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**Inner Sense and the Broad Perceptual Model:
A Reply to Shoemaker**

Abstract

In several recent essays, Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspective knowledge lacks certain central features which parallel the conditions satisfied by ordinary cases of sense perception. In one influential paper, he discusses and criticizes the “broad perceptual” model of the nature of introspective knowledge of mental states, the view which claims that our introspective awareness of internal facts is analogous to our awareness of facts about the external world. This model may be characterized by its conformance to two conditions of ordinary perceptual awareness which Shoemaker dubs the causation condition and the independence condition. Shoemaker attacks the broad perceptual model by arguing that certain mental facts are “self-intimating”, with the implication being that introspective awareness of mental states does not satisfy the independence condition, and hence its character is not adequately captured by the broad perceptual model. In what follows, I will discuss the main arguments of Shoemaker’s essay. I will argue that a broad perceptual model of introspection can successfully circumvent the central problems he raises; and along the way I will develop some criticisms regarding certain aspects of Shoemaker’s positive proposal.

Key words

inner sense, awareness, introspection, self-knowledge, phenomenal character, perceptual experience

1. Features of inner awareness

In several recent essays, Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspective knowledge lacks certain central features which parallel the conditions satisfied by ordinary cases of sense perception. In one influential paper, Shoemaker discusses and criticizes the “broad perceptual” model of the nature of introspective knowledge of mental states, the view which claims that our introspective awareness of internal facts is analogous to our awareness of facts about the external world. This model may be characterized by its conformance to two conditions of ordinary perceptual awareness which Shoemaker dubs the *causation condition* and the *independence condition*. The former states that perceptual beliefs are causally produced (via some reliable causal mechanism) by the objects or states of affairs that are perceived. The latter condition asserts the *observation-independence* of external world facts from perceptual awareness of those facts; the objects and states of affairs which the perception is said to be *of* exist independently of their being perceived. In other words, there is no entailment relation between perceived objects or external world facts and their being perceived. In a similar way, the existence of mental states is said to be independent of our awareness of them. Shoemaker attacks the

broad perceptual model by arguing that certain mental facts are “self-intimating” (although not necessarily transparent), with the implication being that introspective awareness of mental states does not satisfy the independence condition, and hence its character is not adequately captured by the broad perceptual model. In what follows, I will discuss the main arguments of Shoemaker’s essay. I will argue that a broad perceptual model of introspection can successfully circumvent the central problems he raises; and along the way I will develop some criticisms regarding certain aspects of Shoemaker’s positive proposal.

Shoemaker begins by describing eight main features of the perceptual awareness of external objects. Condition (1) is the *organ condition*: sense perception involves the operation of a sense organ and the fact of getting the organ into a proper relation to external object. (2) is the *appearance condition*: the occurrence of sense experiences are distinct from the external object of perception. Put another way, there is an appearance/ reality distinction defined over perceptual experiences. (3) is the *object awareness condition*: one’s awareness of the facts provided by perception is explained by one’s awareness of objects involved in those facts. (4) is the *identification condition*: perception gives one information about the object of perception which enables one to identify what the object is and to distinguish it from other objects. (5) is the *intrinsic feature condition*: the perception of objects standardly involves perceiving some of their intrinsic, non-relational properties, such as color or shape. (6) is the *attention condition*: objects of perception are potential objects of attention, i.e. one can shift attention from one perceived object to another. (7) is the *causation condition*: perceptual beliefs are causally produced (via some reliable causal mechanism) by the objects or states of affairs that are perceived. (8) is the *independence condition*: the objects and states of affairs which the perception is said to be *of* exist independently of their being perceived. In other words, there is no entailment relation between the perceived object and that object’s *being* perceived (Shoemaker 1996, pp. 204–206). In defending the broad perceptual model, my arguments for the most part will focus on these last two conditions – the causation condition and independence condition – because these are the conditions that Shoemaker and many others regard as most defensible with respect to drawing an analogy between introspective awareness and normal perceptual awareness of external objects.¹ These two conditions in a sense define the broad perceptual model. Others have defended a similar claim (Gertler 2001, pp. 308–212).

Shoemaker proceeds to show how these features involved in normal perceptual awareness are not analogous to what goes on in introspective awareness (inner perception) of internal objects. He notes that it is generally accepted that introspection does not satisfy conditions (1) and (2) – for there is no real organ involved in introspection, and there is no appearance/ reality distinction defined over introspective awareness. One’s awareness of a sensation or sensory experience is not mediated by any further sensation or experience that is “of” the first one; rather, the awareness involved in such experiences is direct and immediate. But Shoemaker ignores these disanalogies and instead focuses the remainder of his discussion on conditions (3)–(6). The possible objects of introspective awareness appear to be one’s “self,” intentional states, and sensations. However, the “self” does not satisfy (3). In ordinary cases of perception, one comes to know facts about an object by getting oneself into a proper relation with the object (the “in view relation”), but one cannot come to know facts about the self by “getting” oneself into the relation of identity with the object in question, which just is the self (Shoemaker 1996, p. 209).

Nor is (4) satisfied, for in introspective self-knowledge there is no room for an identification of oneself in the way in which outer perception gives one “identification information” about its objects. Moreover, in the typical case there is no possibility of *misidentifying* the self, and even where “making an identification” is involved, it always presupposes the prior possession of other first-person knowledge that is not identification-based (1996, pp. 210–211).

Mental states which are *intentional*, such as beliefs and desires, do not satisfy condition (5). Shoemaker claims that we are not aware of any intrinsic features of these propositional attitudes, but are only aware of their relational or representational features. This is because such states are standardly individuated by their intentional contents, or by what they are *about*, which involve their external and relational aspects. There is no entity “inside the head” that serves as the “object” of one’s introspective awareness or is such that one is aware of that state by introspecting and picking out its intrinsic, non-intentional properties (1996, pp. 212–213). Hence propositional attitudes are not internal states we identify or become acquainted with by receiving information about their intrinsic characteristics. Also, one does not typically arrive at an awareness of an intentional state (say, a belief or desire) through some process of identification, for it does not seem possible in general to *misidentify* a certain belief as some other belief; thus such mental states do not satisfy condition (4).

Shoemaker turns next to the case of awareness of sensations and sense experiences, which he contends does not meet condition (5). We are not introspectively aware of the qualitative or intrinsic features of sensations, but only their relational or representative features. We are aware of purely *intentional* objects or contents, as is similar in the case of beliefs and other higher order cognitive states (1996, pp. 216–218). The intentional object of a sensory state, e.g. an image, is not an actually existing (internal) object, but rather a non-existent possible (external) object. To put it another way, there is just *the experience of having an image*, which is purely representational in character. Hence, what we are aware of in being aware of sensory states will not be intrinsic properties of them, and so condition (5) is not met.² But neither is (6) fulfilled in the case of sensory states. If you put your hands out in front of you, you can only focus attention on the object (hand) itself, or shift your attention from one hand to the other. You will find yourself quite unable to shift or focus your attention on the experience of the hand itself. As for after-images and the like, the notion of *shifting one’s attention* in these cases presupposes the outmoded “act-object” conception of sensations, along with its unwarranted reification of images. Such attendings are *not* to existent objects of “inner sense,” but to *nonexistent* intentional objects of outer sense (1996, p. 220). So far from its being the case that in order to account for self-knowledge we must assume a “vision-like” access to our mental states, it appears that an adequate explanation of such knowledge must appeal to features that are fundamentally *dissimilar* to ordinary vision. All this matters for Shoemaker because on the *object-perceptual* model, introspective awareness will be at least partially grounded in the intrinsic features of mental entities, and so there will be at least some mental concepts that are not functionally definable. This provides

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Thanks to an anonymous referee for the journal who pointed out the need for clarification on this point.

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I qualify this claim further in my comments below in the following section, where I discuss certain problems with Shoemaker’s view of awareness.

some motivation for opposing the object-perceptual model and seeking elsewhere for an alternative account.

2. Shoemaker on introspective awareness and phenomenal character

Before turning to discuss in detail the broad perceptual model, I want to take up a number of related issues and challenges having to do with Shoemaker's view of introspection and the phenomenal character of experience. Some of what he says here is very hard to sort out, especially the account he offers of qualia and its connection with perception and introspection. According to Shoemaker, the majority view, that certain "qualitative" features of sense experience are not captured by the representational content of experience, presupposes the "object-perception" model of introspective awareness. While on the one hand our perceptual experiences are "diaphanous," in the sense that their contents seem to represent features of the external environment (e.g. 'blueness' is experienced as a property *of the sky itself*, namely its color), on the other hand the way things appear to us seems to depend in part on the nature of the constitution of our sensory apparatus (e.g. our visual system).³

Shoemaker distinguishes between physical properties, such as colors (e.g., the blueness of the sky), and *phenomenal characters*, or the way things look or are perceived (e.g. the sky's "looking blue" to me). Perplexity arises because locating the "phenomenal character" *in the experience itself* implies that our sense experiences systematically misrepresent external objects; on the other hand, if these qualities really *do* belong to the objects, then what do we say is the nature of the experience? Shoemaker immediately rejects what he calls *literal projectivism*, the view that we "project" onto the external world features that in fact belong to our experience(s) of it. He finds it unintelligible to think that properties we normally conceive of as belonging to spatially extended objects could belong to an experience or sensation:

"Remember that an experience is an *experiencing*, an entity that is 'adjectival on' a subject of experience. It seems no more intelligible to suppose that a property of such an entity is experienced as a property of extended material objects than it is to suppose that a property of a number, such as being prime or being even, is experienced as a property of material things" (1996, pp. 250–251).

Thus he takes phenomenal characters to be properties of external objects themselves. At the same time, Shoemaker is impressed by the "inverted spectrum" argument, which he takes as showing that the way things *seem* or *appear* to one – the phenomenal aspect of experience – is in part observer relative. But how can phenomenal characters be *both* properties of objects *and* observer relative? A view to which Shoemaker is somewhat more sympathetic is *figurative projectivism*. When an experience instantiates a quale, the subject perceives something in the world as instantiating some property associated with that quale. In fact, though, the associated property is neither instantiated in the external world nor in the experience itself, but is merely an aspect of the intentional content of the experience. But like literal projectivism, this view suffers the same consequence of infecting our perceptual experiences with the illusion that external things have properties they do not really have. (And what is worse, such properties are never instantiated in anything at all!) What Shoemaker admires about the view is that *a*) the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by some aspect of its representational content, *b*) the properties of representational content that "fix" this phenomenal character

are not themselves features of experience, and *c*) the qualia instantiated in an experience *do* determine that representational content.

How, Shoemaker asks, is it possible to hold these positive tenets of the theory in such a way as to resolve the above mentioned paradox and avoid the charge that our experiences misrepresent the external world? The only solution is to say that the properties one's experience attributes to an external object are *relational* properties – that is, that the “phenomenal characters” are *causal-relational* properties. If Jack and Jill are spectrum inverted relative to each other, and Q1 is the quale associated with redness in Jack while Q2 is the quale associated with redness in Jill, then Jack's experience represents a ripe tomato as having a relational property R1 and Jill's experience represents the tomato as having a relational property R2. Since in point of fact the tomato possesses both R1 and R2, and in addition has the (physical) property of being red (also represented in the experiences of Jack and Jill), the contents of their experiences do not involve any form of misrepresentation of the tomato (1996, p. 253). According to Shoemaker, we are not introspectively aware of qualia; we are not aware of (for instance) Q1 or Q2, but rather phenomenal characters or properties (henceforth *P-properties*), e.g. R1 and R2. If when one looks at a ripe tomato her experience instantiates the quale Q, then she will (correctly) perceive the tomato as having the *P-property* R, which can be characterized as “the (relational) property of causing or producing an experience with intrinsic quality Q.” But she perceives this relation as a monadic property – R is not represented *as* a relational property, and “no reference to [Q] enters into the content of the experience” (1996, pp. 256, footnote). So what we are directly (introspectively) aware of in experience are *P-properties*; qualia are known only inferentially, by reflecting upon and analyzing our experience of *P-properties*.⁴

What does Shoemaker have to say about pain? His explanation is modeled on the same sort of representational account he offers for perceptual experience. Take the example of a pain in my right foot. The pain, or “hurtfulness,” is a property of my foot that my experience represents my foot as having. More specifically, the pain is a certain *P-property* of my foot, that of producing an experience (in me) having a certain quale.⁵ This involves a kind of *perceptual* awareness, an awareness of my foot as having a certain phenomenal property (its hurtfulness). But as with the other kinds of sensations, I am not aware of the pain *as* a relational property (*P-property*). There is an awareness *that* I am having an experience of my foot hurting, but this should not be misconstrued as some kind of inspection by inner sense of the associated quale (1996, pp. 258). Shoemaker maintains that all of our sensory experiences, from perception, to tactual and gustatory experiences, to pains and itches, all have this same basic structure.

Shoemaker argues that a physicalist-functionalist view of mind is compatible with the irreducibility of the phenomenal character of experience. Following Quine, creatures capable of perception have “quality spaces,” based on dif-

³ Shoemaker discusses the nature of appearance properties in more detail in (1996, pp. 249–250) and also in (2002, p. 468).

⁴ For a helpful overview of issues surrounding the inverted spectrum argument, see Tye (2002, pp. 104–115).

⁵ In a more recent paper (2002), Shoemaker considers another possibility, that the pain is an intentional property which represents my foot as having a certain phenomenal character (or *P-property*), namely the property of “hurting.”

fering degrees of discriminability of stimuli in their environment. For each species, a “similarity ordering” is imposed on possible stimuli, which in turn produces a similarity ordering on that creature’s internal states. According to Shoemaker, sensory states have the phenomenal similarities (and differences) they do “in virtue of the roles they play in producing the behaviors that exhibit the quality space of the creature.”⁶ Qualia have similarity and difference relations in virtue of their ability to cause a subject to make judgments of similarity and difference about the corresponding phenomenal characters or *P-properties*. And so these similarity and difference relations are definable in terms of their causal powers or functional roles. Since qualia, then, are features of experience in virtue of which experiences stand in these relations of phenomenal similarity, it follows that qualia are *functionally* definable, in the sense that the similarity relations between qualia are functionally definable. Yet, for Shoemaker, individual qualia themselves are *not* functionally definable, because it remains open which *particular* qualia states are responsible for the phenomenal similarities and differences. Since Shoemaker thinks that qualia inversion is at least a logical (and perhaps real) possibility, there will be a very strong sense in which the phenomenal character of experience is both ineffable and irreducible.

Although this is an ingenious attempt on Shoemaker’s part to reconcile a two-fold commitment to the existence of phenomenal qualia and the diaphanousness of sensory experience, the account is not without difficulties of its own. First of all, there is the problem of *how* instantiations of *P-properties* help cause relevant experiences.⁷ Q-experiences cannot be caused by external objects having the property of *causing Q-experiences*. It doesn’t seem to make sense to say that the (causal) disposition to produce effect *E* could be the *cause* of *E*. Suppose my younger daughter swipes her hand across a stack of wooden blocks made by her older sister (who claims she was building a skyscraper), knocking the blocks down and leveling the building. In pondering the metaphysics of this event, surely it is not the property of *causing the blocks to fall* that caused the blocks to fall! Rather, it was the swipe of younger sister’s mischievous hand that brought about the unhappy result. In the same way, to claim that a causal-relational property such as a *P-property* causes one to have a certain experience appears on the face of it to be a kind of category mistake.

A second difficulty is that on Shoemaker’s account of qualia and “phenomenal characters,” it does not seem possible to be aware of any differences in the phenomenal quality or “feel” of an experience. Suppose that the bright red apple *looks red* to Jack and that a patch of green grass *looks green* to him. This difference can only consist in the fact that the relevant *P-properties* cause different phenomenal qualia (or Q-ness) in Jack’s experience of the apple than they do in his experience of the patch of grass. But Shoemaker contends that no qualia ever enter into the awareness of Jack’s experience. But since it is not possible to be aware of a difference in phenomenal character without being aware of the property in virtue of which such a difference *exists*, then it would seem to be impossible for Jack to be aware of any differences in the phenomenal character of those experiences. The same problem arises in accounting for the differences in the way a given object may appear to different perceivers (e.g. Jack and Jill) whose color experiences, say, are spectrum inverted relative to each other.

A related issue concerns the fact that on Shoemaker’s theory, the content of our experiences consist of representational properties, and the properties

which are represented are really properties of the external object, what I have called *P-properties*. But since we aren't aware of qualia, which are one of the relata of any *P-property*, how can we ever know that the object we are perceiving has *this* particular *P-property*? Recall that because Shoemaker does not want his theory to have the consequence that perceivers “project” qualia onto the object, he must claim that no reference to a qualia state *Q* can enter into the experience at all. But saying this seems to effectively sever any epistemic link the subject might have to the *Q-ness* of his experience. There will be no way for the subject to know of *Q* by reflection and description without first somehow being aware of the *Q-ness* of his experience, that is, without perceiving the object *as* causing a *Q*-experience. However, since he does not introspect the *Q-ness* of the experience at all, how can the agent know that the object, instead of exemplifying the *P-property* *Q** (the property of *causing a Q-experience in S*), does not exemplify the *P-property* *T**, or the property of *causing a T-experience in S*? This problem seems unanswerable on Shoemaker's proposal.

Furthermore, locating the “phenomenal characters” in the external object does not alleviate the problem of *misrepresentation* or misperception of the object, which is one of Shoemaker's primary motivations for rejecting both *projectivist* models. Once again, on Shoemaker's account, one's particular experience represents an object as having a certain relational property *R*, a *P-property*, which can be defined as *the disposition to produce a Q-experience in S*. But in *S*'s actual experience, neither the relational aspect nor the *Q-ness* itself is perceived or introspected. So when *S* looks at a bright red apple and has a certain color experience, namely the apple's *looking bright red* to him, its looking red is not perceived as a relational property, nor is it equivalent to the *Q-ness* of the experience. Still, when *S* looks at the apple, he *attributes* to it the quality of *looking bright red*. (Something about “the way it looks” to *S* is perceived!) So by attributing this property to the apple, *S* must thereby be attributing to it something quite different from *Q** itself, some quality that the apple does not *really* possess. So on Shoemaker's construal *S*'s (visual) experience misperceives the object in just as radical a way as it does on any projectivist model.

Shoemaker's proposal also encounters serious difficulties in explaining the nature of *quasi-perceptual* experiences such as illusions or hallucinations, along with other kinds of sensory experiences like imaging. Suppose that I am really discouraged by all the bad weather we've been having, and so I stare off in a day-dreamy like state and form an image of a beautiful sunset (or better yet, I hallucinate one!). On Shoemaker's theory, my experience is made up of certain representational properties, that is, my experience represents a *purely* intentional object in a certain way. The phenomenal aspect of the experience is its intentional content. For example, I am aware that the sky's horizon in my sunset is bright orange-red. What I am aware of are intentional features of my experience; my experience represents the intentional object as having these features. Now on Shoemaker's account, qualia instantiated in the experience determine its representational content. So when the horizon looks

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1996, p. 262. Of course, as Shoemaker notes, the fact that they have these roles will be dependent on the complexity and sophistication of the creature's sensory and cognitive equipment.

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This objection is formulated independently by Eric Lormand in (2000, p. 160).

orange-red, my experience represents the intentional object (sky) as having a certain *P-property*, say the property of *causing an O-experience in me*. But now a problem stares us in the face: in the case of ordinary perception, the objects that have these causal powers are objects that actually exist. It seems evident that only *existing* objects can have any causal powers. But in the case of hallucinations, illusions, imaging and the like, the intentional objects are nonexistent. The relatum of the standard *P-property* which instantiates that property and is responsible for causing my experience is nonexistent, so there is no way for it enter into the *P-property* at all. (How can an object that does not actually exist *instantiate* a property?). From this we can construct an *anti P-property argument* that bears certain affinities to the argument from hallucination employed in support of the now all-but-scraped sense datum theory of perception (but of course without *that* argument's implausibility!). Whatever mechanisms or factors (internal and external) are responsible for my experience having certain phenomenal properties in cases of imaging and the like, these same factors will be at work in producing the phenomenal element(s) involved in ordinary perceptual experience. Since in quasi-perception such factors do not include the instantiation of *P-properties*, there will be no reason to think that normal perception involves instantiation of *P-properties* either.

What about the case of pain? In what way does Shoemaker take (the experience of) pain to be a representational property? Pain must be represented either conceptually or non-conceptually. Shoemaker opts for the latter, claiming that the experience of pain is a kind of perceptual representation of a *P-property*, a property of a part of the body, namely its *hurting*. But the phenomenology of the experience of pain, its qualitative feel, speaks against its being a form of perceptual representation. A subject who is in pain does not *see* herself hurting. In addition, the account just sketched would seem to imply that *S* can't have this property (i.e. the hurting) without there being a limb or body part in which it is located. But people clearly *do* experience pain in situations where a limb is absent or paralyzed, as cases of "phantom pain" demonstrate. This problem parallels the one discussed in the previous paragraph, regarding quasi-perceptual experience. Now if Shoemaker wishes to construe pain in the alternate way noted above, where he defines pain as an intentional property which represents a part of the body as having a certain phenomenal character (or *P-property*), then he appears to have solved the phantom limb problem, but only at the expense of forcing our notion of pain to no longer reflect the ordinary grammar of pain language. For pain talk does seem to imply that pain is in some sense located in the limb or body part that is damaged (e.g., I step on a nail and exclaim "My foot hurts!"). This account also separates the notion of *pain* from that of the *hurting*, which on the face of it seem to refer to the same thing. At any rate, Shoemaker's lack of a definite commitment to a particular account of pain reflects an important incompleteness in his overall theory, because it is the "pain problem" which poses as the paradigm difficulty for his representational theory of mental states and his account of our introspective access to them.

3. Shoemaker's critique of the broad perceptual model

I turn now to Shoemaker's treatment of the broad perceptual model of introspective awareness and his critique of the independence condition. As a way to highlight the central issue, Shoemaker considers the question of whether or not there could be people who are introspectively blind ("self-blind") to a wide range of the mental phenomena to which normal people have introspec-

tive access. Imagine creatures who have intellectual and conceptual capacities comparable to ours but who are self-blind with respect to their feelings of pain. Supposing that the creature dislikes the pain and wishes for it to end, it would be normal for her to exhibit instances of pain behavior (e.g. reaching for the medicine cabinet or calling a doctor). But such desires to be rid of the pain, along with the ensuing pain behavior, seems to make sense only on the assumption that the subject is aware of her pain and believes she is in pain (otherwise how could her behavior qualify as *pain behavior* at all?). On the other hand, if we assume that she has no dislike for the pain and engages in no pain behavior, but we maintain that the pain is unpleasant nevertheless, we land ourselves in an uncomfortable epistemic position. We would have no way to rule out the possibility that what we all take to be innocent and pleasure-filling activities actually produce in us states that are extremely unpleasant (1996, pp. 227–228). And there would be nothing bad about this, because although our pains hurt, they don't hurt us. Shoemaker finds this supposition nonsense.

Shoemaker wonders whether one with normal perceptual access to the external world could be self-blind with respect to the sorts of experiences that occur in normal perception. The perceptual judgments one makes must be a function of the nature of one's perceptual experiences together with his or her beliefs about perceptual conditions (1996, p. 229).⁸ Supposing that an allegedly self-blind person could make the appropriate perceptual judgments by being somehow "hard-wired" to respond to various experience/ belief combinations, then if deprived of information about certain perceptual conditions (e.g., the lighting conditions in a room) such a person would be unable to say what her visual experience, for example, is like. But this would not be a case of self-blindness according to Shoemaker, for this person lacks the appropriate sensitivity to combinations of experiences and beliefs about perceptual conditions, and thus her perceptual experiences would be altogether different from those of normal persons. Furthermore, the perceptual conditions of one's environment are sometimes uncertain, requiring a certain kind of "low level theorizing" that presupposes having access to certain facts about the nature of one's current experience, e.g. the way a given object appears (1996, p. 231). So it doesn't seem possible for a person to have normal perceptual experiences of the kind we do and yet lack introspective access to them.

To what extent could a person be self-blind with respect to her intentions and volitions? Suppose we observe a person with normal cognitive abilities engaged in some action, but the person denies she has introspective access to what she is doing (she learns what she is doing only by observing her own behavior). Is this kind of case coherent? Since the execution of some action plans involves verbal behavior as well as nonverbal behavior, we will have to suppose that she is self-blind to any verbal behavior that is involved. While such a scenario is conceivable, Shoemaker doubts that it should count as a case of self-blindness. A more natural interpretation is that there are two "selves" or occupants of the body in question – one which controls the nonverbal behavior and some verbal behavior, the other which controls the utterances of introspective ignorance of what is going on (the "agnostic"). Supposing that these utterances were part of an overall coherent pattern of discourse involving all the verbal behavior, so that we could reasonably conclude that a single

8

In Shoemaker's view of perceptual experience, the immediate perceptual judgment(s)

which issue from experience is to be distinguished from the experience itself.

subject were responsible for the entire gamut of behavior, then the “agnostic” would be in a position to draw the same conclusion. So Shoemaker infers that she would have to know *something* about her own beliefs and desires (in order to rationalize all of the verbal and nonverbal behavior going on so as to conclude that it all issues from the same agent), and hence she would need to have introspective awareness of those beliefs and desires (1996, pp. 234–235). At the very least, then, it seems that introspective access to some of one’s beliefs and desires is a necessary condition of knowledge of one’s own agency.

The final kind of case Shoemaker considers is the possibility of self-blindness with respect to one’s beliefs and desires. A “rational agent” is short for “a person with normal intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity,” while a “self-aware agent” is a person who has normal introspective awareness of his own beliefs and desires. A rational agent will answer affirmatively to the question “Do you believe that *P*?” if and only if he will answer affirmatively to the question “Is it true that *P*?” To put it another way, a rational agent will “appreciate the logical impropriety of affirming something while denying that one believes it” (1996, pp. 237). Since the statement “I believe that *P*” is the same thing as giving an affirmative answer to the first question (above), sometimes a rational agent will be disposed to answer that question with the utterance “I believe that *P*.” So there appears to be a strong connection between the ability to give verbal expression to beliefs and the ability to self-ascribe them. But that’s not all. A rational agent will be disposed to use *P* in his reasonings, and because (through a chain of sequential reasoning) he will know that it is in his best interests (*ceteris paribus*) to act on the assumption that *P* is true and that he believes that *P*, he will thus tend to act in ways that manifest to others that he believes that *P*, including making the utterance “I believe that *P*.” Shoemaker takes this to show that the agent is self-aware with respect to his belief that *P*.⁹

At this point Shoemaker pauses to assuage a worry about the argument. We normally do not come to make statements about our own beliefs by the use of such arguments. Shoemaker responds that this objection rests on a misunderstanding – for the purpose of going through the process of reasoning is merely to demonstrate that a rational agent’s first-order beliefs (along with normal intelligence and rationality) are enough to explain the behavior that manifests certain of his second-order beliefs.¹⁰ On Shoemaker’s account, for *S* to believe that *S* believes that *P* is just to say that *S* believes that *P* and that *S* possesses certain faculties of rationality and intelligence. If the preceding arguments against self-blindness refute the claim that the *independence condition* is a key feature of introspective awareness, then the broad perceptual model of introspective awareness is itself cast into serious doubt.

4. In defense of the broad perceptual model

As I see it, there are several significant weaknesses in Shoemaker’s critique of the broad perceptual model. I begin with his arguments against introspective self-blindness. It will be worthwhile to consider them in turn. First, it seems that the case of infants and some lower mammals may provide counter-examples to some of Shoemaker’s arguments. Babies and chimpanzees, for example, are not capable of representing their mental states conceptually, and hence they are incapable of having introspective access to those states. Yet clearly we do not want to deny that they can have such first order sensory states. For instance, infants and monkeys experience pain and color sensa-

tions, and these states play their appropriate causal roles in responding to various environmental stimuli and producing certain output behavior – in spite of the fact that these creatures are unable represent their pain or visual experiences conceptually. These are cases where the experiences of certain creatures are not *representable* conceptually; such creatures do not possess the concepts (or conceptual capacity) necessary to be able to represent their experiences in the way required. Now perhaps Shoemaker could respond by claiming that in my examples the self-blind creatures do not possess the same degree of rationality as human beings, nor do they have the same ability to conceive of the phenomena in question. But if Shoemaker limits the applicability of his argument in this way, there is an important sense in which it ceases to be interesting. For the question is whether there *could* be creatures who have mental states like ours and yet who are (introspectively) unaware of them. If such a possibility exists, that is enough to undermine the original claim that the existence of such mental states implies their being introspectively accessible.

Perhaps a more promising line of response to this kind of counterexample would be to deny any necessary link between the ability of a creature to represent its sensory states conceptually and its ability to engage in some form of introspective awareness. Presumably the idea here would be that although the creature does not represent its own experiential states conceptually, it nonetheless enjoys a kind of “peripheral awareness” of such states and their (qualitative) character, an awareness that doesn’t involve the full-fledged use of concepts. If this is right, then undergoing a certain mental state might still entail having introspective access to that state. Hence the existence of such creatures would cease to pose a problem for Shoemaker’s argument.¹¹

Let’s turn now to another type of case. If, as Shoemaker asks us to suppose, there could be creatures who are self-blind to or unaware of, say, the hurtfulness of their pains (for pain is a feeling¹²), then it *does* seem to be a real possibility that these creatures will not *find* their pains to be unpleasant. The implication that Shoemaker draws out from this is the alarming and absurd possibility that what we take to be activities and events that bring us pleasure might actually produce states in us that are *unpleasant*. While this may seem like “nonsense” with respect to *us*, a human species which distinguishes between the occurrence of pain and the occurrence of pleasure on the basis of inner awareness, I do not find it incoherent to suppose that there could be creatures, with rational and intellectual capacities comparable to ours, who have no such inner awareness. As long as such creatures can have internal states which (i) realize the property of *being a sensation of painfulness or*

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Shoemaker (1996, pp. 238–239). He later employs the same line of thought in reference to *desiring* and *wanting*. Because similar remarks apply both in the cases of belief and desire, I have chosen to follow the example he uses of belief.

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Shoemaker briefly sketches an additional argument against this type of self-blindness (1996, p. 240), which goes roughly as follows: it seems that in order for us to make conscious, rational revisions and adjustments to our belief system (as we sometimes do),

we must know something about what the contents of our belief system are, and this will involve higher order beliefs which presuppose that we have some introspective access to the first-order beliefs that they are about.

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Thanks to an anonymous referee for the journal for suggesting this possibility.

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Shoemaker develops a sophisticated account of pain in (2002).

hurtfulness, (ii) are caused by various sorts of tissue damage, and (iii) produce various forms of involuntary behavior (wincing, groaning, and the like), those creatures would qualify as being capable of having the mental state of *being in pain*, regardless of their having any inner awareness of such a state.¹³ Alternatively, these creatures could have a strong dislike for and desire for the pain to go away, and yet be unaware of *these* states (see below). The bare possibility of there being such creatures establishes the fact that the connection between the existence of a pain state and direct awareness of that state is a contingent one.

Furthermore, according to considerations appealed to in Shoemaker's argument, the kind of "access" to experiences that is required in order to form normal perceptual judgments and to engage in the sort of low level theorizing he speaks of is at best a very weak form of "awareness" analogous to a type of consciousness that Ned Block has dubbed "access consciousness." According to Block, an internal state of an agent is *access conscious* if that state has representational content which *a*) is poised for use as a premise in reasoning, and *b*) is poised for rational control of speech and action (Block 1997, pp. 382–383). Some crucial features of an access conscious state are that it has representational content, it is individuated by the functional role that the content plays in a given system, and its access conscious properties are not essential to the state itself. It appears that Shoemaker is explicating a particular conception of introspective awareness that is parallel to Block's notion of access consciousness. Block points out that there are other forms of consciousness (and introspective awareness), such as "monitoring consciousness." Such internal monitoring could take many forms such as internal scanning or perhaps higher-order thought which involves forming judgments about other internal states. Monitoring consciousness seems to involve events that would cause one to be in internal (introspective) states that are different from states that are the result of events that comprise access consciousness.

Now in order to have the appropriate sensitivity to combinations of perceptual experiences and beliefs necessary for making perceptual judgments, one need only have a kind of first order awareness of one's current mental state, which is nothing more than the initial *experiencing* itself. One need not have an awareness of *being in* the perceptual state, nor does such awareness involve any internal scanning or focusing of one's attention on the character of the experience. And one need not form any kind of judgment at all *about* the state itself. This kind of first order experience, along with beliefs about perceptual conditions, is sufficient in order for the agent's internal state to be poised for use in making judgments about things in his environment. No further awareness of or "access to" the experience is required. But then one may ask, does this form of access qualify as genuine introspection? And even if it does, might not Shoemaker's arguments neglect a significant form of introspective awareness that, when all is said and done, still satisfies his independence condition? Since the notion of introspection targeted in Shoemaker's critique parallels Block's notion of "access consciousness," let's call it *A-type* introspection. In contrast, the form of access that involves the subject's conscious awareness of *being in* a particular mental state, and which also includes activities such as internal scanning and the formation of second order judgments about the state, parallels Block and Lycan's notion of "monitoring consciousness".¹⁴ Let us call such awareness *M-type* introspection. Now Shoemaker's arguments against self-blindness of one's own perceptual states demonstrate only the inseparability of the existence of those states from *A-type* introspective awareness of them. This conclusion I am completely willing to grant.

Nevertheless, I think that it would be quite easy to show that *M-type* awareness of one's perceptual experiences continues to satisfy Shoemaker's independence condition. There is nothing about the nature of *this* type of (second-order) internal state or awareness that would indicate that it is entailed by the existence of the state it is of.

Does it beg the question against Shoemaker to appeal to *M-type* consciousness here? After all, part of his point is that monitoring consciousness doesn't exist. There are several things that might be said in response. First, the distinction between a state and a mechanism that collects and processes information about the state seems every bit as intuitive as Shoemaker's own distinction between core and total realizations. Also, there is a phenomenology of monitoring. Sensations of pain reveal new aspects (e.g. certain internal complexities) when one monitors them. And there are discriminable aspects of monitoring, such as *starting to monitor* (as when a doctor asks you whether a pain is dull or piercing), comparing two sensations, and *finishing* a job of monitoring. These contents seem to stand for real events that can be distinguished introspectively.

Similar worries can be raised about Shoemaker's treatment of self-blindness with respect to intentional states such as beliefs and desires. The impetus having originally derived from early Freudian theory, significant experimental data compiled by cognitive psychologists have shown fairly conclusively that human beings can possess a whole range of mental states, including beliefs and desires, of which they are not consciously (or introspectively) aware. This appears to be much more widespread than anyone had ever thought. It is widely believed now that our mental life is host to an entire realm of "subconscious" activity which involves myriads of suppressed beliefs, desires, and emotions. While most recent studies have focused on the abnormal character of this activity and its connection with certain negative aspects of one's social environment and upbringing, I do not see why this would have to be regarded as a *necessary* feature of such mental phenomena. With regard to an agent's intentions and volitions, Shoemaker's examples describe rather extreme cases in which the alleged "agnostic" is completely ignorant of any of her behavior whatsoever. But there is reason to doubt whether Shoemaker can answer less radical cases of introspective ignorance, e.g. cases in which people are alleged to systematically misconstrue their intentions.

Moreover, Shoemaker's arguments against self-blindness with respect to intentional states fall prey to the same objection previously discussed in regards to perceptual experience. Remember that Shoemaker's construal of a second order awareness of a first order belief just comes to having the first order belief along with an appropriate level of rationality. A rational agent's first-order beliefs (along with normal intelligence and rationality) are enough to rationalize the behavior that manifests certain of her higher order beliefs. The agent's having first order beliefs implies an ability on her part to self-ascribe those beliefs. However, in the typical case no conscious self-ascription is ever made. It is rather that the agent's behavior provides sufficient *evidence* of self-ascription, because such behavior can be assessed as rational (in the sense

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It seems purely ad hoc for Shoemaker to disqualify as a pain state any state which does not produce behavior that is seen to be "rationalized" by certain beliefs and desires. He does not offer any reason for this restriction (see 1996, p. 229).

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Block (1997, p. 390–391). Lycan develops the notion of consciousness as internal monitoring in several places, most notably in (1997, pp. 755–772).

of explaining the behavior in a way consonant with the degree of rationality required – in this case for a normal human being) only by attributing certain second order beliefs to the agent. What will such higher order belief states be like? We may distinguish between *occurrent* beliefs, *actual but non-occurrent* beliefs, and *implicit* beliefs. A rough characterization of such beliefs can be given as follows. A subject *S* holds an *occurrent* belief *that P* if it is true that *S* is now thinking *that P*. *S* holds an *actual but non-occurrent* belief *that P* if *S* is *not* now thinking *that P* but *S* would explicitly affirm *that p* without inference if posed the question “Do you believe *that P*?” Finally, *S* holds an *implicit* belief *that P* if *S* would affirm *that P* only as a result of drawing an inference when posed the question “Do you believe *that P*?”. Now the only types of (higher order) belief required to rationalize the behavior of our allegedly self-aware agent are actual but non-occurrent belief and implicit belief. Such beliefs, in conjunction with other of the agent’s normal first order beliefs, will be sufficient to motivate and support any relevant behavior she engages in. These beliefs are sufficient to rationally guide her actions in the same way that the availability of an “access conscious” state allows an agent in that state to exercise a certain degree of rational control over her speech and behavior. Once again, Shoemaker seems to have successfully tied the existence of our belief states to an *A-type* awareness of those states. But because a rational agent’s belief *that she believes that P*, and hence any rational explanation of her relevant behavior, only requires that this second-order belief be non-occurrent, it is entirely consistent to suppose that that she is not self-aware with respect to *M-type* introspective awareness. Thus, even if *A-type* awareness turns out to be a genuine form of introspection, there will still be a *very important sense* in which introspective awareness (i.e. levels or forms of awareness which fall under *M-type* introspection) *does* satisfy the independence condition and hence conforms to the broad perceptual model.¹⁵

Certain second-order *occurrent* and *actual* (non-occurrent) beliefs and desires provide compelling counter-examples to Shoemaker’s arguments against the plausibility of the independence condition. Having particular second order *occurrent* or *non-occurrent* beliefs about other mental states (e.g. an *actual* belief that I believe (or desire) *that P*), cannot simply be a matter of having certain first-order beliefs or desires along with the requisite degree of rationality. Possessing a certain degree of rationality and conceptual capacity is a high-level dispositional state of an agent, but the phenomenology involved in at least some experiences of second-order awareness seems to rule out such awareness as merely dispositional in nature. Suppose I am weighing my decision whether or not to visit Chicago over Christmas, and so I begin wondering about how desirous I really am to travel all that distance given the inclement weather conditions. It is implausible to argue that this higher order awareness of my first-order desire merely *consists in* having that desire plus having some dispositional state with an appropriate level of intelligence. In cases of such second-order awareness, an agent seems to be involved in a certain kind of activity that can be described as *self-observation*, something akin to a kind of internal monitoring of the agent’s mental states. And internal states realizing this type of awareness apparently *are* independent of the particular states they are about.

Is *A-type* awareness, which involves *actual* (non-occurrent) and *implicit* second order awareness of one’s first order belief states, a genuine form of introspection? Is it fair to count these second order beliefs as a form of introspective awareness? On Shoemaker’s assumptions, for our self-aware agent *S*, who possesses the requisite level of intelligence and rationality, her belief *that*

she (occurrently) believes *that P just is* her (occurrent) belief *that P*. (We shall say that she has the second order belief that she *O*-believes *that P*.) In order to have introspective access to her belief *that P*, *S* need not do anything else to “become aware” of the fact that she believes *that P*. No further activity of the mind is necessary for *S* to “get into” such a state of awareness. This may seem appropriate in the case of introspective awareness of *O*-beliefs, but what about cases of actual but non-occurrent beliefs? Suppose that *S* has an actual but non-occurrent belief *that P*, that is, *S A*-believes *that P*. Then *S* will automatically have the second-order belief *that S A*-believes *that P*, and this will count as *S*’s having introspective awareness of her *A*-belief *that P*. So *S* must be understood as having (introspective) awareness of a belief that is not even consciously entertained at the moment it is introspected! It seems absurd to claim that any such belief states qualify as a form of introspective awareness. In fact, it follows that in Shoemaker’s sense of introspection, each of *S*’s *A*-beliefs (and many other intentional states) are *at all times* being introspected by *S*. But for anyone who wants to deny that introspective awareness applies in the case of awareness of *A*-beliefs, and at the same time wants to defend Shoemaker-style arguments, trouble looms large. For all that is required of many or most of the first order beliefs that contribute to a rational explanation of *S*’s behavior is that they *be A*-beliefs, and not *O*-beliefs. And if *A*-beliefs can rationalize behavior, and the second order beliefs that such behavior manifests are not states of introspective awareness (of any type), then it follows that there could be creatures of *L* intelligence whose belief states are independent of *any* introspective access to them at all.

In the final section of his paper, Shoemaker makes an attempt to sketch a positive account of the relation between mental phenomena and our introspective awareness of them. Central to his account is the distinction between a *core realization* and *total realization* of a mental state. The former is the specific, localized realization that comes and goes along with the state itself, and which plays the standard causal role associated with that state. The total realization can be thought of as the core realization plus those relatively permanent features of the organism which enable the core realization to play the causal role it does. One possible way to characterize the relationship between a first order mental state and introspective awareness of that state is to say that the two states have different core and total realizations, but that their total realizations overlap. Another possibility is that they have the same core realization, while the total realization of the first order state is a proper part of the total realization of the second order state. On such an account, all that must be added to the available first order belief to get a second order belief is the appropriate degree of intelligence and rationality; thus *S*’s *believing that S believes that P* comes to *S*’s *believing that P* together with *S*’s possessing a certain level *L* of intelligence and rationality.

What should we say about Shoemaker’s positive account? On his first model – in which the core realizations differ but the total realizations overlap – introspective awareness will satisfy the causal condition, as Shoemaker himself acknowledges. But the relation between the mental states implemented in the core realizations “will be an internal one, whose relata are not distinct existences” (1996, p. 244). As an example, Shoemaker imagines that the total realization of *S*’s pain state includes the event of C-fiber firing causing Z-fiber fir-

ing, and that this event is also part of the total realization of the belief that *S* is in pain. While there may be this sort of dependence of the former mental state on the latter mental state, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this dependence relation is anything but a contingent one. For it is certainly possible that C-fiber firings do *not* cause Z-fiber firings, or that the total realizations of the two states do not overlap in virtue of that event. At any rate, in order to secure the tightest possible connection between a mental state and a second order awareness of that state, Shoemaker's second account is probably to be preferred.

But if the last argument I sketched above in regard to Shoemaker's criticisms of self-blindness is correct, then Shoemaker's second model appears problematic. Moreover, this second model offers an account of the relation between mental states and our introspective awareness of them that applies only to *A-type* introspection. But as I argued above, his arguments against self-blindness depend exclusively on this very notion of introspection. One consequence of this is that Shoemaker's account as presented rules out the possibility of other forms or levels of introspective access (e.g., *M-type* awareness), which arguably define the core of what constitutes introspective awareness. Equally problematic is the fact that this model has the implication that all *A*-beliefs will be legitimate objects of introspective awareness. With respect to each belief of mine that at any time *t* I am not entertaining, e.g. the belief that the Sears tower is the world's tallest building, it will be true at *t* that I (automatically) have the corresponding second order (introspective) belief *that* I believe that the Sears Tower is the world's tallest building. Given such an account, it follows (implausibly) that all of my *A*-beliefs (even ones that I am at the moment not entertaining) *are currently being* introspected. So Shoemaker's positive account of introspective awareness based on the second model he offers is at once both too broad and too restrictive-- too broad in the sense that under certain circumstances mental (belief) states (illegitimately) qualify as self-presenting, and too narrow in the sense that higher order states involving *M-type* awareness are discounted as introspective states at all.

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Kevin Kimble

**Unutarnji osjet i široki perceptualni model:
odgovor Shoemakeru**

Sažetak

U nekolicini recentnih tekstova, Sydney Shoemaker tvrdi da introspektivnom znanju nedostaju određene ključne centralne značajke koje odgovaraju uvjetima zadovoljenima u običnim slučajevima osjetilne percepcije. U jednom utjecajnom radu on razmatra i kritizira »široki perceptualni« model prirode introspektivnog znanja mentalnih stanja, stajalište koje tvrdi da je naša introspektivna svijest unutrašnjih činjenica analogna našoj svijesti o činjenicama izvanjskoga svijeta. Ovaj model može biti okarakteriziran njegovom sukladnošću dvama uvjetima obične perceptivne svijesti koje Shoemaker naziva uvjet kauzacije i uvjet neovisnosti. Shoemaker napada široki perceptualni model tvrdeći da su određene mentalne činjenice »samozadane«, implicirajući da introspektivna svijest o mentalnim stanjima ne zadovoljava uvjet neovisnosti, te stoga njen karakter nije adekvatno obuhvaćen širokim perceptualnim modelom. U onome što slijedi razmotrit ću glavne argumente Shoemakerovoga rada. Tvrdim da široki perceptualni model introspekcije može uspješno zaobići centralne problem koje on ističe; i usput ću razviti neke kritike vezane uz određene aspekte Shoemakerovog pozitivnog prijedloga.

Ključne riječi

unutarnji osjet, svijest, introspekcija, samo-spoznavanje, fenomenalni karakter, osjetilno iskustvo

Kevin Kimble

**Innerer Sinn und breites perzeptives Modell:
Gegenrede zu Shoemaker**

Zusammenfassung

In ein paar rezenten Essays postuliert Sydney Shoemaker, das introspektive Wissen ermangele gewisser zentraler Spezifika, die den in herkömmlichen Fällen der Sinneswahrnehmung erfüllten Umständen gleichkommen. In einem wirkungsreichen Paper behandelt und kritisiert er das „breite perzeptive“ Modell der Natur des introspektiven Wissens von Mentalzuständen, eine Betrachtungsweise, die besagt, unser introspektives Bewusstsein der internen Tatsachen sei übereinstimmend mit unserem Bewusstsein der Tatsachen über die Außenwelt. Dieses Modell lässt sich aufgrund seiner Deckungsgleichheit mit zwei Voraussetzungen des ordinären perzeptiven Bewusstseins illustrieren, die Shoemaker Bedingung der Kausalität bzw. Bedingung der Unabhängigkeit nennt. Shoemaker attackiert das breite perzeptives Modell, indem er bekräftigt, bestimmte mentale Fakten seien „selbstimplizierend“; zudem befriedige das introspektive Bewusstsein der Mentalzustände nicht die Bedingung der Unabhängigkeit, weswegen dessen Charakterzug inadäquat vom breiten perzeptiven Modell umfasst werde. Im Folgenden gehe ich die Hauptargumente von Shoemakers Essay durch. Ich stelle die Behauptung auf, das breite perzeptives Modell der Introspektion könne die von ihm aufgeworfenen Kernprobleme erfolgreich umgehen. Nebenher erarbeite ich einige Kritik in puncto gewisser Aspekte von Shoemakers positivem Vorschlag.

Schlüsselwörter

innerer Sinn, Bewusstsein, Introspektion, Selbsterkenntnis, phänomenaler Charakter, perzeptive Erfahrung

Kevin Kimble

**Le sens intérieur et le modèle perceptuel large :
la réponse à Shoemaker**

Résumé

Dans plusieurs essais récents, Sydney Shoemaker affirme que la connaissance introspective est dépourvue de certaines caractéristiques centrales correspondant aux conditions qui, elles, sont remplies dans les cas ordinaires de perception sensorielle. Dans un article influent, il examine et critique le modèle « perceptuel large » de la nature de la connaissance introspective des états mentaux, une position qui affirme que notre conscience introspective des faits internes est analogue à notre conscience des faits du monde externe. Ce modèle peut se définir par sa conformité à deux conditions de la conscience perceptuelle ordinaire que Shoemaker appelle condition de causation et condition d'indépendance. Shoemaker attaque d'abord le modèle perceptuel large en affirmant que certains faits mentaux se « laissent entendre d'eux-mêmes », impliquant que la conscience introspective des états mentaux ne remplit pas la condition d'indépendance et que, par conséquent, son caractère n'est pas saisi de manière adéquate par le modèle perceptuel large. Dans ce qui suit, j'examinerai les principaux arguments de l'essai de Shoemaker. J'affirmerai qu'un modèle perceptuel large de l'introspection peut contourner avec réussite les problèmes centraux qu'il soulève ; ce faisant, je développerai quelques critiques à l'égard de certains aspects de la proposition positive de Shoemaker.

Mots-clés

sens intérieur, conscience, introspection, connaissance de soi, caractère phénoménal, expérience perceptuelle