

RECOGNITION OF MUSIC AND BEAUTY BY THE LANGUAGE GAME

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UDC: 78.01

Original Scientific Paper
Izvorni znanstveni rad
Received: May 28, 2006
Primljeno: 28. svibnja 2006.
Accepted: August 7, 2006
Prihvaćeno: 7. kolovoza 2006.

Abstract — Résumé

What is most difficult with any discussion on music is that it cannot be objectively determined whether or not the music in question is a matter of beauty. In this paper, by introducing Wittgenstein's idea of the »language game«, the author proposes a theoretical model for recognition of various kinds of music, moving from the cultural areas where beauty is not known in connection with music, through those where beauty is intrinsic to it. According to the Wittgenstein, what supports personal feeling and experience is not the interior of experience, but the behavior that forms these two. Wittgenstein called this behavior the »language game«. Therefore, the beauty of music, whose experience cannot possibly be certified, should be recognized

as an operative effect created by the language game. For this purpose, four kinds of musical game, that is, »the game of the gesture of approval«, »the game of continuing and repeating a sound«, »the game of the aesthetic black box« and »the game of change« are defined. One can then recognize any musical act as one these four games in the light of the mutually circulative process, resulting in the appearance and disappearance of beauty as an operative effect of such process. It follows that music and its beauty can successfully be described by the language game.

Key words: Wittgenstein; Language game; Musical beauty; Gesture of approval; Primary game; Circulation model; Aesthetic formation

Introduction

When we listen to or play music, we appreciate the good quality of music — or, we find value in music. However, in different cultural spheres people acknowledge such value in a nearly infinite variety of ways. Since the eighteenth century

there has been an increasing frequency of discourse in Western Europe surrounding the subject of »the beauty« of music. However, societies that do not appreciate the beauty of music still exist, though they may acknowledge some good qualities in music. Either way, the discourse surrounding beauty in music has its fountainhead in personal experience, whose reality cannot be observed and known from the outside world. Therefore, beauty is difficult to substantiate. This, the author believes, is the very thing that makes a study on the value of music so difficult.

In this article the author will present a framework for understanding music by creating a link between music in societies where an aesthetic concept is shared and societies that do not recognize such a concept.¹

Difficulty in the Recognition of Beauty

Given that the beauty of music has its fountainhead in personal experiences whose reality cannot be observed and known from the outside world, a unique framework of discourse must be provided in order to discuss the subject. However, many of the conventional frameworks for discussion of the beauty of music have not been adequate, often turning into a *petitio principii*, or a tautology. For example, someone might ask you the question, »Why do you say the sound of this chord is beautiful?« You answer, »Because it is in harmonic interval.« Suppose you are then asked why this particular harmonic interval is beautiful and you answer, »Because it has a beautiful interval.« A concept that needs to be defined in this dialogue, namely the concept of »beauty« is not clearly distinguished according to the framework of an established definition. Thus the entire dialogue becomes a *petitio principii*. To begin with, one particular musical interval might have been considered as a consonance at a certain time in history, whereas in another era the exact same interval might have been considered dissonant. Again, someone asks you, »Why do you find beauty in this melody?« You answer, »Because it soothes me.« Suppose you are then asked why it makes you feel good, and you answer, »Because it has a soothing melody.« Here again, the concept of beauty that should be defined in this dialogue is not clearly distinguished within the framework of an established definition. Thus the entire dialogue becomes a *petitio principii*.² The problem of the theory surrounding the beauty of music is summarized herein according to the following four aspects:

¹ The idea for this article is described in the author's book (YAKO 2001, 2005). However, the content herein has been revised.

² The fact that even the same pitch can be considered both consonant and dissonant implies that an aesthetic pitch, namely a consonant pitch, cannot be defined in a definitive manner (YAKO 2001: Chapter 3).

A. Impossibility of Substantiating Musical Beauty

You could have an aesthetic experience that you could neither substantiate nor provide evidence to prove it. Even if that were possible, it would only be so within a vortex engulfed by music.

B. Non-regulatory Nature of the Theory of Musical Beauty

In a discourse intended to explain the beauty of music, the concept of beauty that should be defined in the first place is not distinguished from the framework. As a result the discourse often becomes a *petitio principii*, or a tautology.

C. Inconsistency and Diversity of Evaluative Discussions for Music

When evaluating music the results of evaluation aren't always in agreement. In a discourse intended to evaluate music there are criteria other than simply »beautiful« or »not.« In modern Japan, shamisen music is evaluated in terms of its being »chic (*iki*)« or »stylish (*otsu*).«

D. Erasable Nature of Musical Beauty

In the Western countries, beauty in music started to be recognized after the eighteenth century. However, there are also many societies where beauty is not recognized as an aesthetic value in music.

Given these factors, let's talk about what kind of explanatory framework is required for a general discourse on the subject of the value in music. We will do so by reviewing some of the methods of dealing with the challenges inherent in carrying out a discourse surrounding the concept of music. When attempting to start from a discussion of theory and/or aesthetics on the premise of a musical piece as an art form with the predetermined evaluative system, to provide a foundation to music that is not based on such a premise seems to be impossible. Accordingly, to proceed further with our discussion, it is necessary for a moment to shift our subject from focusing on music as an art and to turn instead toward a review of primitive music. By so doing we examine the premise of music based on the simplest form of musical practice such as the everyday human activity of creating and listening to a sound, from which the differentiation process involving more complex forms comes into being. Then, based on that examination, the discussion needs to move toward explaining the music in societies where beauty is recognized.

Recognition of Beauty through the Language Game

The method of describing one's recognition of the world used in this paper is a philosophical concept of Ludwig Wittgenstein: the so-called »language game.« Although Wittgenstein provided various interpretations of a »language game,« this article incorporates the understanding of the language game of Herbert Hart and Daisaburo Hashizume.³ Furthermore, this paper pays careful attention to the fact that Wittgenstein himself, when unraveling beauty and art through the language game, first attempted to capture it through the »physical« concept. This article presents a model of a fundamental language game that can describe music with consideration for such physical factors and thereby capture the process in which it conceives a discourse. Therefore, this paper presents a method of describing music and its beauty as a mutual exercise among four types of games: »the game of gesture of approval,« »the game of continuing and repeating sound,« »the game of an aesthetic black box« and »the game of change.« Concurrently with this explanatory procedure, this paper develops a theory for avoiding the aforementioned *petitio principii*.

Language Game and Description of the World

Firstly, the author will address the prerequisite of discussing music within the framework of the language game. The thought of Wittgenstein is roughly classified into two major categories: his earlier »mapping theory« centered on *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, which was published in 1922; and his latter »language-game theory« centered on *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, which was published in 1936-1949 (WITTGENSTEIN 1961, 2002). This paper focuses on his latter thought. Wittgenstein's primary discussion in *Philosophische Untersuchungen* suggests that what drives and sustains us continually to have our personal feelings or personal experiences is not our introspection or the will hidden in an action or experience, but that it is instead customary behavior that forms them. Wittgenstein presents a view about an action and experience, being the concept of »Sprachspiel (language game)« (WITTGENSTEIN 2002:4). The language game, simply put, implies »behavior conducted by incorporating a language or other various aspects relating to that behavior.«

According to Wittgenstein, the language game should be formed and understood according to the circumstances and aspects where it is used (WITTGENSTEIN 2002: 8-9, 129-130). He considers personal feelings or personal experience, etc., to

³ Hart (HART 1961) describes the law, and Hashizume (HASHIZUME 1986) describes Buddhism, as behavior in the language game.

be embedded in the circumstances of the behavior in a language game. For example, the full reality of pain cannot be known even if others are groaning with pain. According to Wittgenstein, it is only the »language game of pain« that is discovered therein, while the pain itself remains unsubstantiated. According to Wittgenstein, it is not reduced to an individual's subjectivism. Instead, personal feelings and experience are shared by people in the behavior of the language game (WITTGENSTEIN 2002:75-76, 78, and 100). Such behavior is an operative effect of the game (WITTGENSTEIN 2002:10, 38, 84).

Additionally, according to Wittgenstein, the language game can be changed or added to without limit. In other words, the actions and experiences of people are modeled as countless language games overlap without a clear outline (WITTGENSTEIN 2002:30-31, 33-34). The language game is what is building people's living environment, or *Lebenswelt*, in this way, and therefore the physical behaviors accompanying language, such as people's gestures, movements and expressions, are wrapped up in the language game (WITTGENSTEIN 2002:7, 10, 75, 141, 148).

Let us suppose that the behavioral movement of people has already become a certain language game and that a society consists of these countless language games. Is it possible, then, objectively to describe a language game when it doesn't seem to have an intrinsic support in itself? Daisaburo Hashizume states that it is possible under a set condition (HASHIZUME 1985:66). According to Hashizume, in contrast to a broadly defined language game in terms of the basis of *Lebenswelt*, there is a narrowly defined »sub-game,« so to speak, in which time and space are limited. Moreover, that sub-game is played only among particular people. Hashizume also argues that although it is impossible to objectify the broadly defined language game, it is possible to describe each sub-game thereof (HASHIZUME 1985:101, 66).⁴ However, according to Hashizume, the attempt at such a description becomes another new language game, as distinguished from the original language game.

Music and the Language Game

It appears that the language game, when used to describe the world in this way, most clearly demonstrates a descriptive power when describing the world as a »game of reporting personal feelings.«⁵ For example, if »fear« is described as a

⁴ Hashizume examines the method of describing the world using the language game while analyzing the language game of law by Hart, who applied it to jurisprudence (HASHIZUME 1985). Furthermore, Wittgenstein himself explains ethics, art, feeling, color, psychology, etc., as, for example, language games.

⁵ The »personal-feeling communication game« is a concept by Hashizume. Hashizume avoids the *petitio principii* of the discussion involving the spiritual enlightenment of Buddhism by specifying that discipline as »a game of examining spiritual enlightenment« and describing the spiritual enlightenment as the operative effect of a language game of communicating personal feelings (HASHIZUME 1986).

language game of communicating one's personal feelings, the action of »fear« can be understood as a game of playing »fear,« or as a game of cross-examining the fear. Assuming that is the case, then the same principle should apply to the concept of beauty. In the language game of beauty, the beauty isn't something to be recognized substantively. Instead, it's something to be viewed as a game, wherein the participants discourse upon and cross-examine the beauty together.

One should attempt to describe music as a language game without first addressing the issue of whether and to what extent it is appropriate to discuss the nonverbal action that does not use natural language through the mirror of a »language« game, when a language game is seemingly derived from natural language. Music is materialized through melody, rhythm and other aspects. This issue can be considered as follows:

The greatest difference between music and natural language is that the distinction between a format and its meaning cannot be clarified in regard to music, though it can be in regard to natural language. Music usually contains the format and meaning in the form of chromosome nondisjunction, so in this respect it differs from natural language. To begin with, the language game does not possess recognition that clarifies a specific meaning or direction for a certain language, but instead captures a language by the behavior or format with which it is carried out. Therefore, it is passive in regard to separating the format and meaning. Given this logic, it is likewise possible to clarify the nature of music as a language game by describing music in the form of the chromosome nondisjunction of format and meaning. Additionally, music and natural language have many common features. Music and natural language both share parameters such as pitch, phonetic value, tone, sound volume and accent. Both use the repetition and continuation of sound to achieve a certain effect.

The Language Game of the Gesture of Approval

Given that we've decided to discuss music as a language game, how shall we define the type of game it would be?⁶ To answer that question, let's look at how Wittgenstein himself considered art and beauty. As mentioned above, this paper has posed an issue derived from the view that beauty can neither be substantiated nor proven. Now, »what cannot be described in words« is often discussed in the flow of Wittgenstein's thought on aesthetics, starting from his early stage through

⁶ Ken Okubo discusses musical composition as a language game (OKUBO 2001). Okubo's discussion shares the method with this paper in that he discusses music using the descriptive power of the language game in a strategic way. However, the discussion in this paper differs from that of Okubo because this paper begins discussing the action of »doing music« under circumstances where there is no musical notation or the recognition of value in music.

to the latter period of his career. Wittgenstein, in his early writings, generally describes music and paintings as things that cannot be described in words. However, because these things cannot be described in words, he generally describes these concepts in terms of negatives. For example, he negatively defines aesthetic language as »what cannot be described in words« in his *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, which forbids looking at the world from outside. Meanwhile, in Wittgenstein's latter thought, beauty is described in *Philosophische Untersuchungen* and *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, Religious Belief* as »what cannot be described in words.« He argues, however, that music and paintings, even if they cannot be described in words, have some kind of grammar and direction. Concerning beauty, he states that even if it cannot be described in a logical manner, it should not be regarded in silence. In other words, Wittgenstein's early assessment of that which »cannot be described in words« is reversed in the latter period and discussed in terms that are affirmative, not negative. Through his attempt to discover a resolution therein, he exhibits the recognition of beauty and art.

Wittgenstein presupposes that, when evaluating music and paintings, the more one understands the rules the more refined the aesthetic judgment becomes. However, if beauty is that which »cannot be described in words,« it is not simple to follow a rule. In this manner, concerning what cannot be described in words, the adherence to rules becomes a subjective matter. In other words, how can we follow rules when beauty is recognized as being what cannot be described in words? Though Wittgenstein defines beauty as what cannot be described in words, he maintains his conviction that there must be a cue that shares the same recognition. From this conviction Wittgenstein arrives at an understanding of a physical language game by which the assessment of the aesthetic is carried out in the form of approval, or a »gesture of approval« (WITTGENSTEIN 1966:2, 11).⁷ Wittgenstein adds this »gesture of approval« to the fundamental game of art, or the aesthetic. His main points are as follows:

- (a) A figure of speech and characterization process, such as expressed by »It's beautiful« or »It's fine,« can be substituted by a facial expression or a gesture as an exclamation.
- (b) Here the facial expressions or gestures, etc., are expressions of approval.
- (c) An effusion as a result of approval and other effusions resulting from rejection or surprise are a game (rule) formed thereby.
- (d) An aesthetic judgment becomes more refined once the rules are learned.

⁷ Wittgenstein leaves the discussion of the »gesture of approval« only at a fragmental level, in *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, Religious Belief*.

According to Wittgenstein, approval is brought to an action not on the basis of verification (proving it is a factual truth) but on the basis of persuasion (justification). An ordinary language is inappropriate for this game of persuasion. Only a gesture can make it possible. When rendering an art with words like »It is right« or »It is in accordance with the rule,« a gesture of approval is brought into effect. In other words, the language game concerning beauty is not purely linguistic.

Gesture of Approval and Music

A gesture of approval in music includes, for example, a so-called »gesticulative communication« between the player and the audience. On one hand, the player generates messages other than sound, for example through body movement, facial expression, etc. On the other hand, the audience might listen to the performance and applaud, clap their hands in time or keep the rhythm by tapping their feet. One might even throw out a coughing gesture hoping to send a certain kind of message to the player through such gestures of approval. The gesture of approval is thus fed back to the one who is playing the music and is promoting a common view between the player and the audience. The gesture of approval is not simply a body movement in reaction to art or beauty. It's a whole set of actions toward the art, including the body movement. Moreover, because a common view is positively developed therefrom, it is also a generative factor of the value in music.⁸

Now, the gesture of approval is frequently observed in the music of a society where beauty in music is not recognized as an aesthetic value. For example, John Blacking states that the discourse in the drum-music performance in the Venda society of South Africa is always associated with good or bad, while the acknowledgment of beauty does not exist. He pays special attention to the fact that affirmative gestures and expressions, where the tempo of the drum flows as if it were integrated within the movement of all the bodies in a group, has a prominent role (BLACKING 1978:157). Additionally, although it is rare to use an aesthetic concept for the shamisen music of modern Japan, it is necessary not only for the player but also for the audience correctly to recognize the finger usage and the body movements made by the shamisen players accompanying the selection of which string to play. Even though the performer plays at the correct pitch, the performance is reproached if the configuration of a finger(s) is not as set with the common rule. Here, the finger usage and the body movement of a shamisen player must be positively recognized through a common set of rules by the player and the audi-

⁸ According to Danto, an aesthetic game is continuous from the *Lebenswelt* (DANTO 1981), and according to Dickie it is maintained as a kind of social system (DICKIE 1974). These attributes are in agreement with the fundamental nature of the gesture of approval.

ence at the place where the music is generated. These examples can be considered gestures of approval, because the gesture movement serves the function of creating a value in music.⁹

In this paper, the fundamental language game of music shall first be defined as »gesture of approval.« By defining the gesture of approval as the fundamental game, the range of recognition of the value in music can be expanded to the *Lebenswelt*. What must be considered at this point is that Wittgenstein also recognizes the action of »performance« to be a gesture of approval, in addition to actions such as handclapping and making vocal utterances (WITTGENSTEIN 1966:20-21). When discussing a good or bad musical composition or performance, persuasion can be effective if it is carried out with gesture movements while performing music and creating sound, in addition to persuasion by words. Given this factor, the action of creating or performing a sound should also be recognized as a gesture of approval.¹⁰

Circulation Model of the Gesture of Approval

The general attribute of the music language game has been described from the standpoint of the gesture of approval. However, certain questions have not yet been clarified in our discussion, such as which level of music the language game of music intends to recognize in order to function properly as a language game; whether it regards a discourse about music, a melody and rhythm, an entire piece of music or an entire field of music from a certain time and cultural sphere. To clarify this point, in this section of the paper the game of music, basically of creating a sound, is defined as a primary game, whereas the game of making reference to the primary game, namely, the game of providing praise or criticism to the music of the primary game—is defined as a secondary game.¹¹ Of course, a game having a means to provide praises without depending only on verbal reference but also on gestures such as applause, is included in the secondary game.

Now, although the game of the gesture of approval is a secondary game that makes reference to the music of the primary game in the affirmative manner, it might also be a primary game that generates a sound. As Wittgenstein suggested, it is also a gesture of approval to perform or compose music. Therefore, the game of the gesture of approval is a game that can serve as both a primary game and a

⁹ In recent studies of ethnomusicology, a lot of musicologists have agreed that the gestures of approval are the primitive conditions of music.

¹⁰ Additionally, there is a passage in *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, Religious Belief* in which the action of drawing a picture is explained as a gesture of approval (WITTGENSTEIN 1966:38, 202).

¹¹ In describing the law in terms of a language game, Hart introduced the concept of the secondary game that describes the primary game (HASHIZUME 1985:89-95).

hear the sound *once again*. A better sound effect is formed by the continuation of a sound. A so-called »tempo« is generated through the repetition of a sound. Even with an unrepeated section in between, the identity of a sound is maintained through such repetition. Therefore, the game of continuing and repeating a sound substantively forms music.

Incidentally, the game of repeating a sound is not only a principle of the formation of a musical piece but is also a principle of performing and listening to the music. Let's consider a case wherein a sound is repeated once a certain period of time has passed since the last time the sound was generated (the next day, next month, next year, etc.). Even after a measurable period of time has passed, you might recognize the sound and say, »Oh, yes. This is the sound . . . ,« and feel a desire to repeat the sound as, »I want to listen to that melody (musical piece) again.« This can be considered a principle of formation of the actions of performance and listening. Therefore, the game of repeating a sound is considered herein as one that encompasses the repetition in terms of repeatedly performing a melody or music in addition to the repetition of the sound within a melody (musical piece) (Figure 2).




Figure 2: The Game of Continuing and Repeating Sound

The repetition of a sound has the function of empowering the integration of people involved in the music. However, if a sound is repeated with a large number of people, one might encounter the problem of inconsistency in repetition. As a result, harmonious parts and inharmonious parts are developed within the context of repetition.¹³ If such repetition accompanied by an inharmonious part were to continue, the differences therein would accumulate. In this way the gesture of approval as a game of repeating a sound is also the fountainhead of a difference seen in music. When the circulation of the gesture of approval advances through the differentiation processes accompanying the repetition, a more complex and varied music is formed.

¹³ There is an inharmonious aspect that is not shared in the gesture of approval. Tilghman (TILGHMAN 1984, 1991) and Cumming (CUMMING 2000) argue that the aesthetic language game allows differences and inharmonious parts in describing Wittgenstein's aesthetics.

The Language Game of Discourse in Music

When music becomes more complex, not only does the significance of the primary game increase but the significance of the secondary game, namely, the discourse of providing praises or criticisms to the music — increases as well. Wittgenstein also recognized evaluation through discourse as a gesture of approval.

Such words as 'pompous' and 'stately' could be expressed by faces. Doing this, our descriptions would be much more flexible and various than they are as expressed by adjectives. (WITTGENSTEIN 1966:4)

The discourse of evaluating music greatly changes within cultural spheres or times. However, either way, when the significance of the discourse increases it has a great impact on the music formed in the next circulation of the primary game. For example, in the nineteenth century, after the genre called »music criticism« was established in response to public concerts in Western Europe, compositions and performances began to be evaluated through discourse, including critiques during intermission and in the newspapers. Rankings were often assigned in accordance with the levels of »good« to »bad.« Under such circumstances, after an evaluative discourse was released, a new music was created as a result of or for the purpose of such discourse.

With the preparation provided so far, let's capture the unsubstantiated aesthetic discourse using the circulation model of the gesture of approval. For instance, let's consider the case of music that might be performed in association with physical labor or a ritual. Firstly, under such circumstances, music that enhances the efficiency of labor or is suited to the proceedings of a ritual — namely, music compatible with a particular context, is considered good music and thus approved. As in this example, the »good« quality or value of music, when obvious in the context, needn't be evaluated through a discourse by isolating the music from the context. A secondary game is not necessarily required. Now, while a *harambee* song or a ritual song is repeated many times, the initial context may shift to a different context in time. These »contextual conversions« in music have in recent years served as a major theme in the study of ethnomusicology.¹⁴ Moreover, in the process, the »contextual conversion« produces music that is still good even though it has departed from the original context, or music that is approved even though it is out of context. Accordingly, there are two types of good music:

- Good Music 1: Good music in compliance with the context;
- Good Music 2: Good music even though it is out of context.

¹⁴ Many have reported that even traditional songs will be forgotten if not sung occasionally in different contexts. Additionally, when music is written into a score, it typically encourages a contextual conversion process.

When the initial »good« quality (or value) of music ceases to be obvious by diverting from the context, it again becomes necessary to engage in the secondary game of evaluating music through discourse.

However, concerning the music that is good even if out of the context, namely, good music 2, no additional conclusion can be drawn from the prerequisite conditions up to this point. Let's clarify the attribute of good music 2. Firstly, when we say music in compliance with the context is good music from outside the framework of a primary game, our reference that »it is good music« is justified if the music demonstrates the effect of enhancing the reliability and premise toward the context. On the other hand, how about when we refer to music that has diverged from the context as good music from the outside of the framework of a primary game? The music will become more »ruleless« for the portion in which it has diverged from the context. However, even if it is ruleless, the music as a primary game must satisfy the prerequisite conditions for the secondary game to be carried out intact.

The discourse involving beauty in music can again be illustrated in a circulation model. It can be concluded that the discourse of beauty in music became necessary in order to distinguish good music 2 from good music 1 in a secondary game; that is to say, it became necessary in order to distinguish still better music even after departing from the context of music compliant with the context. In other words, it became necessary to refer to good music as »aesthetic music« even after diverging from the context. Furthermore, when this secondary game is fed back to the primary game, and as the game circulates and accumulates the verbal references, music will be formed as if for the purpose or the cause of beauty. The discourse involving beauty of music can therefore be understood as an operative effect of the game circulation of the gesture of approval, according to this paper (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Aesthetic Formation as Operative Effect of the Game Cycle

Additionally, this model clearly distinguishes the aesthetic discourse that should be explained, as well as the circulation of the language game that is the framework of the explanation. In other words, the discourse involving beauty in music is not assumed as a basis that forms the circulation but is explained as an operative effect of the circulation. Therefore, the explanatory method of this paper can avoid the *petitio principii* that could heretofore arise in the conventional discussion involving an aesthetic aspect.

black box it becomes possible, using the circulation model, to capture it not directly as beauty itself, but as a concept, which can be a substitute for beauty depending on how it is used.¹⁵ Of course, an aesthetic black box does not necessarily provide the grounds for an aesthetic experience. However, such an assumption can provide space for the behaviors in the games of music, even when an aesthetic experience might not have occurred.

Game of Performance and Composition

We have so far discussed the music language game as a key factor in understanding for the most part the practice of primitive music. Music, in the fully developed stage, undergoes processes such as being composed, performed, listened to and then evaluated. Here each of the processes, such as composition, performance or reception by the audience, has become independent as a distinct game, and each game serves both as the premise and the purpose for the others. Each of the processes can be referred to as a division-of-work process in music. Accordingly, in this final section the »game of composition, performance and reception« is recognized as a differentiated process of the »circulation model of the gesture of approval.«¹⁶ Firstly, the game of performance is the most fundamental game of music because it can be observed in any kind of music, from that at the primitive stage to music at the fully developed stage. At a stage where music has developed to some extent, an additional phase of »musical composition« is included preceding the circulation of the game in order to perform in a similar and repeated manner. (See Figure 5.)¹⁷




Figure 5: The Game of Performance

¹⁵ The author has illustrated a method of describing the various concepts of theories of aesthetic category in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, or the various concepts of feelings used in twentieth-century psychology, as various types of gestures of approval after discussing beauty as a black box (YAKO 2005: Chapter 6).

¹⁶ There are other processes in addition to the game of composition, performance and reception by the audience, such as evaluation, analysis and criticism. However, for the purpose of this paper these factors are included in the game of reception by the audience.

¹⁷ To perform the same piece, one only needs to write down the length and pitch of the sound and/or melody type on a score sheet and then play, following the score. In the stage before a written score is developed, one must consider using oral transmission of the information.

With the addition of the »musical composition« phase, the game of performance will serve as a game of further repeating and approving musical composition, thereby stabilizing the game circulation. Meanwhile, in the game of performance, musical composition is further performed and approved. However, that does not necessarily mean that the musical composition itself is approved down to the smallest detail. Differentiation, to a degree that does not interfere with the game itself, is woven into the game of performance during execution of the game of the gesture of approval. The differentiation of the game of performance is one aspect of the unshared inconsistency that is contained in the cycle of the gesture of approval and derives multiple performance possibilities from a composition. Music is composed, performed, listened to and evaluated at the fully developed stage, whereupon it is re-composed corresponding to the evaluation (Figure 6).




Figure 6: The Game of Composition

The game circulation illustrated in Figure 6 captures the flow of music in which the music is constantly changed and renewed. To keep the unsubstantiated beauty of music being connected in the game space, music is renewed by having changes made to the game. Here the game, which is updated in order to keep the unsubstantiated beauty, is called the »game of change« (Figure 7).




Figure 7: The Game of Change

In the contemporary Western environment, where »originality« has great significance, the more changes are added the more value is acknowledged in music.

Of course, even in a compositional environment where originality is not so important, or in the conventional music traditions, the game of change is observed as an expression of desire for a new expression.¹⁸

In this way, while clarifying the preconditions that form value in music by basing music on a game circulation according to the game of the gesture of approval, one can obtain a perspective that might subsume the various discourses of the beauty seen in the various stages of music.

Conclusion

In this paper the »game of continuing and repeating a sound,« the »game of the aesthetic black box« and the »game of change« were added to »the game of the gesture of approval.« Accordingly, the method of describing music and its beauty was presented as a mutual activity of these four types of games. It may be concluded that by understanding music as a language game in this way it becomes possible to avoid the *petitio principii*, which tended to happen during an aesthetic discourse, thereby allowing the continuous and comprehensive recognition of music both in societies where the aesthetic concept is shared and in those in which it is not.

Additionally, in this paper, although music has been discussed as one of the language games, the model with the language game of this paper can also be applied to art forms other than music. The discussion in this paper could be converted into a discussion of theatrical art, such as dance or dramatic performance. These arts place a great value on physical expression. Moreover, they're provided with discourses for evaluation, as well as opportunities for the recognition of beauty. Particularly in the case of dance performance, repetitive movement and mimicry movement have great significance. Thus, it is clear that the game of the gesture of approval would carry a prominent role in theatrical art. In any case, reviewing the discussion in relation to various artistic genres by applying the model of the language game in this paper, it is concluded that the discussion could be expanded into a new discussion in different areas.

¹⁸ As pointed out by Seeger and Blacking, the phenomenon of continual change is also observed in the music tradition of societies that do not have a clear aesthetic concept (SEEGER 1987: 86; BLACKING 1973).

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Sažetak

PREPOZNAVANJE GLAZBE I LJEPOTE JEZIČNOM IGROM

Ono što je najteže u svakoj raspravi o glazbi jest to da se ne može objektivno utvrditi je li određena glazba predmet ljepote. S druge strane, znamo da u svijetu postoje kulturna područja koja ne poznaju pojam ljepote povezan s glazbom. U ovome članku autor, uvodeći Wittgensteinovu ideju »jezične igre«, predlaže teorijski model za prepoznavanje različitih vrsta glazbe, od onih u kulturnim područjima u kojima se smatra da ljepota u glazbi postoji do onih gdje se smatra da ne postoji. Prema Wittgensteinu, ono što podupire osobni osjećaj i iskustvo nije unutarnjost iskustva nego ponašanje koje ih tvori. Wittgenstein je to ponašanje nazvao »jezičnom igrom«. Stoga, glazbenu ljepotu čije iskustvo nije moguće posvjedočiti valja opisati kao oblik jezične igre. U tu se svrhu utvrđuju četiri vrste glazbenih igara, tj. »igra potvrđujuće geste«, »igra nastavljanja i ponavljanja zvuka«, »igra estetičke crne kutije« i »igra promjene«. Tako se može prepoznati svaki glazbeni čin od primitivnog do vrlo razvijenog stupnja kao jedna od tih četiriju igara u svjetlu međusobno cirkulirajućeg procesa. U tom se procesu glazbena ljepota, koju inače nije moguće posvjedočiti, može uspješno locirati i vizualizirati. Svatko tko se bavi glazbom igra jednu od jezičnih igara, što ima za posljedicu pojavu ili nestanak ljepote. U slučaju opisivanja glazbene ljepote uporabom ovoga procesa može se izbjeći ona tautologija u definiranju ljepote kakva se javlja u zapadnim tekstovima o estetici glazbe. Tako je riješen problem shvaćanja glazbe kao ljepote i otvaraju se vrata za prepoznavanje glazbene ljepote kao djelatnog učinka stvorenog ovim jezičnim igrama.

