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Reverberations of Jung's "Psychological Types" in the Novels of Aldous Huxley

That Huxley was preoccupied with the innate psychological differences of individuals and with various theories attempting the classification of psycho-physical types can hardly have escaped the notice of the readers of his novels, and particularly the notice of the readers of his enquiries or essayistic treatises like *Proper Studies*, *Ends and Means* and *The Perennial Philosophy*. Nevertheless, it has demonstrably escaped the attention of most of his critics.

A year before the publication of *Point Counter Point* Huxley published a collection of essays with the telling title, *Proper Studies*. It is a revealing book insofar as Huxley's interest in the innate irreducible psychological differences between individuals and his view of Jung's typology are concerned. First of all there is a short account of Jung's *Psychological Types* in it. At that time (in 1927) Jung was enormously admired and praised by Huxley, to whom other psychologists of the time, in comparison with Jung, seemed "uninspired, unilluminating, and soundly dull, or else, like Freud and Adler, monomaniacal".¹ For *Psychological Types* Huxley had only terms of praise. In his opinion it was "the most interesting, and certainly the most complete, work yet written about the varieties of human mind".² However, his views about the *Psychological Types* did not remain unchanged although his interest in various systems of classification of human types in terms of their physical and psychological characteristics remained unabated.

Ten years after the first publication of *Proper Studies* another book written with a similar purpose appeared. It was

¹ A. Huxley, *Proper Studies*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1927, p. XIX.

² *Ib.*, p. 41.

Ends and Means (1937). Its subtitle is "An Enquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods employed for their Realization". The book is a collection of more or less systematically or more or less loosely connected essays dealing from diverse points of view with the deplorable behaviour of the human animal throughout its history and with the means of achieving an ideal type of human society. In this book both the distinctive position given to Jung and the classification of innate psychological differences between individuals which he proposed in his *Psychological Types*, and the attention paid to him by Huxley in *Proper Studies*, are taken away from him and transferred to Dr. William Sheldon. After a short survey of the various classifications of human types that have been influential in the cultural history of Europe, beginning with Hippocrates, Huxley turns his attention to the present century and to W. H. Sheldon.

Many attempts have been made to produce a scientific classification of human types in terms of their physical and psychological characteristics. For example, there was the Hippocratic classification of men according to the predominance of one or other of the four humours;...

In recent years we have had a number of new classifications. Stockard, in his *Physical Basis of Personality*, uses a twofold classification in terms of 'linear' and 'lateral' types of human beings. Kretschmer uses a threefold classification. So does Dr. William Sheldon, whose classification in terms of somatotonic, viscerotonic and cerebrotonic I shall use in the present chapter. It seems probable that, with the latest work in this field, we may be approaching a genuinely scientific description of human types.³

Although W. H. Sheldon seems to be superseding Jung in this book, Huxley's preoccupation and acquaintance with various systems of classification of human types are evident enough from this historical account of typological theories which he gives.

What seems to be a modest and still problematical praise of Sheldon here becomes, in a later book, in *The Perennial Philosophy*, a categorical statement of praise. By the time of its publication, in 1946, the major work of Dr. William Sheldon and his collaborators in constitutional psychology was completed and published. *The Varieties of Human Physique* was first published in 1940 by Harper and Row, and *The Varieties of*

³ A. Huxley, *Ends and Means*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1948, pp. 164—165. One may add, by way of chronological comment, that Stockard had his *Physical Basis of Personality* published in 1931 (New York, Norton). Kretschmer's book *Körperbau und Charakter* was published in 1921 (Berlin, Springer) and translated from the second German edition into English as *Physique and Character* by W. J. H. Sprott (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1925).

Temperament, a far more influential book than the first one, in 1942 by Harper and Brothers. In this latter book Huxley repeats a slightly extended — to a Hindu classification in terms of psycho-physico-social categories — and a more detailed survey of the history of typologies (amounting to six pages and covering thirty centuries) than the one given in *Ends and Means*, but most of his attention is given here to Sheldon and the ancient Hindu method of classifying people.

More recently there have been the various physiognomic systems of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the crude and merely psychological dichotomy of introversion and extraversion; the more complete, but still inadequate, psycho-physical classifications proposed by Kretschmer, Stockard, Viola and others; and finally the system, more comprehensive, more flexibly adequate to the complex facts than all those which preceded it, worked out by Dr. William Sheldon and his collaborators.⁴

In 1927 it was Jung whom Huxley had praised almost in the same manner in which he praised Sheldon in 1946. *Proper Studies* contains an account of Jung's *Psychological Types*, and in *The Perennial Philosophy* there is a compendium of Sheldon's typology, or, to be more precise, there is a précis, given in four paragraphs,⁵ of the third chapter of *The Varieties of Temperament*. The classification proposed by Jung in *Psychological Types* was, as I have already said, classified by Huxley in *Proper Studies* as "the most interesting, and certainly the most complete, work yet written about the varieties of human mind." In *The Perennial Philosophy* the very same classification of Jung's was called "the crude and merely psychological dichotomy of introversion and extraversion", as is evident from the quotation above (see note 4).

Yet one may safely say that up to 1937 Huxley was more or less faithful in his allegiance to the Jungian theory of types. In 1937, when *Ends and Means* were first published, none of Sheldon's major works was yet published. That may very likely be the reason why Huxley's praise of Sheldon in *Ends and Means* is so modest and tentative — "It seems probable that, with the latest work in this field, we are approaching a genuinely scientific description of human types" (see note 3). "The latest work" is most likely a reference to *The Varieties*

⁴ A. Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1957 (sixth impression), p. 169. The pages representing the historical survey of typologies are 169—174.; in fact, only two pages are devoted to the historical survey, pp. 169—170. The rest of the pages, 170—174, are devoted to an exposition of the ancient Hindu typology given in the *Bhagavad-Gita* and to Sheldon.

⁵ Cf.: *Ib.*, pp. 171—174.

of *Human Physique* and *The Varieties of Temperament* which were both works in progress then.⁶ Moreover, it is particularly significant that Jung, although not praised, is not slighted at all in *Ends and Means* in comparison with Sheldon. Huxley did not show such grace in *Proper Studies* when he extolled Jung in comparison with other psychologists. Most likely there was still nothing better than Jung for Huxley to look to in 1937.

Since the account of Sheldon's classification given in *The Perennial Philosophy* seems undoubtedly to be founded on *The Varieties of Temperament* (1942), any possible use of Sheldon's typology in Huxley's novels can be looked for only in the novels published after the date of its publication. The first novel, then, to be searched for such evidence is *Time Must Have a Stop*.⁷

Anyway, after what has been said up to now, Huxley's interest in typological theories seems to be an established fact. Immediately, another question arises. Why did Huxley show such a deep and lasting interest in typologies? Huxley proposes an answer in *Proper Studies* both directly and implicitly, by the title of the book itself.

All Huxley's novels and essays could be read as an appeal to the reader, "Know then thyself", which is, anyway, the beginning of the famous couplet in which the words "proper study" occur. As a novelist Huxley is primarily and perhaps solely interested in man, whom he thinks, like Pope, to be "the proper study of mankind". Not only in the title of the last book published in his lifetime, *Literature and Science* (1963), does he express a belief he had held from the very beginning of his literary career that literature and science should be synthesized by men of letters into one common answer to the question "Who is man?". Before the rise of science, he says, the only answers to this question came from a mixture of poets and philosophers in one person.

Who are we? What is our destiny? How can the often frightful ways of God be justified? Before the rise of science, the only answers to these questions came from the philosopher-poets and poet-philosophers.⁸

It is necessary, Huxley believed, for the full knowledge of man, that the answers of science should enter the picture of man given by poets and philosophers. As I have already suggested,

⁶ In Sheldon's own words "The later phases of the study, [have been] since 1935". Cf.: W. H. Sheldon, *The Varieties of Human Physique*, Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1963, pp. XI and XII.

⁷ This will be the subject matter of my next article in *SRAZ*.

⁸ A. Huxley, *Literature and Science*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1963, § 29, p. 70.

this is not a new idea born a year before its author's death. One can find it most fully expressed in *Proper Studies*.

Man in his totality comprises the measurable as well as the unmeasurable aspects of his being, and no account of him can be complete which does not comprehend the results of scientific measurement and relate them intelligibly to that which is unmeasured.⁹

That scientific knowledge has no influence over the core of man's being is a constant complaint of Huxley's, and that it is up to the man of letters to synthesize it in a work of art — which by its nature influences the whole of man, in order to awaken self-knowledge in him — is a constant claim of his.¹⁰ The most explicit statement of this need and of this task is to be found in *Literature and Science*.

And humanity at large — . . . — has need of the synthesis which only the man of letters with 'a heart that watches and receives' and a bird's-eye knowledge of science can provide.¹¹

"Know then thyself" is not simply a cognitive postulate. It is, in its essence, a moral postulate. The behaviour of the human animal throughout its history is thought by Huxley to have been disastrous and deplorable. The history of the human race, its modern history in particular, gives evidence enough of the destructive, evil force that humanity is. What happens nowadays in human history is decidedly wrong.

At the present moment of time, the 'historical' is almost unmitigatedly evil. To accept the 'historical' and to work for it is to co-operate with the powers of darkness against the light.¹²

This must, inevitably, have something to do with the nature of the human animal. A science which deals with the innate psychological differences in men, a science that used to be called characterology and is now more widely known by the name of typology must, inevitably, be of some use in understanding the causes of the present human condition and, perhaps, of the human condition at all times.

Any attempt, therefore, aiming at a social reform and perfection of humankind, at understanding the causes of the

⁹ A. Huxley, *o. c.*, see note 1, p. VIII.

¹⁰ See, for instance, the following texts by A. Huxley: *Texts and Pretexts*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1933, pp. 4 and 222—223.; "T. H. Huxley as a Literary Man", in *The Olive Tree*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1936, pp. 51—59.; *Literature and Science, cit.*, pp. 67—68 and 90—91.

¹¹ A. Huxley, *o. c.*, see note 8, p. 68. The words in inverted commas belong to Wordsworth's poem *The Tables Turned*.

¹² A. Huxley, *o. c.*, see note 3, p. 69.

present unsatisfactory state of humanity must not neglect to take into account the innate psychological differences between human beings. And it is actually in dealing with the problem of social reform (to a certain extent in *Proper Studies* and most fully in *Ends and Means*) that Huxley takes an interest in and discusses the merits of various systems of classification of human types in terms of their physical and psychological characteristics from the time of Hippocrates to the present day.

It might not be insignificant to note that it is very often with social reformers and utopians that the idea of reducing the diversity of human individual differences to a few types, three is the number very much in favour, is extremely popular. This simplification of human individual differences simplifies their task as social reformers.

One of the first presuppositions of all characterologies is that the people who belong, psychologically and constitutionally, to different types live in different universes and that it is next to impossible to conceive of any bridges between these universes. One of the consequences is that mutual understanding and communication between people belonging to different types is impossible and that this is perhaps the primary cause of all conflict. Huxley expresses the first half of this view in a characteristically ironic way of his, his irony being directed here at the proponents of the ideal of economic equality.

The economic is not the only kind of inequality. There is also the more formidable, the less remediable inequality which exists between individuals of different psychological types. 'The fool sees not the same tree that the wise man sees'. The universes of two individuals may be profoundly dissimilar, even though they may be in receipt of equal incomes. Pitt is to Addington as London is to Paddington. Nature as well as Nurture has set great gulfs between us. Some of these gulfs are unbridged and seemingly unbridgeable; across them there is no communication.¹³

This is nothing more nor less than a consequence of the first proposition that Jung makes in his *Psychological Types*, of a proposition which is held by all the characterologists however much they might differ otherwise in detail, terminology and ideas. At the very beginning of this book Jung had quoted from Heine to the effect that Plato and Aristotle not only represent two different systems of thought but that they are the representatives of the two different innate attitudes, introversion and extraversion, that keep appearing in different individuals, at different times, and that are as it were constitutionally inimical to each other.

Huxley has made much of this in his novels. The problem of loneliness, of isolation, of the lack and impossibility of

¹³ *Ib.*, pp. 163—164.

communication between people, which is the burden of all his novels, is based on this presupposition of all typological thinking. It is to be found in the first pages of his first novel, *Crome Yellow* (1921). A young literary gentleman, Denis Stone, attempts to talk to a deaf woman at breakfast. Her inadequate reaction to his conventional question if she had slept well sets Huxley immediately on the train of thoughts about the impossibility of communication between people.

'I hope you slept well', he said.

'Yes, isn't it lovely?' Jenny replied, giving two rapid little nods. 'But we had such awful thunderstorms last week'.

Parallel straight lines, Denis reflected, meet only at infinity. He might talk for ever of care-charmer sleep and she of meteorology till the end of time. Did one ever establish contact with anyone? We are all parallel straight lines. Jenny was only a little more parallel than most.¹⁴

One may have doubts whether this is a result of Huxley's observation of life or a result of his wide reading in characterological theories or both, as seems most probable. But there is one unmistakable evidence of Huxley's interest in the classification of human types in this novel. In an ironical though none the less serious conversation between Denis Stone and Mr. Scogan, the latter is explaining his ideas concerning the "Rational State" of the future, giving in brief the synopsis of what was to be developed later on in *Brave New World* and, in a different way, in *Island*. In speaking about the "Rational State" Mr. Scogan evokes the language and the hopes of all the characterologists.

'In the Rational State', he heard Mr. Scogan saying, 'human beings will be separated out into distinct species, not according to the colour of their eyes or the shape of their skulls, but according to the qualities of their mind and temperament. Examining psychologists, trained to what would now seem an almost super-human clairvoyance, will test each child that is born and assign it to its proper species. Duly labelled and docketed, the child will be given the education suitable to members of its species, and will be set, in adult life, to perform those functions which human beings of his variety are capable of performing'.¹⁵

Again, Huxley's preoccupation with characterology seems to be evident here as well as the reason of this preoccupation. If we have here in germ what is going to be developed later on into *Brave New World* (1932) and *Island* (1962) — and that this is true becomes clearer if one reads the whole of the "Chapter Twenty-Two" of *Crome Yellow* — then the reason for Huxley's

¹⁴ A. Huxley, *Crome Yellow*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1960, p. 19.

¹⁵ *Ib.*, p. 129.

interest in characterology is beyond doubt. Such a "fully developed science of human differences"¹⁶ can be either abused by "government managers",¹⁷ to take away from man all of his freedom and to turn human society into an ant heap (this idea is developed in *Brave New World*), or it can be used, which is less likely to happen in Huxley's opinion, to increase freedom and to construct an ideal type of human society, an example of the latter being given in *Island*.

But here as before I have been speaking only of the instances of Huxley's direct mention of characterological theories. Let me turn now to the use he makes of Jung's theory of psychological types in his novels.

The proximity of *Proper Studies* (1927), where Jung is praised most and where Huxley gives an account of his *Psychological Types*, to *Point Counter Point* (1928) suggests that many of Philip Quarles's convictions, and he is rightly considered to have been constructed on the pattern of Huxley's own personality, and of his ideas concerning his new literary technique, and that even the structure of *Point Counter Point* itself and characterization in it, may all well be, among other things, an application of Jung's ideas in novelistic technique. My further task will be to find evidence for this assumption.

Let us first turn our attention to characterization. There have been speculations on the recurrence of the same types of characters in Huxley's novels. Denis Stone in *Crome Yellow* is a precursor of Gumbriel Junior in *Antic Hay*, of Francis Chelifer in *Those Barren Leaves* and of Philip Quarles in *Point Counter Point*. Mr. Cardan from *Those Barren Leaves* resembles in very many details, in ideas and temperament, John Bidlake, the painter in *Point Counter Point*. They are both of them artists in the art of living. There are a number of scientists in the novels of Aldous Huxley whose intellectual abilities are overdeveloped at the expense of their emotional maturity, as is the case, for example, with Shearwater in *Antic Hay*, Lord Edward in *Point Counter Point* and Jeremy Pordage in *After Many a Summer* etc. There is one more type of

¹⁶ A. Huxley, *Brave New World*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1961, "Foreword", p. 13.

¹⁷ *Ib.* It is surprising how much Scogan's ideas (see note 15) and their expression resemble those of Huxley in his "Foreword" to *Brave New World* written in 1946. "The love of servitude cannot be established except as the result of a deep, personal revolution in human minds and bodies. To bring about that revolution we require, among others, the following discoveries and inventions. First, a greatly improved technique of suggestion — ... Second, a fully developed science of human differences, enabling government managers to assign any given individual to his or her proper place in the social and economic hierarchy. (Round pegs in square holes tend to have dangerous thoughts about the social system and to infect others with their discontents.)

character, a real man of action, to be found in Everard Webley in *Point Counter Point* and in John Barnack in *Time Must Have a Stop*, and Gombauld from *Crome Yellow* as their predecessor.

The fact that similar types of characters, who hold similar ideas and views and who resemble each other in tastes, behaviour and even in the way they express their ideas, appear in Huxley's novels with very few variations has long been noticed by literary critics. It has been suggested that Huxley's characters are the embodiments of certain ideas, and this served, at the same time, as an adverse criticism of his novels since embodiments of ideas cannot be exceedingly lifelike.

The assumption that the character of each personage that appears in Huxley's novels is implied in this personage's ideas is in no need of proof or disproof. It is the distinguishing property of the novel of ideas and its postulate as Philip Quarles conceives of it, and the ideas of Philip Quarles are doubtless those of Huxley himself.

Novel of ideas. The character of each personage must be implied, as far as possible, in the ideas of which he is the mouthpiece. In so far as theories are rationalizations of sentiments, instincts, dispositions of soul, this is feasible. The chief defect of the novel of ideas is that you must write about people who have ideas to express — which excludes all but about '01 per cent of the human race. Hence the real, the congenital novelists don't write such books. But then I never pretended to be a congenital novelist.¹⁸

It is not only the properties of the novel of ideas that Huxley can visualize most clearly, but even its constitutional defects, as it were. All Huxley's critics taken together have never been as clear as that about characterization in his novels of ideas.

Nevertheless, this is not an answer to the question of why similar types of people, who resemble each other in tastes, behaviour, ideas and the expression of those ideas, recur in all Huxley's novels. Does it not mean that there is a small, limited number of types of people and of ideas and the ways they can be expressed? One can gather such an impression if one is a faithful reader of the novels of Aldous Huxley. The types of human beings that appear in his novels could be classified tentatively under four headings: the hedonistic type, the man of action and the man of thought or the intellectual and, as a subgroup of this last group, the emotionally immature scientist.

A moment ago when I was giving examples of the recurrence of the same types of characters in Huxley's novels it was this tentative classification that I had in mind. Such people

¹⁸ A. Huxley, *Point Counter Point*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1961, Ch. XXII, p. 299.

as Mr. Cardan (*Those Barren Leaves*), John Bidlake (*Point Counter Point*) and their like belong to the hedonistic type. Those like Everard Webley (*Point Counter Point*) and John Barnack (*Time Must Have a Stop*) are men of action. Denis Stone (*Crome Yellow*), Gumbriel Junior (*Antic Hay*), Francis Chelifer (*Those Barren Leaves*), Philip Quarles (*Point Counter Point*) and others to appear in the novels that follow these, are men of thought.

All the people that we meet quite demonstrably do not fall completely into these four categories — the hedonist, the man of action, the man of thought and the emotionally immature scientist. Still most of the people one knows could be described by means of these categories. The question is why the characters of Huxley's novels so neatly fit these categories. Of course, the answer that seems to be most closely at hand is that they fit these typical categories of human beings because they are constructed on the pattern of a ready-made typology and, in the cases mentioned above, it is the typology of C. G. Jung that they fit most perfectly.

In order to show in what sense can it be said of Huxley's characters that they are based on the classification of human beings that Jung offers in his *Psychological Types* it is necessary to give, in the shortest and, unfortunately, most schematic way, a few most important facts about Jung's psychology of individuation.

According to Jung there are two attitudes of the psyche, introversion and extraversion, and four functions, sensation, thinking, feeling and finally intuition. The two attitudes, introversion and extraversion, are two opposed habits or mechanisms of thought, the one concentrated on the inner spiritual life and the other on the outer world of objects. Perhaps the best way to express the difference between the two attitudes is to say that in introversion the subjective, inner psychological event, whether it be sensation, thinking, feeling or intuition, is preferred to the object, whereas in extraversion it is the object itself that is preferred. Every single man is in possession of both the attitudes of the psyche, introversion and extraversion. Yet, one of the two attitudes always predominates in a certain person and this predominance of the one or the other of the attitudes makes him belong to a certain type. This predominance of one of the attitudes in a person is reflected in his ideas and even in his ideology. According to Jung Plato constructed a system of thought on certain internal evidence his soul had given him. Aristotle, on the other hand, built his views on the empirical evidence of diligently collected facts. For the one, idea is the substance, for the other it is a definite thing that is the substance. For

instance, it is the idea of a horse that is the substance for Plato, and it is this very horse that is the substance for Aristotle.

This opposition of views is, in fact, reducible to the opposition of the two different ways of thinking, of the two different attitudes of the psyche. The dispute between Plato and Aristotle gave rise to an interminable philosophical war in the history of Western philosophy. Jung's insight here has been that these disputes between rival schools of philosophy, between Platonists and Aristotelians, Realists and Nominalists, Idealists and Pragmatists, were the battles between two psychological types, two incompatible intellectual temperaments, introverts and extraverts, and Huxley appreciated this insight.

The case is similar with the four functions of the psyche. Every single individual is in possession of all four functions, sensation, thinking, feeling and intuition. By means of these functions of the psyche an individual adapts himself to the world he lives in. Sensation establishes what is actually given, what is normally called the reality of things; thinking enables one to recognize the meaning of what is given; feeling determines its value; and intuition points to the possibilities of origin and direction of developments that lie hidden in immediate facts. As it happens, one of the functions predominates in most people. It is by means of this dominant function that one adapts oneself to life. The predominance of a function leads a man to construct or to seek out certain situations and to avoid others, and, consequently, to have experiences that are peculiar to him and different from those of other people. According to Jung, an intelligent man will make his adaptation to the world through his intelligence, and not in the manner of a sixth-rate pugilist. It is so because in the struggle for existence and adaptation everyone instinctively uses his most developed function, the use of which thus defines him as belonging to a certain type of man. The ideal development of an individual would require, of course, the harmonious development of all the functions, which, experience teaches us, all too often does not happen. Certain ages and certain peoples are privileged so far as this harmonious development is concerned and in the history of the West these privileged people are the Ancient Greeks. A consequence of what has been said up to now is that individuals can differ from each other first in the predominant function, they can be sensation, thinking, feeling or intuitive types, and, second, this function in them can be in either the introverted or extraverted attitude.¹⁹

¹⁹ This short account of the tenets of Jung's psychology of individuation is based on *Psychological Types* and, in greater detail, on his

Although one can imagine the numerous combinations of functions and attitudes that make up the diversity of human beings and although Jung has thought that the number of human differences is limitless, still he himself has described only the extreme cases of possible characters with the predominance of one attitude and one function because the majority of people fall into these types. This description of Jung's enables one to conceive of further combinations. It is characteristic of Aldous Huxley that he made use, in making up the characters of his novels, only of the descriptions of four extreme cases of characters that have one of the functions overdeveloped and the rest of the functions undifferentiated and even degenerated.

After this explanatory digression let me give a few examples of the characters in Huxley's novels that fit Jungian types.

The recurrent hedonist of Huxley's novels is, in fact, a variation of extraversion. He belongs to what Jung calls "the extraverted sensation type". Mr. Cardan in *Those Barren Leaves* and John Bidlake in *Point Counter Point* are typical representatives of this type. Both of them love comfort and take great pleasure in eating and drinking. Both of them want to sit comfortably in armchairs. At Lady Edward's party John Bidlake is impatient with the length of the concert and would like to refresh himself.

He opened his mouth and pointed into it with a stretched forefinger; he went through the motions of drinking from a glass. 'Me hungly', he said, 'me velly velly thirsty'.²⁰

He grasps any opportunity to get something to eat.

'Perishing', said John Bidlake. He took her arm familiarly, grasping it just above the elbow with a big, blue-veined hand. 'Give me an excuse for going to have supper. I'm ravenously hungry'. . . . And jovially laughing, he continued to lead her along towards the dining-room.²¹

Mr. Cardan exhibits identical behaviour. He is always the last one to leave the dining table and he enjoys talking incessantly and entertaining people while he eats and drinks.²² He cannot stand loneliness. When alone he is attacked by the thoughts of old age, decrepitude, death. It is for this reason

article "A Psychological Theory of Types", published in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, first published in 1933.

²⁰ A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, p. 29.

²¹ *Ib.*, p. 49.

²² See Part I, Ch. III of *Those Barren Leaves*.

that he must constantly be talking himself out of these thoughts and be the centre of a group of people which he keeps close to him by means of witty conversation. When there is no one close at hand to talk to, and he is lost in the midst of the country he does not know, surrounded by ditches full of water, pestered by mosquitoes, and at sunset to top all that, without a village or a house near, Mr. Cardan can easily cheer himself up by means of a morsel of food and a pull from the bottle.

The bread was stale, the sausage rather horsey and spiced with garlic; but Mr. Cardan, who had no tea, ate with a relish. Still more appreciatively he drank. In a little while he felt a little more cheerful.²³

As well as a little food a little conversation with people cheers these characters up.²⁴ Contact with people and objects is their salvation. They are not only lovers of good food and beautiful women, but very refined aesthetes, if the literal meaning of the word is not forgotten. Their aestheticism is only a refined hedonism. Their aesthetic interest is coloured by sensuous pleasure. Mr. Cardan is a connoisseur of painting and sculpture and John Bidlake is himself a painter of a peculiar sort. His speciality is in the emphasis he lays on the sensual. His painting "Bathers" is famous just because the faces of the bathers are painted as being merely extensions of their charming naked bodies and not, as Mr. Bidlake has aptly put it himself, as if they were "deceptive symbols of a non-existent spirituality".²⁵ Sensuous reality is the only reality for him. Hidden inner life, spirituality, is non-existent and the expression of it in the faces of beautiful women is as deceptive, in Mr. Bidlake's opinion, as the expression of meditating the problems of metaphysics oxen have, when in reality they are chewing the cud. This opinion of Mr. Bidlake's defines him, of course, as an extraverted sensation type. Both Mr. Cardan and John Bidlake are good-humoured, considerate, adapted to the society they live in, they have no ideals they would like to realize and for that very reason they often seem to be cynical. They make fun of anyone who would like to reform humanity and, in a word, they accept what is.

It is surprising how much Mr. Cardan and Mr. Bidlake resemble each other in all their traits. For reasons of space I shall not quote other examples of correspondence. However, it

²³ A. Huxley, *Those Barren Leaves*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1961, Part III, Ch. VI, p. 186. Cf. the whole of Ch. VI of Part III.

²⁴ See *Those Barren Leaves*, pp. 188—189. and *Point Counter Point*, p. 52.

²⁵ *Point Counter Point*, p. 52.

is important to say that these traits are not a result of Huxley's observation of people and of his psychological insight but that they are the result of his knowledge of Jung's *Psychological Types*. It will suffice, I think, to cast a glance at what Jung says in his general description of types about the extraverted sensation type in order to realize that this type has served as a pattern for the characters of Mr. Cardan and John Bidlake.

His aim is concrete enjoyment, and his morality is similarly oriented. . . . It by no means follows that he is just sensual or gross, for he may differentiate his sensation to the finest pitch of aesthetic purity without being the least unfaithful, even in his most abstract sensations, to his principle of objective sensation. . . .

Upon the lower levels this is the man of tangible reality, with little tendency either for reflection or commanding purpose. To sense the object, to have and if possible to enjoy sensations, is his constant motive. He is by no means unlovable; on the contrary, he frequently has a charming and lively capacity for enjoyment; he is sometimes a jolly fellow, and often a refined aesthete. In the former case, the great problems of life hinge upon a good or indifferent dinner; in the latter, they are questions of good taste. When he 'senses', everything essential has been said and done. Nothing can be more than concrete and actual; conjectures that transcend or go beyond the concrete are only permitted on condition that they enhance sensation. This need not be in any way a pleasurable reinforcement, since this type is not a common voluptuary; he merely desires the strongest sensation, and this, by his very nature, he can receive only from without. What comes from within seems to him morbid and objectionable. . . . Tangible reality, under any conditions, makes him breathe again. . . . His love is incontestably rooted in the manifest attractions of the object. In so far as he is normal, he is conspicuously adjusted to positive reality — conspicuously, because his adjustment is always visible. His ideal is the actual; in this respect he is considerate. He has no ideals related to ideas — he has, therefore, no sort of ground for maintaining a hostile attitude towards the reality of things and facts. This expresses itself in all the externals of his life. He dresses well, according to his circumstances; he keeps a good table for his friends. . . .²⁶

Huxley's man of action is most often an extraverted thinking and intuitive type. In *Point Counter Point* Everard Webley is made up on this pattern. He is indifferent to comfort, he paces his office while dictating a letter to his secretary, his energy cannot be exhausted. He is a politician. He wants to reform England into a fascist country. He wants to dominate other people and is described as a caricature of Mussolini (he has his white horse, love of swords and public speeches).

²⁶ C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1964 (twelfth impression), pp. 458—459 (First published in England in 1923).

(Webley had a weakness for swords; he wore one when the Freemen paraded, his speeches were full of them, his house bristled with panoplies.)²⁷

He loves to assume responsibility for other people and to take their destiny into his own hands. He is grotesquely self-certain. He exhibits these traits even in such small and trifling events as taking people for a ride in his car. He takes pleasure in fast driving in the midst of dense traffic.

Driving with Everard in town was almost too exciting. Elinor had protested the last time he took her out. 'I don't so much mind dying', she had said. 'But I really should object to passing the rest of my life with two wooden legs and a broken nose'. He had laughed. 'You're quite safe with me. ... I don't have accidents. I manufacture my own luck'.²⁸

As soon as he makes a decision he acts on it without any hesitation. He has his ideals about social order and he insists on carrying them out without scruples and with enormous energy. As a consequence he has no sense of humour. As a politician he cannot detach himself from his ideas and view them from a distance. Perhaps Lady Edward's judgement of his character is the shortest and most complete summing-up of his person.

Webley left them. Lady Edward watched him ploughing his way through the crowd. 'Like a steam engine', she said. 'What energy! But so touchy. These politicians — worse than actresses. Such vanity! And dear Webley hasn't got much sense of humour. He wants to be treated as though he were his own colossal statue, erected by an admiring and grateful nation'.²⁹

Direct action is his credo in politics and politics is his sphere of self-expression. It is because he believes that his ideal is the only true and world-saving one, so nothing has to be left to chance and voting.

But where fundamental principles were at stake, you couldn't allow politics to go on being treated as a Parliamentary game. You had to resort to direct action or the threat of it.

'I was five years in Parliament', said Webley. 'Long enough to convince myself that there's nothing to be done in these days by Parliamentarism. You might as well try to talk a fire out. England can only be saved by direct action. ...'³⁰

He has no tolerance for what differs from his *idée fixe*. The majority of his traits are those of Jung's extraverted thinking type.

²⁷ A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, p. 61.

²⁸ *Ib.*, pp. 371—372.

²⁹ *Ib.*, p. 46.

³⁰ *Ib.*, p. 61.

This type of man gives the deciding voice — not merely for himself alone but also on behalf of his entourage — either to the actual objective reality or to its objectively orientated, intellectual formula. By this formula are good and evil measured, and beauty and ugliness determined. All is right that corresponds with this formula; all is wrong that contradicts it; and everything that is neutral to it is purely accidental. Because this formula seems to correspond with the meaning of the world, it also becomes a world-law whose realization must be achieved at all times and seasons, both individually and collectively. Just as the extraverted thinking type subordinates himself to his formula, so, for its own good, must his entourage also obey it, since the man who refuses to obey is wrong — he is resisting the world-law, and is, therefore, unreasonable, immoral, and without a conscience. His moral code forbids him to tolerate exceptions; his ideal must, under all circumstances, be realized; for in his eyes it is the purest conceivable formulation of objective reality, and, therefore, must also be generally valid truth, quite indispensable for the salvation of man. . . . But the more rigid the formula, the more does he develop into a grumbler, a crafty reasoner, and a self-righteous critic, who would like to impress both himself and others into one schema.³¹

The fact that Everard Webley should be a politician at all shows that he is, by Jung's standards, a mixture of the extraverted thinking and intuitive type.

Since his intuition is largely concerned with outer objects, scenting out external possibilities, he readily applies himself to callings wherein he may expand his abilities in many directions. Merchants, contractors, speculators, agents, politicians, etc., commonly belong to this type.³²

Perhaps the most readily recognizable type in Huxley's novels is the man of thought, the intellectual whose personality consists mostly of the traits of Jung's "introverted thinking type". It is not at all difficult to reconize that Philip Quarles in *Point Counter Point*, as the type of an intellectual, has his predecessors in Denis Stone (*Crome Yellow*), Gumbriel Junior (*Antic Hay*) and Francis Chelifer (*Those Barren Leaves*), and that there are other characters in the novels that follow *Point Counter Point* who belong to the same type of man, as do, for example, Anthony Beavis in *Eyeless in Gaza* and, to a certain extent, Sebastian Barnack in *Time Must Have a Stop*.³³ However, Philip Quarles seems to be the best illustrative example

³¹ C. G. Jung, o. c., see note 26, pp. 435—436.

³² *Ib.*, p. 465.

³³ Perhaps it should be noted here that although Sebastian Barnack belongs to the same type of man of thought as do the characters mentioned up to *Eyeless in Gaza*, he is not made up on the basis of the Jungian psychological theory of types but on the basis of the psychosomatic theory of W. H. Sheldon. The same remark holds good for John Barnack, mentioned earlier (see pp. 313 and 314 of this paper) as a representative of the man of action type.

of this type of man in Huxley's novels and of Jung's introverted thinking type.

The essential trait of this type is that his attention is attached to the subjective, inner process of thinking and not to the outer world of objects and people. Whatever might impose itself on his attention from this outer world when he is in a meditative mood, is considered by this type as an undesirable intrusion, is feared by him and, whenever possible, avoided. Most undesirable intrusions into his life are direct contacts with other people which threaten to produce disturbing emotions which would, in their turn, be a hindrance to the inner flux of his thought. The kind of people who wish and try to arouse emotions in him, or to induce him to accept certain opinions are most feared and avoided by him. These traits of Philip Quarles are best manifested in his relationship with his wife Elinor, and in his analysis of Everard Webley's political speech addressed to his Freemen in Hyde Park.

Elinor, being a daughter of John Bidlake, is, like him, an extraverted sensation type and she enjoys contact with people, she loves to talk to her husband and to claim his attention every now and then. Since his attention is, in accord with his introverted attitude, turned inwards, Elinor's repeated attempts to attract his attention to her person, that is, to an object in the world of other objects, are felt by him as irritating intrusions into his private inner life. This happens even at such moments in which his wife — reminded by the bright disc of the full moon, in India, of their romantic evenings by moonlight in the garden at Gattenden, her mother's house, eight years ago — requires of him to notice her and at the same time to remember their young married love of that time. This demand is met by indifference and coldness on his part, and by a humiliating inability to grasp the situation at once.

Elinor had lifted her face towards the same bright disc. Moon, full moon. ... And instantly she had changed her position in space and time. She dropped her eyes and turned towards her husband; she took his hand and leaned tenderly against him.

'Do you remember those evenings?' she asked. 'In the garden, at Gattenden. Do you remember, Phil?'

Elinor's words came to his ears from a great distance and from a world in which, for the moment, he felt no interest. He roused himself with reluctance. 'Which evenings?' he asked, speaking across gulfs, and in the rather flat and colourless voice of one who answers an importunate telephone. ... After the first moment, when he had had time to come to the surface, so to speak, from the depths of his reverie, he had understood what she meant, ... But he was annoyed at having been interrupted...³⁴

³⁴ A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, p. 78.

When Elinor is offended by his absent-mindedness and indifference and begins to talk about their relations it makes him very uncomfortable because it threatens his peace of mind, his isolation and solitude.

Philip was silent. These discussions of personal relations always made him uncomfortable. They threatened his solitude — that solitude which, with a part of his mind, he deplored (for he felt himself cut off from much he would have liked to experience), but in which alone, nevertheless, his spirit could live in comfort, in which alone he felt himself free. At ordinary times he took this inward solitude for granted, as one accepts the atmosphere in which one lives. But when it was menaced, he became only too painfully aware of its importance to him; he fought for it, as a choking man fights for air. But it was a fight without violence, a negative battle of retirement and defence. He entrenched himself now in silence, in that calm, remote, frigid silence, which he was sure that Elinor would not attempt, knowing the hopelessness of the venture, to break through. He was right; Elinor glanced at him for an instant, and then, turning away, looked out at the moonlit landscape. Their parallel silences flowed on through time, unmeeting.³⁵

It seems to me to be difficult not to recognize Jung's guiding hand in these quotations. In his *Psychological Types* he cites, approvingly, a description of introversion given, in a different terminology and as a part of another theory of human types it is true, by Otto Gross. This description might have served as a basis for the characterization of Philip Quarles given in the above quotations.

... we regularly find an extraordinary concentration upon the inner processes, directed, in accordance with the nature of the subject, either upon physical sensations in one preferentially orientated by sensation, or upon mental processes in the more intellectual subject. ... In every case there is only a meagre participation in external life, and a distinct inclination to an unsociable and solitary existence, ... this type has a decided tendency to hold external stimuli at a distance, ...³⁶

Introverted feeling makes people who are characterized by it — and Philip's feeling is introverted although thinking is his dominant function — love solitude and defend it from the outer world by means of silence and indifference, among other things, says Jung.

It makes men silent and difficult of access; with the sensitiveness of the mimosa, it shrinks from the brutality of the object, in order to expand into the depths of the subject. It puts forward

³⁵ *Ib.*, p. 81.

³⁶ C. G. Jung, o. c., see note 26, pp. 343—344.

negative feeling-judgements or assumes an air of profound indifference, as a measure of self-defence.³⁷

However, the best possible description of the relation between Philip Quarles and his wife, of her feeling of being superfluous and not loved, can be found in the text to be quoted presently. Here a description is given of the introverted thinking type, which is that of Philip Quarles, and of the impact he makes on the extraverted sensation type, in fact, his counter type, which is that of Elinor.

Like every introverted type, he is almost completely lacking in that which distinguishes his counter type, namely, the intensive relatedness to the object. In the case of a human object, the man has a distinct feeling that he matters only in a negative way, *i. e.*, in milder instances he is merely conscious of being superfluous, but with a more extreme type he feels himself warded off as something definitely disturbing. This negative relation to the object — indifference, and even aversion — characterizes every introvert; it also makes a description of the introverted type in general extremely difficult.³⁸

Elinor threatens to leave Philip for a more human lover but she nevertheless knows, together with Jung, that Philip's self-defensive indifference and coldness are not directed particularly at her, but that they are impersonal, which means that they are signs of Philip's belonging to the introverted thinking type.

What was living and sensitive and irrational in her was hurt by his indifference, as though it were a personal coldness directed only against herself. And yet, whatever she might feel, Elinor knew all the time that his indifference wasn't personal, that he was like that with everybody, that he loved her as much as it was possible for him to love ...³⁹

It was this very introversion of Philip's which made it easy for him to resist the political propagandistic speech of Everard Webley and to show, by means of analysis, how ridiculous it was.⁴⁰ Of course, he is helped in this by his being an introverted intellectual who has enough ideas of his own and to spare and is, therefore, not inclined to be a recipient of ready-made ideas of others. In this connection Gross is once more cited by Jung.

The strong predominance of his own ideas does not favour an acceptance of the ideas or ideals of others.⁴¹

³⁷ *Ib.*, p. 490.

³⁸ *Ib.*, p. 485.

³⁹ A. Huxley *o. c.*, see note 18, p. 82.

⁴⁰ *Ib.*, pp. 343—346.

⁴¹ C. G. Jung, *o. c.*, see note 26, pp. 349—350.

Some of Philip Quarles's analyses of the inborn traits of his own character are, without doubt, only paraphrases of Jung's descriptions of the introverted thinking type. So, for example, he says, with respect to Webley's speech, in which Webley develops his fascist ideas:

It's probably better to be dispassionately analytical than to be overwhelmed by Everard's stage-managing and eloquence into becoming a British Freeman. But in other circumstances?⁴²

To be dispassionately analytical is not a conscious decision with Philip, but an inborn trait of his character, or of any introverted thinking type for that matter, as he himself well knows and says on the very same page, that his lifelong intellectual habits are the expression of an inborn indifference and coldness. And then, there were no other circumstances, since *Point Counter Point* was published in 1928 and the prospects for the future were grim. The only thing that remained was, thought Philip Quarles (and Huxley himself), to concoct a character on these lines.

Meanwhile, it might be rather interesting to concoct a character on these lines. A man who has always taken pains to encourage his own intellectualist tendencies at the expense of all the others. He avoids personal relationships as much as he can, he observes without participating, doesn't like to give himself away, is always a spectator rather than an actor. ... By this suppression of emotional relationships... he seems to himself to be achieving freedom — freedom from sentimentality, from the irrational, from passion, from impulse and emotionalism. But in reality, as he gradually discovers, he has only narrowed and desiccated his life; and what's more, has cramped his intellect by the very process he thought would emancipate it. His reason's free, but only to deal with a small fraction of experience. He realizes his psychological defects, and desires, in theory, to change. But it's difficult to break life-long habits; and perhaps the habits are only the expression of an inborn indifference and coldness, which it might be almost impossible to overcome.⁴³

These lines on which Philip Quarles would like to concoct a character in a novel, and he himself has been, in fact, concocted on these lines, are those by means of which Jung has described his introverted thinking type and which have been quoted here at length. Philip's instinctive attempt to avoid and suppress emotional relations, whether with other people or with other ideas (this man cannot accept an idea passionately to the point of acting on it) is again given by Jung in a citation of the views of Otto Gross. I will quote this particular passage because Philip Quarles's feeling of

⁴² A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, p. 345.

⁴³ *Ib.*, p. 345.

melancholy on account of his own "psychological defects" is mentioned in it as a particular feature of this type.

The affective inner life is very intense... there is a peculiar emotional sensibility, revealing itself to the outer world in a peculiar timidity and uneasiness in the presence of emotional stimuli... This touchiness, or irritation, is specifically directed against the emotional conditions of the environment. Hence, from brusque expressions of opinion, assertions charged with affect, attempts to influence feeling etc., there is an immediate and instinctive defence, proceeding, of course, from this very fear of the subject's own emotion...

From such sensitiveness time may well develop a certain melancholy, due to a sense of being shut off from life.⁴⁴

It is not only this melancholy of Quarles's that has its master-type in Jung's descriptions, but also this insistence on freedom from any possible influence from the outer world.

The more the ego seeks to secure every possible liberty, independence, superiority, and freedom from obligations, the deeper does it fall into the slavery of the objective facts... The object assumes terrifying dimensions, in spite of conscious depreciation. Detachment from, and command of, the object are, in consequence, pursued by the ego still more violently.⁴⁵

And it is his wife Elinor on whom Quarles is utterly dependent so far as his contact with the outer world of objects is concerned. Without her he would live in a vacuum.

Naturally, these are not the only descriptions Jung gives of the introverted thinking type that Huxley has obviously used in the characterization of Philip Quarles. To present them all here would take too much space. Perhaps one should mention only one more example. The description Elinor gives of the way her husband thinks, in reality, closely follows Jung's description of the peculiarities of the basic psychological function of thinking in the introverted attitude.

He understood everything so perfectly. ... he generalized her experience for her, he related it with other experiences, classified it, found analogies and parallels. From single and individual it became in his hands part of a system. She was astonished to find that she and her friends had been, all unconsciously, substantiating a theory, or exemplifying some interesting generalization.⁴⁶

A part of Jung's description of the peculiarities of introverted thinking runs as follows:

⁴⁴ C. G. Jung, o. c., see note 26, pp. 345—346.

⁴⁵ *Ib.*, p. 478. This description is particularly relevant to what Huxley says of the relation between Anthony Beavis and Helen in *Eyeless in Gaza*.

⁴⁶ A. Huxley, o. c. see note 18, p. 83.

External facts are not the aim and origin of this thinking, ... As illustrative examples they have their value, but they must not prevail. Facts are collected as evidence or examples for a theory, but never for their own sake. For this kind of thinking facts are of secondary importance; ... its goal is to see how external facts fit into, and fulfil, the framework of the idea.⁴⁷

Of course, it is not only the peculiarities of the four psychological functions in either the introverted or the extraverted attitude that Huxley has made use of in making up the characters of his novels, and it is certainly not only in characterization that he has deliberately followed Jung's ideas. There are some implied presuppositions in any typological theory about the inborn human differences that Jung did not hesitate to make explicit and Huxley, on his part, did not hesitate to incorporate into the very texture of his novels. One such presupposition is the impossibility of communication between individuals of different psychological types.⁴⁸ This impossibility has been illustrated by the example of Philip and Elinor Quarles.

Elinor's doubts that her husband does not love her are not justified and she knows that well.⁴⁹ On the contrary, he loves his wife, but, being an introvert, he finds it difficult to exhibit his emotions as directly, loudly and openly as she would like him to do. His indifference and coldness are not personal and are not directed only against herself. They are typical of any introvert, they are his defensive attitude against the outer world. It is equally true of Elinor's preference for an open exhibition of emotions; it is not personal. It is a peculiarity of the extraverted sensation type in her. The differences between Elinor and Philip Quarles, which make her feel that she is not loved, are not individual differences. They are the differences between two opposed psychological types. Elinor, like her father John Bidlake, belongs to the extraverted sensation type. Philip is an introverted thinking type. The differences between these two types are so great that, in fact, they live in two different worlds between which there seems to be very little, or no, communication. Philip avoids direct emotional contact with people because it disturbs him whereas for her this very same direct emotional contact is the most cherished value of life. In other words the ideals or the values of these two respective types are mutually exclusive. Huxley makes it clear that he knows how Philip's indifference is impersonal and typical of his type and not individual as well as that the elements of drama in the relations

⁴⁷ C. G. Jung, *o. c.*, see note 26, pp. 480—481.

⁴⁸ Cf. note 13 and the whole of p. 310. of this article.

⁴⁹ See note 39, p. 323. of this article.

between Elinor and Philip Quarles and the lack of communication between them are not as it were their private, individual and personal affair, but that the cause of them is to be found in the fundamental differences of the psychological types they belong to.

... and there would be the elements of drama in the relations between the woman, living mainly with her emotions and intuitions, and the man whose existence is mainly on the abstracted intellectual plane. He loves her in his way and she loves him in hers. Which means that he is contented and she's dissatisfied; for love in his way entails the minimum of those warm, confiding human relationships which constitute the essence of love in her way. She complains; he would like to give more, but finds it hard to change himself.⁵⁰

The pessimistic conclusion of this passage, that Philip finds it hard to change himself, in fact, finds it impossible, is based on Jung's views of the impersonality of individual differences between people. As a matter of fact these differences are not individual but typical. A man's character, to put it bluntly, is not his own. What seems to constitute his individuality is something non-individual and impersonal, something far more deeply rooted than is the personal layer of existence. At the beginning of chapter X of *Psychological Types* a short description of typically introverted and extraverted people is given with the emphasis on the idea that the differences between these people, although they seem to be individual and personal, are too deep and fundamental to be simply individual. This description resembles very much Huxley's description of the relations between Philip and Elinor.

Who does not know those taciturn, impenetrable, often shy natures, who form such a vivid contrast to these other open, sociable, serene maybe, or at least friendly and accessible characters, who are on good terms with all the world, or, even when disagreeing with it, still hold a relation to it by which they and it are mutually affected.

Naturally, at first, one is inclined to regard such differences as mere individual idiosyncrasies. But anyone with the opportunity of gaining a fundamental knowledge of many men will soon discover that such a far-reaching contrast does not merely concern the individual case, but is a question of typical attitudes, with a universality far greater than a limited psychological experience would at first assume. In reality, ..., it is a question of a fundamental opposition.⁵¹

In the same paragraph Jung insists that this fundamental opposition of the two types is not the result of a conscious

⁵⁰ A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, pp. 345—346.

⁵¹ C. G. Jung, o. c., see note 26, p. 413.

choice and, one may conclude that, therefore, no conscious change or reform of character is possible.

...our types can be demonstrated among labourers and peasants as among the most differentiated members of a nation. Furthermore, these types over-ride the distinctions of sex, since one finds the same contrasts amongst women of all classes. Such a universal distribution could hardly arise at the instigation of consciousness, *i. e.* as the result of a conscious and deliberate choice of attitude.⁵²

Since one's being an introvert or an extravert is due to the fundamental opposition of types and not to a conscious and deliberate choice of attitude, no conscious reform, that is, no conscious change of type, is possible. It is of no avail to Philip Quarles that he "realizes his psychological defects, and desires, in theory, to change", because it is impossible consciously and by the action of one's own will to escape the limitations of the psychological type one belongs to. This impossibility of reforming or simply changing one's character, and, consequently, one's life, is a constant leitmotif of *Point Counter Point*. It is not only Philip Quarles who would like to change himself, but, for example, Spandrell as well, and he too comes to the same fatalistic conclusion that it is impossible to change.

To sum up, this fatalism which permeates *Point Counter Point* is manifested first in the total lack of communication between the characters that appear in it. They are parallel straight lines that never meet, as Huxley likes to say repeatedly in his novels. This may be, as I have already suggested, a result of Huxley's observation of life, but I should think that his pessimism concerning communication between people is firmly based on and as it were scientifically proved by Jung's psychological theory of types. In making it impossible for his characters to communicate with each other Huxley has simply incorporated into his novel, and into his understanding of human life, a ready-made presupposition of Jung's and, for that matter, of any typological theory. In this he has done nothing that would not agree with his express views of how a man of letters should, in his novels, make a synthesis of the scientific knowledge of man and the literary expression of that knowledge.

In order to demonstrate how Huxley incorporated Jung's explanation of the impossibility of communication between people who belong to different psychological types into the texture of his novels of ideas I used the relation between Elinor and Philip Quarles as an illustrative example. There

⁵² *Ib.*

are many more examples, of course, and not only in *Point Counter Point*, but it is impossible to analyse them all in an article of this size.

A peculiarity of those of Huxley's characters mentioned up to now is their one-sidedness. John Bidlake is predominantly an extraverted sensation type, Everard Webley an extraverted thinking type and Philip Quarles an introverted thinking type. All the other psychological functions they have are underdeveloped. According to Jung, the ideal development of an individual would be the harmonious development of all the four functions and both attitudes of the psyche. When this does not occur, and this is normally the case, one of the functions is completely differentiated and developed, as are, for example, introverted thinking in Philip Quarles and extraverted sensation in his wife, whereas the other functions are undeveloped and undifferentiated, as is the case with feeling and emotional life in general with Philip Quarles. Nevertheless, Philip's feeling is not subnormal. It is only less differentiated than his thinking. But there are such characters in Huxley's novels in whom one or a few functions are either infantile or even degenerated. The majority of these characters belong in the subgroup of introverted intellectuals which is constituted of emotionally immature scientists.

A typical specimen of this group to be found in *Point Counter Point* is Lord Edward. He is a physiologist, a caricature of the creature whose intellect is overdeveloped and who has remained in every other respect a child.

At forty Lord Edward was in all but intellect a kind of child. In the laboratory, at his desk, he was as old as science itself. But his feelings, his intuitions, his instincts were those of a little boy. Unexercised, the greater part of his spiritual being had never developed. He was a kind of child, but with his childish habits ingrained by forty years of living.⁵³

That scientists in general should be conceived by Huxley as emotionally crippled, as perverts, or, perhaps, only childish is clear after what he makes Philip Quarles say about them.

One of the hardest things to remember is that a man's merit in one sphere is no guarantee of his merit in another... In the case of scientists and philosophers this ineptitude outside their own line of business isn't surprising. Indeed, it's almost

⁵³ A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, p. 25. It is significant that Huxley speaks of Lord Edward's feelings and intuitions as being those of a little boy. Feeling and intuition are two of the four psychological functions according to Jung, and they are undeveloped in Lord Edward because all of his psychic energy, libido, has been used up by his function of thinking.

inevitable. For it's obvious that excessive development of the purely mental functions leads to atrophy of all the rest. Hence the notorious infantility of professors... But in an artist there's less specialization, less one-sided development; consequently the artist ought to be sounder right through than the lop-sided man of science... That's why a man like Tolstoy is so specially unforgivable. Instinctively you trust him more than you would trust an intellectual or a spiritual specialist. And there he goes perverting all his deepest instincts and being just as idiotic and pernicious as St Francis of Assisi, or as Kant the moralist (oh, those categorical imperatives! and then the fact that the only thing the old gentleman felt at all deeply about was crystallized fruit!)...⁵⁴

Lawrence's influence on Huxley has been much talked and written about, and perhaps overstated. Nevertheless it seems to be beyond doubt, although not all that has been said about it can be possibly true. Perhaps this influence is very evident in connection with the ideas of the total, fully developed harmonious man and the one-sided, fragmentary, crippled man. Huxley was even praised by Lawrence for his idea of the "grand perverts" in a letter written on 27th March, 1928, the year when *Point Counter Point* was first published.

Your ideas of the grand perverts is excellent. You might begin with a Roman — and go on to St Francis — Michael Angelo and Leonardo — Goethe and Kant...⁵⁵

Lawrence probably would not have said that had he known that the ideas derived from Jung's theory of psychological types, since in an earlier letter, in speaking about *Proper Studies*, he had said: "...I think to make people introverts and extraverts is bunk".⁵⁶ And however much Huxley might have been influenced by Lawrence in other matters and particularly in the idea of the fully and harmoniously developed man as opposed to the one-sided man of modern civilization, it is beyond all doubt that Huxley has been influenced by Jung's formulations of this idea, and that it is Jung's formulations of this idea that he has incorporated into his novels.

Lord Edward and Kant are described in *Point Counter Point* as being childish only. But the specialized scientists of the other novels, like Jeremy Pordage of *After Many a Summer*, are clearly perverts whose life is spent in two opposed worlds of scientific research and hired love. For this perverted type of life, characteristic of the highly refined intellectuals that appear in Huxley's novels, Jung has set the pattern.

⁵⁴ *Ib.*, p 321.

⁵⁵ D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Letters*, Penguin Books, 1961, p. 168., letter No. 88.

⁵⁶ *Ib.*, p. 165., letter No. 86.

For example, I remember an introverted and highly intellectual neurotic, who wasted his time alternating between the loftiest flights of transcendental idealism and the most squalid suburban brothels, without any conscious admission of the existence of a moral or aesthetic conflict. The two things were utterly distinct as though belonging to different spheres. The result, naturally, was an acute compulsion neurosis.⁵⁷

These fragmentary people, intellectual giants and emotional degenerates, appear in Huxley's novels in various degrees of degeneration. In *Point Counter Point* there is not one complete, fully developed personality except, perhaps, Mark Rampion (who is based on D. H. Lawrence). And even his completeness is not real. It is manifested mostly, or even only, in his words about how a man must be a complete harmonious being. The harmony required is that of the conscious soul and instincts.

The sane, harmonious, Greek man gets as much as he can of both sets of states. He's not such a fool as to want to kill part of himself. He strikes a balance. It isn't easy of course; it's even damnably difficult. The forces to be reconciled are intrinsically hostile. The conscious soul resents the activities of the unconscious, physical, instinctive part of the total being. The life of the one is the other's death and vice versa. But the sane man at least tries to strike a balance. The Christians, who weren't sane, told people that they'd got to throw half of themselves into the wastepaper basket. And now the scientists and business men come and tell us that we must throw away half of what the Christians left us. But I don't want to be three-quarters dead. I prefer to be alive, entirely alive. It's time there was a revolt in favour of life and wholeness.⁵⁸

Here, it is obvious, Rampion is developing Jung's ideas using Jung's language. According to Jung there are four functions and two attitudes of the psyche to be harmoniously developed. There is a constant amount of energy at a person's disposal to do that. If one uses up all the energy to develop and differentiate only one of the functions, the other functions deteriorate. The trouble is that different realities correspond to different psychic functions. Each reality can be grasped only by means of the appropriate function. The man who overdevelops and differentiates one function at the expense of the others loses the possibility of having the experience of the neglected spheres of life because his tools as it were are not developed. Jung, as well as Rampion, thought that the Greek man was superior to the modern man simply because he was not so specialized, and, therefore, was more harmoniously developed. However, Jung thought this supe-

⁵⁷ C. G. Jung, o. c., see note 26, p. 348.

⁵⁸ A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, pp. 122—123.

riority of the Greek man to have been relative only and conditional, whereas for Rampion it was absolute. Jung has thought that if one develops all the functions harmoniously one cannot develop them to such a degree of differentiation as would be possible if all the psychic energy were used to develop only one function. But this is not our concern here. So far as this superiority of the Greek man over the modern is concerned Jung is explicit.

The advantage of the Greek consisted in the fact that he was less differentiated than the modern, if indeed one is disposed to regard that as an advantage;⁵⁹

Categories such as "conscious soul" and "the unconscious, physical, instinctive part of the total being", that appear in Rampion's speech, are Jung's as well. Jung's, too, is the view that the repressed functions sink into the unconscious because their connection with consciousness is broken and there they constitute the irrational, unconscious, autonomous part of a man's being while the conscious soul or the ego identifies itself with the function of thinking. The balance to be struck that Rampion is speaking of is the balance between these two.

The repressed functions, according to Jung, and Huxley has accepted this view wholeheartedly, change their character as they sink into the unconscious. They become primitive, archaic and destructive.

Identification with the directed function has the incontestable advantage that by so doing a man can best adapt himself to collective claims and expectations... But, upon the other side, we have to weigh the great disadvantage that inevitably accompanies this identification with the directed function, viz. the *degeneration of the individual*. Man, doubtless, is capable of a very extensive reduction to the mechanical level, although never to the point of complete surrender, without suffering gravest injury. For the more he is identified with the one function, the more does its over-charge of libido withdraw libido from the other functions. For a long period, maybe, they will endure even an extreme deprivation of libido, but in time they will inevitably react. The draining of libido involves their gradual relapse below the threshold of consciousness, their associative connection with consciousness gets loosened, until they sink by degrees into the unconscious. This is synonymous with a regressive development; namely, a recession of the relatively developed function to an infantile and eventually archaic level.⁶⁰

Philip Quarles, in paraphrasing what Rampion has said concerning the fact that the whole modern civilization is based on the development of the specialized function of thinking at

⁵⁹ C. G. Jung, o. c., see note 26, p. 92.

⁶⁰ *Ib.*, p. 370.

the expense of the others, does not even change Jung's terminology.

The intellectual life is child's play; which is why intellectuals tend to become children — and then imbeciles and finally, as the political and industrial history of the last few centuries clearly demonstrates, homicidal lunatics and wild beasts. The repressed functions don't die; they deteriorate, they fester, they revert to primitiveness.⁶¹

The same Jungian language is used by Huxley in giving his comment of Spandrell's character.

There are many people, it is true (and they are generally the most intellectually civilized, refined and sophisticated), who have a hankering after lowness... Excessive intellectual and aesthetic refinement is liable to be bought rather dearly at the expense of some strange emotional degeneration...⁶²

Now it seems that there is enough evidence to conclude that the problem of totally developed human beings, or of integrated personalities, in the form in which it appears in *Point Counter Point* at least, is taken over from Jung. My intention was to supply a few illustrations that corroborate this statement. It is equally clear, it seems, why Lord Edward should be represented as an infantile scientist.

There is only one more statement that is in need of a demonstrative proof. This statement is that many of Philip Quarles's ideas concerning his new literary technique, and that even the structure of *Point Counter Point* itself, which is an application of these ideas, represent a use of Jung's ideas in novelistic technique.

A part of this statement has already been proved. What Philip Quarles says of the novel of ideas and characterization in it,⁶³ that the character of each personage must be implied in the ideas of which he is the mouthpiece, is in fact nothing less than the application of the first tenet of Jung's psychology of individuation. As has been already said, Jung begins his *Psychological Types* by quoting Heine to the effect that Plato's and Aristotle's systems of thought are not simply two opposed systems but that they represent two opposed attitudes of the psyche, two opposed natures, that of an introvert and that of an extravert. It follows, inevitably, that the character of any man, as of a personage in a novel, must be implied in his ideas, — or perhaps in his actions, sensations, feelings and intuitions, which Quarles duly does not mention since he is an introverted thinking type who has nothing to do with action, sensation, feeling and intuition — since whatever he

⁶¹ A. Huxley, o. c., see note 18, pp. 323—324.

⁶² *Ib.*, p. 221. Cf. quotation 57 of this article.

⁶³ See note 18, p. 313. of this article.

thinks or does or senses or feels or intuitis is coloured by his being either an introvert or an extravert as well as by either thinking or sensation or feeling or intuition being his dominant functions. So much for that.

The other part of this statement which is still in need of proof is concerned with the new literary technique Philip Quarles is speaking about. This new technique is most aptly described by him as the technique of the "multiplicity of eyes and multiplicity of aspects seen"⁶⁴ The essence of this technique is based on Jung's view that there is not one universal truth and one universal reality, but that there are at least as many truths and as many realities as there are irreducible psychological types. It has been noticed that Huxley's novels of ideas are not ideological novels. Huxley did not try to propagate this or that idea or a whole ideology as the only right one. He simply could not do it because different "ideologies" of his characters are based on the types these characters belong to, and while one set of ideas is good and true for the one type it is demonstrably false for the other. There is no other way out of this situation but complete tolerance of all views, the tolerance which is expressed by Philip Quarles as a literary credo:

Because the essence of the new way of looking is multiplicity. Multiplicity of eyes and multiplicity of aspects seen.

Multiplicity of irreducible aspects or views is simply an expression of tolerance among all the possible views and this tolerance is once again, required by Jung himself and by the very typological way of thinking. If psychological differences between people are irreducible and are manifested in the differences of their ideas then communication and understanding are possible only if we tolerate and respect these differences and do not try to impose our point of view as the only right one on everybody else. Let us see what Jung has said about it.

Should, therefore, the existence of typical differences of human psyches be granted, and I confess I can see no reason why it should not be granted, the scientific theorist is confronted with the disagreeable dilemma of either allowing severally mutually contradictory theories of the same process to exist side by side, or of making an attempt that is doomed from the outset to found a sect which claims for itself the only correct method and the only true theory.⁶⁵

Huxley has transformed this demand for tolerance among contradictory theories into the postulate of a new literary technique. Q.E.D.

⁶⁴ *Ib.*, p. 196.

⁶⁵ C. G. Jung, *o. c.*, see note 26, pp. 626—627.