

AUTHOR'S ANSWER TO THE
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
"PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIMENT" Cf.
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Rudolf Brajičić — Zagreb

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Questions

Two questions were posed to the author of the "PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIMENT" from the last issue of "DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA" (No 1, / 2002, p. 177–188)

Question number one

The author's deduction from the concept of "the supreme being" that God exists would be more convincing if we initially knew that the supreme being is *positively* possible, but from the mere concept of "the supreme being" we can not know it.

The author's answer

It is true that we do not initially know whether the supreme being is *positively possible or not*, although we do not see that the concept itself is contradictory. Therefore our conclusion on the basis of discourse from the concept of the supreme being and verifications in experience which we had done, it has this meaning: When we prove that God exists as a supreme being on the basis of discourse from the concept of the supreme being and from the "verification" in experience, we claim only this, that by claiming this we do not become contradictory. That is all. We do not claim more. Therefore in order to prove God's existence by means of philosophical experiment, we have to follow through our reflection of the verification in experience with much care, which we had not done in the text to which the upper text is referring. By doing the verification we showed that we do not see any contradiction in God's exist-

ence as a supreme being. But we did not show that the supreme being really does exist. Therefore, with the reflection it should go like this: If the supreme being would in itself be contradictive and absolutely impossible, including the fact that we do not see any contradictions in it, i. e. if it would be without the *positive* possibility, then the beings from our experience, whose positive possibility of their extrasensory substance absolutely depends on the supreme infinite being, as we had shown in the discourse, would also be without the *positive possibility* concerning their extrasensory cognition, i. e. that they are finite, so they would according to this be contradictory in themselves, which they are not, because they *exist* as finite. The participation of the absurd can not be anything else than absurdity. According to this, the concept of the supreme being is positively possible, i. e. it can be realized. But is it really realized? Can we prove its reality a posteriori or can we also show it a priori? Let us try to show it a priori. When the concept of the positively possible supreme being would not be realized in reality, every finite being realized in reality would be greater than the positively possible supreme being. So Anselmo, but we know that an illegal jump from possibility to reality is hiding here. Can we nevertheless give some other a priori reasons that the concept of the positively possible supreme being does in fact exist in the reality? Let us weigh the following a priori reasons:

Firstly, what kind of harmony would there be in the kingdom of beings if all those finite beings, in their possibility depending on the supreme being, would be real, and the supreme being would not be real?

Secondly, the finite beings in their reality depend on the infinite positively possible infinite being concerning their positive possibility. And who do they depend on concerning their finite reality? On that same positively possible infinite being, because *two* positively possible infinite beings are not possible, are they? Therefore positively possible infinite being is in the reality.

Thirdly, if God as a supreme being would not exist, the a priori concept of the supreme being, which a madman prefers to the a posteriori evidence about God's existence, he would be a pure subjective product of our mind, he would be an empty idea as other ideas which are his participations would be, and as such they would not utter noumenons. Nevertheless, when we say at the beginning of the experiment that God is a supreme being, we understand the concept of the supreme being *objectively*. A "madman" is an objectivist, and not a subjectivist in Kant's manner. Therefore when we show with our discourse that God exists as a supreme being, it should be understood objectively, and not subjectively, otherwise we make *mutationem elenchi*. This mutation brought Kant to the practical claim that all "madmen", and there are many of them, think, by mistake, that their concept, created in their minds, is in fact God.

Fourthly, we showed that the being, which is supreme, is the being of infinite perfection (ens realissimum) and as its participations show the nature of finite beings, i. e. they have a face of potential (possibility), and not of the act, but they are by themselves defined for the act (potentia ordinatur ad actum), so does the being of infinite perfection have the face of potential (form) and not the act but is by itself defined for its appropriate act. The act appropriate to the infinite perfection is the *infinite* act. And since infinite perfection is positively possible concept, and that the infinite act is positively possible concept, and because the reality fits under this concept, it means that it necessarily actualizes infinite perfection of the supreme being, for which it is defined as an act itself. Therefore God, as a supreme being of infinite perfection, does exist. Of course there is the difference between the act and the potential in the finite beings, between the core and the essence. There is no such difference in the infinite being. When talking about God we always talk about the same thing from the different points of view, and we do it the our human way, that is "per modum compositorum" (st. Thomas), knowing well that God is the most simple being (ens simplicissimum).

Question number two:

Is the evidence from our contingency stated in the text an integral part of the philosophical experiment or is the experiment independent from it?

The author's answer:

From the answer to the first question it is clear that our a posteriori evidence from our contingency (Disputatio Philosophica, p. 178–179) does not form an integral part of our philosophical experiment. With this we want to point put that in our philosophical experiment it is better for the a posteriori evidence for God's existence, instead of the evidence from our contingency, to mention Thomas' evidence ex gradibus perfectionis (quarta via), with which we can prove the existence of the Supreme being as an all-perfect being (ens realissimum). Generally speaking, we can confirm the a priori evidence of God's existence from the concept of "the supreme being" with the a posteriori evidence.

In conclusion we can add that God is not only the supreme, but also the infinite, the unchanged, the eternal, the allmighty being and that all this is visible without contradiction in human mind so it is possible to make the a priori evidence for God's existence about all this, as we did it with the concept of the supreme being. With these evidence we can always find out that only in the light of God's mentioned attributes and with the dependence on them we can perceive characteristics of visible beings around us: that they are con-

tingent, finite, changeable, from something else, temporal, that they take limited space and that they have limited activity. All our philosophic cognition is based on the thing which a "madman" perceives, that God is the supreme being, that he is infinite and so on.

Of course, everything that was stated in this argument is open to the criticism of respected authors.