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DVA DOKUMENTA PROMATRAČKE MISIJE EUROPSKE ZAJEDNICE IZ VREMENA DOMOVINSKOG RATA U ZAPADNOJ SLAVONIJI

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Autor donosi dva dokumenta čiji su autori pripadnici Promatračke misije Europske zajednice, odnosno posebne promatračko-izvještajne agencije Europske zajednice, koja je u Hrvatskoj djelovala od rujna 1991. Prvi priloženi dokument donosi analizu humanitarne situacije u dijelu nekadašnje zaštićene zone Ujedinjenih naroda Zapad u prva tri tjedna svibnja 1995. Dokument je na temelju izvještaja s terena (izjave sudionika) načinio voditelj Regionalnog centra Zagreb. Drugi priloženi dokument bavi se položajem preostalog srpskog stanovništva u mjestima Japaga, Kraguj i Šeovića (pakračka okolica). Uz oba dokumenta priloženo je kraće objašnjenje okolnosti u kojima su nastali, odnosno upozoreno je na najvažnije dijelove.

Ključne riječi: zapadna Slavonija, Domovinski rat, Bljesak, Promatračka misija Europske zajednice, 1995.

Autorstvo oba priložena dokumenta pripada jednoj od organizacija međunarodne zajednice koja je posredovala u potrazi za rješenjem sukoba u Hrvatskoj. Riječ je o posebnoj promatračko-izvještajnoj organizaciji koju je utemeljila Europska zajednica (EZ) u srpnju 1991., odnosno Promatračkoj misiji Europske zajednice (PMEZ). No, tek od početka rujna iste godine može se govoriti o stvarnom djelovanju PMEZ-a u Hrvatskoj. Do kraja svibnja 1995. PMEZ se uspio afirmirati u važnog čimbenika prisutnosti EZ-a u ratnoj Hrvatskoj. Zadatci PMEZ-a mogli bi se najkraće opisati kao kombinacija promatranja i izvještavanja o tome, uz dodatak nekih ovlasti nadzornog tipa. Nakon razmjestaja mirovnih snaga UN-a promatrči EZ-a preuzeli su i neke zadatke humanitarnog karaktera. Sjedište misije za sve države nastale raspadom bivše

Jugoslavije bilo je u Zagrebu. Najveći dio Hrvatske ulazio je u sastav Regionalnog centra (RC) Zagreb (zaštićene zone UN-a Sjever, Zapad i Istok s pripadajućim ružičastim zonama). Ključno je uočiti izvještavanje: promatrački izvještaji slani su na čitav niz adresa, uključujući vrh EZ-a i vlade zemalja članica. U tom smislu, oni su služili kao važan izvor informiranja EZ-a, ali i kao važan čimbenik utjecaja na formiranje politike EZ-a u odnosu na Hrvatsku.¹

Izvještaj koji je načinio voditelj RC-a Zagreb donosi svojevrsnu sintezu događanja nakon početka vojne operacije *Bljesak*, odnosno nakon 1. svibnja 1995. Treba uočiti kako je izvještaj načinjen na temelju razgovora sa sudionicima događanja: hrvatskim i srpskim civilima, vojnicima i policajcima te članovima timova PMEZ-a. Naglasak je stavljen na humanitarnu situaciju tijekom razdoblja 1.-22. svibnja 1995., odnosno na problematiku odnosa hrvatskih vlasti prema zarobljenim srpskim civilima i vojnicima. O tome je dosad najrelevantnije pisao Nikica Barić. On je korektno iznio zaključke do kojih su došle različite međunarodne organizacije i hrvatske neovisne udruge, a koji bi se mogli sažeti otprilike ovako: nije bilo sustavnog i planiranog terora nad preostalim srpskim stanovništvom, ali su zabilježeni pojedinačni slučajevi različitih oblika nasilja, odnosno reakcija hrvatskih vlasti na njihovu sprječavanju mogla je biti učinkovitija.² Isti zaključak donosi i autor izvještaja.

Na nekoliko mjesta u izvještaju treba posebno upozoriti. Prema podatcima Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske od 28. svibnja 1995. ukupno je prilikom asanacije netom oslobođenog područja pronađeno 159 leševa.³ Izvještaj, pak, navodi, broj od 188 pronađenih leševa. Nejasnoće oko ukupnog broja žrtava, neovisno o načinu njihova stradanja, nastavit će se i kasnije: u tom smislu niti tablični prikaz koji donosi izvještaj ne pridonosi točnosti. Broj ranjenih Srba čini se prevelik (zar bi ih baš u tolikom broju prepustili hrvatskim vlastima?), a broj ubijenih i nestalih Srba također, što uostalom proturječi i podatku o 188 žrtava koji se donosi u samom izvještaju. Voditelj regionalnog ureda PMEZ-a i sam je konstatirao kako će spomenute nejasnoće predstavljati plodno tlo za širenje glasina i međusobnog optuživanja.

Već je navedeno kako se izvještaj temelji na razgovoru sa svjedocima. Lošu stranu takvog načina prikupljanja podataka ilustrirat ćemo jednim primjerom. U izvještaju se navodi kako su hrvatske antiterorističke jedinice u

¹ Ivica Miškulin, „Sladoled i sunce” – Promatračka misija Europske zajednice i Hrvatska 1991.-1995.“, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest (ČSP)*, Zagreb, 42/2010., br. 2, 299.-337.

² N. BARIĆ, *Srpska pobuna*, 492.-501.

³ Hrvatski državni arhiv (HDA), Zagreb, Ured Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske (UPRH)/Tehnička jedinica (TJ) 307/Strogo povjerljivi spisi (SPS), Republika Hrvatska (RH)/Ministarstvo obrane (MO)/Uprava za zdravstvo, Kl. 035-01/95-164/13, Ur. broj: 512-33-01-95-63, Podaci o poginulim osobama prilikom asanacije terena u zapadnoj Slavoniji od 29. svibnja 1995.

mjestima Čovac, Vrbovljani i Gređani Okučanski zapalile ukupno 76 kuća. Međutim, dostupan je i jedan drugi PMEZ-ov izvještaj o tim događajima. Zaista, 2. i 3. svibnja 1995. spomenute kuće su zapaljene, ali nije bilo moguće utvrditi tko je to učinio. Navedeno je nekoliko mogućih počinitelja: hrvatske postrojbe, lokalno hrvatsko, ali i srpsko civilno stanovništvo u odlasku i vojne postrojbe pobunjenih Srba s ciljem diskreditacije hrvatskih snaga.⁴ U ovdje donesenom izvještaju te dvojbe su nestale pa su hrvatske snage navedene kao počinitelji. Jednako tako, pokazalo se kako izbjegli Srbi nisu najpouzdaniji svjedok. Većina ih je nekritički optuživala hrvatske snage za kršenje ljudskih prava i druge zločine, ali se, primjerice, ustanovilo kako se jedna osoba srpske nacionalnosti, koja je prijavljena kao nestala, nalazi u nekoj bolnici.⁵ Nameće se dojam kako je hrvatska strana mogla znatno organiziranije pristupiti informativnoj obradi ovih događaja, čime bi spomenute sumnje svakako imale manju političku težinu.

Konačno, u izvještaju se vrlo kritički ocjenjuje UN-ov program *Siguran prolaz*, odnosno akcija koja je za cilj imala osigurati siguran odlazak srpskih civila, a koju je uglavnom proveo UNHCR. Može se zaključiti kako je on doprinio bržem odlasku srpskih civila. Kada je sve bilo gotovo, čak je i glasnogovornica mirovnih snaga u zapadnom sektoru priznala pogrešku. Odgovornost je prebacila na UNHCR čiji su djelatnici svemu pristupili s neobjašnjivom žurbom, ali je dodala i kako je organiziranje konvoja bilo motivirano „prijetnjama iz Knina da će u suprotnom bombardirati Zagreb. Složila se je da se sve odigralo brzo i da su ljudi stoga otišli i prije nego što su imali mogućnost da vide u kojem pravcu će krenuti smirivanje situacije“.⁶ Zaista, UN je demonstrirao zadivljujući stupanj brige za sigurnost srpskih civila koje se nastojalo zaštititi na način da ih se praktički požurivalo na odlazak. Koliko je takvo djelovanje bilo promašeno svjedoči jedan podatak iz sredine kolovoza 1995.: posredstvom Crvenog križa u nekadašnji zapadni sektor već se povratile 10 obitelji izbjeglih Srba, a više od tisuću ljudi je u Bosni i Hercegovini, Srbiji ili istočnom sektoru predalo zahtjeve za povratak.⁷ Dakle, samo tri mjeseca nakon hrvatske vojne operacije, želja srpskog stanovništva za povratkom bila je više negoli prisutna.

⁴ Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata (HMDCDR), Zagreb, Zbirka Karlovac (ZK), ECMM/RC Zagreb, Special Report: Weekly Assessment for 07 to 13 May 1995.

⁵ *Isto*.

⁶ „Misija UN nije uspjela“, *Pakrački List (PL)*, 27. svibnja 1995.

⁷ Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske (MORH), Zagreb, Ured za suradnju s Ujedinjenim narodima i Europskom zajednicom (UUNEZ), Odjel Sektor Zapad (OSZ), Kl. 81/95-02, Ur. broj. 1078-28-95/339, Izvješće iz bivšeg Sektora Zapad od 17. kolovoza 1995.

Drugi priloženi izvještaj načinila su dvojica pripadnika Koordinacijskog centra PMEZ-a Pakrac. Oni su tijekom prve polovice lipnja 1995. boravili ukupno četiri dana u seoskim naseljima Japagi, Kraguju i Šeovici, nedaleko Pakraca. Cilj im je bio prikupiti saznanja o stanju preostalih srpskih civila u tim mjestima, kao i doći do novih spoznaja o događanjima tijekom same operacije *Bljesak*. U tu svrhu intervjuirali su ukupno 40 osoba.

Na nekoliko mjesta u njihovu izvještaju treba posebno upozoriti. Prvo se tiče razmišljanja srpskih civila o odlasku ili ostanku. Početkom lipnja 1995. većina ih je bila sklonija odlasku pri čemu su kao razlozi navođeni: činjenica da je većina otišla već ranije (članovi uže obitelji, rođaci i slično), slabe mogućnosti ekonomskog prosperiteta (strah od diskriminacije po etničkoj osnovi prilikom pokušaja pronalaska zaposlenja) i strah od skorog odlaska međunarodnih organizacija (nakon čega bi bili prepušteni hrvatskim vlastima). Zanimljivije je uočiti ono što nije navedeno, odnosno promatrači nisu naveli niti jedan primjer netrpeljivog postupka hrvatskih vlasti i civila, što upućuje na njihovo korektno ponašanje. Naravno, nije teško pretpostaviti stvarne osjećaje hrvatskih civila o njihovim novim susjedima. Prema izjavama neimenovanih pakračkih Hrvata: „U redu je to da im se [Srbima] pruži humanitarna pomoć, da se ljudi nahrane i obuku, da se djeca zbrinu, ali sam čula da im se i novci daju. [...] Pucali su po nama, pobili nam rodbinu, prijatelje i znance, uništili grad, a sada nam mašu iz autobusa. Mi to ne možemo podnijeti i gledati, u nama kipti. Ogorčen sam situacijom u gradu. [...] ali mi se ne sviđa koliko im se sada pomaže. Bojim se da se ne vrate pa da nam bude kao i prije. [...] Ne znam kako ćemo dalje zajedno živjeti. Pretpostavljam – vrlo teško.“⁸ I promatrači su zaključili kako je inicijativa u rukama hrvatskih vlasti, odnosno o njihovim postupcima ovisi uspješnost rekoncilijacije, pri čemu je također primijećeno kako će sjećanja na događanja iz 1991. predstavljati najveći psihološki problem.

Promatrači su naveli i pozitivne reakcije preostalih srpskih civila na djelovanje hrvatskih policijskih i vojnih vlasti. Izvrsnim potezima ocijenjeno je brzo izdavanje osobnih dokumenata, ali i brz povrat otetih vozila tijekom operacije. Srbi iz Japage, Kraguja i Šeovice bili su zadovoljni i činjenicom da je policija stalno nadzirala ta mjesta, iako je bilo slučajeva noćnih pljački napuštene imovine. Ponašanje HV-a tijekom operacije ocijenili su neočekivano korektnim. Naravno, bilo je prerano da bi nepovjerenje u hrvatske vlasti nestalo, pogotovo ako se ima na umu gotovo četverogodišnja kampanja poistovjećivanja vlasti Republike Hrvatske s ustaškim režimom. U takvoj situaciji, neprovjerene glasine mogle su izazvati paniku. Primjerice, sredinom svibnja 1995. raširena je bila ona prema kojoj će mladi ljudi biti mobilizirani i poslani

⁸ Goran Gazdek, „Zadovoljstvo pomiješano sa zabrinutošću“, *PL*, 16. svibnja 1995.

negdje na liniju bojišta.⁹ Ako se i radilo o uobičajenim mobilizacijskim poslovima, može se zaključiti kako su s time nadležne vojne vlasti mogle pričekati. Promatrači EZ-a uočili su i kako hrvatske vlasti nastoje naplatiti porez za vrijeme trajanja zaštićene zone UN-a. Ocijenjeno je kako to nije bio mudar politički potez.¹⁰ Usprkos svemu navedenome, može se zaključiti kako je tretman zatečenog srpskog stanovništva bio više negoli dobar. Pripadnici UN-CIVPOL-a su u srpnju 1995. potvrdili „da se hrvatska policija ponaša potpuno profesionalno te da radi sve što može da bi uvjerila civile da su sigurni“.¹¹

Konačno, i ovaj promatrački izvještaj dokazuje pogrešku UNHCR-a u provedbi akcije *Siguran prolaz*. U lipnju 1995. UNHCR je, naime, namjerno počeo odugovlačiti s njihovom organizacijom. Nadležni hrvatski časnik za vezu točno je primjetio kako je „ova akcija od strane najodgovornijih [UNHCR] za nju [...] bila loše organizirana i nespretno realizirana“.¹²

⁹ „Polovina izabrala odlazak“, *PL*, 16. svibnja 1995.

¹⁰ HMDCDR, ZK, ECMM/CC Pakrac, Daily Report for 23 June 1995.

¹¹ „Zadovoljstvo radom policije“, *PL*, 27. svibnja 1995.

¹² HDA, UPRH/P/TJ 307, RH/MORH/UUNEZ/OSZ, Kl. 81-95-02, Ur. br. 1077-28-95/249, Izvješće iz Sektora Zapad od 11. svibnja 1995.



1995., 22. svibanj

Zagreb

*Posebni izvještaj voditelja Regionalnog centra Zagreb Promatračke misije Europske zajednice Jan-Uwe Thomsa o humanitarnoj situaciji u zapadnoj Slavoniji*¹³

From: RC Zagreb

To: As per SOPs¹⁴

Document-type: Special Report

Subject: The Humanitarian Situation in West Slavonia

Author: Jan-Uwe Thoms, HRC¹⁵

Date: 22 May 1995

1. SUMMARY

a. After Croatia violated the CFA¹⁶ from 29 March 1994 and several UN resolutions by military „reintegrating“ West Slavonia, Bosnian Serb, RSK media and other reports of International Organizations accused Croatia of ethnic cleansing, massive violations of human rights and systematically conducted war crimes. ECMM¹⁷ has found no direct evidence of this, however there are some indications that there were individual cases of the above.

b. This report is based on eye witness reports and statements taken by ECMM members and on confirmed reports of other International Organizations. Source include Serb officials from West Slavonia. (As appropriate sources are stated).

2. MAIN SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, Part 1 (1-4 May 95)

a. 1. May 95:

¹³ HMDCDR, Zagreb, fond: Zbirka Karlovac (nesređeno gradivo).

¹⁴ Standard Operational Procedure.

¹⁵ Head Regional Centre.

¹⁶ Cease Fire Agreement – Sporazum o prekidu neprijateljstava od 29. ožujka 1994.

¹⁷ European Community Monitoring Mission.

(1) The initial HV¹⁸ military actions on the 1 May 95 involved professional Guards units, Home Guard Regiments and Special Police Units and were concentrated around the following areas:

The PAKRAC/DRAGOVIC Road in the North of SW¹⁹. NOVA GRADISKA/OKUCANI (3 km east) in the East. NOVSKA/JASENOVAC in the West and STARA GRADISKA (air-strike/artillery/17.20 hrs).

The HV and Special Police met with mixed results over the initial 24 hrs.

(2) ‹ARSK²⁰› conducted defensive operations on the ground. The BSA²¹ shelled civilian targets in NOVSKA and NOVA GRADISKA, and also engaged HV Arty²² positions to the North of NOVA GRADISKA and HV Assembly points North of NOVSKA.

(3) At 1300 hrs OKUCANI was evacuated by local buses (source: refugee, member of the ‹RSK› MoD²³ administration). No incidents (same source).

(4) Villages along the SAVA west of STARA GRADISKA were evacuated during the afternoon via ferries, boats and the SAVA bridge to BOS. GRADISKA (source: refugee, member of milicija from MLAKA).

b. 2 May 95:

(1) At about 1000 hrs HV conducted heavy arty shelling and two air-strikes against the SAVA bridge and the Headquarters of the 18 Corps ‹ARSK›.

(2) The OKUCANI pocket surrendered at 1400 hrs.

(3) A large number of refugees, mixed in with ‹ARSK› soldiers, was pinned down in cross fire between an ‹ARSK› position at NOVA²⁴ VAROS and an HV advance unit on the road south of OKUCANI. Refugees were caught in nearby ditches and suffered casualties (about 10 killed, Serb source). ‹ARSK› counter-attacked against the HV, defeated it and retook their positions in order that the refugees could then proceed and cross the SAVA bridge into Bosnia. (source: refugee, member of ‹RSK› MoD). The Croatian artillery stopped the shelling in the eastern part of Sector West (OKUCANI area) at 1313 hrs (source: Team OKUCANI).

¹⁸ Hrvatska vojska.

¹⁹ Sector West.

²⁰ Army of Republic Srpska Krajina.

²¹ Bosnian Serb Army.

²² Artillery.

²³ Ministry of Defence.

²⁴ U tekstu navedeno: NOVO.

Note: The Croatian Deputy Prime Minister, Prof. Dr. Kostovic, stated in his letter, dated 22 May 1995, that during this engagement on the OKUCANI road 54 persons were killed, 20 of whom were clearly identified as civilians.

(4) ZAGREB was shelled from ‹RSK› with several rounds of rockets.

c. 3 May 95:

(1) ZAGREB was again shelled by ‹ARSK› from UN Sector North with several rounds of rockets.

(2) HV gained control of the The Highway between NOVSKA and NOVA GRADISKA and the terrain between The Highway and river SAVA. Minor groups of Serbs were still fighting in the wooded and hilly parts north of OKUCANI an south of the DRAGOVIC road. The GAVRINICA pocket (Serb held part of PAKRAC) had not surrendered at this point.

d. 4 May 95:

(1) After heavy shelling from the HV, protracted negotiations and some dubious circumstances surrounding the HV actions, the defenders of the GAVRINICA pocket surrendered. 1494 male inhabitants were detained and taken into custody (source: ECMM teams. All other organizations – including UN forces, disappeared before shelling and one ECMM car was destroyed). ECMM teams accompanied the detainees during their transfer to and for the first 24 hrs of their detention, and there afterwards visited them on a daily basis. ICRC²⁵ was informed of the situation by ECMM and the UN arrived at the camps after about 24 hrs.

(2) 186 persons are still detained. They are imprisoned at: BJELOVAR, POZEGA, OSIJEK, ZAGREB. (Source: Prof. Dr. Kostovic, Dep²⁶ Prime Minister).

3. MAIN SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, Part 2 (5-22 May 95)

a. After the fall of GAVRINICA the Croatian civil and military administration took over full control of Sector West. Although UN still has some restriction of movement, ECMM teams achieved freedom of movement from the 6 May. An ECMM Co-coordination Centre at PAKRAC and two ECMM teams in

²⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross.

²⁶ Deputy.

OKUCANI and DARUVAR have now been established in place of the two monitors in NOVA GRADISKA and DARUVAR.

b. During the period from 5 – 20 May different Croatian authorities (Such as Minister of Defence) released the following (unconfirmed/unverified) information:²⁷

| Personnel Losses | | | | |
|------------------|--------|---------|----------|---------|
| | Killed | Wounded | Captured | Missing |
| Croats | 52 | 200 | / | 30 |
| Serbs | 400 | 1000 | 1494 | 150 |

c. Local Croatian sources stated in OKUCANI that about 350 dead Serbs were buried immediately after identification at the nearest local cemetery. Identification had been possible through a combination of documents, personal knowledge and fingerprints. ECMM has been assured lists will be provided with confirmed figures on completion of the identification process.

d. The numbers above of killed, wounded and missing Serbs are to be considered as rough estimates. These figures were proudly published by the Croatian Minister of Defence after his „victory“ and the so-called „liberation“ of Sector West.

e. This publication of the estimated numbers of wounded and indeed dead Serbs by the Croatian Authorities at such an early stage is likely to backfire on them. It would seem unlikely that 5000 <ARSK> soldiers, retreating in an orderly fashion would leave behind 1000 wounded. Croatian government stated on the 22 May 1995, officially, that „only“ 188 dead bodies were found until now. 127 of these dead bodies have been identified since they were found. This discrepancy in number will no doubt lead to further allegations of mass executions.

f. The names of 10 wounded Serbs, who are still being treated in Croatian hospitals, were handed over to ICRC and ECMM. At least 28 Croat civilians who lived in the Serb held territory of Sector West are listed as missing.

g. Serb sources claim that about 11900 Serbs fled from Western Slavonia to Bosnia. In addition about 1200 were transported by UN to Bosnia within the „UN Safe Passage Program“. If both numbers are correct, in the region of [about?] 3500 Serbs must still remain in the former Serb part of Sector West.

²⁷ Podatci su uobličeni u pregledniju tablicu negoli je ona u izvorniku.

h. The UN Safe Passage Program²⁸ is facing difficulties. The Government of Bosnia Hercegovina objects that the UN is facilitating the exodus of Serbs from Croatia into Bosnia Hercegovina without their approval. Croatian officials are starting to accuse UN of condoning and indeed actioning the „ethnic cleansing“ of Western Slavonia. The government of Serbia/FRY²⁹ will not allow more than 1000 refugees to enter their territory. Serbs who were asked by ECMM and others why they were choosing to accept the UN offer of a safe passage to Bosnia answered mainly with following statements:

„I don't know; but with all of us leaving, do we have an option?“ and: „If UN offers this transport, the UN must think that our life is endangered if we stay. They know better.“

i. Between 3000-5000 refugees from Western Slavonia are accommodated in four temporary camps along the road from BOS.³⁰ GRADISKA to BANJA LUKA. Their living conditions are even worse than „at BATNOGA camp outside VELIKA KLADUSA last year“ (source: ECTF³¹).

j. The «RS³²» Minister for Foreign Affairs in PALE refused a request from ECMM to monitor the situation of the refugees around BANJA LUKA and to interview them for human rights and war crimes purposes:

„... Since the event the local authorities on the ground have, to a considerable extent, succeeded in providing help from them. Accordingly, I see no point in your presence...“!

However Bosnian Serbs are still very willing to accept European humanitarian aid through ECTF.

k. The Serb Radical Party distributed flyers in the camps around BANJA LUKA demanding the eviction of all Croats and Muslims from their property in Bosnian Serb territory and their expulsion to Croatia.

4. THE REFUGEE SITUATION

a. UNHCR sources are expecting about 5000 refugees in the BARANJA area of SE³³ in the near future. It is not clear whether these refugees will be from

²⁸ Program *Siguran prolaz*: organiziran odvoz srpskih civila iz južnog dijela zapadnog sektora kojeg su provele mirovne snage UN-a i UNHCR.

²⁹ Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

³⁰ Bosanska.

³¹ European Community Task Force: posebna organizacija EU-a zadužena za humanitarnu problematiku.

³² Republic of Srpska.

³³ Sector East.

the BANJA LUKA camps or additional refugees. If this is really going to happen the International Organizations have to be aware that this will have a significant affect [on] the living conditions of about 5000 to 6000 Hungarians, who still live in the BARANJA. A major deterioration of the already poor conditions for the Hungarians is to be expected and could easily become a reason to internationalize the conflict.

b. About a hundred refugees have found accommodation in Sector East with relatives. Their presence has already started to affect the living conditions of the Croat and Slovak minority in the southern part of Sector East around the town of ILOK, who have become victims of harassment and evictions (14 May) (source: ECMM ECLO(E)³⁴).

c. An additional 1200 refugees arrived 20 May in the area of Western Srijem³⁵ in Sector East. Most of the Croat inhabitants (approx. 165) of BAPSKA (Sector East) would appear to have been evicted on 15 and 16 May 1995 in order to find accommodation for Serb refugees (source: Serb milicija). The destination of these evicted people is not completely clear. Those that possessed passports have arrived in VINKOVCI (Croatia) via Hungary. About 67 Croats who did not possess valid passports are allegedly detained in Serbia (source: self proclaimed evicted inhabitant of BAPSKA). (Source: ECMM).

d. Not more than about 1000 Serb refugees from West Slavonia have found or will find accommodation in SERBIA.

5. INDIVIDUAL CASES

a. Several vacated houses of Serbs who fled from Western Slavonia have been burnt down. Five cases in MLAKA have been PRELIMINARY investigated by ECMM, RC ZAGREB. These houses were probably burnt by Croatian displaced persons, whose own property had been burned down in 1991/92 by Serbs. This type of revenge should not be excused, however it is confirmed that these recently burned houses in MLAKA belonged to those Serbs, who conducted the complete destruction of the adjacent village of KOSUTARICA in 1991/92 and expelled all Croats from that area. (local Serb and Croatian sources). All other Serb houses in MLAKA are untouched, though occupied by the Croatian Army.

³⁴ European Community Liaison Officer [Sector] East.

³⁵ U tekstu navedeno: Srejm.

b. The Chief of Police in OKUCANI, [...] has clearly stated that 76 houses have been burnt down by Croatian Anti-Terrorist Units³⁶ in the villages of COVAC,³⁷ VRBOVLJANI and GREDANI³⁸-OKUCANSKI.

c. The Croatian authorities have not succeeded in preventing a significant number of crimes against remaining Serbs, neither within the former Serb held territory nor in the former Croatian part of the Sector. This is despite the presence of considerable numbers of Police and HV.

d. Besides arson the following other criminal activities have been reported and confirmed by ECMM members: robbery, burglary and bodily injury.

e. No cases of murder can be confirmed yet.

f. The case of an attack against four orthodox nuns, including bodily injury and robbery as well as the partial looting of the monastery of St. Ana, seems to be one of the most severe acts of terrorism against the Serbs at the current time. (Source: ECMM).

g. It is far beyond ECMM's capabilities and mandate to continue with such individual investigations. Where appropriate details have been forwarded to UNCIVPOL³⁹ and Croatian Authorities.

h. The process of issuing Croatian citizenship to inhabitants of the former Serbian part of Western Slavonia continues smoothly. The Croatian Government states that:

(1) About 3500 people are living in the former Serb held territory since the Croatian Government has taken over the responsibility.

(2) 1719 of them left voluntarily to Bosnia, 1070 are waiting to receive Croatian citizenship, 675 have received citizenship already.

(3) Humanitarian aid is provided if necessary. Remaining Serbs receive social welfare, including money.

6. CONCLUSIONS

a. The unnecessary exodus of Serbs from West Slavonia has to be stopped; the UN Safe Passage Program has to be considered as a humanitarian and political mistake, that is likely to damage the reputation of the International Community even more.

³⁶ Nejasno je na koje se hrvatske postrojbe ovo odnosi.

³⁷ Čovac.

³⁸ Gredani.

³⁹ United Nations Civilian Police.

- b. Those who left Sector West and are now living in dreadful conditions have to be offered safe return, guaranteed by UN.
- c. The Croatian Government has to be convinced and financially enabled to start their reconstruction program for Slavonia at the earliest opportunity.
- d. In order to start a program of confidence restoration in Slavonia, UN has to deploy a credible and effective unit in order to ensure that UN guarantees will be respected by local authorities and to restore faith in the UN.
- e. The events of West Slavonia have to be considered in four categories:
- (1) Violations of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
 - (2) Human Rights violations.
 - (3) War crimes.
 - (4) Ordinary crimes including politically motivated terrorism.
- f. Undoubtedly the Croatian invasion of Sector West must be assessed as a serious violation of UN Resolutions and the bilateral Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994.
- g. ECMM has not confirmed any war crimes or systematic violations of human rights have been, although the public TV presentation of the camps at BJELOVAR and VARAZDIN violated the dignity of detainees. However it should be recognized that this transparency may have prevented further allegations of war crimes against Croatia.
- h. A significant number of ordinary crimes and even some politically motivated terrorism have been confirmed by ECMM Teams. The continuous close cooperation with local police, the Ministry of Interior and the office of the Croatian Deputy Prime Minister, Prof. Dr. Kostovic, as well as with other International Organizations is absolutely vital.



1995., 13. lipanj

[Pakrac]

Posebni izvještaj članova Koordinacijskog centra Pakrac Promatračke misije Europske zajednice Scipionea Allegrettia i Camilla Schwarz o stanju u mjestima Japaga, Kraguj i Šeovica (pakračka okolica)⁴⁰

From: CC⁴¹ Pakrac

To: RC Zagreb

[Document-type: Special Report]

[Subject: The Living Conditions of the Remaining Serb population in Japaga, Kraguj and Seovica]

Author: Scipione ALLEGRETTI, Camillo SCHWARZ

Date: 13 June 1995.

SPECIAL REPORT ON THREE VILLAGES NEAR PAKRAC: JAPAGA (XL 7131), KRAGUJ (XL 7333), SEOVICA (XL 7230)

In order to investigate the living conditions of the remaining Serb population, we spent four days in the villages JAPAGA (XL 7132), KRAGUJ (XL 7333) and SEOVICA (XL 7230), east and south of nearby PAKRAC, which were reintegrated into Croatia in May 1995 and belong to the municipalities Pakrac and Lipik respectively. More than 40 persons were interviewed.

1. PRESENT SITUATION

a. There are 75 houses in Japaga. The shelling did not cause human losses nor heavy damages in the houses. There was no supply of electricity only some days during and after the hostilities. There is still no natural gas available and no telephone functioning. A telephone box for public use functions (also for international calls). More than 50% of the natives and nearly all the DP's⁴² have left.

⁴⁰ HMDCDR, Zagreb, fond: Zbirka Karlovac (nesredeno gradivo).

⁴¹ Coordination Centre.

⁴² Displaced persons.

b. Kraguj had before the action 250 inhabitants (170 natives, the rest DP's). 36 natives and 34 DP's have left. Shelling caused the death of a woman. No considerable damage on the houses. Electricity and water supply function normally.

c. Seovica had 200 houses with approximately 900-1000 native inhabitants before 01 May and had many DP's („thousands“). Shelling caused the death of two children and one woman. Some houses were damaged. Electricity and water supply function normally. Of all the inhabitants approximately 25% have remained so far.

d. Most of the native population in the three villages live on agriculture. There is a high degree of jobless natives who used to work until 1991 in nearby Pakrac or Lipik or elsewhere (in supermarkets and other stores, a sawmill, glass works, various communal, electrical, agricultural, textile, etc. firms). The overwhelming number of DP's are jobless. People are pessimistic as to their chances to find a job and expect to be discriminated as Serbs by the Croatian employees. Elementary and high school are open again since end of the May with new Croatian teachers.

e. All the persons interviewed had already personal documents issued free of charge, including photograph, by the Croatian authorities. Most of the old-age pensioners interviewed had applied for the Croatian old-age pensions but had not yet received payments. Some had already. Precondition for application is the possession of the certificate of citizenship (domovnica). Average duration of application is one month, according to a Croatian PTT⁴³ employee.

f. Many people interviewed who had acquired personal documents do not intend to stay in Croatia. They need the documents for the exchange of their houses and properties with expelled Croats and Moslems in Bosnia or elsewhere. There are lot of advertisements concerning house and property exchange fixed on public buildings in the villages.

g. It should be mentioned that many people interviewed had received parcels of LRC⁴⁴ who invite the villagers on poster to register „in their own interest“. But not only LRC does an essential job. In these days we found quite a few people who had received letters and sent letters to their families with the help of the ICRC (with forms „Red Cross messages“).

h. Police is present everywhere in the villages. People judge them higher than CA⁴⁵ present on the first days of May. For many people Police are correct („as everywhere there are black sheep“). On the other side, interviewed people

⁴³ Post, telephone and telegraph.

⁴⁴ Local Red Cross.

⁴⁵ Croatian Army.

complain sometimes of nocturnal looting in empty houses and even of organized nocturnal robbing in inhabited house (one case was investigated by us) and would prefer Police being less indulgent towards burglars.

2. OPERATION „FLASH“

a. After some shelling in the first days of May, CA came into the three villages on 04 May. There was no fighting in the villages. The population came out of their houses hands up and was escorted to a school or a public building where they spent the night. Before leaving their houses they were allowed to take bread and blankets with them. In the evening people could go home, escorted by CA soldiers, and feed their animals. Women and children could go home the next day, whereas men were brought to sport facilities, gymnasiums, (some also to prisons) in Bjelovar, Varazdin and Požega and spent the several days there. Some are still in prison.

b. Returning the next to their houses, women, children and old men found that their houses had been thoroughly searched. The property including tractors and animals was still there, sometime smaller technical equipment or tools were missing. All the cars had been taken away but were, with some exceptions still unsolved, returned after some days. No houses were set on fire. Altogether, most people found the behaviour of the CA soldiers unexpectedly correct, the degree of looting if there was looting at all, with few exceptions quite tolerable („war is war“).

3. MOTIVES FOR LEAVING THE NATIVE COUNTRY

a. Out of a total of 12000 inhabitants, approximately 2400 have remained in the former Western Slavonian part of „RSK“. U.N. observers find that a change in the motives for leaving the native country is gradually taking place. People, according [to] them, leave now primarily not out of fear and in a feeling of dangerous insecurity, but rather out of a pessimistic assessment of their future in this country. On investigating the motives, we found still fear being the main reason quoted for leaving. Propaganda spread during 4 years concerning „Ustasha atrocities“ together with recent news on mass graves of civilian victims etc. had their effect in all minds of the population.

b. There are more reasons why most of the rest still want to leave. The younger people believe that they won't have any chance, competing with Croats, to get jobs from Croatian employers in Pakrac, Lipik, etc. Many of the remaining people want to leave because their children have already left earlier, their neighbours and friends have gone, the Serb element in Western Slavonia has become so weak that the individual will not anymore be protected, the Serbs

won't be anymore protected as soon as UN and the other Int Org's⁴⁶ will have left, some people had to under go beating in Varazdin, Pozeza or Bjelovar and were exposed to threats and insults there or elsewhere.

c. In view of the recent blowing up the Sava bridge near Stara Gradiska, some people interviewed didn't believe the official explanation (lightning) an appealed to us to help them to get out of the country as soon as possible. In this connection should be mentioned that we have learned from UNHCR that they are deliberately delaying preparations to organize next convoys via other routes. This maybe a reaction on critique according to which UN had the first convoys organized too soon after the reintegration.

d. Most of the people interviewed intend to leave also their native country. Some hope to settle down with the help of relatives, in Serbia. There are clear reservations as to Bosnia or Eastern Slavonia. Some wait until their sons have been released from prison, others are about to sell their animals to Croats or wait for their documents necessary for the exchange of houses in their future place of residence.

4. SUMMARY

a. The isolated Serbs in the villages are not in an enviable situation nowadays. Quite a few are, as the losers, open and ready to any initiative from the side of the Croatian winners. For instance when there was a rumor that a Croat-Serbian reconciliation would be held, some were ready to attend (in fact, a closed Croat-Serb round table was held). It is up to the Croatian side to stretch out the hand for reconciliation but it is obvious that many Croats did not forget what had happened in 1991/92. Will it be the Government who make the first step in the field or the Catholic Church or will there be another initiative.

b. Police and the competent authorities have done a good job by issuing in a relatively short time the most important personal documents. Police have prevented Croatian extremists to cause clashes with the Serb population. Police have withheld looters from intruding into the villages and have confiscated stolen cars and goods. Cop⁴⁷ Pakrac enjoy a good reputation among the Serbs. Nevertheless Police should convey to the villagers a higher feeling of security by intensifying nocturnal patrols and controls of cars and persons.

⁴⁶ International Organizations.

⁴⁷ Chief of Police.

Summary

TWO DOCUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION OBSERVERS FROM THE TIME OF THE HOMELAND WAR IN WESTERN SLAVONIA

The author presents two documents written by the European Union observers, i.e. of the special observation and reporting agency of the European Union, which was active in Croatia from September 1991. The first attached document gives an analysis of the humanitarian situation in part of the former safe area of the United Nations West during the first three weeks of May 1995. The document was – on the basis of a field report, i.e. statements of participants - issued by the head of the Regional Centre Zagreb. The second document refers to the position of the remaining Serb population in Japage, Kraguj and Šeovica (surrounding area of Pakrac). Attached to both documents are brief explanations of the circumstances in which they originated, and the most important parts in them are pointed to.

Key words: western Slavonia, Homeland War, Operation Flash, European Union Observer Mission, 1995