

The OSCE Role in Cooperation with NATO and the EU in Southeastern Europe

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The paper discusses the role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Relations between international organisations are, as a rule, characterised by both cooperation and competition. Cooperation of the OSCE with NATO and the EU in Southeastern Europe reflects the changes that have taken place in recent years among the main security structures in Europe. The OSCE specificity is that all the 19 states members of NATO and the 15 states members of the European Union also belong to the OSCE. For this reason, a concept of labour division emerged several years ago among these three security structures. According to that concept NATO would deal with military aspects, the EU would tackle politico-economic issues and the OSCE would focus on social and humanitarian matters. As all 19 states members of NATO and the 15 states members of the European Union also belong to the OSCE such division could not function and has not functioned for many reasons. The OSCE's role in restoring stability is less spectacular than NATO military operations or EU economic assistance though it is no less essential. It promotes the building of democratic institutions and the shaping of security based on the respect for common values.

Keywords: OSCE, NATO, Stability Pact for SEE, security, stability.

1. Introduction

What is the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) among the main security-related organizations in Europe? Relations between international organizations are, as a rule, characterized by both cooperation and competition. It is the case particularly when the mandate and tasks of organizations encompass the same or similar spheres of activity. Cooperation finds its expression in official documents, agreements and declarations, and competition is reflected in the day-to-day practice, particularly at medium and lower levels. Sometimes it takes a shape of overtly critical opinions addressed to each other; more common, however, is to mutually diminish the role and importance of rivalling organizations or merely ignore each other.

Cooperation of the OSCE with NATO and the EU in Southeastern Europe conforms only in part with

the above-mentioned rules; indeed, it reflects in large measure the advantageous changes that have taken place in recent years among the main security structures in Europe. The OSCE specificity is that all the 19 states members of NATO and the 15 states members of the European Union also belong to the OSCE. For this reason, a concept of labour division emerged several years ago among these three security structures. According to that concept NATO would deal with military aspects, the EU would tackle politico-economic issues and the OSCE would focus on social and humanitarian matters.

Such a division could not function and has not functioned for many reasons. It did not, however, prevent closer cooperation between the three structures. *A sui generis* proving ground has become their collaboration in Southeastern Europe.

Before addressing the subject of this presentation it is worth reminding the general norms and rules guiding cooperation between the Organization and other security institutions on the European continent.

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2. Helsinki II: new tasks

The decisions of the July 1992 Helsinki summit meeting were of crucial importance for institutionalizing the CSCE process and mapping out a strategy for mutually reinforcing institutions for security in Europe. At the June 1991 Berlin Council meeting, the foreign ministers had encouraged the exchange of information and relevant documents among

CSCE and other main European and transatlantic institutions.¹ In Prague, the list of CSCE relationships with international organizations had been expanded to embrace the Council of Europe, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), NATO, the WEU, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) 'and other European and transatlantic organizations which may be agreed' with the aim of inviting them to make contributions to specialized CSCE meetings for which they have relevant expertise.²

At the Helsinki summit meeting, the leaders of the participating states welcomed the rapid adaptation of European and transatlantic institutions which were 'increasingly working together to face up to the challenges before us and to provide a solid foundation for peace and prosperity'.³ The meeting laid down guidelines for CSCE cooperation with individual organizations. The Helsinki Document stated that the European Community, 'fulfilling its important role in the political and economic development in Europe . . . is closely involved in CSCE activities'. NATO, through NACC, 'has established patterns of cooperation with new partners in harmony with the process of the CSCE. It has also offered practical support for the work of the CSCE'.⁴ The WEU, stated the Helsinki Document, as an integral part of the development of the European Union, is 'opening itself to additional cooperation with new partners and has offered to provide resources in support of the CSCE'.⁵ A framework of cooperation was also established linking the CSCE with the Council of Europe, the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty Four as well as with the OECD, the ECE and the EBRD.

The Helsinki Document also indicated possibilities for such regional and sub-regional organizations as the Council of Baltic States, the Visegrad Triangle, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, the Central European Initiative and the Commonwealth of Independent States to co-operate with and assist the CSCE. This list of diverse organizations reflected the excessive bureaucratization of multilateral relations among European, North American and Central Asian states; the doubling of the functions and tasks of these institutions and structures ran the risk that they would become more competitive than compatible in mutual relations, more 'inter-blocking' than interlocking and

more likely to weaken than reinforce each other. The later developments showed that in general such fears were unfounded.

Finally the leaders of the participating states declared their understanding that 'the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations'.⁶ No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the UN Security Council. The Helsinki Document reaffirmed that 'The rights and responsibilities of the Security Council remain unaffected in their entirety'.⁷ For the first time this established an important link between the CSCE and the United Nations or, more broadly, between European and global security.

One may raise a question: How have these general rules functioned in practice over the last two years?

In 1999 European security developments were dominated by the NATO intervention in Kosovo (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the war waged by Russian federal forces in Chechnya, part of the Russian Federation. In both cases the OSCE played a specific role in seeking ways of, first, preventing the use of force, and when it failed, settling peacefully the conflict situation. The decisions adopted in 1999 at the NATO summit in Washington and the EU summits in Cologne and Helsinki are of a special importance for the recognition of the new role of the OSCE in shaping a European security system.

During that year the OSCE expanded its operations considerably and strengthened its role as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation. New tasks were taken up in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Southeastern Europe. In total, OSCE permanent missions and other forms of field activities encompassed 25 different operations,⁸ supplemented by the work of such OSCE institutions as the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (in Warsaw), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OSCE Regional Strategy and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

3. The OSCE as seen from the NATO perspective

At the OSCE Seminar on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model (Vienna, 18-19 Sep. 1995), NATO's Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke presented the Alliance's view on the future role of the OSCE and the guiding principles of the future security model. He also mentioned a number of things such a security model should stay away from. It should not:

- cut across existing provisions and achievements of the OSCE or weaken any existing arms control and co-operative security achievements;

- create differences of status between OSCE member States which could undermine their equal rights to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

- create strategic dividing lines nor be based on any notion of blocs;

- prejudice the sovereign rights of states to belong to or to join security organizations in accordance with international law and the agreed principles of the OSCE;

- undermine, directly or indirectly, the transatlantic security partnership embodied in the North Atlantic Alliance and integral to the OSCE;

- encourage any institutional hierarchy.

He pointed out three specific areas central to the development of a security model, in which NATO can contribute significantly:

1. Meeting military challenges, particularly through arms control and disarmament measures;
2. Promoting security and stability in the OSCE area through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace as well as the inclusion of new members in the Alliance;
3. Implementing the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions adopted by the OSCE in Helsinki in 1992.

Four years later the new basic NATO document (1999), *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, defined the OSCE's role as follows:

'The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing co-operative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical co-operation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.'⁹

A test of the OSCE's capabilities and limitations in 1999 was its role in the Balkans, in Kosovo in particular. In early 1999 it finished the building of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which was established by the Permanent Council on 25 October 1998 to a great extent as a result of the efforts of US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke. By far the largest OSCE operation, it was withdrawn from Kosovo on 20 March 1999 because of the grave deterioration of the security situation and the erosion of its ability to discharge its tasks. The brief history of the KVM demonstrated that the OSCE can play a key role only if it has the strong support of the major powers and the major European multilateral security institutions.

Recognizing that the Kosovo crisis was in large part a human rights crisis, the mission had a mandate to monitor, investigate and document allegations of human rights violations committed by all parties to the

conflict. By the time the OSCE-KVM stood down on 9 June 1999, its Human Rights Division had collected hundreds of in-country reports and had taken statements from nearly 2 800 refugees.¹⁰ The published report describes the organized and systematic nature of the violations both of human rights and humanitarian law.

Following UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1 July 1999, a new OSCE mission was established within the UN Interim Administration. This mission has taken a leading role in the institution- and democracy-building process and human rights.¹¹ Its responsibilities are unprecedented within the OSCE. Its work covers, among other things, the training of a new police service and judicial and administrative personnel.

In Kosovo, the OSCE interacted closely with the UN, NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe. Its experience in 1999 in the Balkans confirmed the tendency towards a gradual expansion of its security role. This was also demonstrated in the OSCE regional strategy and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

The NATO-led international peace force deployed in Kosovo (KFOR) provided a secure environment and appropriate support for the OSCE activities focused on institution-building process, human rights work and training of Kosovo police. The Brussels session of the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting (North Atlantic Council, 15 December 1999) recommended its members to intensify cooperation between NATO and the OSCE, 'notably in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-keeping, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation'.¹²

From NATO's point of view, of special importance are military aspects of cooperation with the OSCE, particularly provisions concerning CSBMs and the Platform for Cooperative Security. In that context, interesting is the Report on the Implementation of the Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Vienna Agreement) and the Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control. (As a result of the Kosovo crisis, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suspended its participation in all types of activities envisaged under the Florence Agreement. The participation was resumed only in late summer 1999). However the implementation of inspections and visits to the Weapons Manufacturing Facilities have been satisfactorily completed. All inspections, as envisaged in Article IV (sub-regional arms control), have been conducted. As the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office stated, the steps ahead which should facilitate the passage from a stability based on a structurally unstable balance of power to a co-operative security system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole sub-region are still fairly modest.¹³

4. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

The EU initiative of 10 June 1999 to launch a Stability Pact in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis reflects an integrated, comprehensive and coherent approach to the entire region.¹⁴ The concept of the Stability Pact was (a) to isolate and limit the Kosovo crisis, and (b) to develop in a more coordinated way a political framework for promoting stability in south-eastern Europe. The concept is innovative, although in its essence it is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan offered to post-war Europe by the United States in 1947. Two essential distinctions, however, are to be stressed, unlike the Marshall Plan, the Stability Pact does not reflect a consolidated strategy implemented under the leadership of one global power—the United States, but divergent national strategies of many European states and non-governmental international organizations and financial institutions; and, second, South Eastern Europe is addressed conceptually as a coherent political and economic area, while, in fact, it is rather divided than united, and the states of the region are more competitive in their mutual relations than cooperative. In the long term the Stability Pact offers those countries in the region, which seek integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures a prospect of achieving this, especially in the context of their aspirations to join the EU.

The FRY is not a participant. Bodo Hombach (Germany), appointed in July 1999 as Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact, noted that it remains a central problem and challenge: '[as] soon as Yugoslavia has solved its political problems, it can and should become a participant in the Stability Pact with full rights. Until then, the Stability Pact will reach out to the democratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro'.¹⁵ He pointed out that the process launched with the signing of the Pact is not directed against the people of the FRY; what is more, it opens up a prospect of their future integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures as full partners.

The decision-making bodies of the Stability Pact consist of a system of three working tables addressing issues similar to the 'baskets' of the Helsinki process established 25 years before: (a) democratization and the promotion of civil societies; (b) economic development; and (c) internal and external security. The results of the working tables are brought together at the Regional Table. The members are the states, which are participants in the Stability Pact and other institutions such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and financial institutions by invitation. A novelty of the Stability Pact process is that all the members of the working tables enjoy full equality. The Pact did not create any new organization or structure but made it possible for all interested states and international organizations to collaborate under OSCE auspices. Some progress has already been noted in the work of all the working groups.¹⁶

The Sarajevo Summit Declaration of heads of state and government, issued on 30 July 1999, confirmed the commitments undertaken under the Stability Pact. Two aspects of the process initiated in Cologne and endorsed in Sarajevo are central: (a) promoting political and economic reforms, development and enhanced security; and (b) facilitating the integration of south-east European countries into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The Sarajevo Declaration contained a message addressed to the people of the FRY 'to embrace democratic change and work actively for regional reconciliation'. With this intention, the participants at the Sarajevo Summit decided to 'consider ways of making the Republic of Montenegro an early beneficiary of the pact' and reaffirmed their support to all democratic forces.¹⁷

The philosophy reflected in both the Stability Pact and the Sarajevo Declaration is to engage the countries of the region in security cooperation and in the democratic transformation and reconstruction of South-eastern Europe. They bear the main responsibility for its stabilization and their actions are of critical importance. The other state signatories of both documents undertook to support these actions in order 'to accelerate the transition in the region to stable democracies, prosperous market economies and open and pluralistic societies in which human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, are respected, as an important step in their integration into Euro-Atlantic and global institutions'.¹⁸

The main challenge for all European security institutions is to build in Kosovo and other countries of the region a multi-ethnic society on the basis of substantial autonomy while still respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states, including the FRY. The decisions taken in 1999 by NATO, the EU and the OSCE demonstrated the need for a broader view of the region: regional cooperation should be a catalyst for the integration of the Southeast European countries into broader structures. The Istanbul Summit Declaration states that the OSCE 'has a key role to play in contributing to [the Stability Pact's] success'.¹⁹ In fact, the problems that face the signatories of the documents adopted in Cologne and Sarajevo - ensuring democratic development, political pluralism and respect for the rights of individuals and minorities within states as well as the integrity of those states - concern almost all conflict situations. They are the very problems the OSCE was set up to deal with and, although often associated with developments in the area of former Yugoslavia, they are also the main cause of instability in the former Soviet space. The links between the European Union and the OSCE are reflected in all documents adopted as Presidency reports of the European Councils in Cologne, Helsinki and, recently, in Santa Maria da Feira (19-20 June 2000). The Portuguese Presidency stressed, in the context of the com-

mon European Security and Defence Policy, 'the strengthening of military and non-military crisis management and conflict prevention'. Also the importance has been underlined of ensuring an extensive relationship in crisis management by the Union between the military and civilian fields, as well as 'cooperation between the EU-rapidly evolving crisis management capacity and the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe'.²⁰

5. The OSCE and the new security responses

As it was rightly pointed out, both the Platform for Co-operative Security and the Charter for European Security propose a set of arrangements 'for closer ties and cooperation between the OSCE and other international institutions which-together with the operational guidelines for a more effective OSCE-are directly relevant to NATO's role in Europe'.²¹

The Istanbul Summit Declaration reaffirmed several essential elements that make up a new type of security system in Europe. First, except for the dispute, which has lasted for more than 10 years between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, all the conflicts the OSCE has dealt with are essentially of a domestic character. Even so, none of the states concerned, including Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine, has questioned the legitimacy or role of the OSCE in seeking peaceful solutions, nor has Russia questioned the right of international organizations, including the mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, which is to assist in the renewal of a political dialogue and initiate the process of finding a lasting, comprehensive solution to the problem there. The second aspect is the commitment to apply in practice the acknowledged principles and norms, including respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, condemnation and rejection of 'ethnic cleansing', and support for the unconditional and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The third element, which is of key importance for ensuring stability in the OSCE area, is overall support for a policy of tolerance and for a multi-ethnic society 'where the rights of all citizens and the rule of law are respected'²² but there is no intention to undermine or call into question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states to whom decisions of the international community are addressed.

The meeting at Istanbul faced the question of Russia's use of force on a mass scale in Chechnya. The use of violence and terror against the civilian population as a whole and recourse to the rule of 'collective responsibility'-holding the population at large answerable for the crimes of the few, as has been seen in Chechnya-cannot be equated with combating terrorism. Russia's reaction to the criticism of the international community in the period up to the Istanbul Sum-

mit Meeting came close to jeopardizing the successful conclusion of the meeting,²³ but it was not broken off, and several important documents were adopted. However, the price of this 'moderate success' was the application of a double standard: the OSCE in practice made greater demands of the small and medium-sized states and was more lenient towards the major powers, especially Russia, regarding violations of their international commitments.²⁴ The result was seriously to erode the OSCE's authority and demonstrate its limits in enforcing its principles.

In the confrontation between principles and practice, the latter won. Since OSCE decisions are taken by consensus, the documents adopted reflect the balance of interests. In effect, a political compromise made it possible to agree on several essential new steps which are to facilitate the implementation of OSCE principles and norms and make more effective its decisions aimed at preventing the outbreak of violent conflict wherever possible.

The Charter for European Security, signed at Istanbul on 19 November 1999 by 54 OSCE heads of states and government (excluding the FRY, reflects the experience and the crises of recent years and adapts the OSCE principles and norms to the new needs.

The decision to prepare a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century was taken at the Budapest Summit Meeting of the OSCE in December 1994.²⁵ It stemmed from the twin needs (a) to give expression to fundamental changes and define the new risks and challenges, and (b) to develop new instruments, which would be not only expedients but also part of a broader system and mechanism of conflict prevention.²⁶ Over more than five years of negotiations since then, hundreds of proposals have been made which reflect differing visions of a European security system and different concepts of the OSCE's role in such a system. Russia demanded a hierarchical and normative order, which would reaffirm legal and international treaty commitments. The EU states, differences among them notwithstanding, were inclined towards more pragmatic solutions.²⁷

The main new elements in the Charter are new steps, means and mechanisms to enhance the role of the OSCE as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; it does not seek yet again to determine new or reinterpret old principles.

Agreement was reached on six new types of activity: (a) a Platform for Cooperative Security, the aim of which is to strengthen cooperation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions and thus make better use of the resources of the international community; (b) the development of the OSCE's role in peacekeeping operations; (c) the creation of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) to enable the OSCE to respond quickly to requests for assistance, to offer civilian and

police expertise in conflict situations, to deploy the civilian component of peacekeeping operations quickly and to address problems before they become crises; (d) the expansion of the OSCE's ability to do police-related work, including police monitoring, training and assisting in maintaining the primacy of law; (e) the establishment of an Operation Centre at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna to facilitate preparation, planning and rapid deployment of OSCE field operations; and (f) the establishment of a Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council to strengthen the consultation process.²⁸

The Charter is designed much more for operational tasks than was originally assumed or expected. It reaffirms states' duty to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 'the rights of persons belonging to national minorities'.²⁹ This is not an innovative provision: such commitments were contained in numerous documents and conventions adopted within the UN system, in the Council of Europe, in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. A new provision, however, is that international security and peace must be enhanced through a dual approach: 'we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen cooperation between States'.³⁰

Also new are the instruments and mechanisms to assist and consolidate state bodies in activities that would traditionally be seen as falling within the competence and discretionary power of the individual state. In their security policies, states should be guided by 'equal partnership, solidarity and transparency'.

An essential element of the Charter for European Security is an elaborate code of conduct of the OSCE in its cooperation with other organizations.³¹ It recognizes the integrating role that the OSCE can play, without creating a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them. The Platform for Co-operative Security, adopted within the Charter, can be considered a new stage in the development of the concept reflected in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security contained in the 1994 Budapest Document.³² The Charter stated:

'The risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organization. (...) In order to make full use of the resources of the international community, we are committed to even closer cooperation among international organizations. (...) Through this Platform [for Co-operative Security] we seek to develop and maintain political and operational coherence, on the basis of shared values, among all the various bodies dealing with security, both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges. Recognizing the key integrating role that the OSCE can play, we offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster cooperation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular

strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them. We are ready in principle to deploy the resources of international organizations and institutions of which we are members in support of the OSCE's work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise.

Sub-regional cooperation has become an important element in enhancing security across the OSCE area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the auspices of the OSCE, help to promote our common values. They contribute to improved security not just in the sub-region in question but throughout the OSCE area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security, as a forum for sub-regional co-operation. In this respect, and in accordance with the modalities in the operational document, the OSCE will facilitate the exchange of information and experience between sub-regional groups and may, if so requested, receive and keep their mutual accords and agreements.'³³

Two follow-up conferences, in 1997 and 1999, confirmed states' adherence to the 1994 Code of Conduct and the principle of democratic control of armed forces, which it emphasized. A suggestion was raised at the OSCE Review Conference in June 1999 that the issue of corruption in defence spending should be addressed. To promote transparency, it was suggested that information exchanges based on national responses to the questionnaire on implementation of countries' OSCE commitments could be made public on an Internet site.³⁴ The Charter for European Security reaffirmed the validity of the Code of Conduct and declared that the signatory states will consult promptly 'with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its right to individual or collective defence in the event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence are threatened'.³⁵ In other words, the Charter reflects a new political commitment to consider jointly the nature of threats and actions that may be required in defence of common values.

Today, the essence of security is rightly seen not exactly through the prism of businesslike contacts in secondary matters, but in the search for an answer to the questions: what is the architecture of future security in Europe to be like? Which organizations are to play the key role: NATO and the EU or the OSCE? It is not a secret that in the debate on a model of future European security a concept has been brought up to give the OSCE a character and status of the main security structure. A question arises whether such hierarchical approach is needed.

Another issue is whether-and if so, then which of them the existing organizations in Europe might play the key role in the new security system.

It is true that practical experience has shown that a single organization seldom meets all the necessary political, humanitarian and military needs in the man-

agement and settlement of a major crisis. Thus, the OSCE must establish closer working relations both with NATO and the EU, the only two organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area with political and military capabilities and internationally recognized legal mandate to authorize peacekeeping and enforcement operations.³⁶ It is all the more so as the picture of the OSCE as a weak and fair-weather organization is quite common. An illustration of this is the report entitled *Russia in the system of international relations in the coming decade*, prepared five years ago by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), one of the most authoritative research centres of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It reflects much better the real understanding of the present and future role of the OSCE, as seen from the Russian perspective, than many official statements and declarations:

'Looking into the nearest future, it is very difficult to imagine a situation in which the OSCE would genuinely provide the main pillar of European stability. Balance and universalism of this inter-state structure, which are necessary for lowering the tensions of inter-bloc antagonism, are proving insufficient in the new circumstances even for settling an individual conflict, let alone ensuring security and stability on the pan-European scale. The capacities of the OSCE at present and for the foreseeable future are quite rigidly limited, on both the institutional and operational levels. It is and will not be able to provide a considerable military-political force. The "common denominator" of security interests and stability is insufficient to meet the specific interests of participating states in the sphere of foreign policy and to form among them a leading body which would operate in accordance with a future OSCE Statute, a legally binding document'. (IMEMO, Moscow, 1995).

Developments of the recent five years confirmed that the authors' reasoning struck a note of realism.

The same authors affirmed that: 'NATO will survive in the foreseeable future, all changes notwithstanding, through internal transformation and adaptation to the changing circumstances. However, the very fact of retaining the immense concentration of the bloc's military potential will not pose a danger to Russia's security, because its main direction is [set] at maintaining the stability in Europe and out of its area. Considering that even in the period of confrontation NATO did not have an offensive potential at its disposal, all the more it is characteristic for the present and future conditions'.³⁷ The authors of the study, like many others, expressed concern about the reconstruction of the security system in Europe which, on the one hand, would lead to NATO's expansion, and, on the other hand, could do harm to the national interests of Russia. Nevertheless, they reject arguments about a threat to Russia posed by 'NATO aggressiveness', etc. What is more, they found the Alliance 'the main factor of stability on the continent'. Although this state of affairs is not always compatible with

Russia's interests, one should, in the opinion of the IMEMO authors, consider the 'Westernization' of Central and Eastern Europe, following that of Southern and Northern Europe, 'an objective, historically warranted process'.³⁸ Russia faces two alternatives: either cooperation with the whole of Europe in all fields including the security and arms control sphere or a return to confrontation and the policy of enmity towards the West.

Ten years after the end of the cold war, the realities that determine the transatlantic agenda are completely changed. The decisions adopted by and arrangements made within NATO, the EU and the OSCE have taken these changes into account and set out a new conceptual framework for the further shaping of the security system in Europe. These three security-related structures are adapting internally; NATO and the EU have initiated the process of enlargement eastwards. The OSCE Charter for European Security codified a set of arrangements for closer cooperation between all security-related international institutions existing in Europe. The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the bloody conflict in Chechnya in 1999 were the litmus test of the effectiveness and, at the same time, of the limitations, which these multilateral security institutions have encountered in their attempts to prevent and resolve conflicts.

The NATO, EU and OSCE documents are the expression of the new role played by the multinational security organizations and reflect the process of redefining national interest. The decisions regarding security adopted in 1999/2000 give expression to the concept that political and operational coherence is possible if it is based on common values and in close cooperation between all the bodies dealing with transatlantic security. Important is to adopt decisions on cooperation and work out its procedures and mechanisms. More important, however, is how these decisions are implemented in practice. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is exemplary. At a regional funding conference (29-30 March 2000), international donors pledged*2.4 million euros earmarked for divergent projects under the auspices of the Pact. No doubt, this showed the measure of commitment of states, the Union and non-governmental organizations, and a concrete contribution to stability in the region. However, it is premature to assess whether these decisions will lead to the expected outcome: replacing violence and terror by cooperation and respect for human rights. Operation of such instruments as the Stability Pact is of a long-term character; restoration of normality between peoples in the region is a generation matter. The OSCE's role in restoring stability is less spectacular than NATO military operations or EU economic assistance. Nevertheless, it is no less essential. It promotes the building of democratic institutions and the shaping of security based on the respect for common values. ■

NOTES

- 1 In the Summary of Conclusions of the Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council in June 1991 the following organizations were mentioned: the EC, the Council of Europe, the ECE, NATO and the WEU.
- 2 In the Prague Document, the Ministers requested these organizations to inform the CSCE Secretariat annually of their current work programme and of the facilities available for work relevant to the CSCE.
- 3 Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Declaration, para. 10.
- 4 Helsinki Document 1992. Proposed by the NATO Rome summit meeting on 7-8 Nov. 1991, NACC was called into being on 20 Dec. 1991 to establish 'liaison' between the Alliance and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); in 1997 NACC is succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which brings together 46 member states (19 NATO Allies and 27 Partner States).
- 5 Helsinki Document 1992. See also the Petersberg Declaration (19 June 1992) adopted at the WEU Council of Ministers Meeting. The Petersberg Declaration structures the WEU-Central European states' dialogue, consultations and co-operation with regard to the European security architecture and stability.
- 6 Chapter VIII of the UN Charter deals with regional arrangements (articles 52, 53 and 54). Article 52, para. 2, reads as follows: 'The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall value every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.' Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (UN Office of Public Information: New York, 1963), p. 28.
- 7 See Helsinki Document 1992.
- 8 The OSCE missions and other field activities were developed in different forms and ways: the OSCE Presence in Albania; 2 missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; the Long Duration Mission in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina; the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje (Macedonia); 2 missions to Estonia and Latvia; the Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus; the Assistance Group to Chechnya (Russia); the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office (CIO) on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference; the OSCE Offices and Missions to Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan; the OSCE Liaison Office in Central Asia (Uzbekistan); the OSCE Centres in Almaty (Kazakhstan), Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan); the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine; 3 types of activities in Kosovo-the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the OSCE Task Force for Kosovo and the OSCE Mission for Kosovo; and 2 specific activities in Estonia-on Military Pensioners and the Joint Committee on the Skruna Radar Station. For more detail, see OSCE, Secretary General, *Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities* (1 Dec. 1998-31 Oct. 1999) (OSCE: Vienna, 1999).
- 9 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, para. 1 b. In *NATO Review*, Summer 1999, Documentation.
- 10 A comprehensive analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE-KVM is presented in the volume OSCE: *Kosovo-as seen, as told. An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. October 1998 to June 1999* (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 1999), pp. 433.
- 11 *Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities* (1 Dec. 1998-31 Oct. 1999), published by the OSCE Secretary-General, Vienna, 1999.
- 12 See the text in Documentation Supplement, *NATO Review*, Spring/Summer 2000, vol. 48, p. D5.
- 13 See more on this, Yearly Report on the Implementation of Articles II and IV, Annex 1B, Dayton Peace Accords, 2000, by Gen. Carlo Jean.
- 14 The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, URL<<http://www.stabilitypact.org/Foreign%20Ministries.htm>>.
- 15 Hombach, B., 'The Stability Pact: breaking new ground in the Balkans', *NATO Review*, winter 1999, p. 20.
- 16 Hombach (note 15), p. 22. Hombach reported that on the defence side progress had been made on such matters as improved military-to-military contacts similar to confidence-building measures, control of arms sales, reducing the transfer of small arms, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The question of resources for many of the projects to be implemented will be decided at a regional financing conference to be held in 2000.
- 17 Sarajevo Summit Declaration, para. 4.
- 18 Sarajevo Summit Declaration, para. 7.
- 19 Istanbul Summit Declaration, para. 11.
- 20 Annex I to Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000.
- 21 Yves-Ghebali, V., 'The OSCE Charter for European Security', *NATO Review*, vol. 48, p. 23.
- 22 Sarajevo Summit Declaration, para. 4.
- 23 'The conflict in Chechnya shows clearly the limitations of the OSCE. In times of serious crises, it is too weak to be able to enforce its principles.' *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19 Nov. 1999.
- 24 'The OSCE is an Organization with great ambitions but little power to act.' *La Stampa*, 20 Nov. 1999. 'The OSCE meeting in Istanbul will go down in history as "the Chechnya meeting" . . . Russia was at the centre of attention -Russia with the bleeding issue of Chechnya'. *Izvestiya*, 20 Nov. 1999. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 Nov. 1999.
- 25 CSCE, Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 Dec. 1994, chapter VII, p. 20; and 'Decision on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the 21st century: a new concept for a new century', Budapest, 8 Dec. 1995, reproduced in *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996), pp. 320-21.
- 26 'To find comprehensive solutions and not just "quick fixes", we must look beyond these immediate needs', stated Wilhelm Höynck, OSCE Secretary General. See also Rotfeld, A. D., 'Europe: towards new security arrangements', *SIPRI Yearbook 1996*, p. 303.
- 27 On the main opening positions see Rotfeld (note 26), pp. 303-06.
- 28 Charter for European Security, Istanbul, Nov. 1999, para. 1.
- 29 Charter for European Security, para. 3.
- 29 Charter for European Security, para. 3.
- 30 Charter for European Security, para. 3.
- 31 This code of conduct is reflected in the Platform for Co-operative Security set out as an 'operational document' attached to the Charter for European Security. It defines the rules, commitments and modalities of cooperation. Charter for European Security (note 27), pp. 14-16.
- 32 Budapest Decisions, in Budapest Document 1994, chapter IV, pp. 9-13.
- 33 Charter for European Security, paras. 12-13.
- 34 For more detail, see Review of the Implementation of all OSCE Principles and Commitments, OSCE Review Conference, RC(99).JOUR/10, Vienna, 1 Oct. 1999. Several proposals have been made with the aim of ensuring proper implementation and further development of the Code of Conduct. See also Reports of the Second Follow-up Conference on the Code of Conduct, FSC.DEL/221/99, 30 June 1999, FSC.DEL/235/99 and FSC.DEL/236/99, 1 July 1999; and Chairman's report, FSC.DEL/252/99, 7 July 1999 and FSC/GAL/84/99/Rev., 19 July 1999.
- 35 Charter for European Security, para. 16.
- 36 Väyrynen, R., 'The European Union's new crisis management capability', *Policy Brief*, no. 3, Feb. 2000, The Kroc University.
- 37 *Russia v sisteme mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniy blizhayshego desatiletiya*. (Report on the results of prognostication research done within the research project financed by the Russian Fund for Basic Research). IMEMO-Moscow, 1995, pp. 40-41.
- 38 'One can flexibly adapt [to this process-ADR] by limiting damage and taking advantage of it or embark upon the road of dumb opposition and, consequently, increase damage and squander benefits' op. cit., p. 48.