

JUSTIFICATION OF METAPHYSICS IN VIEW OF KANT

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UDK 111 Kant, I.

Over a decade and a half ago, I published a book titled “Justification of Pure Reason.”¹ The course of argumentation I then pursued did not lead me to the end of justification of pure reason (you heard Ms Natalija Herbut talk of this course in her presentation).

The course I shall pursue today is short, but it leads consequently to the end of justification of metaphysics. Will it be successful and to what extent, it is up to you to tell.

Let us go first to Kant — to his definition of synthetical judgments. He says: “Entweder das Prädikat B gehört zum Subjekt A als etwas, was in diesem Begriffe A (versteckterweise) enthalten ist; oder B liegt ganz ausser dem Begriff A, ob es zwar mit demselben in Verknüpfung steht. Im erstem Fall nenne ich das Urteil analytisch, im andern synthetisch.” (Krv, B10) “Predicate B either belongs to Subject A as something contained (and concealed) in concept A, or B lies totally outside of concept A, although in relation to it. In the case of the former, I call the judgment analytical, and in case of the latter, synthetical.”

Let us now go to Euclid. This is what Kant says about him:

Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and a priori. Here is one such judgment: A line or a straight line between two points is the shortest path (between the two points).

Kant now asks himself: *Whence the necessity in that synthetical judgment?* He answers: From the necessary a priori concept of infinite space, in which, as in intuition, we see that a line is necessarily the shortest line.²

Let us move now to Aristotelian–Thomistic philosophy. According to this philosophy, man is a sensible rational being. This is an analytical judgment: the predicate is implicitly contained in the subject.

1 R. Brajičić: *Opravdanje čistoga uma. U svjetlu transcendentálnih odnosa*. FTI, Edition Philosophical Series, Volume 2, Zagreb 1988

2 Ibid.

We could, though, state the genus of man, i. e. that man is a sensible being, although not in a way that would allow this judgment to be completely reversed so as to state: all that is sensible is man — in the same way that we can state — all that is man is sensible. Fish, for instance, is also a sensible creature, but it is not a human being!

The relation between the concepts of man and the concept of sensible being is not necessary!

We can state, however, man's specific difference — i. e. that man is a rational being — moreover, we can do so in a way that allows us to completely reverse this judgment:

All that is rational, as far as we know, is man.

The relation between the concept of man and the concept of rational being is necessary!

Thus, all that is man — is necessarily a rational creature.

Let us replace the concept of rational being with a definition of rational being. What being is rational?

A rational being is a being which uses syllogisms in his thinking. Naturally, this definition can be more specifically determined, however — that is of no interest to us here.

Now we shall replace man's *differentiae specificae* with the aforementioned definition. What do we obtain?

We obtain the following judgment:

Man — moreover, all that is man — is necessarily a being which uses syllogisms in his thinking.

There, this is a true synthetical judgment. What is it, then? It is merely a claim about the subject of his specific difference, where such difference is replaced by its definition.

Let us apply this to the well-known synthetical judgment:

A line or a straight line between two points is the shortest path (between the two points). Since the specific difference of a straight line is to have from the beginning to the end (between the two points) the lowest number of dots — it is the same as being the shortest line!

Thus, the definition of the specific difference of a straight line reads as follows: To be the shortest line.

From this we can conclude the following:

We reach the necessity in synthetical judgments on the basis of concepts, not on the basis of the a priori perception of the necessary infinite space.

Certainly, in this respect we are followed by an appearance of these general concepts, without which the use of general concepts would be impossible.

A question: Since a definition of the subject's specific difference is in synthetical judgments — and it is again reduced to a definition of the subject as

its specific difference — could it be argued that the predicate of synthetical judgments, just like the predicate of analytical judgments, is contained in the subject?

Answer: It could, but with due difference. The predicate of synthetical judgments is also contained in the subject — but only in the subject *materialiter*, and not *reduplicative*, just like the predicate of analytical judgments is contained in the subject *sensu reduplicativo*.

I have said in the beginning that in my previous texts on Kant I have failed to reach the end, I failed to master him, which I was able to do only today, by unmasking the non-sustainability of his understanding of synthetical judgments. Through them, I could refute his entire philosophical system built upon a priori perceptions of space and time. And why was I not able to do that earlier? Because I thought at the time that synthetical judgments expressed only the properties of things, not their specific difference, as I see it now.³

Therefore, we enter the secret of synthetical judgments on the basis of concepts, thus opening to pure reason the way to metaphysics — above all, to the knowledge of God's existence. However, Kant awaits us there with yet another difficulty: *Existence may be determined theoretically, but not really*.

After the proof that God *must* exist, a question arises: *Does God really exist?* Whether he really exists, we can find out only by empirical verification.

Our answer: Experiences may be complete and incomplete, more intense or less intense. While we are on Earth, we do not have complete experience of God. That we shall have in eternity.

We do, however, have incomplete experiences. They include: the voice of conscience, genuine mystical experiences, and the experiences of God according to St. Ignacio Loyola's *rules for the discernment of spirits*.

These occurrences of the experience of God are so alive that we can derive from them the proof of God's existence, although it would seem better to apply them in order to verify the existence of God through *The Five Ways (quinque viae)*.

The proof inferred from the concepts that a line is the shortest line is demonstrated in Euclid's system, where it may be directly observed. The proof inferred from the concepts that man uses syllogisms in his reflection, is easily demonstrable in philosophers' texts.

3 Since the specific difference differentiates one set of objects from another, as a transcendental relation it establishes a mutual connection between them?