The Breivik Challenge: Why Norway Should Not Be (Too) Surprised

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Abstract

The attacks in Norway showed the horrifying strength of radical right thought in contemporary Europe. Breivik's ideology as well as his actions are rooted in the radical way of thinking that is embracing Europe today. Radicals are gaining more votes than ever, and by challenging the globalised world, they are putting forward the idea of "re-inventing" European national states in terms of anti-immigration, nationalism, patriarchal values and ethnic purity.

Key words: Breivik, radical right, Norway, Scandinavia, Progress party, Islamophobia

1. Introduction

The terrorist act on July 22, 2011 in Norway stunned the world. The deadly march of Anders Behring Breivik was a shock not only for Scandinavian societies but also for the world at large. The image of Norway as a peaceful, socially based and progressive country was turned into a place thriving with right-wing extremism. Breivik's case is certainly a special one, but conceives within it the imminent threat of radical right extremism. Roger Griffin's fascist minimum, the revolutionary national reawakening, finds its place even within radical right populists who are not considered as neo-fascists. Europe needs to re-define its democratic minimum, because the existence and unprecedented activities of radical right parties show the weakness of European judicial systems. Namely, hate speech is omnipresent in public discourse and despite the charges, radical parties get away with it unharmed.

Scandinavia is not immune to it. Quite the contrary, electoral success of the radical right is rising in every electoral cycle. Until recently, Finland was the only country in Scandinavia (excluding far-away and very specific Iceland) without the presence of a strong radical right party. Now this has also changed. A Neo-Nazi and Neo-Pagan underground is also very vivid and successful in these countries. Maybe the Breivik case is unexpected, but his theories and his ideas are not uncommon in Scandinavian societies.

This article provides a short introduction to Breivik's ideas connecting them to contemporary radical right thought in Western Europe.

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In addition, it brings the history of radical right movements and parties in Scandinavia, and especially Norway.

2. Breivik's manifesto

Breivik makes an interesting insight in radical right thought. His vast compendium "2083: A European Declaration of Independence" shows remarkable knowledge of different political worldviews and boasts with classic radical right wing thinking on world, religion, society and politics. It is written in English, rather than in Norwegian, because his message is essentially worldwide, or at least Europe-wide. His viewpoint is inherently anti-postmodern but conceives classic liberal modern thought as the basic value of every Western European society. Specifically, he opposes ideas and movements labelled as postmodern, from feminist ideas to the loss of significance of the nation-state. The compendium is, in fact, a showcase for radical right movements and political parties in Scandinavia (see below). His favourite literature, as he wrote in his compendium (p. 1407), contains liberal classics such as Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, John Locke, Adam Smith, but also George Orwell, Ayn Rand, William James and Carl von Clausewitz. His manifesto is a vast and generally resourceful collection of thoughts, comments and ideas about the Western European society in general. He begins with the discussion about political correctness, labelling it as a cultural Marxist term and the source of "all the mistakes and wrongdoings of contemporary European governments", especially in introducing multiculturalist policies. In this sense, he is very critical of Theodore Adorno, George Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse and Antonio Gramsci, as forerunners in Frankfurt School. Nevertheless, his critique misses the very foundation of this movement and at one point, he misunderstands the very basics of the Frankfurt School. Partial reading and misconclusions are also present elsewhere in Breivik's manifesto.

Ardent Islamophobia and xenophobia are present throughout Breivik's work. He is constantly under the influence of Gisèle Littman alias Bat Ye'or, a British scholar of Jewish background, who is arguing that Europe is under sway of willing surrender to Islam. Europe is becoming "Eurabia", a thesis that is present in many other radical-right groups, such as in Philip Dewinter's Vlaams Belang in Belgium (previously known as Vlaams Blok). Under this thinking, the great influx of Muslims is part of the jihadist idea of conquering Europe, while European agenda here stems from the French idea of the 1950s where a Euro-Islamic axis should have made a counterbalance to the USA and the Soviet Union. However, Islamophobic personalities like Breivik and Bat Ye'or do not recognise the possibility of coexistence; there is only victory or total decay of Western civilisation. It is the time, as Breivik points, of "European Slaves, Arab Masters". Breivik is also making his own image as a fierce Zionist. Israelis are, according to his viewpoint, "brothers in arms", the blocking tower against Islamic invasion. It is the myth gone wild.

Renowned twentieth-century philosopher Ernst Cassirer explains that in man's practical and social life there is a defeat of rational thought, much different from scientific researches, which forms a basis of our every-day life influenced by modern technology and scientific breakthroughs. He perceives myth not only as a product of intellectual processes; it sprouts from deep human emotions (Cassirer, 43). However, Cassirer stresses that myth cannot be described as a bare emotion because it is the expression of emotion: "The expression of a feeling is not the feeling itself – it is emotion turned into an image" (ibid). Indeed, this image, in the creation of myth of the state, or identity, is intertwined with culture, music, poetry, arts. Cassirer says, "To the true romanticist there could be no sharp difference between myth and reality; just as little as there was any separation between poetry and truth. Poetry and truth, myth and reality interpenetrate each other and coincide with each other" (ibid, 5). The more poetic it is, the truer it becomes. Myth is filled with the most violent emotions and the most frightful visions, says Cassirer. Nevertheless, in myth man begins to learn a new and strange art: the art of expressing, and that means of organizing, his most rooted instincts, his hopes and fears. The fears explained here, however, are becoming an enchanted circle of hatred and disapproving identities. This characteristic of human beings is certainly used by radical right groups, spreading fear in order to spread their own ideology.

Breivik finds the answer to all these threats in coming back to traditional nationalism. The nation is a big solidarity, says Ernst Renan, and it is based on sacrifices, which are understood as necessary in past, present and in future (Renan, 1995:

56). Political myth transcends logic, it is elusive, but because of this elusiveness, it has a coherent and complete belief system. There is neither legitimacy nor logic other than its own. Vladimir Tismaneanu mentions major themes revolving around such political mythologies: Golden Age (innocence lost, glorious patriarchal beginnings, the fall into modernity); victimhood, martyrdom, treason and conspiracy; salvation and the advent of the millennium; charismatic saviours (who can be heroic individuals, allegedly predestined classes, or biologically defined races); and ultimate bliss in the form of revolutionary chiliasm, when leader, movement, nation, and mankind become one, whether in life or death (Tismaneanu, 9). Its principal function is to imagine a reality in accordance with certain political interests.

His manifesto attacks the governments of Europe, especially those of social-democratic background. Breivik perceives them as being the same as "all the other socialists", naming explicitly Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Marx and, interestingly, Hitler. In his view, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi movement were, in its very core, socialist. In this way, Breivik cannot be called a Nazi, as National Socialism is to him a mere variation of the ideology he strives against. His opposition to neo-Nazism is certain if we consider him as "Zionist-friendly".

Breivik is also overtly anti-feminist. Following the critique of cultural Marxism, he stresses that there is an active feminisation of European culture, with the goal of transforming patriarchal society into a matriarchal form. In this way, new cultural trends want to "deny the intrinsic worth of native Christian European heterosexual males". This is wrong, according to him, out of two basic principles. Firstly, it destroys the traditional nuclear family and bears responsibility for demographic demise, while the threat of Muslim colonisation is at the gates. Secondly, because women are having a (basically false) liberal consciousness, the society must be brought back to the state of mind of the 1950s, when Norway has been pure and conservative, and where women have been considered to be reproductive machines and have been able to receive a maximum education of bachelor degree. Women are also taken as a metaphor: Since Europe is like a woman, it submits itself to rape.

This statement, however, is not so uncommon for the radical right. According to Terri Givens, who made research on the radical right gender gap, women are less likely to vote for the radical right because there are fewer women who are employed and work in the sectors (manufacturing/blue-collar) that are attracted to the radical right (Givens, 2004: 39). Although she finds that Scandinavian societies have comparatively less differences between men and women, nevertheless, when immigration is used as a dependent variable, this difference persists (ibid, 50). Also, Givens finds that men are more likely to vote for the radical right than women because they have stronger anti-immigrant attitudes than women (ibid, 41), and that the occupations most affected by globalisation and immigration (i.e. blue-collar industrial workers) will be more anti-immigrant than those in other sectors (ibid, 42). Thus, we can conclude, that radical right parties are essentially traditional patriarchal "men" parties. But, in the same Scandinavian environment, there is one successful radical right party, the Danish People's Party, led by a woman, Pia Kjærsgaard.

Breivik disclosed the manifest to his like-minded fellows and friends a few hours before the attacks. Later on, he went to the governmental quarter of Oslo and activated a car bomb outside the office of Norwegian Prime Minister and other governmental buildings. It killed eight people and wounded several others. Two hours later, in full police uniform, Breivik arrived to the summer camp on the island of Utøya in Tyrifjorden, organized by the youth division of the ruling Labour Party. He opened fire, killing 69 persons, among them personal friends of the Prime Minister as well as the stepbrother of Norway's crown-princess Mette-Marit. He was soon captured by police, arrested and put on trial. Among many shocking testimonies, he said that the attacks were "gruesome, but necessary". Leading members of the European radical right immediately accused the attacks and spread their conviction that Breivik has done it not out of ideology, but because he is insane. The same reason was put forward by Breivik's defence at court. Especially it was the case with Geert Wilders, the chairman of the Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) and with the English Defence League. Both reacted instantly. Mr. Wilders was explicit: "Neither the PVV nor I are responsible for a lone idiot who violently distorted the freedom-loving, anti-Islamization ideals, no matter how much some people would like that." The English Defence League

in its official statement denied any connection to Breivik and accused the media for creating a false image in the public. In the meantime, psychiatrists assessing the self-confessed Norwegian mass killer concluded that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. In the end, Breivik will still be tried in April 2012, but it seems likely that he will be placed in psychiatric care rather than prison. Prosecutors told to the public that the two psychiatrists who interviewed him on 13 occasions had concluded that he lived in his "own delusional universe where all his thoughts and acts are guided by his delusions". Prosecutor Inga Bejer Engh speaking to reporters on November 29, 2011 in Oslo, said: "If the final conclusion is that Breivik is insane, we will request that the court in the upcoming legal proceedings passes a sentence by which Breivik is subjected to compulsory mental health care". Although this brings another specific aspect of the Breivik case, it does not mean that radical right background is prone only to psychiatric cases.

3. Radical right scene in Norway

The radical right is a strongly heterogenic party family, with national specifics, election successes and with very different reasons for their survival in the political arena. Cas Mudde mentions 58 different definitions of the radical right, and their most common characteristics, as parties and movements that embrace nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democratic values and statism. Consequently, Mudde counts 23 terms describing these movements: extreme right (Schain et al. 2002a; Perrineau 2001; Hainsworth 2000a; Ignazi 1994; Pfahl-Traughber 1993; Stouthuysen 1993), far right (Jungerstam-Mulders 2003; Roxburgh 2002; Marcus 2000; Cheles et al. 1995), radical right (Ramet 1999a; Minkenberg 1998; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Merkl & Weinberg 1993), right (Betz & Immerfall 1998; Hockenos 1993), radical right populism (Zaslove 2004a; Betz 1994), right populism (Eismann 2002; Decker 2000; Pfahl-Traughber 1994), national populism (Backes 1991; Taguieff 1984), new populism (Lloyd 2003; Taggart 1995), neopopulism (Betz & Immerfall 1998), exclusionist populism (Betz 2001), xenophobic populism (DeAngelis, 2003), populist nationalism (Blokker, 2005), ethnic nationalism (Rydgren, 2004a), anti-immigrant parties (Gibson, 2002; Fennema, 1997), nativism (Fetzer, 2000), racism (MacMaster, 2001; Husbands, 1988; El-

bers & Fennema, 1993), racist extremism (Mudde, 2005), fascism (Ford, 1992; Laqueur, 1996), neofascism (Fenner & Weitz, 2004; Karapin, 1998; Cheles et al, 1991), postfascism (Mell, 2002), reactionist tribalism (Antonio, 2000), integralism (Holmes, 2000) and anti-partisanship (Belanger, 2004)*. Of course, the attempts to give the parties a special name are associated with the definition of radical right parties by individual researchers. However, although all authors agree that the approach to these parties should still be individual, on case-by-case basis; there is general agreement on the authoritarian nature of the radical right. It includes dogmatism, rigidity, exclusivity, authoritarianism, nationalism, xenophobia, racism, intolerance and so on.

The term is so problematic because of the very concept of the right itself. In this case, it is not at all hostile to the leftist ideas. According to the theory of relative deprivation, resource struggle between citizens and immigrants in a globalised world threatens workers, the unemployed, those employed in regressive industries, workers with economic uncertainty and identity problems in the new economic environment. These voters are more likely to vote for radical right populist parties than for traditional social democratic ones (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Eatwell, 2004). What is indeed right and what is left in radical right is thus a matter of perspective. Opposing all change is not the distinctive character of this right any more. Conceptually, these parties are called radical rightist parties, as they combine all the "rightist" positions. But, they also have a populist character and strong social messages stressing (national) unity. In political science, one tries to systemise the terms, and it certainly makes some kind of confusion. The left oriented worker, as mentioned before, will hardly, according to the rational choice theory, vote for a radical right party. But this party also has a social program, full of justice, order and peace, issues that the worker is interested in. If voters vote for the party according to their own left-right continuum position, they will have little or no interest in the party that is far from their standpoint, and big interest in the party close to it. However, if a radical right party is not perceived in the same way as other parties, but according to some other criteria, then the voter's perception changes as well. Van der Brug et al.

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* Everything in: Mudde, 2007: 11, 12

(2005) have concluded that, if the voter perceives some party as an essentially protest one, the potential protest voter would be interested in giving his voice even to the party that is far from his personal standpoint and his self-perception as a participative citizen. Thus, radical right parties are often considered as protest or anti-system parties, which are *a priori* not institutionalised parties. This is often proved by economically determined election results. If prices are up, inflation, crisis and unemployment are soaring then radical right parties are expected to have bigger success. But, a strong link between the crisis and their success is not proven.

Of course, we should not understand the left-right continuum in a two-dimensional, but rather in a multi-dimensional system, with additional variables and sub-variables, bordering with relative complexity of connecting, integrating and practical concluding. Also, if there can be un-institutionalised parties in institutionalised party systems (Italy would be a good example), why is it so difficult to perceive the institutionalisation of anti-system parties, which ironically, function very well in institutionalised party systems (a good example is the Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia, the anti-system party functioning within the multi-party liberal democracy in the Czech Parliament today)?

More and more pragmatic conservatism is evident in Western European radical right parties. There has been a wide debate among academics whether such parties in general can be called radical, extremist or populist. The author here suggests that it is the wrong question, because the parties themselves are very loosely connected by their ideologies, and due to national specificities they can be labelled only as subcategories such as "anti-immigrant parties", or "radical right populist parties". At the same time, these categories are more of descriptive nature than the specific party group. Some of them are racist, and some are only immigrant exclusive. It would be very difficult to gather all these parties in one distinctive group with a common character. Scandinavian Progress parties, for example, have no historical connection with the fascist tradition. These parties are adjusting to the system, hence possibly losing part of their identity or the distinctive feature in their opposition to the mainstream, as well as intra-party relations regarding the idea, but abide by liberal democratic values of parliamentary representative

democracy, gaining votes, and essentially "playing by the book".

Scandinavia has always been seen as a special case in comparison to some other radical right landscapes in Europe. So called progress parties were founded in the seventies and have continued to exist to this day. The contemporary scene of radical right in Scandinavia is vivid and gaining strength. From basically populist conservative-liberal movements, these parties have become the beacons of new anti-immigrant thought. Today, in Scandinavia there are five parties worth mentioning that bear the name of the radical right. Firstly, there is the tremendously successful Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), a party that was in government from 2001 to 2011; it was a breakout branch of the Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet), which still exists today, but have a lesser impact on Danish society. In Finland, for the first time, a radical right True Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) entered the Parliament in 2011, winning 19.1 percent of votes. Sweden is captured by New Democracy (Ny Demokrati), which entered the Parliament in 2010, after many years outside the legislative chambers. In Norway, the most important party is the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP). Breivik was a member of this party, but two years ago he left it, because it was not radical enough. At first Scandinavian parties were formed as anti-tax parties, as a reaction against the ever-increasing welfare state. Indeed, after tax lawyer Mogens Glistrup founded the Progress Party in Denmark, and made considerable success, Norwegians tried to follow. The first name of the FrP was Anders Lange's Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention, simply following the founder and the brief description of party activity (Bjørklund, 1). It was the period of economic revival in the European North. Only in 1963 did Norway assert its sovereign right over oil fields in the North Sea, and began its way to become one of the most prosperous countries in Europe. After the 1990s, due to strong transformation of political parties (Beyme, 2002), voters lost their traditional partisan allegiances, especially those connected to class and religion. New patterns of voting emerged, and some parties, like the FrP gained strength by applying more populist, more radical policies against immigration and by requesting law and order.

However, as is apparent elsewhere, these parties cannot be in power alone and are mostly focused on coalition building or supporting the government of the day in the Parliament. Thus, they also have to change some of their ideology or discourse. In 2001, the FrP supported a minority government in Norway, but it also toned down its anti-immigrant rhetoric. And while earlier this party had been considered a pariah party by other actors in the political arena, later on the FrP gained an unprecedented position of legitimacy and influence (Widfeldt, 2004: 151).

The theoretician of fascism Roger Griffin, however, suggests that fascism is still in the core of every anti-immigrant party, no matter how liberal its actual social policies might be. In this way, Griffin labels Italian MSI and Flemish Bloc as neo-fascist; German REP, DVU and NPD as crypto-fascist; and FPÖ, the Centre Party in the Netherlands and the Progress parties in Scandinavia as the ones who have adopted growing crypto-fascist racist policies (Griffin, 1991: 161-179). Of course, one has to notice the difference in style, policies, origins, leadership, etc.

In fact, Andersen and Bjørklund explain that, in the context of predominantly social democratic Scandinavia, it is not too surprising to find parties less extreme than their counterparts elsewhere (Hainsworth, 2008: 48). Others often characterise Progress parties as entrepreneurial parties, i.e. those which saw opportunities in the political party system of the mid-to-late 1980s and aggressively sought strategies to position themselves to take advantage of the openings. They reinvented themselves and adopted winning formulas based on populism and economic arguments (not racial ones) against the presence of immigrants. Hainsworth agrees that Progress parties in Norway and Denmark are essentially anti-establishment and anti-elitist, seeking to break the mould of the traditional party politics and policy making (in this case, it is social democracy).

The Norwegian Progress Party is basically a successor of Anders Lange's Party and it revived the political scene in the Norwegian Parliament, Storting, by gaining 4.5 percent and four seats in the 1981 elections, and again 3.7 percent and two seats in 1985. After these modest results, the party managed to take 12.3 percent and 22 seats in 1989, backing temporarily to 6.3 percent, and ten seats

in 1993. Impressive 15.3 percent and 22 seats in 1997 were followed by 14.6 percent in 2001. The last result is impressive nonetheless because the party split in 1994, when members of the neo-liberal wing left. (Hainsworth, 2008: 50). In fact, the FrP not only established a stronger policy against immigration, but it increased membership in a time when all the other (mainstream) parties struggled to keep their membership stable and intact. In 2001 the new government, involving the Conservatives (Høyre), the Christian People's Party (KrF) and the Liberals (Venstre), was supported by the Progress Party. In 2005, the Norwegian Prime Minister refused to have formal cooperation with the FrP and thus lost their support. The former coalition lost, the Left enjoyed victory, but the FrP received 22 percent and 38 seats, emerging as the leading party on the right and Norway's second largest party behind the Labour Party. After the old chief Carl Hagen has left in 2006, the party started to grow under the new leadership of Siv Jensen and even looked to form a government on its own (Hainsworth, ibid: 51). Overall, the far right's ascent reached an undoubted post-war peak in the region with the parliamentary elections in 2005. There have been some signs of extreme right and populist success, but hardly on the same scale or consistency as in Norway (and in Denmark), where anti-immigrant discourses have served to attract voters (ibid: 53).

Andersen and Bjørklund (2000: 216) found that in Norway the voters for the extreme right were more on the younger side, mostly young men, even the core supporters of the party. The grievance model of Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2007) shows remarkably what the main preferences of Scandinavian radical right voters are. In her analysis, she shows how easily deceptive some economically determined theories might be. The models that place primary importance on economic changes propose that successful populist right parties attract voters who prefer right-wing economic policies (ibid, 6), but in Ivarsflaten's cross-country analysis of Western Europe, one can easily see that the extent to which successful party mobilises economic grievances does not make better impact than all major parties. Indeed, the major parties of the right mobilised voters who prefer right-wing economic policies more successfully than the populist right parties in Denmark and Norway (ibid, 11). Thus, the radical right could be successful without mobilising voters with right-

wing economic preferences. However, Norway possesses another interesting feature. Ivarsflaten's results show that the Norwegian radical right successfully mobilises distrust in the EU and political elites better than all major parties, although the Christian Democratic Party has a better stand-off with the disillusionment with the European Parliament, probably because Norway is not part of the EU and Norwegians rejected to enter the European Union twice. Empirically, Ivarsflaten showed that one grievance, immigration, is consistently mobilised by all successful populist right parties in Western Europe. Economic changes and elitist or corrupt politics, on the other hand, contributed to the explanation of the populist right vote in some, but not all countries.

Breivik's challenge poses also the difficult question of whether he acted alone or was he a proponent of some other party or extra-party groups. His own opinion is that the parties listed here are on good track, but not necessarily radical enough.

In general, radical right parties are often connected to groups and subcultures through their members. Party organisation is vital here. It consists of a number of party members, national coverage, regular annual meetings and human and material resources. Today, party membership is not big. Political scientists try to find out whether the reason is the loss of interest of the citizens to become members of a party or it is the opinion of the party leadership that it is not necessary to invest in membership. Sigmund Neumann thought that democratic parties with huge membership are necessary for the survival of modern democracy, because only the parties are capable of guarding the connection between the individual and the broader community (Neumann, 1956). Maurice Duverger also thinks that democratic parties with big membership are the dominant force in politics. Both Neumannn and Duverger wrote under the influence of the Second World War. Other researchers thought it was unnecessary to give such a big importance to membership. Otto Kirchheimer suggests that catch-all parties have an electoral strategy without the need for big party organisation (Kirchheimer, 1996). From the demand side, party leadership loses its interest in the organised support because it is a comparatively useless electoral resource (Scarrow, 1996: 6). New information-communication technologies, especially in the me-

dia sector, make possible for the parties to employ easily a small and efficient number of professionals instead of huge numbers of party volunteers. Parties do not depend on financial strength of their members either; the price is rather high anyway, so that the primary source of financing must come from outside. The supply side also shows the difference between the former class and interest parties and contemporary mass and catch-all parties. Big and organised parties bring another potentially lethal combination. In 1911, Robert Michels wrote about the Iron law of Oligarchy, i.e. that every organisation is an oligarchy, and if that organisation is big, the oligarchy is even bigger. Mosei Ostrogorski in his classic work Democracy and Organisation of Political Parties also claims that parties with good extra-parliamentary organisation are not desirable, because they cannot rule in the nation's name. The party leaders rule the state.

In the theory of party institutionalisation, the party must be autonomous, i.e. independent of their leaders, and party activities must not be under heavy influence of organisations, groups and ideologies existing outside the party. Radical right parties have often been described as highly charismatic ones, with a great deal of personalisation (Eatwell, 2003; Taggart, 2000), but there are researchers who challenge this theory. They do not think that there is sufficient evidence for the charismatic person to be present everywhere and be powerful, but acknowledge his importance in an authoritarian intra-party climate. However, they warn, charismatic leadership is not achieved and perceived in any better way in the radical right parties than in other mainstream parties.

4. Conclusion

Breivik's act is certainly horrific and must be condemned by all means. Despite his psychotic behaviour, caused by his illness, his idea does not stem from his illness, but from an ideology persisting in post-industrial societies in Europe. This persistence, incorporated in parties and subcultures like skinheads, Neo-Nazis and Neo-Pagan (Aryan, racist, Nordic) groups that are thriving in Northern Europe, might give us a clue that maybe they are not part of the system, but are rooted in Nordic societies. The touch of globalisation came to Norway too, despite the social welfare. Today, one can see rising crime rates, the crisis of national identity as well as of faith and even of the

monarchy itself, and the loss of traditional Nordic values. Norway, as well as other Western European countries, indeed expresses the need to "re-invent" themselves. Breivik, unfortunately, did it in a wrong way. Still, we may have the opportunity to see more radical groups and parties filling the political space of Europe.

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