A cognitive approach to innovative metaphors derived from root analogies

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The paper deals with the relationship between the conventional metaphorical expressions based on basic conceptual metaphors (root analogies) and the nonconventional creative metaphors produced by extension, elaboration, mixing or other methods of combining basic metaphors. The analysis is based on a cognitive theory of metaphors as outlined by G. Lakoff, M. Johnson and M. Turner (1980, 1987, 1989) and the more recent work of A. Goatly (1997) , G. Steen (1994) , T. Krzeszowski (1993), D. C. Freeman (1993), etc. The corpus includes metaphors from the following novels: The Ambassadors, The Wings of the Dove and The Golden Bowl by H. James.

The introductory section deals with the theoretical background and presents a review of the theories of metaphor starting with Aristotle's views on metaphor to the most recent philosophical and psychological studies. The first section presents the cognitive approach to metaphor based on the belief that most of our conceptual system is metaphorically structured. The second section deals with the difference between the so-called root analogies and more complex, creative metaphors. It briefly reviews the techniques employed in the creation of creative metaphors with special attention paid to the presence of axiological dynamism in image schemata and in metaphors based on these schemas. The third section includes the classification of metaphors according to the source domains and image schemata in light of the cognitive approach to metaphor. The classification includes the analysis of ontological metaphors such as Personification/Depersonification and Reification with special emphasis on the expression of value judgements in metaphorical expressions. The last section deals with the interplay of metaphors, their productivity and the contribution of such complex metaphors to the coherence of a literary work.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally metaphor has often been presented as an anomaly, an unusual or deviant way of using language, a minority interest. Taking a similar view, philosophers

have often considered metaphor to be strictly confined to literature, rhetoric and art, because of its supposed dangers to clear thinking. However, over the last 30 years, philosophers, psychologists and linguists have begun to agree that metaphor is not something that can be easily confined, but is an indispensable basis of language and thought. At the end of the 1970's, however, landmark publications such as Ortony (1979a), Honeck and Hoffman (1980), and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) completed what may be called the "cognitive turn" in metaphorology. This cognitive approach to metaphor has grown into one of the most exciting fields of research in the social sciences with psychologists leading the way for cognitive linguists, anthropologists and philosophers, since in the last decade or so the study of metaphor has become a way of approaching some of the most fundamental traditional concerns of philosophy.

John Middleton Murry's essay, "Metaphor" (1931) opens with the remark that, "Discussions of metaphor - there are not many of them - often strike us at first as superficial." Today both comments would be inappropriate. The extraordinary volume of papers and books on the subject produced during the past 40 years might suggest that the subject is inexhaustible. Warren Shibbles's useful bibliography from 1971 (Black, 1979:19) has entries running to nearly 300 pages and contains perhaps as many as 4000 titles. As for these discussions being superficial, one might rather complain today of ungrounded profundity. Wayne Booth states that explicit discussions of "something called metaphor" have multiplied astronomically in the past fifty years. The bibliographies show more titles for 1977 than for the entire history of thought before 1940. Thus, Metaphor II, a bibliography of the 1985-90 publications has more than 3500 entries (Van Nopen & Hols, 1990).

Since the 1970's there has been an explosion of books and publications on metaphor. Thus, metaphor has become comparable to other instruments of conceptualization like models and theories in folklore and science. This was foreseen before the current fashion in metaphor studies in such philosophical publications as Black (1962), Turbayne (1963) and Hesse (1966). Other important books developing the cognitive approach in more recent times are MacCormac (1985), Kittay (1987), Levin (1988) etc. New collections have been edited by Haskell (1987), Van Noppen (1990) and Fernandez (1991a). Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* has been followed by Lakoff (1987a), Turner (1987), Johnson (1988), Kovecses (1988) and Lakoff and Turner (1989), Turner and Fauconnier (1998) etc. With the founding of the special journal *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity*, the institutionalization of metaphor as a specific domain of research in the social sciences was completed.

The preceding analysis of the major contemporary views reveals that metaphor has been moving slowly from the periphery of philosophical interest toward a more prominent position in the last couple of decades. Urging the view that metaphor is not merely a linguistic phenomenon but also a fundamental principle of thought and action, Lakoff and Turner (1980: 486) argued that "no account of meaning and truth can be adequate unless it recognizes and deals with the way in which conventional metaphors structure our conceptual system".

By examining certain classical and contemporary views Turner (1989) has tried to show how the study of metaphor leads directly to basic epistemological and ontological issues - fundamental questions about language, meaning, truth, and human understanding. Hence, metaphor has been approached by philosophers and psychologists who attempted to explain and clarify the phenomenon of metaphorical projection from their points of view. The psychological theories have been concerned with two main aspects of metaphor: the difference between the comprehension of literal and metaphorical statements and the duration of time necessary for the comprehension of literal and metaphorical utterances (Gerrig and Gibbs, 1989).

1. Historical review

The historical review includes theories of metaphor starting with Aristotle's views proceeding to the substitution and comparison views and the interaction theory. Special emphasis is placed on the relationship between the two elements of the metaphorical expression as a relationship of similarity, dissimilarity, interaction and tension. As these different views have developed and been modified, the theory of metaphor has evolved from treating metaphor as an ornament to its status of a cognitive tool for conceptualizing the world.

Since Aristotle wrote that "the greatest thing by far is to be master of metaphor" *(Poetics,* 1450a), scholars have studied the many uses of metaphor, primarily in its distinctive rhetorical functions. In the past few decades many scholars have argued that metaphor is not simply a form of speech but something more fundamental: a form of thought with its own epistemological functions.

Aristotle provided the first scholarly treatment of metaphor in his writing on the art of poetry. His views have been influential in both traditional and contemporary discussions of metaphor interpretation. Aristotle gave metaphor the following definition: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on the ground of analogy" (Poetics, 1457b)

Two important ideas come from Aristotle's definition of metaphor. First, metaphor is a matter of words because metaphoric transfer takes place at the level of words, not sentences. Second, metaphor is viewed as deviant from literal usage because it involves the transfer of a name to some object to which that name does not properly belong. A third characteristic of metaphor for Aristotle is that metaphor is based on similarities between two things. Each metaphoric transfer requires that some underlying resemblance or similarity be noted that permits the transfer to be made.

It is with this famous definition that the history of metaphor begins. First, the metaphorical transfer is located at the level of *words* rather than sentences. As Paul Ricoeur (1977) argues, this analysis of metaphor, restricted to the study of changed meanings of *words,* established a precedent broken only in the twentieth century after the realization

that the basic semantic unit is larger than the word. Second, metaphor is understood as a *deviance* from literal usage, since it involves the transfer of a name to some object to which that name does not properly belong.

Thus, the future of metaphor is prefigured in terms of these three basic components: 1. focus on single words that are 2. deviations from literal language, to produce a change of meaning that is 3. based on similarities between things. After Aristotle there followed over twenty-three hundred years of elaboration on his remarks. From a philosophical point of view, at least, virtually every major treatment up to the twentieth century is prefigured in Aristotle s account.

Aristotle's views have prompted much discussion among metaphor theorists. In the 1930's, I.A. Richards (1936) revived the study of metaphor by, among other things, offering a terminology that has become widely accepted in talking about metaphor. According to Richards, metaphor consists of two terms and the relationship between them. The relationship between the topic and the vehicle is the ground. Richard also introduced the notion of *tension* to describe the literal incompatibility of the topic and vehicle. Richard's terminology has provided a useful framework for discussing the problem of metaphor.

The advocates of the negative view of metaphors include the philosophers T. Hobbes and J. Locke (T. Cohen, 1979: 3). Referring to metaphors Hobbes speaks about the two cases of abuses of language use: the first case is when men register their thoughts wrong; the second case is when they use words metaphorically, that is, in other senses than that for which they are ordained and thereby deceive others. (Leviathan, pt 1, Chap 4). In his Essay (bk 3, chap 10) Locke seems to agree with him saying that it is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors. Although these remarks of Hobbes and Locke may seem remote, their influence has prevailed until recently.

The conversion in the estimate of metaphor is very recent. The most important text is Max Black's "Metaphor" (1962). Black, refusing to concede that metaphor's only legitimate capacities are emotive, argues for their "cognitive" status. Black's essay became an important stimulus to the theory of metaphor adopted by Nelson Goodman in *Languages of Art* in 1968 (T. Cohen, 1979). Although Goodman does not assign meaning to metaphors, and Black does not explicitly treat them as bearers of truth values, their work, along with that of others, has created a climate in which metaphors are treated comfortably as if they were thoroughly "descriptive" potential vehicles of knowledge possessing a special meaning other than that belonging to their literal readings.

In *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936) Richards made several claims that merit special attention because of the challenge they posed to the dominant tradition: (1) Metaphor is not a matter of language alone, nor is it a trope at the level of individual words. Instead, it is an omnipresent principle of thought: "Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom" (1936: 94); (2)

Neither is metaphor only a deviation from "ordinary" speech-it permeates all discourse. In so far as our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorically structured, the pretense to do without metaphor "is never more than a bluff waiting to be called" (1936: 92).

Another of Richard's important contributions is his attempt to provide a more adequate way of talking about how metaphors work. He describes the principle of metaphor as "two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction". In "*John is a rock*", for example, the "thoughts" active together consist of the "tenor" or underlying idea (e.g. John's personality) and the "vehicle" or figure (e.g. the rock) by which we grasp this idea. Finally, Richards argues that metaphors are frequently based just as much on dissimilarities between things as on similarities and cannot be reduced to literal paraphrases since their meaning is a product of a special interaction of contexts. Philosophers paid little attention to Richard's work when it appeared. After all, in 1936 it was not prudent to insist that thought is essentially metaphoric.

Max Black (1955) elaborated on Aristotle's and Richards's views to present two different theoretical descriptions of metaphor. The *substitution view* holds that in understanding a metaphor, its metaphorical terms are replaced with literal terms that can fit the same context. For instance, a metaphor of the "A is B" form (e.g., *Man is a wolf*) is nothing but an indirect way of presenting some intended literal meaning "A is C" (e.g., *Man is fierce*). Two things motivate people to replace a straightforward statement with a metaphorical expression the meaning of which must be derived. (Black, 1962). First, metaphors are stylistic devices that serve an ornamental function in discourse. Readers should experience some aesthetic delight when they discover the hidden meanings of metaphor. Second, metaphors are useful for coining terms for new concepts such as the *leg* of the triangle (Ortony, Reynolds, & Arter, 1978). The substitution view assumes that metaphor plays only a minor role in language and is at best an affectation that obscures literal meaning.

The more popular *comparison view* suggests that a metaphor consists of the presentation of some underlying analogy or similarity in the form of a condensed or elliptical simile (Black, 1962; Henle, 1958). Thus, a metaphor of "A is B" form indirectly implies the speaker's intended literal meaning "A is like B in certain respects". For instance, the metaphor *the car beetles along the road* describes the movement of the car as being like the movement of a beetle.

A nominal metaphor, such as *John is an octopus*, is interpreted by seeing two properties such that the topic having the first property is like the vehicle having the second. *John is an octopus* can be understood not by simply applying the property "having tentacles" to John but by searching for a type of human behaviour that could be considered to bear some resemblance to this property of the octopus. (e.g., the ability to influence many things simultaneously).

Black's essay, "Metaphor", is perhaps the best landmark by which we may orient ourselves in attempting to understand recent work on this subject. He insisted that the problem of metaphor was at least partly a semantic issue. He also made the provocative

claim that metaphor may more nearly create similarities between things, rather than merely express preexisting ones. Later on Black (1954-55) noted that the comparison theory "suffers from a vagueness that borders on vacuity". Since any two objects are similar in some respects, in his opinion the comparison view does not explain how we are able to pick out the relevant similarities in each instance. Even before him Richards (1936) argued that by overemphasizing the role of similarities the theory ignores the sometimes crucial role of differences. Thus, his objection is preliminary to the more serious criticism that "the metaphorical assertion can remain true even though it turns out that the statement of similarity on which the inference to the metaphorical meaning is based is false" (Searle, 1979: 89). *Richard is a gorilla* may be true if it is taken to mean *Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth.* According to the comparison theory this metaphor is based on the belief that Richard and gorillas are similar in being fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so on. But it is, in fact, false that gorillas have these characteristics. So the metaphor is true but the relevant statement of similarity upon which it is based is false. The point here is similar to that of Beardsley (1962) who shows that metaphors need not depend on actual properties of existing objects, but rather on relations at the level of meanings or of beliefs about objects.

One popular version of the comparison theory, the semantic feature view, proposes that metaphor interpretation requires the cancellation, transfer, combination, or exchange of semantic features associated with the topic and vehicle terms (L. Cohen, 1979; Levin, 1977). Metaphor specifically involves the cancellation or transfer of some of those features, usually from the nonliteral to the literal form. For instance, understanding *their legislative program is a rocket to the moon* (L. Cohen, 1979) proceeds by cancelling the features of *rocket to the moon* that are incompatible with those of *legislative program* (air-cleaving, cylindrical) while retaining features such as fast-moving, far-aiming, etc. that provide some basis of similarity.

Another difficulty with the feature addition or deletion view of metaphor can be found by looking at the opening lines of Yeats's poem "The Crazed Man" (Kittay, 1987). One could interpret this metaphor of a childbearing moon by displacing features of *moon* that violate selection restrictions on what can be childbearing and replacing them with those features appropriate to things that are childbearing (e.g., things that are /animate/, /human/, /female/). It is immediately clear that no simple process of adding or canceling semantic features will account for this complexity. The semantic feature version of the comparison view of metaphor has inspired many psychological experiments on metaphor understanding (M.G. Johnson & Malgady, 1979, 1980). Good metaphors were those in which the topic and the vehicle terms shared a number of common properties and had a number of salient (high frequency) common features. Almost all comparison view theorists assume that the ground of a metaphor consists of common category membership, or a set of features, shared by tenor or topic (usually the metaphor's first term) and vehicle (usually the metaphor's second term) (G. Miller, 1979; Tversky, 1977).

Beardsley (P.Ricoeur, 1977: 94) argued that metaphor is either "indirectly self-contradictory or obviously false in its context" (p 142), but later revised this to the claim that the "metaphorical twist" occurs whenever there is a "logical opposition" of a special sort between the meanings of the terms in the metaphorical expression. The main problem with proposals of this sort is that they try to elevate a condition that frequently holds (namely semantic deviance) into a necessary condition of metaphor. Semantic deviance (or violation of selectional restriction rules) cannot be a necessary condition of metaphor.

Lakoff and Turner (1980) have also argued that many metaphors, such as "orientational" metaphors are grounded on correlations within experience rather than on similarities. The core of all these objections is expressed by Searle as follows: "Though similarity often plays a role in the comprehension of metaphor, the metaphorical assertion is not necessarily an assertion of similarity". Comparison theorists make at least two mistakes: first, they assume that because similarity often plays a role in our comprehension of the metaphor, it is therefore the essence of the meaning of the metaphor; and second, they take similarity as the sole basis for the act of comprehension.

Criticisms like these have been the basis for alternative theories. Chief among these is Black's third theory, the "interaction view". Black's account is basically a development of Richard's remark that the metaphorical generation of meaning results from the "interaction between co-present thoughts" (Richards, 1936, p. 93). Black's chief and distinguishing contribution was the notion of "interaction". Contrary to the standard comparison theory, comprehending a metaphor is not merely a matter of comparing objects to determine what discrete properties or relations applying to one also apply to the other in the same or in some similar sense. Instead, we use one entire system of associated commonplaces (e.g. that of wolf) to "filter" or organize our conception of some other system (e.g. that of man). The "associated commonplaces" are whatever properties and relations are commonly believed to be true of an object, person, event, etc., even if they do not actually apply. The "interaction" is a screening of one system of commonplaces by another to generate a new conceptual organization of a new perspective on some object.

However, in the two decades since Black's essay appeared it has become clear that a more detailed account of the alleged "interaction" upon which metaphors are based is needed. Black's latest work on this problem (Black, 1977) supplied some long-awaited details but it did not substantially alter his initial formulation. Much of the recent literature on how metaphors work consists of attempts to go beyond Black's groundwork to explain more fully the "mechanism" by which a metaphor creates new meaning and generates insight. Max Black's interaction view is committed to the following seven claims: (1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects: a "principal" subject and a "subsidiary" one. These subjects are often best regarded as "*systems* of things" rather than "things". The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of "associated implications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject. These implications usually consist of "commonplaces" about the subsidiary subject. The metaphor selects,

emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject by *implying* statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject. This involves shifts in meaning of words belonging to the same family or system as the metaphorical expression. There is, in general, no simple "ground" for the necessary shifts of meaning.

The interaction theory suggests that understanding metaphor *creates* similarity and does not simply emphasize some preexisting but unnoticed aspects of the meaning of similarity relationship (Black, 1955, 1962, 1979). The topic and the vehicle *interact* in the sense that the presence of the topic incites the listener to select some of the vehicle's properties to form a *parallel implication complex* that can fit the topic which in turn induces parallel changes in the vehicle. For example, Wallace Stevens's remark *society is a sea* is not about the sea but about a *system of relationships* between society and sea signaled by the word *sea*. New meanings are made possible by the interaction of terms in a metaphor and not as a result of shifting attention to marginal aspects of meaning or highlighting accidental properties of things. At least some metaphors involve the creation of new frameworks of connotation rather than the actualization of potential but unrealized connotations (Ricoeur, 1977). A simpler comparison theory misses this interactive process of "seeing as" or "conceiving as" by which an emergent meaning complex is generated (M. Johnson, 1987). The presence of the topic stimulates the listener to select some of the vehicle's properties and thus constructs a "parallel implication complex" to fit the topic which in turn induces parallel changes in the vehicle (Black, 1979).

The interaction view is perhaps the dominant theory in the multidisciplinary study of metaphor. According to the interaction view, at the earliest moments of comprehension of a metaphorical utterance, listeners project two conceptual domains, linguistically represented by the topic and vehicle terms onto each other to arrive at a metaphorical meaning that highlights the similarity between the two terms. According to some theoreticians Black's idea of an "implication system" should be replaced by the notion of *semantic fields* wherein a semantic field consists of the dependencies holding between concepts in a particular domain (Kittay, 1987). According to this view, metaphorical meaning arises from the introduction of relations from one domain or semantic field (the vehicle domain) into another semantic field (the topic domain). This view of metaphorical mappings gives greater specificity to the idea that metaphor understanding involves discovery of a "system of commonplaces" resulting in an "implication complex". However, this semantic field view of metaphor also assumes that the second-order meanings peculiar to metaphor arise only when selection restriction rules have been violated or when some pragmatic anomaly is noticed. Yet the empirical evidence from psycholinguistics clearly suggests that people can easily understand metaphorical expressions without having to specifically derive a second-order meaning (the metaphorical meaning) from a first-order meaning (the literal meaning).

One recent model that attempts to overcome some of the difficulties associated with other psychological theories of metaphor is the class inclusion model (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990). Considering the metaphorical statement *My job is a jail* Glucksberg

and Keysar argue that metaphors are not understood by converting them into similes (e.g., *My job is like a jail).* Instead metaphors are exactly what they appear to be: class inclusion statements in which the topic of the metaphor (my job) is assigned to a diagnostic category (entities that confine one against one's will, are unpleasant, are difficult to escape from). In these statements, the metaphor's vehicle (jail) refers to that newly created diagnostic category and at the same time is a prototypical example of that category. The newly created categories to which metaphorical comparisons refer are structurally similar to other taxonomic categories that have conventional names at the superordinate level such as "food" and "furniture" (Rosch, 1978). The class inclusion model is appealing because it explicitly links categorizing processes to metaphor understanding. Its suggestion that metaphor understanding creates new categories, ones with systematic entailments, also provides a concrete model of the "parallel implication complex" to which Black referred in his most recent work on the interaction view (1979).

Many theorists in linguistics and philosophy have attempted to formulate a precise set of rules for the identification of metaphors based on its various deviant features (Beardsley, 1962; Levin, 1977; Loewenberg, 1975). They suggest that if a metaphor were interpreted literally it would be grammatically deviant, semantically anomalous, conceptually absurd, or simply false. For example, *The stone died* violates certain selection restrictions, i.e. rules that govern the different grammatical categories in which the terms in permissible word strings may be combined. Thus, inanimate objects, such as stones, are restricted in the possible actions they can take so that sentences such as *The stone died* would be marked semantically anomalous. The anomaly view of metaphor proposes that metaphor comprehension proceeds through the recognition that certain rules or norms have been violated. The listener's task is to translate the metaphorical expression into another, nondeviant, expression (i.e., "The stone-like individual died").

A French theoretician in the field of poetics, Jean Cohen, in *Structure du language poetique (*Ricoeur, 1977: 152) speaks of this deviance in terms of semantic impertinence, meaning by that the violation of the code of pertinence or relevance which rules the ascription of predicates in ordinary use. The metaphorical statement works as the reduction of this deviance by the establishment of a new semantic pertinence. This new pertinence in turn is secured by the production of a lexical deviance which is, therefore, a paradigmatic deviance that is precisely the kind of deviance described by classical rhetoricians. Classical rhetoric, in that sense, was not wrong, but it only described the "effect of sense" at the level of the word while it overlooked the production of this semantic twist at the level of sense.

P. Ricoeur (1977) thinks that the decisive problem that an interaction theory of metaphor has helped to delineate but not to solve is the transition from literal incongruence to metaphorical congruence between two semantic fields. This can be illustrated by a metaphor of space; it is as though a change of distance between meanings occurred within a logical space. The *new* pertinence or congruence proper to a meaningful meta-

phoric utterance proceeds from the kind of semantic proximity which is suddenly obtained between terms in spite of their distance. Things or ideas which were remote now appear close. Resemblance, ultimately, is nothing else than this rapprochement which reveals a generic kinship between heterogeneous ideas. What Aristotle called the *epiphora* of the metaphor, that is, the transfer of meaning, is nothing else than this move of shift in the logical distance, from the far to the near.

All new rapprochement runs against a previous categorization which resists, or rather which yields while resisting (Goodman, 1968). This is what the idea of a semantic impertinence or incongruence preserves. The predicative assimilation involves a specific kind of tension which is not so much between a subject and a predicate as between semantic incongruence and congruence. The insight into likeness is the perception of the conflict between the previous incompatibility and the new compatibility; "remoteness" is preserved within "proximity". The decisive feature is the semantic innovation, thanks to which a new pertinence, a new congruence, is established in such a way that the utterance "makes sense" as a whole (Goodman, 1968: 94). In other words, metaphorical meaning does not merely consist of a semantic clash but of the *new* predicative meaning which emerges from the collapse of the literal meaning, that is, from the collapse of meaning which obtains if we rely on the common or usual lexical values of words. Thus, the metaphor is not the enigma but rather the solution of the enigma.

Beardsley (Ricoeur, 1977: 94) argues that inherent tensions within the metaphor cause the metaphoric predicate to lose its ordinary extension and to thereby obtain a new intention, namely, its previous connotation. More specifically, a term will have a central meaning (its ordinary designation) and a marginal meaning (its connotation). The standard designation of "wolf", e.g., might include "mammal," "four-legged", whereas the marginal meaning would include "fierce", "voracious" and so on. In metaphor there occurs a "logical opposition" between the ordinary designated properties of the two things juxtaposed by the metaphor – men are not four-legged nor are they members of the canine family. This failure of primary reference forces us to call up the associated connotations of the modifying term (wolf) which are then applied to the principal subject (man) in their new senses. Thus, *Man is a wolf* is understood as suppressing the conflicting designated properties and highlighting such potential connotations as "is fierce", "is clever", "is greedy", etc., which can be seen as applying to human beings.

According to the "Verbal-opposition Theory" (Ricoeur, 1977) a metaphor induces insight by calling up or actualizing connotations which were previously potentially available but unnoticed. Beardsley goes beyond Black in claiming that metaphor does not simply call upon "associated commonplaces" but may actualize connotations not yet brought forward in our present conceptual system. Beardsley argued that metaphor is either "indirectly self-contradictory or obviously false in its context" (Ricoeur, 1977: 95), but later revised this to the claim that the "metaphorical twist" occurs whenever there is a "logical opposition" of a special sort between the meanings of the terms in the metaphorical expression (Beardsley, 1981: 118).

A highly controversial view of metaphor is that any account of what is special about metaphorical utterances belongs to a theory of language use rather than to semantic theory. (Davidson, 1979). According to this metaphor-without-meaning view metaphor is a special use of literal language (as are jokes, lies, etc) that needs to be explained by a theory of language use. In the case of metaphor there is no special propositional content or meaning associated with such use. Rather *metaphor means what the words mean and nothing more* (Davidson, 1979: 30). Metaphor is a special use of this literal meaning to *intimate or suggest* some new insight that might otherwise go unnoticed. The great difficulty we have in specifying the meanings of metaphors, Davidson suggests, lies precisely in the fact that there is really no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention. These additional insights should not be confused with the meanings of metaphors. Davidson's account is directed at all those who try to defend the irreducibility of metaphor by reference to a special metaphorical "meaning". Metaphors state a patent falsehood or an absurd belief and thus need no paraphrase as this is already given in the literal meanings of the words themselves. The opposite view which emphasizes the cognitive role of the metaphor is the cognitive approach to the theory of metaphor.

2. Cognitive theory of metaphor

The Cognitive theory of metaphor has extended the scope of metaphor to include its role in scientific reasoning and has recognized metaphor as a pervasive principle of human understanding that underlies our vast network of interrelated literal meanings. Thanks to the principles of this theory, metaphor has achieved a remarkable prominence as an important problem in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and other cognitive sciences in the last two decades.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1987) advocate a particular philosophical view called experientialism which transcends what they call objectivism and subjectivism. Their experientialism is based on the psychological tradition of gestaltism, a kind of holism which seems a rather more restricted approach to understanding than is commonly accepted.

Objectivist theories of meaning have always assumed that metaphor is a deviation from proper literal meaning. Treated as a "literary device" metaphor was considered a rhetorically powerful or artistically interesting mode of expression without its own unique cognitive content. Black was the first to call metaphor a cognitive instrument, an instrument for drawing implications grounded in perceived analogies of structures between two subjects belonging to different domains.

In the last decade, various strands of research have led to the re-examination of the role of metaphor in language and to the suggestion that it is a tool for thought. Research reported in Paprotte and Dirven (1985) shows that scientific thought is firmly grounded in metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Turner (1989) de-

velop the view that metaphor is part of the human cognitive system and, thus, fundamental to thought. According to G. Steen (1993) the most provocative linguistic account of metaphor that has emerged from the cognitive turn is that of George Lakoff and his colleagues. Theirs is a radical departure from the position that metaphor is a figure of speech; instead, Lakoff (1986a) argues metaphor is a figure of thought.

The cognitive approach to metaphor rejects the two traditional characterizations of metaphor - that it is a structure parasitic upon ordinary language structure and that it can be explained in terms of its deviance from semantic interpretations of ordinary, non-metaphorical language. The cognitive view arises from the Experientialist position (Lakoff 1987: xv) on semantic theory. The Experientialist position claims that we create metaphor by projecting onto an abstract *target domain* the entities and structures of a concrete *source domain*, a schematized real or vicarious bodily experience. Metaphor arises from, in Johnson's (1987: xv) formulation, 'embodied human understanding'. As human beings we share a range of physical experiences that takes its structure and coherence from the non-propositional schemata we extract from them. Our propensity to extract these schemata is a fundamental property of mind. We project elements of the structure and components of our physical experience onto our non-physical abstract experience. Precisely this sense of projection from schematized bodily experience constitutes the claim for metaphors as embodied human understanding.

The view that metaphor is not merely a matter of language per se, but is an indispensable part of how people experience the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987; Turner, 1987) is based on the belief that our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. The way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:3). Lakoff and Johnson (198) thus speak of *conceptual metaphor,* suggesting that metaphor is a matter of understanding one thing in terms of another. Lakoff (1987a) approaches understanding in terms of gestalts, whence experience, perception and categorization are linked.

Departing from the traditional view that metaphor merely has an ornamental function, Lakoff & Johnson claim that the primary function of metaphor is to understand difficult, complex, abstract, or less clearly delineated concepts. That is, we try to understand such a concept (love) in terms of a simpler, more concrete, or more clearly delineated concept (nutrient). The concept we try to understand (love) is called the target domain, and the concept that is used for this purpose (nutrient) is called the source domain. Thus, Lakoff and Johnson state that metaphor has, as its primary function, the cognitive role of understanding one concept in terms of another.

The structural aspect of a conceptual metaphor consists of a set of correspondences between a source domain and a target domain. These correspondences can be divided into two types: ontological and epistemic. Ontological correspondences are correspondences between the entities in the source domain and the corresponding entities in the target domain. For example, the CONTAINER in the source domain corresponds to the BODY in the target domain. Epistemic correspondences are correspondences between

knowledge about the source domain and corresponding knowledge about the target domain.

Lakoff and Johnson claim that many such conceptual metaphors have become highly conventionalized. There is nothing innovative or deviant about them, as can be seen from the great number of familiar linguistic expressions that are available to convey them. They argue that conventional conceptual metaphors belong to the common knowledge of the language user, and that they are stored as conceptual units in the mind. They have also coined the term *linguistic metaphor* for the verbal manifestations of conceptual metaphor.

According to this view, our conceptual system is grounded in our experiences in the world. Both directly emergent concepts (like UP-DOWN, OBJECT, and DIRECT MANIPULATION) and metaphors (like HAPPY IS UP, EVENTS ARE OBJECTS, ARGUMENT IS WAR) are grounded in our constant interaction with our physical and cultural environments. Likewise, the dimensions in terms of which we structure our experience (e.g. parts, stages, purposes) emerge naturally from our activity in the world. The kind of conceptual system we have is a product of the kind of beings we are and the way we interact with our physical and cultural environments. Metaphor is not only another way of referring to phenomena (processes and participants) but rather an important mode of understanding and a way of structuring experience. The concepts used in metaphorisation are "concepts for natural kinds of experience and objects /which/ are structured clearly enough and with enough of the right kind of internal structure to do the job of defining other concepts. These other concepts are less concrete and less clearly delineated in their own terms" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 118). Consequently, one important function of metaphor is to structure abstract domains by means of projections from more concrete domains. (D.W. Allbritton, 1995).

Lakoff and Johnson make a distinction between linguistic and "conceptual" metaphors which they describe as mappings of knowledge about one conceptual domain onto a different domain. The idea that conceptual metaphors systematically structure the way that many domains are understood has subsequently been used to help explain the nature of emotion concepts (Lakoff & Kovecses, 1987) and the meaning of idioms. A related cognitive function that metaphor often fulfills is that of providing a framework for understanding a new domain, or for restructuring the understanding of a familiar domain. In using the term conceptual metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson sought to emphasize the distinction between metaphor as a kind of utterance and metaphor in the realm of thought. Hence, it is not the use of linguistic metaphor such as "TIME IS MONEY" that is ultimately responsible for structuring one's understanding of time in terms of currency, but rather it is the metaphorical way of thinking about time that leads to the use of the verbal metaphor. Consequently, metaphor is primarily a matter of thought.

Conceptual metaphors are responsible for the existence of schematic knowledge structures that can influence the way information about a metaphor's domain is processed and represented in memory. To highlight the uniquely metaphorical origins of

such structures, Albritton (1995: 38), refers to them as metaphor-based schemas. What makes the "CRIME-AS-DISEASE" schema special is that it is not simply a summary of things that one knows about crime, but rather an encapsulation of a particular way of understanding crime that results from the metaphorical comparison of crime to a disease.

An important feature of conceptual metaphor is its systematicity: highlighting and hiding at the same time. The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another (e.g. comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle) will necessary hide other aspects of a concept (e.g. the battling aspects of arguing), a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor.

Apart from Structural metaphors where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another, such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY or TIME IS MONEY, Lakoff and Johnson distinguish two other types of metaphors, i.e. Orientational metaphors and Ontological metaphors. Instead of structuring one concept in terms of another in Orientational metaphors a whole system of concepts is organized with respect to another. Most of these metaphors have to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Such metaphorical orientations are not arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience.

Spatialization metaphors are rooted in physical and cultural experience; they are not randomly assigned. A metaphor can serve as a vehicle for understanding a concept only by virtue of its experiential basis. Just as basic experiences of human spatial orientations give rise to orientational metaphor, so our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of Ontological metaphors (Entity and Substance Metaphors), that is, viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances. Understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Once we can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 26).

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), a basic metaphor, however flexible in its periphery or its instantiations, has a centrally fixed mapping that carries a fixed source domain onto a fixed target domain. Such metaphors are conventionalized specific-level conceptual metaphors. But, according to Turner (1987) and Lakoff and Turner (1989), there are, in addition to these basic metaphors, certain conventionalized generic-level conceptual metaphors such as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS (as in *Events conspired against us*) and CAUSATION IS PROGENERATION (as in *Fear is the father of cruelty*). These conceptual metaphors do not have fixed mappings. Instead, they have generic-level constraints on possible mappings. Turner suggests there is a general constraint that governs all conceptual metaphors; we call it "The Invariance Hypothesis".

The core of the constraint is that in conceptual metaphor we are constrained not to violate the image-schematic structure of the target domain.

In their consideration of the grammatical (linguistic) structure of metaphor, i.e. in metaphor syntax, Lakoff and Johnson consider the relationship between a conceptual and linguistic metaphor. The cognitive approach to metaphor provides a sound explanation of the fact that one conceptual metaphor may manifest itself in many grammatical variations of linguistic organization (Dirven, 1985). As can be seen from this example the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME is realized by various grammatical means: I'll *take my chances;* The *odds are against me;* I've got an *ace up my sleeve;* He's a real *loser;* He's *bluffing.* In other words, cognition on the basis of conceptual metaphor is relatively independent of the way it is expressed grammatically in language: all of these different linguistic expressions can be said to relate to the same conceptualization of a situation.

3. Basic metaphors - root analogies *vs.* Innovative, creative metaphors

This section deals with the classification of metaphors into basic specific and generic metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1987)) and Root analogies (Goatly, 1997). The classification serves as a basis for the analysis of metaphors in the novels of H. James, i.e. the relationship between these basic metaphors, conventional metaphorical expressions and the novel, innovative, creative metaphors in literature. The novel metaphors are created by processes such as extension, elaboration, mixing, combining, etc. of basic metaphors as illustrated by examples of metaphors from our corpus of H. James's novels.

Basic conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1989) are part of the common conceptual apparatus shared by members of a culture. They are systematic in that there is a fixed correspondence between the structure of the domain to be understood (e.g., death) and the structure of the domain in terms of which we understand it (e.g., departure). We usually understand them in terms of common experiences. They are largely unconscious. Their operation in cognition is mostly automatic and they are widely conventionalized in language, that is, there are a great number of words and idiomatic expressions in our language whose interpretations depend upon those conceptual metaphors. Thus we see that though there is an infinitude of potential conceptual metaphors, only a very few have special status as basic metaphors in our conceptual systems.

Any discussion of the uniqueness or idiosyncrasy of a metaphor must therefore take place on two levels: the conceptual level and the linguistic level. A given passage may express a common conceptual metaphor in a way that is linguistically either commonplace or idiosyncratic. However, an idiosyncratic conceptual metaphor cannot be deeply conventionalized in our thought, and therefore its linguistic expression will necessarily be idiosyncratic in at least some respect. Modes of thought that are not themselves conventional cannot be expressed in conventional language. In short, idiosyn-

crasy or language may or may not express idiosyncrasy of thought, but idiosyncratic thought requires idiosyncratic language. (Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 50). With respect to the relatively small number of existing basic metaphors at the conceptual level, there are three attitudes that poets have chosen to take toward them. The first is simply to versify them in automatic ways; this results in a lot of feeble verse. The second is to employ them masterfully, combining them, extending them, and crystallizing them in strong images. The third attitude is to attempt to step outside the ordinary ways we think metaphorically and either to offer new modes of metaphorical thought or to make use of conventional basic metaphors less automatically by employing them in unusual ways (Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 51), or otherwise to destabilize them and thus reveal their inadequacies for making sense of reality.

Goatly's term for the cognitive metaphors which Lakoff, Turner and Johnson identify as basic metaphors is the term Root Analogy (1997: 43). Such cognitive metaphors resemble roots, which are relatively unobtrusive, but which, in poetry, often develop shoots and flowers and become noticeable, not to say beautiful. Roots are alive and, for the most part, buried; this is true of Root Analogies as well. Burying refers to a change of form which disguises the original morpheme expressing the analogy. The vast majority of abstract vocabulary in the lexicon of English derives from conceptual metaphors. Most other Buried metaphors die because the original Vehicle no longer exists, but Root analogies are still alive, and have the potential to grow vigorously. Their original Vehicles are so basic and universal to our experience, being concerned with objects, space, movement, orientation, etc. that they have no chance of disappearing.

Stephen Pepper called these metaphors root metaphors. A basic metaphor can serve as the hypothetical presupposition for a single theory. Pepper describes the root metaphor method as follows: A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of common sense fact; this original area becomes then his basic analogy or root metaphor.

A question worth pursuing, according to Goatly (1997), is whether literature exploits or undermines these basic metaphors, these Root analogies since the same abstract concept can be metaphorically structured in different ways. This suggests that the choice of metaphor can have far-reaching ideological as well as cognitive consequences.

Lakoff and Turner claim that even metaphors in literature are guided by general principles of cognition. There exist basic conceptual metaphors for understanding life and death that are part of our culture and that we routinely use to make sense of the poetry of our culture. Lakoff and Turner chose the Dickinson poem to introduce the range of common, unconscious, automatic basic metaphors which are part of our cultural knowledge and which allow us to communicate with each other, whether in ordinary conversation or in poetry. (Lakoff and Turner 1989:15). According to them 'Poets can appeal to the ordinary metaphors we live by, in order to take us beyond them, to make us more insightful than we would be if we thought in the standard ways'. Poets do this

by means of four strategies called extension, elaboration, questioning, and composing of conceptual metaphors (1989: 67-69).

Innovative and creative metaphors imply the use of the mechanisms of everyday thought by extending them, elaborating them, and combining them in ways that go beyond the ordinary. One major mode of poetic thought is to take a conventionalized metaphor and extend it. Extension is illustrated with reference to Shakespeare's Hamlet, where DEATH IS SLEEP is extended to include the aspect of dreaming. It is partial; it does not map everything in our general knowledge of sleep onto death but only certain aspects: inactivity, inability to perceive, horizontal position, etc. Hence extension involves the inclusion of those parts of a conceptual metaphor which are conventionally omitted from consideration when the non-literal analogy is used in discourse. Non-literal analogies usually involve a partial mapping from one domain to another, and poets can explore the opportunities for further extension of the metaphor to yield relatively new insights. Another principal mode of poetic thought that goes beyond the ordinary is the nonconventional elaborating of schemas, by filling the slots in unusual ways rather than by extending the metaphor to map additional slots, e.g. Horace's reference to death as the "*eternal exile of the raft*". Elaboration takes place when a poet uses those parts of a metaphor that are conventionally included but in a more specific and special manner than is customary. For instance, Lakoff and Turner argue that Emily Dickinson elaborates DEATH IS DEPARTURE by including the destination and filling it in as 'home'. Finally, perhaps the most powerful of all ways in which poetic thought goes beyond the ordinary way we use conventional metaphoric thought is the formation of Composite metaphors. As we have seen, there may be more than one conventional metaphor for a given target domain. One of the things that characterize poetic thought is the simultaneous use of two or more such metaphors in the same passage or even in the same sentence. In a Shakespeare's sonnet, for example, there are at least five conventional conceptual metaphors sculpted into the composite metaphorical conception of death. Thus, a simple clause "*black night doth take away the twilight*" contains a composite of the metaphors that a lifetime is a day and death is night, that light is a substance, that a life is a precious possession, and that events are actions. Composite metaphors allow the use of ordinary conceptual resources in extraordinary ways.

A. Goatly proposes a similar, but slightly different, framework for studying the interplay of metaphors; he defines the interrelation of metaphors according to two factors - the semantic/real world relations of their separate Topics and Vehicles, coupled with the co-textual relations between their corresponding V-terms and T-terms.

First, and simplest is the Repetition of a metaphor. This occurs when a V-term is repeated referring to the same Topic on each occasion (1997: 256). Next follows the complementary pair Multivalency and Diversification. (1997: 259) In Multivalency the V-term is again repeated, but the topic differs with each repetition. With Diversification, by contrast, the Topic remains the same, but the V-terms differ. Thus, diversification rules out any syntactic relation between the two different V-terms, which would amount to Mixing (1997: 269). Extension generally occurs when the V-terms belong to

the same lexical set. More specifically in Articulated Extension there is a syntactic link between the two V-terms which parallels the relation between the two Topics, hence the term Articulated (1997: 264).

4. Classification of metaphors: ontological metaphors

This section includes the classification of Ontological metaphors from the corpus of H. James's novels *(The Wings of the Dove, The Golden Bowl, The Ambassadors)* and the relationship between conventional metaphors (Root analogies) and creative, innovative metaphors from this literary corpus. The analysis of metaphors in this section is based on the relationship between basic conceptual metaphors, conventional metaphorical expressions and the novel, creative metaphors, i.e. metaphor in literature. All these metaphors are analyzed as extensions or elaborations of conventional metaphorical expressions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1987)) or Root Analogies (Goatly, 1995). The analysis includes the expression of value judgements in these metaphorical expressions, i.e. the presence of axiological dynamism in image-schemata.

Since all our basic experiences, not clearly delineated abstract entities, can be conceptualized as persons or concrete objects, these metaphors can be divided into several groups: 1. Personifying and Animizing metaphors; 2. Depersonification metaphors; and 3. Reification metaphors. In the first group, i.e. Personifying and Animizing metaphors, abstract concepts are conceptualized as animate entities (persons, animals and plants), in the second group persons are conceived of as animals or objects and in the third group abstract entities, such as emotions and ideas, are reified, i.e. seen as objects and substances; hence, abstract qualities are conceptualized as physical qualities and abstract processes are materialized.

Understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to treat parts of our experience as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Hence, our experiences with physical objects, especially our own bodies, provide the basis for an extraordinary wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is, viewing events activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances. The first group of metaphors includes Animizing and Personifying metaphors where abstract entities are represented not simply as concrete, but as animate and human. This group can be further divided into three sub-groups: 1.1. abstract entities are seen as persons; 1.2. abstract entities are seen as animals and 1.3. abstract entities are conceptualized as plants.

4.1. Animizing and personifying metaphors

Personification is one of the most inclusive classes of metaphors since our bodies and their functioning are a very productive source domain which is used to understand less salient concepts. Human purposes typically require us to impose artificial boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete just as we are: entities bounded by a sur-

face. Thus, in the metaphor: INFLATION IS AN ENTITY, viewing inflation as an entity allows us to refer to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect of it, see it as a cause, act with respect to it, and perhaps even believe that we understand it. Ontological metaphors like this are necessary for even attempting to deal rationally with our experiences. The power of poetic composition to create complex new ideas from simpler conventional ideas reveals itself in especially clear form in personification-metaphors through which we understand other things as humans (Lakoff & Johnson, 1989). As human beings, we can best understand other things in our own terms. Personification permits us to use our knowledge about ourselves to maximal effect, to use insights about ourselves to help us comprehend such things as forces of nature, common events, abstract concepts and inanimate objects.

This section presents metaphorical sets which involve or depend on the concretizing of abstract entities and their qualities as animate and human. Animation and personification of abstracts use some general categories of metaphor to structure our cognition of abstracts. According to A. Goatly (1997) abstract entities, conceived in terms of human life, both live and grow, can undergo attack, injury and death and its consequences/after-effects: an activity can be stifled or smothered, a plan, project or experiment can be suffocated or revived.

Perhaps the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities, e.g.: *His theory explained to me the behavior of chickens raised in factories; Life has cheated me; His experiment gave birth to a new physical theory.* In each of these cases we are seeing something nonhuman as human. But personification is not a single unified general process. Each personification differs in terms of the aspects of people that are picked out. In the metaphors: *Inflation has attacked the foundation of our economy. Our biggest enemy right now is inflation,* inflation is personified, but the metaphor is not merely INFLATION IS A PERSON. It is much more specific, namely, INFLATION IS AN ADVERSARY. It not only gives us a very specific way of thinking about inflation but also a way of acting toward it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 26).

4.1.1. Personification

4.1.1.1.

In the first metaphor an abstract entity, a plan, a thought is personified, seen as a child. In the conventional metaphors like: *Cognitive psychology is still in its infancy. Whose brainchild was that* ? (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) the metaphorical expression is confined to one sentence. In this example the metaphor is extended to several sentences with specific details not encompassed by the above conventional metaphor. The plan, the idea that they could do something together is conceptualized as a child, tenderly nursed and brought up and allowed to put its feet to the ground and take a few steps on the carpet.

*There had been, from far back- **a plan** that the parent and the child should "do something lovely" together, and **they had** recurred to it on occasion, **nursed it and brought it up theoretically, though without as yet quite allowing it to put its feet to the ground.** The most it had done was **to try a few steps on the drawing-room carpet, with much attendance, on either side, much holding up and guarding...** (The Golden Bowl, 330)*

4.1.1.2.

In the second example a secret thought is compared to a maimed child tenderly handled by his father; the personification metaphor is combined in this example with a reifying metaphor; the thought is not only a maimed child but also an object, carefully wrapped and kept in secret corners which leads to the BODY-AS-THE-CONTAINER metaphor where our mind is seen as a container for our thoughts, emotions and ideas. Thus, a simple conventional metaphor becomes a composite metaphor by combining three basic metaphors.

> **The thought was all his own...** *He kept it back like a favorite pang; left it behind him when he went out, but came home again the sooner for the certainty of finding it there. Then he took it out of its sacred corner and its soft wrappings; he undid them one by one, handling them,* **handling it, as a father, baffled and tender, might handle a maimed child.** *(The Wings of the Dove, 450)*

4.1.1.3.

In the following metaphor a negative emotion, a falsity, is personified as a bad faced stranger, which includes a negative value judgement, from the basic schema UGLY IS BAD, which is transferred to the target domain. The abstract concept of an unexpected emotion is materialized by presenting this stranger as arriving, unheard, because he walked on thick-carpeted corridors.

> **It was the first sharp falsity** *she had known in her life, to touch at all, or be touched by;* **it had met her like some bad-faced stranger surprised in one of the thick-carpeted corridors** *of a house of quiet on a Sunday afternoon; (The Golden Bowl, 459)*

4.1.2. Animizing (inanimate- animal)

In the following examples emotions, like anxiety or danger, are seen as dangerous animals waiting in the shade, in ambush, ready to jump. All these metaphors are extensions of a basic conceptual metaphor PASSIONS ARE BEASTS INSIDE A PERSON (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980); these beasts have to be controlled, metaphorically said "appeased with a biscuit".

4.1.2.1.

The feeling of anxiety is personified as somebody hiding in the shade and inevitably presenting itself. This metaphor is combined with the metaphor: SEEING IS COGNITION where things that are known are visible, in the light, while those that are unknown, kept secret, are in the shade or in the darkness.

> *while she further got from him the sense of something that had been behind, deeply in the shade, **coming cautiously to the front and just feeling its way before presenting itself** (The Golden Bowl, 482)*

4.1.2.2.

The possibilities which imply negative results are conceptualized as prowling dangerous animals; the situation is extended to present the experiencer like a night-watcher whose safety and protection against beasts depends upon having means for making a fire. Danger is thus symbolized by darkness and by beasts and safety by fire and light; this metaphor is combined with the axiological dynamism present in most image-schemata where LIGHT IS GOOD/POSITIVE and DARK IS BAD/NEGATIVE; these value judgements are transferred from the source domains of our experience where LIGHT implies life, warmth and safety and DARK implies danger, death and coldness.

> *... **and all of these possibilities were things of evil when one's nerves had left one in a darkness of prowling dangers** that was like the predicament of the night-watcher in a beast-haunted land who has no more means for a fire. (The Golden Bowl, 502)*

4.1.2.3.

The specific feeling of approaching death and incurable illness has been conceptualized as a dangerous animal; the animizing metaphor is combined with the BODY-AS-THE-CONTAINER schema, where the body is seen as a container, a bounded space which is approached by the threat of death; the presence of the animal fills in the whole space, thus not leaving space for light and life.

> *So then it had been a general conscious fool's paradise from which **the specified had been chased like a dangerous animal. What therefore had at present befallen was that the specified, standing all the while at the gate, had now come in on such a scale as to fill out the whole of the space. The facts of physical suffering, of incurable pain, of the chance grimly narrowed, had been made, at a stroke, intense...** (The Wings of the Dove, 388)*

4.1.3. **Inanimate-animate (plants)**

The following sub-group includes expressions belonging to the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE PLANTS. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 89) list a great number of exam-

ples of conventional metaphorical expressions portraying this conceptual metaphor such as: *His ideas have finally come to fruition; That's a budding theory; It will take years for that idea to come to full flower; The seeds of his great ideas were planted in his youth; Here's an idea that I'd like to plant in your mind; He has a barren mind.* In this metaphor people are viewed as plants, or parts of the plant such as leaves, flowers, and fruit that blossom and then wither or decline. The stages of the plants in their yearly cycle correspond to the stages of life: bud to youth, full leaf to maturity, and withered leaf to old age, as in Shakespeare: "*I have lived long enough. My way of life is fallen into the sere, the yellow leaf*". (Macbeth 5.3).

Ideas and emotions are conceived of as plants, flowers; when they are not ripe, they are seen as young sprouts, shots or even as seed, or germs, buried in the rich, warm earth, ready to emerge. After an idea has been realized it is seen as a full-blown flower. Further on emotions are conceptualized as fruit which has ripened and is waiting to be picked and tasted.

4.1.3.1.

In the first example the plans are seen as a handful of seed, which had been buried for a long time in dark corners; the metaphor IDEAS ARE PLANTS is combined with the metaphor BODY-IS-A-CONTAINER where our mind is seen as a container for storing ideas and plans, keeping them somewhere until they can be realized, until the germs and the seed are ready to sprout again.

> As such **plans** as these had come to nothing, however, in respect to acquisitions still more precious, it was doubtless little enough of a marvel that he should have lost account of that **handful of seed. Buried for long years in dark corners, these few germs had sprouted again** under forty-eight hours of Paris. (The Ambassadors, 55)

4.1.3.2.

The conventional metaphor IDEAS=PLANTS is extended by comparing the idea to a flower in the first example and to a tender shot struggling to come out of the warm rich earth in the second example. This metaphor is repeated several times with slight modifications; repetition is one of the ways of combining basic metaphors and creating coherent, if not consistent, series of metaphors.

> His comparative blindness had made the good faith, which in its turn had made the soil propitious for the **flower of the supreme idea;** with the supreme idea, all the while, **growing and striking deep, under everything, in the warm, rich earth.**

> He had stood unknowing, he had walked and worked where it was buried and the fact itself, **the fact of his fortune, would have been a barren fact enough if the first sharp tender shot had never struggled into day.** (The Golden Bowl, 124)

4.1.3.3.

The emotion, the feeling, the moment of fulfillment is compared to a golden fruit, shining from afar as a reward to be plucked after long suffering. The value judgement implied in the metaphor is positive since gold is a precious metal which is always valued positively.

> *Here it was, then, the moment, **the golden fruit that had shone from afar;** only, what were these things, in the fact, for the hand and for the lips, when tested, when tasted - **what were they as a reward?** (The Golden Bowl, 729)*

4.2. Depersonification

4.2.1. **Human – Animal**

The metaphorical expressions in which humans are conceptualized like animals are numerous both in conventional everyday expressions and in innovative metaphors in literature. It is possible to select a single feature of an animal's existence, or life-cycle, such as the fact that the snail has a 'house' consisting of its shell or that the cuckoo lays its eggs in other birds' nests, and exploit the coincidental parallels with human experience. Many of these commonplaces about animals become codified into proverbial form.

In commonplace assumptions about animals (serpents are dangerous and doves are innocent, tigers are cruel) all the attributes are essentially human ones, illustrating our tendency to anthropomorphize the rest of creation. (A.Thompson, 1987: 48). Having made this commonplace assumption that lions are brave we can praise a man by calling him lion-hearted. The objective truth about animals in question hardly comes into it. The frequently cited metaphor: *Richard is a gorilla,* is based on the belief that Richard and gorillas are similar in being fierce, nasty, prone to violence, even though in fact gorillas are shy, timid, and sensitive creatures. However, generations of gorilla mythology (Searle, 1979: 277) have set up associations that will enable the metaphor to work even though we know these beliefs to be false.

In an example from Shakespeare: 'They flatter'd me like a dog' the metaphor is created according to Kittay and Lehrer's semantic field theory: the writer takes a number of features from the syntagmatic donor field (spoilt pet dogs) and transfers them in order to produce new insights in the syntagmatic recipient field (false friends). It is significant in this regard that the degree of metaphoricity in these passages can change almost without our noticing. 'Truth's a dog' involves transfer from the animal field to the abstract field, quite a leap in semantic space. Calling a man a dog is clearly metaphorical, but the leap is not so great (men like dogs are, componential-semantic terms, CONCRETE and + ANIMATE). (A. Thompson, 1987: 65)

4.2.1.1.

The metaphor where Milly is conceptualized as a dove is the dominant metaphor of the novel "The Wings of the Dove" as revealed in its title. It is extended throughout the

novel, from the beginning to the end, when the dove has spread its wings to cover them all. Milly has won although she died; her affection, her forgiveness, her innocence has won the battle over evil, the dove has conquered the serpent. This metaphor has its origin in the Bible (Matthew 10:16) speaking about serpentine wisdom and the innocence of doves: " Be ye therefore wise as serpents, and innocent as doves" (The Holy Bible, King James Version). The opposition between good and evil is mapped onto the opposition between doves and serpents. In this passage the metaphor of the dove is combined with the image schema UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, where cognition is mapped onto perception and gaining knowledge, making a discovery is mapped onto the domain of coming into light from the darkness of ignorance.

> *Poor Milly enjoyed one of her views of how people, wincing oddly, were often touched by her. "Because you're a dove." With which she felt herself ever so delicately, so considerately, embraced; partly as if, though a dove who could perch on a finger, one were also a princess with whom forms were to be observed. It was for the girl like an inspiration: she found herself accepting as the right one, the name so given her. She met it on the instant as she would have met the revealed truth; it lighted up the strange dusk in which she lately had walked. (The Wings of the Dove, 184)*

4.2.1.2.

The dove metaphor is combined with the spatial metaphor where covering more space implies gaining influence, heightening moral power. It is also combined with orientational metaphor UP-GOOD where the adjective higher implies a positive value judgement; UP IS BETTER since covering more space means exercising a stronger influence.

> *Our dear **dove has folded her wonderful wings.** Unless it's more true that she **has spread them the wider.** He again assented, though the works fitted an image deep in his own consciousness. Rather, yes-spread them the wider; for a flight to some happiness greater*

> *I used to call her, in my stupidity a dove. Well, she stretched out her wings, and it was to that they reached. They cover us. (The Wings of the Dove, 425)*

4.2.1.3.

The conventional metaphor of a person as an animal is extended to reflect very complex feelings of having got hurt without admitting it. The animizing metaphor does not confine itself to the general characteristics of a dog, as being loyal but to a specific situation where a dog does not admit getting hurt or wet. It is an innovative metaphor of animizing combined with an orientational metaphor where DOWN IS UNHAPPY where the direction downwards indicates a fall in status, unhappiness.

> *though she tried to deal with herself, for a space, only as **a silken-coated spaniel who has scrambled out of a pond and who rattles the water from his ears, her***

*shake of her head, again and again, as she went, was much of that order, and she had the resource, to which, save for the rude equivalent of his generalizing bark, the spaniel would have been a stranger, of humming to herself hard as a sign that nothing had happened to her. **She had not, so to speak fallen in; she had had no accident and had not got wet**; this at any rate was her pretension until after she began a little to wonder if she mightn't, with or without exposure, have taken cold. (The Wings of the Dove, 303)*

4.2.2. **Human– Plant**

A standard way of understanding and talking about the life cycle is in terms of a metaphor according to which people are plants or parts of plants and a human life corresponds to a plant's life cycle. The stages of plants and parts of plants in their yearly cycle correspond to the stages of life: bud to youth, full leaf to maturity, and withered leaf to old age, as in Shakespeare: "*I have lived long enough. My way of life is fallen into the sere, the yellow leaf*". (Macbeth 5.3). In this metaphor, people are viewed as plants with respect to the life cycle; more precisely, they are viewed as that part of the plant that blooms and then withers or declines, such as leaves, flowers, and fruits. As Psalm 103:5 says, "*As for man, his days are as grass: as a flower of the field, he flourisheth.*" Death comes with the harvest and the falling of the leaves.

The metaphorical expressions depending upon the Analogy HUMAN=PLANT are: Parts of humans/humanity are parts of plants: *flower (of youth), root (of hair, tooth);* acting on humans is acting on plants: *plant (an informer, etc.), transplant (someone, organ), uproot (oneself);* the life cycle of humans is the life cycle of plants: *put down roots, go to seed,* especially realizing human potential is flowering: *blossom, bloom, budding;* the qualities of humans are the qualities of plants: *barren, green (immature, inexperienced) luxuriant (hair cf. Vegetation), seasoned (performer)*; in particular humans are fruits: *peach, apple of my eye, ripe (old age), etc.* (Goatly, 1997: 43)

Youth is compared to unfolding of petals, the beginning of the life-cycle is compared to a flower bud, opening its petals to the sun. The metaphor is combined with the light-dark relationship where light always implies a positive value judgement and darkness a negative one. The worth of a man is compared to the intensity of light; the golden sun is more valuable than a small cheap candle. This combination of metaphors yield an innovative combined metaphor which is creative.

4.2.2.1.

In the following metaphors the physical natural cycle for plants is once more applied to the cycle of human life, pale pink petals unfolding under the golden sun representing the process of growing up, a bud for innocent youth and withered apples for old age.

*She's certainly immense. I mean she's the real thing. **I believe the pale pink petals are folded up there for some wondrous efflorescence in time-to open,** that is, to*

some great golden sun. I'm unfortunately but a small farthing candle. What chance, in such a field, for a poor little artist-man?" (The Ambassadors, 171)

4.2.3. Human - Inanimate

This group of metaphors can be divided into several more specific metaphor sub-groups according to the source domain: in the first sub-group persons are conceptualized as books; in the second sub-group persons are conceived as precious objects, crystal, jewels or objects with perfect shapes and smooth surfaces; and in the third sub-group persons are seen as buildings with all their specific properties. Each group implies a transfer of positive and negative value judgements from the source of concrete objects to the target domain of emotions and ideas.

One of the sub-groups of depersonification metaphors is the PEOPLE ARE BOOKS metaphor. The Elizabethans, like ourselves, were fond of using a PEOPLE ARE BOOKS everyday structural metaphor. Books as a donor field have the following characteristics, some of which can be applicable to people: they are readable, by passing the eye over their print we receive messages, ideally truths. They have covers and are kept closed when not in use. Although a whole book is a lengthy and often complex message, its general character and particular contents are revealed by special parts, namely the title-page and the index. Similarly, people can be 'read': their appearance and their behavior are semiotic. This process can require - for those who are not already 'open books' some opening or revealing process (compare the fairly recent idiom 'He finally opened up to me'). Equally, parts of person's appearance or behavior can be indicative of the whole of his or her character. (A. & J. Thompson, 1987:165). Thus, the face, the heart and the brain can all be 'seen as' books or parts of books. The man's brow is not like a title-leaf because it literally looks like one but also because it has a similar capacity to 'foretell' a story. The resemblance depends primarily upon the conceptual point that the expression of the brow or face is like writing in so far as both are sign-systems which can be 'read' by those possessing the necessary skill. The qualities applied to a book, which can be revised, amended or be brought up to date, are mapped onto the qualities of a person to be improved and changed, but not always for the better.

4.2.3.1.

I'm not sure he was really meant by nature to be quite so good. It's like the new edition of an old book that one has been fond of, revised and amended, brought up to date, but not quite the thing that one knew and loved. *(The Ambassadors, 110)*

... that (thee career) will improve and enlarge him still more. He won't then be my pleasant, well-rubbed, old-fashioned volume at all. You speak of your familiar volume altered out of recognition. Well, who's the editor? (The Ambassadors, 111)

4.2.3.2.

In the second sub-group persons are conceptualized as precious objects, jewels or object made of gold or silver; the positive value judgements from the source domain where these precious metals have positive value are transferred to the target domain of human character and personality.

In the first metaphor of this sub-group a beautiful girl is compared to a pointed diamond, the positive value judgement is transferred from the source domain where a diamond is a precious metal. This metaphor is combined with the metaphor: Ideas are plants, so that sensations are compared to small, wild blossoms to be picked up. This extended metaphor includes all the details of the description where the human mind is compared to a dim forest and new, fresh sensations to wild blossoms.

> *It all fell in beautifully, so that, as, at this time, in spite of her fever, **as a little pointed diamond, the Princess showed something of the glitter of consciously possessing the constructive, the creative hand.** (The Golden Bowl, 398)*

4.2.3.3.

In the following depersonification metaphor, or reification, a person is conceptualized like a crystal; the positive value judgement from the source domain where crystal is considered precious is transferred to the target domain of a person's character. This metaphor is combined with the PART/WHOLE schema where integrity implies perfection with a positive value judgement transferred from the source domain, while fragmentization, cracks and flaws on a smooth surface, imply imperfection, i.e. a negative value judgement.

> *Oh, if I'm a crystal I'm delighted that I'm a perfect one, for I believe that they sometimes have cracks and flaws - in which case they're to be had very cheap. (The Golden Bowl, 121)*

4.2.3.4.

The depersonification metaphors in these two examples conceptualize a person's character as a smooth surface with no concavities, so that the golden drops evenly flow over it. This innovative metaphor represents the extension of the basic metaphor: A PERSON IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT. The metaphor is one of the most productive one and is repeated throughout the novel, so that this repetition adds to the coherence of the whole novel. The plus-minus dynamism is implied by assigning positive values to smooth surfaces and round shapes while negative values are assigned to rugged surfaces, fragmentized forms with cracks and flaws.

In this metaphor the person's character is compared to a smooth surface to express perfection; this metaphor is based on the PART-WHOLE image schema where integrity always implies perfection while disintegration and fragmentation imply imperfection. This perfection of physical shapes and smooth surfaces is mapped onto the perfection of human character and relationships.

*You're round, my boy, when you might have been abominably square. It's the sort of thing in you, that one feels with one's hand. Say you had been formed, all over, in a lot of little pyramidal lozenges like that wonderful side of the Ducal Palace in Venice - so lovely in a building, but so damnable, for rubbing against, in a man - each of them sticking out by itself - all the architectural cut diamonds that would have scratched one's softer sides. **As it is, for living with, you're a pure and perfect crystal.**

*The Prince had taken the idea and nothing perhaps **even could more have confirmed Mr. Verver's account of his surface than the manner in which these golden drops evenly flowed over it.** They caught in no interstice, they gathered in no concavity; the uniform smoothness betrayed the dew but by showing for the moment a richer tone. (The Golden Bowl, 120)*

4.3. Reification

According to A. Goatly (1997), the first and major step on which the metaphorical structuring of abstractions depends is reification. The expressions used to illustrate this structuring have been selected because they seem to apply very generally, that is to a large number of abstract entities. (Goatly, 1996: 46). Abstract entities are seen as concrete objects which can be created: *create/shape/form (a plan, organization etc.), construct (a theory, system, etc.), shape, structure, restructure.* However, they are subject to penetration, destruction and disintegration: *penetrate (an organization, system), damage (prospects), dash/shatter (hopes), destroy, dissipate (time, money, energy).* Their propensity to decay and disintegration will depend on their strength or weakness: *brittle (character), fragile/strong (argument), firm (evidence, decision), flaw/hole (in a theory, argument).*

Like objects the abstract entities can be metaphorically handled, grasped, turned and manipulated, as in conventional expressions: *manipulate, handle (problem, situation), hold (opinions), seize (opportunity).* They can be possessed, or transferred/offered to others, or simply relinquished: *present someone with (information, challenge, difficulty), lend (support), abandon (hope, activity), throw away (opportunity, chance).* These abstract objects are solid enough to have a physical impact on humans: *hard hit by, impact on (responsibility), protect, shield (against danger, from information).* These abstract entities can be possessed or offered to others, or simply relinquished. Hence, *a promise can be kept, support lent, hope abandoned or chance thrown away.*

As objects these reified abstractions have dimensions, shape and parts; they have centers and peripheries, as in metaphorical expressions: *central, core (of a problem), edge (of war).* They can be divided into parts: *shred (of evidence, truth), layer (of meaning)*; they possess dimensions: *small (task, problem),* etc. and changeable shapes: *elastic (ideas, policies) (facts) fit (theory), mould (character, behavior, etc).*

Abstract entities, such as ideas, can be conceptualized as a place, a building (Goatly, 1996: 58). This place has boundaries: *on the verge (of doing something), on*

the threshold (of an activity), (within) the confines/framework (of). It is possible to move into/around an activity as will be shown by metaphors from H. James novels, and is evident from the following conventional metaphorical expressions: *enter/venture/rush (into an activity), know your way around/about (a job/situation), walk into (a job).* It is also possible to cause others to move into an activity: *talk/frighten someone into/out of (doing something)* or to leave off or move/stay out of an activity: *pull out of, keep out of, retreat, shrink from (doing something).*

4.3.1. Ideas/buildings

The first sub-group of the Reification metaphors includes mappings from the source domain of BUILDINGS to the target domain of ideas, or generally abstract entities which are seen as buildings with all their properties, i.e. having definite shape, size and dimensions. They are conceptualized as buildings in a specific setting, on a square or in a park. All the physical properties of buildings are mapped onto the domain of abstract entities, our thoughts, ideas and emotions which are thus materialized. In these metaphors the salient attributes of an OBJECT CATEGORY (BUILDING) and basic level categories (CASTLE, CHURCH) are used to structure the abstract category IDEAS. Thus, these metaphors differ from IDEAS/PLANTS metaphors which are concretive, animistic, humanizing metaphors where the metaphor mappings are derived from the domains of living organisms and human beings. We understand abstract categories (ideas) in terms of these general classes (people, plants) because the specific way in which we interact with instances of these classes is extremely familiar to us, and this INTERACTION provides the source for the metaphorical mappings. Hence, there is a difference between such metaphors as IDEAS/BUILDINGS and IDEAS/PLANTS/PERSONS.

4.3.1.1.

In the following metaphor the metaphorical mapping from the source domain of raising a structure, by piling blocks, is transferred to the target domain of realizing a plan. The physical effort to raise a structure after the blocks have tumbled down is mapped onto the emotional effort to reach a satisfactory solution of a problem.

> **On this affectionate interest the good lady's young friend now built,** *before her eyes - very much as a wise, or even as a mischievous,* **child, playing on the floor, might pile up blocks, skillfully and dizzily,** *with an eye on the face of a covertly-watching elder.* **When the blocks tumbled down they but acted after the nature of blocks; yet the hour would come for their rising so high that the structure would have to be noticed and admired.** *(The Golden Bowl, 369)*

4.3.1.2.

The whole situation, the personal relationship is seen as a building to be entered, looked up at from outside; this reification metaphor is extended to include details of the

structure which is rising high and is combined with a BODY-IN-THE-CONTAINER metaphor where a relationship is seen as a container to be entered, i.e. as a structure to be entered or approached after admiring it from outside.

The relationship, which is an abstract concept, is seen as a concrete building that can be walked around; it is firm, its presence is sensed and it can be approached as we approach a concrete physical structure. Activities are seen as containers in conventional metaphors: *enter/venture/rush (into an activity),* but in this nonconventional metaphorical expression this container has definite shapes and forms; the metaphor is extended by making the container more specific; a temple or a palace.

She had walked round and round it... she had carried on her existence in the space left her for circulation, a space that sometime seemed ample and sometimes narrow; *looking up, all the while at the fair structure that spread itself so amply and rose so high, but never quite making out, as yet, where she might have entered had she wished She had knocked, in short - though she could scarce have said whether for admission or for what;* she had applied her hand to a cool, smooth spot, and had waited to see what would happen. *(The Golden Bowl, 302)*

4.3.2. Emotions – precious objects

In this sub-group of the Reification metaphors emotions, ideas and other abstract concepts are conceptualized as precious objects, jewels, objects made of gold and silver or sacred objects.

4.3.2.1.

A perfect condition such as freedom is compared to a pearl, perfect and rounded; perfect emotion is compared to a perfect shape which is round. A positive value judgement from the donor domain, where the pearl is valued as a precious object, is transferred to the target domain of a perfect state of mind.

It had all been just in order that his freedom should at present be as perfect and rounded and lustrous as some huge precious pearl. He hadn't struggled nor snatched; he was taking but what had been given him; the pearl dropped itself, with its exquisite quality and rarity, straight into his hand. (The Golden Bowl, 268)

4.3.2.2.

The memorable moments, precious memories, are reified and presented as pearls on a string; this metaphor of concretization, reification of abstract things, experiences as precious objects is very productive in the novels of H. James.

It fell, for retrospect, into a succession of moments that were watchable still; several of these moments stood out beyond the others, and those she could feel again most, count again like the firm pearls on a string, had belonged more particularly to the lapse of time before dinner. *(The Golden Bowl, 306)*

4.3.2.3.

The person's character is compared to a silver cross, carried, out of sight, almost hidden. The metaphor is extended to imply the entire situation of carrying a specific precious object; the positive value judgement of silver and gold as precious metals is transferred from the source domain to the target domain of abstract entities. In this metaphor, like in other reification metaphors, an abstract concept is reified as a concrete object which can be carried, hidden, shown, made visible or invisible.

> *What I've always been conscious of is your having concealed about you somewhere no small **amount of character; quite as much in fact. Somewhere under, like that little silver cross** you once showed me, **that you always wear, out of sight, next your skin. That relic I've had a glimpse of.. the precious little innermost, say this time little golden personal nature of you**. (The Golden Bowl, 376)*

4.3.2.4.

A positive emotion like happiness is metaphorically presented as a smooth surface with no holes; the PART/WHOLE schema, according to which physical integrity implies moral integrity thus expressing a positive value judgement, is applied in combination with the reification metaphor; it is further extended to imply that a crack in the physical surface implies disintegration of an emotional relationship. These metaphors are combined with a CONTAINER metaphor in which the bowl is seen as a container for personal relationships. The smooth surface stands for an unimpaired relationship.

> *I want **a happiness without a hole** in it big enough for you to poke in your finger. A **brilliant, perfect surface** - to begin with at least.*
> *The golden bowl - as it was to have been. The bowl with all happiness in it. The bowl without the crack. (The Golden Bowl, 445)*

4.3.2.5.

The abstract concept of a personal relationship is conceptualized as a special trophy; the reification metaphor is extended to include such details as describing this special possession which is wrapped in silk; again a positive value judgement from the source domain of precious metals is transferred to the target domain to emphasize the value of this possession. The trophy is tucked away under the arm of memory; hence the reification metaphor is combined with the personification metaphor where memory is seen as a person carrying memorable events under her arm.

> *She had established in this time-saving way, a relation with it; and **the relation was the special trophy that**, for the hour, she bore off. It was like an absolute possession, a new resource altogether, **something done up in the softest silk and tucked away under the arm of memory.** She hadn' t had it when she went in, and she had it when she came out; she had it thereunder her cloak, but dissimulated, invisibly carried. (The Wings of the Dove, 151)*

CONCLUSION

After analyzing and classifying metaphors according to the source domains into three main groups, i.e. PERSONIFICATION , DEPERSONIFICATION and REIFI-CATION metaphors, it is possible to draw conclusions with reference to the processes of Extension, Elaboration and Composing, as well as regarding the combinations of metaphors and image schemata since these processes are mainly responsible for the distinction between conventional metaphors, root analogies and innovative, creative metaphors. The analysis also includes the consideration of the transfer of positive and negative value judgements from the source domains to the target domain.

In a considerable number of instances we consider the interplay of metaphors with more abstract image schemata in the sense of Johnson (1987) and we explore the way in which concrete subdomains interact with the more abstract image schemata. This yields interesting conclusions about the overall importance of image schemata in the metaphorical expression of value judgements. It is also interesting to stress the contri-bution of specific donor domains (materials, precious objects) to the expression of value judgements which may be transferred from the source domain directly, or may come in only after the extension to a specific target domain, i.e. human feelings and emotions or emotional states.

Image schemata, understood in terms of M. Johnson, are relatively simple struc-tures constantly recurring in our everyday bodily experience. These kinesthetic image schemata give rise to abstract concepts through *metaphorical projections* from physi-cal to abstract domains. (Johnson, 1987: 126). Among these schemata are CON-TAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE as well as such orientations and re-lations as UP-DOWN, PART-WHLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY. Johnson defines a schema as "a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, (our) ongoing ordering activities. These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects and our preconceptual interactions (Johnson, 1987: 29).

According to T.P. Krzeszowski (1993: 310) all preconceptual image schemata must incorporate an additional parameter which is directly responsible for the dyna-mism of the metaphorisation processes. Hence each image schema is activated by the fundamental dynamism PLUS-MINUS, as a vector built into each schema. This funda-mental dynamism is manifested in conventional and unconventional creative meta-phorical expressions.

T. Krzeszowski stresses the importance of value judgements in metaphorical ex-pressions and the transfer, either direct or indirect, of those judgements from the source domain to the target domain. The relevance of value judgements was also considered in the analysis of language action verbials (Vanpary, Vanderbergen, 1995). The study of values with reference to the meaning of various linguistic expressions constitutes the scope of what might be called *axiological semantics* whose task is to describe those values and the ways in which they determine both the structure and the functioning of

human language as manifested in communication. Value judgements are among the most important factors that facilitate metaphorical transfer. (P. Pauwels & A.M. Simon-Vandenbergen, 1995: 364)

The analysis of value judgements is combined with the analysis of the processes of combining, i.e. mixing metaphors with image schemas. In composite metaphors several conventional metaphors are used for one target domain, i.e. two or more such metaphors are used simultaneously in the same passage or sentence. The combination of these metaphors with the mentioned schemas and with the expression of positive and negative value judgements transferred from the source domain to the target domain makes these metaphors innovative, creative and different from basic conceptual metaphors and conventional metaphorical expressions.

Compounding or combining metaphors as defined by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1989) and A. Goatly (1997) includes combinations of coherent metaphors with image-schemata such as the FORCE/CONTROL schema or the WHOLE/PART schema which are combined with personification or depersonification metaphors.

In the analysis of examples from our corpus special attention has been paid to the PART-WHOLE schema and the expression of the semantic axiology (axiological dynamism) in the corresponding metaphorical projections. This schema is connected with the experience of our own bodies as organized WHOLES consisting of PARTS so that WHOLE is experienced as *positive* and, on a more abstract level, as *good.* The most fundamental experience of WHOLE is being in ONE PIECE. Certain secondary experiences are consistent with this basic axiology; putting things together in order *to construct a whole* is experienced as good. Conversely, ruining a thing, destroying an organized structure, disintegrating a system are experienced as bad. These positive and negative experiences are reflected in various unconventional metaphorical extensions (Krzeszowski in press).

In the GOLDEN BOWL metaphor the crack in the gold is considered negative according to the consideration of concepts such as *totality, integrity, ensemble, unity, completeness, integration* as positive (cf. Langacker, 1983, II: 96ff, 157ff) and concepts such as *decompose, disembody, decomposition, decay, disintegration* as negative. Hence, concepts with a positive and negative axiological load emerge from the plus and minus poles of the schemata. A negative value judgement of *decomposition and disintegration* is transferred from the source domain of CONTAINERS to the target domain of a personal relationship which has been marred. This is a perfect example of COMPOUNDING or MIXING where a REIFICATION metaphor has been combined with an abstract preconceptual schema WHOLE/PART and the expression of value judgement which has been transferred from the image schema to the target domain.

Another example of a complex combined metaphor which expresses a positive value judgement is the DOVE metaphor, i.e. an ANIMIZING metaphor where a person is conceptualized as a bird, a dove. The positive value judgement from the source domain of birds, where the dove is associated with innocence and honesty, has been ex-

pressed in the Bible: *Be thou as wise as serpents and innocent as doves.* This ANIMIZING metaphor combined with the expression of the positive value judgement is combined with the image schema MORE IS BETTER. The dove covers them all with her wings; this spatial metaphor implies that gaining more space means increasing one's power and strength when transferred to the target domain of a person's character.

This metaphor is combined with one of the reification metaphors, i.e. COGNITION IS PERCEPTION schema where cognition is metaphorically represented as a perceptual process. Hence, an abstract entity like the revelation of the truth, available knowledge, is made visible while inability to understand is conceptualized as darkness, or more specifically *as walking in the strange dusk.* Thus, the concept of light implies a positive value judgement which is directly transferred to the target domain of abstract entities. Consequently, the interplay of metaphors in this case implies an ANIMIZING or DEPERSONIFICATION metaphor with the COGNITION IS PERCEPTION metaphor, a MORE IS BETTER schema and the transfer of positive value judgements from these source domains of animals, light and space.

Extension of basic metaphors can be analyzed on the examples of THEORIES (IDEAS) ARE BUILDINGS metaphors. The parts of the concept building that are used to structure the concept THEORY are the foundations and the outer shell. The roof, inside rooms, staircases and hallways are parts of a building not used as part of the concept THEORY. Thus, this metaphor has a "used" part and an "unused" part. However, the "unused" parts of this metaphor can be reflected in imaginative language and some basic metaphors can be extended to their unused parts in coining innovative metaphorical expressions. An abstract entity like marriage or other emotional relationships can be conceptualized as a building. The following metaphors are examples of extension and elaboration by using the "unused" part of the metaphor: an abstract entity is conceived as a *glazed rotunda, a temple, a public square, a towering building.*

Elaboration of a conventional animizing metaphor: *Man is a dog* can be followed in the example where specific details are elaborated and added to the conventional metaphor; metaphorical projection from the source domain of animals, i.e. dogs includes specific details, the unused attributes from the source domain. The dog is not any dog but a silken-coated spaniel; being emotionally hurt is conceptualized as getting wet and catching a cold. This animizing metaphor is combined with the Materializing the Abstract metaphor, where emotional pain is conceived in terms of physical pain. The two metaphors imply also a transfer of the negative value judgement from the source domain, of getting physically hurt, to the target domain of emotions.

A whole range of examples refers to the transfer of positive value judgements from the donor domain of precious metals in the sense that precious metals such as, silver, gold, etc. have positive connotations in our culture. Hence, pleasant emotions or memories are conceptualized as a *silver cross, a precious medallion, a string of pearls, etc.*

Positive or negative value judgements are also transferred from the source domain of materials, i.e. their shape, size and dimensions. Thus, the physical properties of strength, hardness, smoothness and the respective characteristics, such as round, imply

positive value judgements which are transferred to the target domain of a person's character: a smooth surface, with no hard edges and with no cracks and holes, implies reliability and this positive value judgement is transferred to the person's character or to an emotional relationship.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of these metaphors is that the image-schematic approach to metaphorisation is essential, both for establishing links between metaphorical expressions originating within a particular domain and for making generalizations over domains. Hence, it is only when we show how all the factors mentioned, i.e. image schemata, domains and value judgements interact that we can capture the intricacies of metaphorisation.

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KOGNITIVNI PRISTUP INOVATIVNIM METAFORAMA IZVEDENIMA KORJENSKIM ANALOGIJAMA

U radu se analizira odnos između konvencionalnih metaforičkih izraza koji se temelje na konceptualnim metaforama i nekonvencionalnih, kreativnih metafora koje nastaju primjenom procesa proširivanja, razrađivanja, stvaranja metaforičkih sklopova i drugim oblicima stvaranja jedinstvenih, novih metafora. Analiza se temelji na kognitivnoj teoriji metafore G. Lakoffa, M. Johnsona i M. Turnera (1980, 1987, 1989) i na novijim radovima A. Goatlya (1997), G. Steena (1994), T. Krzeszowskog (1993), D.C. Freemana (1993), itd. Korpus na kojem je izvršena analiza nekonvencionalnih metafora uključuje romane H. Jamesa: Ambasadori, Krila golubice i Zlatni pehar. Uvod sadrži teoretski pregled teorija metafore od Aristotela do najnovijih filozofskih i psiholoških pristupa metafori. Prvi dio sadrži osnovne postavke kognitivne teorije metafore prema kojoj je čitav naš konceptualni sustav metaforički strukturiran. U drugom dijelu razmatra se odnos između kreativnih metafora i temeljnih metafora koje A.Goatly (1993) definira kao "root analogies". Iznosi se kratak pregled tehnika koje se koriste u stvaranju kreativnih metafora s posebnim naglaskom na izražavanje vrijednsonih sudova, tj. pozitivnog i negativnog aksiološkog dinamizma koji je ugrađen u slikovnim shemama, odnosno u metaforama koje se temelje na ovim shemama (Johnson, 1987). Treći dio uključuje analizu i klasifikaciju metafora prema izvornim područjima i slikovnim shemama u okviru kognitivnog pristupa metafori. Analiziraju se ontološke metafore s podjelom na skupine metafora personifikacije, depersonifikacije i reifikacije s naglaskom na izražavanje vrijednosnih sudova koji se izravno ili neizravno prenose iz izvornog područja. Zaključak obuhvaća razmišljanja o utjecaju procesa proširivanja, razrađivanja i spajanja metafora, odnosno interakcije metafora i slikovnih shema, na stvaranje ovih inovativnih, jedinstvenih metafora, kao i njihov doprinos koherenciji teksta književnog djela.