

Gabriel Alkon,¹ Boris Gunjević²

¹City University of New York, Baruch College, Department of English, 455 Fort Washington Avenue,
US-10033 New York, NY

²Theological Faculty "Matija Vlačić Ilirik", Radićeva 34, HR-10000 Zagreb
gabriel_alkon@msn.com, boris.gunjevic@zg.htnet.hr

**According to the Identity of the Real:
The Non-Philosophical Thought of Immanence**

Abstract

Are the things of this world given to thought? Are things really meant to be known, to be taken as the objective manifestations of a transcendental conditioning power? The Western philosophical tradition, according to Francois Laruelle, presupposes just this transcendental constitution of the real – a presupposition that exalts philosophy itself as the designated recipient of the transcendental gift. In our article on Laruelle's trenchant project we try to show how this presupposition controls even the ostensibly radical critiques of the philosophical tradition that have proliferated in the postmodern aftermath of Nietzsche and Heidegger. An effective critique of philosophy must be non-philosophical. It must, according to Laruelle, suspend the presupposition that otherness is given to be known, that thought has a fundamentally differential structure. Non-philosophy begins not with difference, not with subject and object, but with the positing of the One. From this axiomatic starting point, non-philosophy takes as its material philosophy, rethought according to the One. The non-philosophy project does not, like so much postmodern philosophy, herald the end of philosophy. It takes philosophy as an occasion to raise the question of another kind of thought – one that, instead of differentially relating to the world that it presupposes, asserts that it is ultimately, in the flesh, at One with what it can never know.

Key words

non-philosophy, immanence, One, difference, Real

Meta-philosophy or philosophical self-presupposition

François Laruelle is the contemporary thinker who has most trenchantly criticized the self-presupposing and circular character of even the most apparently "advanced" philosophy. Modern philosophy after Kant has ostentatiously criticized the power of thought to grasp its object. But according to Laruelle, the post-Kantian claim to discern the limits of philosophical knowledge, to set philosophy against an inaccessible other, actually perpetuates and aggrandizes traditional philosophical pretences: setting the real beyond or against philosophy is nonetheless to define it in philosophical terms – to presuppose a (negative) adequation between philosophy and the object it cannot reach. Philosophy objectifies its ostensible other by reducing it to a negative term in its own discourse. The "end of philosophy" announced by Nietzsche and Heidegger has, Laruelle observes, taken the form of a proliferation of specifically philosophical accounts of the difference between thought and what it would know. These supposedly self-critical philosophies are in fact insidious exaltations of philosophy's power to know its own limitations and to preemptively incorporate all forms of non-philosophical thought. The quintessential

“lie” of modern philosophy is its claim to admit that it is “lying”, to describe and account for its own intrinsic failures and limitations. In doing so philosophy simultaneously posits its other and brings it within the scope of its own discourse. The inadequacy of philosophy is what modern philosophy uniquely knows – and so it presumes to know what it does not and cannot know. Only in the absence of this presumption, Laruelle contends, is it possible to discern the limitations of philosophical discourse and thereby to apprehend its true form, its actual way of knowing.¹

The presupposition of the adequacy of thought to the real defines philosophy as such. The presupposition is the same whether the real is defined in advance as the known or as the unknown – the latter definition merely reducing the real to the negative correlate of the philosophical concept. Thought undertaken in the absence of this presupposition is, by Laruelle’s definition, “non-philosophy”. The inaugurating postulate of non-philosophy is that thought is in no way other than the real; the relation of thought and the real cannot, therefore, be understood as a relation of adequation or of inadequation. In his discourse the non-philosophical subject cannot objectify the relation (or non-relation) of reality to thought. But for Laruelle the de-objectification of knowledge does not preclude the possibility of a specifically non-philosophical way of knowing.

The modern emphasis on the difference of philosophy from what it would know is, on Laruelle’s account, fundamentally consistent with the meta-philosophical ambition that has characterized philosophy from its pre-Socratic beginnings. Philosophy has always tried to get outside itself so as to know itself by accounting for its own possibility – the possibility of its systematic relation to the extra-philosophical. The intrinsic meta-philosophical ambition of philosophy seems impossible to fulfill: to conceptualize its relation to its other, philosophy would have somehow to know itself and its other apart from that very relation. Thought and being, *logos* and *physis*, would have to be known in themselves, apart from each other, if the actual constitution of their relation were somehow to be known or even imagined. But there is no thought without the actual thinking of things other than thought. And there is no way thought could ever access matter, or world, or being, in a putatively pristine un-thought state. Thought cannot know what it knows without knowing it – and so thought cannot transcend its own relativity so as to grasp it as a unity.

The impossibility of finally closing upon itself in a secure unity of subject and object has not, however, thwarted philosophy in its meta-philosophical ambition. It has rather served as the preeminent occasion for philosophical claims of self-knowledge: for in recognizing its difference from what it knows, philosophy has, since Parmenides, identified itself with this very difference – as a transcendently given differential relation. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, is the claimed identity-in-difference of thought and being, of philosophy with what is not philosophy. When the emphasis is on the overcoming of difference in identity, as it has been for much of the philosophical tradition, the overcoming is still defined in differential terms – as the identity of elements given as distinct (thought and being, mind and matter, concept and intuition), an identity that can only be comprehended philosophically. In this structure philosophy is one of the elements within the differential relation (thought or mind assimilated to philosophy) and simultaneously the identity of the differing elements (the comprehension of philosophy and its other meta-philosophically). At once inside and outside of the relation, philosophy looks at itself

and its other as a commensurable pair, as distinct entities that are implicitly correlated even in their difference, and thus philosophy is able to treat the relation abstractly, as a single object for thought. Even though a full unity with its other is impossible, this impossibility is itself reduced to a unified object – difference as transcendently given, as itself an identity.

The differential identity of modern philosophy

The circular pattern is most evident in post-Kantian thought. For Kant the posited inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself makes necessary the transcendental deduction of the possibility of the object's assimilation to thought, through intuition, schematization, and categorization. Crucially, the assimilation can never quite be accounted for – the crossing can be divided into ever finer layers of mediation – and this conceptual ramification *is* Kant's philosophy. The assimilation cannot be accounted for, and yet it is in fact presupposed from the beginning – for what else does philosophy explain? In his late works Kant himself realized that his entire project had depended upon the presupposed correlation of the unknowable with the mechanisms of knowledge; all along, in other words, he had understood difference as a relation. His idealist inheritors took this correlation or differential relation as the object of their explicit speculation. Laruelle's non-philosophy is an attempt to think without presupposing this correlation, without assuming that thought is somehow related in difference to what is not thought.

The difficulty of this undertaking became evident for Laruelle during his study in the 1970s and 1980s of Heidegger, Nietzsche, Derrida, and Deleuze, the modern “philosophers of difference” whose works, Laruelle contends, betray the same self-presupposing structure of earlier philosophies.² Though they no longer emphasize the overcoming of difference in the identity of differential relation, these thinkers still subject difference to conceptual identification, and implicitly exalt philosophy as the place where the transcendental truth or given-ness of difference (or virtuality, or will-to-power) is exposed. Thus for Deleuze the power of self-differentiation functions in the “plane of immanence” as a kind of absolute that perpetually instantiates and disrupts the forms of discrete actuality; and it is philosophy that discerns the truth of difference, the dynamic power of the immanent differential process, in the movement to and from particular actualities. Philosophy is actual, but it also knows the differential relation of the virtual and the actual; it is inside and outside of itself. As Laruelle contends, Deleuze's positing of a planar and virtual immanence sets it as a kind of background or “field of presence” correlated to the philosophical subject, who knows actual objects in their emergence from and return to the immanent process that is their implicit precondition.

¹ The author who has done the most to bring Laruelle to the attention of the English-speaking world is Ray Brassier. The account of Laruelle in this introduction has benefited from Brassier's presentation of Laruelle's project in his essay “Axiomatic Heresy: The Non-Philosophy of Francois Laruelle”, *Radical Philosophy* 121 (2003), p. 24–35. Also see Brassier's book *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 118–149.

² Laruelle presents his conclusions about these authors in *Les Philosophies de la Différence: Introduction Critique* (Paris: PUF, 1986). This work has recently been published in English translation as *Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy*, trans. Rocco Gangle (London: Continuum, 2010).

In some respects Laruelle is closer to Derrida, who does not associate difference with immanent forces but rather with the cognitive structure of recognition and self-recognition. In Derrida's account the subject forever differs from itself because its identity depends on self-apprehension, intrinsic to which is the space of self-difference that renders full self-comprehension impossible. Only its own alterity as object allows the philosophical subject to know and identify itself – but this self-identification is as such a self-division and a falling away from or exceeding of itself. This understanding of alterity, according to Laruelle's arguments still presupposes it as “sufficient or absolute”, which means that it is correlative, if only negatively, to the subject that it simultaneously constitutes and disrupts. The subject is still the privileged site for the manifestation of difference, which is given in the subject as its own internal fissure or intrinsic impossibility. Difference can still be conceptually grasped by the philosophical subject who describes his own self-division. By setting it against the philosophical aspiration to identity, deconstruction defines difference in philosophical terms – as the frustration/object of its desire – and thereby hypostatizes difference and makes it graspable conceptually. Deconstruction has not relinquished meta-philosophical ambition, for the identity that it places beyond self-differing philosophy is still defined in terms of the frustration of meta-philosophical desire, the impossibility of self-closure.

The event as philosophical decision

Furthermore, Laruelle uses recent philosophical accounts of “the event”, which are supposed to concern what is beyond philosophy, to show with special clarity the way in which philosophy is unable to escape the presumption of its own sufficiency. The concept of the event in Derrida, Deleuze and other thinkers following Nietzsche and Heidegger, is deployed so as to manifest in philosophy what is ostensibly beyond it. This manifestation involves the disruption of a realm of thought understood as relative and limited, an ontic realm subjected to continuous and consistent reference (associated by Laruelle with the relative transcendence of knowledge about being, knowledge as *meta-*). Philosophy allows for the disruption of this mode of thought in the emergence or breaking-in of its other – which may be either a deeper unity that dissolves discrete appearances (the true One as other) or a more irreconcilably transcendent other. The event is the vertical impingement, as from another level of reality, of an unconditioned beyond (*epekeina*) upon the realm of consistently knowable forms of apparent being. The philosophical thinking of the two levels, *meta-* and *epekeina*, is enabled by the manipulation of opposed pairs of hypostatized transcendental terms – the One, the Other, Multiplicity, Being-as-such. The ontic or actual level is conceived as a “hybrid” or combination of opposed transcendental terms – the Multiple and the One, for example, resulting in conditioned multiplicity; or Being and particular form, resulting in discrete being. In the event the hybrid forms of being are eliminated or attenuated in favor of the purified extreme terms, which are immediately unified or brought into conflict. Instead of being discretely combined, as they are in relative and visible forms, the transcendental terms fuse, interpenetrate, flow, or erupt. The event is the thought of the unthinkable in the posited identity of opposed terms; the best example of this pattern is provided by Deleuze's account of the event as the perpetual excess of self-differentiating power over given actualities, or as the ceaseless virtual act by which actual forms are dissolved and recomposed, or as the accession of

diverse forces to the oneness of pure multiplicity in the endless flight between conditioned multiples.

What makes this general approach to the event philosophical is the way the two realms – of conditioned and unconditioned, relative and absolute – are thought in terms of each other. The transcendental terms are hybridized to account for the appearance of discrete and knowable beings; the same terms are polarized and fused to evoke the event that transcends and transforms these beings. The *epekeina* and the *meta-*, the relative and the absolute, form a single philosophical system – they are posited together and are mutually presupposed. Not only is the event known through its effects on the conditioned realm; the very notion of conditioned being presupposes the possibility of the event that undoes it. The event is in fact an effect of the philosophical understanding of reality as split into two levels, one of which is supposed to give the other through a process of conditioning or differential relation. The notion of particular being as the combination of opposed transcendental terms (whether of One and Multiple, or Being and One, or Being and Other) already holds the possibility of the identification of opposed terms that is the event.

According to Laruelle, the true event for philosophy is in fact the coordinated positing of relative and absolute, combined and separate, conditioned and unconditioned, as mutual presuppositions – there is no event apart from the philosophical “decision” that sets these oppositions in motion. This decision is the “proto-event”, which is the self-positing of philosophy as the discourse concerning the relation of the unconditioned to what it conditions, or of the transcendental to the given. This relation, which becomes an immediate unity in the event, is the presupposition that establishes philosophy’s adequacy to its other. The presumed correlation of actual being to a transcendental conditioning power is what allows philosophy to know itself through the other by moving beyond the other as given. It is the sheer being-given of what it knows that philosophy must resist; its skill is the derivation of the transcendental – the transcendental that is its unacknowledged presupposition. The event, which undoes the given in the immediate presence of its preconditions, is the true culmination of philosophy – the moment at which it need no longer depend on its objects, which are replaced by the transcendentals that are the preserve of philosophy alone.

Presupposed by thought: the real transcendental

The philosophical circle can only be broken by real knowledge of philosophy, which has to arrive at its object from outside the circle of self-presupposition. This non-philosophical knowledge must allow itself to be determined by its object – philosophy as such – from which it has to remain separate; in this sense non-philosophy must be like positive science. But the subject of non-philosophy cannot simply be identical to the scientific subject. If non-philosophical knowledge is to do more than negate philosophy as an illusion, then it cannot abandon the transcendental aspect of philosophical discourse. Non-philosophy must, Laruelle insists, be transcendental in the sense that it must concern the way reality is given to thought. For philosophy this givenness can always be grasped *through* the given – for the object is presupposed as given through a conditioning or differentiating process that is the *same* as that which differentially relates the subject to its object. Philosophy knows the object by knowing its own difference from (and relation to) the object. This knowledge always entails philosophy’s reflexive self-discovery because the

philosophical decision on the real as transcendently given or conditioned *is* the self-positing of the philosophical subject as that which knows or derives this conditioning. To know philosophy objectively and non-philosophically requires the suspension of the subjective self-constitution of philosophy in the transcendental circle of conditioning and conditioned, or given-ness and being-given.

As the object of non-philosophical knowledge, however, philosophy must still be seen as given, for it must appear to a subject. But it must be seen as given-without-given-ness – and not as given by a process of conditioning or individuation that can be known through what it gives. The subject of non-philosophy can no longer presume that the given has been given *to him*; he must accept the given as present without any derivable process of donation.

What is given, what is radically immanent in and *as* philosophy, is the mode of transcendental knowledge in which it operates. To know this mode of knowledge, to know it without entering into its circle, is to practice a science of the transcendental, the “transcendental science” of non-philosophy. This science is *of* the transcendental, but according to Laruelle, it must also itself *be* transcendental – it must be a global theory of the given-ness of the real. A non-philosophical transcendental is required if philosophy as a whole, including its transcendental structure, is to be received and known as it is. Philosophical knowledge may be “hallucinatory”, but this hallucinatory knowledge remains a real phenomenon. To dispel an illusion is not to know it; to know it requires that it be known according to its actual given-ness – the determination or conditioning by which it really comes to appear. Philosophy must then be known as it is given – as it is transcendently determined or conditioned – but somehow this knowledge must avoid lapsing into the philosophical derivation of a presupposed conditioning power through the object that it ostensibly conditions. The real transcendental determination of philosophy cannot be philosophically derivable. The non-philosophical subject must therefore know philosophy according to a transcendental that is radically foreclosed from philosophy – though for this very reason it is its real determination or transcendental cause.

This cause cannot, in Laruelle’s view, be a presupposition of non-philosophy, for presuppositions are accessible through what they effectively condition and are therefore material for philosophy. What non-philosophy requires is rather the transcendental reality that is *presupposed* by all thought – a presupposed reality that cannot be derived as the condition of any particular thought, object, event, or phenomenon. If it is presupposed *by* thought, then the transcendental cannot be derived from anything given *to* thought – and so it cannot be articulated in the form of an otherwise implicit presupposition. The reality presupposed by thought – if it is really transcendental, if it is really presupposed – cannot be an object of thought. What is presupposed by thought cannot be a thinkable presupposition. But though this foreclosed reality cannot be an object of thought, it is not entirely inaccessible to thought. It can still be accessed by a form of thought that follows the exigencies of this foreclosure. The foreclosure demands that thought accept that it can never take what it presupposes as its own object – for the presupposed is not other than thought but rather is radically *immanent* in and as thought. The form of thought, according to Laruelle, that accepts and accords with this immanence – the immanence of the foreclosed transcendental – is the un-derived axiom. The positing of this axiom – the axiom of thought’s immanent identity to the real – is the beginning of non-philosophy.

Immanence is identity: the axiom according to the One

With this primary axiom non-philosophy suspends the presupposition by which thought is differentially related to its other – the presupposition that allows philosophy to identify itself as the thought of this difference. For non-philosophy thought is instead radically and unthinkably identical to what it would think. This identity is not coincidence, synthesis or truthful correspondence; it is identity “in the last instance”, to use the crucial phrase Laruelle adapts from Marx – the identity of thought and what it would think insofar as both are seen according to “the One”, according to the unthinkable reality of radical immanence.

As Laruelle understands it, immanence is sheer identity; there can be no immanence “to” anything else, for this sets immanence in relation to something other than itself – to some form of exteriority or transcendence. Though the “immanence to self” that defines Deleuze’s virtual plane of immanence is meant to be distinguished from immanence to any determinate whole, the “to” gives the plane a self-consistency that correlates it to the philosophical subject, who relates discrete actualities to the immanent forces by which they are singularized and dispersed. For Deleuze immanent virtuality is still given to the subject, not within the stability of the actual but as the dynamic differential relation that destabilizes and virtualizes the actual (see, again, chapter two). By contrast Laruelle posits radical immanence as an identity which precludes all relation because there can be no distance from it. There is no other to this identity, not even a transiently discrete actuality that would ultimately be dissolved by it. Such discrete forms of course exist, but they are already identical to and in the One. The subject and the things it discerns are identically immanent – not “to” anything but insofar as they are real at all. The immanence of the real simply cannot be seen or known – not as the other to thought, not as the differential relation of thought to this otherness. Thought itself is real, is immanent, and can never be otherwise.

On this point Laruelle’s notion of immanence can also be distinguished from that of Michel Henry, though the two share important similarities. Like Laruelle’s immanence, the immanent auto-affection posited by Henry is foreclosed to thought; but Henry also *opposes* the self-closure of pure auto-affection to the alienation of thought, whereas Laruelle sees thought and everything else as identical in radical immanence. It is precisely because thought *is* immanent that immanence cannot be subjected to thought. The failure of philosophy to accept this – to accept that it cannot know itself in its immanent identity – is the reason why philosophy cannot know itself at all. The foreclosure of immanence to thought is in fact the transcendental determinant of philosophy as such, which is nothing other than the attempt to overcome this foreclosure by positing it as otherness or as differential relation. True alterity, according to Laruelle, is not otherness but the identity of immanence “in the flesh”. This reality is not beyond philosophy; it is foreclosed to philosophy because it *is* philosophy – it is the act or force that is thought “in-person”, a force that is identical in the last instance to the immanent force of everything “in-One”.

The radical identity of the non-philosophical One allows for no exterior and thus no interior. It lacks all consistency, but neither is there anything apart from it with which it could be called inconsistent – it is without-consistency, just as it is without-being and without-otherness. Nothing can be separated from it – and so it is separated not only from the notion of separation but also from that of union. There can be no thought about the One, for this implies a pre-existent thinker, separate from the One, who could take up a relation to

it – whereas the thinker is always already in-One. Non-philosophical thought “according to the One” must be determined by the One – determined in and *through* its own radical immanence to everything that it is. The One must determine this thought along with the subject capable of thinking it – somehow acting on the subject with which it is identical, exerting its causality upon it through the identity of radical immanence. The non-philosophical subject *is* this thought, which takes the form of the axiomatic postulation of the One itself.

This postulation “accords” with the One by which it is determined, but this determination is without an identifiable determinant. It emerges from no discernible sequence or process. The positing of the One cannot be received as a fact or phenomenon to be interpreted, as if the One were a condition giving evidence of itself through that which it conditions. The One does determine the positing that accords with it, but there is no way back to the One from what it determines. There is no relation *between* the One and the thought or positing of the One; the thought seems to be distinct from, and thus related to, the One, but this relation appears only to thought. From the perspective of the One, the real identity, there is no difference between itself and what it determines. The determination can thus be called “unilateral”. As real transcendental, the One is radically foreclosed from the thought with which it accords; it cannot be deduced as presupposition or conditioning process. The immanent identity of the One allows for no movement in thought beyond the thought that posits it – for there is nothing beyond or other than the One, to which the thought is in the last instance identical. Thought cannot grasp this immanence by positing it as differentially related to the actual thought that it already is. Radical immanence is thinkable only according to its unilateral effect as the thought that knows itself as caused by its own immanent and ungraspable identity.

The Stranger-subject of non-philosophy

The question then is what allows the thought to exist as such, to be discrete. With respect to the One, the thought is not discrete – it remains in-One. As the effect of immanent causality, the thought is distinct only with respect to itself. This thought is what Laruelle calls the “experience” of radical identity or of the “vision-in-One”. Terms like thought and experience and vision are all potentially misleading insofar as they suggest a pre-existent subject to which the One appears and by which it is known – whereas according to Laruelle the One is knowable only insofar as it immanently causes or determines the subject of non-philosophy. This subject does not “have” an experience of the One; it *is* the experience of the vision-in-One or thought according to the One, the experience of its own immanent causation.

How can the subject experience the causation by which it is? This experience can be related to philosophical notions of subjective experience only in the last instance. This is not the experience of perception and judgment; rather it is the experience of the axiomatic positing of the One that initiates non-philosophical activity. This postulation is an act that is performed by the subject, but it is “performed without performance” – for there is no pre-existent subject to which the act can be attributed. The subject is this performance and does not exist otherwise. The subject is given in the act of postulating the One, given in its own self-performance.

Who or what performs the act if there is no pre-existent performer? What gives the act of the subject, if it arrives as given? According to Laruelle the

only answer to these questions is the postulation of a reality foreclosed to thought – in other words, the questions force a repetition of the act of axiomatic positing that occasions the questions in the first place. There is no inferential or analytical path back from the given to the source, no derivation of conditions from what is conditioned, for the subject is the thought of its own identity to its cause. What is radically immanent cannot be derived or inferred from the given, for such derivation presumes an attenuation of immanence and the need for (philosophical) actualization.

The postulation of the One is given, but without given-ness, without any possible recession into a presupposed realm of virtual conditions; it arrives not from an inferred “hinterland” of given-ness but rather from the “a-chronic” and “u-topic” identity of the immanent real. Impossible to correlate with any identifiable cause, the subject of non-philosophical thought arrives as if from nowhere, or as if it were the uncanny arrival of the already-given. Its arrival seems without cause, for it does not extend the network of worldly interrelationships posited by the philosophical subject, who knows itself by knowing itself and the world as interrelated objects of mutual determination or conditioning. According to the vision-in-One, the subject and the objects to which it is differentially related are identical and identically given in real immanence. This leveling vision enacts a causality other than the network of worldly determinations – a causality of immanence that effects the arrival of the subject that sees according to this immanence.

The causality of the One cannot act within the worldly realm, the world in which objects are knowable as discernibly conditioned. Without-being and without-thought, “without ontological, linguistic, or worldly consistency”, the One is separated beyond all relation from the object-world. The One can still, however, affect the world from which it is separated, for this separation is the non-relation of immanent identity. The effect of the One can be exerted only through its own immanence. As immanent identity, the One does not give itself as that which conditions or produces the objects of the world; the One remains itself, independent of the world precisely because it is identical to it in the last instance. Seen apart from this identity, the world is an array of dynamically interrelated objects which develop and affect each other in philosophically interpretable processes. But when seen in its radical immanence, the world of philosophy can serve as an occasional cause of the non-philosophical vision-in-One. And in fact for subjects in the world the vision-in-One must always be occasioned in this way – as the non-intuitive “experience” of philosophical “material” postulated as identical in the last instance with its immanent cause.

The philosophical material is required to effect or “effectuate” the vision-in-One because the One as such (in-One) does not express or represent itself by affecting worldly objects in any visible way. Its manifestation occurs through the One’s determination of conditioned objectivity as such – through its effect upon the mode of representation and cognition that objectivity is: philosophy. The One cannot affect philosophy from outside of it, as if philosophy were an object upon which the One could act. Instead the One affects philosophy through immanence, through its identity in the last instance to philosophy’s transcendental structure. In a sense the effect of real identity changes nothing; the causality of the One leaves no discernible trace on the objects of the philosophy-world. The change is the arrival of the subject of non-philosophy, the subject that is the act of thought performed without performance, given without given-ness, through the radical immanence that it thinks.

This subject, Laruelle says, “is not something facing me”. Because it is determined by an ineluctable immanence with which it remains identical, the non-philosophical subject cannot be posed against the particular objects reflected in philosophy by being derived according to its conditions. The “Stranger-subject” of non-philosophy is an unseen face turned towards a faceless future; this face can be “seen” by the subject who, instead of trying to perceive or face it, posits itself as ultimately identical to it. The face of this identity, the surface of this immanence, is not a visible composure; it is formed in the vision that sees everything, including itself, as unilaterally (“uni-facially”) given, untraceably and irretrievably – as given entirely to the future.

Cloning: philosophy and non-philosophy

Philosophy gives itself as absolute, self-positing, autonomous. But it is also given according to the One as “relatively autonomous”. The “taking into account” of the relative autonomy of philosophy is what the non-philosophical subject “does”. The relativity of philosophy’s autonomy does not simply negate philosophy or the philosophical subject; the exposure of the illusions perpetuated by its self-presupposing discourse does not mean that philosophy is itself an illusion. Its pretensions do not separate it from the real One. Laruelle insists that the being-given of philosophy does not undo its autonomy, because in the being-given without given-ness of the One, there is no other, no hidden given-ness or conditioning process, which can be derived as the “truth” behind or beyond the philosophical given. The identity of radical immanence is foreclosed to philosophy because it cannot be determined as conditioned – but this foreclosure leaves the immanence of philosophy itself intact and autonomous, for there is nowhere other than philosophy to turn for its true reality. This autonomy is nonetheless relativized, for it must be taken as given – a being-given of philosophy that is all the more radical precisely because it cannot be derived as a thinkable given-ness.

When seen according to the vision-in-One, the philosophical “material” or “occasion” for non-philosophy is thus “cloned”: nothing is changed, philosophy remains its autonomous self, but this autonomy is now “experienced” or posited as given without given-ness, as identical in-the-last-instance to everything real. Cloning is causality through radical immanence – a causality which by definition can have no discernible effect apart from the immanence that it already is. The effect of immanent causality is the effectuation of the One in the cloning of the philosophical material that is the occasion of non-philosophy. The effectuation of the One affects nothing because everything is already in-One, in the one real identity with no outside, no other, no shape or synthetic structure. To see philosophy and its world as cloned is, according to Laruelle, to receive them as they already are, as given in immanence, and not as the philosophical subject would have them be, as objects through which transcendental presuppositions can be derived. The non-philosophical subject of this reception *is* this reception, which means that the subject is identical to what it receives or takes as given without given-ness. The subject is what is given; there is nothing else. This is the identity of the last instance, the identity postulated in the u-chronic and u-topic vision in which the philosophy-world and the subject are determined according to the uni-laterality of the real.

The cloning of philosophy is what Laruelle calls the “transcendental function” of real immanence, a function effectuated only in the vision-in-One whereby philosophy is brought forth as immanent, as given without given-

ness. In this function the real is the constant, the variable is philosophy in its various forms, and the outcome is the “dualization” of philosophy and world: the bringing forth or determination of philosophy in the last instance as *both* discretely autonomous *and* identical, without synthesis or unity or combination, to what it thinks – and identical also to the non-philosophical subject that is nothing other than the reception or effectuation of this identity. In the last instance philosophy and what it thinks are distinct but identical as radically immanent or given without given-ness.

This immanence is itself transcendental, not in the philosophical sense of the unconditioned that is given through what it conditions, but insofar as it is a universal and ineluctable reality foreclosed from thought: everything is already given, as it is, including thought itself – whereas the content of philosophical thought is deduced by being abstracted from this being-given. The real transcendental, as opposed to the philosophical one, is forever foreclosed from what it gives. It is foreclosed from what it gives because it *is* what it gives, which is the identity of the real as being-given without given-ness. Whereas philosophical transcendental terms are given through what they condition and are thus accessible to thought, the real transcendental is radically given and is therefore foreclosed from thought. Thus while philosophy derives its own identity with the transcendental by thinking the given-ness of its objects, non-philosophy separates itself from philosophy – and separates philosophy from its objects – by accepting both philosophy and its objects as unthinkable given in immanence.

Advent: the immanence of the future

Laruelle claims that non-philosophy separates philosophy from its objects and thereby exposes the object-world to an unknown future. The world is the synthetic combination of philosophy and the objects that it posits as the products of transcendental conditioning and as therefore susceptible to philosophical knowledge. When seen in-One, the philosophy-world is transformed into – or cloned as – “world-thought”, which is a “mixture” of thought and its objects, as opposed to a combination. To see thought and its objects as “mixed” rather than combined or synthesized is to see them as separate but at the same time as identical in immanence. The vision-in-One takes the entire philosophical apparatus, the simultaneous identity and difference of thought with its presupposed others, as given without given-ness – as relatively autonomous with respect to the real from which it is foreclosed and with which it is ultimately identical.

No less, but no more, real than anything else, philosophy is thus leveled with the world that is its object – and according to Laruelle this releases the world from the philosophical presupposition of its conditioned objectivity, its correlative sufficiency for philosophy. The world, in other words, is released from itself, from its structure as world-object. When the world is no longer seen as presupposed by philosophy, as a set of objects knowable as conditioned, but rather as the world-thought “mixture” – when the world-thought combination is cloned as a duality that is ultimately identical, as an identity without synthesis – then the entire world has been brought into the unknown reality of the future. In its bringing forth as given without given-ness the world arrives from no depth or distance – no *meta-*, no *epekeina*. There is no process of objectification to analyze, no distance crossed by the given for thought to traverse once again. This arrival is an “advent” that comes from nowhere, that presents

again what was already present, but now turned towards and into the invisible face of the Stranger-subject. In this turning the given is itself estranged, for it is identified with the unseen face – the solitary and unilateral face of the future, or of the present as it faces the future for the first time.

In the non-philosophical advent, the release of the philosophy-world from its own self-sufficiency is not the transcendence of this world. The future towards which the world is turned cannot be beyond the given. Whereas the philosophical event perpetually dissolves the given into its preconditions, the advent of the non-philosophical Stranger-subject is also the advent of the world. According to Laruelle, to see the world in-One, to see it as identical to an immanence that cannot be seen, does not dissolve the world but brings it forth in the form of an unthinkably given autonomy. The world is all the more real when its sufficiency for thought, its conditioned objectivity, is suspended – when it can no longer be presupposed as given across a philosophically derivable depth or distance. As it is released and received in the advent of the subject of non-philosophy, the world, says Laruelle, is brought forth as a non-objective reality. The things of the world still exist, but no longer as objects sufficient for philosophy's derivation of its own presuppositions. Instead of being linked to correlative forms or concepts, worldly objects relate to nothing beyond themselves – which is to say that they enter a future that cannot be anticipated according to established patterns of substitutive pseudo-transformation. The advent of the real future can start only with things as they are, as they are given, and not insofar as they can be substituted for each other according to the systemic logic of the world as philosophical object.

Laruelle's recent work has attempted to theorize the life of the non-philosophical Stranger-subject, a life which, though it cannot be subjective or human in an essential sense, must be distinguished from the real One that it posits. Whereas the immanent real is in-Man or in-person, the non-philosophical subject posits this immanence and lives in and through this positing. The life of the subject is, according to Laruelle, a *faithful* adherence to generic scientific or theoretical procedures – an adherence to the axiom of an immanent identity that is foreclosed from the world, and to the theorems that follow from this axiom. The subject lives in the faithful application of these axioms to philosophical material and also, as in some of Laruelle's most recent work, to religious material.³ The non-philosophical or non-religious subject lives *only* in this application. Arriving as if from nowhere, from no time or place apart from the world as it is, the Stranger-subject posits the vision-in-One only by suspending the reciprocal mediation of immanence and transcendence in worldly thought. The life of the subject depends for its occasion on the various forms of philosophical and religious thought that are structured by the presumption of a transcendental that determines (and is determined by) the realm of the immanent given.

Faith-in-life: future-Christ

In the case of religion, the suspension of mediation pre-empts belief in a divine source of the visible world. This suspension differs from the dogmatic assertions of atheists, who insist that they know and possess the transcendent as a reified nothing. The application of non-philosophical procedures to religious materials requires a subject who is non-Christian and also non-atheist, a subject for whom transcendence is not negated but suspended by being posited as ultimately identical, without synthesis, to what appears as immanent to

worldly thought. This ultimate identity is the immanence of the last instance, the immanence of the One in which the mutually-determining immanence and transcendence of philosophy are together given-without-given-ness.

The figure of Christ has, for Laruelle, become the model of the non-religious suspension of reciprocal mediation, for the most scandalous statements of Christ were and remain the axiomatic assertions by which he assumed identity with Law and Logos, the two principles of mediation that structured the order of his world. By identifying these structures in himself, in his own flesh, Christ called them radically into question: to *be* the Logos as such is necessarily to present the source of this Word; and to *be* the Law is to embody a perfection that Law as such can only indicate. Thus in Christ the transcendent does not somehow *become* immanent; rather his axioms suspend their mutual relation according to a more ultimate identity. In claiming to be these principles of mediation, Christ seems to assert that there is nothing any longer to mediate. With the perfection of mediation announced by Christ, the transcendent realm, along with the Law and Logos that had upheld it, is nowhere but in-him – that is to say, in Laruelle’s terms, in the radical immanence, the identity of the last instance, of his positing.

Laruelle calls his account of Christ’s action non-Christian because the suspension of mediation leaves nothing in which to *believe*. The notion of belief presupposes a philosophical mode of knowledge in which the divine gives and is discerned through the world; belief in divinity becomes a way of knowing the object and content of faith. Laruelle suggests that there is a more radical, non-religious faith – a faith adhering to the generic non-philosophical axioms that suspend mediation and produce the world as given-without-given-ness, as given beyond any possible philosophical retrieval of the giving.

The suspension of mediation is itself immediately and unaccountably given in the postulation of immanent identity – and this postulation is in the last instance identical to the materials of mediated worldly knowledge that function as its occasion. The positing of the One cannot be deduced from any worldly phenomena, nor can it be induced from any prior suppositions. According only with the unknowable immanent identity of the real, this axiom announces an “unlearned knowledge” (a phrase that Laruelle uses to allude to the disembodied intuitions of Gnosis). And because this “knowledge” cannot be derived and lacks any form of its own, it requires faith to effectuate it, to bring it to life in this world.

The positing of the ultimate identity of the One is empty and meaningless apart from the structures of worldly knowing that it neutralizes and suspends. The articulation of the vision-in-One occurs only in the faithfully asserted identity-without-synthesis of particular determinations of immanence and transcendence, of objectivity and its philosophical derivation. The vision-in-One must therefore be posited or effectuated again and again, always through its neutralization, without negation, of particular hierarchical structures of worldly knowledge. The faith of Christ, according to Laruelle, lives only in

3

See especially *Le Christ futur: un leçon d’hérésie* (Paris: Exils Editeur, 2002). This book has recently been published in English translation as *Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy*, trans. Anthony Paul Smith (London: Continuum, 2010). Laruelle extends this work, especially as it concerns the relation of belief and faith, in the essay “A Science

in Christ”, trans. Aaron Riches, in *The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism*, eds. Peter Candler, Jr. and Conor Cunningham (Canterbury: SCM, 2010). Here Laruelle specifically discusses the generic functioning of Christ’s axiomatic language.

his asserted identity to Law and Logos, an identity that suspends these mediating principles of worldly order, and thereby brings forth their world as identical in the last instance to an immanence that they cannot know or master. And Christ must live again – the living faith of a “future Christ” is always required – because philosophical knowledge perpetually attempts to objectify and transcend the radical immanence to which it is nonetheless identical. This is the immanence of the future itself, a future that is always identical to what has already been given, insofar as this given is radically inconsistent with the predictable motions of philosophical attenuation and objectification.

The subject that lives into this future, the Stranger-subject or future Christ, is a non-individual, non-egoistic subject deprived of concrete form in the world. The subject arrives from and disappears into the future that he opens by positing the ultimate identity of every worldly form in an immanence that remains unknown and undetermined. In the present the subject lives in the application of axioms to the worldly structures he suspends. His life is an impersonal faith in this application and suspension, in generic non-philosophical functions and the immanent future to which they are committed. There is no object to this faith-without-belief. It is a living adherence to the efficacy of the unlearned or axiomatic knowledge of ultimate identity. To adhere to these axioms requires faith because they have no knowable efficacy: the suspension of mediation accomplishes nothing within the world; rather it exposes the world as a whole to the future, which is nothing other than the immanence that cannot be known and objectified by predictable philosophical transformations.

The fidelity of the Christ-subject to the immanent future that he posits is also, according to Laruelle, his fidelity to all of those whose violent exclusion from the world ensures that they live in an immemorial and unforgettable past. In the vision-in-One everything other than or excluded from the world is seen as nonetheless identical to the world in the last instance. The unknown past, the past of the nameless victims, and the unknown future, unilaterally exposed, are One with the world in the ultimate real. By living according to the positing of this ultimate identity, by effecting the neutralization of the worldly order founded on the denial of this identity, the Christ-subject shares the immanent life of past and future, of victim and redeemer.

Belief and faith: theological questions

Laruelle’s focus on the figure of the “future Christ”, and his more recent engagement with Christian mysticism in still un-translated works,⁴ have raised questions as to the precise relation between the discourses of non-philosophy and Christian theology. Though the preemption of belief by an immediate and objectless faith is supposed to separate non-Christianity from the Christian tradition, this preemption may be based on a simplified understanding of traditional belief as directed towards a presupposed transcendental source of given objectivity. For the ban on idolatry, the first axiom of monotheistic religion, calls into question all presupposed notions of knowable divinity. God as *creator* cannot be known as the conditioning source of the world, as if he were a First Cause or Primal Being without qualitative difference from finite beings and causes. God cannot be known as the cause of any discernible effect.⁵ The transcendence of the creator can be known only insofar as it is paradoxically immanent in and as the world it creates and sustains. Indeed one can understand the divine act of creation as a cause of the last instance, a cause that applies to everything, but only insofar as it is seen according to the

Oneness of God's ultimate and ungraspable reality – a real immanence identical to but radically inconsistent with the world as it appears. The faith that adheres to the non-philosophical vision-in-One, that takes everything in the world as given-without-given-ness, is perhaps closer than Laruelle realizes to trust in an unknown God, a trust that allows for the world in all its diversity and inconsistency to be received as a single unfathomable *gift*.

If, however, the objectless character of traditional and non-idolatrous belief can seem to resemble non-religious faith, the converse may also hold true: Laruelle's ostensibly objectless faith may not, despite his efforts, be entirely purged of a positive content. Belief and faith are not easily dualized, not only because the ban on idolatry has already (non-religiously) foreclosed transcendence from the realm of objective and worldly thought, but also because faith, in Laruelle's own account, is ambiguously tied to the worldly and historical figure of Jesus Christ. This tie seems to contradict Laruelle's own understanding of faith as adherence to a world-less "unlearned knowledge". The fidelity of Christ, Laruelle contends, is not specific to him personally: indeed Christ's own individual personality is neutralized in the way he lives according to the postulation of the immanent identity of every worldly thing (including himself). This fidelity need not be tied to the worldly image of Christ because it is impersonal and can therefore be lived in every subject whose place in the world is called into question by the positing of radical immanence. According to Laruelle, the faith of Christ lives not in the visible acts that characterize his personal and worldly image, but in his axiomatic suspension of mediation, in his self-identification as Law and Logos. The "self" thus identified exists nowhere except in its positing and in the identity that it effects. Christ cannot exist without the Law and Logos that he neutralizes, and that is why the future Christ is always required: non-religious axioms must be similarly applied to other regimes of mediation and worldly order.

But why, if faith is the life adhering to a generic non-philosophical procedure, does Laruelle focus on the figure of Christ? Why does Laruelle invoke *this* name? The answer cannot be, as Laruelle sometimes suggests, that he is simply making non-religious use of given religious and theological material. The future Christ is not simply cloned from the image of Christ that appears in this world. For as Laruelle also makes clear, the axioms of Christ, his asserted identity to Law and Logos, are the model for the non-philosophical and non-religious positing of radical immanence – to the extent that Laruelle's proposed generic science of religion would be a "science in Christ". And these axioms cannot be entirely separated from the worldly figure of Christ (which is worldly simply insofar as it appears, regardless of how this appearance is understood, whether as historical or mythological or in some other way). Does not Laruelle imply the indispensability of this figure, if only by his fidelity to the name?

4

Mystique non-philosophique à l'usage des contemporains (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007).

5

Etienne Gilson, commenting on a passage from Aquinas' *De Potentia* (q. 3, a. 1), says that "creation is not a change, because to create is not to make something from something else..." See Etienne Gilson, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 193. Herbert McCabe, OP, follow-

ing Gilson, pointedly summarizes the relevant implications of the classical doctrine: "...creation does not make any *difference* to anything, it is not a matter of a transition from one kind of thing to another kind of thing.... In thinking of something as *creature* we are not thinking of it in contrast and distinction from other creatures, we are thinking of it, or trying to think of it, as existing instead of not existing." See Herbert McCabe, *God Matters* (London: Continuum, 1987), p. 150.

Even if the significance of Christ lies in his adherence to impersonal and generic scientific procedures, one must still ask about the relation between the worldly Christ and the positing of world-less “unlearned knowledge” that has been associated with him. If there is *any* relation, if “Christ” is not simply an arbitrary name for the life of generic scientific procedures that can arrive anytime and anywhere, inexplicably and without condition, then the figure of Christ takes on an exceptional *eminence* – in other words, transcendence – that threatens the finality of the immanence he ostensibly posits. If the worldly Christ, the figure that has arisen and taken its place in worldly history, is in some way *necessary* for the positing of the identity of radical immanence, then Christ simply cannot be identical in the last instance to this supposedly ultimate reality. It seems that Laruelle’s ostensibly generic Christ-subject, standing *out* from the One that he posits, introduces an ineluctable transcendence into the heart of the immanent One.

Non-philosophy dualyzes immanence and transcendence by positing them as in the last instance identical in radical immanence. For theology, by contrast, immanence and transcendence are neither distinguishable nor identical: they cannot be differentially related in philosophical fashion, as if they were two objects; but neither can they be identified according to the non-philosophical axiom that the ultimate and unknowable transcendental for worldly thought is radical immanence. Instead theology takes transcendence as *itself immanent*, as itself given-without-given-ness in a world of things that are simultaneously interrelated and incommensurable. Transcendence is internal to the structure of things that exist in mutually determining relation to each other, a relation that is *positive* and not just differential or dialectical; and so transcendence cannot, even in the last instance, be foreclosed from any form of worldly knowledge. Transcendence *as such* is foreclosed: that which gives the world as a whole is as unknowable for theology as it is for non-philosophy; the doctrine of creation insists that the world is given without a philosophically recoverable given-ness. But this doctrine also implies that human beings assert their belief in an ultimate transcendence simply by perceiving the world in all its beauty and diversity – a perception which requires that they attend to some worldly objects more than others, granting them relative eminence.

To attend to the world in this way, to receive it as constituted and held together in its very being by the mutual determination of incommensurable forms, is to believe in the living reality of transcendence-in-immanence. It is to receive the world as dynamically structured at its deepest level by an incarnate mystery. For there is an inescapably positive and *creative* aspect of causal interrelationships, even at the worldly level. Of course causes can always be philosophically derived as conditioning their effects (and vice-versa, in the movement of reciprocal determination). But philosophy can never use causes and effects to account exhaustively for each other; what remains mysterious is the separation, the shared discretion, of causal factors from their effects – which nonetheless shape and affect each other. In this separation is the unaccountable creative power of causality, by which interrelated worldly elements *give being* to each other by giving each other the space freely and distinctly to be, while still remaining always in mutually constitutive relation. To accept the reality of things is to believe in the immanence of this ultimately transcendent power.⁶

For theology, then, some form of belief inheres in the life of the subject – even the non-philosophical one. The preemption of belief by generic faith threatens to harden into an untenable distinction. Though vulnerable to all sorts of

worldly and philosophical abuses, belief in a truly transcendent being – given the strictures of monotheistic revelation, beginning with the ban on idolatry – cannot be philosophical in Laruelle’s sense. There is in the very notion of ultimate transcendence a built-in check on the philosophical manipulations that would capture it for worldly knowledge. And conversely, faith cannot be truly world-less and imageless. The images and objects of faith must be provisional, broken in advance by ultimate transcendence; but there can be no primal trust or faith without visible forms to elicit it and bring it to life. Could Laruelle have articulated his non-religious faith without the direction provided by his personal belief in – his inclination towards, his attention to, his imagination of – Jesus Christ?

Bibliography

Ray Brassier, “Axiomatic Heresy: The Non-Philosophy of Francois Laruelle,” *Radical Philosophy* 121 (2003), p. 24–35.

Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Etienne Gilson, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

François Laruelle, *Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy*, trans. Anthony Paul Smith (London: Continuum, 2010).

François Laruelle, *Les Philosophies de la Difference: Introduction Critique* (Paris: PUF, 1986).

François Laruelle, *Mystique non-philosophique a l’usage des contemporains* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007).

François Laruelle, “A Science in Christ,” trans. Aaron Riches, in *The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism*, eds. Peter Candler, Jr. and Conor Cunningham (Canterbury: SCM, 2010).

Herbert McCabe, OP, *God Matters* (London: Continuum, 1987).

6

See again Gilson, who notes Aquinas’ statements in *De Potentia* (q. 7, a. 2): “All the created causes communicate in one effect, which is being, although everyone of them has its proper effect, and this distinguishes it from the others.... There must therefore be a cause higher than all the causes, a cause because of which they themselves cause being...” At the basis of all causal efficacy, says Gilson in interpreting Aquinas, is the power of the cause to communicate its being to the effect; this communication occurs as the cause gives

its own separate form to the effect, a separation which is not a difference but a sharing of common being. Creation, says Gilson, “is the prototype of causal efficiency, and if they are to be conceived as contributing to the very being of their effects, finite beings are efficient causes only inasmuch as, in acting, they imitate the first efficient act, cause of all other beings as well as of their causal fecundity.” Gilson, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy*, pp. 206–207.

Gabriel Alkon, Boris Gunjević

**Prema identitetu realnog:
Ne-filozofska misao imanencije**

Sažetak

Jesu li stvari ovog svijeta nešto što je dano samoj misli? Jesu li stvari tako mišljene da budu spoznatljive, da budu objektivne manifestacije transcendentale uvjetovanih moći? Zapadna filozofska tradicija prema Francoisu Laruelleu pretpostavlja tu transcendentale konstituciju realnog. To je pretpostavka koja uzdiže samu filozofiju kao označenu primateljicu transcendentale dara. U našem članku o Laruellovom projektu želimo pokazati kako ta pretpostavka kontrolira čak i prividno radikalne kritike filozofske tradicije koje su se umnožile kao posljedice Nietzscheovog i Heideggerovog mišljenja. Zato učinkovita kritika filozofije mora biti ne-filozofska. Ona prema Laruelleu mora dokinuti pretpostavke da je drugotnost dana da bi bila spoznata, kao što mora dokinuti pretpostavku kako sama misao ima fundamentalno drugačiju strukturu. Ne-filozofija počinje ne sa razlikom, ne sa subjektom i objektom, nego sa pozicioniranjem Jednog. Od te početne aksiomske točke, ne-filozofija uzima kao vlastitu materijalnu filozofiju ponovno mišljenje u odnosu na Jedno. Ne-filozofski projekt ne započinje kao što to čini postmoderna filozofija s naviještanjem kraja filozofije. On uzima filozofiju kao prigodu da postavi pitanje drugačije vrste mišljenja – onog koji, umjesto da se diferencirajući odnosi prema svijetu koji pretpostavlja, potvrđuje kako je ultimativno u tijelu s Jednim kojeg nikad ne možemo znati.

Ključne riječi:

ne-filozofija, imanencija, Jedno, razlika, realno

Gabriel Alkon, Boris Gunjević

**Gemäß der Identität des Realen:
der nichtphilosophische Gedanke der Immanenz**

Zusammenfassung

Sind die Dinge dieser Welt etwas dem Gedanken Gegebenes? Sind sie gemeint, um erkannt zu werden, um als objektive Manifestationen transzendental bedingter Kräfte betrachtet zu werden? Die westliche philosophische Tradition, Francois Laruelle zufolge, setzt gerade diese transzendente Konstitution des Realen voraus – eine Sehweise, die die Philosophie an sich als designierte Empfängerin der transzendentalen Gabe lobpreist. In unserem Artikel zum Laruelles zielbewussten Projekt versuchen wir zu schildern, wie die betreffende Voraussetzung sogar die vorgeblich radikalen Kritiken der philosophischen Tradition der Kontrolle unterwirft, die sich in der postmodernen Nachfolgeperiode von Nietzsche und Heidegger vermehrt haben. Die effektive Kritik der Philosophie muss nichtphilosophisch sein. Laut Laruelle soll sie die Annahmen ausschließen, wonach die Anderheit zum Erkennen gegeben sei und der Gedanke eine elementar ungleiche Struktur besitze. Die Nichtphilosophie setzt nicht mit der Differenz an, nicht mit dem Subjekt und Objekt, sondern mit der Postulierung des Einen. Von diesem axiomatischen Ausgangspunkt her fasst die Nichtphilosophie die Wiederabwägung gegenüber dem Einen als eigene materielle Philosophie. Das nichtphilosophische Projekt sagt nicht, wie vorab die postmoderne Philosophie, den Ausklang der Philosophie an. Vielmehr beurteilt es die Philosophie als die Gelegenheit zur Fragestellung nach einer anderen Eigenheit des Denkens – jenes, welches anstatt vielschichtig von der Welt zu handeln, die es voraussetzt, letzten Endes ihre Verkörperung mit dem Einen bestätigt, das man niemals zu kennen vermag.

Schlüsselwörter

Nichtphilosophie, Immanenz, das Eine, Differenz, das Reale

Gabriel Alkon, Boris Gunjević

**Selon l'identité du réel :
la pensée non-philosophique de l'immanence**

Résumé

Les choses de ce monde sont-elles données à la pensée ? Les choses sont-elles supposées être connues, être des manifestations objectives d'un pouvoir conditionné transcendalement ? La tradition philosophique occidentale, selon François Laruelle, présuppose cette constitution transcendante du réel. Une présupposition qui exalte la philosophie elle-même en tant que réceptrice désignée du don transcendantal. Dans notre article sur le projet de Laruelle, nous souhaitons montrer que cette présupposition incisive contrôle même des critiques soi-disant radicales de la tradition philosophique, qui ont proliféré à la suite de la pensée de Nietzsche et de Heidegger. C'est pourquoi une critique efficace de la philosophie doit être non-philosophique. Selon Laruelle, elle doit suspendre la présupposition que l'altérité est donnée pour être connue et que la pensée a une structure fondamentalement différente. La non-philosophie commence, non pas avec la différence, ni avec le sujet et l'objet, mais avec la postulation de l'Un. Partant de ce point axiomatique, la non-philosophie prend comme matériau la philosophie repensée selon l'Un. Le projet non-philosophique ne commence pas, comme tant de philosophie post-moderne, en annonçant la fin de la philosophie. Il prend la philosophie comme occasion de poser la question d'une autre sorte de pensée – une sorte qui, au lieu de se rapporter au monde qu'elle présuppose en se différenciant, affirme qu'elle est, en dernière instance, en chair et en os en Un avec ce qu'elle ne peut jamais connaître.

Mots-clés

non-philosophie, immanence, Un, différence, réel