SYLLOGISTIC DISPUTATION AT JESUIT FACULTIES AND RELATED GRADUATE SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

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It would be futile to evaluate this little paper as an exposition of some struggle for prestige of these institutions. Namely, is it possible for a common reader to expect unbiased and complete objectivity here, considering the evaluation of scientific and educational quality, when he is aware that the author of this paper is a member of the Order that is one of the important supporters of the same didactic method? Therefore, there is nothing else left but to give simply and unpretentiously some historical information aiming to simplify understanding of the studies that will — *Deo favente* — appear in this new periodical, named DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA.

Apart from that, there can be no temporal advantage, because in the didactics of the supreme sciences (in the title), at least two and a half centuries before the birth of St. Ignatius of Loyola, the Order of Preachers (Dominicans) profusely uses the disputation method as its distinction. Not only Dominicans, but other learned monks of the late Middle Ages as well, especially the Little Brothers or Franciscans. Moreover, some look for the beginnings of philosophical disputes in Socrates and his pupils.[1] St. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, was a man of the Catholic reformation, which did not intend to abolish all of the old institutions, but to creatively correct mistakes and open new, more promising ways. As a former student of philosophy (*Magister Artium*) he knew well the Parisian University, and admired its method of active engagement of students under the leadership of their teachers in obligatory repetitions and exercises. This teaching model of Sorbonne is reflected in the regulations of the *Constitutions of the Society of Jesus*. He was writing them in consultation with his first friends, who were all Parisian students. We give here only those regulations that contain rules regarding disputation of young members–students of the Order, so called "scholastics". So in Part IV of the work, subtitled: "Education of Those That Stay in the

1 Cf. G. CORALLO, "Disputation" in: *Enciclopedia filosofica,* ed. Centro di studi filosofici di Gallarate, vol I (1957) ediz. Simonetti, p. 165. One is tempted to think that Plato's dialogues are some form of Disputation, not really "in forma" but nevertheless "materialiter."

Order and Study and Other Means of Help to the Neighbors" (in chapter 6) we read:

> [378] "10. Considering that, for students of philosophy and scholastic theology, the exercise of discussion is rather useful, scholastics should engage in regular discussions in their schools (although they are not under the care of the Order), and they should persist in it, although with measure, so that they excel in learning. It is advisable that every Sunday, or some other day of the week, in our course, one in every year of study, determined by the Dean, after lunch (if there is no obstacle to prevent it) we defend some statements. They should inform about these statements in writing the evening before on the doors of the school, where those that want to will gather for the discussion or listening to it. Considering that the one in question briefly proved his statements, those that want, members of the house or not, may provide their objections. Somebody must preside, to keep order in the discussion, and to extract a teaching from a particular discussion that should be kept in mind. Those that are discussing will be given the sign to end it, thus giving time to everybody, as much as possible, to join the discussion."
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> [377] "11. Except for those two forms of discussion, some time should be assigned to discussion every day during lectures, with somebody presiding, as we said. So the skill is exercised more, and that what is difficult in these subjects becomes clearer for the glory of God.[2]"

It seems advisable to provide both a nominal and a real definition of the term *disputatio* in the beginning of this attempt.

Nominal Definition

Experts consider that the word *disputation* is composed of Latin words *putare* + *dis* that designate the activity of questioning through contradiction. The adjective *putus* = clean, cleaned, shiny..., while the verb *puto* (*putare*) means: 1. clean, trim fruit trees, vine... 2. compute[3], also: think, appreciate, consider... Are these two meanings of the word *putare* in dictionaries juxtaposed as two different expressions (*termini aequivoci*) or they are in a mutual causative

2 SAINT IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, *THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.* Translated, with an introduction and a Commentary, by GEORGE E. GANSS, S. J. — THE INSTITUTE OF JESUIT SOURCES, St. Louis, 1970 /Fourth printing, 1984/ PART IV, Chapter 6. [378–379] 10–11, pp. 194–195.

3 Cf. K. E. GEORGES, *LATEINISCH–DEUTCHES HANDWOERTERBUCH, 11. Auflage, II. Band, BENNO SCHWABBE & CO–VERLAG, BASEL 1962, Sp 2100–21002. Also:* MIRKO DIVKOVIĆ, *LATINSKO–HRVATSKI RIJEČNIK ZA ŠKOLE (Latin–Croatian Dictionary for Schools), 2nd edition, Zagreb 1900, p. 869.*

relation as analogue terms (*termini analogi*) and not synonyms (*termini univoci*)? It can be discussed, because this matter is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, the other explanation seems more probable to us, i. e., the analogous connection. Computing, calculating, reckoning etc., has some conceptual connection with cleaning, cleansing etc., of human intellect from cognitive elements, which may mine logical value with syllogistic conclusions as "half truths" and ambiguities. Constitutions SJ, in both of the quoted numbers connect disputations with their FRUIT — CLARITY! So, in the original Spanish text we read: "[378] 10. ... y después que brevemente hayan probado sus conclusiones, argüirán los que quisieran de fuera y de dentro de casa; presidiendo alguno que enderece los argumentantes, y resuelva y saque EN LIMPIO LA DOCTRINA de lo que se trata..."

In the next number: [379] 11. ... some time should be assigned to discussion every day during lectures "presidiendo alguno, como es dicho; para que más se exerciten los ingenios, y SE ACLARECEN LAS COSAS DIFFICILES a gloria de Dios nuestro Señor[4]"

The verb *putare* joins with prefixes *dis*— and *cum*— in Latin, so we get compounds *disputare* and *computare*. In the first case, it is collective, mutual thinking, talking, i. e., discussing of some subject or problem by means of contradictory approaches to the subject, negations are applied or discarded. (If this methodic procedure is strictly personal and not communal, in the professor's or pupil's quarters, without cooperation of other individuals, either profesors or pupils, it still retains the name of disputation, what is proved by numerous, often voluminous books named *Disputationes philosophicae, D. metaphysicae, D. theologicae* etc.) The other prefix, *cum*, produces the words *computare, computatio, computator* etc. Therefrom comes the English word for the invaluable gift that modern electronic technique gave to the humankind: COMPUTER! That "Dis" (in disputing) by means of distinction analytically separates (even discards) different opinions, while "Cum" (com) should quasi synthetically connect by means of electronic technique.

Real Definition

There are enough elements for a real definition given in some places of the above nominal definition, so the author is justly reluctant to give his own definition. Moreover because there already exists an excellent text by Josef de Vries, Professor at the Philosophical Faculty in Berchmanskolleg (once Pul-

4 Cf. *Constituciones de la Compañia de Jesús IV*, 6 in: Obras completas de San Ignacio de Loyola, Edicion manual, BAC Madrid 1963, p. 497.

lach, today Munich) in the American edition of Brugger's PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY[5], so we provide its complete text here:

> *DISPUTATION.* "A disputation is a scientifically ordered debate. Often in disputations arguments and counter–arguments are set in a rather free style; this easily leads to the danger that the debaters do no really collide "head on."[6] The *scholastic* type of disputation proceeds in strict form according to set rules. After the "exposition" of a "thesis" and the presentation of the proof by the defender (*defendens*), the objector (*obiciens*) counters with an objection presented in strict syllogistic form; the defender repeats the objection word for word and passes judgement on each of its propositions. If he denies one of the premises, then it is incumbent upon the objector to offer a proof for the proposition that has been denied. The principal means available to destroy fallacious counter–arguments is the *distinction (*distinctio*) which is applied to the ambiguous terms or propositions which may be contained in those counter–arguments. In the Middle Ages the disputation was considered an important help for the clarification of difficult questions; today it is rarely used, but when it is used it serves primarily as an educational tool and thus is a help for students to think through difficult problems."

In the above text, the term *distinction* is marked with an asterisk (which directs the reader to look up the same term elsewhere in the same dictionary). Considering that distinction is the soul of every good disputation, it seems useful (even necessary) to include here, from the same dictionary, the article about this first rate operation of philosophers as such.

Distinction

Distinction (1) is the act whereby the different is recognozed as different, or it is the *difference* itself (2). Difference in the broad sense is non–*identity or the relation of one to another insofar as it another. It is based on *multiplicity the *denial of *unity; therefore it has as many kinds as unity itself. Fundamentally different (=*disparate*) are those realities that belong to different genera or orders, such as "blue" and $\sqrt{2}$. Difference in the narrow sense is that in

5 Cf. J. de Vries' article, *"Disputation"* in *Philosophical Dictionary, Walter Bruger, Editor of the Original German Edition; Kenneth Baker, Translator and Editor of the American Edition, Gonzoga University Press, Spokane, Washington, 1972, p. 99.*

6 This possibility P. Foulqué or R. Saint–Jean, in their *Dictionary of the Philosophical Language* present with a French wit, considering the lack of discipline in disputation of the newer times, they say: "... discussion dans laquelle adversaries s'opposent violemment jusq' en venir parfois AUX VOIES DE FAIT." op. cit., p. 182

which several things, which have something in common, are different; therefore what one has the other does not have, for example, the whole and the part or the species concept and the genus concept. — A *real distinction* is given where a denial of identity in the mind is also a denial of identity in the thing referred to; this can occur either because the distinction is given in experience (= *physical distinction,* as between concrete things), or because the distinction is knowable only by means of thinking, as the necessary condition of the possibility of an object (= *metaphysical distinction* between nonintuitable partial principles of a material existent; it would be, for example, in the Thomistic synthesis the distinction between essence and existence in the finite existent.) — A *conceptual* or *logical distinction* is found to be present in something grasped by means of different concepts, but this does not mean that the distinction corresponds to a similar real multiplicity in the thing. For, the logical distinction is based on the fact that in our human condition we must separate objective contents from each other by means of *abstraction, although they are really one in the thing and belong to it because of the same principle. Thus, for example, the whole man in sense–endowed and rational, and both characteristics pertain to him by reason of the same soul. If one idea–content (as is the case here) is not reduceable to another but is conceptually self–contained, so that the other can be added only on the basis of experience, then one speaks of a logical distinction that is *perfectly grounded objectively.* However, a logical distinction is said to be *imperfectly grounded objectively,* if the complete thinking through of one idea–content necessarily leads into another; such in the case with the *transcendentals, with the attributes of God and with the first differences of *existence. — See also *Opposition.*[7]

Distinctions in Disputation

Considering that continuous usage (use) of various distinctions is the heart of disputation, we consider it useful to include here, according to Professor J. Donat from Innsbruck, some of the thirty most well known scholastic distinctions, and to comment them — at least those that are less clear — in according to the same author or more freely.[8]

7 *Philosophical Dictionary*, Gonzaga University Press, Spokane, Washington, 1972 pp. 99–100. Kenneth Baker, Translator and Editor of the American Edition. The article is signed with WB, designating Walter Brugger, professor at the Philosophical Institute in Pullach, today's Philosophical Faculty in Munich.

8 Cf. *Logica et Introductio in philosophiam christianam* auctore J[osepho] DONAT S. J. Editio decima recognita a J. SANTELER S. J., 1953 Oeniponte [=Innsbruck.] –1441. Catalogus distinctionum, pg. 179–181.

1) *Absolute — hypothetice, absolute — hypothetical*, i. e., absolute (unconditioned) and conditioned, e. g., penance is necessary — not absolutely, but hypothetically or conditionally: if somebody has sinned.

2) *Absolute — relative, absolute — relative* (comparative) i. e., absolutely (in itself) and comparatively, for example, a middle class man is not absolutely poor, only in comparison to the richest.

3) Abstracte — concrete, abstract — concretely, i. e., if we observe something WITHOUT special characteristics, differences, circumstances or WITH THEM; so for example playing is something morally indifferent, but if it observed concretely (with purpose and circumstances), than it is either good or evil.

4) *Actualiter — habitualiter — potentialiter, actually — habitually — potentially potentialy,* i. e., a grown and religious man, when he prays he has an actual knowledge of God, when he sleeps, he has habitual knowledge, and a little child has that knowledge only, i. e, when it develops, when it grows up with that possibility.

5) *Adequate — inadequate, adequate — inadequate.*

6) *Totaliter — partialiter, completely — partially*.

7) *Antecedenter — consequenter, antecedently — consequently*, i. e., in advance, and consequently: God does not wish an eschatological fall of a man, but he wishes that only consequently, that is, after a deadly sin.

8) *Collective — distributive*: avoid all "light" (excusable, "little") sins — each and every collectively summed up, that is impossible to avoid (Concedo), but some separately taken a man can avoid, that is not impossible (Nego).

9) *Directe — indirecte, direct, indirect.*

10) *Essentialiter — accidentaliter, essentially — accidentally*: if something is NECESSARILY united with certain reality (i. e., according to the essence of that reality), or UNNECESSARILY. So, the quality of monarchy does not belong to a state essentially (necessarily, because of the nature of a state), but only accidentally, i. e., in concrete cases.

11) *Essentialiter — gradualiter, essentially — gradually*: mind and senses differ considerably, but the mind of a thinker and of the mentally disturbed do not differ essentially, only gradually.

12) *Explicite — implicite, explicit — implicit* (expressed, included). So, for example, the one who explicitely claims that everything should be doubted, he inclusively states that his claim should be doubted.

13) *Formaliter — materialiter, formally — materially*. This distinction begins with matter and form that the human mind differentiates in some things. Matter is the subject that has some form, and form defines exactly that (it is a definer). If, according to that, only the subject is observed in a disputation, than the matter is being taken materially, but if the form is being observed (i. e., matter, but in what aspect, but in what sense?), then the subject is being

taken formally. So, for example, in the statement: "God suffered," defendens must differentiate:... suffered is materially observed, *Concedo* (= I allow that statement), suffered is formally observed, *Nego* (=I deny, although christologists could find here yet another subdistinction).

14) *Formaliter — causaliter, formally — causatively* (efficienter, dispositive). The distinction is used at observing a thing itself, or its causality, for example: food is healthy — distinguo: formaliter, *Nego*, causaliter, *Concedo*.

15) *Immediate — mediate* (i. e, directly — indirectly), for example, knowing God.

16) *In fieri — in facto esse*, *in becoming — finalized* (in becoming and when becoming stopped, i. e., when it is done). For example, a house depends on workers — in fieri, *Concedo*, in facto esse, *Nego.*

17) *In potentia — (in) actu, potentially — actually*, i. e., if something CAN only BE, and if it really IS. So, a sinner is God's friend *in potentia*, but not *in actu* i. e., as if — while he is a sinner.

18) *In sensu composito — in sensu diviso, composite in sense — divided in sense*: depending on whether the two parts of a syntagm should be taken together or separately. So in the statement: "The righteous cannot fall" there should be distinguished: cannot fall while somebody is righteous (without deadly sins), *Concedo*, when he stops being that, *Nego.*

19)

20) *Logice — realiter (ontologice), logically — really (ontologically)*: world before God, distinguo: logically, *Concedo*, really, ontologically, *Nego*.

21) *Per se — per accidens, i. e., by itself — by accident*, i. e., whether some quality is ascribed to something based on a natural relationship, necessarily, always... or only on the bases of unnecessary (contingent) and not always relevant "cases." A similar distinction is between *essentialiter–accidentaliter.*

22) *Physice — moraliter, physically — morally*. For example the one that makes somebody murder someone, although not physically forcing him but morally (by advice, talking into, threatening, blackmailing), is nevertheless guilty of the crime.

23) *Positive — negative, positive — negative*.

24) *Proprie — improprie, proper — improper*.

24) *Simpliciter (i. e., without additional limitation) — secundum quid*: for example, pain and suffering is not good, distinguo: they are not good simpliciter (=simple, i. e, in no way, or differently said: they are never good, let us say, not even as a cause for a medical examination, or dental care...) *Nego;* but secundum quid (in some way) *Concedo*.

25) *Stricte — late sumedo*, i. e., in the strict meaning of the term, according to its definition, or only in a wider (popular, unscientific) sense.

26) *Subjectivelly — objectively*. For example, the happiness of the blessed is infinite, without bounds... *D(istinguo)*: objectively, *C(oncedo),* subjectively,

N(ego). Or another example: Some activity may be a *sin* if observed *objectively*, but subjectively speaking, it cannot be considered that, not completely. (For subjectivity moral "adiuncta" or circumstances should be taken into account.: lack of knowledge about a fact or a law, and lesser or no freedom, accountability and similar...)

A Specimen of Scholastic Disputation

What does a school syllogistic disputation look like? The answer to this interresting question can only provide a physical presence (of course, careful) to this exercise, if there is a chance for it. At our Philosophical Faculty S. J. in Zagreb (Jordanovac 110) and at its predecessor, Philosophical–Theological Institute S. J. (at the same address) they no longer exist, since 1970. At that time during the reformation of all studies, until then a systematic teaching of philosophy through a *triennium* (lasting three years) was reduced to a *biennium* (lasting two years) in the hope that, at least more capable candidates will go on with some post gradual levels of study — as a rule (including "ceteris paribus" i. e., that all demands of logic and justice etc. are satisfied) and candidates of clergy, after completing a four year theological study, were expected to continue studying and achieve those academic graduations at other universities (for example PUG).

As for the period before 1970, the author of this article could resort to memories from the times when he, studying philosophy during three years at the same Institute before and during the war (1940–1943)[9], had to be at least passively present, and not rarely actively as an *obiciens* and *defendens* in all the prescribed exercises (at least on three levels: 1. *disputatio hebdomadaria seu sabbatina*, when the last week's material was *treated in a dispute,* 2. *disputatio menstrua*, i. e., for the material studied last month, 3. *disputatio sollemnis et publica* i. e., a dispute (about last semester's material or even the material pertainining to the whole academic year, so that it could be called Disputativ annua). But such a gnoseological founding would be too weak, too poor. Namely, the author of this article does not believe his (sometime maybe better) memory would be able to offer enough *completely certain* data for a thorough description of scholastic disputations. That is why he uses here a description from Donat's already quoted book. Although *Logica* was publish-

9 For the history of our Philosophical Institute, Faculty today, and for an illustration of the discussed theme about scholastic disputation, I remind of the Spartan merciless strictness considering the time table (for professors as well as students): For three years, I was not allowed to be absent from even one lesson or exercise, although the war was going on during my second and the third year!

ed in his Innsbruck series SUMMA PHILOSOPHIAE CHRISTIANAE, it did not prevent J. Donat to take probably more philosophical than theological thesis for the beginning of his specimen of a syllogistic disputation: *Miracula possibilia sunt* (Miracles are possible), although we could say today that it would be most proper to say that the thesis belongs to a wide borderline area of fundamental theology and philosophy.

Donat first gives his quasi definition, or better, his description of a syllogistic disputation: *argumentatio inter duos, quorum alter thesim statutam defendit, alter impugnat, servata ab utroque forma syllogistica.* (In a free translation: Disputation is a mental play (fight) with proofs of the two, one of whom defends a certain thesis, while the other is attacking it, provided that both stick to the syllogistic pattern). The first of the two is called *defendens* (defender), while the other is called *obiciens* (attacker), even *arguens.* (There can be two arguments, even more of them, especially when the conductor of the whole disputation — the teacher of the subject — in the end calls anybody from the audience to speak: *ex corona*). The purpose of a school syllogistic disputation is at first to make the thesis more understandable (by analyzing terms, weighing reasons, enlightening difficulties...), secondly, to exercise the minds (of students and the audience) an to achieve skill in logical operations.

> [378] — 10. Because of the utility there is in the practice of disputation, especially for those who are studying arts and scholastic theology, the scholastics should participate in the disputations or ordinary circles of the schools which they attend, even though these schools are not those of the Society itself, and they should endeavor to distinguish themselves both by their learning and by their modesty. Within the college too, after dinner on Sunday or some other day of the week (unless a special reason impedes the exercise), it is good to have someone from each class of the students of arts and theology, whom the rector will designate, defend some theses. During the preceding afternoon these theses will be posted in writing on the door of the schools, that those who wish may come to dispute or to listen. After these the defendants have briefly proved their theses, those from within and without the house who wish to object may do so. Someone will preside to direct the disputants, to sum up the doctrine about the subject under discussion and to make it clear for the benefit of those listening, and to give the signal to stop to those who are disputing, meanwhile distributing the time in such a way that there will be room for the disputations of all them.
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> [379] — 11. In addition to the two kinds of disputations mentioned, an hour ought also to be designed each day for holding disputation within the college, with someone presiding in the manner already stated. The purpose is that intellectual powers may be exercised more and that diffi-

cult matters occurring in these branches may be clarified, for the glory of God our Lord[10].

Form of Disputation

Donat differentiates three successive parts: *The beginning (I), Prima concertatio* = first discussion /facing/ (II), *Continuation of the same conflict* (III). Here are a few concrete forms:

I. In the beginning, the text of the thesis is quoted by defendens (defender) and after a short exposition the first objection comes from obiciens or oppugnans.

1. Defender (standing up) recites: "Out of the proposed theses for today's disputation I should defend (e. g. the sixth) which says 'Mirabilia possibilia sunt' (Miracles are possible)." Then (sitting down) he explains the thesis, its sense and the terms, history, opponents, he gives the proofs. In the end he concludes: "This proves the thesis."

2. *Oppugnans* (standing up): "Against the thesis that says (he literally quotes the little text: 'Miracles are possible') I prove this: Miracles are not possible, therefore the thesis, being false, cannot be accepted.

(Or he can say that the second /third, fifth... / argument does not prove the thesis. And, that is why it cannot be accepted).

3. Defender (sitting down, from now on) first, to the letter, repeats what obiciens said ("Against the thesis we heard following objecgtion: '...'") and then expresses his opinion about it: 'Miracles are impossible (or: second... third... fifth... proof does not prove the thesis, therefore...),

"Nego antecedens" (I deny the premises given by the oppugnans).

II. *The first discussion* (all sitting down) first includes the proving of *oppugnans* (i. e., Probo antecedens: I prove the premise, strictly syllogisticly...) and *defendens*' answer to that proof. In this answer defendens repeats, word for word (not changing anything) oppugnans' argument, and then simply or partly — i. e., where it is logically unacceptable — throws it away (negates it). Donat, here leaving the chosen paradigm about miracles, gives *seven general types* of defendens' answer:

10 SAINT IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, *THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS*, Translated, with an introduction and a Commentary, by GEORGE E. GANSS, S. J. — THE INSTITUTE OF JESUIT SOURCES, St. Louis, 1970 /*Fourth printing, 1984*/ PART IV. Chapter 6, No. [378–379] 10–11, pp. 194–195.

1) *Transeat argumentum* (=neglect the argument!) This is sometimes allowed to be said, if it seems that the disputation is going astray, to some other matter.

2) *Nego consequentiam* (= I deny [logical] consequence) when it cannot be observed, most often in enthymeme (enthymema), i. e., in a short syllogism with only one premise. If oppugnans is trying to prove denied consequence, defendens must trustworthily repeat some of his statements (premises), this way:

3) *Transeat maior* or:... *minor*, and that means: I do not want to pass my judgement on that, because the solution does not depend on this or that premise. For example some syllogism in its hypothetic form says:

"God does not exist, if he is not necessary for explaining the existence of the world.

Atqui (nevertheless) He is not necessary for that.

Ergo (therefore) God does not exist."

If the defendens thinks that the force of the argument is in the minor, he can — by repeating the major — say: Transeat maior, and then pass the judgement on the minor: distinguo, nego, concedo etc.

4) *Nego suppositum* (= I deny the supposition) when some of the premises are based on wrong supposition. Defendens *must repeat* it, and then say *Nego suppositum*. For example, in a syllogism such as this:

"A created being that is larger than any other is infinite.

Atqui (nevertheless) a infinite being is not smaller than God.

Ergo (therefore) there is a created being that is not smaller than God."

Negating defendens' supposition in the major is negating the statement: that there can be a created being larger than any other.

5) *Nego maiorem vel minorem vel antecendens* (when there is enthymeme) (I deny the major or minor or antecedent) if the premise is wrong (untrue). As soon as he negated something like that, defender does not have to go any further, it is the objectionist's duty to prove his negation.

6) *Concedo maiorem vel minorem* (I allow the major or the minor), if your statement is true.

7) *Distinguo* (= I distinguish) *maiorem, minorem (antecedens) or consequens* (major, minor of this reduced syllogism or conclusion). If the statement is ambiguous (*ambigua*), it should be distinguished and, considering the true part, conceded; if the term is ambiguous, it should be *sub–distinguished*. This ambiguity can be in some middle term (*terminus medius* of the syllogism) or in the extreme term (*terminus extremus*)

a) If *terminus medius* (middle term) is ambiguous, the major statement is distinguished, and minor statement is contra–distinguished. After repeating the conclusion defendens adds: *nego consequens et consequentiam.*

b) If the *extremus is* ambiguous, the premise, where it resides, should be distinguished *et pariter distinguendum est consequens* (conclusion): If the distinction is not clear, defendens should expain it — but briefly.

It is nice — according to disputational "etiquette and chivalry" — for a *defendens* not to respond, in the beginning, to the first objection with: *"distinguo, subdistinguo et iterum subdistinguo...,"* because the poor *obiciens* (especially if we are talking about weekly disputations) must desperately spread, or raise his hands: "He used up all of my objections, which I have been preparing for the whole week. I have nothing more.

(This comment about disputational etiquette is not Donat's, but the author of this text remembers it from his young days in Jordanovac from 1940–1943.)

III. *Continuatio concertationis (Continuation of discussion)*

After the defendens answered to the first objection, the obiciens' duty is to continue his attacks now, and that: either proving what the defendens simply negated (i. e., "in forma": "probo minorem"), or, if he distinguished, obiciens should "sub–summate" or restore his attacks. For example: if the defendens distinguished this way: "The cognated object is in the spirit of the one who cognized it... distinguo: in spirit really, *nego* (I negate);

... in spirit only by cognizant direction and capability (=*intentionaliter*), *concedo*," obiciens can summate this way:

a) Atqui, what is intentionaliter in mente, in spirit is realiter. Ergo manet difficultas (=therefore a difficulty remains), or in other words: there is no place for a distinction.

b) Atqui, si obiectum est intentionaliter in mente, non est extra mentem. (if the object is by its direction of cognition in spirit, then it is not outside of it.) Ergo manet difficultas.

c) Atqui obiectum est realiter in mente, Ergo manet difficultas.

When obiciens "spends" all of his sub–summations, then he should attack the thesis *alio argumento* (by different proving)...

The above could satisfy to a degree the first commendable curiosity of those who do not know much about syllogistic and scholastic (or school) disputation throughout Jesuit colleges. There is a lot to be added, no doubt — and we sincerely admit it — maybe even correct in our exposition. This can be done by reading other philosophy schoolbooks, especially those regarding logic[11] or by writing in this new periodical DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA, but also by using the following lines about historical notes.

11 Cf. for example: *Logica in usum scholarum* auctore CAROLO FRICK S. J., editio quinta emendata, Friburgi Brisgoviae B. HERDER 1919, pp. 103–106.

Spicilegia & Parerga Historica

The history of Jesuit education and its sources, gives us some chosen, even if "accidental data" (gatherings) about syllogistic disputations. We bring here just some of them, not in their chronological order, but thematically i. e., in the way some disputational sub–themes appear, and are proved in history.[12]

First of all, these exercises are obviously demanding: they are conducted every week, every month, and at solemn occasions, or at the end of the year. Not only intellectus is employed here, which must constantly distinguish (and contra–distinguish) but memory as well, which must literally remember and repeat so many syllogisms! In addition, we saw above in the Constitutions the wish of the Founder and the first Jesuits that young members dispute EVERY DAY. Nevertheless, we should not call this an attack on the health (either mental or physical) of participants. It could be viewed this way, if the Constitutions were not filled with direct and indirect warnings regarding health. The most important warning is in the 3rd part of the Constitutions, in Chapter 2, about which the connoisseurs of Ignatius' works say that it was inspired by advice coming from contemporary physicians. This chapter is titled *The preservation of the body*.[13] After general norms (1st to 3rd), in the 4th and 5th number follow the rules directly connected with our theme:

> "[298]— *4. Just as it is unwise to assign so much physical labor that the spirit should be oppressed and the body be harmed, so too some bodily exercise to help both the body and the spirit is ordinarly expedient for all, even for those who must apply themselves to mental labors. These too ought to be interrupted by exterior activities and not prolonged or undertaken beyond the measure of discretion.*

12 In this footnote we give an important colection of sources, in order to simplify further quoting.
For 16th century, i. e., in the time until RATIO STUDIOURUM S. J. (1599) was definitely approved, we have a fine work of Hungarian father Ladislav Luk'acs: *Monumenta paedagogica Societatis Iesu*, edidit, ex integro refecit novisque textibus auxit LADISLAUS LUK'ÁCS. S.J.:

I	(1540–1556) MHSI 92, Romae 1965 — our (possible abbreviation)	MP1
II	(1557–1572) MHSI 107, Romae 1974	MP2
IV	(1557–1572) MHSI 108, Romae 1974	MP3
VI	(1573–1580) MHSI 124, Romae 1981	MP4
V	Ratio atque institutio studiorum Societatis Iesu (1586, 1591, 1599) MHSI 129 1986	MP5
VI	Collectenea de Ratione Studiorum S. I. (1582–1587) MHSI 140, Romae 1992	MP6
VII	Collectenea de Ratione Studiorum S. I. (1588–1616) MHSI 141, Romae 1992	MP7

13 SAINT IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, *THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS*, Edition quoted above in the footnote 12, Part III, Chapter 2, number [298–299], pp. 168–169.

> [299] — *D. For on hour or two after taking a meal, especially during the summer, strenuous exercitions of body or mind ought not to be permitted, as far as this possible (with all needs being judged with all possible charity). But other light activities may be pursued during this time. Even outside these hours it is not good to continue to work for a long time without some relaxation or proper recreation."*

All school exercises were performed in this spirit. Let us emphasize frequent advice of psychologists to people that suffer from boredom, jobs that are not interesting, or require too much effort, or are repellent: "You must learn to love your professional work! Observe it from its positive sides, think of its usefulness and purpose, help yourself by your fantasy!..." Let us provide some examples from our — today a Faculty, then only an Institute — of philosophy, where nobody, as far as I know, suffered damages from school disputation practice for 33 years (1937–1970). Disputations were — with some rare, minor humiliations — source of real joy, especially when both the fighters and the audience, after some successful deeper distinctions, started revealing the beauty of the truth.

I noticed one positive example and have remembered it for 62 years. It is about the then young student of philosophy Fr Martin Mihoković S. J. (1916–1998). In the summer of 1937 he finished his novice period, but he started his study of philosophy in the same Zagreb and the same building for novices where the faculty was opened that fall, and not somewhere abroad where, until 1937, young Croatian Jesuits had studied. Požun (Slovakian Bratislava), Innsbruck, Kraków, Pullach, Gorizia, Gallarate... Fr. Martin, in spite of all of his indifference of a monk (*indifferentia religiosa*) was nevertheless — as well as his colleagues — sorry for losing the chance to see the world, and learn major foreign languages in his youth (German or Italian), but he accepted the reality the Providence gave him, and started diligently studying philosophy. He was just in love with it. That was my impression when I became a Jesuit novice the following year. It is true, the "philosophers" and we, novices, were divided by separation, i. e., except for holidays (*separatio soluta*) we were not allowed to speak to each others. Nevertheless, every Thursday (*dies villae, rusticationis*) according to the wise ordinance of the third general of the Order St. Francis de Borja for reasons of preservation of health, we should discontinue our weekly studying and lectures in order to walk for several hours (through the beautiful nature surrounding Zagreb) to rest our spirits. After that, we had lunch on our college farm (Fratrovac 38, today it is that smaller building for spiritual exercise, built in the year 1938.). We, novices, sat close to the philosopher's tables in the dining room of the villa, and being "good" novices we could *oculis clausis omnia videre* (i. e., see everything with our eyes closed). Also we could listen to Fr. Mihoković and admire him, as he disputed

with his philosopher colleagues and with his sonorous voice distinguished: "Concedo maiorem, nego minorem..." and how joyously, almost triumphantly, fast, as if from a machine gun poured the rest of the disputational wisdom of a defendens on his colleagues. As if playing football in front of a chosen audience and "dribbling" oponens' defense, running after the ball towards the opponent's goal (and he was a good football player!). This took place not only at the first "villa" during my novice period, but regularly later. In spite of all those, but also other proofs for the 'love of wisdom' (literal translation of the Greek term *philo–sophia*), Mihoković, later in his life, did not specialize in philosophy, but church music and became *musicae sacrae artifex*.

Mihoković was not the only 'wisdom lover' — philosophus, in the literal sense, but our whole generation was, more or less. Our diligent professor of general metaphisics (or ontology) and acknowledged philosophy author, Fr. Franc Šanc S. J. (1880–1953), along with his regular lectures at our place, was also a spiritual assistant in a nearby sanatorium MERKUR. One day he had several patients (maybe on their death bed). He resolved this *collisio officiorum* this way: he sent a message to us that his lectures would be moved for the afternoon, and he devoted himself to his dear patients. Just imagine: none of us even thought of making an objection to that! So, for example, for the three years before, and during the war, I did not miss a single lecture...

The important thing that I noticed on Mihoković's example was institutionalized in various ways: all that would help joyful philosophical disputation was introduced and incited the students to develop a spiritual, intellectual fighting spirit. Here, above all, I should emphasize the interest of the audience during solemn disputations (not only the audience of students, but also professors and external guests on the occasions), who would, at least those better prepared, after the official opugnants, *ex corona* join the disputation.

As in Ancient Greece, music played its role to raise spirits for this specific fight. Let me mention something from my memories of studying philosophy at Jordanovac. We used to perform a mottet closely related to the learning of truth. So, we used to sing an enchanting composition for a male choir by the church musician Fr. Joseph Kreitmeier S. J. (1874–1946), an antiphon in the office of the Holy Teachers (=Doctors) of the church: *Qui autem docti fuerint, fulgebunt tamquam splendor firmamenti, et qui ad iustitiam erudiunt multos, quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates.*[14] I experienced that (and I believe my colleagues as well) as the Old Testament, blessing, and the mission of apostolate! Young scholastics from Jordanovac considered the apostolate for truth to be a fight — the friends from Mihoković's generation, when they exactly

14 Dan 12,3.

in those years named their periodical PALAESTRA, what, according to Divković's Latin–Croatian dictionary (Zagreb, 1900, p. 747) meant the wrestling ground, place for exercise, gimnasium etc.

Similar — and more — happened in other Jesuit Colleges. Hence, for example, in the biggest and most respectable of them, i. e., Roman College. In the history of that Jesuit university, today's Gregoriana, we read reports about music that was performed on such occasions. A historiographer of the college says, for example: 1601... Vi fu anche musica, e se ne stamporano i versi delle Cantate.[15]" Or 1603: "–9. dicembre. Si fecero solenni difese di Filosofia in salone del Sig. D. Carlo Carafa, figliuolo del Principe della Rocella. Vi furono 20 Cardinali, e gran numero di Prelatura. Le conclusioni erano dedicate al Re di Spagna, e vi fu ancora musica solenne.[16] Or similar 1615: "con musica squisita?[17], 1625: "... vi fu ancora una nobile musica, con distribuirsi in stampa le Cantate"[18], 1629: "... musica scelta[19]" 1664: "... bella musica"[20], 1676 (November 12): "... Fece ancora una superbissima musica, e si distribuivano i libretti che avevano un molto nobile frontispizio, e dove erano stampate le parole."[21] 1693: "... A pié del salone si fece un gran palco, dove erano sopra a 60 istrumenti che fecero superbissima sinfonia..."[22] 1695. (August 26) Hungarian count Zichy Pál from Germanicum received his Ph. D.:... "Vi ha fatta ancora una nobilissima musica con molti instrumenti; e per li soli musici, e istrumenti ha spesi scudi 147"[23]. And, some forty days later, i. e., on October 5, his countryman, count Imre Cziachy also received his Ph. D. there, but the musician and the instruments cost him even more money, i. e., 177 scudi[24].

Among external and psychological aids I would mention the decoration of the space for disputation. The hall had to be decorated with verdure and flowers[25], oleanders, rhododendrons, palm trees... or, in the rich church–aristocratic papal Rome of Baroque, the walls were covered with goblins, damask

15 Cf. RICCARDO G. VILLOSLADA S. J., *Storia del Collegio Romano dal suo inizio (1551) alla soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù (1773),* Romae 1954. p. 267.

16 op. cit. p. 267

17 op. cit. p. 268

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. p. 269

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 op. cit. p. 271

23 op. cit. p. 272

24 Ibid.

25 M. VANINO, *Isusovci i hrvatski narod I* /Jesuits and the Croatian People/, Zagreb 1969, p. 159.

with golden and silver threads, brocade, and seats were clothed with quality materials.[26]

In the reports of the chronicle keepers of the college, very rarely, almost never, we see that there were ladies in the audience at public disputations. So, on August 13, 1703 in the Church of St. Ignatius, after long questionings and disputations the Pope's nephew, Abbot Annibale Albani received his Doctor's Degree in philosophy and theology, and in the large audience there were 21 cardinals, 300 prelates, large estate owners of Venice, Bologna and Ferrara...! "Vi fu ancora il Sig. D. Orazio padre, e la Sig. D. Bernardina madre del Sig. Abbate."[27] Croatian historian MIROSLAV VANINO S. J., in his truly interesting and lively description of a solemn disputation in the Academy of Zagreb (i. e., the Jesuit college of higher studies) writes the following beautiful lines, which he does not base on any directly quoted works in the footnotes, but he takes the rarely used liberty of essay–writing in strictly scientific work to describe a part of reality: "... Disputation is starting. We leave to the reader to picture how the young fighters are taking their position, their parents and brothers with pride, maybe even fear, are watching their dear student, while the sister is silently uttering a prayer. The fighting begins. The opponents are trying each other... The defender is dodging the hits. The professor is occasionally intervening to help the defender who is forced to the edge of an abyss... The defender, although slightly wounded, fought like a hero. The loud applause is his earned reward."[28]

The entering into the game of those who call out *ex corona* (i. e., from the audience), after the last oppugnans "shot" his arguments, could be motivated in different ways: maybe by the older colleagues' little ambition, to show that they have not forgotten the charms of philosophy, or scorned it, or maybe because some gentlemen — maybe older, with gray hairs but young in spirit as ambitious youths are — saying something truly educating and useful. We can read about it in the report about a solemn disputation at Jordanovac, in 1942, just before the holiday of the coryphaeus of Scholasticism, St. Thomas Aquinas (then it was celebrated on March 7). Most importantly, the Archbishop of Zagreb, Dr. Alojzije Stepinac and the legate of the Holy Father at

26 Cf. R. G. VILLOSLADA op. cit. passim: p. 269, for year 1641; p. 270, for year 1673; p. 271, for year 1693: ..."il salone era nobilmente apparato d'arazzi, di velluti e di broccati." — The mentioned hall is the same as *aula magna* of the Collegue. "Ha appareta /count Zichy/ tutta la navata della chiesa con damaschi, e bellissimi arazzi assai nobilimente..." year 1695, p. 272. [That church was in the whole context that completely close to the Roman College *Sant Ignazio*, who would often come to help, if "salone" i. e., Aula magna was too small for too numerous audience.]

27 VILLOSALDA, op. cit. p. 272.

28 M. VANINO op. cit. pp. 159–160.

the Croatian Episcopate, the white Benedictine, Abbot Ramiro G. Marcone were invited to the intellectual festivity. The unsigned report brings the following important sentences: "... S. Eminenza [sic] / — (a long term professor of scholastic philosophy) — interferes from time to time in a fine Italian Latin, expounding the difficulties, suggesting better distinctions, looking for solutions and explaining — when necessary — occasional more complex chapters from ontology 'that can bother people in their old age, if they have not cleared things in their youth'." All of that was unforced, fatherly, so that it was a true delight.[29]

Nevertheless, not every public and solemn disputation ended with such a pleasant final chord. I remember one from the beginning of May in 1946, Bellarmine's day in the old calendar, when the disputation was held in the hall of Palmotićeva 31, because Jordanovac, after the total German occupation of our house (1943–1945), was now occupied by another force. This time too, there was a large and excellent audience: [at that time more, and with more hatred attacked Archbishop], now beatified Alojzije Stepinac, his suite, and professors of the Catholic Theological Faculty. There were also the students of the faculty and our non–Jesuit colleagues from the fall of 1943., when because of the war scholastics of the Croatian Province S. J. could not go to PUG in Rome, or anywhere else abroad. As far as I remember, both disputations — theological and philosophical — passed successfully, as well as the reading of an excellent disertation of Fr. Mijo Škvorac about the large (over 1000 pages) controversial book in the Croatian language of Antun Kanižlić S. J. *Kamen pravi smutnje velike (1780) /The real stumbling block of enormous confusion/* sc. de causis schismatis Ecclesias inter Byzantinam et Romam. But, in the very end, I heard a painful criticism of scholastic disputation as such, that it is *logomachia* (a fight, more with words than advancing, fruitful ideas). This criticism was expressed by a rather talented non–Jesuit colleague whose theological capabilities in following decades were proven. He referred to our professor of dogmatics Dr. Stjepan Bakšić (1889–1963). This did not seem very likely to me, because Bakšić studied and received his Ph. D. in Innsbruck, where Donat taught as well, and similar talents among the members of the Society of Jesus, and where, because of them, syllogistic disputation flourished.

Maybe this criticism was justified by concrete mistakes in the disputation that preceded it, but generally speaking, it should be admitted, we entered a short period of crisis: this complete abandoning of this excellent didactic me-

29 Cf. MALI VIJESNIK XX /SMALL NEWS/ (1942) — Pro NN tantum, pg. 14–15. Judging on the style and language, the author of this anonymous test is Fr. Philipp Johler S. J. (1919–1995), then a second year student of philosophy. Lapsus calami is that "Sua Eminenza.," because Abbot Marcone was not a Cardinal then, or ever.

thod in many schools, this abandoning of the Latin language in education, these — at least, considering philosophy — too "static" themes of discussion. Already mentioned historian, M. Vanino, in his doctoral thesis *A History of Philosophical and Theological teaching at Jesuit Academy in Zagreb*[30] gave the titles of some theses that were defended in the Old Town of Zagreb in the period of Baroque, but do these theses speak how advanced that philosophy was — even[31] theology — *adhuc sub iudice lis est.*

Final Chord

As the final chord of this disputable text, its author would like to humbly suggest, regarding the survival and advancement of syllogistic disputations, some of his ideas, of course, leaving it those more qualified to correct his mistakes and bring in their experiences — according to the wise advice of a Croatian folk song:

> Who knows better how,
> He can have the field now!

1. It would be good today to conduct disputations in a non–Latin language, i. e., in the mother tongue of the speaker, or some language of the modern world, major language. This other option seems more functional for the internationalization of the philosophical culture, and the first option — at least with smaller nations and generally unknown languages — could be used for better involvement of students in philosophical proving. Maybe it would be good that these "smaller" disputations are conducted in the mother tongue during the FIRST YEAR of study, because after students master the technique of disputation in the language they understand better, they will easier dispute in some of the dominant languages of mankind in their second year, and further on. Of course, as long as these languages remain dominant in this whimsy changing world. (I must admit that I am very, very sorry to bury Latin this way, that school language, which, by its structure, was precise and appropriate for science, especially philosophy and theology from antiquity to the second part of the 20th century.)

2. I would suggest a technical innovation. In order to make a disputation easier to follow, it is not enough to distribute programs on invitations with

30 This Ph. D. thesis, defended and approved by the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Zagreb in 1918, and published by HRVATSKA BOGOSLOVNA AKADEMIJA /CROATIAN THEOLOGICAL ACADEMY/ as volume 14, in 1930. Cf. ibid. p. 3.

31 Cf. for example pp. 62–64 and pp. 67–74.

printed titles of the theses; that is not enough, it should be made possible, not only for disputants, but the whole audience, to follow the very essence, which a priori cannot be printed in advance. This essence of a disputation is not present on printed material as *factum esse,* it is for all the listeners only *in fieri*; it will be emerging during the disputation. How would it be if the arguens would type down his first syllogistic summation, "on the spot, while it is still hot," i. e., while he speaks; if he could put it on a screen for the whole audience. In this way — even for those whose memory for whatever reason does not serve them well (and amnesia today is not rare because of illness or old age) — it would be obvious what should (not) be distinguished or what should (not) be conceded. Then, the defendens should also put his loud answer to the screen, watched by everybody. It could be discussed by the experts how to practically implement this — electronic media technicians, psychologists, pedagogues and especially didactic experts... — who can give their competent opinion (whether this suggestion is technically feasible and useful from the standpoint of pedagogy and didactics, etc.).

3. Considering (not) interesting, practically aimless themes, supposedly sterile metaphysics, the objection was that the themes of syllogistic disputations were too speculative, theoretical, "essential..." Briefly: they were far from life. But if we notice the fact that in today's world practical norms are dictated by the richer countries — by applying force (by blackmail, isolation, denying help, etc.), by strategically, economically and politically more powerful, to the poorer countries, many times less powerfull, and therefore dependable... including worldviews, politics, economics and ethics, educational programs for children, youth, and adults (for example, through mass media) — it is completely clear then that people must stand on their own feet through philosophy, free.[32]

What are the chances for success? What tools and methods should be used (ethically allowable, of course)?

I am not trying to answer this question, it will be possible to solve it (or possible to attempt to solve it) on the pages of our new periodical.

Certainly, we should continue our dialogue with various philosophies and worldviews present today: not all of them are the same. I would dare reduce many of them, especially the louder ones, to their common denominator and give them the name that maybe does not exist, but could be generally accepted. What do you say about NEODEISMUS? There is something common in the genesis of this worldview and its several centuries older ideo-

32 I cannot enough recommend the article of our professor Rudolf *Brajičić Ideolog otvorenog društva o skolastici i skolastik o otvorenom društvu /An Ideologist of Open Society On Scholastics and a Scholastic On Open Society/* OŽ 54 (1999) pp. 303–325. It is a pity that this article was not written in some major world language.

logical parent without the prefix NEO: neither do its followers formally negate God the Creator, but in their anti–metaphysical postulates they behave as if He did not exist in the world (which seems to be without it and against it). They are moved and helped by, in this fashion — as well as their predecessors were, i. e., deists, by philosophers "illuminated" by rationalism of the past ages — by greater and greater achievements in natural sciences (18th cent.) and unimpeded technology (19th through 20th cent.). For them, *Deus providus* is gnoseologicly and metaphysically completely superfluous, not to say harmful. They may allow an exception in the spirit of what Voltaire said: "Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer," i. e., as a temporary scarecrow to prevent individual and common crime to get too strong.

I would like to change this dictum a little: "If God does not exist in philosophy, and consequently not in various other forms of human behavior (in culture, education, politics, economy...) then he should not be made, because it is conceptually and realistically impossible, but he should be RETURNED there.

On the occasion of starting this new periodical of ours, I repeat the saying from a Roman story to the young philosophical talents:

HIC RHODUS, HIC ROSTRA!