PHILOSOPHICAL MORPHOLOGY

Josip Lukin — Kristijan Krkač

1. *Morphology as a method*

Morphology as *a method* (μορφή + λόγος) examines *forms*, *structures*, and *patterns*, and as a form/pattern recognition *technique* is all about the activities of *seeing exhaustively* and *describing synoptically*. J. Lukin in the article "Morphology" claims that morphology is used in at least four different meanings, namely, "[...] as a form and a structure of something, as a description of a form and structure, as a scientific investigation of a form and structure independently of its function, and as a scientific method" (in the third and fourth meaning Lukin mentions Aristotle and Goethe, see Lukin 2010). Here, the last meaning in terms of philosophical method and technique will be espoused generally, and in a few interesting details as basic steps of the procedure.

(1) One engaged in (philosophical) morphology needs to explore (*look at* and *look for*) forms of phenomena in order to understand (*see–as*) their patterns. Once a pattern (often explicated as a symbol, a sketch, or a drawing) is seen and *eo ipso* understood, which means that it can be clearly described in summary fashion ("clear" here means "clear to one to whom it is described") for a particular practical purpose, an inquiry has ended. Then again, one can raise many questions regarding this preliminary description of morphology (1).

(1.01) For instance, one can object that there is a *matter* or a *content* of phenomena too and consequently that there is no particular reason why it should not be investigated as well. That forms of phenomena are vital for the understanding of their patterns is no easy thing to explicate. However, there are some examples which could be used as metaphors for the claim that forms are necessary and sufficient for *understanding* (not *explaining*) phenomena. In terms of drastic examples, it should be mentioned that there are phenomena that are morphologically speaking *matterless*, for instance clouds. They could be compared solely by comparison of their forms, in this particular case their shapes (since a form should not be understood in terms of shapes only, but in terms of rules, regularities, and processes as well). From an observation of

their forms, and from their comparisons in various ways, one could understand their patterns in terms of rules, regularities, and proceedings.

(1.02) Another objection can be that there must be some special kind of observation included here, since a scientist observes as well. To this objection one can reply that scientists observe with so to say a *presupposed agenda*, namely a hypothesis or the model which directs them toward seeing what they want to find in order to explain, and nothing else. Say that one observes various games (as described in PI 66) and sees a great variety of them which is by no means *revealed*, but not *perspicuous*, and that one wants to make it perspicuous. Now, scientists produce a hypothesis say that *all games must have something in common*, and therefore they see only features of games which are almost identical to all games (we can name it as "scientific methodological reductionist essentialism"). Finally, those games that do not have the feature (common to all or at least to the relevant majority) they proclaim to be something different from games. On the other hand, a morphologist observes each one regarding all of their features and operates *without a hypothesis* whatsoever (PI 109, in one specific sense a pattern can be regarded as a model). What one sees then is a complicated net of more or less important similarities, and finally a game–pattern. Now, one will hardly *point to* the very game–pattern since there is nothing common to all games. However, since such a game–pattern manifests itself differently in all games, if one is presented with such a pattern and with two candidates for games, then one will clearly see whether both of these candidates fit into the net (system) or not. A completely different issue is which concept of "seeing", namely "seeing as interpreting", is implied in morphology.

(1.03) Then again, if forms are indispensable to such a degree, then why the morphology as a form and a structure of something and as a method, cannot be formalised and as such be considered as a part of say formal ontology? The answer is somewhat complicated since formal ontology is a part of logic, while philosophical grammar is not (philosophical grammar is "the descriptive science of speaking", BT 87). Namely, there is a grammar of negation or conjunction for instance (in fact the grammar of use of signs such as "¬" or "→"), and a grammar of logic in general, in the same sense as a grammar of colour or of shape, but there is no logic of morphology since morphology is already a method of investigation, however, somewhat *informal* and *qualitative*. For instance, if one observes that red colour is warmer on a lighter than on a darker colour as its background or its surroundings, then "being warm" is an analogy, not "a property" of red colour which depends on its background. A metaphysician can say that for red colour the property of being warm is differently actualised in different surroundings. Well, what if there are no surroundings at all (just slight difference in a tone of colour, or the difference between painting technique say between water colours and oil colours), or,

what if someone says that red on black surroundings seems to be cold and bloodcurdling, and not warm at all? A metaphysician seems to have no answer to this question, at least not a metaphysical one, not because he dislikes metaphors and analogies (as well as a naturalist, which *de facto* is the case), but because he has no use of them in his system. On the other hand, a logician cannot say much of interest regarding red being warm and cold at the same time except perhaps that it is an example of a contradiction, and as good as any. A morphologist can use symbols instead of expressions for observed phenomena and their features because of complexity of observed phenomena but this does not count as formalisation. More to that, the difference between logical and morphological emphasis of "formal" is like the difference between explaining red colour in terms of its light wavelength and describing a procedure of using a certain type of dust (powder) or a type of a worm in order to get red painting colour. Speaking in general and in the words of B. Pascal once again, what one needs is not *esprit de géométrie*, but *esprit de finesse*, and *finesse* sometimes consists of implementing detailed examination, and sometimes of pointing to a particular technique or practice as a particular know–how. Replies to these three objections guide us to the following explication of the remark (1).

(1.1) In morphology a form of a phenomenon reveals its content. In other words, there is a primacy of phenomenon's form over its matter or content (in a way *its form is its content*), and there is a primacy of say "pre–scientific observation" over "scientific observation". There is a morphological agenda as well, but it does not concern the phenomena, rather the very procedure, for instance, "take everything what you see into account, nothing should be left out" (which is anti–essentialist and anti–reductionist in all respects).

Morphology is a method of investigating phenomena, their forms and structure without meddling into their substance (for instance a reductionism in sciences is an example of precisely the opposite procedure), a method of revealing their forms (sometimes even their whole patterns) as wholes (dynamic wholes, or processes, see Lukin 2010). Let us take another example, and here we are using one of Wittgenstein's metaphors, which was already used by J. Good. It reads, "When we construct a theory or a definition to capture its essential nature, we divest the artichoke of its leaves, trying to find the real artichoke hidden within. Nevertheless, the artichoke *is* its leaves." Therefore, a morphological method "offers us a technique for exploring the whole artichoke, for getting to the heart without losing the whole." (Good 2006: 2, PI 164) Phenomena have their content like an artichoke has its leaves. Consequently, in the case of an artichoke, a morphologist is stuck with its leaves, their organisation, and their pattern. The only thing possible to do is to observe leaves, to describe their relations within a system as a larger whole, and to reveal their structure, their form, and eventually their overall pattern.

(1.2) In morphology there is a primacy of a pattern of a whole phenomenon over the structure of its parts (Wittgenstein himself seems to have thought that the morphology of history of philosophy is one of the finest examples of what philosophical morphology is not or should not be, see BT pp. 300–18, PI 89–133).

Investigation of this kind includes investigating many if not all similarities and dissimilarities, analogies and disanalogies, most of which are of little or no use at all. Loads of useless materials, tonnes of garbage as it were, and leftovers of "wrong turns" during the course of morphological investigation are proper parts of results of the inquiry. However, some of the results of such investigation which are useful regularly contain nothing more than *stating the obvious* (perspicuous, transparent, manifested, revealed, or that which is not hidden), for instance, "this ☞ ☁ is the pattern of this cloud" (say the one of a cirrocumulus compared to the one of an altocumulus), or '☞₃ is the pattern of an artichoke", pointing to a certain scheme or sketch of a particular type of cloud, or to the artichoke pattern in comparison with the pattern of some similar plant.

Regarding the difference between revealed and perspicuous a note should be supplied. Old philosophers of science (of the *Vienna Circle*, especially R. Carnap) thought that "the revealed" or "the uncovered" is the same as "perspicuous" and *vice versa*. Namely, if one reveals something, then by being revealed it is *eo ipso* perspicuous. Later on, (starting perhaps with W. V. O. Quine), some came with the idea that this is not so, more to that, it became *obvious* that there are many phenomena which are "revealed" but in the same time "not perspicuous" at all, as for example two almost the same drawings with say ten differences which should be detected (as the one which could be found in crossword puzzle magazines, as shown in Figure 1). Now, what is interesting is the opposite, namely that there are phenomena which are "not revealed", as it were, "hidden" but nevertheless "perspicuous", as for instance a pattern of a heap, i. e. a cone is hidden but perspicuous to a child who knows–how to gather its toys into a heap when its mother commands it. Now, the opposite can be of some interest also, since in some phenomena nothing is hidden, and everything is revealed. However, not much that which is revealed is *eo ipso* perspicuous, but most of it could be made perspicuous (PI 435, regarding "hidden" see also the following sections: 91, 102, 126, 129, 153, and 164, and regarding the expression "open to view" see 92, 126, for two meanings of "hidden" see Luntley 2003: 50–8). The change from hidden to revealed is not the same as the change from not–perspicuous to perspicuous, because some phenomena could be (made to be) revealed but at the same time not be perspicuous at all. One needs to make them perspicuous.

Figure 1: Ten differences: the case of revealed but not perspicuous
phenomena

On the other hand, the opposite idea is of paramount importance, since if only phenomena are "open to view", then nothing is hidden, but they are not perspicuous, because they are too close, too familiar, too everyday, however they could be made so for practical purposes. Precisely this possibility is *the possibility of philosophy as morphology and grammar* (as shown in Table 1, regarding differences between Carnap, Quine, and Wittgenstein see Hookway 1996). Morphology ends when a pattern is seen and described, and such a description, if possible, should also be clear and as such, it simply explicates a pattern.

Phenomena	Are revealed	Are hidden
Are perspicuous	To be revealed = to be perspicuous (and *vice versa*, R. Carnap) — against	Ø (perhaps mysticism)
	to be revealed ≠ to be perspicuous, (and *vice versa*, W. V. O. Quine)	
Are not-perspicuous	Are revealed but not perspicuous, e.g. a puzzle drawing with a number of differences to be detected like in crossword puzzle magazines	
	Are revealed (not hidden), but not perspicuous, however, they can be made so by means of morphological method and in the manner of giving grammatical remarks = (PI and related works)	Are not perspicuous and cannot be made perspicuous, because they are essentially hidden = metaphysics (perhaps TLP as against → well)

Table 1: Revealed and hidden phenomena

(1.3) In morphology there is a primacy of description and explication (*understanding*) over hypothesis and explanation because nothing (of any importance for philosophy) is hidden, everything is revealed, and it should be made perspicuous.

One describes phenomena by describing all of their relations, and explicates them in a survey, overview, summary, or perspicuous presentation (PI 122, GB 133, see Breithaupt *et. al*. 2002) which consists of (propositions serving as) *grammatical remarks* regarding the phenomena in question, and produces understanding (because understanding is like having an overview, BT p. 3).

Now, a kind of practical objection can be provided against morphology. On the other hand, no matter how persuasive such a description could be, one should be aware of many difficulties which are integral parts of a morphological technique. Morphology generally speaking, neither is a method *of our times*, nor is a method *for our times* (culturally and practically speaking). First of all, it is too expensive and too risky to be broadly applied nowadays. That is so since it includes years, as it were a lifetime, of education, training, and reflection of trainer and trainee over the very training process which at the end could turn out to be completely unsuccessful. Namely, the probability of success is extremely low. In addition, it implies a kind of (reflective and self–conscious) conversion of a trainee to a new worldview, namely the morphological one (one can try to compare Goethe's approach to science, or Spengler's approach to history with opposite approaches, or Wittgenstein's approach to anthropology and culture in his criticism of Frazer (GB) in order to see the morphological particular approach). In other words, it requires working on a subject as well as working on oneself in similar proportions, since it is of the essence for the success of training, which on the other hand it does not consist of anything fabulous. In addition, a morphological investigation comprises elements of crafts, arts, sciences, and even religions, which makes it somewhat unpopular these days.

(2) Applying morphological method is industrially and economically speaking quite a risky deal; educationally speaking it is by no means too difficult for a trainer and a trainee in order to be applied among the general population during the course of regular education, no matter how "Deweyian" it could look like. Socially, politically, and culturally speaking it is too dangerous, since it results with extreme "clarity" of an issue upon which the investigation was conducted, and in many issues in mentioned spheres "clarity" is neither needed, nor wanted. Perhaps philosophically it could be applied without such fear, because of overall social and cultural irrelevance of philosophy, then again why should it be if it increases its irrelevance and unpopularity.

In terms of reply to this objection (2), one can say that morphology is a method which humans apply on a daily basis, which is more to that a part of

various common practices (like face or emotion recognition among small children), techniques, crafts, customs, traditions of ours, even of our sciences (for instance mathematics, or biology), arts, humanities (for instance art theory, cultural anthropology), and among the last group of our philosophy as well.

(2.1) Various techniques include the most primordial morphological procedures, as it were, pre–conceptual activities. The morphological procedure is pre–scientific in a sense in which a daily technique is pre–industrial, and the daily industry is pre–scientific. Say that a member of the group (Neanderthals or) Homo sapiens sapiens (that is to say anatomically modern humans) invented a primitive pot made out of clay by looking at his/her footsteps in mud and by extracting a footstep together with the surrounding mud and by drying it by the fire in a cave and then compare it to a pot made of leaves or of wood. He or she made it because he or she saw an analogy between a pot made of leaves and his/her deep footstep in mud during rain. Simple analogy is sufficient for one to try to make a primitive pot, and a motive, investigation, and invention could be the need for hot water which could not be boiled in a pot made of leaves or of wood. Of course, afterwards, a procedure can be made more sophisticated (industry), and even scientifically investigated (science), but at the beginning the morphology was sufficient. An important difference between a daily technique, an industrial production, and a scientific investigation is that analogy or simple similarity in any such case is in fact pre–conceptual in a sense in which industry and science use pure concepts (in terms of scientific models). What is sufficient in morphological procedure is a kind of load of personal and communal experiences which can be used in actualising such similarity or analogy for a particular practical purpose. Such load is never conceptualised since there is no need for a conceptualisation, in a way it is "moulded" (*like a pot*) for a particular practical purpose.

Here, morphology would not be presented in all of the mentioned areas, except the morphology in philosophy and therefore we turn now to this particular subject matter. Philosophical morphology comes into view in two approaches,

(2.2) as a non–morphological but still philosophical investigation of forms, structures, and morphological approaches in other sciences, arts, and crafts (by E. Husserl, E. Cassirer and M. Merleau–Ponty),

(2.3) and as a philosophical morphological investigation of phenomena, linguistic and non–linguistic as well (for instance by L. Wittgenstein in terms of investigating language–games, and forms of life, creating "perspicuous presentations", and in the light of his claim "What I give is the morphology of use of an expression", should be repeated once again, see Malcolm 2001: 43, Lukin 2010).

The second approach will be of our interest here. In short, morphology as a philosophical method consists of two general commandments, namely,

look–for, look–at and see–as, and describe perspicuously what you see. These two commandments could be further divided into more particular sub–commandments; however, this will suffice for the present purpose of introducing the very idea of the morphological technique during the course of philosophical investigation.

2. *First commandment of morphology: see exhaustively!*

Here, some elements of general description of morphology will be advanced, namely two basic commandments of morphological procedure. However, one should start by telling a story about phenomena. Phenomena are like dead shells, there is nothing *inside* them, and there is no "deep reality" *behind* them. One could imagine a child inventing a story about living beings that once occupied these strange "shell–caves", tombs in fact, since thousands of years ago; an evil tyrant won the battle against these innocent creatures and consumed them eventually. However, they are empty now in the age of humans. Nonetheless, a serious philosopher, a morphologist indeed, while being like a child in some aspects, and like a shrewd crime scene investigator in others, would rely completely on investigating not "their hidden essence", rather the very "structure of their surfaces", and use her/his creativity and imagination precisely in that direction. We do not want to mislead you, since surely, *a serious philosopher* will try to tell you a story as well, but of a different kind (it would not be a legend; it would have to be a myth in terms of a series of metaphors and parables, OC 95), like for instance the following one. Imagine that you are presented with two masks and asked for a comment. You make a remark that one is quite good for Earth, while the other one is much better for a masquerade of "Deep Space 9" (DS9, *Star Trek* SF TV series) for instance. What do you want to say, that the second one is too bizarre for "Earthlings", or that you really know how one should dress for a masquerade for DS9? The first one of course, how should I know, for God's sake, in which fashion should one dress for such a peculiar occasion as a masquerade at DS9? As far as I am concerned, all of them can be masked as humans. It would be strange enough for me as a human. On the other hand, what did you mean by "is quite good for Earth", compared to what? Yes, I know something about DS9; however, it seems to be insufficient to know how to dress for a masquerade. Is this essential? In a way it is. If you know typical masks for a typical masquerade in a particular culture, then you know a great deal about it. It concerns being overwhelmed with harsh realities of *a cultural ontic place*. Now, this last point concerns the difference between an essence and a prototype — the first is believed to be *found*, while the second is believed to be *created*. The difference between foundation and creation, or within these, for instance, between find-

ing, founding, and building foundations on one hand, and giving existence, creating existence, and existence by mistake, or as a side–effect of building (quite often phenomenon in a culture) on the other hand is of some importance. In addition, the one who created a prototype will never ask a masked man — who are you, and this point could be quite illustrative in occasions such as this, namely a masquerade at DS9. Now, imagine one looking–for, finding, and taking good looking–at dead shells. In order to see the mistake one should go back to the beginning of an inquiry and come to the conclusion — that what I was *looking–for* is precisely what I will eventually find (PI 66). If one is looking–for an essence, interpreting it as an essence before one even started to observe the surface (making it perspicuous), then one will eventually interpret the results as an essence. Now, if one is just looking–at without such rash presumptions, then one sees what one sees, there is nothing behind, no deep essence, no need for a reduction, just the structure of a surface, and its complicated system of relations.

(3) Look–for, look–at, and see–as! This is the first commandment of morphology.

However, one must not forget that when one "sees", for instance, a particular practice (practiced by particular members of a group, at certain time, and in a particular situation, say a member of an early Homo sapiens group making pottery), within a larger unit, perhaps a habit, a tradition, or even a culture, that what one really "sees" is "why", no more, no less. Now, one can invent a story regarding his/her own observation of a practice, write it down in a diary, as cultural anthropologists sometimes indeed do (and this is important part of the investigation process in contemporary cultural anthropology, see Kottak 1999), but one should not forget that such a story is written for a particular practical purpose, say for an educational one, or in order to tell his/her children what he/she has been doing during their field work. "Why they are doing this?" one could ask, and your answer at first should always be — "Go there and see for yourself, and afterwards perhaps we can discuss it." It is the same with all humanities, especially with irrelevant ones, primarily with philosophy, because while bearing heavy burden of overall irrelevance, philosophers often struggle to accomplish a kind of relevant burden of overall heaviness (as it were substantiveness). Now, a fortunate side effect of the morphological method is that one elegantly avoids "pretending" (*to have results*) simply by refraining from a reduction on one hand, and from an abstraction and a universalism on the other hand. Universalism can be a quite good test for rules in general; however, it is an awful test for their exceptions. Morphology is all about exceptions, since patterns are *exceptional* (if one reduces them or tries to make them abstract nothing remains, one is just left with a lump of artichoke leaves). Indeed, morphological relations (similarity, analogy, pattern, network, etc.) can be formalised, but they are not formalised

because of nowadays somewhat bizarre presumptions regarding language, truth, and logic, but because of purely educational and pedagogical drives. If something, which at first appears to be a rule–like phenomenon, has no exceptions, then it is not a rule at all, God knows what it is. One could be easily misled. For instance, the following description (in D. Adams' style): *It is raining. I see people walking around. From above, they all look like a bunch of crazy space invaders consisting of umbrellas drilled into their elegantly decapitated bodies. Just walking around pointlessly, drifting. It is raining. Who knows what will be revealed when sunshine comes through the clouds? When umbrellas are closed? Suddenly, by direct divine intervention, they will be given a direction? Obscured by clouds, obscured by a rain. Say that rain never stops, what should I conclude then if anything at all?* Basic morphological relations are:

(3.1) being webbed — not–webbed, being patterned — not–patterned, being analogous — not–analogous (simple and complex analogies), and being similar — not–similar. Of course, these are not pure opposites; they are in more complex relations of

(3.2) "being more... than... regarding...", and "being less... than... regarding...".

If one observes two parts or features of a phenomenon, or one feature in two phenomena, then one investigates a similarity. Say that one of our previously mentioned early Homo sapiens's observes clouds in order to detect rainy clouds because he/she needs clay (types of clouds are showed in Figure 2).


Figure 2: Types of clouds

There are two types of clouds in the sky on the day of the observation, namely A and B types (as shown in Figure 3).

Figure 3: Rainy and not–rainy clouds I

One compares them regarding all characteristics one can observe. First, they both have a cloudy shape and regarding their basic pattern, they are obviously similar, but one dismisses this as irrelevant since one can easily differ a cloud from a rain or a flock of birds. Now, one compares them regarding size, shape, and colour. They seem to differ regarding all observed characteristics and therefore they are overall dissimilar. The very observation runs as follows: A is bigger than B (size), A is much darker grey than A (colour), and B is kind of flat, while A is taller (shape); therefore, A and B are different regarding all of the observed characteristics, or in another words, A and B are dissimilar. One observes that A is a rainy cloud, while B is not. Now, this is a simple situation which presents the very procedure, but in an actual situation an observation is far more difficult. Namely, actual situations are closer to the following circumstances (as shown in Figure 4).


Figure 4: Rainy and not–rainy clouds II

Here one observes three types of clouds in the sky. Obviously, one needs to observe some further characteristics than in the previous case since colour, shape, and size are not enough, especially if there are only clouds of type B in the sky. One observes for instance their changes, and movement, and say, concludes that clouds type B in most cases change into clouds type A, then into clouds type C, and therefore this becomes the decisive similarity in drawing the conclusion that B is more similar to A than to B regarding colour, shape, and size change. One then concludes that cloud type B most probably will turn into a pure rainy cloud type A, because the pair A, B is more similar compared to the pair B, C regarding colour, shape, and size change. However, such observations are relative in many different ways. Say that one observes clouds of type B on various "backgrounds" and compares them with clouds of type A and C (as shown in Figure 5).

Figure 5: Relativity of observation

Obviously, cloud type B of the same shade of grey appears lighter grey on the darker background than on the lighter background on which it appears darker. Therefore, in the previous situation one could easily make a mistake if one does not consider the background and concludes that say B is more similar to A on the lighter background, or that it is more similar to C on the darker background regarding colour. Such relativity, namely background or surroundings relativity is possible regarding colour as shown in the present case, and in others cases regarding size, shape, change, and especially movement, and it is an integral part of any (morphological) observation.

Seeing as one of the basic morphological methods does not differ from ordinary *seeing* in any significant respect whatsoever. However, a morphologist, as being contrary to a scientist regarding this particular matter, does not have any pretensions toward *pure seeing*; he/she is satisfied with the fact that it is always *half–seeing and half–interpreting* (and "seeing as interpreting", PI p. 193). In order to see this • as a dot, or as a hole, one needs concepts of a colour, of a surface, or of a lack of surface and of a background or surroundings. In short, there are no perceptions without concepts (see for instance examples and interpretations of a double cross and a duck rabbit head in PI). However, it is not the *interpretative* aspect of seeing that is puzzling, rather the very change from *interpretative* to the *creative* aspect of it (regarding PI p. 193, the point in which one slides for instance from an interpretation of a drawing as a duck to an interpretation of the same drawing as a one–eyed monster). When one sees the pattern, say, the one of a carpet, then one sees something, a picture in one's mind, as a kind of key for understanding the whole of a carpet, its structure, its pattern. On the other hand, "picture", "mind", and "key" are still metaphors. A football player (or a coach, or a conductor of a symphonic orchestra), a midfielder especially, automatically sees the ball with his feet (there is a physiological and a training–method explication here) and at the same time positions of all players on the pitch (his team and rival team, including their midfielder as well). In addition, he sees the pattern of an action before it is played, the pattern of a particular match before it has even started (he is the manager's relation to the team during a match, as it were the most important relation in the system and crucial for the pattern). The match starts. The rival team leads by 0:1. The midfielder adapts to new circumstances better than the one of the rival team and the final result is 1:1. How is this possible? Precisely because what he sees is a whole and he see its pattern better than the midfielder of the rival team (of course there are

other factors, but this is or should be the crucial one). This kind of football basic strategy belongs to the basic "organisational culture" of a team; it constitutes a culture of this particular practice.

(4) Seeing a pattern or even a network is the final result of the process, while during the very process one sees many similarities and dissimilarities (e. g. "This wing of this bird is similar to that foreleg of that mammal", "The pattern of this butterfly wing is similar to the pattern of this tree bark"), analogies and disanalogies, patterns, and networks. While seeing and comparing all of a phenomenon's characteristics some similarities appear to be important at the beginning, but they end up as quite irrelevant or even as dissimilarities, and the situation is the same with analogies, more complicated similarities, pattern–aspects, and network–aspects. Some characteristic, say A, can accentuate itself, in simple relation of similarity of form such as "A is more similar to B than to C", while this particular similarity A may be irrelevant in analogy of the form such as "Pairs A, C and B, D are disanalogous since their similarities are not mutually similar." This procedure goes on as far as it is needed in order for one to see the overall pattern or the network of a phenomenon.

3. *Second commandment of morphology: describe synoptically!*

Morphology as a (practical) technique / procedure is far more important than morphology as a (theoretical) method. During the process of seeing, some similarities, analogies, pattern–aspects, and network–aspects can be invisible to one person, but this is not so because the another person "sees them better" or "has some special ability", rather because the other person seeing them is trained in such technique, and above all, is trained in being cautious, careful, thorough, detailed in seeing, and comprehensive in describing.

(5) Describe perspicuously what you see! This is the second commandment of morphology.

Then again, descriptions are always incomplete and this belongs to their core. They are not crippled, or unfinished, but incomplete, since they are made complete only for a particular purpose. There is a logical clarification of this nonsense; say, *a complete description* would have to be complete regarding its borders as well (seen as well as described, regarding the *indescribable* as being *beyond description*), and in order to describe the borders of what is described one needs to describe something which is not seen at all, and more to that, the relations of what is seen to what is not seen, and so on, but this is besides the point. On the other hand, it is of utmost significance that only an incomplete description can be clear to the one to whom a phenomenon is described. This limitation comes from the particular practical purpose of clear descriptions, not from a *regressus ad infinitum* objection, or from the seem-

ingly "deep" claim that the very expression "a complete description" is "an incomplete and non–descriptive expression" *ex terminis*.

One can imagine L. Wittgenstein saying something like the following: my whole philosophy consists entirely of my private mental experiences, episodes, events, and examples, wisely clothed in a jargon that is suited for various dialogues and audiences. Sometimes, when I talk with overeducated philosophers, I am bound to use common technical vocabulary of a particular school of thought that they belong to in order to "get straight to the point" as they sometimes refer to it (contrary to what non–philosophers mean by the very expression). However, sometimes, when they are really imaginative and creative, I can use various metaphors and examples including propositions serving as grammatical remarks, and then philosophy for a moment or two becomes what it should be all the way, a kind of poetry spiced with a lot of humour while being at the same time *astringent and strange*. My whole philosophy should be understood as a kind of poetry since that is what truly matters. My morphology is there. There one can find descriptions for various purposes (similar notes could be found in P. Valery's book "Philosophy" which strangely resembles some points both from Wittgenstein's earlier and later works).

Now, regarding perspicuity, let us take a different example. When you see a drawing of two shiny dice rolling on a gambling table do you think of gambling (do you think of a definition of gambling, say, "the practice of risking money or possessions on the result of something uncertain, for example a card game or a race"), or do you suddenly feel lucky, do you feel happiness, can you smell money? Then again, do you perchance feel sadness remembering some unfortunate event from your own personal gambling history? Research what others have to say about the drawing. Does *the definition of the gambling* ever pop up? No! How utterly bizarre! What do you think, why not? Now, compare various descriptions given by different people and summarize them. What kind of sentences does your summary consist of, and if all people to which it is presented "see" the point, is it then clear or perspicuous enough? On the other hand, compare the daily patterns of a dozen people. You do not see any similarity whatsoever. They differ regarding almost everything. However, you notice a few quite strange and idiosyncratic practices. One person is rather nervously checking the sports page every morning at his work. You attribute it to relaxation before work. The other has a pair of sponge dice in her car, etc. You ascribe it to her awful aesthetical taste concerning car interior. Now, you are observing all of them on Saturday evening. They all went to a casino. What you regarded as marginal suddenly becomes crucial. Now you see the similarity, now you understand the pattern. Now it is clear and perspicuous. And at the same time you cannot point to the pattern, you can only describe their daily activities which are similar at certain points, and quite dissimilar at other ones. Patterns of their daily activities sometimes overlap, sometimes are crossed, and are sometimes completely detached. Now,

you can clearly describe the pattern to someone to whom it may be of some interest.

(5.1) *Perspicuous presentation* is nothing more then a kind of *summarising, clear description*. Now, descriptions are an important part of philosophical morphology as a procedure. Describing phenomenon includes detailed descriptions of all of its relations, characteristics, features, and aspects (propositions here function as *empirical remarks*). In order to get a clear and summarising description of a phenomenon one needs to understand *a description* as *an instrument for particular use*, and here one should think of "a machine–drawing, a cross–section, an elevation with measurements, which an engineer has before him" (PI 291, BT p. 12: "One can compare understanding a description with drawing a picture based on that description", "I understand this picture exactly. I could knead it in clay. (I could reproduce it as a sculpture) I understand this description exactly; I could make a drawing from it."). One should also have in mind a document of a patent including the summary *drawing* of a "useful thing" and *written* summary or "an abstract" (illustrative topics regarding this matter are presented in Petroski 2000, as shown in Figure 6). As an engineer (and writing patent documents as well), Wittgenstein surely had in mind such drawings and summaries when writing on the subject matter.


Figure 6: Patent of a large paper clip made of spring wire (reprinted from Petroski 2000: 40). This particular patent solves the problem of conventional paper clips digging into paper and thus tending to tear them upon removal (try to point to the part of a paper clip which solves the problem).

On the other hand he must have had in mind a structure of a poem which is in a way a kind of summary as well. The third idea comprising the activity of *presenting* is shown in his presentation of colours in "colour octahedron" (PR). Now, a clear and summarising description includes propositions functioning not as *empirical*, but as *grammatical remarks* (sometimes referred to as "hinge–remarks") to which different kinds of propositions are implicit, namely *axis–remarks* (OC 152) and these compose, are implicit, and at the same time are essentially manifested at the core of our world–picture and of our form of life, the way we live, act, and talk.

However, clarity and perspicuity are somewhat different. Clarity, precision, and definability should not be mixed with perspicuity. For instance, *a well defined thing* mostly means something that is *a completely defined thing* (in other words, it is often concluded from *not so well defined* to *undefined completely*). "A fence with a hole in it is as good as none." (PI 99, see also 499) Say that one is presented with two fences, A, the one without a small hole in it, and the other, B, the one with a small hole in it (as shown in Figure 7).


Figure 7: Two fences

However, there is a passage within B where a small creature can move through it. Therefore, the land is not completely enclosed. The border is not clear, it is opaque, it is not solid, it is porous, etc. However, there is the grammar of "fence". A fence is a kind of boundary determining a piece of land and differentiating it from other neighbouring pieces. Therefore, a fence with one small hole in it is a complete fence as well as the one without it. Consequently, by the grammar of fence B *is fence enough* because it presents the border of a piece of land sufficiently; B presents a full–blooded fence as well as A does because it fulfils the function of a fence, it is used as *a complete fence*. Fences represented by A and B as symbols are completely perspicuous or perspicuous in the same degree, but, one may say, B is less clear, precise, and defined than A. The hole in B is completely irrelevant in order for B to perspicuously present a fence, and B is a proper fence as well as A. Let us modify this example a little bit. Say that the fence is the fence of a vegetable garden. Notice that the grammar of a fence is slightly changed. In such a situation a hole big enough in order for a small dog to enter into the garden through it would create an issue. However, the issue here is a grammatical, not an empirical one. A fence now does not mean "a border demarcating a piece of land" any more,

but "a fence which prevents some animals to enter and to destroy the vegetables in the garden" as well. One could imagine a situation with a fence full of holes but with a sign that it is forbidden for dogs to enter (like the ones in public parks). This is also a case of a very perspicuous symbol of fence, and as any other symbol it mirrors our culture, our language, and above all the way we act, in short, our *Weltanschauung* according to which we act on a daily basis (here to *act* means to *know*, and to *know* means to *understand* and to *master a technique* as well).

Philosophy as morphology and as grammar does not intend to solve, nor can it solve problems sometimes regarded as philosophical but which are by no means logical problems. Let us take an example of a heap. *The case of a heap*: This case is not considered as the problem of material, physical items of medium size, namely of their position in space and time, nor as a problem in philosophy of science. However, it was and still is regarded as a logical problem. Morphology dissolves the problem simply by pointing to the very structure of the heap as a phenomenon. Say that there are four cubes of four shades of grey. They can be in various spatial relations to each other and therefore composing various structures, say a layer (A), a pillar (B), creating part of a wall (C), and creating a heap (D) in a way that three of them create a base and the fourth is positioned on them roughly in the centre (as shown in Figure 8).


Figure 8: Four structures of four cubes

What one can say regarding these structures? One or two cubes cannot compose a heap, but they can compose a small pillar, or a row. Three cubes can compose, among other things, a small wall as well. However, it seems that four cubes structured in a way that three are the base and a fourth is put on top of them composes a heap. As far as cubes and grains of sand are similar, four grains of sand and four cubes as well are sufficient to compose the smallest possible heap of sand and of cubes. Now, A is too flat to be considered a heap, in other words, it lacks height. In that way it can be a part of a heap but it is not a heap, in fact, it is a layer of cubes. On the other hand, B lacks basis, in fact it lacks A. However, it is a pillar by no means. C on the other hand can be a part of a wall. Now, only D seems to have *the heap structure* or *pattern* which resembles a cone, a pyramid, or a kind of tent (it *only resembles* because

of the differences in the process of their composition). It is so because heaps can be produced in essentially two ways, namely, by pouring units of mass in one place, or by throwing mass at one place. These activities are necessary and sufficient for the composition of a heap. Therefore, a heap has the specific structure due to a specific structuring process, and this specific pattern of a heap can be called *the cone–pattern*, produced by *the heap–composition process*, and seeing that process in detail and in terms of its overall pattern means that it is possible to describe the process clearly. Consequently, the morphological, not a kind of solution, but a dissolution of the logical problem of a heap is to be found in the grammar of heap, which says that any four units of any mass, say of sand, poured in the same spot will produce a heap, and therefore four grains of sand poured or thrown at the same spot are necessary and sufficient for the smallest possible heap of sand. This grammar of heap is nothing special, it just describes how we humans use our words: grains, sand, a mass, heap, etc. (PI 496). The word heap has precisely this "humble use" in an order such as "Willard, put your scattered toys in a heap and then place them in the bag!" and similar.

Complexity and overall relativity of morphological technique in terms of seeing patterns of phenomena on one hand, and solidity of grammatical results in terms of describing the overall pattern of an investigated phenomenon on the other hand, seems to be understandable enough on the basis of these examples. This tension in morphology, created mostly by tension between the two mentioned commandments, needs to be accepted as a part of regular morphological investigation. However, there are circumstances in which this becomes a serious issue (say in a situation in which there is a need for change in world–view and its most common practices). On the other hand, explicating this issue surely goes beyond the simple answer to the simple question — what is philosophical morphology which was answered in this paper.