

The Political Activities of Dr. Ivo Pilar on the Eve of the Demise of the Habsburg Monarchy (1915-1918)

Zlatko MATIJEVIĆ

Croatian Institute for History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia

UDK 323.1(497.1)"191"
323.1(436-89=163.42)"191"

(accepted on 29th October 2006)

On the basis of scholarly literature, archival materials and available newspapers from the period, the author reconstructs the political activities of Dr. Ivo Pilar during the final years of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's existence. Pilar thought the "South Slav Question" should be solved in "Croatian terms," that is to say the unification of all Croatian lands — Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina — in one independent administrative area contained within the existing dualistic system. Even though he formally remained within the framework of dualism, he was, in fact, advocating a solution which in its main outlines was a form of "veiled trialism." The Hungarian politicians' rejection of a solution of the "South Slav Question" in "Croatian terms," that is, their attempt to attach Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Hungarian part of the Monarchy as a "corpus separatum", caused additional dissatisfaction and deepened the already serious crisis into which the Monarchy had fallen. Recognizing that one of the consequences of the World War was going to be the irreversible disappearance of the time-honoured Habsburg state from the Central European political stage, Pilar radicalized his position in terms of its internal reform, proposing that it be transformed — into a federation.

“Die habsburgische Monarchie steht im Süden vor schicksalsschweren Entscheidungen. Wer klar sieht, muss mit sich im Reinen sein, dass die Monarchie die strikte Wahl hat: entweder sofort ein Königreich Kroatien mit ihr oder nach einigen Dezenen ein Königreich Grossserbien gegen sie”.

Ivo PILAR, “Das südslavische Problem im Habsburgerreiche”,
Kroatische Rundschau, Zagreb, 1/1918, no. 9, S. 124.

After the arrangement of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement of 1867, the Habsburg Monarchy was divided into an Austrian (Cisleithanian) part and a Hungarian (Transleithanian) part.¹ According to the terms of the new constitutional framework, Dalmatia and the Croatian part of Istria, along with the Slovenian lands, entered the Austrian part of the Monarchy, while Banian Croatia, together with Vojvodina, the

¹ A. J. P. TAYLOR, *Habsburška Monarhija 1809-1918*, Zagreb, 1990, pp. 161-173.



Hungarian part. A year later, the Croato-Hungarian Agreement was concluded, which was a sub-dualistic amendment of the established dualistic organization of the state. Under the terms of the Agreement, Croatia and Hungary defined their constitutional relationship to each other. The dynastic union of Croatia and Hungary dating back to 1102 and the real union of 1790 had been shattered by the revolutionary upheaval of 1848, so the constitutional relationship between the two kingdoms was unclear until 1868. With its 70 articles, the Agreement established the fundamental legal relationship between Croatia and Hungary that would obtain until 1918. Above all, the Agreement affirmed the indivisibility of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. Further, joint representation, joint business and a joint government for all matters except interior affairs were stipulated, besides which the Provincial Administration for Croatia and Slavonia (Civil Croatia) was ascribed autonomy in the sphere of administration of justice, religious affairs, and education. Under the provisions of the Agreement, Civil Croatia was subordinated to Hungary in two important ways: 1) the Croatian ban (viceroy) was appointed by the king on the recommendation of the Hungarian prime minister, and the minister for Croatia and Slavonia was not responsible to the Croatian Sabor (Assembly), but to the joint parliament in Budapest; and 2) in financial matters Civil Croatia was totally dependent on Hungary, because its budget was approved by the Hungarian minister of finance.

The question of the status of the port city of Rijeka was solved by means of the “Rijeka scrap” to the advantage of Hungary, which the Croatian Sabor never accepted.² The Croato-Hungarian Agreement erected a relatively long-lived constitutional system for Civil Croatia and established a stable and comparatively broad institutional framework for Croatian autonomy. Despite the many limitations that arose from the Agreement, it nevertheless enabled, by means of an autonomous legislature, a modernization of the by then largely antiquated Croatian institutions of government to take place.³

On the basis of the decisions taken at the Berlin Congress (1878), the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy obtained the right to “occupy” Bosnia and Hercegovina, which were under the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. The annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina was carried out by Imperial decree on 5 October 1908. The newly acquired territory, which was given the status of a co-dominion, was administered by the joint Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Finance (1912-1918).

Pilar and Stadler’s “Memorandum” to Pope Benedict XV (January 1915)

The ominous shots fired in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, from the gun of the youthful Serbian assassin Gavrilo Princip marked a new chapter in the history of humanity.⁴ They were, indeed, the spark that set off the First World War (1914-1918). In this war, the largest in the history of humankind up to that time, four empires disappeared: the German, the Russian, the Austrian, and the Turkish.

After the start of the war, the Kingdom of Italy, the unreliable member of the Central Powers,⁵ remained temporarily neutral. The Archbishop of Vrhbosna (Sarajevo), Dr. Joseph Stadler, known as an individual favourable to the Frank’s (Pure) Party of (Croat State) Right orientation in terms of a solution to the situation of the Croatian lands within the borders of the Monarchy,⁶ had trustworthy information about the attempt of the Entente powers, that is Great Britain, France, and Russia, to win Italy over to enter the war on their side. Worried that the realization of this plan might change the balance of power between the two warring camps and lead to the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on January 28, 1915 he sent Pope Benedict XV a “Memorandum” requesting him to use his influence toward preserving Italy’s neutrality in the world conflict. In the “Memorandum”, Archbishop Stadler stated that by directly appealing to the head of the Catholic Church he was

² N. RATNER, *Postanak Hrvatsko-ugarske nagodbe od godine 1868.*, Zagreb — Beograd, 1949; Jaroslav ŠIDAK, Mirjana GROSS, Igor KARAMAN and Dragutin ŠEPIĆ, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda g. 1860-1914.*, Zagreb, 1968, pp. 38-43; Vasilije KRESTIĆ, *Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba*, Beograd, 1969; Josip ŠARINIĆ, *Nagodbena Hrvatska. Postanak i osnovne ustavne organizacije*, Zagreb, 1972.

³ Dalibor ČEPULO, “Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba i reforme institucija vlasti u Hrvatskom saboru 1868.-1871.”, *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci*, Rijeka, 2001, Suppl., no. 1, pp. 117-148.

⁴ R. W. SETON-WATSON, *Sarajevo. Studija o uzrocima svetskog rata*, Zagreb, 1926; L[eo] PFEFFER, *Istraga u Sarajevskom atentatu*, Zagreb, 1938.

⁵ Vladimir ŠULEK, *Diplomatska historija Centralnih sila, 1882-1915*, I-II, Zagreb, 1938-1939.

⁶ Stjepan MATKOVIĆ, *Čista stranka prava 1895.-1903.*, Zagreb, 2001; Zoran GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhobosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera*, Zagreb, 2001.

not really going beyond his spiritual duties and entering into the political sphere, because, in his opinion, the preservation of the Monarchy as a state was very closely tied to the continued existence of Catholicism on its south eastern frontiers. Even if Archbishop Stadler composed and signed the "Memorandum", its content was inspired by Dr. Ivo Pilar, Stadler's onetime bitter political opponent.⁷ In his private letter to Dr. Pilar, Stadler said: "You would be pleased with me, because I wrote in your terms generally and sent it to a prominent personage", i.e., Pope Benedict XV.⁸ The day before Stadler sent his "Memorandum" to the Pope, Dr. Pilar wrote a letter to the Archbishop of Zagreb, Dr. Antun Bauer, asking him to intercede with the Holy See to keep Italy neutral.⁹

The Holy See supported the preservation of the Monarchy, because the Habsburg State was the largest Catholic state in Europe at the time, and this alone made it potentially the most reliable ally of the Papal state in the complex international relations of the early 20th century. Pope Benedict XV threw his considerable diplomatic influence behind the attempt to prevent Italy's entering the war on the side of the Entente. In fact, he encouraged the Monarchy's leaders to concede territory to its insatiable Adriatic neighbour. Negotiations between the two states were terminated the moment the Entente powers, under the terms of the secret London Treaties of April 26, 1915, guaranteed Italy far greater territorial concessions than the Monarchy was prepared to make.¹⁰ The untrustworthy ally became a bitter enemy in the battlefield.

Pilar's "Memorandum" to Archbishop Stadler (July 1917)

During the last two years of the World War I, Dr. Ivo Pilar made many attempts to find an optimal solution to the burning "South Slav Question", that is the Croatian question, within the confines of the dualistic structure of the Monarchy and thereby guarantee its survival as a European great power in the Danubian basin and on the Balkan peninsula. After the death of Emperor and King Francis Joseph I in December 1916, who had sat on the throne since 1848, Slovene, Serb, Croatian and Muslim (Bosnian) politicians began directing their politics toward demanding the greatest degree of independence possible for their lands, which in constitutional terms were divided between the two halves of the Habsburg state. They based their claims on "national principles," that is, "the right to national self-determination" and "Croatian state right". These two principles were emphasized by the members of the Yugoslav Club at the Imperial Council in Vienna, the parliament of the Austrian half

⁷ Luka ĐAKOVIĆ, *Političke organizacije bosanskohercegovačkih katolika Hrvata. (I. Dio: Do otvaranja Sabora 1910.)*, Zagreb, 1985, p. 229. and etc.; Jure KRIŠTO, "Uloga Ive Pilara u hrvatskom organiziranju u Bosni i Hercegovini," in: [Srećko LIPOVČAN and Zlatko MATIJEVIĆ, ed.], *Godišnjak Pilar. Prinosi za proučavanje života i djela dra. Ive Pilara* (further: *GP*), 1/2001, pp. 86-93.

⁸ Zoran GRIJAK, "Ivo Pilar i Stadlerova promemorija papi Benediktu XV., g. 1915.," in: *GP*, 1/2001, p. 108.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

¹⁰ Milan MARJANOVIĆ, *Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915. Prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917.*, Zagreb, 1960.

of the Monarchy, and in the “May Declaration” (1917).¹¹ The cryptically formulated “Declaration” could potentially be interpreted in many ways. To some, it was seen as the work of the Viennese court and an attempt at a “trialistic solution”¹² to the “South Slav Question” within the Monarchy’s borders; for others, it was a matter of “necessary political tactics” in the conditions of war, which enabled the promotion of “Yugoslav ideas” and the “creation of a common state for all Yugoslav peoples,” besides the Bulgars, outside the Monarchy’s borders.¹³

Among the first to realize that the “May Declaration” and its proponents had as their ultimate goal the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the creation of an independent Yugoslav state, Dr. Pilar handed Archbishop Stadler his “Memorandum on the Solution of the South Slav Question” (“Denkschrift über die südslawische Frage”).¹⁴ Analyzing the geo-political situation and relating it to the “South Slav Question”, Pilar proposed, as the “optimal solution,” the “unification of the South Slavic regions into one single administrative area” which would include: Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Istria, Carniola, southern Styria to the Drava river, Gorica and Gradiška. For Trieste he envisioned a form of special status, by which this port would be directly subordinated to state authority.¹⁵ In this “Memorandum”, he showed particular concern for the future of Bosnia and Hercegovina. In Pilar’s view, Serbian politicians had succeeded in misusing the idea of “national unity” [*narodno jedinstvo*] of Serbs and Croats in the interests of their own expansionist politics: “If the Serbs and Croats are one people then it logically follows from this that the Serbs, on the basis of national principles, have the right to strive toward the unification of all South Slav regions into one Great Serbian state.”¹⁶ Further, he believed that the United States of America, with President Wilson at its head, had accepted the idea that Bosnia and Hercegovina “must be torn” from the sphere of the Monarchy and on the basis of the nationality principle “turned over” to Serbia.¹⁷ Supposing that the unification of all the South Slavic lands of the Monarchy might lead to insurmountable problems, Pilar proposed a “minimal solution,” that is, the “unification of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, [and] Bosnia and Hercegovina”.¹⁸ This constitutional entity, in his opinion, had “the national, geopolitical, and economic preconditions for successful development”.¹⁹ Without the realization of at least this “minimal solution” it was impossible, argued Pilar, to find any solution to

¹¹ Ferdo ŠIŠIĆ, *Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata, i Slovenaca 1914.-1919.*, Zagreb, 1920, p. 94.

¹² M. GROSS, “Hrvatska politika velikaustrijskog kruga oko prijestolonsljednika Franje Ferdinanda,” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* (further: ČSP), Zagreb, 2/1970, no. 2, pp. 9-74.

¹³ Dragovan ŠEPIĆ, *Italija, Saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje 1914-1918*, 1970, pp. 204-205.

¹⁴ University and National Library, Zagreb; Collection of old and rare books and manuscripts; Ostavština Ive Pilara [The papers of Ivo Pilar] (further: OIP), R-5708.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

the “South Slav Question,” and this could ultimately have only negative consequences for the future existence of the Monarchy.²⁰

The “Memorandum” of Stadler-Pilar political circle to Emperor Charles (August 1917)

Concern for the survival of the Monarchy and the future of the Croat people who had lived within its borders for centuries induced Archbishop Stadler and Dr. Pilar into concrete political action. For this reason, the “Memorandum on the solution to the South Slav Question” (“Promemoria über die Lösung der sds[la]w[sl]ischen Frage”) to Emperor and King Charles I (IV) was composed.²¹

This “Memorandum”, which usually is called by Stadler’s or Pilar’s name,²² begins with the assertion that in the period from the promulgation of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement to the outbreak of the First World War the “South Slav Question” was, for the Monarchy, the “most pressing aspect of the Eastern Question”, which affected the internal political life of the state in a “disastrous way.”²³ Assuming that the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) would achieve a military victory over the Entente Powers and their allies, the author of the “Memorandum” did not believe that this would lead to important changes which would reduce tensions and enable the establishment of lasting peace in the international relations of the European continent. For this very reason, the moment had certainly arrived in which the Monarchy, out of “a commitment to itself”, had to deal with the “South Slav Question” in order that it “cease to be the Achilles heel of the whole state.”²⁴ The author of the “Memorandum” was aware of the fact that the solution to the “South Slav Question” could not be tied to an “general reconstruction of the Monarchy” and openly carried out as a “effort at trialism”, because at that time there were many impediments to this.²⁵ Thus, the “South Slav Question” had to be resolved in a way that left the Dualistic structure of the Monarchy, to the largest extent possible, intact.²⁶

Starting from this position, the author laid out his plan for the solution of the “South Slav Question” in nine points. The first point suggested: “Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina are joined into one unitary administrative area.”²⁷ The comment attached to this point stated:

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ OIP, R-5704b.

²² In November 1917, the Archbishop of Sarajevo told the Hungarian journalist, Arpad Pasztor, that the “[Memorandum] was not inconsistent with his interpretation.” (“Razgovor ‘Az Estova’ dopisnika s nadbiskupom Stadlerom,” *Hrvatska*, Zagreb, 1917, no. 1892, p. 1.). In other words, the Archbishop hinted at the possibility that he might not be the author of the “Memorandum”. It is obvious that the “Memorandum”, even if it was written in the first person singular, was, more or less, the common product of Stadler’s political circle, in which Dr. Pilar’s ideas played a very important role.

²³ OIP, R-5704b, p. 1.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ L. v. SÜDLAND [Ivo PILAR], *Južnoslavensko pitanje. Prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja*, Zagreb, 1943., 398. This point was further developed in the following manner: “Eventually Istria and Carniola. Because it is

“With the suggested union a territory would be created of approximately 106.000 km sq. and about 5.5 million inhabitants. Of these, about 3.25 million would be Croats (Catholics and Muslims), about 1.5 million would be Serbs (Orthodox) and about 0.5 million would be Germans, Hungarians, Italians, and other Slavs of the Monarchy. Along with the historico-political and ethnic, natural geographic-transport and economic-political belonging is given to these lands. It must be emphasized, that the union of three historico-political entities is also the most important moment for the preservation of conditions in the south, because in the existing situation the three individual regions can neither economically nor culturally develop. That is why the division of the South Slav regions can not even be considered, and it would be an especially unfortunate resolution if [...] Hercegovina was to be attached to Dalmatia, that is Austria, and Bosnia to Hungary.²⁸ I do not hesitate to state that this type of solution would become the basis for a new war. [...]”²⁹

In the second point it was specifically emphasized that the “territory mentioned under point 1 would be inseparably tied with both states of the Monarchy,” that is Austria and Hungary, as a “common area (like Bosnia and Hercegovina are now).”³⁰ The explanation to this very important point, in which the creation of a new co dominion territory within the existing dualist structure is envisioned, stated:

“To the common territory, Austria will hand over Dalmatia and the Istrian islands and Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia. The natural resistance which will arise because of this will be overcome most easily by the fact that the primary power of both states [Austria and Hungary] over the territories that were set apart will continue to be a co-dominion and because the limitations to its powers will be augmented by its extension to new territories. [...] Common possession will tie the fastenings of the two states of the Monarchy more tightly.”³¹

According to the third point of the “Memorandum”, the common ruler should appoint “a member of the royal Imperial house the Vojvoda [Duke] of Croatia and grant to him the historical title: “Dux illustris totius regni Croatiae, Sclavoniae, Dalmatiae, Ramae et Culmae” and entrust “to his name the administration of the terri-

doubtful that we could [now] get these from Austria I do not portray this as indispensibly necessary to a resolution of the Croatian question. Every means should be because of vital economic and transportation reasons [used to] attach the Istrian islands Krk, Cres, and Lošinj. Without these islands it is hard to access the Croatian Littoral [which is] without economic-transport value!” (Reproduced according to “Iz memorandum dr. I. Pilara”, *Hrvatska*, 1917, no. 1893, 1.) OIP, R-5704b, pp. 4-5.

²⁸ Concerning Hungarian territorial pretensions in Bosnia and Hercegovina see: Hamdija KAPIDŽIĆ, “Austro-ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini i jugoslovensko pitanje za vrijeme prvog svjetskog rata,” in: *Godišnjak Istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine*, Sarajevo, 1958., 9/1957., pp. 17-19, 22, 34, 41-47; Ferdo HAUPTMAN, “Kombinacije oko državnopravnog položaja Bosne i Hecegovine,” in: *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine*, Sarajevo, 1/1960., pp. 87-109; L. ĐAKOVIĆ, “Kombinacije mađarskih političkih faktora 1915. godine oko priključenja Bosne i Hercegovine Ugarskoj. (Prilog proučavanju istorije Bosne i Hercegovine u prvom svjetskom ratu),” *Prilozi Instituta za istoriju*, Sarajevo, 15/1979., no. 16, pp. 103-145; L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Položaj Bosne i Hercegovine u austrougarskim koncepcijama rješenja jugoslavenskog pitanja 1914-1918.*, Tuzla, 1980, pp. 5-192.

²⁹ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 5-6.

³⁰ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, p. 4.

³¹ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 6-7.

tory mentioned under [point] 1, to name a responsible ministry under the presidency of the ban, in order for this ministry to work out a constitution on the basis of instructions it will receive, to submit this constitution to the governments of both states [Austria and Hungary], and that they pass it through Parliament.”³² In explaining this point, the author made the following remarks:

“Croatian dukedom is an institution of Hungarian state right dating back to the pre-Turkish period. The origins of this institution go back to the earliest Hungarian and Croatian history, back before the union of the two states. The power of the duke in that time stretched across the very lands that it would stretch across today, which can already be seen from the title (Rama and Culma — today’s Bosnia and Hercegovina). The Croatian duke then was always named when conditions in the Hungaro-Croatian state were very difficult, or when important questions had to be settled in the south. The exalted status of a contemporary Croatian duke would be a sure guarantee, that the difficulties of the new order would be overcome and that, further, the development of conditions in the south such as took place before the [First World] War would be rooted out. The institution of Croatian dukedom would be sympathetically welcomed in Croatia and in Hungary. In its duties, the rule of a duke would be identical to that of the Palatine in Hungary”.³³

According to the designs of the author of the “Memorandum”, presented in the fourth point, the new “unified administrative territory” had to be “totally autonomous in all affairs”, excepting those which were common to the whole Monarchy as stipulated in the provisions of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement.³⁴ This autonomy had to serve above all as “one means, to sustain [the Monarchy] in the south”, and the envisaged “[united administrative territory] to enable its cultural and economic development”.³⁵

In the fifth point of the “Memorandum” the anticipated powers of the Hungarian and Austrian prime ministers over the “unified administrative territories” were laid out:

“The prime ministers of both states of the Monarchy have the right, against unconstitutional laws brought forward in the common unified administrative territory, to enter a veto within a period of a month, in case something has been proposed contrary to the law. This veto is a prevention of the law entering into force. In the prescriptions of the constitution a means should be foreseen by which these kinds of conflicts can be resolved.”³⁶

In the accompanying explanation to this point the author called on the already existing right of “control” of both halves of the Monarchy over Bosnia and Hercegovina.³⁷

³² L. V. SÜDLAND, *op. cit.*, 398; OIP, R-5704b, p. 4.

³³ L. V. SÜDLAND, *op. cit.*, 400; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 7-8.

³⁴ L. V. SÜDLAND, *op. cit.*, 398; OIP, R-5704b, 4. According to the provisions of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise the Monarchy had three joint ministries: Army, foreign affairs and finances. (A. J. P. TAYLOR, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.)

³⁵ L. V. SÜDLAND, *op. cit.*, 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 8.

³⁶ L. V. SÜDLAND, *op. cit.*, 398; OIP, R-5704b, p. 4.

In the sixth point, the likely contribution of the “unified administrative territory” to the common affairs of Austria and Hungary was laid out:

“The territory mentioned more specifically under [point] 1 takes part in the deliberations about common affairs, eventually by way of sending an equal number of delegates to each state from its own parliament. The quota, according to which the common unified administrative territory will pay its share of the expense for common affairs, should be determined according to § 3. of the law referred to under [point] 4.³⁸ and in conjunction with the above mentioned points.”³⁹

In explaining this point, the author specifically emphasized that the means suggested for the “unified administrative territory” to cooperate in the common affairs of the Monarchy had to be “in conformity with the efforts to establish a new order in the south, protecting to the greatest extent possible the constitutional relations in the Monarchy.”⁴⁰

As regards the administration of customs and taxes, the seventh point of the “Memorandum” said the following: “The common area mentioned under [point] 1. will be accepted in the existing tariff zone of the Monarchy⁴¹ according to a special tariff convention. The collection and administration of taxes will be executed by officials of the above mentioned unified territory.”⁴²

In the eighth point of the “Memorandum” the author suggested an official name for the anticipated “unified administrative territory”: “The territory, mentioned under [point] 1 will have the title: Unified Common Territory of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Herceg-Bosnia and it will be under the political leadership of the Croats.”⁴³ The introduction of this title is justified in the following manner:

“The name is derived from the construction of this territory. Croatian leadership is imposed out of necessity, in order to grant the South Slavs one possible form of political and cultural fulfillment. It is impossible to carry out South Slav politics and deny any possibility of life to the South Slavs. Croats were always loyal to the Monarchy and dynasty, and in every difficult moment for the Monarchy they were a strong bulwark for the throne and the state. [...] The new order in the south therefore can only be implemented in Croatian terms. This new order will be an element of strength and stability for the Monarchy in the south. [...]”⁴⁴

³⁷ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 8. The position of Bosnia and Hercegovina as a co dominion was regulated in 1880. (Ferdo ČULINOVIĆ, *Državnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX. I XX. vijeka /Hrvatska, Slavonija i Dalmacija, Istra, Srpska Vojvodina, Slovenija, Bosna i Hercegovina te Država SHS/*, Zagreb, 1953, p. 310.)

³⁸ He is referring to the Austro-Hungarian Agreement.

³⁹ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 398; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 4-5.

⁴⁰ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, 8.

⁴¹ According to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the tariff treaty between the two halves of the Monarchy had to be renewed every ten years. (A. J. P. TAYLOR, op. cit., 166.)

⁴² L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, 5.

⁴³ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, 5.

⁴⁴ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, 8-9.

In the ninth and final point of the "Memorandum", the author attempted to address a possible Hungarian complaint as regards their loss of unimpeded access to the Adriatic Sea: "in order to forestall Hungarian complaints, that the new arrangement removes their access to the sea, the Rijeka 'corpus separatum'[⁴⁵] will be surrendered to the Hungarian state in full sovereignty, and a constitutional guarantee will give them the right to take part in decisions regarding fees and administrative matters on the Gyekenyes-Rijeka railroad. Other railroads in Croatia and Slavonia naturally pass under the autonomous administration of the new unified territory."⁴⁶ This point, according to its drafter's opinion "[had] to help in overcoming the considerable difficulties in Hungary."⁴⁷

The following is stated at the end of the "Memorandum":

"The solution of the South Slav Question, which I am suggesting, would make the Monarchy a southern rampart, which would have the same value against its enemies in the south and south east [⁴⁸] that the Military Frontier against the Turks once had. Once the Croats are politically satisfied and unhindered in their progress, they will be a sure bulwark for the Monarchy. The bungling and the foot dragging that has taken place up until now can no longer be defended. The sooner and the more fundamentally the Monarchy establishes order in the south, the more surely it can confront all international entanglements."⁴⁹

According to the suggestions presented in the "Memorandum", the existing dualistic structure of the Monarchy had to, at least formally, remain inviolable to the greatest extent possible. Yet the creation of a new "unified administrative territory," in which, besides Banian Croatia and Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina had to be joined, and its constitutional arrangement as a common possession of Austria and Hungary, negated the dualistic system as it existed up to that point in important elements. In other words, the Stadler-Pilar political circle tried to carry out a reorganization of the Monarchy on the basis of a "veiled trialism" in the form of a co-dominion.

Dr. Pilar was not entirely in agreement with the final text of the "Memorandum": "Even if I do not fully agree with the project, it is at least very close to my own notions, and I see in it a means to the solution of the problem."⁵⁰ To his mind, some of its points were "actually lacking".⁵¹ Thus he was very critical of points 3. and 6. concerning the institution of a "Croatian duke" and of the problem of parliamentary delegations from the "unified administrative territory" cooperating with both states of the Monarchy.⁵² In spite of his stated objections, Dr. Pilar saw in the "Memoran-

⁴⁵ F. ČULINOVIĆ, op. cit., 146-151.

⁴⁶ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, 5.

⁴⁷ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 9.

⁴⁸ He has the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Italy in mind.

⁴⁹ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 9.

⁵⁰ L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 401.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

dum” the “road to the solution of the problems” on the south of the Monarchy, and that in “Croatian terms”: “With one of the fundamental points [of the “Memorandum”] I must register my unconditional agreement, with the eighth point. The new territory can only stand under the political leadership of the Croats and by its content it can be none other than a Croatian state. It is entirely clear, what I have in mind by Croatian state. The autonomy, which came about during an eight hundred year history of development within the framework of the Monarchy. Only this kind of solution conforms with the benefits of the Monarchy.”⁵³

On August 14, 1917, Dr. Pilar and Eng. Josip Vančaš met with the Austrian Prime Minister, Ernest von Seidler; two days later, they met Stephan von Burián, the joint Minister of Finance.⁵⁴ These discussions preceded their audience with Emperor and King Charles I (IV), which was granted by the Emperor’s Chancery at the request of Archbishop Stadler. During the half hour audience, Eng. Vančaš explained the contents of the “Memorandum” on the reform of the Monarchy to the ruler. Pilar spoke of his objections to parts of the “Memorandum” to the ruler himself and he used the opportunity of the audience to present some of his own ideas about how he “conceives of a solution to the South Slav or Croatian question.”⁵⁵ Charles was also interested in Pilar’s constitutional views.⁵⁶

The Stadler-Pilar “Declaration” (November 1917)

The President of the Yugoslav Club and one of the signatories to the “May Declaration”, Rev. Anton Korošec traveled to Sarajevo 31 August 1917.⁵⁷ His intention was to acquaint himself with the current attitudes of key politicians and religious leaders in Bosnia and Hercegovina. What interested Korošec the most was the opinion of Archbishop Stadler and his group to the political program of the “May Declaration”. Dr. Pilar explained the views of the Archbishop of Sarajevo and his adherents to the Slovene politician, repeating what had already been said in the “Memorandum on the Resolution of the South Slav Question”.⁵⁸ In other words, this support of this political group for the “May Declaration” could not be expected.

Korošec redeemed his failure in discussions with Stadler’s group by scoring a success with the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Franciscans, who, in the following months, gave their unreserved support for the “May Declaration”.⁵⁹ Before the Fran-

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ “Vančaš i Pilar u audijenciji.”, *Hrvatska riječ* (further: *HR*), Zagreb, 1917, no. 217, p. 2.

⁵⁵ “Razgovor s J. pl. Vančašem,” *Novine*, Zagreb, 4/1917, no. 200, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁶ “Deputacija pl. Vančaša i dra. Pilara.”, *Novine*, 4/1917, no. 192, p. 4. On this occasion Dr. Pilar gave his own “Memorandum” to the Emperor. (Ibid.) On the possible content of this “Memorandum” see: Z. GRIJAK, “O sadržaju promemorije Ive Pilara caru Karlu I. (IV.) iz kolovoza 1917. godine,” in: *GP*, 2/2002, pp. 83-102.

⁵⁷ Momčilo ZEČEVIĆ, *Slovenska ljudska stranka i jugoslovensko ujedinjenje 1917-1921. Od Majske deklaracije do vidovdanskoj ustava*, Beograd, 1973, pp. 92-94.

⁵⁸ L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Položaj Bosne i Hercegovine*, pp. 176-177.

⁵⁹ B.[onifac] BADROV, “Odjek svibanjske deklaracije u Bosni.”, *Franjevački Vijesnik*, Visoko — Sarajevo, 35/1928, no. 12, pp. 363-365. For the statement of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian in favor of the “May

ciscans publicly endorsed the “May Declaration”, the “Declaration of Clerical Groups of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Catholics” (or Stadler’s “Declaration”) was issued in November 1917, which in its content was totally contrary to the “Declaration” of the Yugoslav Club.

The second point in the “Declaration” demanded the following:

“We ask for the unification of those lands to which Croatian state right extends, namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatian Istria, into one politically and financially autonomous state entity to be tied irrevocably to the entirety of the Habsburg Monarchy.”⁶⁰

The “Declaration” was signed by Archbishop Stadler, not only in his own name but “in the name of 51 outstanding citizens of Sarajevo and the Province”, whose signatures were not published.⁶¹ To the “Declaration” was added an unsigned accompanying article entitled “To the Defense of Croatism!”, in which the program of the “May Declaration” was argumentatively rejected as politically unrealistic, calling for the kind of solutions which were based on the demands presented in Stadler’s “Declaration”, that is to say, demands based exclusively on Croatian State Right directed against the then current Hungarian pretensions to Bosnia and Hercegovina.⁶²

Stadler’s “Declaration” immediately called forth divided reactions: adherents of the “May Declaration” attacked it, among which, prominently, were members of the Croatian Catholic Seniorate,⁶³ the elite clerical-lay organizations of the Croatian Catholic movement,⁶⁴ while some Catholic priests, the Party of (Croat State) Right (Frankists), and Radić’s Croat People’s Peasant Party supported it.⁶⁵

Nobody of the political figures of the time believed that Archbishop Stadler was the initiator and author of the “Declaration”. Suspicion as to its authorship fell primarily on General Baron Stjepan Sarkotić,⁶⁶ who was believed to have, through the intercession of Dr. Pilar and Dr. Ivica Pavičić, influenced Archbishop Stadler to publish and sign the “Declaration”.⁶⁷ Yet the style of the “Declaration” and the accompanying article point to their author being Dr. Pilar’s work, a fact that he confirmed ten years later.⁶⁸

Declaration” see: F. ŠIŠIĆ, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

⁶⁰ “Izjava,” *Hrvatski dnevnik* (further: *HD*), Sarajevo, 12/1917, no. 263, p. 1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² “Na obranu Hrvatsstva!”, *HD*, 12/1917, 263, p. 1.

⁶³ Z. MATIJEVIĆ, “Hrvatski katolički seniorat i politika (1912.-1919.),” *Croatica Christiana Periodica*, Zagreb, 24/2000, no. 46, pp. 121-162.

⁶⁴ Jure KRIŠTO, *Prešućena povijest. Katolička crkva u hrvatskoj politici (1850.-1918.)* Zagreb, 1994.

⁶⁵ Z. MATIJEVIĆ, “Izjava vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa dr. Josip Stadlera iz studenoga 1917. godine,” *ČSP*, 31/1999, no. 1, pp. 51-72.

⁶⁶ Ernest BAUER, *Der letzte Paladin des Reiches. Generaloberst Stefan Freiherr Sarkotić von Lovćen*, Graz — Wien — Köln, 1988.

⁶⁷ Marijo MATULIĆ, “Postanak Jugoslavije,” in: *Seljački Kalendar*, Zagreb, for 1928, pp. 44-45.

⁶⁸ Božidar JANČIKOVIĆ, “Ivo Pilar u svjetlu nepoznatih dokumenata,” in: *GP*, 1/2002, p. 242.

Pilar's "Memorandum" to Count Tisza (September 1918)

At the beginning of 1918, the situation on the European battlefields appeared more than favourable for the Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Indeed, on February 9, 1918 the Central Powers reached a peace with the newly established independent Ukrainian state. Three weeks later, on March 3, 1918, in Brest-Litovsk, they signed an advantageous peace treaty with the new Soviet (Bolshevik) government in Russia. Then Rumania, two months later on May 7, 1918, succumb to combined German-Austrian military pressure and was forced to sign a separate peace. Some weeks earlier, the German General Staff, carried away by these successes, had launched the great spring offensive on the western front on March 21, 1918. Success was not absent. The Allied line began to give way in the face of massive German assaults. The German army approached to within 70 km of Paris. The Central Powers were almost certain of final victory.⁶⁹ But the unexpected Allied counter-offensives under the command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, halted the German advance. The fortunes of war passed to the Entente powers. Even if the collapse of the Central Powers seemed ever clearer, the members of the Entente were still not in agreement as to the question of who was — "enemy number one". For the Kingdom of Italy, without doubt, this was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. To the other Allies — France, Great Britain, and the United States of America — this was Germany. None of these states had assumed in its war aims the total destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and its disappearance from the map of Europe. Even Italy was only interested in reducing its territory. This meant that the leading political circles in the Entente countries "approached conservatively and hesitantly all hypotheses and plans concerning the eventual division of Austria-Hungary and, consequently, the creation of a common Yugoslav state made up of some of its regions and the lands *beyond* its framework and the ruins of its framework."⁷⁰ Even the Serbian government, which was still in exile on Corfu, had two solutions regarding the possible fates of the Monarchy — a "big" one and a "small" one. The "big" solution envisioned the separation — according to "ethnographic principles" — of territories from the Monarchy where "South Slav peoples" (Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs) lived, and their union with the Kingdom of Serbia, after its restoration to its prewar borders. The "little" solution was limited to the creation of a "Great Serbia," that is, the kind of Serbia that in its borders would include all those parts of the Monarchy where Serbs, allegedly, had a "marked" or "predominant majority."⁷¹

Despite a relatively good diplomatic and military outlook, the Dual Monarchy's internal crisis grew more serious with each passing day, primarily because of the dissatisfaction of its many Slavic peoples (Poles, Czechs, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, etc.),

⁶⁹ Bogdan KRIZMAN, "Stvaranje jugoslavenske države. (Referat na Drugom kongresu historičara Jugoslavije)," *Historijski pregled* (further: *HP*), Zagreb, 4/1958, no. 3-4, pp. 167-168.

⁷⁰ B. KRIZMAN, "Austrougarska diplomacija u danima raspadanja Dvojne Monarhije 1918. god.," *HP*, 8/1962, no. 1, p. 15.

⁷¹ B. KRIZMAN, "Stvaranje jugoslavenske države. (Referat)," p. 170.

but also because of disagreements between Austria's two dominant nations, the Germans and the Hungarians. The crisis was most severe in the Monarchy's south.

Emperor and King Charles perceived the importance of the "South Slav Question" to the Monarchy's future rather early on. Attempting to save his state, the Emperor decided to entrust an important political "informative mission" to the former Hungarian prime minister István Tisza, still considered to be the most influential politician in Hungary. Calling Tisza from the southwestern front, Charles held an audience with him on September 7, 1918 where he gave him the task of travelling to the "South Slav lands" of the Monarchy in the capacity of a "homo regius" in order to try to find a life-saving formula to avert the danger threatening the Habsburg state.⁷²

Tisza's first stop in his political tour of the south of the Monarchy was Zagreb, where he arrived on September 13, 1918.⁷³ Some days later, on September 13, 1918, general Sarkotić received a telegram from Tisza in which he asked Sarkotić "to meet him in Sarajevo on September 20".⁷⁴ In Sarkotić's opinion, Tisza's journey was "inappropriate," but he met the Hungarian Count any way.⁷⁵

In Sarajevo, Tisza met with many mainly Yugoslav oriented Bosnian and Hercegovinian politicians from all three "ethnic-religious" communities (Croat-Catholic, Serb-Orthodox, and Bosnian-Muslim),⁷⁶ among which were included on the recommendation of provincial chief Sarkotić, the anti-Yugoslav oriented Dr. Pilar and Eng. Vancaš.⁷⁷

On September 22, 1918, Tisza met with Dr. Pilar for the second time.⁷⁸ On this occasion he handed the Hungarian politician the "Memorandum" ("Denkschrift"),⁷⁹ wherein he wanted to justify the "pro-Austrian orientation"⁸⁰ of his political circle in

⁷² B. KRIZMAN, *Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu*, p. 251. Before Tisza's mission to the Monarchy's south, Hungarian politicians had envisioned a few possible solutions to the "South Slav Question". The three following were mentioned most often: "a) Bosnia and Hercegovina are united with Hungary as 'separatum corpus sacrae coronae hungariae'. b) Dalmatia is attached to Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina to Hungary. c) Croatia receives from Bosnia its western districts: Bihać and Banja Luka, and from Dalmatia the portion north of Split. The southern portion of Dalmatia with Dubrovnik and Boka Kotarska, Hercegovina, and the eastern part of Bosnia along with the Bosanski Brod-Sarajevo-Mostar-Zelenika railway as an axis would fall to Hungary." (H. KAPIDŽIĆ, "Austro-ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini," p. 43.)

⁷³ B. KRIZMAN, "O putu grofa Stj. Tisze po jugoslavenskim zemljama u septembru 1918," *Historijski zbornik*, Zagreb, 11-12/1958-59, pp. 233-249; B. KRIZMAN, *Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 251-261; L. ĐAKOVIĆ, *Položaj Bosne i Hercegovine*, 178-192; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, pp. 550-555. See also: Sandor TONELLI, *Tisza István utolsoutja (Sarkotić István baro vezerezredes, Bosznia-Hercegovina utolso tartományi főnökenek naploja)*, Szegedin, 1941.

⁷⁴ B. KRIZMAN, *Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu*, p. 252.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ For more about Tisza's conversations with Serb, Croat, and Muslim (Bosniak) politicians in Sarajevo see: H. KAPIDŽIĆ, "Austro-Ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini," pp. 44-47; B. KRIZMAN, *Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 254-261; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, pp. 550-555. F. ŠIŠIĆ, op. cit., pp. 161-165.

⁷⁷ B. KRIZMAN, *Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu*, p. 252, note 34.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 259.

⁷⁹ OIP, R-5710.

their attempt to bring about the constitutional unification of all Croatian lands which to him included Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Istria.⁸¹ Pilar began the “Memorandum” with a general introduction in which he said that he began his studies of the “South Slav Question” twelve years before,⁸² when he learned “[...] what a catastrophic turn of events had occurred in the South” of the Monarchy.⁸³ To his mind, in “Hungary there is no more consciousness that the Croatian lands were, and that they always will remain, the most threatened point in the whole Monarchy”.⁸⁴ He made this claim on the basis of the geopolitical position of the Croatian lands: “The geopolitical position of these lands is conditioned by the fact that every leading power on the Apennine and Balkan peninsulas always aspires to possess them. They have to aspire to this out of rightful geopolitical reasons, and thus they must always lean to creating an alliance against anyone who rules Croatia.”⁸⁵ In terms of the actual world conflict, Pilar was of the opinion that “the Monarchy has completely unnecessarily secured for itself in the south a reason for world war, because in 1867 it established a constitutional position which guaranteed that the state, in order to maintain this order created in opposition to the vital interests of the Croats, had to rely especially on the Serbs and Italians against the Croats. This politics was carried out successfully until a cause for a world war appeared and now it is clear that Serbs and Italians are united to seize these [Croatian] lands from our Monarchy.”⁸⁶

In the discussion that followed in the “Memorandum”, Pilar presented his view of the relations between Magyars and Croats during their 800 year coexistence in a common state.⁸⁷ In his opinion this common state survived for so long because the Hungarians did not hinder the existence of Croatian statehood.⁸⁸ Problems between the two peoples began, he feels, only in the 19th century when “the idea of a unitary Magyar state” arose and replaced the historical notion of Hungary that had existed until that time.⁸⁹

⁸⁰ In the “Memorandum”, Pilar stated: “The Hungarians stand before the choice of defending the long Carpathian front or the long Adriatic front. They will always choose the Carpathian front, and we will stay with those who will settle with the Italians. In this Austria can help us more [...]. Our affection for Austria is the emotional expression of this understanding, though it has faded many times over.” (OIP, R-5710, [p. 3].; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.)

⁸¹ OIP, R-5710, 1; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, 552. In terms of his understanding of the extent of Croatian lands, Pilar referred Tisza to his book *Die südlawische Frage und der Weltkrieg* (Vienna, 1918) and to his second chapter in particular, pp. 140-232. (OIP, R-5710, p. 1; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 724, note 2541.)

⁸² OIP, R-5710, p. 1. In other words, his interest in the “South Slav Question” began around 1906.

⁸³ Ibid.; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 552.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ OIP, R-5710, pp. 1-2; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 252.

⁸⁶ OIP, R-5710, p. 2; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 552.

⁸⁷ OIP, R-5710, [pp. 3-4]; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.

⁸⁸ “We Croats could live well with the Magyars for 800 years, because they allowed our statehood to continue to live.” (OIP, R-5710, [p. 4]; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.)

In his dissection of Croatian-Hungarian relations, Pilar expressed great wonder at Hungarian sympathy for the Serbs.⁹⁰ To him these sympathies were proof that Hungarians understood “neither the aims nor the nature of the Serbs”.⁹¹ Because according to him, “Serbian aims are the weakening and ultimate assimilation of the Bulgars and Croats, and the unification of the whole Slavic Balkans into a Great Serbia. The basis for this is their middle position between the Bulgars and Croats, their state-political and church-political tradition [...], and the circumstance that they were the first South Slavs who were able to renew their state after the collapse of the Ottomans.”⁹²

Without mincing words Pilar accused the Hungarians, by helping the Serbs, of contributing to the fact that “they have become so strong in the south, that they can contest the Monarchy’s possession of the South Slav lands.”⁹³ Then followed this direct accusation: “[...] 50 years of struggle for the idea of a unitary Hungarian state has shown as its only result, that now in the south the Serbian state idea is on the best path to victory.”⁹⁴

Pilar did not doubt that the main role in bringing about the idea of a Greater Serbia state was allotted to the Serbian Orthodox Church: “The Serbian Orthodox national church is the instrument: it is more of a social-political warring and initiating organization than a religious community, and its power has not been sufficiently perceived for long.”⁹⁵

Warning Tisza of the complete disastrousness of the current politics toward Croatian aspirations, Pilar says: “The state is now in the position that it can not effectively confront the dangerous centrifugal forces in the south, namely Greater Serbia irredentism, which has been quietly at work since 1860, yet it has to support its natural enemies [Serbs] against its loyal elements [Croats]. This disastrous politics was carried out for so long that loyal Croats realized that loyalty is not at all helpful, that it in fact becomes disloyalty, and that disloyalty always is more effective.”⁹⁶

Pilar warned Tisza that the state of affairs in the Monarchy’s south was such that “the Monarchy was going to lose the South Slav lands forever, if not in this war, then certainly in the next.”⁹⁷

The unclear constitutional position of the Croatian lands led, according to Pilar, to the fact that Croats “today in large part prepared to accept as a substitute [for a

⁸⁹ “Our relations were irreparably poisoned only with the idea of a unitary Hungarian [Magyar] state, which which thus had to include and consume Croatia. I believe that Louis Kossuth gave this idea its sharpest outline, because he wanted to end Croatian autonomy, divide up Croatia, and Magyarize the Croats.” (OIP, R-5710, [p. 4]; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.)

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ OIP, R-5710, [p. 5]; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.

⁹² OIP, R-5710, [p. 5].

⁹³ OIP, R-5710, [p. 4].

⁹⁴ Ibid.; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.

⁹⁵ OIP, R-5710, [p. 5]; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.

⁹⁶ OIP, R-5710, [p. 6].

⁹⁷ Ibid.; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 553.

Croatian state within the Monarchy], a Serbo-Croatian state outside of the Monarchy, and this is the fundamental idea of Yugoslavism.”⁹⁸

But that which Pilar knew the Magyars did not know: “Unfortunately in Hungary the current extent of the danger to the position in the south is still unknown. Likewise, it is not known that the moment of decision is here: either a Kingdom of Croatia as a crown land within the Monarchy or a soon to be Kingdom of Great Serbia outside the Monarchy.”⁹⁹

For Pilar, only one solution to the difficult situation in which the Monarchy found itself existed: “We have come so far, that today only the speedy unification of Bosnia and Hercegovina with the remaining Croatian lands can help, and the implementation of one Croatian [political] direction. The attempt to lead politics as they have been led up to now, can only have as a consequence the worsening of the position of the state in the south. But, the situation is so ‘tense’ that it could bear no worsening.”¹⁰⁰

Finally, Pilar suggested the following in the “Memorandum”: “1. Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Istrian islands will be united in a Croatian Kingdom; 2. The Croatian Kingdom must politically be in the hands of Croats and a Croatian program must be put in place in an acceptable way; 3. The Croatian Kingdom will be included in the dualistic organization in the form of sub-dualism and it will enjoy partial sovereignty within the framework of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen, subject to (a) a guarantee to Croatia of unconditional national and state individuality and the extension to the new territory of the possibility of unhindered development in economy and transportation, and (b) Austria’s acceptance of this solution.”¹⁰¹

Pilar’s “Memorandum” was yet another attempt to re-organize the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the principle of “veiled trialism,” that is, to nominally leave the dualistic structure of the state in place yet implement the constitutional unification of all Croatian lands, including Bosnia and Hercegovina. This proposal was opposed to the Hungarian intention of strengthening the dualistic system, a plan which in part called for trying to join Bosnia and Hercegovina directly to Hungary, as a “corpus separatum”.¹⁰²

Pilar’s views on the reform of the Monarchy, as might be expected, did not receive Tisza’s approval.

The day after Tisza’s departure, September 24, 1918, the new joint Minister of Finance, Alexander Spitzmüller von Harmersbach, arrived in Sarajevo.¹⁰³ On the occasion of his departure, on September 27, 1918, from Sarajevo to Vienna, he ran across Dr. Pilar at the railway station. According to the newspaper reports, the min-

⁹⁸ OIP, R-5710, [p. 4]; Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, pp. 553-554.

⁹⁹ OIP, R-5710, [p. 6].

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ B. KRIZMAN, *Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu*, p. 259-260.

¹⁰² Z. GRIJAK, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera*, p. 554.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 555; Alexander SPITZMÜLLER, “...und hat auch Ursach, es zu lieben.”, Vienna - Munich - Stuttgart - Zürich, 1955, pp. 252-256.

ister invited him to “come to Vienna, to present his position on the solution to the Bosnian question that is, the whole South Slav problem.”¹⁰⁴

In the somber atmosphere of the last weeks of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's existence, Dr. Pilar arrived in Vienna, where he gave two lectures to “Austrian political society”.¹⁰⁵ Right at the start of his second lecture, aimed at the Austrian-German political public, he argued that the “urgency of the South Slav Question” stemmed from the fact that the war, which was “sparked by this question”, was threatening “the Monarchy with an unpleasant end”.¹⁰⁶ In Pilar's view, the Austro-Hungarian compromise was one of the main reasons for the difficult situation in the Monarchy's south. Under its provisions Dalmatia, which indisputably belonged to Croatia, was reduced to a legal position which was “unique in the world”:

“[...] according to the December Constitution (21. XII. 1867) Dalmatia fell to Austria, but according to the earlier Compromise — to Hungary. This gave rise to that unfortunate, uncertain position in which Dalmatia, according to Austrian state right as well as de facto, belonged to Austria, and according to Hungarian state right as well as virtually — Hungary.”¹⁰⁷

Bosnia and Hercegovina were no less of a problem. Relations in that part of the state had become unbearable, in Pilar's opinion, as a result of the political efforts of Gyula Andrássy, the first Hungarian Prime Minister in the Dual Monarchy:

“He occupied Bosnia and Hercegovina in order to forestall the creation of a Greater Serbia Empire. Unfortunately, he had partly insufficient and partly incorrect information regarding the essence and strength of the Greater Serbia idea. Thus he wanted to break the Greater Serbia movement in Bosnia, but he did not allow, coming from a Hungarian perspective, the other possible solution — Croatian. He wanted, therefore, to create a national-political vacuum in Bosnia. This was a regime that from its very beginning was doomed to fail, and the result is now apparent in that the Greater Serbia idea is about to be realized at the Monarchy's expense. This result will be realized because Andrásy organized Bosnia in such a way that Magyar influence would gradually be predominant; Bosnia was, hence, treated as if it were a Magyar area of interest. [...] Together with Magyar influence Magyar serbophilism, which is the enemy of Croats, took hold, and soon the final result of this will become apparent.”¹⁰⁸

Owing to what he said above, and also some other errors, the entirety of the Monarchy's politics, to Pilar's way of thinking, had “wound up on the wrong track”.¹⁰⁹ “Most ominous,” of the whole constitutional and political quagmire in the Monarchy's south, was the fact that “the South Slav Question in its current balance

¹⁰⁴ “Raspoloženje u Bosni,” *Novine*, 5/1918, no. 214, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ The first lecture was held on 9 and the second on 12 October 1918. The outline of the second lecture, which began with the words “Meine Herren!”, has been preserved. (OIP, R-5712, p. 1).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰⁷ OIP, R-5172, p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

of relations between right and might, can no longer be solved at all in a legal way.”¹¹⁰ Despite this gloomy statement Pilar offered the following solution:

“The South Slav Question has to be solved. [...] The solution can only be implemented within a general reconstruction of the Monarchy. The reconstruction of the Monarchy can only be successful and purposeful if it takes into account its nature. The Monarchy, in its historical development, is a conglomerate, a sanctuary for the remains of various states and peoples, who because of the violent assaults of the waves of history here in the transition zone between East and West were shipwrecked, finding shelter in the framework of the Monarchy. The Monarchy can fulfill its life’s purpose only if it continues to provide, to those states and peoples who are still alive, a sure sanctuary. Regrettably, the aged Monarchy has let this task go undone and thus must, in its contemporary [dualistic] form, experience collapse. [...] Let us not delude ourselves! The Monarchy in its old form — is dead. [...] I believe [...] that the reconstruction [of the Monarchy] can only take place on a federalistic foundation. The existing Monarchy can now only be a federal state composed of several small national states. A single federative South Slav state will enter into the framework of this federative state.”¹¹¹

In Pilar’s opinion, the “South Slav federal state” could be built in one of two ways: 1. if the Croatian and Slovenian lands of the Monarchy were made into “two small federal states — Croatia and Slovenia”; and 2., if all the South Slav lands of the Monarchy were made into “a unified South Slav state [‘Südslavien’]”.¹¹² Pilar himself assumed that the second solution would be “real”, because “the first [Croatian] state would not be acceptable to neither the Entente nor the people in the south of the [Monarchy].”¹¹³

Pilar concluded his lecture with words which in themselves carried the portent of numerous tragic historical events for the Central European region in the last century of the second millennium of the Christian era: “All peoples need the Monarchy on its present territory, and if they forget about it at this moment in time, they will soon learn to value it in the harsh school of life.”¹¹⁴

Radicalizing his views about the possible solution of not only the “South Slav Question”, which was for him basically identical to the solution of the situation of the Croatian lands, but also for the survival of the whole Monarchy, Pilar gave up on “veiled Trialism” and openly took up the cause of federalization of the Habsburg state. The reform of the Dual Monarchy into a federal state would, in his opinion, solve all the constitutional problems of Croatia and the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the state. However, the efforts of Dr. Pilar and those people who shared his political views, to reform the internal political organization of the Monarchy in its final moments and save it from its inescapable collapse, but to also ensure Croatia

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-14.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

a constitutional position in the Central European culture sphere, did not obtain the expected result. Even before the formal end of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy disappeared from the political map of Central Europe, relinquishing its place to the new states which emerged from its ruins. "The South Slav Question" was "solved" outside the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the Croatian lands, together with Bosnia and Hercegovina, found themselves in the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Serbian Karadorđević dynasty.

Summary

On several occasions during World War I Dr. Ivo Pilar endeavoured to find the optimal solution to the burning "Southern Slavic" or Croatian question within the borders of the dualistically constituted Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Setting forth from the then current fact that the solution to the "Southern Slavic question" could be tied neither to the general reconstruction of the Monarchy nor to the realisation of the triadic formula of its reconstitution, he ardently advocated its remodelling on the basis of a "concealed triadism" in the form of condominium relations between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand, and the Austrian and Hungarian parties of the state on the other. In the dismal atmosphere of the last weeks of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Pilar arrived in Vienna to hold two lectures. According to him, the Austro-Hungarian agreement was one of the main causes of the grave state of affairs in the south of the Monarchy. Having radicalised his stands on not only the possible solution to the "Southern Slavic question" but also the survival of the Monarchy as a whole, he renounced the idea of "concealed triadism" and started openly advocating the idea of a federation of the Habsburg state. However, even before the war formally ended, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy vanished from the political map of Central Europe, surrendering its position to the new countries constituted on its ruins. The "Southern Slavic question" was "solved" outside the Central European political, economic and cultural circle, while the Croatian states, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina, became part of a newly constituted Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, having thus entered the Balkan geopolitical region.