

Elections in Croatia for the House of Counties of the Sabor*

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Summary

In the first part of the article the author analyzes the type of electoral system used to elect members of the House of Counties in the Sabor, its essential determinants and political effects. The proportional electoral system did not produce the political effects expected from it. Proportional elections in small constituencies returning three members, like the ones in Croatia for the election of members to the House of Counties, lead to the representation goal of plurality elections. Proportionality is incomplete and differences occur between the participation of votes and weight of votes in relation to seats. This works to the detriment of small parties. The proportional electoral system with three seats considerably favours large political parties.

In the second part of the article the author analyzes the results of the elections for the House of Counties. They showed that although the Croatian Democratic Union is still the leading and dominant political force with an absolute parliamentary majority, it is no longer the only party with political power. In these elections the Croatian Social Liberal Party and the Croatian Peasant Party affirmed themselves as political parties with a clearly presented party position and political strength. The election results show a tendency of concentration in the party system in which there will be room for four to five political parties.

In the third part of the article the author presents the role of the House of Counties as a kind of supervisory Sabor body, but also a body through which are expressed not only party and political, but especially regional interests and the specific features of individual counties.

Introduction

The first free multiparty elections and the constituting of the democratically elected Sabor (Parliament) of the Republic of Croatia in May 1990 began the process of democratic transition from authoritarian socialism towards multiparty parliamentary democracy. The new democratic Constitution of the Republic of

* Elections for the Chamber of Counties of the Sabor were held on 7 February 1993.

Croatia, enacted on 22 December 1990, established the legal framework for the further development of democratic institutions and the new state and political order. The new Constitution fundamentally changed the structure of the Sabor, whose three chambers (House of Associated Labour, House of Communes and Sociopolitical House) were replaced by two, *House of Representatives and House of Counties (Županije)*. Furthermore, members of the two chambers of the Sabor are now elected directly (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Articles 70 and 71). A new *Law on the Election of Representatives to the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia* was passed on 10 April 1992 so that elections could be held for the House of Representatives and House of Counties of the Sabor, and the parliament reconstituted and reorganized (because the current Sabor had been elected on the basis of the old Constitution according to election laws valid at that time). This reorganization was left to the new democratically elected authorities. The constitutional foundation for the promulgation of this law is contained in Article 72, Paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.

The type of electoral system on which to base free democratic elections is of great importance both from the aspect of political representation and for the legitimacy and functioning of the political system itself. In the Republic of Croatia a balance had to be found between the fragmented and unprofiled party system and aspirations to achieve a stable executive government on the one hand, and on the other the requirement that the interests of important political and social groups within the parliament should be represented. For this reason the choice of electoral model was a key issue for the democratic development of modern Croatia. In almost all western democracies, and in countries of South and East Europe that have passed or are passing through political and economic processes of transition since the fall of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, the type of electoral system used was a result of political *compromise* among the ruling parties and those in the opposition, or was based on referenda at which electors opted for the kind of electoral model they wanted¹. In Croatia, however, the ruling political party, the *Croatian Democratic Union*, dominated the choice of electoral system and its configuration both for the elections held on 2 August 1992 and for those in February 1993.²

¹ Paul Wilder, *The Italian Referendum on Electoral Reform, Representation*, Summer, London, 1991, p. 22. At a referendum held on 18 and 19 April 1993 Italian voters decided on changes in the electoral system, on financing political parties and some other issues important for changes in the regime. The Irish decided on changes in the electoral system at a referendum held in 1959.

Richard Gunther, *Electoral Laws, Party Systems and Elections: The Case of Spain, American Political Science Review*, 1989, Volume 83, No. 3, pp. 835-858.

² In the words of Smiljko Sokol, one of the authors of the electoral system, "it is not true that this system is tailored only in the interest of the CDU, because then the elections would be by relative majority where the CDU would have won 90 per cent seats". From an interview of Smiljko Sokol by the journalist Miljenko Manjkaz: "Vodimo Hrvatsku prema Švedskoj", (We are leading Croatia towards Sweden), *Danas*, 12 February 1993, No 6/93, Zagreb, pp. 6-7.

The Croatian electoral model, established by the *Law on the Election of Representatives in the Parliament (Sabor) of the Republic of Croatia*, is a combination of two different types of electoral system: the plurality and the proportional systems, and is called the *combined plurality-proportional electoral system*. Article 22 of this law prescribes that 124 members shall be elected into the House of Representatives of the Sabor (the first chamber of the Croatian parliament). This number can be increased in accordance with conditions set forth in Article 26 of the Electoral Law. Since members are elected into the House of Representatives on the basis of two types of electoral systems, the Law defines two types of constituencies. Sixty members of parliament are elected according to the *proportional system* (Article 24) for which the whole territory of the Republic of Croatia is *one constituency*. There is a prohibitive clause of 3 per cent, a closed list and d'Hondt's method is used for transforming votes into seats. The remaining sixty-four members of parliament are elected in *uninominal constituencies* that elect one member into the House of Representatives by *relative plurality* ("first past the post"). Four of these are elected by members of specific national minorities in special constituencies established by the Constituency Law.

Elections for the *House of Representatives*, which has 138 members (according to the Constitution, Article 71, it may have a minimum of 100 and a maximum of 160 members), were held on 2 August 1992 according to the *mixed electoral system*.³ These were the second⁴ democratic, free, multiparty elections but the *first* in a sovereign, independent, democratic and internationally recognized Republic of Croatia.

However, elections for the *House of Counties, the second chamber* of the Croatian parliament (which are treated here), were not held at the same time as elections for the House of Representatives (2 August 1992). They could not be held until the Republic of Croatia had been divided into counties (*Županije*), which had at that time not yet been carried out. A solution was found in postponing the county elections to enable, in the months that followed the constitution of the House of Representatives, a suitable solution to be found for the new territorial organization of the Republic of Croatia and its division into *counties (Županije)*, in place of the earlier communal system. The Constitutional Law passed after the elections in the summer of '92 empowered the House of Representatives to discharge the constitutional role of the House of Counties until its constitution.

³ Štefica Deren Antoljak, 'The Croatian Electoral Model, Its Most Important Elements (1992 Elections)', *Croatian Political Science Review*, 1.1 1992, Zagreb, pp. 100-124.

⁴ The first free multiparty elections for the representative bodies of municipalities and the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia were held in spring 1990 based on the Law on the Election and Recall of Councilors and Representatives (*NV* no 7/90). These were *absolute majority (two-round) type* elections applied to the old Sabor structure with three chambers, based on unequal electoral rights. That model was selected bearing in mind the expected advantages of the majority system, i.e. the concentration of political parties, the formation of a parliamentary party majority and a stable one-party government. In the past two years, however, the functioning of the Croatian Sabor and government did not fulfill what the creators of the electoral law had expected, so it was decided to change the electoral system.

At the end of 1992 the *Law on the Territories of the Counties (Županije), Cities and Municipalities in the Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine no. 90, 30 December 1992)* was passed, which provided the legal foundation for holding elections for members of the House of Counties. The elections were called for 7 February 1993. This law defines the counties primarily as units of local government but also of self-government, capable of acting as natural self-governing entities within the framework of a single and indivisible Croatian state. However, they are also *electoral units* from which members are elected to the House of Counties. During their constitution care was taken to make the counties an expression of the historical, communications and economic interests of a region. On the basis of these elements, and on area and number of inhabitants³, the law divided the Republic of Croatia into twenty counties; the City of Zagreb which has the status of the twenty-first county; and two districts with special self-government status, Knin and Glina. These districts are territorially divided between two counties: the District of Glina is part of Sisak County and the District of Knin part of Zadar-Knin County.

Basic determinants of the electoral system by which members of the House of Counties were elected, and political effects

The first text of the Law on the Election of members of the House of Counties divided counties into three constituencies, each of which was to elect one member by the system of relative plurality. However, a month before elections for the House of Counties, at a session of the House of Representatives (5 January 1993), the electoral law was changed from a relative plurality into a *proportional* electoral system, in spite of opposition disagreement. Counties were no longer divided into three constituencies and instead the whole territory of a county became a single constituency. The party that won at the August '92 elections, the CDU, probably changed the electoral system because it judged that a proportional system with three seats was better suited to its political interests, expecting as great a victory as that of August '92. The team of experts (Vladimir Šeks, Smiljko Sokol, Ivica Crnić) explained this change of electoral system by the need to achieve stable executive rule and the constitutional need by which it was considered more logical for a whole county to form a single constituency from which three members would be elected representing all the voters in the county, not only some of them. They considered the proportional system better for an uneven number of members. Only several months earlier the team of experts had used these same arguments to explain the advantages of the relative plurality electoral system. The opposition parties were for an absolute plurality electoral system (in two rounds) for the House of Counties elections. Some of them formed election coalitions and a common county list, others, like the Croatian Party of Rights, decided to boycott the elections. All the opposition parties voted against the electoral solutions offered, but the CDU's absolute parliamentary plurality greatly limits the opposition's political influence.

Three key questions dominated the Sabor discussion about changes in the electoral system for the House of Counties: type of electoral system, the composition of electoral commissions, and who can be the bearer of a county

³ The Republic of Croatia has 4 million 780 thousand inhabitants.

list. CDU domination engineered the change in electoral system from relative plurality to proportional. Concerning the composition of electoral commissions, the ruling party did not yield to opposition demands for multiparty commissions saying that both solutions were democratic, but that the one that had been suggested first was technically simpler to implement. The Sabor members, most of them CDU members, accepted only one of the amendments put forward by the opposition, the one that the Republican Electoral Commission should choose a printing house to print ballot papers marked with serial numbers. All other opposition demands were rejected. The third question under dispute concerned those bearing the county lists. The solution accepted in the Sabor was that well-known "political" figures could be bearers of county lists but need not stand for the House of Counties. Even a person who had a seat in the House of Representatives, but whose mandate was in abeyance because he had in the meantime been elected to an office incompatible with that of member, could be the bearer of a list. This was done to enable well-known party figures to be included on party lists to win as many votes as possible, and then appoint their deputy. This would not have been possible if elections for both the houses had run parallel.

An electoral system consists of many different elements, most important being *the formation of constituencies, i.e. their size, voting structure, procedure of transforming votes into seats and the prohibitive clause (threshold)*. Each of these elements in itself, or in combination with others, is known to have a political effect on election results. Under specific circumstances, the elements of an electoral system influence tendencies in the political and party system. Research shows that electoral results do not depend only on votes cast by voters but also on electoral rules laid down in the electoral law.

In type, the Law on the Election of Members of the House of Counties in Croatia establishes *proportional elections*. In proportional elections in *large* constituencies, it is a *rule of decision-making* that seats are distributed according to the participation of votes won by candidates or a party, which allows the proportional *representation* of political parties in a parliament. Under such conditions the rule of decision-making leads to the *representational goal of proportional elections*. The aim of proportional elections is the faithful representation of the social forces and political groups that exist in a society. Participation in votes and participation in seats should coincide as far as possible. This is the main function of the principle of representation and the scale for evaluating the proportional electoral system.

In proportional elections in *small* constituencies (like the ones that existed in Croatia for the election of members of the House of Counties) with three seats, decision-making through proportion leads to the representational goal of plurality elections. In small constituencies there are great differences between participation in votes and participation in seats, to the detriment of small parties. Proportionality is incomplete because it involves only a few seats (in our case only three). Large parties are privileged to the disadvantage of small parties.

This makes the *division into constituencies, i.e. the size of constituency*, the most important element of the electoral system, determining the electoral chances of political parties and influencing election results the most directly.

Constituencies should be *equal* to ensure equal weight to the votes of all voters and thus uphold the *principle of equality*. It is a democratic principle that each vote must have the same numerical value.

As has already been said, Croatia was territorially divided into twenty counties and the City of Zagreb, one constituency corresponding to one county. However, the counties *are not* equal either in territory or in number of inhabitants. There is a great difference in number of voters between the largest and the smallest county. In the 1993 elections for the House of Counties the constituency with most voters was the City of Zagreb (the 21st county) with 715,772 registered voters, and the smallest the Lika-Senj County with 47,761 registered voters, which is a ratio of 1:15. This division seriously *devalues not only the principle of proportional elections as a principle of representation but also the principle of equal electoral rights*. There are great differences in number of voters between the Split-Dalmatian (360,752), Primorje-Gorski Kotar (261,158) and Osijek-Baranja (256,075) Counties on one hand, and the Virovitica-Podravina (70,945), Šibenik (79,954) and Požega-Slavonia (86,946) Counties on the other. In forming the counties constitutional guidelines were borne in mind according to which the area of a county is determined so that it is the expression of historical, traffic and communication as well as economic factors and that it represents a natural self-government whole in the framework of the Republic of Croatia in which citizens can realize common interests, order affairs of the infra-structure relevant for the territory of the county and coordinate views on issues decided on by the bodies of the Republic of Croatia. They were not formed on the basis of number of inhabitants (or voters) in a certain area so that more or less the same number of inhabitants would elect one representative.

The Electoral Law prescribed *plurinominal constituencies with three seats for elections into the House of Counties*, regardless of the number of registered voters or number of citizens. This created the foundation for a significant departure from the principle of equal vote validity. A vote in the smallest constituency, the Lika-Senj County, "weighed" almost fifteen times more than a vote in the most populous constituency - the City of Zagreb. Democratic principles call on every vote to be of equal value. This equality is realized when the same number of people (or voters or, more rarely, valid votes cast) on the whole electoral territory achieve the same number of seats. Equity is realized if the number of members elected in each constituency is proportional to the total number of voters.

The division and size of constituencies in Croatia resulted in *inequality in representation* based on number of voters, giving an advantage to smaller constituencies, i.e. counties with a relatively small number of voters. In the 1993 elections for the House of Counties there was one member of parliament (seat) for every 15,920 registered voters in the Lika-Senj County, and one member of parliament (seat) for every 238,591 registered voters in the City of Zagreb, which was a ratio of 15:1 in favour of the Lika-Senj County. This disproportion has a great effect on representation, and is augmented by the geo-graphical division of constituencies and the distribution of political parties. In small constituencies returning three members, like the ones in Croatia, there is no relative proportion between votes and seats as there is in large

constituencies. This gives an advantage to political parties that dominate in a sufficient number of small and medium constituencies.

Constituency size is a very important element of the electoral system. It does not mean size of territory but number of members of parliament elected in a constituency. Constituency size and the effects of proportionality are directly connected, which means that the effects of proportionality depend on constituency size. Disproportion is the greatest in small constituencies⁶. Research shows that the smaller a constituency, the smaller the effects of electoral proportionality, and thus also the chances of small parties to win seats. Constituencies returning three members, like those in Croatia for the House of Counties elections, are considered small in electoral theory, which considers constituencies with between 2 and 5 representatives small. As we said earlier, the number of representatives elected in a constituency can in certain cases decisively influence the effects of an electoral system.

In the 1993 elections (for the House of Counties) the Croatian Democratic Union fared best in the smallest constituency, the Lika-Senj County, winning 74.69 per cent votes. Electoral disproportion was expressed by the CDU winning an absolute parliamentary plurality of seats, i.e. 58.73 per cent, with 45.49 per cent votes. This again gave it the position of the dominant political party.

The proportional electoral system used in Croatia for the House of Counties elections openly contradicts the principle of equal electoral rights in democratic elections because of unequal representation based on voter distribution. The *political effect* of this type of proportional system is the advantage of the largest political party and the concentration of power in its hands. Secondly, it resulted in a parliamentary plurality based on a relative plurality of votes transformed into an absolute plurality of seats. In spite of election results, the other two political parties, the Croatian Social Liberal Party and the Croatian Peasant Party, do not seriously threaten the CDU. At the present moment the Croatian party system does not allow the alternation of parties in power.

In the House of Counties elections voters had to choose among lists drawn up by political parties. The writers of the electoral law decided on *rigid or closed lists* that do not allow voters to express preferences among candidates on a party list but must vote for the list as a whole. Each voter has only one vote and electoral coalitions on the level of constituency are allowed.

Lists of candidates that won at least 5 per cent votes in a constituency participate in seat distribution. The *prohibitive clause* is contrary to the principle of equitable political representation but stimulates party concentration, i.e. it counters the dispersion of the party system. The corrective character of the 5 per cent prohibitive clause in the House of Counties elections is diminished because the small three-seat constituencies deter smaller parties from winning seats in any case.

The *procedure of transforming votes into seats* is also an important factor influencing election results and the chances of political parties. Along with the division of the country into constituencies, this is considered to be the most

⁶ Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, New Haven, 1971.

important element of an election system. In the House of Counties elections votes were transformed into seats (according to the Election Law) by the *d'Hondt method*. This method of transforming votes into seats is known to favour large parties more than other procedures. The *d'Hondt method* can sometimes give a large party one seat more to the disadvantage of a smaller party. For example, by the *d'Hondt method* the CDU won 2 seats in the Zagreb County and the CPP one seat. However, had the procedure of electoral number (the quota procedure) with the method of the greatest remnant or the method of dividing the remnant been used, the CDU would have got one seat, the CPP one seat and the CSLP one seat.⁷ Transforming votes into seats according to one or the other method shows that the differences in specific cases are minimal and that in individual counties (constituencies) one party can get a maximum of one seat from another party. In the Sisak-Moslavina County the CDU got two seats and the CSLP one, regardless of whether the *d'Hondt* or the Hare method is used. In this case the effect is the same. The advantage of the *d'Hondt method* is its simplicity.

The 1993 elections for the House of Counties showed *bias*. All the parties needed more votes to win one seat than the CDU. The CDU "paid" less votes for one seat than any other party (except in the Istria County, where the IDP was privileged in the same way). The "price" of a seat in number of votes for parties that participated in the division of seats was as follows: IDP = 25,424 votes for one seat; CDU = 27,388 votes for one seat; CSLP = 34,585 votes for one seat; CPP = 51,790 votes for one seat. These results show that bias was on the side of the CDU (in Istria the IDP) to the disadvantage of the CSLP and especially the CPP which, as the "third" party, had to "pay" the highest "price" in votes per seat. Although bias appears in only some electoral systems, mostly in plurality and very rarely in proportional elections (and the elections for the House of Counties are proportional), in this case bias resulted from: 1. small constituencies (returning three members), 2. *d'Hondt's method* of transforming votes into seats, 3. the participation of third and fourth parties in some constituencies, 4. gerrymandering.⁸ In this case gerrymandering primarily resulted from the fact that the constituencies were counties in which three representatives were elected regardless of the number of voters registered. This also resulted in the fact that the political representation of some social groups or parties in some counties-constituencies was increased, and in others limited. In any case, the political effect of the proportional electoral system with three seats is biased in favour of one party, which results from special conditions in the electoral system.

Results of elections for the House of Counties

Elections for the House of Counties of the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia (and those held on the same day for county assemblies, city and municipal councils), held on 7 February 1993, ended the constitution of the new bodies

⁷ The Hare method with the addition of the remnant using the principle of greatest remnant would have given the CDU 33 mandates instead of the 37 it got using the *d'Hondt method*; the CSLP would have got 20 seats instead of 18, the CPP 7 instead of 5, and the IDP 2 instead of the 3 it got.

⁸ Gerrymandering is a politically biased division into constituencies.

of independent Croatia prescribed by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. A bicameral parliamentary structure was fully formed when the House of Counties was constituted.

The Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia reported on the final official election results: a total of 3,580,396 voters were registered in the electoral rolls, 2,303,782 or 64.34 per cent voted. This is 11.27 per cent smaller voter participation than in the elections held in August 1992 for the House of Representatives (the first chamber of the Croatian parliament), which had been 75.61 per cent. It is important to emphasize that voter participation on the county level varied from 31 per cent to 81 per cent. It was relatively low, only 31 per cent, in the Zadar-Knin County, 51 per cent in the Sisak-Moslavina County and 55 per cent in the Osijek-Baranja County. Voter participation was highest in the Virovitica-Podravina County (81 per cent), the Bjelovar-Bilogora County (80 per cent) and the Zagreb County (78 per cent). In the City of Zagreb (which has the status of twenty-first county), the largest urban centre of the Republic of Croatia, voter participation was 68 per cent (see table in the supplement).

The pronounced decrease of voter participation, 11.27 per cent in comparison with the August 1992 elections, is no cause for concern considering the circumstances in which the elections were held: a state of neither war nor complete peace, Croatia's political and constitutional-legal system not yet functioning on the whole area of the republic because of the cruel and brutal Greater-Serbian aggression and many of the displaced still not living in their homes. The reasons for electoral abstinence can only be guessed at because there has been no reliable research on the subject. Several factors seem to have primarily contributed, one was the uninteresting electoral campaign in which only some parties participated and others did not take an active part because they could not cover the costs. Voters also stayed at home on election day because they believed that the opposition was weak and divided and because they believed that politicians make promises they do not hold. Voters are much more than marginally interested in elections and politics, but they expressed their dissatisfaction by abstaining because of the bad economic and social situation, dissatisfaction with the way in which privatization was being managed and with the degree of democracy in the media. Citizens of the Republic of Croatia who temporarily work abroad did not vote in the February 1993 elections because one of the conditions for voting was place of residence, and the electoral rolls had not yet been completely updated. In the August 1992 elections they voted only for representatives on state lists, but they could not vote in the small constituencies in which the second group of representatives was elected. However, their response in the summer of 1992 was not especially great.

Of the twenty-six political parties that put forward county lists for the election of representatives into the House of Counties (see list of parties at the end of this article) and the six independent candidates (so-called independent county lists), at the end of the electoral process *only six political parties* entered the second parliamentary chamber, i.e. the 63 members elected belong to six parties.

The strongest and the ruling political party, the *Croatian Democratic Union* (CDU), won a convincing victory getting 37 seats (45.49 per cent votes) of

the total of 63 members elected into the House of Counties. The CDU ensured not only a plurality in the House of Representatives (85 of the total number of 138 members), but also a plurality in the House of Counties (37 of 63 elected members).

The second party, the *Croatian Social Liberal Party* (CSLP), won 18 seats or 27.94 per cent votes alone or in coalition. However, on the basis of coalition agreements the Croatian National Party got one of these seats and the Party of Democratic Change another, so the CSLP ended up with 16 seats. The third was the *Croatian Peasant Party* (CPP) with 5 seats or 11.61 per cent votes; then followed the *Istrian Democratic Parliament* (IDP) with three seats or 3.42 per cent votes, the *Socialist Party of Croatia - Party of Democratic Change* (PDC) with one seat (in coalition with the CSLP in the Brod-Posavina County) and the *Croatian National Party* (CNP) with one seat (in coalition with the CSLP in the Medimurje County). From the aspect of voter support the strength of the other political parties is almost negligible (9.18 per cent).

The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia lays down that five more members will enter the House of Counties when it is constituted, nominated by the President of the Republic from among "citizens especially meritorious for the Republic", probably according to the criterion of prominence, professionalism and esteem. When his term in office ends, if he so wishes, the President of the Republic becomes a member of the House of Counties for life (Article 71 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia). This means that the second chamber of the Croatian parliament (House of Counties) today has a total of 68 members with full rights and obligations. In Article 59 of the Italian Constitution⁹ the President of the Republic can similarly name up to five citizens as senators for life in the Senate, the second chamber of the Italian parliament, from among persons who are the most meritorious for contributions to their country in the social, scholarly, artistic and literary fields.

A comparison of election results for the House of Counties held in February 1993 with election results for the House of Representatives held in August 1992 shows that the CDU won 1,176,000 votes in the August elections and 1,013,356 votes in the February 1993 elections, which means that it won 162,635 votes less in February 1993. However, because of decreased voter participation it managed not only to keep the percentage of votes that its state list won for the House of Representatives in August 1992 (43.72 per cent), it even won 1.77 per cent votes more (45.49 per cent). With a relative plurality of votes (45.49 per cent) the CDU ensured an absolute plurality of seats (58.73 per cent or 37 of the total of 63 seats). The absolute plurality of CDU seats is not the result of an absolute plurality of votes but of the electoral system, or to be more precise, its disproportional effect (that is why it is called a manufactured plurality, as opposed to an earned plurality).

The *Croatian Social Liberal Party* (CSLP) and the *Croatian Peasant Party* (CPP) came to expression in elections for the House of Counties. Both of their election results were above what had been expected. Voter participation for the liberals grew from 17.33 per cent in 1992 to 27.94 per cent in February

⁹ *Costituzione Della Repubblica Italiana*, p. 11, Art. 59.

1993, which convincingly made them the second party in strength and the strongest opposition party on the Croatian political scene.

The greatest jump, however, was made by the *Croatian Peasant Party* (CPP), which came sixth in the August elections with 4.16 per cent votes to reach third place in February 1993 with 11.62 per cent votes. This means that it more than doubled its August electoral results, which makes it the real victor of the House of Counties elections. It is important to emphasize that the CPP did not enter any of the coalitions that had been offered it by other opposition parties, conscious not only that its strength was growing but also that it was gaining increased respect among voters.

The influence of *regional parties* grew somewhat but it is not high on the national level, especially if we bear in mind that their strength is at present limited to Istria. In the Istrian County the *Istrian Democratic Parliament* (IDP) won all the three seats i.e. 66.42 per cent votes on the level of that county.

The increase in the number of CSLP and CPP votes expresses changes in type of voter support and party ties, which led to political re-grouping in the electorate. Instead of the former dispersion of votes among a large number of parties, the House of Counties elections showed a concentration of votes to in most cases three party lists, especially in some counties. Psychology played its part in the elimination of smaller parties, because voters estimated that votes given to the fourth or some other weaker party that has no real chance of winning are in fact lost, so they rationally decided to vote for one of the large parties. This conscious voting for a candidate or party that is not the voter's first preference is called strategic, sophisticated or even insincere voting which, however, might be the best rational strategy to avoid the worst possible results.¹⁰

An analysis of results by county (constituency) shows that the *Croatian Democratic Union* (CDU) list won most convincingly in the Lika-Senj County, winning all three seats or 74.69 per cent votes. The Croatian Democratic Union won two seats in fifteen counties. It is interesting to note that it won two seats in the Littoral-Gorski Kotar County, in which there were as many as nine party lists, although it was supported by only 35.40 per cent voters. In the remaining four counties the CDU won one seat: in the Varaždin County (39.29 per cent votes), the Koprivnica-Križevci County (39.56 per cent), the Bjelovar-Bilogora County (44.06 per cent) and the Međimurje County (33.07 per cent). In comparison with the 1992 elections, CDU support grew somewhat in the Dubrovnik-Neretva County (46.02 per cent votes), and greatly in the Vukovar-Srijem County (62.54 per cent, although voters with the status of displaced persons voted in places where their concentration was greatest, and in Zagreb) and in the Zadar County, where CDU support reached 61.62 per cent, which is 1.3 per cent more than in the August 1992 elections. The Maslenica operation probably influenced the electorate's support for the CDU most directly. In the Šibenik County the CDU returned the support it had enjoyed at the first multiparty elections but had lost in the August 1992 elections because of voter dissatisfaction with conditions on the front and the occupation of parts of their

¹⁰ Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats and Votes, The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989, p. 12

territory. CDU support also grew slightly in the Zagreb County and in the County of the City of Zagreb because of a decrease of left-wing influence. The CDU lost votes to the Croatian Peasant Party in regions that had from the first multiparty elections until the August 1992 elections been CDU strongholds. In the Krapina-Zagorje County the CDU won a high 64.7 per cent votes in the summer 1992 elections, and in the 1993 elections it won only 58.53 per cent votes. The same happened in the Koprivnica-Križevci (39.56 per cent) and the Virovitica-Podravina (49.35 per cent) Counties. In the Varaždin (39.29 per cent) and the Međimurje (33.07 per cent) Counties the Croatian Democratic Union had poor results both in the first and the August elections, and in 1993 CDU support continued to decline, whereas Croatian Peasant Party support increased.

The *Croatian Social Liberal Party* (CSLP) won one seat in sixteen counties. In the Međimurje County it was in coalition with the Croatian National Party (CNP) and they won two seats, each party getting one. The CSLP increased its percentage of votes in all the counties except the Istrian County. In the counties in which the CSLP won seats, its percentage of votes varied from 21.87 per cent in the Krapina-Zagorje County (coalition CSLP/CNP/PDC) to 42.17 per cent in the Međimurje County (coalition CSLP/CNP). In the August 1992 elections this percentage had been rather low - as a rule under 20 per cent. The liberals got significant support in some rural areas, and their support also grew in the larger towns. In the County of the City of Zagreb they won 35.41 per cent, in the Ibenik County 30.14 per cent, in the Split-Dalmatian County 28.55 per cent, in the Sisak-Moslavina County 30.05 per cent, etc.

The Croatian Democratic Union fared worst, winning only 16.35 per cent votes, in the Istrian County, which is a region of special interests and has its own tradition. But the result was, nevertheless, higher than it had been in August 1992 (in three constituencies the CDU had won 9.8 per cent, 14.8 per cent and 13.1 per cent votes). The Croatian Social Liberal Party won 10.15 per cent votes in the Istrian County and the Croatian Peasant Party fell far behind with only 1.22 per cent votes. In Istria the Istrian Democratic Parliament (IDP) won convincingly due to mass political voter mobilization, winning 66.42 per cent votes and all three seats. The IDP victory established the superiority of one political party leaving a very limited field for the work of other political parties. Dalmatian regionalists, unlike Istrian ones, were very far from winning a parliamentary seat.

In counties in which it won a seat (Zagreb 29.51 per cent, Varaždin 25.14 per cent, Koprivnica-Križevci 31.64 per cent, Bjelovar-Bilogora 26.56 per cent and Virovitica-Podravina 27.59 per cent), the *Croatian Peasant Party* (CPP) won the support of over a quarter of the electorate and became serious competition for the CDU in rural areas in which a large number of the voters had convincingly supported the ruling party in previous elections. The Croatian Peasant Party, however, did not win a single seat in the Krapina-Zagorje County, although it won 19.61 per cent votes. By forming a common county list three political parties, the CSLP/CNP/PDC, decreased voting dispersion and together won 21.87 per cent votes and one seat, which went to the CSLP.

The Croatian Democratic Union lost part of its potential voters to the CPP, whose parliamentary position strengthened after these elections and which became as an important political factor on the Croatian political scene. It is

not certain who the members and sympathizers of the Croatian Party of Rights voted for at these elections, because that party did not form its own list for the House of Counties. The ruling party derived certain "benefits" from the disunity and factions in the Christian Democratic opposition and it is supposed that some CDU votes came from those parties. CDU voter loss in some counties is believed to have gone to the CPP and CSLP, while some of the sympathizers of opposition parties, the CNP, CPR and PCD, also voted for the CSLP and CPP at these elections.

At the August 1992 elections the Croatian Democratic Party and the Croatian Christian Democratic Party together won 4.2 per cent votes, at the February elections the CCDP won only 1.2 per cent votes. At the county elections all the opposition Christian Democrats together won about 44,000 votes, which is three times less than in August. Some of the voters who had previously supported those two political parties doubtlessly now switched to the Croatian Democratic Union, which is also a party of Christian Democratic orientation.

The *Croatian Peasant Party* (CPP), which is the real victor of these elections, was presented as a recognizable party through the social strata and the partial social interests it represents. But it is still in a process of organization. Although it won most votes in rural areas, it is important that it came third in votes won in the City of Zagreb (10.30 per cent). This shows that, although it has the identity of a peasant party, farmers, agricultural workers and peasants are not its only voters. It is also a party of owners, small landowners, craftsmen, entrepreneurs and all who were up to now marginalized on the political scene. It also aims to attract the support of workers, office employees and the intelligentsia. The Croatian Peasant Party was built slowly as an independent political subject, but very successfully, greatly helped by its organization in the field and especially by the renewal of the Economic Concord, Peasant Concord, Agrarian-Crafts Bank, Savings-Credit Association and many other activities. By favouring multiparty parliamentary democracy, tolerance, dialogue and respect for the opinions of others, this party gained great respect and voter support. In the spectrum of political parties on the Croatian political scene the Croatian Peasant Party is a party of the centre.¹¹

The *Croatian Social Liberal Party* (CSLP) is also a party of the centre, although it has options of the "left and right centre". What differentiates the CSLP from the CPP, and will probably go on differentiating them in the future, are the social strata and partial social interests they represent, not their programmes. Both parties have similar political programmes and views. The Croatian Social Liberal Party is not a social-democratic party either in programme or in membership. It is increasingly becoming a party supported and voted for by younger, educated, predominantly urban, middle social strata, although rural areas also supported it in these elections.

The *Croatian Democratic Union* is the largest, best organized, territorially most widespread and richest political party with strong social and political connections in the electorate, from the intelligentsia and urban dwellers to

¹¹ Interview with Drago Stipac, Napokon smo prepoznatljivi (Finally we are recognizable), *Danas*, 9 April 1993, no. 14, Zagreb, p. 20

peasants and workers both in Croatia and abroad (so-called emigrated Croatia). However, it is to be expected that the Croatian Democratic Union, which successfully developed as a Croatian national, democratic, state-building, mass, non-violent, anti-Communist movement, will be transformed into a modern political party of Christian Democratic orientation. The Croatian Democratic Union played an essential role in over-throwing the totalitarian regime, in pursuing an uncompromising policy of emergence from Yugoslavia, in the struggle for the creation of an independent state and in efforts for international recognition and the acceptance of the Republic of Croatia in the United Nations, which certainly played an essential role in the political will of most of the Croatian electorate to support it and ensure its victory in the first, second and third elections. All the political parties that emerged at that historic moment were unanimous in their desire to create an independent Croatian state. And that desire to create a national state, which was born in war and in resistance to the brutal and cruel Greater Serbian aggression, demanded national unity. However, today, when that state has been created and internationally recognized, although not yet liberated, rational voter interests are coming to expression more and more. This was shown in the 1993 elections. Although still the leading and dominant force, the Croatian Democratic Union is no longer the only party with political power. The Croatian Social Liberal Party and the Croatian Peasant Party have after these elections been affirmed as political parties with a clearly defined party position and political strength, and they will have a decisive influence on the course of future policy, the advancement of democratic political life and the creation of a modern Croatia. In one word, the results of the 1993 elections for the House of Counties of the Sabor showed a tendency of profilation in the party system in which there will be room for four to five political parties.

In these elections, too, the electoral decline of Croatia's democratic left continued. Election results show that the electorate does not want an ultra-right Croatia nor an ideology of extreme nationalism. However, political grouping in Croatia should tend towards the European multiparty liberal-democratic model with room for a democratic left centered around a socialdemocratic orientation and similar to the modern left in countries of northern and western Europe. Marginalized and disunited, in Croatia the left has one single alternative for survival. The programatically identical left political parties, who all share the same basic principles and have a common social foundation, should unify with the purpose of creating a strong political organization of socialdemocratic orientation. Similar unification should take place between Christian Democrats and parties that support the rightist Party-of-Rights political option. If these related political parties do not unite, some of them may disappear after the House of Counties elections.

Croatian political parties developed at the historic moment when the old regime was overthrown, i.e. during the fall of communism on one hand and the disintegration of Yugoslavia and a struggle for Croatian independence on the other. Typical for the birth and development of Croatian political parties is that they were not the expression of a developed social structure in a civil society composed of a great number of different social groups and strata dominated by private ownership, the market economy and the functioning of a state governed by the rule of law. Therefore, it is still not clear which social

strata political parties in Croatia represent. The elections showed that political polarization does not coincide with the basic social polarization in Croatia, i.e. that political parties (except the CPP) are not yet rooted in the Croatian social structure. Thus, for example, the Croatian Democratic Union, as a party of the centre and of a Christian orientation, has strong social and political connections in the electorate from the intelligentsia and the urban population to the peasants and workers, in one word, socially and economically diverse social strata tend to cohere around it. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that there is no institutionalized connection among individual political parties and trade unions in spite of the fact that there are several trade-union centres in Croatia. These links do not exist because parties do not yet have a sufficiently recognizable social basis and it seems that at this moment trade unions cannot yet see which political party they could cooperate with. However, with the creation of a modern society, a state governed by the rule of law, private ownership and the market economy, political forces will regroup and parties will be formed on the Croatian political scene based on the West-European model.

The Role of the House of Counties of the Sabor

Although the Croatian Sabor is *bicameral*, this is not classical bicamerality in which the chambers are equal. Differences between the House of Representatives and the House of Counties result from the *competence* of the chambers and their *method of election*. The House of Counties has special constitutional competence not enjoyed by the House of Representatives, and vice versa. The House of Counties *does not have the right of decision-making and passing laws*, but is a kind of *supervising (control) parliamentary body*. As such it plays an important role in parliamentary functioning, although it is the House of Representatives that decides on all issues in the competence of the Sabor. Articles 81, 121 and 122 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia show that several groups of affairs are in the competence of the House of Counties. First, the House of Counties has the *right to propose laws* to the House of Representatives and *call a referendum* (initiative function, Article 81 of the Constitution). Second, it has the right to *discuss* and *may give opinions* on questions falling within the competence of the House of Representatives. It *may but need not* discuss any law, elections and appointments. The opinion of House of Counties members is *not binding* although the House of Representatives must hear it. The House of Counties *must give* the House of Representatives *prior opinion* in the procedure of passing (or amending) the Constitution and laws that regulate national rights, elaborate constitutionally determined freedoms and the rights of man and the citizen, the electoral system, the organization, responsibilities and operation of government bodies and the organization of local self-government and administration (Article 81). However, the most important *right* of the House of Counties (legally and politically) is the *right of suspensive veto of all the laws* passed by the House of Representatives. The House of Counties may, within a period of 15 days from the date when a law is passed in the House of Representatives, with a substantial opinion return the law for fresh consideration. In other words, it returns laws *for fresh consideration* to the House of Representatives. In that case the House of Representatives *must* vote

on such a law again but this time with a *plurality of all the members* in the House of Representatives, unless it is a law passed by a two-thirds plurality. It is important to stress that laws (except organic laws) are passed by a plurality of all the members present, on condition that at least one half of the total number of members of the House of Representatives is present at the session¹².

Three very important *rights* connected to the activities and formation of the judiciary are also in the field of competence of the House of Counties. It *proposes* to the House of Representatives the 11 judges of the Constitutional Court (Article 122), which means that the House of Representatives *cannot* chose as Constitutional Court Judge any person that was *not proposed* by the House of Counties. Furthermore, the House of Counties *proposes* and the House of Representatives elects the president and members of the High Judiciary Council of the Republic. In conformity with the Constitution (Article 121), the High Judiciary Council appoints and relieves judges and public prosecutors and decides on questions concerning their disciplinary responsibilities.

Although it is not the decision-making chamber, the House of Counties is a body in which representatives of the counties can express and form (because of its election foundation) the *regional interests of voters and the specific features* of the counties concerning all questions decided on in the House of Representatives of the Sabor. As in other bicameral parliaments, the House of Representatives slows down the legislative procedure and through methods of control ensures and influences the quality of the laws passed.

¹² Today the majority of all the representatives in the House of Representatives is 70, since the chamber has 138 representatives, whereas the smaller majority quorum is 36 representatives. For laws that concern questions the Constitution demands a two-thirds majority. Suspensive veto could occur only if a 2/3 majority of representatives weighed some law differently.

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
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The twenty-six political parties that put forward county lists for the election of representatives into the House of Counties of the Sabor:

1. Croatian Democratic Union - CDU
2. Croatian Social Liberal Party - CSLP
3. Croatian Peasant Party - CPP
4. Croatian Party of Natural Law - CPNL
5. Social Democratic Party of Croatia-Party of Democratic Change - SDP
6. Social Democratic Union of Croatia - SDU
7. Croatian People's Party - CPP
8. Croatian Christian Democratic Union - CCDU
9. Croatian Christian Democratic Party - CCDP
10. Democratic Alliance of Rijeka
11. Istrian Democratic Assembly - IDA
12. Serbian People's Party - SPP
13. Socialist Party of Croatia - SPC
14. Party of Democratic Action
15. Party of Middle European Action
16. Croatian Democratic Party - CDP
17. Christian People's Party - CPP
18. Dalmatian Action - DA
19. Croatian Republican Union - CRU
20. Croatian Party - CP
21. Istrian Liberal Party - ILP
22. Istrian People's Party - IPP
23. Istrian Independent Party
24. Social Democratic Party of Croatia - SDPC
25. Homelandly Civil Party - HCP
26. Croatian Democratic Party of Rights



COUNTIES ON THE TERRITORY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

- | | |
|--------|------------------------|
| I. | ZAGREBAČKA |
| II. | KRAPINSKO-ZAGORSKA |
| III. | SISAČKO-MOSLAVAČKA |
| IV. | KARLOVAČKA |
| V. | VARAŽDINSKA |
| VI. | KOPRIVNIČKO-KRIŽEVAČKA |
| VII. | BIELOVARSKO-BILOGORSKA |
| VIII. | PRIMORSKO-GORANSKA |
| IX. | LIČKO-SENJSKA |
| X. | VIROVITIČKO-PODRAVSKA |
| XI. | POŽEŠKO-SLAVONSKA |
| XII. | BRODSKO-POSAVSKA |
| XIII. | ZADARSKO-KNINSKA |
| XIV. | OSIJEČKO-BARANJSKA |
| XV. | ŠIBENSKA |
| XVI. | VUKOVARSKO-SRIJEMSKA |
| XVII. | SPLITSKO-DALMATINSKA |
| XVIII. | ISTARSKA |
| XIX. | DUBROVAČKO-NGRETVANSKA |
| XX. | MEDIMURSKA |
| XXI. | GRAD ZAGREB |

Table 1. ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE CHAMBER OF COUNTIES OF THE SABOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Constituency (county)	Total number of votes in the electoral register	Voters turnout	Percent of votes (%)	Non-valid ballots	Percentage of non-valid ballots (%)
I. Zagrebačka	129.913	101.758	78	3.469	3.41
II. Krapinsko-Zagorska	116.256	80.525	69	2.977	3.70
III. Sisačko-Moslavačka	205.189	104.405	51	3.422	3.28
IV. Karlovačka	130.210	72.749	56	2.313	3.18
V. Varaždinska	144.529	102.917	71	3.623	3.52
VI. Koprivničko-Križevačka	100.425	74.063	74	2.474	3.34
VII. Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska	99.828	80.057	80	3.171	3.96
VIII. Primorsko-Goranska	261.158	174.335	67	5.596	3.21
IX. Ličko-Senjska	47.761	31.302	66	1.124	3.59
X. Virovitičko-Podravska	70.945	57.283	81	2.642	4.61
XI. Požeško-Slavonska	86.946	66.131	76	2.102	3.18
XII. Brodsko-Posavska	120.804	83.876	69	3.322	3.96
XIII. Zadarsko-Kninska	197.369	61.716	31	1.912	3.10
XIV. Osječko-Baranjska	256.075	140.604	55	4.613	3.28
XV. Šibenska	79.954	47.082	59	1.970	4.18
XVI. Vukovarsko-Srijemska	110.743	67.021	61	2.129	3.18
XVII. Splitsko-Dalmatinska	360.752	225.806	63	8.294	3.67
XVIII. Istarska	159.502	118.823	74	3.980	3.35
XIX. Dubrovačko-Neretvanska	96.387	64.423	67	2.307	3.58
XX. Međimurska	89.878	64.590	72	2.321	3.59
XXI. Grad Zagreb	715.772	484.316	68	12.258	2.53

Table 2. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY ZAGREBAČKA

Party	votes (%)	mandates (%)	mandates
CDU	48.1	66.66	2
CPP	29.51	33.33	1
CSLP	19.02	0	0
SDP	2.21	0	0
SDU	0.78	0	0
CPNL	0.37	0	0

Table 3. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY KRAPINSKO-ZAGORSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandates (%)	mandates
CDU	58.5	66.66	2
CSLP/CPsP/SDP	21.87	33.33	1
CPP	19.61	0	0

Table 4. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY SISAČKO-MOSLAVAČKA

Party	votes (%)	mandates (%)	mandates
CDU	55.34	66.66	2
CSLP	30.05	33.33	1
CPP	13.28	0	0
CPNL	1.34	0	0

Table 5. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY KARLOVAČKA

Party	votes (%)	mandates (%)	mandates
CDU	60.43	66.66	2
CSLP/CP'sP	27.54	33.33	1
CPP	6.7	0	0
SDU	5.33	0	0

Table 6. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY VARAŽDINSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	39.29	33.33	1
CSLP/CP'sP/SDP/HKDU	33.5	33.33	1
CPP	26.1	33.33	1
CPNL	1.09	0	0

Table 7. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY KOPRIVNIČKO-KRIŽEVAČKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	39.56	33.33	1
CPP	31.6	33.33	1
CSLP/CP'sP/SDP	26.51	33.33	1
CCDP	2.28	0	0

Table 8. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY BJELOVARSKO-BILOGORSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	44.06	33.33	1
CPP	26.56	33.33	1
CSLP	26.25	33.33	1
CCDP	3.13	0	0

Table 9. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY PRIMORSKO-GORANSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	35.4	66.66	2
CSLP	29.16	33.33	1
IDA/RDA	13.51	0	0
SDP	12.27	0	0
CP'sP	2.39	0	0
CPP	2.35	0	0
CCDP	2.29	0	0

Table 10. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY LIČKO-SENJSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	74.69	100	3
CSLP	18.84	0	0
CPP	6.46	0	0

Table 11. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY VIROVITIČKO-PODRAVSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	49.35	66.66	2
CPP	27.59	33.33	1
CSLP	23.06	0	0

Table 12. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY POŽEŠKO-SLAVONSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	54.5	66.66	2
CSLP	24.55	33.33	1
CPP	8.6	0	0
CCDP	6.54	0	0
CP'sP	3.5	0	0
SPS	2.28	0	0

Table 13. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY BRODSKO-POSAVSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	50.72	66.66	2
CSLP/SDP	26.6	33.33	1
independents	10.36	0	0
CPP	8.65	0	0
CCDP/CP'sP	3.59	0	0

Table 14. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY ZADARSKO-KNINSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	61.62	66.66	2
CSLP	23.49	33.33	1
CP'sP	7.61	0	0
SDP/ CPP	3.06	0	0
independents	2.41	0	0
CCDU	1.38	0	0
PDA	0.48	0	0

Table 15. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY OSJEČKO-BARANJSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	51.4	66.66	2
CSLP	35.41	33.33	1
CPP	5.7	0	0
CP'sP	3.33	0	0
SPS	2.12	0	0
CCDU	1.53	0	0
SEA	0.51	0	0

Table 16. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY ŠIBENSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	52.6	66.66	2
CSLP	30.14	33.33	1
CP'sP/SDP	10.33	0	0
CPP	3.8	0	0
CCDP/CDP/ChPP	3.13	0	0

Table 17. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY VUKOVARSKO-SRIJEMSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	62.54	66.66	2
CSLP	25.45	33.33	1
CPP	10.05	0	0
SDP	1.96	0	0

Table 18. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY SPLITSKO-DALMATINSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	44.16	66.66	2
CSLP	28.5	33.33	1
DA	10.19	0	0
SDP/SPC	7.58	0	0
CPP	6.24	0	0
CCDU/CRU/ChPP	1.94	0	0
CP	0.65	0	0
CPNL	0.51	0	0

Table 19. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY ISTARSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
IDA	66.42	100	3
CDU	16.35	0	0
CSLP	11.15	0	0
ILP	2.0	0	0
SDP/SPC/SDC	1.91	0	0
ChPP	1.47	0	0
CPP	1.22	0	0
CPNL	0.48	0	0

Table 20. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY DUBROVAČKO-
NERETVANSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	46.02	66.66	2
CSLP	25.62	33.33	1
SDP	6.77	0	0
DA	6.65	0	0
CPP	5.74	0	0
CCDU/CCDP/CDP	5.65	0	0
independents	3.5	0	0

Table 21. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY MEĐIMURSKA

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CSLP/CP'sP	42.17	66.66	2
CDU	33.07	33.33	1
CPP	17.01	0	0
ChPP	4.61	0	0
CCDU	3.14	0	0

Table 22. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUNTY GRAD ZAGREB

Party	votes (%)	mandat (%)	mandates
CDU	42.57	66.66	2
CSLP	32.16	33.33	1
CPP	10.03	0	0
SDP	2.88	0	0
CCDU	2.61	0	0
SDU	2.32	0	0
SPP	1.56	0	0
independents (1)	1.54	0	0
CDPR	1.48	0	0
DGS	0.66	0	0
CPNL	0.54	0	0
PDA	0.42	0	0
independents (2)	0.38	0	0

Figure 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CDU AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES IN COUNTIES





Figure 2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOTES AND MANDATES ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL



mandates won in alliance with CSLP)