

Ivo Pilar's Role in the Organization of Croats in Bosnia and Hercegovina

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Based on the fact that Dr. Ivo Pilar lived and worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina for fifteen years (1905-1920) of his life, the author cautions that no attempt has been made to describe Pilar's public activities in that part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Beginning with an outline of the "Difficulties of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Hercegovina," the author gives an overview of the formation of the Croatian People's Union (1906) and Pilar's contribution to its work, then the reasons and circumstances of the conflict between this party and the Vrhbosnian Archbishop Josip Stadler, who established the Croat Catholic Association, leading to a split among the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats of Catholic faith.

Introduction

From the biography of Ivo Pilar it is apparent that he came to Bosnia and Herzegovina sometime at the beginning of the 20th century, after he defended his doctoral thesis in law at Vienna in 1899 and ended his brief term of service as secretary to the director of a Viennese joint-stock iron industry corporation. After he worked as a secretary to the director of a bank for economic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we encounter him in 1905 working at his own law office in Tuzla, where he remained until 1920.¹ Pilar thus could have been active in the political life of the Croats of Bosnia sometime around the beginning of the 20th century, before he even reached 30 years of age.

At that time, Bosnia had already been under the administration of the Combined Ministry of Finance of the dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for a full quarter of a century and was under the powerful control of Benjamin Kállay (1882-1903). Bosnia was no less the sphere of influence of the equally authoritarian Vrhbosnian Archbishop in Sarajevo, Dr. Josip Stadler (1882-1918). During the whole of this period these two men were in conflict, above all because Kállay attempted to advance Hungarian interests in Bosnia, which were for their part impeded by Croatian interests, and Stadler was uncontested arbiter of not only the religious life of the Croat Catholic people, but also their political representative.

¹ See: *Znameniti i zaslužni Hrvati te pomena vrijedna lica u hrvatskoj povijesti od 925 do 1925*, Zagreb, 1925. From 1920 until the end of his life he was a lawyer in Zagreb.

In part due to a lack of tact, and in part due to conflicts concerning political and religious interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina, during his tenure as bishop Stadler made a lot of other enemies as well. As might be expected, many of those were the religious and national representatives of the Orthodox and Muslims. But peculiar to the situation of Croats in that land, one of his greatest opponents came from the ranks of the Franciscan community there, and another from among the tiny lay Catholic intelligentsia.

Much has been written about Stadler and the Bosnia of his era, especially recently as considerations and anxieties about political repression have been lifted;² more research has been done on Pilar only in these last years.³ Pilar was a man who published the majority of his work under a pseudonym, as if to denote his slow and difficult extrication from anonymity.

In this article I will look at Pilar's role in the organization and activities of the first larger cultural and political organization of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian People's Union (*Hrvatska narodna zajednica* — HNZ), then at his conflict with Archbishop Josip Stadler, who until then was the leading man of the Catholics of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Difficulties of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina


Even though the Croat Catholics of Bosnia expected to be favored under the Monarchy's administration and to make progress on their relative backwardness and unprivileged status compared with members of the other two religious communities, neither of these two things came to pass. On the contrary, following the brief rule of general Baron Josip Filipović (he was removed in December 1878), the monarchical government, attempting to win over the political support of the Orthodox and especially the Muslim populations, turned against the Catholics. Besides this, anti-Catholic propaganda coming from Banian Croatia (Croatia and Slavonia) played into the hands of the Monarchy's policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it goes without saying that internal conflicts and divisions among the Catholics contributed further to the undermining of Catholic interests.

These, in short, were the confines within which the struggles for political dominance and dominance generally over the Catholic population were carried out by Archbishop Stadler, with his secular clergy and Jesuits (brought in from outside), and the Franciscans, who until Stadler's arrival, enjoyed undivided political, cultural and religious dominance in that land.

When the young Pilar sailed into the Bosnian and Herzegovinian political waters he knew that the unfavorable situation of the Croat population in Bosnia was first

² Luka ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije bosanskohercegovačkih katolika Hrvata. (I dio: Do otvaranja Sabora 1910.)*, Zagreb, 1985.; [Petar BABIĆ and Mato ZOVKIĆ, ed.], *Katolička crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini u XIX stoljeću*, Sarajevo, 1986.; [Pavo JURIŠIĆ, ed.], *Josip Stadler. Prilozi za proučavanje dubovnog lika prvog vrhobosanskog nadbiskupa*, Sarajevo, 1999.; Zoran GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhobosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera*, Zagreb, 2001.

³ See: [Srećko LIPOVČAN and Zlatko MATIJEVIĆ, ed.], *Godišnjak Pilar. Prinosi za proučavanje života i djela dra. Ive Pilara*, Zagreb, (vol. 1, 2) 2001, 2002.



and foremost due to Austro-Hungarian policies.⁴ No less influential was the preconception that the responsibility for the situation of the Croat people lay in the fact that Croatian politics were represented and interpreted by Archbishop Stadler and his clergy.⁵ Pilar was, obviously, part of the very small class of lay intelligentsia in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶ It is not entirely clear what kind of ideological precepts led him, even though it can be assumed that during the course of his studies in Vienna and Paris he certainly was exposed to various modern ideas. In any case, after his arrival in Bosnia we can encounter him politically engaged on the opposite side of Stadler.

To obtain a fuller picture of the political atmosphere of that period it is necessary to take into account the directly impending political and ideological ferment in

⁴ L. V. SÜDLAND [Ivo PILAR], *Južnoslavensko pitanje. Prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja*, Varaždin, 1990 (reprint of Croatian translation from 1943), p. 271.

⁵ ZAJEDNIČAR [I. PILAR], *Nadbiskup Stadler i Hrv.[atska] Nar.[odna] Zajednica*, Sarajevo, 1910.

⁶ One indication of how small this class was is that the number of members of the Central Croatian Cultural and Publishing Society from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1894 was 895, 163 of which were clerics. (See: Marko KARAMATIĆ, *Franjevci Bosne Srebrene u vrijeme austro-ugarske uprave 1878-1914.*, Sarajevo, 1992, pp. 291-292).

Banian Croatia and in the Monarchy. In Croatia, the group of young politicians known as the “Progressives” were particularly active. In 1904, they began to publish the weekly *Hrvatski Pokret* (Croatian Movement); after 1 October 1905, it came out daily. In 1906, they founded a new party, the Croat People’s Progressive Party (*Hrvatska pučka napredna stranka* — HPNS); it was also the year in which the Croat-Serb Coalition (*Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija* — HSK) first came to power.

The Progressive’s paper was a vociferous opponent of “clericalism” in Croatian society, which supposedly could be found in culture and politics.⁷ In fact, the Progressives and their paper *Pokret* were the biggest propagators of the anti-Stadler position, criticizing it for supposedly equating Croatism with Catholicism and alienating Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Muslims and Orthodox Serbs. Moreover, Stadler alone was blamed for his conflict with the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Franciscans.⁸

The Progressives took aim at Archbishop Stadler of Sarajevo using their criticism of developments within Catholicism in Banian Croatia. They were most upset by the movement among Catholic students with bishop Antun Mahnić of Krk at its head, which appeared and was growing in Croatian lands after 1903. Besides this, some of the politically active laity and clerics, following the orientation of the Croatian Party of (State) Right (*Hrvatska stranka prava* — HSP), decided to join the struggle for Catholicism with the struggle for the political future of the Croat people. They founded a publishing society whose main purpose was to “protect, preserve, and promote Catholic consciousness through the press, and thus renew our Catholic people in Jesus Christ”⁹ and immediately began to issue the daily *Hrvatstvo* (Croat-ness). People around the Catholic daily represented themselves as defenders of Christian faith and morals, and workers against the “anti-religious and anti-Christian spirit, which the enemies of religion and morals are spreading increasingly among the people.” Their program — to “recognize only one political people in the Croatian lands: CROATS, only one state flag: Croatian, and one official language: Croatian”¹⁰ was directed against the Orthodox of Croatia, who were increasingly promoting Serbian politics. The clerics thus were close to, if not perhaps fully in accord with, the program of the Pure Party of (Croat State) Right (*Čista stranka prava* — ČSP) with Josip Frank at its head.

The Progressives were convinced that as a result of all the developments in Catholicism “the Church [...] had become a political organization which exploited religion for political purposes.”¹¹ The Progressives feigned concern for the purity of Christianity, but in fact they considered the Church the greatest obstacle to the establishment of a political program uniting Croats and Serbs as one nation. In accor-

⁷ Većeslav WILDER, “O stranačkoj štampi”, *Hrvatski Pokret* [below: *HP*], Zagreb, 3/1906, no. 130; “Što je klerikalizam”, *HP*, 3/1906, no. 119.

⁸ “Stadler i Jeglič”, *HP*, 5/1908, no. 238, p. 6.

⁹ See: *Katolički List*, Zagreb, 55/1904, no. 18, p. 205.

¹⁰ *Hrvatstvo*, Zagreb 1/1904, no. 1.

¹¹ V. WILDER, “O stranačkoj štampi”.

dance with this, they also reacted to the possibility of changing the policies of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia.¹²

The Founding of the Croat People's Union

The first opportunity to reshape Croatian politics in Bosnia, politics that would first of all be independent of Archbishop Stadler, presented itself on 16 August 1906, when Catholics celebrated the blessing of flag of the Glee-Club *Vlašić* in Dolac, near Travnik.¹³ The most eminent members of the Bosnian intelligentsia congregated at the celebration, led by Archbishop Stadler and his assistant bishop Ivan Šarić with the right of succession.¹⁴ It was decided to form a religious and cultural organization which would take the name Croat People's Union. For this purpose the so-called Committee of Six was formed, drawing a representative from each district that existed at the time. Dr. Pilar sat on the Committee, along with Dr. Nikola Mandić, Milan Katičić, dr. Jozo Sunarić, Stjepan Kukrić and Đuro Džamonja.¹⁵ Even though all the members of the Committee were from the laity, differences in political views between them and Archbishop Stadler were not yet discernible. The Committee, which was given the task of working out all the organization's rules and ensuring their acceptance by the government, worked up a political program as well (the Punctations), which proclaimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina was by "state law a Croatian land" and that it was the "natural will" of Croats in that land to unite with Croatia "within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy."¹⁶ As a result, the Committee advocated the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁷ It is not superfluous to mention two other points contained in the political program. First, the Committee insisted that due to the small number of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, no other association of Croats should be allowed to exist. Second, the Committee specifically remonstrated the political program of the Croat-Serb Coalition in other Croatian lands.¹⁸ The Committee attempted to assume a neutral position towards the Muslims, neither questioning their landholding rights nor surrendering the claim that they form part of the corpus of Croats.

In November 1907, the Provincial Administration and the Joint Ministry of Finance in Vienna approved the HNZ's rules, following which many founding assemblies were held throughout the cities and larger towns of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁹

¹² "Bosna i Hrvati", *HP*, 4/1907, no. 185, p. 1.

¹³ L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije*, 229 and etc.

¹⁴ The unity of Catholic Croats in Bosnia is demonstrated not only by this gathering of the Archbishop of Sarajevo and the lay intelligentsia, but also by the concluding decision to present the Emperor, on his the occasion of his upcoming visit to attend military maneuvers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a memorandum about joining that land to Croatia. (The Presidency of the Provincial Administration 2625, 2795/1906; see: *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, Sarajevo, 1/1906. (18 and 20 August); Mirjana GROSS, "Hrvatska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1878 to 1918," *Historijski zbornik*, Zagreb, 19-20/1966, no. 1-4, pp. 9-68.

¹⁵ L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije*, p. 229.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230.

¹⁷ L. V. SÜDLAND, *Južnoslavensko pitanje*, p. 272.

¹⁸ L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije*, p. 230.

The constituent assembly of the Central Committee of the HNZ was held on 24 February 1908, and its first working assembly sat from 22 to 25 February 1908. Pilar was elected to be a member of the Central Committee as well as the president of the district committee in Donja Tuzla.²⁰

A Franciscan, fr. Marijan Dujčić, and a Muslim, Hamid Šahinović-Ekrem, were elected to the Central Committee, which would reveal one of the reasons why the HNZ would soon run into problems that were not easy to overcome. The Archbishop of Vrhbosna (Sarajevo), in particular, was not satisfied with specific formulations of the rules of the organization, especially as pertained to the statement of its purpose. Stadler wanted the HNZ to be an organization of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croat Catholics, which then implied a strong statement of this kind in the rules. Since the lay members of the Central Committee wanted the HNZ to be open to Muslims, who they held to be Croats, and since the Franciscans were in any case against Stadler's position on the Bosnian and Herzegovinian religious and political scene, the Committee attempted to extricate itself from the Archbishop's control. These were two variant conceptions of the organization of Croat Catholics and conflict was unavoidable.

Pilar later claimed that the problem emerged because Stadler did not want to relinquish political leadership of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to non-clerics and that Croatian interests at the time of Stadler's leadership were not protected.²¹ But I must mention two points from Pilar's list of reasons explaining why the situation of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina was so unfavorable. First, "the estrangement of Muslims from Croatian popular consciousness" and, secondly, the fact that the "understanding spread throughout the land that Catholicism and Croathood were identical."²² Herein really lay the reasons for the disagreement and conflict between the Archbishop of Vrhbosna (Sarajevo) and the leadership of the HNZ. The leadership of the Croatian organization believed Stadler and his clerics were directly responsible for the estrangement of Muslims from Croats and the equation of Catholicism and Croathood. Propaganda about the identification of Catholicism and Croathood and the accusation of Archbishop Stadler for responsibility for this was spread by Bosnian and Herzegovinian Serbs; while propaganda about Stadler's intention to convert the Muslims and Orthodox to Catholicism was spread by Serbs and Muslims. This propaganda was readily accepted by the liberal circles of the Progressives and other anti-Catholic circle in Banian Croatia. The new

¹⁹ "In spite of its exclusively educational and economic program, the Croat People's Association was authorized in the pre-annexation era [at Christmas 1907] in order to execute political aims in the interest of the ruling circles of the Monarchy. The new organization consisted of the followers of Stadler as well as Frank, but the most important roles were occupied by members of the intelligentsia, Dr. Nikola Mandić, Dr. Jozo Sunarić, Dr. Ivo Pilar and Đuro Džamonja. Mandić became the president because he had the most developed economic ties and played an important part in the accumulation of Croatian capital." (M. GROSS, *Povijest pravaške ideologije*, Zagreb, 1973, p. 358.)

²⁰ L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije*, pp. 231-233.

²¹ ZAJEDNIČAR, *Nadbiskup Stadler i HNZ*, pp. 5-9.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 11.



Archbishop
Josip Stadler

representative body of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina took these accusations to be true, even though they were more than questionable. The leadership of the HNZ thus in fact acknowledged the basis of the false accusations of the previous leadership of Croat Catholics and made this the starting point of their own politics. This is also obvious from the fact that the leadership of the HNZ did not oppose the cooperation of Franciscan clerical organizations in its upper echelons, and because of this the argument that they supported an exclusively lay leadership in Bosnian and Herzegovinian politics can not stand.

Archbishop Stadler could not accept this new direction in the politics of the leadership of the HNZ not only because it denied that Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the time of his tenure have made any progress, but also because it seemed to him that the leadership of the HNZ neglected the promotion of the interests of Croat Catholics for the sake of a specific ideology. Stadler accused the leadership of the HNZ of representing anti-clerical and anti-Catholic ideas. The Archbishop reached out to this argument, because he did not have better one on his disposal, but in reality he was opposed to the general direction of the new politics among Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croat Catholics, politics which ran counter to his political and ideological convictions.

What was Stadler objecting to in this new direction in Croatian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Stadler certainly felt that the influences of the propaganda of the Progressives and the political reorientation taking place in Banian Croatia with the arrival of the Croat-Serb Coalition on the political scene had had an influence on some of the organizers of the HNZ. Even though the Committee of Six, which was supposed to prepare the rules of the HNZ, specifically distanced itself from the politics of the Croat-Serb Coalition as regards Bosnia and Herzegovina, other elements of the ideological views from Banian Croatia are visibly present in the deliberations of this committee and, later, in the Central Committee of the HNZ.

Pilar's wide-ranging theoretical analysis of the nature of the conflict between the leadership of the HNZ and Archbishop Stadler is illustrative. Pilar's problematic assertions, on the basis of which he constructs his whole argument, that Stadler's leadership of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not contribute at all to their social development and that as a matter of principle the Archbishop and his clergy were left out of the very organization founded on the Archbishop's initiative aside, his ideas reveal the most important characteristics of the Progressives' criticism of 'clericalism.' Pilar's basic thesis is that clerical leadership, or, better put, Stadler's leadership, could only be harmful to the advantages of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why? One of the reasons would be — often brought up by Croatian liberal circles — that bishops are appointed by a "foreign," "a-national" power, which follows and protects its own interests, but does not protect national interests.²³ Secondly, "theological education is exclusively ideological, abstract and focused more on the otherworldly needs of humanity, consequently less on the material side of human existence," thus, the clergy can not represent material and secular national interests.²⁴ Pilar allows that in the past there were clergymen who were good political leaders of their nations, even among the Croats (Pilar recounts that standard liberal list of "progressive Churchmen": Strossmayer, Rački, Dobrila and Pavlinović), but that this would probably be harmful for the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Above all, Stadler insists on the confessional aspect, which denies that the Catholic population in Bosnia and Herzegovina has a 'great political mission.' If the all-pervasiveness of propaganda concerning Slavic reciprocity is taken into account, Pilar's explanation of this great political mission is not surprising: the mission of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina is "to create in the Monarchy's south a strong *Slavic* political formation, with an extensive political and cultural task."²⁵ Pilar does not elaborate exactly what the "political and cultural tasks" of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Catholics would be, but it is clear that he is carried away by a romantic, Strossmayer-like idea of the acculturation of non-Catholics to the values of western civilization — an idea that, at any rate, can still be found today among important and elite political circles — but in this case has the Muslims first and foremost in mind.²⁶ Of course, speaking in the pre-constitutional era and about

²³ Ibid., pp. 44, 54-57.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 50. The emphasis is mine.

the Croat-Serb Coalition, Pilar has a politically pragmatic coalition with the Muslims in mind. What Pilar does not doubt is that setting the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina apart by emphasizing Catholicism is harmful to the great political task.

Pilar imagined the role of the HNZ and his leadership as instrumental to the economic, social, and cultural amelioration of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was supposedly the great failing of the earlier leadership of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats. Yet, when he tried to show how this political program would be carried out, he never got further than empty rhetoric such as “we need to have ambition” and “we must know what is necessary,” and pointing to the Serbs as an example.²⁷ The Serbs were a model to him, as they were to the Progressives in Civil Croatia, in terms of Church organization as well: the people jointly manage Church estates with the clergy, it is not entirely the prerogative of the clergy.²⁸

The last point on which Pilar defended the leadership of the HNZ and accused Archbishop Stadler concerned a defense of the Franciscans. This view was also a reflection of the thinking of the Progressives. Like the anti-Church circles in Civil Croatia, Pilar blamed the Jesuits for many negative developments in Church and society, and therefore in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁹ With regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pilar actually noted what one of the most important problems was in the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the 20th century, and likewise a problem in relations between Archbishop Stadler and the leadership of the HNZ. Pilar insists “*that the political goal of the Franciscans is the only one with a chance to succeed.*”³⁰ Pilar did not clarify what the politics of the Franciscans was exactly nor why it only had the prospect of succeeding, but it has been remarked that he accepted the standard Franciscan claim that because the Franciscans protected Catholicism in Bosnia and Herzegovina through 400 years it was self-evident that their political views were correct, and that they were justified in their long-standing conflict with Archbishop Stadler. He did not think that it was necessary to explain why, if he was looking to lay blame for the poor condition of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he would blame Stadler for his 30 year leadership of the Catholics, and not the Franciscans for their 400 year absolute spiritual dominance over these people. I assume that Pilar could not pose such questions, because that would mean reexamination of his own prejudices and unstated, perhaps even ill-defined, starting positions, which is maybe too much to expect of him at this time in his life.

²⁶ “We believe, that the only way we can accomplish this is if we become an element of strength, which at an attractive time, will be in a position to entice other elements to it and in coalition with them draw on a new source of strength.” (Ibid., p. 51) This was the way in which Pilar and Mandić spoke to Monarchical circles in Vienna at the time of the proclamation of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 63-64.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 66-67.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 69-77.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 78. The emphasis is mine.

The Breach among the Catholics of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Archbishop Stadler was handed the rules of the HNZ and was not at all pleased with them. Offended because of his total exclusion from the process of determining the rules of the Union, in February 1908, Stadler informed the leadership of the Union in writing that he could not approve of the rules.³¹ The Archbishop insisted that “education, which should be promoted among the Catholic people, can not be any other than Christian education, the moral upbringing of Catholic people must be based on Catholic moral precepts,”³² and thus he did not desire popular education of an “inter-confessional spirit.” He was not against cooperation with the Muslims, but he suggested that the Muslims organize themselves on the basis of their own religious beliefs. Then Muslim and Catholic organizations could cooperate in fields where they have common interests.³³

In the meantime, on October 5, 1908, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was proclaimed by Imperial decree. The Catholic population, in contrast to the Muslims and the Orthodox, welcomed this eagerly. The Catholic newspaper *Hrvatski Dnevnik* (Croatian Daily) expressed its agreement with this action: “We do not say that the annexation is harmful to Croatia, rather, we are firmly convinced that the annexation is in fact a large step toward the realization of the Croatian [Party of] Right’s program.”³⁴ In fact, Stadler’s circle, which stood behind the “Croatian Daily,” did not see the annexation as representing the realization of the “program of the Party of (Croat State) Right”, but it did at least preclude the possibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina being joined to Serbia.³⁵ The political forces united in the Coalition did not hide their anger that the annexation was carried out. When this became a fact, they attempted to set a politics in motion in Bosnia that would “reconcile Croats and Serbs in the defense of the national interests of Bosnia.”³⁶ Namely, even before the annexation there were obvious differences in the political views of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats and the liberal politicians in Civil Croatia. The Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Archbishop Stadler at their head were for the annexation, but also for the unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia and Dalmatia at the right time, if this was not possible immediately.³⁷ However, the leading political force in Civil Croatia, the Croat-Serb Coalition, did not share the opinion of the

³¹ L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije*, pp. 271-275. (The author relies on the Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo. “Napretkova” cultural-historical collection. File II/3. Correspondence and memoranda of the Central Committee of the HNZ).

³² Ibid.

³³ “Our desire was that the Catholic Croats organize for themselves, because they have so many social problems, while Muslim Croats should organize for themselves, then we can cooperate in all common issues.” (Ibid.)

³⁴ “Bosna i Hrvati,” *HP*, 5/1908, no. 234, p. 1.

³⁵ See: “Opportunitizam bosanskih Hrvata,” *HP*, 5/1908, no. 197, p. 1.

³⁶ “Katastrofa jedne katastrofalne politike,” *HP*, 5/1908, no. 229, pp. 1-2.

³⁷ See: “Mandićeve izjave, Aneksija Bosne i Hrvati,” *HP*, 5/1908, no. 206, 5. and “Dr. Mandić o aneksiji Bosne,” *HP*, 5/1908, no. 227, p. 6. See also an interview of Archbishop Stadler by “Reichpost” in: *HP*, 5/1908., no. 209, p. 1.

Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats. At least some of its members supported an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina,³⁸ which was also the point of view of the Orthodox Serbs of the province.³⁹ Archbishop Stadler, on the other hand, let it be clearly known even before the annexation that the Serbs would be against any joining of Bosnia to the Monarchy.⁴⁰

After the annexation was announced, the sole organization of Catholic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina likewise was not of one mind. The organization of two delegations to honor his Highness the Emperor and King under separate leadership was an indication of this lack of solidarity. Pilar and Mandić happened to be in Vienna when the annexation was announced, and in their capacity as leading men of the HNZ, they also presented themselves as the legitimate political representatives of Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pilar advised the political leadership of the Monarchy that it should look to the Croat Catholics in Bosnia to “re-educate” the Muslims and create a common defense against the Serbs and their penetration to the west.⁴¹ Disatisfied with this Stadler organized a new delegation of honour from Croat Catholics. The much larger delegation set out to Vienna November 24, 1908, and was granted admission to important audiences.⁴²

Towards the end of the year, on December 13, 1908, Stadler called the clergymen of Sarajevo to a conference on the newly established political conditions and the direction of future work. The conclusions reached at the conference bear the Archbishop's mark.⁴³ Stadler felt that the new political conditions confirmed the need for the organization of Croat Catholics along religious lines. Contrary to the accusations made by some of his contemporaries and the historiography, the Archbishop was not primarily interested in religious propaganda. He believed that the strength of the organization in the conditions prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time could be ensured on the basis of that which most unites people, and that was faith. For this reason, one of the main conclusions of the Sarajevo meetings was the request that the HNZ changes its rules in the sense that it restricts membership to Catholics. This, to be sure, did not preclude the possibility of close cooperation and political compromise with “Croats of other confessions,” that is to say, Muslims, as this is specifically stated in the conclusions. Along with the newly prepared, more effective rules, Mandić was supposed to resign from the leadership of the HNZ.⁴⁴

In the extraordinary assembly held at the end of January 1909, the leadership of the HNZ rejected the Archbishop's proposals and it withheld the promise to amend

³⁸ “Aneksija Bosne”, *HP*, 5/1908, no. 226, p. 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ See: “Izviješća o Bosni”, *HP*, 5/1908, no. 209, p. 1.

⁴¹ Compare: L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije*, pp. 275-277.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 284-286; “Šta hoćemo u H.N.Z?”, *Vrhbosna*, Sarajevo, 23/1909, no. 2, p. 31.

⁴⁴ L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije*, p. 286. From the files of the Provincial Administration in Sarajevo it is clear that a secret meeting was held in the Archbishopric at which these decisions were taken.

its rules.⁴⁵ Archbishop Stadler, at the end of July 1909, founded another organization for Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croat Catholics, which he called *Hrvatska katolička udruga* (Croat Catholic Association). With this action, of course, the division among Catholic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina only deepened.

Summary

Pilar came to Bosnia immediately after completing his studies of law in various European metropolises at a very crucial moment for its Croat Catholics, just at the time that their organized predominantly cultural activity under the leadership of Archbishop Stadler had an opportunity to develop into organized political work. But the newly elected, non-clerical leadership denied any value to their predecessor's efforts, even holding Archbishop Stadler personally responsible for all of their setbacks, and concentrating of their political work on the winning over of Muslims to the side of the Catholic Croats. The leadership thought that to do this it was sufficient to use affirmative rhetoric and to suppress fully the religious features of Catholic members. With this kind of attitude in sway, it favoured an ever more pronounced, open and aggressive anti-Catholic propaganda which was imported from Banian Croatia, and its direct target was the Archbishop of Vrhbosna, Dr. Josip Stadler. Since Pilar was young, he was sympathetic to this kind of propaganda, though he was also influenced by the political and ideological outlook of his elders. Stadler, on the other hand, judged that neither the desired goals nor any great advantage could be won with these kinds of methods, especially by the Catholics. In a society that was strictly divided on the basis of religion, it seems that Stadler's judgment was more realistic. In any case, the result of these kinds of ideological and political confrontations was disunity and an even lesser efficacy on the part of the Croat Catholics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pilar contributed to this disunity in good measure. Yet, in contrast to others, with the passing of time Pilar became vividly aware of the real political situation of the Croats and at the next critical juncture was wholly in agreement with Archbishop Stadler. I do not know if this can be taken as a sign of genius and self-respect, but I am sure that with this he decided his own fate of being consigned to age-long silence.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 288. The author is relying on the Archive of Bosnia and Hercegovina and its cultural-historical collection, File IX.