

nally NATO. Croatia must not and will not stay isolated from European and global integrations. This does not imply that it will not accept its share of responsibility for the further stabilisation of the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in its eastern neighbourhood. However, by accepting co-operation, Croatia needs to keep on stressing that it cannot be the hostage of the neighbouring region, and that the dynamics of its ascension to the above mentioned associations depend only on the development of the situation in south-eastern Europe.

In keeping with such considerations, and always bearing in mind the firm protection of the fundamental national and state interests, in the upcoming period, Croatia will reinforce its efforts to start the first round of negotiations in view of joining the PHARE programme and the negotiations regarding the Co-operation agreement. This will be done by means of an ongoing dialogue and co-operation, and by entreating the European Union to show a more affirmative and constructive approach. The normalisation of the situation in the Croatian Danubian region has opened the door for the stepping up of the lobbying activity in view of Croatia joining the NATO Partnership for Peace programme. According to some announcement the very important negotiations regarding the ascension of the WTO should be concluded very soon. By ascending this organisation, Croatia will reaffirm both its economic strength and its willingness to participate side by side with other states in the global association of national economies. The current successful presidency over

the Central European Initiative, which gained its confirmation in the recently very successfully organised ministerial summit on the islands of Brijuni, the nearly completed bilateral agreements regarding free trade with all CEFTA members, as well as the recently approved membership in the Danubian Commission, clearly prove that the door leading to Central Europe is opening to Croatia. Simultaneously, bilateral talks are being held with representatives of the Mediterranean countries who respect the fact that the Republic of Croatia is also a Mediterranean country. Based on their reactions, it may be concluded that the Republic of Croatia will become a fully fledged member of those regional associations in the foreseeable future.

As we are undergoing the period of globalisation and mutual interdependence, it is very important to stress that when it comes to joining European and trans-Atlantic associations Croatia does not have an alternative. Irrespective of the lack of understanding, even pressures which come from these associations, Croatia must constantly demonstrate its affiliation with Europe. This it will do best by reinforcing the internal stability based on democracy and the rule of law, by protecting citizens' and minority rights, reinforcing a market economy and welfare state. These standards Croatia wants to apply not only as a down payment for its future membership in the EU and NATO, but primarily in its own interest and for the advantage of all its citizens. ■

Reflections of the New European Security in South-Eastern Europe

Mario Nobile

A new European security architecture is rapidly being created. Changes have taken place in both organisation and substance.

In an organisational and structural sense, the changes are visible at first glance.

NATO has expanded powerfully to the east and south of Europe. Through the Partnership for Peace plan, the young democracies are being stabilised and prepared for full membership of the NATO collective security system. OSCE has grown out of its conference beginnings and become an organisation, considerably expanding its membership among the newly created states. After OSCE served for decades as a cold-war mechanism for relaxing

tension and control of escalation in the arms race, now it has a growing role as a security organisation covering almost the whole of the northern hemisphere and in stabilising the regions and states in transition. The WEU is also adapting itself to the vigorous processes of European integration, in depth and across the board, and has become an independent western European instrument for defence and foreign policy.

There are two opposing tendencies in the process of the complete breaking-down of cold-war bipolarity in post-wall Europe. Western countries, particularly the USA, are interested in expanding NATO to the countries of the former eastern bloc. The Russian Federation wants to stop this process or slow it

down, at the very least. The expansion of NATO is not a real security threat to Moscow, rather a threat to its status. The main Russian foreign policy effort is directed towards the preservation of super-power status for Russia, and the process of NATO expansion reduces the sphere of influence of Moscow in the regions of eastern Europe that for centuries Moscow considered its own backyard. The inexorable creation of a new European collective security system, a more all-embracing process than the simple expansion of NATO, will probably result in new compromises in relations between the enlarged NATO and Russia, likely to be broader than the current relationship of partnership. It is impossible to imagine a new European collective security without specific security arrangements with the Russian Federation and consideration being given to its interests in status and security.

Moscow is attempting to slow down the geographical expansion of NATO, arguing that OSCE should become an umbrella security organisation for the whole of the northern hemisphere, which is being resisted by western countries, especially the US. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the role of the OSCE as a security mechanism for crisis management and for the democratisation of the countries in transition is growing. Nevertheless, western countries will continue to prevent OSCE growing into a hard and fast treaty organisation like the UN.

In terms of substance too, the new European regional security has changed thoroughly.

What is the new concept of European regional security?

In practice, the NATO alliance no longer primarily serves as a defensive system for the collection defence of the USA and western Europe. The main aim of the NATO alliance is not any longer keeping up militarily with its competitor. Working militarily and politically outside the area of its members, NATO has become an instrument for dictating conditions and guarantees of peace in various unstable countries in transition. NATO is also an instrument for the democratisation of these societies through a relationship of partnership, joint military exercises and professional training and standardisation of the armed forces of these countries. The aims of this influence are to reduce the costs of defence, to increase transparency, to contribute to the relaxation of tension, standardisation, and civilian control over military structures. NATO has become an important instrument for the westernisation of those societies in transition that have such an ambition and vocation.

WEU is looking for a place for itself in the strengthening of the military and political independence of the western European countries as a counter-balance to American leadership and as an instrument of the defensive transparency and co-ordination of the members of the Union. In a sense as well, the WEU also acts as an instrument for the stabilisation of the regions in its neighbourhood (the naval blockade at Otranto during the time of the sanctions on ex-Yugoslavia, the umbrella role in the Albanian crisis and so on).

The OSCE for these reasons still mainly acts as a conference in which decisions are made by consensus and have a political and not a legal force. There is no likelihood of the Permanent Council of OSCE or any other organ of OSCE getting authority similar to that of the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, in the years to come to a certain extent one should expect the continuation of institutionalisation and the accumulation of institutional memory. OSCE also still plays an important role in negotiations about arms control or the verification of the implementation of earlier agreements about arms reductions and the balance of forces. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the new political map of Europe have brought about a completely new military and political situation that no longer corresponds to the previously established balances. That is why future negotiations inside OSCE will be concerned with the total elimination of certain weapons and further reductions, and less about the maintenance of balances established earlier between the European west and east. It can be expected that one of the main efforts in the area of arms control will be directed to the prevention of the transfer of weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet bloc and the Russian Federation to undemocratic regimes, terrorist groups and criminals.

The main role of OSCE today, then, is no longer to establish and implement balances of forces and measures for the relaxation of tension. On the contrary, OSCE has turned into a mechanism for crisis control and, on the other hand, an instrument for the stabilisation and democratisation of countries in transition. This refers particularly to post-conflict societies in which questions such as national reconciliation, the return of refugees and displaced persons, human and civil rights, and post-war reconstruction have an important political and security dimension.

The main areas of work of OSCE have become areas of broader definitions of national and regional security, such as:

- parliamentary control of the armed forces
- the depoliticisation of the army

- a military code of behaviour
- war and humanitarian law,
- training observers for work in other countries,
- supervision of the freedom, fairness and regularity of elections,
- protection of minority and human rights,
- freedom of the media
- the role of NGOs
- the openness of society,
- economic and social equality, and so on.

In some countries, like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania, the OSCE has a very broadly based mandate through which, in collaboration with other international mechanisms, after a period of war or anarchy, it can carry out the initial establishment of various levels of government and the reinforcement of democratic institutions until such time as they are able to function independently, without international supervision or guardianship.

In many other eastern European lands, OSCE missions are small, focussed on certain of the political problems essential for regional security or internal security in these countries, such as: the position of the Russian minority in the Baltic countries, in the Crimea and Ukraine; the (non)withdrawal of the Russian army from Moldova; the status of the Russian Skrunda radar station in Latvia; preventing the conflict from spilling over into Macedonia; the underdevelopment of democratic institutions in Belarus; mediating in conflicts in Abkhazia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each of these missions is specific, depending on the character of the problem in which the OSCE is mediating and reporting about. The substance of the mandate is mostly limited by the political views of the belligerents or the government on whose territory the mission is working. The foreign policy position of these countries depends very largely on reports by OSCE missions, according to which the attitudes of regional organisations and individual countries are determined.

Everything, then, points to the modern European definition of internal and international stability for the next millennium putting the democratic and developmental criteria of security above military factors. Regional networks, compatibility, and integration into a system of collective security are more important than real individual military power or bilateral military alliances, geopolitical advantages or propinquity in terms of ideology and culture.

At the bottom of this trend is a conviction that national and regional security can be attained best via:

- democratisation
- development

- the rule of law and order,
- an open society,
- transparency of social mechanisms,
- the reinforcement of the public and NGOs
- economic and political pluralism,
- ethnic, religious and ideological toleration,
- media freedoms,
- developmental interdependence and complementarity,
- social mobility.

The European concept of regional security and stability on the threshold of the new millennium is a post-modern concept in which national, political and state identities constitute a welcome diversity in technological competition and creative reciprocity. In the post-ideological age the concept of the creative interpenetration of civilisations is superior to the conflict of civilisations concept. The concept of security through the control of territory and military bases, or the balance of military forces, is being abandoned. The world is dominated and influenced by the flow of information, technology, ideas and people. The efforts being made by NATO, OSCE, WEU and other mechanisms from this point of view in the societies in transition are directed towards equalising and co-ordinating the parameters of development, technology, security and world-view.

Unfortunately, many of the problems with which the organisation still deals are from the pre-modern age. The collapse of communist federations in eastern and south-eastern Europe created, sometimes accompanied by bloodshed, new states in which nationalist instincts and priorities are still predominant on the political scene. Hard-won freedom and great losses and sacrifices, as well as objective difficulties in development in these economically and morally shattered societies do not create a fertile soil for the new humanist definition of European security and stability. From this point of view post-conflict and anarchic societies are a clot in the bloodstream of the new Europe. Belatedly, but still in time, Europe is realising that the stability of these countries and their being integrated into Europe constitute the central problem of the new European regional stability.

How the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia affected the evolution of the concept of European security

The conflict in ex-Yugoslavia had the most effect on the change in the substance of European security, and the influence of this regional crisis, which is now shifting deeper into the south-east, is

continuing. This particularly refers to the role of regional mechanisms in peace negotiations and post-conflict stabilisation. The area of south-east Europe is still a laboratory for a new kind of European cooperation in the domain of security.

The implosion and entropy of communist structures was particularly complex in the multi-national federations. Communism did not collapse primarily because of external pressure, rather because of internal national and social movements in the socialist countries, because of an indigenous need for reform and opening up. Without the belated national revolutions it was not possible to start the transformation of these authoritarian societies into multi-party democracies, market economies and open societies. This belated or regenerated politogenesis, which was completed in other European states in previous centuries, and rampant exploitative capitalism, the consequence of war and conditions of anarchy, as well as the absence of a democratic tradition, led to the appearance of a non-modern, frustrated concept of sovereignty in some of the states in transition.

European and global security organisations and methods of crisis management were not at the beginning ready to cope with these challenges, because they functioned on the defence philosophy of bipolarity and isolation from the infectious influences of the environment. At the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s, European security architecture still functioned on the "balance of terror" in a bipolar system built in such a way as to stop local crises escalating into a wider conflict. The classic peace-keeping strategy of the UN was also tuned to freeze rather than to solve problems. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the liberation of eastern Europe took European security structures by surprise, for these were not ready to cope with the disintegration of communist federations and the internal ferments in post-communist societies. Instead of adjusting rapidly to these new realities organisationally and in terms of substance, the European powers then were not able to stand up to the challenge of the classic balance of forces and the need to fill the power vacuum created by the post-communist implosion.

The paralysis of international mechanisms in the face of the demands posed by the looming tragedy in ex-Yugoslavia was caused by the inappropriateness of the instruments, and also by the lack of political will and unanimity among the great powers. The USA was occupied with the war in the Gulf, and let the EC get on with the management of a crisis in its own backyard. There was a powerful fear that open support to the national liberation struggle in Yugoslavia might be an overture to a still more

violent disintegration of the USSR, which might put the enormous Soviet nuclear and military potential outside political control. In the perception of the west, the Helsinki principle of the inviolability of frontiers had priority over the right to self-determination. The west cherished the illusion that the complex crisis in Yugoslavia after Tito could be solved by economic development.

The UN was brought in to mediate a peace after the EC demonstrated its lack of unity and its impotence, but only as an instrument to freeze the situation, first in Croatia, and then in Bosnia, and preventively in Macedonia. The Cyprus-style solution applied to the conflict did not stop the escalation because it did not touch the roots of it. Promoting the approach of diplomatic mediation, depending on the good will of the belligerent parties, the international community actually championed the right of might. Ultimately, the west was prepared for a Croatian Tiananmen if Serbia could impose itself as a regional policeman. After the victims of Serbian aggression offered stiff resistance, however, Europeans had to be prepared for moral and territorial compromises so that the conflict could be brought to an end.

How and why was force finally demonstrated and employed?

This happened gradually, with hesitations, with many built-in fall-back points that were not only political but also institutional. For the first time in history, Yugoslav wars were transmitted live every day. The brutality of the siege of the cities, the random murders of civilians, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and mass rapes, the taking of the international hostages troubled the international public with the worst memories of genocide. Public outrage exerted a strong pressure on western governments. The Islamic countries were united in their support to the Bosnian Muslims, seeing a conspiracy against Islam in the tepid reaction of the west. The blond third world in the heart of Europe, the genocide and culturocide could no longer be ignored. The problem was of an ideological nature too. The west was aiming at a new European and world order. In an interdependent world of open societies and markets there was no room for xenophobic, fascist ideas of blood and soil, ethnic purity and territorial conquests. The anachronisms of premodern societies could not be tolerated on the threshold of the post-modern third millennium.

America got into the game with hesitation to ensure the leadership and unity of the west and to prevent other power centres being antagonised. It did

this after a long period of neoisolationist hesitation, troubled by the Vietnam and Somali syndromes, and by the uncomfortable responsibility of being the only remaining superpower. The regional crisis in ex-Yugoslavia was creating a deep rift between American allies, was alienating Russia and the Orthodox world, eroding the credibility of the UN and NATO, and polarising the Islamic world against the west. The US, more powerfully than the pragmatic and opportunist Europeans, were forced to defend the international order, meaning above all the principles of sovereignty, the inviolability of international borders, open, multiethnic societies and human and civil rights. Otherwise, ex-Yugoslavia might have been the Pandora's box of similar territorial, ethnic and ideological disputes right round Europe. In a later phase, and for the same reasons, the US mediated in Ulster, Cyprus, in Kosovo, Macedonia and elsewhere.

Washington sought peaceful solutions that were based on a regional balance of forces, not on the total defeat of one side that would have threatened the unity of the Contact Group, difficult to maintain anyway. This was achieved through the growing power of Croatia and the military and political alliance of Croats and Muslims renewed in the Washington and Dayton agreements. Air and naval power was used selectively and limitedly, to send messages and to regulate the process. After the cooling of the war machine in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a *de facto* international protectorate was set up, the focus of the management of this regional crisis being Albania, and now Kosovo.

NATO changed most in this process. The change was more operative than institutional. For the first time in its long history NATO acted in a combat role, and, what is more, outside the NATO countries as a guarantor and as an active peacemaker, and partly as a police force and a machine for economic reconstruction. For the first time in the sensitive military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Russian forces were involved, as were units from some NATO candidates. From a defensive military alliance, introverted and exclusive, NATO had evolved into a persuader, a guarantor, and manager of the internal and regional crises derived from the enormous problems of the countries in transition. NATO became an instrument for wider European collective security, even without formal treaties and the expansion of its membership, a champion of democratisation and transparency, and of democratic control of the army and control of weaponry in the new democracies and troubled regions.

The experience in ex-Yugoslavia required NATO, the basic guarantor of collective security,

arms control, peace mediation and the democratisation of the questions of defence and security, should be subject to a thorough legal, doctrinal and tactical overhaul.

The OSCE was the institution that most changed the form and contents of its work in this way through its operations in ex-Yugoslavia. It had an indispensable role in implementing key elements of the Dayton Agreement, especially in the successful implementation of Article 2 of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement and in promoting Article 5, which expanded the arms control measures and surveillance measures to the countries in the neighbourhood of the area of ex-Yugoslavia, involving them indirectly in the existing regional arms control systems.

In B-H the role of the OSCE was irreplaceable in: the establishment of democratic institutions, the division of government in the complex structure of B-H, the organisation and supervision of elections, democratisation of the armed forces, promotion of reconciliation and trust, the freedom of the media, coexistence and so on. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, alongside SFOR, the military guarantor of peace, the OSCE was most important for the stabilisation and regulation of the internal political life of B-H. In Croatia it played the leading role in observing and advising the Croatian government in the period after the UN presence and the total integration of the country. In Macedonia too the organisation stabilised political and ethnic relations. The OSCE has not yet been brought in to mediate in the inflamed Kosovo crisis, but observers of the organisation are already on the Albanian-Yugoslav border. Belgrade has to co-operate with the OSCE if it wants to find a way back into the organisation and out of formal isolation and the eternal wall of sanctions. The OSCE played a key role in the relatively rapid halt to the anarchy in Albania. OSCE election observers work in all the countries of ex-Yugoslavia. The OSCE, as well as specialising in peacemaking, is also involved in the post-conflict stabilisation of societies in transition.

The current and future role of the OSCE in Croatia

The OSCE and the Council of Europe are the only broad European regional organisations of which the Republic of Croatia is a full member. In a way they are a kind of antechamber or purgatory through which Croatia might be able to achieve its ambition to join the EU and NATO. The OSCE mission in Croatia, the most important international presence in the country, has an umbrella mandate to co-ordi-

nate all other international mechanisms operating in Croatia. Accordingly, the reports and opinions of the OSCE missions in Croatia about how the country fulfils its international obligations are reading-matter according to which NATO and the EU and the UN SC define their political attitudes to Croatia. The OSCE Mission in Croatia is a kind of evaluation commission about the democratic readiness of Croatia for gradual improvement of its relations with European associations.

The work of the Mission in the RC is not given enough public prominence, probably because it is less spectacular than other forms of international presence. There is also satiation in Croatia, an exaggerated sensitivity on the part of the Croatian public because the international community still feels it needs to keep Croatia under a magnifying glass, as well as because of the previous build-up of frustration about the inefficacy of the international presence. The work of the OSCE is more in the public eye when it seems to go too far in its work, as was the case with the critiques of the history textbooks, TV programmes and newspaper reports. This is understandable psychologically, but politically not very useful because of the importance of the Mission with respect to the overall international position of the Republic of Croatia.

The OSCE Mission has been present in Croatia for years; however, its role was previously less visible, being overshadowed by other, more robust mechanisms of international mediation. The Mission has grown in numbers to about 250 international employees, and has expanded its mandate in Croatian society in its post-conflict state.

The mandate of the Mission is to advise and help the Croatian government in internal stabilisation, in the two-way return of refugees, reconciliation, the strengthening of democratic institutions, the protection of minority rights, the freedom of the media... The mandate has been deliberately widely drawn to provide role flexibility and to let the Mission shift its priorities when helping the Croatian government and reporting to the international community about the situation in Croatia.

The Mission is fairly easily accepted because it was considered most important to get rid of the Transitional Administration and the authority of the SC, because the situation in Croatia was no longer a threat to international security, and because this kind of role of this regional organisation was accepted much earlier. It turned out that, although the OSCE had not army on the ground, no executive government or sanction mechanisms, negative reports by the Mission were not without consequences, and that they could be painful, and harmful to Croatian interests, particularly international interests.

In the approach to the role and mandate of the OSCE, there are two opposed schools of thought in the Croatian government and in the public.

The first holds that reintegrated Croatia, after years of wartime losses and international mediation and guardianship, has to shake off international supervision, take its fate into its own hands, and take care first of all to strengthen the sovereignty attained with so much difficulty, stop Croatia being pushed into any new kind of

Balkan union, and look after, above all, the return and well-being of the Croats, who were the first and hardest-hit victims of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The growing intention of the international community to be present in various spheres of political and public life is construed as an intention to overthrow the current government, to destabilise Croatia and, in general, as a conspiracy. Those who believe this think that Croatia has to resist even at the cost of sanctions, isolation and thus automatic departure from the OSCE and other international observer mechanisms.

The other school of thought considers that there is nothing unusual or demeaning in an international presence in a post-conflict society and in a country in transition, because there are such mechanisms in most countries of this type. Since this international interest cannot be avoided, then it should be used intelligently for the democratisation of the country, for help in reconstruction and for more rapid approach to European unification. Any opposite policy, they think, would lead to a kind of autism that would bring Croatian society to economic collapse, result in a new war in B-H, the growth of authoritarian tendencies, the abolition of law and order and the rule of a single party, in short, to a society of inequality and injustice. Croatia has no alternative but to be co-operative and transparent. The international community is not engaged in a conspiracy against a young Croatian state, but simply wants internal and regional stability for an area that has for years been an obstacle in the way of wider processes of unification and stabilisation in the European continent. It is not a matter of attempts to suffocate the young state of Croatia and merge it into some wider framework of regional, Balkan unification, but of the renewal of the normal regional circulation, which then cements peace on the basis of development, democracy, interdependence and toleration of diversity. The international community does not have the sensibility or the time to accommodate itself to our emotional, ethnic and historical over-sensitivity, because it considers it an immature concept for the future. The world will not accept our attempts to revise the injustices of history as a ground for a definition of the new Europe, because this would be to open the way up to a great deal of national and territorial revanchism, say the representatives of this way of thinking.

This division in the public at large and in the government is most dramatically revealed in connection with the question of the return of Serb refugees from inside Croatia and from surrounding countries. The first school of thought sees in it a threat to Croatia, an attempt to destabilise it through a Serb fifth column and European regional condition making. The second school of thought thinks that Croatia, as moral and military victor, has no need to be afraid of returning Serbs and should in this case show that Croatia is a humane, open and tolerant society capable of forgiving, an example to others in the region. Anyway, they say, the number of Serbs who want to come back is relatively small, and they can be controlled so that they should not cause any instability. Those who want to homogenise the nation once again against

the world do not actually want further democratisation but a continuation of exploitative capitalism and political arbitration in all spheres of life.

The divisions in the Croatian public and government about this question and others, on which the international position of the country depends, has brought Croatia closer than ever to sanctions. All this means that those of us who are involved in the Croatian diplomatic effort have to attempt the difficult task of reconciling these obvious oppositions in the interests of the state and for the good of its citizens.

There are elements of truth in both approaches, but morally and in all soberness one's predilection must be against any Croatian autism. At the international level Croatia has to maximise its effects, and inside the country has to channel domestic differences through the democratic institutions of the political system. International surveillance, observation and interference are not always pleasant, and sometimes are degrading. Our attitude to them however cannot be a clumsy threshing around. The main reason the international community, through the OSCE Mission, is interfering more and more critically and in detail in the public and political life of Croatia is in the growing mutual distrust that is the result of the opposing viewpoints already mentioned in the public and the government, viewpoints that clash in an unproductive way.

There is not such a great problem in the formulations of procedures and other documents and instructions that the Croatian government accepts, rather in the distrust shown by the international community with respect to Croatia's most recent intentions. Croatia sometimes takes on international commitments too lightly, and then does not carry them out to the letter, reducing its international credibility. This situation is made use of by countries and services that via their network in Croatia would like to further their own particular interests, equating the historical guilt of Serbia and Croatia. We must not help assist them in this.

The solution, then, lies in restoring mutual trust between Croatia and the international community. The only way for the OSCE to stop laying down the law about our television programmes, history text books or judicial procedures is to have the required official explanation believed in the world. Fewer and fewer observers will be met in the field in Croatia, and more and more European experts who will assist Croatian society in making its regulations, standards and behaviour fit the standards and expectations of the developed world to which it both aspires and belongs.

It is not up to the Croats to change the destiny of the world, but, with their new state, the Croats have a chance to change their own, making it a harmonious part of a developed and integrated Europe. ■

The United States and Divided Societies

David T. Jarvis

Societies torn by internal conflict are a common feature of the contemporary international landscape. Whether in Chechnya, Algeria, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, or Sri Lanka, peoples in many countries are fighting each other. While more visible perhaps at the end of the cold war, divided societies have been an international reality for years. Roy Licklider has identified 84 such wars between 1945 and 1990. These were of two general types: wars fought over socio-economic and/or political issues, e.g., Vietnam, Cuba and Haiti, and conflicts on the basis of identity, e.g., Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, and Cyprus. This article will attempt to make some generalizations about American policy in these diverse cases. First, it will look to the past by reviewing U.S. policy during the cold war. Then, it will consider the Clinton administra-

tion by examining its policies and the dilemmas which have resulted.

A Brief Historical Review

The United States was involved in many internal conflicts in the years after 1945. It sent large numbers of troops to Korea and Vietnam, provided large amounts of assistance to embattled governments in Greece, Taiwan, and El Salvador, and promoted unrest in Cuba, Nicaragua, the Congo, and Chile. To cite merely the most extensive and geographically remote involvement, there were 550,000 American troops in South Vietnam in 1968, despite the fact that that country is literally halfway around the world from Washington, D.C. While the U.S. employed many tactics, the purpose of these initiatives was