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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="doi">10.5613/rzs</journal-id>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="udc">316</journal-id>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title xml:lang="hr">Revija za sociologiju</journal-title>
        <trans-title-group xml:lang="en">
          <trans-title>Croatian Sociological Review</trans-title>
        </trans-title-group>  
        <abbrev-journal-title xml:lang="hr">REV SOC</abbrev-journal-title>
        <abbrev-journal-title xml:lang="en">CRO SOC REV</abbrev-journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
      <issn pub-type="ppub">0350-154X</issn>
      <issn pub-type="epub">1846-7954</issn>
      <publisher>
        <publisher-name xml:lang="hr">Hrvatsko sociološko društvo</publisher-name>
        <publisher-name xml:lang="en">Croatian Sociological Association</publisher-name>
        <publisher-loc>Ivana Lučića 3 <city>Zagreb</city>
          <postal-code>10000</postal-code> Hrvatska <institution>Filozofski fakultet</institution>
          <email xlink:href="revsoc@ffzg.hr">revsoc@ffzg.hr</email>
          <ext-link xlink:href="https://hrcak.srce.hr/ojs/index.php/rzs" ext-link-type="url"/>
          <phone>+385(0)1 409-2007</phone>
          <fax>+385 (0)1 4092-007</fax>
        </publisher-loc>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.5613/rzs.51.3.1</article-id>
      <article-id pub-id-type="other">316.654(4-11/191.2):314.15</article-id>
      <article-id pub-id-type="other">314.15(4)"2013/2015"</article-id>
      <article-id pub-id-type="other">327(4)(4-6EU)</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Research-article</subject>
        </subj-group>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading" xml:lang="hr" >
          <subject>Izvorni znanstveni članak</subject>
        </subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title xml:lang="en">Anti-EU Backlash from Below or Above? Public Opinion in Central and Eastern Europe Prior to the 2015 Migration Crisis</article-title>
        <trans-title-group>
          <trans-title xml:lang="hr">Otpor EU odozdo ili odozgo? Javno mnijenje u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi prije migracijske krize 2015.</trans-title>
        </trans-title-group>
      </title-group>
      
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">0000-0002-0308-521X</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Petrović</surname>
            <given-names>Nikola</given-names>
          </name>
          <email xlink:href="nikola@idi.hr">nikola@idi.hr</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">0000-0002-4919-0277</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Mrakovčić</surname>
            <given-names>Marko</given-names>
          </name>
          <email xlink:href="mmrakovcic@pravri.hr">mmrakovcic@pravri.hr</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">0000-0002-9127-3324</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Fila</surname>
            <given-names>Filip</given-names>
          </name>
          <email xlink:href="filip@idi.hr">filip@idi.hr</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution xml:lang="en">Institute for Social Research in Zagreb – IDIZ, Croatia</institution>
          <institution xml:lang="hr">Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu – IDIZ, Hrvatska</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution xml:lang="en">Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka, Croatia</institution>
          <institution xml:lang="hr">Pravni fakultet, Sveučilište u Rijeci, Hrvatska</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      
      <author-notes>
        <fn>
          <label>CONFLICT OF INTEREST</label>
          <p>Authors declare no conflict of interest.</p>
        </fn>    
      </author-notes>
      
      <pub-date publication-format="online first">
        <day>31</day>
        <month>12</month>
        <year>2021</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>51</volume>
      <issue>3</issue>
      <fpage>317</fpage>
      <lpage>345</lpage>
      <history>
        <date date-type="received">
          <day>14</day>
          <month>June</month>
          <year>2021</year>
        </date>
      </history>
      <permissions>
        <license license-type="open-access"> 
          <license-p>CC-BY</license-p>
          <ali:license_ref>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</ali:license_ref>
          <license-p>Croatian Sociological Review is an open access journal. In accordance with the BOAI definition of open access, all content is freely available without charge to the user. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search or link to the full texts of the articles in the journal without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. Revija za sociologiju applies the CC BY license.</license-p>
        </license>
        <license license-type="open-access" xml:lang="hr"> 
          <license-p>CC-BY</license-p>
          <ali:license_ref>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</ali:license_ref>
          <license-p>Revija za sociologiju je časopis otvorenoga pristupa. U skladu s definicijom otvorenog pristupa BOAI-a, korisnicima je pristup cjelokupnom sadržaju slobodan i besplatan. Korisnici mogu čitati, pohranjivati, kopirati, distribuirati, ispisivati, pretraživati i vezivati cijele tekstove članaka u ovom časopisu ne tražeći prethodno dopuštenje izdavača ili autora. Revija za sociologiju primjenjuje CC BY licencu.</license-p>
        </license>
      </permissions> 
      <abstract xml:lang="en">
        <p>Relations between Brussels and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) worsened during and after the 2015 migration crisis. In order to see to what extent CEE citizens contributed to and/or resonated with this new state of affairs, this paper investigates public opinion before the migration crisis in seven CEE EU Member States. We inquire whether the main issues of the rift (CEE political elites’ opposition to following EU decisions and immigration and their emphasis on sovereignism, nationalism, Christian Europe and historical traumas) could also be traced to public stances towards these issues before the migration crisis. We used the ISSP National Identity module conducted in 2013 and 2014 in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia. The results show that opposition to EU supranationalism was not linked to ethnic nationalism and religious identity (except in Hungary). Contrary to political elites, who emphasised the cultural threat posed by migration, public opinion was more concerned with the economic threat. Moreover, the perception of cultural threat was not linked to opposing EU supranationalism in any of the countries. However, particularly support for sovereignism (in almost all the countries), but also pride in national history (in some countries) correlated negatively with support for EU supranationalism. The results suggest that political elites can bypass public opinion to construct an anti-EU climate, however not out of thin air. The conditions for such a process were present in Hungary with its emerging transnational cleavage, which shows the importance of cleavages in studying Euroscepticism.</p>
      </abstract>
      <trans-abstract xml:lang="hr">
        <p>Odnosi između Bruxellesa i država srednje i istočne Europe pogoršali su se tijekom i nakon migracijske krize iz 2015. godine. Kako bi se ustanovilo koliko su stavovi građana srednje i istočne Europe pridonijeli i/ili odgovarali tom novom stanju, ovaj rad istražuje javno mnijenje prije migracijske krize u sedam srednje i istočnoeuropskih članica EU-a. Propitujemo mogu li se glavni problemi rascjepa (otpor srednje i istočnoeuropskih političkih elita spram slijeđenja odluka EU-a i spram imigracije te njihov naglasak na suverenizmu, nacionalizmu, kršćanskoj Europi i povijesnim traumama) dovesti u vezu sa stavovima javnosti prema tim problemima prije migracijske krize. Koristili smo National Identity modul ISSP-a koji je proveden 2013. i 2014. u Češkoj, Estoniji, Hrvatskoj, Mađarskoj, Litvi, Latviji i Sloveniji. Rezultati pokazuju da otpor spram EU supranacionalizma nije bio povezan s etničkim nacionalizmom, a ni religijskim identitetom (osim u Mađarskoj). Suprotno naglasku političkih elita na kulturalnu prijetnju od migracija, javno mnijenje bilo je više zaokupljeno pitanjem ekonomske prijetnje. Štoviše, percepcija kulturne prijetnje nije bila povezana s otporom EU supranacionalizmu ni u jednoj od država. No, potpora suverenizmu (gotovo u svim državama) i ponos nacionalnom poviješću (u nekim državama) osobito su bile negativno povezane s potporom EU supranacionalizmu. Rezultati sugeriraju da su političke elite mogle zaobići javno mnijenje i konstruirati anti-EU atmosferu, iako ne ni iz čega. Uvjeti za takav proces postojali su u Mađarskoj s ondje nastajućim transnacionalnim rascjepom, a to upućuje na važnost proučavanja rascjepa u istraživanju euroskepticizma.</p>
      </trans-abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Euroscepticism</kwd>
        <kwd>Central and Eastern Europe</kwd>
        <kwd>public attitudes</kwd>
        <kwd>national identity</kwd>
        <kwd>migration</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
      <kwd-group xml:lang="hr">
        <kwd>euroskepticizam</kwd>
        <kwd>srednja i istočna Europa</kwd>
        <kwd>javno mnijenje</kwd>
        <kwd>nacionalni identitet</kwd>
        <kwd>migracija</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
      <funding-group>
        <funding-statement>This paper was written as part of the “Integration and Disintegration of the European Union: Dynamics of Europeanism and Euroscepticism” project supported by the Croatian Science Foundation under Grant UIP-2019-04-2979.</funding-statement>
      </funding-group>    
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  
  <body>

    <sec sec-type="intro">
      <title>1. INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>Relations between Brussels and Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States worsened
        during and after the 2015 migration crisis. The contention culminated as Visegrád Group
        states (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland) rejected the plan for mandatory
        migrant quotas in September 2015. That the contention had spread to other post-socialist EU
        Member States was evident from a letter to the European Commission (EC) signed by the
        Ministers of the Interior of Visegrád states, as well as those of Slovenia, Estonia and
        Latvia in June 2020. In the letter, they reiterated “strong objection to mandatory
        relocation of asylum seekers and migrants in any shape or form” (<xref ref-type="bibr"
          rid="r11">Hamáček et al., 2020</xref>). But migration has not been the only issue of
        contention.</p>

      <p>The 2010s in CEE were shaped by illiberal turns in Hungary and Poland, led by
          Eurosceptic<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f1"><sup>1</sup></xref> Fidesz and PiS, respectively.
        The rise of centrist populists in the Czech Republic (ANO) and Slovakia (OĽaNO) marked the
        2010s and particularly the beginning of the 2020s when these anti-establishment parties led
        coalition governments. In Slovenia, the newly formed government of Janez Janša followed the
        lead of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Eurosceptic in 2020. Although at the time of
        signing of the letter to the EC both Latvia and Estonia were led by Prime Ministers from
        more (Unity in Latvia) or less (Estonian Centre Party) pro-European parties, both Ministers
        of the Interior belonged to more right-wing, Eurosceptic parties in coalition governments.
        Croatia and Lithuania were, on the other hand, led by strongly pro-European coalition
        governments and Lithuania experienced a notable decline of Eurosceptic forces. However, in
        Croatia, the radical right and Eurosceptic Homeland Movement has been challenging the
        dominance of the centre-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) since 2019.</p>

      <p>The developments of recent years indicate that, regardless of their similar historical
        backgrounds, various CEE Member States differ in their relations towards the EU (<xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r36">Styczyńska, 2017</xref>). Despite this, the growth of right-wing
        Euroscepticism has been apparent all over the region. Right-wing authoritarianism, as well
        as new contentious relations towards the EU in some of the CEE EU Member States, are
        described as a result of “intellectual, ideological, and organizational innovations of a new
        authoritarian elite” in which a particularly prominent role is played by Orbán (<xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r9">Enyedi, 2020: 364</xref>). In 2016, Orbán organised a referendum
        on migrant quotas where 98% of voters rejected the proposition according to which the
        European Union would “be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian
        citizens into Hungary”. Although the referendum was invalid due to turnout being lower than
        50%, Fidesz-led campaigns were successful in politicising the issue of migration and
        promoting anti-immigrant attitudes (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r5">Bíró-Nagy,
        2021</xref>).</p>

      <p>In order to see to what extent CEE citizens contributed to and/or resonated with this new
        state of affairs, this paper investigates public opinion in seven CEE EU Member States
        before the migration crisis. The key question which emerged during and after the crisis is
        whether the EU could impose its decisions on EU Member States. To answer it, we use the
        International Social Survey Programme National Identity module (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r16">ISSP, 2015</xref>) conducted in
        2013 and 2014 (pre-crisis), as it asks not only this particular question measuring the level
        of support for EU supranationalism but also a string of questions related to various issues
        that became the main talking points in terms of the relations between Brussels elites and
        Eurosceptic CEE elites. Previous research has analysed attitudes of voters in CEE after the
        migration crisis (2016) and has shown that anti-immigration and anti-EU attitudes have a
        positive effect on voting for radical-right populist parties, such as Fidesz and Estonian
        EKRE (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r31">Santana, Zagórski and Rama, 2020</xref>). However, a comparison of public opinion in CEE
        before the migration crisis regarding their support for EU decisions is largely absent. This
        comparison can provide a general answer to whether the public’s sociodemographic
        characteristics, aspects of identification and social attitudes explained opposition to EU
        supranationalism before these issues were politicised in CEE. Moreover, comparing the public
        and the elites can help discern whether the elites’ positions and actions towards the EU
        were grounded in prevailing public opinions or not. On a wider scale, it can help to
        understand the background of the rift between Brussels and CEE.</p>
    </sec>
    
    <sec>
      <title>2. THEORETICAL-CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</title>
      <p>Political elites are often crucial in shaping public opinion and increasing support for
        ethnic intolerance and authoritarianism (for research in post-socialist countries see <xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r33">Sekulić, Massey and Hodson, 2006</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr"
          rid="r21">Lavrič and Bieber, 2021</xref>). Likewise, it could be argued that Orbán and PiS
        leader Jarosław Kaczyński were the most prominent actors of the illiberal and authoritarian
        turn in CEE. As prominent CEE experts Zielonka and Rupnik argued (<xref ref-type="bibr"
          rid="r41">2020: 1074</xref>): “Voters in Central and Eastern Europe supported liberal
        policies and politicians for many years, so it is difficult to claim that this region is
        particularly prone to authoritarianism and xenophobia”. Orbán and Kaczyński were also
        heavily involved in constructing the increase in refugees coming from war-torn countries as
        a civilisational clash and a full-scale crisis of relations within the EU.<xref
          ref-type="fn" rid="f2"><sup>2</sup></xref> Hooghe and Marks (<xref ref-type="bibr"
          rid="r15">2018: 117</xref>) showed that party salience on immigration in 2010 was lower in
        CEE than in Western and Southern Europe. However, the migration crisis narrative allowed
        some CEE political actors to present themselves as protectors of their nations against
        migration from the East and centralisation from Brussels, while they were trying to take a
        firmer grip on the national judiciary and media (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r40">Vachudova,
          2020</xref>).</p>

      <p>Largely due to their ideological entrepreneurship and Brussels’ initiatives and responses,
        several topics of the previous decade have been often presented as insurmountable
        differences between Western and Eastern Europe. Orbán (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r25"
          >2020</xref>) summed this up in a speech, as he inaugurated a monument commemorating the
        Treaty of Trianon (see <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r27">Petrović, 2019</xref>):</p>

      <disp-quote>
        <p><italic>“Western Europe has renounced … the spiritual energy of national culture. In
            other words, it has renounced Christian Europe. In place of this it is experimenting
            with a godless universe, with the rainbow reshaping of families, with migration and with
            open societies”.</italic></p>
      </disp-quote>

      <p>Four key elements of such CEE Eurosceptic narratives of the 2010s can be singled out.
        First, an emphasis on national interests instead of EU supranationalism, to the point of
        talking about a return to greater national sovereignty. Second, a refusal to make CEE
        countries immigrant and multicultural societies as happened in Western Europe.<xref
          ref-type="fn" rid="f3"><sup>3</sup></xref> Third, the emphasis on the Christian character
        of both CEE nations and Europe as a whole, exemplified in the expression “Christian Europe”
        often used by Orbán. Fourth, strong historical narratives of national pride and Western
        betrayal, exemplified particularly by Orbán’s insistence on the historical role of Hungary
        as a Christian bulwark and evocation of the Trianon trauma.</p>

      <p>In their pursuit of general explanations of public support for European integration, Hobolt
        and de Vries (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r14">2016</xref>) found three main ones: (1)
        utilitarian approach (focusing on the benefits of European integration, with those more
        well-off and more educated showing higher support for the EU), (2) identity approach
        (focusing on issues of national identity and national pride, with those more attached to
        their nations and more proud of their nations being more Eurosceptic) and (3) cue-taking
        approach (focusing on cues or proxies, such as political parties which help citizens form
        their opinion). The utilitarian aspect has not been central in the post-2015 Eurosceptic
        narratives in CEE, but we test it for each country. Aspects of <italic>national
          identity</italic>, however, have been prominent in those narratives; thus, we explore
        their effects on attitudes towards the EU. The third, cue-taking approach, informs our very
        research question: we inquire whether, prior to the onset of the CEE–Brussels rift, themes
        at the centre of the rift had any influence on the public opinion towards EU
        supranationalism (i.e., transferring sovereignty to EU institutions, see <xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r8">Díez Medrano, 2020</xref>). If the answer is yes, that means that
        the cues the Eurosceptic political parties and figures pushed already had some support “from
        below”.</p>

      <p>As a precursory note, we point out that Eurosceptic CEE themes that have emerged after 2015
        are not necessarily region-specific, as the whole of the EU can be understood as being
        transformed by a new transnational cleavage. The focal point of this cleavage is “the
        defence of national political, social, and economic ways of life against external actors who
        penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule” (<xref ref-type="bibr"
          rid="r15">Hooghe and Marks, 2018: 2</xref>). The definition broadly articulates the
        concept of <italic>sovereignism</italic>, whose influence on stances towards EU
        supranationalism is another relationship we investigate. In contrast to Western Europe, the
        transnational cleavage in CEE is more recent and can be analysed more clearly after the end
        of the accession process. However, transnational-national cleavage was more politicised in
        some of the analysed CEE countries than in others. In Croatia and Baltic countries, this
        cleavage was and still is moderated by what the majority of the elites see as the
        geopolitical necessity of joining and belonging to the West, i.e., the EU, and escaping from
        Serbian or Russian dominance. Czech politics were shaped by a socioeconomic cleavage (<xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r13">Hloušek and Kopeček, 2008</xref>). Until quite recently “the EU
        has not been an important issue of the inter‑party competition line/cleavage in Slovenia”
          (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r20">Krašovec and Batrićević, 2020</xref>). On the other hand,
        Hungary stood out with a cleavage between more transnationally oriented liberals and
        socialists and more nationally oriented conservatives, drawing on a historical cleavage
        between traditionalists and Westernisers (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r22">Márkus,
          1999</xref>). Consequently, it is not surprising that Orbán was again at the forefront of
        the rise of transnational-national cleavage, for instance in his 2011 European Parliament
        speech he “steadily emphasised that he was firmly resolved to defend the ‘Hungarian national
        interest’ at all times” (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r1">Arató and Koller, 2018:
        91</xref>).</p>
      <p>Next, we examine the closely connected concept of <italic>nationalism </italic>and its two
        most explored expressions: ethnic and civic (see <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r34">Shulman,
          2002</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r17">Janmaat 2006</xref>). The types of
        nationalism are measured with multiple items, which often form separate dimensions. Reeskens
        and Hooghe used the national identity ISSP module data grouped together and confirmed
        dichotomous ethnic-civic structure (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r30">2010</xref>). However,
        they also used it in various national contexts and concluded that ethnic and civic
        nationalism “are not being measured cross-nationally equivalent across nations” (<xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r30">2010: 593</xref>). Our analysis of CEE Member States confirmed
        this because, in some countries, the factor analysis produced different factor structures.
        Most notably, and highly indicative for other results that will be presented later, in
        Croatia there was only one factor containing variables representing both the ethnic and
        civic dimensions of identity. In the Croatian case, this could indicate a lack of
        differentiation regarding types of national identity, which could be the result of strong
        national cohesion forged by the Croatian War of Independence in the 1990s and its
        consequences. In Hungary, respect for Hungarian political institutions and laws belonged to
        quasi-ethnic citizenship, because Fidesz voters supported this statement more than left
        opposition voters, who were probably concerned about Fidesz’s state capture. Aspects of
        ethnic and civic nationalism are often interpreted by respondents according to national
        contexts and not exclusively as part of firm theoretical concepts. Therefore, in order to
        see how national contexts influence the support or resistance to EU supranationalism, we
        opted for single variables.</p>

      <p>We also inquire whether the topics related to the EU accession process had influenced
        citizens’ attitudes towards EU supranationalism. The topic of <italic>protectionism</italic> i.e., the idea
        of protecting the national economy, marked the accession process. It encompassed an
        unfavourable trade balance for CEE countries and securing a transition period during which
        EU citizens would not be able to buy agricultural land in CEE countries (<xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r39">Vachudova, 2005</xref>). CEE EU Member States were also shaped
        by different trajectories when joining the EU. All of the analysed countries joined the EU
        in 2004, except Croatia. However, there were considerable differences even within this
        group. Lithuania and Latvia had more protracted negotiations “as they did not satisfy the
        Copenhagen economic criteria” (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r39">Vachudova, 2005: 158</xref>).
        Croatia had a unique journey to Europe compared to other CEE member states (<xref
          ref-type="bibr" rid="r26">Pauković and Raos, 2015</xref>). It joined the EU in 2013 after
        a long and difficult process, during which its accession was conditioned by full cooperation
        with the Hague war crimes tribunal. This eventually shook the foundations of Croatian
        European identity. In 2011, the Hague tribunal issued a first-instance verdict, sentencing
        Ante Gotovina, who was considered a national war hero, to a long-term prison sentence. At
        that point, trends reversed and opinion polls immediately showed that the majority of Croats
        would vote against EU membership (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r2">Bago, 2011</xref>).</p>
    </sec>
    
    <sec>
      <title>3. AIMS AND HYPOTHESES</title>
      <p>This paper aims to investigate to what extent topics related to the transnational cleavage
        and CEE Eurosceptic narratives after the migration crisis determined the attitudes of
        citizens of Central and Eastern European countries towards EU supranationalism before the
        crisis. Our main hypothesis (H0) is that no topics imposed by Eurosceptic political elites
        after 2015 were important for citizens’ attitudes just before the onset of the crisis. Based
        on theoretical and empirical insights, several additional hypotheses were formulated. If
        support for themes related to the cleavage and Eurosceptic narratives existed among
        citizens, resisting the European Union should correlate positively with the following:
      
        <list list-type="bullet">
          <list-item>
            <p>H1: ethnic aspects of national identity</p>
          </list-item>
          <list-item>
            <p>H2: nationalism</p>
          </list-item>
          <list-item>
            <p>H3: pride in national history</p>
          </list-item>
          <list-item>
            <p>H4: protectionism</p>
          </list-item>
          <list-item>
            <p>H5: sovereignism </p>
          </list-item>
          <list-item>
            <p>H6: anti-immigrant attitudes</p>
          </list-item>
        </list>
      </p>
    </sec>
    
    <sec sec-type="methods">
      <title>4. DATA AND METHODS</title>
      <p>The data used in the analysis are from the National Identity III module of the 2013 ISSP
        dataset (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r16">ISSP, 2015</xref>). The sample comprised the
        citizens of investigated CEE countries. The countries are the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia
        (EE), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LIT), Latvia (LV), Slovenia (SI).<xref
          ref-type="fn" rid="f4"><sup>4</sup></xref> Data were weighted with the supplied dataset
        weight (‘WEIGHT’). Due to different sampling techniques in different countries, a weighing
        variable had to be used in order to correct sampling bias.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f5"
            ><sup>5</sup></xref> Sample sizes were as follows (for additional data on survey
        methodology and samples see <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r19">Joye and Sapin,
        2016</xref>):</p>
      
      <table-wrap position="anchor" id="t1">
        <label>Table 1.</label>
        <caption>
          <title>Sample sizes in researched countries.</title>
        </caption>
        <table border="1" frame="box" width="60%">
          <thead style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
            <tr>
              <th></th>
              <th><bold>CZ</bold></th>
              <th><bold>EE</bold></th>
              <th><bold>HR</bold></th>
              <th><bold>HU</bold></th>
              <th><bold>LIT</bold></th>
              <th><bold>LV</bold></th>
              <th><bold>SI</bold></th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody align="center" valign="middle">
            <tr>
              <th><bold>N<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f6"><sup>6</sup></xref></bold></th>
              <td>1909</td>
              <td>1009</td>
              <td>1000</td>
              <td>1007</td>
              <td>1194</td>
              <td>1000</td>
              <td>1010</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </table-wrap>
          
      <sec>
        <title>4.1. Survey measures</title>
        <p>The chosen ISSP module contains several variables pertaining to attitudes towards the EU.
          We chose a single dependent variable that best represents “resistance to Brussels’
          decisions”. Question 18 provided the best wording of such a sentiment, albeit in the
          direction opposite to resistance: <italic>[COUNTRY] should follow [European Union]
            decisions, even if it does not agree with them</italic>. The scale ranged from 1 (agree
          strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly).</p>
        <p>As for independent variables, we used two sets: sociodemographic ones and variables
          measuring respondents’ identification and attitudes. Notably, we opted for single
          variables as representatives of relevant concepts instead of scales due to the thematic
          accents we wanted to investigate. Sociodemographic variables were: sex, age, highest
          completed education level, attendance of religious services, top-bottom
            self-placement<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f7"><sup>7</sup></xref>, voting in previous
          elections and urban vs. rural residence. Other explanatory variables were derived from the
          additional hypotheses.</p>
        <p>The first couple of variables straightforwardly measure identification with a country and
          Europe: (1) <italic>How close do you feel to your country?</italic> (2) <italic>How close
            do you feel to Europe?</italic></p>
        <p>Four variables representing different aspects of <italic>How important for being truly</italic>
          (NATIONALITY) <italic>is</italic> were chosen. For civic nationalism, we selected: (1) <italic>To have (country
          nationality) citizenship</italic>; (2) <italic>To respect (country nationality) political institutions and
          laws</italic>. For ethnic nationalism, we selected: (1) <italic>To have (country nationality) ancestry</italic>; (2)
          <italic>To be a (country dominate)<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f8"><sup>8</sup></xref> religion</italic>. The last question was also a proxy for the issue of
          Christian Europe.</p>
        <p>From aspects of national pride, we choose two variables: (1) the question <italic>How
            proud are you of [COUNTRY]’s history?</italic> is a proxy for the issue of historical
          narratives emphasising glorious national past; (2) the question <italic>How proud are you
            of [COUNTRY]’s social security system?</italic> indirectly measures aspects of material
          well-being.</p>
        <p>Attitudes toward immigration are measured by the following: 1) <italic>Immigrants are
          generally good for [COUNTRY’S] economy</italic>; (2) <italic>Immigrants take jobs away from
          people who were born in [COUNTRY]</italic>; (3) <italic>Immigrants improve [COUNTRY’S NA-
          TIONALITY] society by bringing new ideas and cultures</italic> (4) <italic>[COUNTRY’s] culture
          is generally undermined by immigrants</italic>.</p>
        <p>Nationalism is measured by the statement similar to the classical nationalist
          expression of “My country, right or wrong”: (1) <italic>People should support their country
          even if the country is in the wrong</italic>; and (2) <italic>The world would be a better place if
          [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] acknowledged [COUNTRY’s] shortcomings</italic>.</p>
        <p>Attitudes towards sovereignism are measured by the following statements: (1)
          <italic>In general, (COUNTRY) should follow its own interests, even if this leads to con-
          flicts</italic>; (2) <italic>International organisations are taking away too much power from the
          [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] government</italic>.</p>
        <p>We also included two variables related to protectionism. A proxy for the problem
          of unfavourable trade balance is the statement: <italic>[COUNTRY] should limit the import
          of foreign products in order to protect its national economy</italic>. For the limiting of EU
          citizens’ right to buy agricultural land in CEE Member States, we included the state-
          ment: <italic>Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY]</italic>.</p>
        <p>Regarding scales, variables related to identification were measured on a scale
          from 1 to 4 (1 – very close\very important; 4 – not close at all\ not important at all),
          while variables measuring attitudes have a scale from 1 to 5 (1 – agree strongly;
          5 – disagree strongly)<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f9"><sup>9</sup></xref>.</p>
      </sec>
    
      <sec>
        <title>4.2. Analysis</title>
        <p>The analysis was conducted by means of univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical
          procedures. Univariate procedures were used to show distributions of answers on specific
          questions, means and standard deviations. Bivariate analyses (analysis of variance,
          t-tests) served the purpose of testing differences between countries<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f10"><sup>10</sup></xref>. Multivariate
          analysis entailed linear regression analysis, which was used to test the hypothesised
          model of a transnational cleavage predicting atti- tudes towards the EU. Statistical
          analysis was performed in SPSS (version 26).</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    
    <sec sec-type="results">
      <title>5. RESULTS</title>
      
      <sec>
        <title>5.1. Differences in support for EU supranationalism in CEE Member States and by
          voters of the most significant political parties</title>
        <p>CEE Member States considerably differed in terms of support for EU supranationalism.
            <xref ref-type="table" rid="t2">Table 2</xref> presents frequency distributions of
          attitudes towards the idea that their country should follow EU decisions, even if it does
          not agree with them. Data shows that, in most of the analysed countries, nearly a double
          percentage of respondents disagree (categories 4 and 5) compared to those who agree
          (categories 1 and 2) with the mentioned idea. The exceptions are Slovenia and Hungary. In
          Slovenia, equal numbers agree and disagree with this idea. In Hungary, twice as many
          respondents agree than disagree. The mean values show that Hungarians are the most
          permissive towards this idea, while Slovenes are neutral. Respondents from all other
          countries achieve values below the theoretical scale mean. Latvians and Czechs are the
          most critical of the idea, Croats are slightly less critical than them, and Lithuanians
          and Estonians are slightly less critical than Croats.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f11"
              ><sup>11</sup></xref> Czechs had been under the influence of pronounced Euroscepticism
          by their former prime-minister and president Václav Klaus for almost two decades at the
          time when the survey was conducted (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r12">Havlík, Hloušek and
            Kaniok, 2017</xref>). In Latvia, the EU conditionality regarding the protection of the
          rights of the Russian-speaking minority challenged the Latvian nation-building process,
          which was based on the domination of ethnic Latvians. This tension was more pronounced in
          Latvia than in Estonia, which went through a very similar process (<xref ref-type="bibr"
            rid="r32">Schulze, 2018</xref>). The question of following EU decisions in the Latvian
          and Estonian cases most probably refers to the Russian minority question, as Baltic
          Russian respondents agreed to a greater extent than ethnic Estonian or Latvian respondents
          that Latvia or Estonia should follow EU decisions, even if it disagrees with them. On
          other questions related to EU issues (benefits from being a member of the EU, leaving the
          EU) Baltic Russian respondents were more Eurosceptic than ethnic Estonian or Latvian
            respondents.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f12"><sup>12</sup></xref></p>

        <p>Díez Medrano (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r8">2020: 74</xref>) showed that the average for
          all EU Member States participating in this ISSP module is 31% of respondents who “agree or
          strongly agree that the country should abide by EU decisions even when their own country
          disagrees”, therefore only Hungary and Slovenia had an above-average share of
          “supranationalists”. These results are surprising only from the perspective of Hungary’s
          and Slovenia’s ruling parties challenging supranationalism and democratic norms in the
          beginning of 2020s. Hungary and Slovenia have been the frontrunners of the EU accession
          process since the late 1990s.</p>

        <table-wrap position="anchor" id="t2">
          <label>Table 2.</label>
          <caption>
            <title>(Country) should follow EU decisions, even if it does not agree with them</title>
          </caption>
          <table border="1" frame="hsides" width="80%">
            <thead style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <th>(in %)</th>
                <th>HR</th>
                <th>CZ</th>
                <th>EE</th>
                <th>HU</th>
                <th>LV</th>
                <th>LIT</th>
                <th>SI</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr style="border-bottom: solid">
                <td align="left">1 - Agree strongly</td>
                <td>4.3</td>
                <td>3.5</td>
                <td>8.8</td>
                <td>6.8</td>
                <td>1.8</td>
                <td>1.2</td>
                <td>2.9</td>
              </tr>
              <tr style="border-bottom: solid">
                <td align="left">2 - Agree</td>
                <td>19.7</td>
                <td>17.6</td>
                <td>19.0</td>
                <td>32.1</td>
                <td>17.4</td>
                <td>22.1</td>
                <td>32.0</td>
              </tr>
              <tr style="border-bottom: solid">
                <td align="left">3 - Neither agree nor disagree</td>
                <td>25.6</td>
                <td>29.6</td>
                <td>29.8</td>
                <td>39.7</td>
                <td>26.1</td>
                <td>34.8</td>
                <td>27.9</td>
              </tr>
              <tr style="border-bottom: solid">
                <td align="left">4 - Disagree</td>
                <td>35.4</td>
                <td>30.2</td>
                <td>26.8</td>
                <td>14.4</td>
                <td>38.6</td>
                <td>36.2</td>
                <td>31.3</td>
              </tr>
              <tr style="border-bottom: solid">
                <td align="left">5 - Strongly disagree</td>
                <td>15.0</td>
                <td>19.2</td>
                <td>15.7</td>
                <td>7.1</td>
                <td>16.1</td>
                <td>5.8</td>
                <td>5.9</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>
                  <p>M</p>
                </td>
                <td>3.37</td>
                <td>3.44</td>
                <td>3.22</td>
                <td>2.83</td>
                <td>3.50</td>
                <td>3.23</td>
                <td>3.05</td>
              </tr>
              <tr style="border-bottom: solid">
                <td>(SD)</td>
                <td>(1.09)</td>
                <td>(1.09)</td>
                <td>(1.18)</td>
                <td>(.996)</td>
                <td>(1.01)</td>
                <td>(.899)</td>
                <td>(.992)</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">F*</td>
                <td colspan="7">49.877***</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Post Hoc</td>
                <td colspan="7"><bold>HR</bold>≠ HU, LIT, SI ;<bold>CZ</bold>≠ EE, HU, LIT, SI
                    ;<bold>EE</bold>≠ CZ, HU, LV,SI ;<bold>HU</bold>≠ HR, CZ, EE, LV, LIT, SI
                    ;<bold>LV</bold>≠ EE, HU, LIT, SI ;<bold>LT</bold>≠ HR, CZ, HU, LV, SI
                    ;<bold>SI</bold>≠ HR, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LIT</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
            
        <p>Despite the rise of right-wing Euroscepticism in the region, the comparison of support
          for leaving the EU in 2013 with more recent surveys reveals that the percentage of those
          who support leaving the EU was reduced in all the countries (<xref ref-type="table"
            rid="t3">Table 3</xref>). The contours of country differences in levels of support have
          remained, however. Czechs are still the most inclined to support leaving the EU and are
          likewise the least enthusiastic about remaining in it. Conversely, Lithuanians remained
          the most supportive of their country’s EU membership. Hungary, as the country that has
          been at the forefront of conflicts with the EU, has not demonstrated a trend towards lower
          or simply low popular support for its membership. This trend was probably also influenced
          by a bounce-back from post-economic-crisis dissatisfaction with the EU and the Brexit
          vote, which made the option of leaving the EU less attractive all over the continent (see
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r7">De Vries, 2017</xref>). In the Baltic countries, the
          Russo-Ukrainian War could have also played a part in lowering the levels of hard
          Euroscepticism.</p>

        <table-wrap position="anchor" id="t3">
          <label>Table 3.</label>
          <caption>
            <title>Leaving vs. remaining in the EU as compared between ISSP 2013 and Spring
              Eurobarometer 2019</title>
          </caption>
          <table border="1" frame="hsides" width="80%">
            <thead style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="4">ISSP 2013</th>
                <th colspan="4">Spring Eurobarometer 2019</th>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="2">Leave</th>
                <th colspan="2">Remain</th>
                <th colspan="2">Leave</th>
                <th colspan="2">Remain</th>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th>f</th>
                <th>%</th>
                <th>f</th>
                <th>%</th>
                <th>f</th>
                <th>%</th>
                <th>f</th>
                <th>%</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <td>CZ</td>
                <td>892</td>
                <td>46.7</td>
                <td>735</td>
                <td>38.5</td>
                <td>240</td>
                <td>23.7</td>
                <td>454</td>
                <td>44.9</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>EE</td>
                <td>289</td>
                <td>28.6</td>
                <td>588</td>
                <td>58.2</td>
                <td>97</td>
                <td>9.6</td>
                <td>715</td>
                <td>70.7</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>HR</td>
                <td>329</td>
                <td>32.9</td>
                <td>487</td>
                <td>48.7</td>
                <td>168</td>
                <td>16.7</td>
                <td>517</td>
                <td>51.3</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>HU</td>
                <td>173</td>
                <td>17.2</td>
                <td>558</td>
                <td>55.5</td>
                <td>157</td>
                <td>14.8</td>
                <td>669</td>
                <td>63.1</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>LIT</td>
                <td>132</td>
                <td>11.1</td>
                <td>762</td>
                <td>63.8</td>
                <td>91</td>
                <td>9.1</td>
                <td>702</td>
                <td>70.2</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>LV</td>
                <td>394</td>
                <td>39.4</td>
                <td>432</td>
                <td>43.2</td>
                <td>143</td>
                <td>14.2</td>
                <td>612</td>
                <td>60.9</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>SI</td>
                <td>258</td>
                <td>25.5</td>
                <td>485</td>
                <td>48.0</td>
                <td>139</td>
                <td>13.5</td>
                <td>728</td>
                <td>70.5</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
            
        <p>We will now illustrate instances of possible cue-taking in some countries i.e., whether
          voters have similar opinions towards the EU as the parties they voted for in the last
          election. <xref ref-type="table" rid="t4">Table 4</xref> presents the most relevant
          parties at the time this ISSP module was conducted<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f13"
              ><sup>13</sup></xref>. Along with the mean country results and standard deviations, we
          also show the scores of voters of specific parties, as well as the parties’ general
          positions towards the EU<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f14"><sup>14</sup></xref>. In Croatia and
          Hungary, the situation was quite clear, as centre-left parties, as well as their voters,
          were more favourable towards the EU than centre-right parties and their voters. In the
          Czech case, on the other hand, leftist party voters were more Eurosceptic. In general, the
          numbers show a higher political elite preference<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f15"
              ><sup>15</sup></xref> towards the European project as the position of most of the
          listed parties towards the EU was a supportive one. A notable exception to this was
          Fidesz, which became the vanguard of ruling CEE Euroscepticism.</p>

        <table-wrap position="anchor" id="t4">
          <label>Table 4.</label>
          <caption>
            <title>Comparison between party voters’ attitudes towards following the decisions of the
              EU and the parties’ general positions regarding the EU (N &gt; 100)</title>
          </caption>
          <table border="1" frame="hsides" width="80%">
            <thead style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <th>Country</th>
                <th>Country <break></break>M (SD)</th>
                <th>Party</th>
                <th>Party voters’<break></break> M (SD)<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f101"><sup>1</sup></xref></th>
                <th>Diff.</th>
                <th>N</th>
                <th>Party <break></break>EU_position<break></break> (2014)<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f102"><sup>2</sup></xref> </th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <td rowspan="4">CZ</td>
                <td rowspan="4">3.44 <break></break>(1.091)</td>
                <td>ČSSD</td>
                <td>3.47 (1.091)</td>
                <td rowspan="4">ČSSD ≠ KSČM <break></break>ČSSD ≠ TOP 09 <break></break>KSČM ≠ TOP 09<break></break>KSČM ≠ ANO</td>
                <td>326</td>
                <td>6.07</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>ANO</td>
                <td>3.39 (1.051)</td>
                <td>262</td>
                <td>5.20</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>KSČM</td>
                <td>3.81 (1.062)</td>
                <td>153</td>
                <td>2.73</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>TOP 09</td>
                <td>3.10 (1.029)</td>
                <td>104</td>
                <td>6.67</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td rowspan="3">EE</td>
                <td rowspan="3">3.22<break></break>(1.179)</td>
                <td>ER</td>
                <td>3.42 (0.992)</td>
                <td rowspan="3">-</td>
                <td>113</td>
                <td>6.88</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>EK</td>
                <td>3.06 (1.299)</td>
                <td>111</td>
                <td>5.00</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>IRL</td>
                <td>3.27 (1.051)</td>
                <td>113</td>
                <td>6.50</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td rowspan="2">HR</td>
                <td rowspan="2">3.37<break/>(1.089)</td>
                <td>SDP</td>
                <td>3.09 (1.145)</td>
                <td rowspan="2">SDP ≠ HDZ</td>
                <td>143</td>
                <td>6.56</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>HDZ</td>
                <td>3.56 (1.047)</td>
                <td>133</td>
                <td>6.22</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td rowspan="2">HU</td>
                <td rowspan="2">2.83<break></break>(0.996)</td>
                <td>Fidesz-KNDP</td>
                <td>2.88 (0.962)</td>
                <td rowspan="2">Fidesz-KNDP ≠MSZP</td>
                <td>317</td>
                <td>2.71</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>MSZP</td>
                <td>2.30 (0.918)</td>
                <td>113</td>
                <td>6.07</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td rowspan="2">LIT</td>
                <td rowspan="2">3.23 <break></break>(0.899)</td>
                <td>LSDP</td>
                <td>3.20 (0.860)</td>
                <td rowspan="2">-</td>
                <td>185</td>
                <td>6.60</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>DP</td>
                <td>3.19 (0.948)</td>
                <td>133</td>
                <td>5.13</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td rowspan="2">LV</td>
                <td rowspan="2">3.50 <break></break>(1.014)</td>
                <td>Unity</td>
                <td>3.55 (1.014)</td>
                <td rowspan="2">-</td>
                <td>109</td>
                <td>6.80</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Harmony</td>
                <td>3.41 (1.091)</td>
                <td>104</td>
                <td>6.86</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td rowspan="2">SI</td>
                <td rowspan="2">3.05 <break></break>(0.992)</td>
                <td>SD</td>
                <td>2.85 (1.011)</td>
                <td rowspan="2">-</td>
                <td>111</td>
                <td>5.85</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>SDS</td>
                <td>2.96 (0.942)</td>
                <td>109</td>
                <td>6.38</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
          <table-wrap-foot>
            <fn-group>
              <fn id="f101">
                <p>Country should follow EU decisions. Scale: 1 – agree strongly, 5 – disagree strongly.</p></fn>
              <fn id="f102"><p>Party EU position scale: 1 = least favourable towards the EU, 7 = most favourable towards the EU</p></fn>
            </fn-group>
          </table-wrap-foot>
        </table-wrap>
            
        <p>There are also some interesting discrepancies between certain parties and their voters.
          The dominant pattern is that of voters being more Eurosceptical than their parties. In the
          Czech case, we thus see that social-democrat ČSSD voters were moderately sceptical towards
          following the decisions of the EU, even though their party was judged to be markedly
          pro-EU. The very same conclusion applies to the liberal Eesti Reformierakond party (ER) in
          Estonia and its voters, the Christian Democrat HDZ party in Croatia and the
          liberal-conservative Unity party in Latvia. ER had elements of soft Euroscepticism during
          the 1990s, which it later abandoned (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r28">Ploom and Veebel,
            2017</xref>). HDZ transformed itself, during the 2000s, from an internationally isolated
          nationalistic party of the late 1990s to a pro-European party with strong backing from the
          European People’s Party.</p>

        <p>A notable departure from this pattern can be observed in Hungary, where voters of Viktor
          Orbán’s Eurosceptic and conservative Fidesz party, on average, showed a much more
          favourable attitude towards following EU decisions than the party. Fidesz was originally a
          pro-EU party, became engaged in soft ‘national-interest’ Euroscepticism at the beginning
          of the 2000s and made an explicit turn towards Euroscepticism in 2010 (<xref
            ref-type="bibr" rid="r37">Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001: 18</xref>; <xref
              ref-type="bibr" rid="r6">Csehi and Zgut, 2021: 63</xref>). This indicates that, in
          these, cases voters were rather slow in taking cues on the EU from the parties they
          supported. These results corroborate Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (<xref ref-type="bibr"
            rid="r38">2004</xref>) conclusion that, in some CEE candidate countries, the level of
          party-based Euroscepticism did not correlate to levels of popular Euroscepticism (they
          showed that Hungary had low public Euroscepticism, but high party-based Euroscepticism).
          Croatia, as these results also indicate, was an opposite case. The comparison of results
          in Hungary and Croatia also indicates the difference between the two countries mentioned
          in the theoretical-conceptual framework. Although in both countries a transnational
          cleavage between the voters of the two main parties could be discerned, only in Hungary
          does this cleavage seem to be clearly politicised.</p>
      </sec>
      
      <sec>
        <title>Respondents’ identities and attitudes towards their nation and Europe</title>
        <p>The mean values of variables we explore as predictors of the attitude towards EU
          supranationalism are shown in <xref ref-type="table" rid="t5">Table 5</xref> and are
          presented in detail in the online Supplement. When looking at absolute values as they
          relate to the theoretical scale mean, we can infer that citizens tend to feel closer to
          their countries than towards Europe in all of the cases. The difference is least
          pronounced in Central European states (Hungary and the Czech Republic), but is
          particularly pronounced in the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and, to a lesser degree,
          Lithuania, as well as in the former Yugoslav states Croatia and Slovenia, which also show
          a notable discrepancy. Czechs and Hungarians also profess noticeably higher closeness to
          Europe than others do.</p>

        <p>The four variables pertaining to two dimensions of nationalism, in general, reveal a
          higher preference for aspects of civic identity, rather than ethnic ones. Having country
          citizenship and respecting political institutions and laws tends to be deemed more
          important for being a true national than belonging to the dominant religion or having
          dominant ethnic group ancestry.</p>

        <table-wrap position="anchor" id="t5">
          <label>Table 5.</label>
          <caption>
            <title>Aspects of identification and attitudes toward nationalism, protectionism,
              sovereignism and immigrants (M)</title>
          </caption>
          <table border="1" frame="hsides" width="80%">
            <thead style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th>HR</th>
                <th>CZ</th>
                <th>EE</th>
                <th>HU</th>
                <th>LV</th>
                <th>LIT</th>
                <th>SI</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Closeness to country (1–4)</td>
                <td>1.82</td>
                <td>1.66</td>
                <td>1.68</td>
                <td>1.61</td>
                <td>1.89</td>
                <td>1.96</td>
                <td>1.89</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Closeness to Europe (1–4)</td>
                <td>2.74</td>
                <td>1.97</td>
                <td>2.68</td>
                <td>1.81</td>
                <td>2.97</td>
                <td>2.58</td>
                <td>2.51</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of citizenship for true (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td>1.83</td>
                <td>1.51</td>
                <td>1.91</td>
                <td>1.65</td>
                <td>1.90</td>
                <td>1.71</td>
                <td>1.91</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of respecting political institutions and laws for true
                  (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td>2.00</td>
                <td>1.84</td>
                <td>1.67</td>
                <td>1.84</td>
                <td>1.72</td>
                <td>1.99</td>
                <td>1.88</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of belonging to (COUNTRY DOMINATE) religion for true (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td>2.30</td>
                <td>3.05</td>
                <td>3.39</td>
                <td>2.57</td>
                <td>3.08</td>
                <td>2.36</td>
                <td>3.22</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of having (COUNTRY NATIONALITY) ancestry for being
                  truly (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td>2.12</td>
                <td>2.02</td>
                <td>2.62</td>
                <td>1.75</td>
                <td>2.33</td>
                <td>2.01</td>
                <td>2.58</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Supporting country even if wrong (1–5)</td>
                <td>2.99</td>
                <td>2.63</td>
                <td>2.77</td>
                <td>2.48</td>
                <td>3.21</td>
                <td>2.77</td>
                <td>3.00</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Acknowledging (COUNTRY’S) shortcomings (1–5)</td>
                <td>2.41</td>
                <td>2.41</td>
                <td>2.22</td>
                <td>2.48</td>
                <td>2.74</td>
                <td>2.61</td>
                <td>2.35</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Pride in country’s social security system (1–5)</td>
                <td>3.02</td>
                <td>2.99</td>
                <td>3.34</td>
                <td>2.80</td>
                <td>3.34</td>
                <td>3.01</td>
                <td>2.91</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Pride in country’s history (1–5)</td>
                <td>1.79</td>
                <td>1.70</td>
                <td>2.21</td>
                <td>1.93</td>
                <td>2.33</td>
                <td>1.91</td>
                <td>2.00</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Limiting foreign products (1–5)</td>
                <td>1.86</td>
                <td>2.51</td>
                <td>2.99</td>
                <td>2.28</td>
                <td>2.09</td>
                <td>2.82</td>
                <td>2.39</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Opposition to foreign land ownership (1–5)</td>
                <td>2.81</td>
                <td>2.31</td>
                <td>2.88</td>
                <td>1.94</td>
                <td>2.10</td>
                <td>2.45</td>
                <td>3.04</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Following national interests, even if it leads to conflicts (1–5)</td>
                <td>2.56</td>
                <td>2.53</td>
                <td>2.63</td>
                <td>2.62</td>
                <td>2.42</td>
                <td>2.88</td>
                <td>2.44</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">International organisations taking too much power from national
                  government (1–5)</td>
                <td>2.58</td>
                <td>2.26</td>
                <td>2.44</td>
                <td>2.56</td>
                <td>2.27</td>
                <td>2.67</td>
                <td>2.62</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants generally good for national economy (1–5)</td>
                <td>3.37</td>
                <td>3.48</td>
                <td>3.12</td>
                <td>3.34</td>
                <td>3.19</td>
                <td>3.18</td>
                <td>2.85</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants taking jobs away (1–5)</td>
                <td>2.65</td>
                <td>2.11</td>
                <td>2.91</td>
                <td>2.47</td>
                <td>2.49</td>
                <td>2.57</td>
                <td>2.90</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants improve society by bringing new ideas (1–5)</td>
                <td>3.15</td>
                <td>3.30</td>
                <td>3.39</td>
                <td>2.98</td>
                <td>2.90</td>
                <td>2.95</td>
                <td>2.92</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants undermining national culture (1–5)</td>
                <td>3.49</td>
                <td>2.93</td>
                <td>3.36</td>
                <td>3.16</td>
                <td>3.06</td>
                <td>3.19</td>
                <td>3.22</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
            
        <p>Religion, in particular, was shunned in the non-religious Czech Republic and Estonia, as
          expected, but surprisingly the same also happened in Slovenia and Latvia. Religious
          affiliation as a part of national identity is most important to respondents from Croatia
          and Lithuania, where Catholicism is the dominant religion and Catholic Church was an
          important protector of national identity during communism. Ancestry, on the other hand,
          was overall considered more important than religion, with Hungary standing out with a mean
          value close to those of the variables representing civic nationalism.</p>

        <p>On the whole, the two variables covering nationalism point to a mixed bag of results.
          Respondents in all countries are somewhat on the fence regarding supporting their own
          country even if it is wrong, but Czechs, Estonians, Hungarians and Lithuanians lean
          towards it more than the others. We cannot observe the same constellation with answers
          about acknowledging a country’s shortcomings, but this time around there is more
          inclination towards agreement with the hypothetical in all the countries.</p>

        <p>The results for the two explored aspects of national pride should be interpreted
          carefully. Pride in a country’s social security system may be tied to overall satisfaction
          with the quality of governance, which tends to be lower in CEE. Even if these countries
          still carry elements of a more socially oriented approach to services, this is not
          something they tend to, on average, highly link to national pride. On the flipside,
          respondents in all countries stated greater pride in national history, which was the
          highest in Croatia and the Czech Republic, and the lowest in Estonia.</p>

        <p>Regarding protectionism, the means point to rather stark differences between some
          countries. Estonians were the least protectionist on both variables, reflecting the
          neoliberal policies which have been pursued there since the 1990s. On the other hand,
          Croats heavily favoured limiting the import of foreign products, as even during the
          accession process “Buy Croatian” campaigns were led. The same goes for opposing foreign
          land ownership. Hungarians are, on average, distinctly inclined to oppose foreign land
          ownership, all the while Slovenians are much laxer about the prospect.</p>

        <p>With sovereignism, we default back to less pronounced country differences. In all of the
          countries, more respondents agree than disagree with following national interests even if
          they lead to conflict. Likewise, most are of the opinion that international organisations
          take too much power away from their own government.</p>

        <p>Finally, citizens of CEE states had a somewhat negative attitude towards immigrants as an
          economic threat even prior to the politicisation of migration. Only Slovenes slightly
          leaned towards thinking that immigrants might be good for their country’s economy, but
          were also slightly more in agreement than in disagreement with the idea that immigrants
          are taking jobs away. Even if attitudes towards immigrants were not exceptionally
          positive, it should be noted that the idea of some sort of a cultural danger was not
          supported at that time. Respondents were apprehensive about immigrants improving society
          by bringing new ideas and did express doubts about them undermining national culture, but
          the mean values do not show great deviation from the theoretical scale mean.</p>
      </sec>
      
      <sec>
        <title>5.3. Effects of sociodemographic characteristics, identities and attitudes of
          respondents on their attitude towards EU supranationalism</title>
        <p>We conducted regression analyses to determine whether the sociodemographic
          characteristics, identities and attitudes of respondents are related to positive or
          negative attitudes toward their country following the decisions of the EU even if it does
          not agree with them. The first regression model tested the effects of sociodemographic
          variables and the second one tested the effects of variables representing different
          aspects of respondents’ identification and attitudes.</p>

        <p>The results presented in <xref ref-type="table" rid="t6">Table 6</xref> show that the
          sociodemographic characteristics included in Model 1 explain 1.5–4.4% of the variance of
          the dependent variable in most of the analysed countries. However, in Croatia, none of the
          sociodemographic variables significantly affects the attitude of respondents on EU
          supranationalism. We assume that the reason for this lies in the fact that dominant public
          and political narratives presented EU accession as “Croatia's escape from the Balkans”
          i.e. as a necessary step, which during the long accession process lost its emotional
          dimension and resulted in euro-indifferentism (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r18"> Jović,
            2012</xref>).<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f16"><sup>16</sup></xref> In other countries,
          gender, age, socioeconomic status, place of residence (urban-rural) and frequency of
          attending religious services have been shown to influence respondents' attitudes about
          whether their country should follow EU decisions even if it does not agree with them. For
          example, in Slovenia, women and those who attend religious ceremonies more often are more
          likely to agree with EU supranationalism than men and those who attend religious
          ceremonies less often. In the Czech Republic, EU supranationalism is more supported by
          younger respondents, those who attend religious services more frequently, those who live
          in larger urban areas and those of higher socioeconomic status. In Latvia and Lithuania,
          EU supranationalism is also more supported by younger respondents and those who attend
          religious services more frequently. In addition, in Lithuania, EU supranationalism is more
          supported by those who “place themselves” in higher socioeconomic positions. In Estonia,
          EU supranationalism is more supported by respondents who live in larger settlements than
          those who live in smaller settlements. The model showed that the respondents from Hungary
          differ to some extent from the previous cases. Namely, in that country, EU
          supranationalism is more supported by those who attend religious services less often and
          those with a higher level of education. These differences regarding religion coincide with
          national political contexts.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f17"><sup>17</sup></xref> In Hungary,
          Socialist voters are less religious than Fidesz voters and more pro-EU.<xref ref-type="fn"
            rid="f18"><sup>18</sup></xref> Hungary showed consistent and reinforcing social
          divisions compared to other CEE countries, which became particularly visible during the
          early 2000s in conflicts between Fidesz and socialists over the definition of the
          Hungarian nation, in which socialists were deemed as traitors (<xref ref-type="bibr"
            rid="r10"> Gessler and Kyriazi, 2019</xref>). In Latvia, on the other hand, the Russian
          minority is on average more religious and more supportive of the EU imposing its decisions
          on the country.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f19"><sup>19</sup></xref> In the Czech Republic,
          Communist Party (KSČM) voters, as already mentioned, show a more critical attitude towards
          EU supranationalism and, on average, very rarely attend religious services while the
          opposite is true for Christian Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL) voters.<xref ref-type="fn"
            rid="f20"><sup>20</sup></xref></p>

        <table-wrap position="anchor" id="t6">
          <label>Table 6.</label>
          <caption>
            <title>Regression analysis – the effect of sociodemographic characteristics on attitude
              toward Country following EU decision (even if it does not agree with them)</title>
          </caption>
          <table border="1" frame="hsides" width="80%">
            <thead style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th>HR<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>CZ<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>EE<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>HU<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>LV<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>LIT<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>SI<break></break> Stand. β</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Sex of Respondent</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.031</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.013</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.005</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.001</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.012</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.029</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.122***</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Age of respondent</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.049</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.054*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.014</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.014</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.158***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.078*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.003</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Highest completed education level<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f21"><sup>21</sup></xref></td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.006</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.007</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.001</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.210**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.031</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.031</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.030</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Attendance of religious services</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.035</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.060*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.015</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.082*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.099*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.074*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.082*</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Top-bottom self-placement</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.044</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.139***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.060</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.044</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.023</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.148***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.058</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Did respondent vote in last general election</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.060</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.025</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.003</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.008</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.043</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.013</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.004</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Place of living: urban–rural</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.058</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.095***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.209***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.085*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.037</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.023</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.048</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.005</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.032</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.042</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.044</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.028</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.030</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.015</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">F</td>
                <td>1.509</td>
                <td>9.198</td>
                <td>5.50</td>
                <td>6.205</td>
                <td>3.966</td>
                <td>5.202</td>
                <td>2.716</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">p</td>
                <td>p&lt;.161</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">p&lt;.000</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">p&lt;.000</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">p&lt;.000</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">p&lt;.000</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">p&lt;.009</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
        

        <p>The results presented in <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="t7">Table 7</xref> show that
          predictors included in Model 2 explain a higher percentage of the variance of the
          dependent variable (between 8–22.4%) than predictors from Model 1. It can also be observed
          that variables representing respondents’ attitudes towards nationalism, protectionism,
          sovereignism and immigrants are more frequent predictors of the dependent variable than
          variables representing discussed deeper issues of contention between Eastern and Western
          Europe i.e., different aspects of respondents’ identification.</p>

        <table-wrap position="anchor" id="t7">
          <label>Table 7.</label>
          <caption>
            <title>Regression analysis – the effect of different aspects of identification and
              attitudes toward nationalism, protectionism, sovereignism and immigrants on attitude
              toward Country following EU decision (even if it does not agree with them)</title>
          </caption>
          <table border="1" frame="hsides" width="80%">
            <thead style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th>HR<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>CZ<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>EE<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>HU<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>LV<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>LIT<break></break> Stand. β</th>
                <th>SI<break></break> Stand. β</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody style="border-bottom: solid" align="center" valign="middle">
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Closeness to country (1–4)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.048</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.009</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.077</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.077</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.174***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.061</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.037</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Closeness to Europe (1–4)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.077*</td>
                <td>.016</td>
                <td>.176***</td>
                <td>.117**</td>
                <td>.100*</td>
                <td>.296***</td>
                <td>.034</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of citizenship for true (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.035</td>
                <td>-.036</td>
                <td>.066</td>
                <td>-.036</td>
                <td>-.083</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.030</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.016</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of respecting political institutions and laws for true
                  (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.025</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.003</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.078</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.058</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.059</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.035</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.093*</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of belonging to (COUNTRY DOMINATE) religion for true (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.077</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.028</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.093*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.030</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.022</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.080</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.134**</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Importance of having (COUNTRY NATIONALITY) ancestry for being
                  truly (NATIONALITY) (1–4)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.004</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.020</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.071</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.072</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.011</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.002</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.037</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Supporting country even if wrong (1–5)</td>
                <td>.153***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.075**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.021</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.076*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.010</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.037</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.054</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Acknowledging (COUNTRY’S) shortcomings (1–5)</td>
                <td>.018</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.066**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.079</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.103**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.019</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.028</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.022</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Pride in country’s social security system (1–5)</td>
                <td>.115**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.113***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.137**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.066</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.100*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.075</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.134***</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Pride in country’s history (1–5)</td>
                <td>-.059</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.061*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.019</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.044</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.084*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.026</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.098*</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Limiting foreign products (1–5)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.026</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.078**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.068</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.017</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.034</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.017</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.097*</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Opposition to foreign land ownership (1–5)</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.077*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.080**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.065</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.058</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.039</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.033</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.081</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Following national interests, even if it leads to conflicts (1–5)</td>
                <td>-.079*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.067*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.038</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.146***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.019</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.056</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.037</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">International organisations taking too much power from national
                  government (1–5)</td>
                <td>-.203***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.157***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.240***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.189***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.045</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.094*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.100*</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants generally good for national economy (1–5)</td>
                <td>.034</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.145***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.019</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.108*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.166***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.020</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.074</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants taking jobs away (1–5)</td>
                <td>.009</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.025</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.168***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.081*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.017</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.052</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.071</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants improve society by bringing new ideas (1–5)</td>
                <td>.110**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.106***</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.092</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.157*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.096**</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.111*</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.046</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Immigrants undermining national culture (1–5)</td>
                <td>-.039</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.005</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.088</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.015</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.001</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.010</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">-.004</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></td>
                <td>.142</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.178</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.215</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.224</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.088</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.135</td>
                <td rowspan="1" colspan="1" align="center">.080</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <p>F</p>
                </td>
                <td>
                  <p>8.052</p>
                </td>
                <td>
                  <p>18.599</p>
                </td>
                <td>
                  <p>7.041</p>
                </td>
                <td>
                  <p>12.016</p>
                </td>
                <td>
                  <p>4.646</p>
                </td>
                <td>
                  <p>6.210</p>
                </td>
                <td>
                  <p>3.955</p>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">P</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
                <td>p&lt;.000</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>

        <p>For example, only the variable that measures the feeling of closeness to Europe proves to
          be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable in most of the analysed
          countries. Those who feel closer to Europe are more willing to accept the idea that their
          country should follow EU decisions. Exceptions are the Czech Republic and Slovenia, where
          this is not the case. Furthermore, in Latvia, respondents who feel closer to their country
          are more inclined to reject the idea that their country should unquestioningly follow EU
          decisions. In addition, in Estonia and Slovenia, those for whom religious affiliation is a
          more important aspect of national identity are more supportive of EU supranationalism.
          Finally, in Slovenia, those who feel it is important to respect the country's political
          institutions and laws are also more supportive of EU supranationalism.</p>

        <p>On the other hand, as expected, attitudes towards sovereignism prove significant for
          accepting or rejecting EU supranationalism. In all countries except Latvia, respondents
          who feel that international organisations are taking too much power from nation-states do
          not support EU supranationalism. Similarly, in Croatia, the Czech Republic and Hungary,
          this idea is more likely to be rejected by respondents who believe that the country should
          pursue its interests even when it leads to conflict. Aspects of national pride have been
          significant predictors of the dependent variable in some countries. In most countries,
          with the exception of Hungary and Lithuania, respondents who are less proud of their
          country's social security system are also less supportive of EU supranationalism. This
          possibly reflects the fact that those less proud of their country's social security system
          are also less well off. In contrast, in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovenia,
          respondents who are prouder of their country's history are less supportive of EU
          supranationalism. Attitudes towards protectionism also proved to be statistically
          significant predictors in Croatia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Croats and Czechs who
          believe that foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in their countries are more
          likely to disagree with EU supranationalism, as are Czechs and Slovenes who believe that
          their governments should restrict imports of products from other countries to protect
          their economies. For most of these cases, possible explanations could be looked up in the
          structures of their economies and the dangers that part of the public sees in less
          protectionist economic policies and more Europeanised economies for future economic
          development. The Croatian economy is reliant on tourism dominated by private renters.
          Slovenia was able to protect numerous companies from foreign takeover during the
          transition to capitalism and the Czech Republic has the strongest industrial tradition in
          CEE.</p>

        <p>Attitudes related to nationalism are connected with dependent variables in Croatia, the
          Czech Republic and Hungary. Quite unexpectedly, it turns out that Croats and Czechs who
          believe that people should support their country even when it is wrong tend to accept the
          idea that their country should follow EU decisions even when it disagrees with them. A
          possible explanation could be discerned from the fact that HDZ voters have these
          characteristics. HDZ was responsible for cooperation with Hague, which resulted in EU
          accession, but also often espoused strong nationalistic and anti-Hague sentiments. At the
          same time, in Hungary, people who disagree with this claim are, as expectedly, more
          supportive of EU supranationalism. Similarly, Czechs and Hungarians who agree with the
          idea that the world would be a better place if the citizens of a country were aware of its
          shortcomings, are also more inclined to support EU supranationalism.</p>

        <p>Finally, attitudes towards immigrants are linked to support for EU supranationalism. In
          most countries, with the exception of Estonia and Slovenia, respondents who agree with the
          idea that immigrants can improve society by bringing new ideas and culture are also more
          willing to agree with EU supranationalism. In Latvia, on the other hand, those who are
          more pro-immigrant in terms of culture are less supportive of EU supranationalism.
          However, due to a low and positive zero-order correlation, we believe this to be a case of
          suppression. EU supranationalism is also more likely to be supported by those Czechs,
          Hungarians and Latvians who believe that the arrival of immigrants is generally good for
          the country’s economy.</p>

        <p>Interestingly, those Estonians who believe that immigrants take jobs from their fellow
          citizens are also inclined to support EU supranationalism. Ethnic Estonians mostly produce
          this unusual correlation as some of them probably equated pro-Europeanism with
          anti-Russian stances i.e., they saw the EU as an exit from Russian imperial ambitions and
          colonisation and still see the Russian minority as immigrants (on anti-immigrant
          foundations of Estonian nationalism, see <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r35">Smith, 2003</xref>). In addition, Estonian Russians are
          overall more concerned with immigrants taking jobs away and are more willing to accept EU
          decisions.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f22"><sup>22</sup></xref> This is most likely connected to their positive assessment of the EU
          conditioning Estonian accession with the protection of minority rights. In contrast,
          Hungarians who believe that immigrants take jobs from their fellow citizens tend to reject
          EU supranationalism. The claim that immigrants undermine the culture of the country of
          arrival has not proved to be significantly related to the dependent variable in any of the
          analysed countries. This could be related to the fact that the narratives which oppose the
          acceptance of immigrants on the basis of “defending the values of Christian Europe” have
          become prominent in public and political debates only after the start of the migration
          crisis.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    
    <sec sec-type="conclusions">
      <title>6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>Even though general explanations of the public support for the EU exist, our research
        showed that national contexts matter a great deal. Higher social status, higher education
        level and living in urban areas are associated with higher support for EU supranationalism
        confirming the utilitarian approach, but only in some of the analysed countries. The seven
        countries we analysed showed a non-negligible discrepancy between levels of support and
        between the predictors of support. Aside from country differences we also found perplexing
        relations between politics and the public. The Hungarian case perhaps best exemplifies the
        complexity of the issue. The citizens of the country that has been at the forefront of CEE
        conflicts with the EU have in fact shown the greatest support for following the decisions of
        Brussels. On the other hand, our regression model was most successful in Hungary i.e., it
        explained the highest share of variability. This is because, despite being generally pro-EU,
        questions of nationalism, sovereignism and immigration correlated with Hungarian
        respondents’ attitudes towards the EU even before the migrant crisis, probably reflecting an
        earlier emergence of transnational cleavage in Hungary. At the same time, questions of
        national identity, religion and history were not significant predictors. This points to the
        salience of broader sovereigntist sentiments in public opinion (as in most analysed
        countries), but also indicates that political elites can build on existing cleavages by
        further politicising them.</p>

      <p>When looking at national identity in other CEE countries, we found that neither the ethnic
        nor the civic aspects of national identity proved to be correlated with support for
        following EU decisions in most of the cases. We cannot espouse a similar conclusion
        concerning immigration since we observed that positively worded statements about immigration
        were in most cases positively correlated with support for following the decisions of
        Brussels. It is, however, worthy of mention that the statement about the cultural threat
        posed by immigration did not predict opposition to EU supranationalism. Furthermore, the
        data show that in all of the analysed countries public opinion was somewhat more concerned
        with negative economic consequences than with negative cultural consequences of migration.
        This was contrary to the emphasis political elites placed on the cultural threat during and
        after the migration crisis. This could add weight to the hypothesis of political elites
        constructing the narrative of the crisis.</p>

      <p>The question of CEE seeing itself as somehow truer to Christianity, which would oppose it
        to the West and the EU, did not have much grounding in 2013. In fact, this paper points to
        quite the opposite. In Slovenia and Estonia, seeing religion as part of national identity
        was positively correlated with support for the EU. Moreover, in 4 of the 5 countries where
        church attendance predicted support for following the decisions of the EU, the more frequent
        churchgoers tended to be more in favour of the EU, which corresponds to previous research
        (see <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r24">Nelsen and Guth, 2005</xref>). The only exception was
        Hungary, which may yet again point to some fertile ground for Orbán’s narratives. Even
        though history is present as a point of contention between CEE and the EU in some
        narratives, this study finds that citizens of most of the analysed countries did not
        recognise it as such. However, pride in national history was negatively correlated with the
        support for EU supranationalism in three countries: the Czech Republic, Latvia and
        Slovenia.</p>

      <p>We also noticed that, in almost all of the countries, being proud of the country’s social
        system was a significant predictor. That could point to citizens’ support for following EU
        decisions being related to their position in social stratification. As indicated in the
        results of effects of sociodemographic characteristics, those who see themselves as having a
        higher status are more likely to support EU supranationalism. Likewise, those who have
        suffered the most from transition and Europeanisation costs are probably more likely to be
        critical of their country’s social security system and oppose EU supranationalism.</p>

      <p>The results indicate that different accession processes and EU conditionality could have
        left quite a strong mark on the opinion on the EU, particularly when they also questioned
        nation-state identities. In Latvia and Estonia, EU conditionality has different meanings for
        titular nations and Baltic Russians. In Croatia, it could have produced a relatively broad
        sense of seeing the EU only as a necessity for escaping the Balkans. Regarding the answer to
        the question of whether the CEE–Brussels rift came from below or above, it seems that elites
        are able to bypass public opinions and construct an anti-EU climate, however not out of thin
        air. The conditions for such a process were clearly present in Hungary and this calls for
        further analysis of cleavages and their politicisation by prominent ideological
        entrepreneurs.</p>

      <p>The impact of political elites can hardly be overstated and Fidesz’s anti-EU and
        anti-immigrant campaigns were crucial in creating the CEE–Brussels rift. However, the
        Hungarian case also suggests that following the predictors of opposition to EU
        supranationalism can indicate polarisation in a given society and help predict its
        transposition at a European level. When compared to other analysed CEE countries, the
        Hungarian public has to the highest extent formed its opposition and support to EU
        supranationalism according to the theory of transnational cleavage. Only the Czech Republic
        comes close to it and that is due to its preoccupation with protectionism, probably
        reflecting the importance of the socioeconomic cleavage. A brief historical comparison with
        all other analysed countries shows that they all (except Hungary and, with some caveat, the
        Czech Republic) started their transition with issues of gaining statehood looming large.
        Hungarian and Czech elites could focus on other social issues and potential contentions from
        the start of the transition, whereas other countries for quite some time saw the EU
        primarily as a “rescue” of their newly founded nation-states (<xref ref-type="bibr"
          rid="r23">Milward, 2019</xref>).</p>

      <p>Finally, we want to point to the limitations of this paper. Some questions likely carry
        different meanings in different countries. Regarding immigration, different ethnic groups
        could be considered immigrants prior to the migration crisis, for instance, in the cases of
        Latvia and Estonia and their relations toward Russians. Another limitation is that we
        focused exclusively on the issue of following the decisions of the Union, which means that
        the research should not be interpreted as exploring general attitudes towards the EU. Future
        research should further investigate this topic and explain the similarities and/or
        differences between countries, as well as similarities and differences between the political
        elites and the public in identification and attitudes related to support for the EU.</p>
    </sec>
  
  
  </body>
  
  <back>
    
    <sec sec-type="ethics-statement">
      <title><bold>ETHICAL APPROVAL</bold></title>
      <p>Not applicable [secondary analysis of publicly available data]</p>
    </sec>
    
    <sec sec-type="data-availability">
      <title><bold>DATA ACCESS AND TRANSPARENCY</bold></title>
      <p>Data available from the GESIS data archive (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r16">ISSP, 2015</xref>)</p>
      <p>Analytic procedures in SPSS and additional analyses available from the online Supplement to
        this article (<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="https://hrcak.srce.hr/ojs/index.php/rzs/libraryFiles/downloadPublic/233"/>).
      </p>
    </sec>
    
    <fn-group>
      <title>Footnotes</title>
      <fn id="f1">
        <label>1</label>
        <p>Euroscepticism of CEE parties was estimated by EU position scores from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2019 (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r3">Bakker et al., 2020</xref>).</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f2">
        <label>2</label>
        <p>Every crisis is, in a way, socially constructed. By referring to the increase in refugees
          and migrants coming to the EU in 2015 as a “migration crisis” we do not wish to imply that
          this was a particularly shocking event in and of itself. Rather it could be claimed that
          political elites i.e., the new authoritarian CEE elite, were involved in framing it as
          such.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f3">
        <label>3</label>
        <p>During and after the migration crisis, the issue of immigration in CEE was framed mainly
          as a cultural threat. However, due to the importance of the perception of both the
          economic and cultural threats regarding immigration, we analyse both dimensions, although
          separately (see <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r4">Bandelj and Gibson, 2020</xref>).</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f4">
        <label>4</label>
        <p>Poland was not included due to not being present in the ISSP dataset, while Slovakia had missing answers on variables concerning attitudes towards the EU and was therefore omitted.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f5">
        <label>5</label>
        <p>“Each individual in the sample is assigned a weight to reflect the extent to which he or
          she would occur in repeated sampling from the population using the given sampling design”
          (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r42">Zou, Lloyd and Baumbusch, 2019: 6</xref>).</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f6">
        <label>6</label>
        <p>All samples are considerably smaller than the Czech one, but the minimum achieved sample size (N=1000) suffices for the statistical analysis carried out.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f7">
        <label>7</label>
        <p>The top-bottom self-placement variable encompasses a broader estimate of one's position on the social ladder compared to others (1-lowest; 10-highest).</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f8">
        <label>8</label>
        <p>In Croatia, Slovenia and Lithuania, which are predominantly Catholic, respondents were asked: “How important do you think is to be a Catholic?” and in other analysed countries: “How important do you think is to be a Christian?”</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f9">
        <label>9</label>
        <p>All categories of scales can be found in the tables in the online Supplement to the article.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f10">
        <label>10</label>
        <p>The analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure was done by first conducting Levene’s test of
          equality of variances. If the result suggested non-homogenous variances, the Welch test
          substituted the standard F test, while the Tamhane T2 test was used for post-hoc
          comparisons between specific groups. If Levene’s test indicated homogenous variances, the
          standard ANOVA F test was conducted, and Scheffe’s test was used for post-hoc
          comparisons.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f11">
        <label>11</label>
        <p>While we do not discuss in detail all the statistically significant differences between the analysed countries, the results of ANOVA and post-hoc tests are presented in tables.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f12">
        <label>12</label>
        <p>Russians constitute 32% of the Latvian and 25% of the Estonian sample. Estonian Russians show higher support for supranationalism (M=2.74; SD=1.06) than ethnic Estonians (M=3.42; SD=1.31; t<sub>(351.7)</sub> = 7.15; p &lt; 0.01), as is the case for Latvian Russians (M=3.31; SD=1.1) compared to ethnic Latvians (M=3.59; SD=0.95; t<sub>(550.1)</sub> = 3.77; p &lt; 0.01).</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f13">
        <label>13</label>
        <p>Only those parties for whom 100 or more respondents had voted are included.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f14">
        <label>14</label>
        <p>Party EU position scores were sourced from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014 (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="r29">Polk et al., 2017</xref>).</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f15">
        <label>15</label>
        <p>Party position scores mostly hover around 6, which is close to the top score (7). To be
          sure, the two variables compared are not identical. Party preferences estimate the general
          view of the EU, while the ISSP variable deals with EU supranationalism. Yet in the case of
          citizens, country means show slightly more disagreement with EU supranationalism than
          agreement.</p>
      </fn>
      <fn id="f16">
        <label>16</label>
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      <fn id="f17">
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      <fn id="f18">
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