

FOREWORD

Philosophical interest in the emotions have been increasing in the past few decades. This development has brought the revival of some time-honoured theories, as well as the launch of new ones, which often attempt to integrate findings of neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology with philosophical discourse. The evident relevance of science to the topic poses a specific challenge to the philosophical investigation of the emotions, and a number of papers in this issue can be seen as attempts to contribute to a philosophical account of the place of emotions in the natural world.

Many problems in the field are of course still open. In fact, on the most fundamental questions (such as what emotions at bottom *are*), there is as little consensus as before. What is perhaps safe to say is that single-focus accounts (such as “feeling-theories”, “cognitive theories”, “hedonic theories”) gave way to more complex ones that integrate such focuses as aspects of the emotions. As the drawbacks of single-focus conceptions have been revealed, there are fewer attempts at definitions or full descriptions of emotion. Some caution indeed seems to be justified, for there is still much to learn, part of which is forthcoming from empirical science.

One possible lesson of this special issue is that it is advisable to pause for a moment, proceed slower on certain assumptions and re-examine certain hypotheses that emerged most recently. David Pugmire’s paper directly addresses the methodological encounter of philosophy and science on the subject of emotion, and argues against excessive deference to the latter. It also discusses the recently revived philosophical conceptions that would have us see emotion as a certain type of experience of physiological change, exposing some “costs” of such theories. Ronald de Sousa finds that, after a period of discovering the multi-faceted functionality or utility of emotion, “it’s time for restoring emotion’s bad rep”. Emotions can be dysfunctional, he claims, “at the individual, social, moral, or even species levels”. Carolyn Price proposes an understanding of moods that avoids some deficiencies of both the “objectless emotion” and the “emotion with a generalized object” understandings of these mental states. The discussion of moods is embedded in a teleosemantic account of intentional content. M.G.F. Martin investigates Hume’s theory of the passions, and the question of whether Hume’s theory can accommodate the sense in which the passions are directed on things or possess intentionality, while still holding to his view that passions are simple feelings. Judit Szalai targets a particular argument, by York Gunther, concerning the relationship between feeling and attitude, on the one hand, and feeling and content, on the other, in the case of emotion. The paper claims that the correspondence between attitude and feeling and the intimacy of feeling and content do not secure that attitude and content connect in a similar way. Alfred Mele makes a move in a new direction, discussing the possibility that (certain kinds of) delusions are caused by emotional/motivational factors rather than by some cognitive deficit. Specifically, the paper addresses the possible aetiolo-

gies of the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy, and the so-called “reverse Othello syndrome”. In a historically oriented paper, Gábor Boros reviews the grounds for seeing philosophical links between 17th- and 20th-century theories of emotion. We can see from this paper that the philosophical project of finding the place of emotions in the world described by the natural sciences occupied the greatest thinkers in our intellectual tradition already back in the 17th century.

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