional state. The dilemma is whether to respect the existing constitution and follow the procedure envisioned for amending it, or to make amendments following a revolutionary breach with the existing situation i.e. a direct manoeuvre of the constituting power. The author is in favour of separating what the constituting power may decide upon and what the constituted power may decide upon, since this maintains the balance of both types of powers in a constitutional state.

Ključne riječi

Hrčak ID:

32300

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/32300

Datum izdavanja:

3.9.1998.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 1.165 *