

Performance Appraisal in Indian Bureaucracy: Need for Systemic Reforms

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This paper explores the performance appraisal system in government in India and suggests some systemic reforms. The system of performance appraisal in India is a tool of control rather than of development. It is vague, subjective, control-oriented, cumbersome, sometimes biased and devoid of basic guidelines. It is suggested that the performance appraisal system should follow two-in-one objective – development of the policies and programmes through optimization of performance and potentialities of the officers. Secondly, it should be future-oriented rather than merely control-oriented. There should be proper classification of the bureaucracy as per the level and separate forms should be devised for each category. All forms, however, should invariably contain some common components – record of critical incidents, self-assessment component and report of potentialities. There should be clear guidelines for all

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officers regarding the targets and standards. It should be development-oriented, time-bound, confined to two levels.

Key words: civil service – India, performance appraisal, confidential reports, efficiency bar, administrative reform

1. Introduction

Bureaucracy or the Civil Service is the backbone of administration, a vehicle of development and a buffer-system for smooth political transformation in any country today. It involves management of people and so it is rightly called the soul of all management. The system of confidential reports or performance appraisal, as it is called in public administration, is an important tool of management of people. The performance of government, like that of any other organization, is ultimately the sum-total of the performances of the individuals through whom it functions. Government, therefore, is vitally interested in knowing from time to time how well or, for that matter, how badly its constituents function. Without this information, proper servants also need to know from time to time what their strong as well as weak points are. Without this information, they would not be able to plan their own career development properly. The system of confidential reports is intended to satisfy these needs. The system of confidential reports may be defined as a periodical stocktaking of the quality, quantity and style of the present and potential performance of an officer with a view to providing personnel information to government and developmental feedback to the officer concerned. If the system works in the spirit of this definition, it will function to the maximum satisfaction of the government and the government servant and ultimately, of those whom they all serve i.e., the public (Kashikar, 2004).

The following paper deals with the system of performance appraisal followed in Indian bureaucracy in general. Bureaucracy in India has been the largest organisation and the biggest employer. It encompasses almost every aspect of human life in India. Its performance ultimately reflects on the success or failure of the government. Therefore, general system of performance appraisal in Indian bureaucracy is taken up as the focal point of study in this paper. This paper is a case study of the system of performance appraisal followed in Indian bureaucracy. For this purpose, the actual system followed in different states was studied on the basis of appraisal forms used in those states. Reports of administrative reform

commissions formed by the government from time to time were also analysed so far as they dealt with performance appraisal. Similarly, some important legal documents like the Civil Services Rules (1984), Code of Conduct (1984), Indian Civil Service Rules Discipline and Punishment were also referred while studying the nature and status of Indian bureaucracy. Eventually, this paper is an attempt to analyse the present nature and shortcomings of the performance appraisal system of Indian bureaucracy in general; to focus on the challenges it has to face in present times; and finally to present some useful suggestions for systemic overhaul of this system in order to make Indian bureaucracy more vibrant, more efficient and development-oriented (Pradhan et al., 1997).

2. Nature of Performance Appraisal in India

The system of confidential reports about the performance of government servants is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. The end or ultimate goal is to optimize the achievement of governmental policies and programmes through optimization of the development of the government servant. The performance of every Government servant is assessed annually through his/her Confidential Report, which is an important document providing the basic and vital inputs for assessing the performance of the Government servant and his/her suitability for his/her further advancement in his/her career on occasions like confirmation, promotion, crossing of Efficiency Bar (EB), selection for deputation, selection for foreign assignment etc. Performance appraisal through confidential reports is a tool for human resource development in order to enable a Government servant to realize his/her true potential. It is not a fault-finding process, but a development one.

The system of confidential reports as it exists in the Indian Civil Service is based on the old bureaucratic pattern of the colonial days, notwithstanding the fact that with the passage of time some significant changes have been introduced in it, some of them on the lines of modern management thinking. However, traditionally governance structures in India are characterized by rule based approaches. The focus of the civil services in India is on process regulation; compliance with centrally prescribed standards and rules; in other words, how things should be done and how inputs should be aligned. With such focus on processes, systems in government are oriented towards input usage how much resources, staff and facili-

ties are deployed in a scheme, programme or project and whether such deployment is in accordance with rules and regulations. Thus, the main performance measure is the amount of money spent and the success of the schemes, programmes and projects is generally evaluated in terms of the inputs consumed. However, broadly the system still operates as a tool of control and hardly of development (Gov, 2011).

In India, performance of the bureaucracy depends, to a great extent, on its relations with their political masters; i.e. the politicians/ministers. Bureaucracy in India is accountable to the ministers in charge of the department, but in practice, the accountability is vague and of a generalised nature. Since there is no system of *ex ante* specification of accountability, the relationship between the ministers and the bureaucrats is essentially issue-sensitive and bureaucrats deal with the ministers as the issues present themselves. The role of the senior bureaucrat is to advise the ministers about the long-term social pay off of any proposed policies so that these are not determined by short-term political priorities. The accountability relationship can be anything from all-pervasive to minimalistic and it is left to the incumbent minister to interpret it in a manner that is most convenient to him/her. This leads to either collusive relationship or to discord between the two, both of which can adversely affect the performance of the bureaucracy (Dewey, 1993).

The following observation is based on the actual study of different appraisal forms and working of the performance appraisal system in different Indian states. (The author is grateful to many senior bureaucrats, working as well as retired, from different states for their valuable inputs and other help in this study.) In Indian bureaucratic parlance, »performance appraisal« is traditionally referred to as »Confidential Reports«, the term interchangeably used in this paper. The system works like this – Soon after the end of a financial year the reporting officer i.e., the immediate superior of an officer, writes the latter's confidential report. He does so based on his memory. Some officers have to write confidential reports of even hundreds of subordinates, all of whom they might not have enough knowledge about. The confidential report consists of his remarks on the performance and personality of the subordinate. Usually the two aspects are mixed up in the same report that becomes subjective or casual. The report then goes to the still superior officer who is in some States called reviewing officer. He notes down whether he agrees or disagrees with the remarks of the reporting officer. This is also mostly done casually. The paper then goes to the head of the office, where »in due course«, which may mean any length of time, it is analysed and adverse remarks and

sometimes even appreciative remarks, if any, are conveyed to the officer concerned.

Multiplicity of forms is a characteristic feature of the system of confidential reports in public administration in India. The central and state governments have devised their own system. In Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, for example, there are five different forms for different levels and/or departments. In Rajasthan, there are eight different forms for very top executives down to the stenos and other lower levels. The interesting thing is that these categories are based primarily on their salary scales. In Arunachal Pradesh, different forms are prescribed not only for different levels of officers but also for officers belonging to the same level but working in different departments. Actually, however, most of these forms follow the same pattern with slight variations here and there, which are considered to be warranted by their different departments or levels. The comparative advantage of differentiation is eclipsed by the overwhelming disadvantages of multiplicity and consequent complications.

An anticlimax of this feature is found in some states like West Bengal and Karnataka where they have only two forms, one for Gazetted Officers and the other for the other office staff. Each form mentions in brief about 12 to 15 items of assessment against which the reporting officer has to indicate his rating chosen from four or five points like very good, good, average, poor etc. This makes the system too casual and superficial.

Most of the states leave the replies unstructured. This enables the reporting officer to describe the performance and qualities of the subordinate officer in any manner he likes. The same words, however, get used by different reporting officers to mean different things. This leads to complication in comparative interpretation and assessment of reports written by different officers. Some States like Rajasthan and Kerala, however, give detailed description of the points to be considered under each item of assessment, and provide boxes to be tick-marked by the reporting officer. In Maharashtra, there are two different sets of forms for gazetted and non-gazetted officers. Each form consists of self-assessment by the officer concerned of his/her own performance. The reporting officer comments on it and gives his assessment of general ability and character of the officer in a separate part. The whole report is commented upon by the reviewing officer.

There is a lot of discontent among public servants of India regarding the way the system of confidential reports operates. It is felt that the confidential reports do not satisfy their essential conditions, namely, adequacy, relevance, objectivity, comparability and precision.

The assessment done by the reporting officer is usually considered to be subjective, partial and biased. Multiplicity of forms and vagueness of assessment create lot of confusion, complexity and heart-burning. The system is used mainly as a control measure and its vital developmental aspect is largely neglected.

The focus is more on the future than on the present job of an officer. Even the adverse or appreciative remarks meant to guide the officer in his future work are conveyed to the concerned officer so late that they mostly lose relevance and hardly serve any purpose. In the case of adverse remarks, they lead to a spate of representations and become totally counter-productive. In the process, the present is neglected and the future spoiled (Gov, 2010).

The basic flaw in the working of the system is that generally no targets or standards are laid down beforehand and the officer is usually uncertain about the targets for which and the standards against which he would be assessed.

Thus, the confidential report is looked upon as serving neither the present nor the future of the officer and his organisation. Many people therefore recommend abolition of the whole system.

This, however, is an extreme reaction. No progress is possible unless there is periodical stock-taking of the work done and the direction taken. Periodical review of the performance and potentiality of an officer is, therefore, necessary. The present system of confidential reports or performance appraisal in India suffers from certain basic shortcomings as explained above. It adversely affects the working of the bureaucracy. Therefore, drastic reforms are necessary in this system.

3. Rationale for Reforms

The government and bureaucracy, in particular, are expected to give results, rather fast results. In the 21st century, bureaucracy has to maintain pace with the rest of the sectors in society. Far-reaching changes in the global economy, increased global inter-dependence and a sea change in the way governments function have made it all the more necessary to build a competent, well-functioning civil service. The telecommunications and computer revolution offer immense opportunities to bring about efficient delivery of services. Here there also is resistance to simplification of procedures, which is a pre-requisite for introduction of e-governance.

In short, if the civil services are to be relevant and competent to meet the current and emerging needs, nothing short of a mutation will be adequate. With the passage of time, the role of civil society organisations in governance has increased with demands for better governance. The same can be said of the private sector, which is increasingly providing services in several areas, which hitherto were the exclusive preserve of the public sector. Consequently, civil servants should view civil society organisations and the private sector as partners in the process of the country's governance. There is need to shift from pre-eminence of governance to effective governance with a focus on decentralization and citizen-centricity.

Rapid and fundamental changes are taking place in India in terms of rapid economic growth, urbanization, environmental degradation, technological changes and increased local awareness and identity. The response time to adapt to these changes is much shorter than it used to be. As instruments of public service, civil servants have to be ready to manage such change. However, the perception is that they resist change as they are wedded to their privileges and prospects and thereby have become ends in themselves. In the political field, the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution have brought about a major change. Rural and urban local governments have to be enabled to become institutions of self government. To bring this about, the existing system of administration at the district level has to undergo fundamental changes. The progress of change at the district level remains very slow and local governments are »local« only in »form«, but are »central and state in content« (Arora and Goyal, 2011).

There are also concerns about the performance of the civil service in the context of realising a results-oriented government. It has been pointed out that the Civil Service in India is more concerned with the internal processes than with results. The systemic rigidities, needless complexities and over-centralization in the policy and management structures within which the civil service functions are too complex and often too constraining. The structures are based on hierarchies and there are a large number of veto points to be negotiated for a decision to emerge eventually. To compound it, the size and the number of ministries and departments have both overloaded the decision-making system and diminished the capacities of the individual civil servants to fulfil their operational responsibilities.

Theory and practice of public administration is undergoing change all over the world. New Public Management and the concept of »reinventing-the-state« emphasize the importance of measuring results and high-

light the outputs and outcomes rather than inputs and processes. They focus on the benefits derived from the use of government funds and seek to establish a framework in which it can be ascertained what quantifiable outcomes have been achieved. Under the circumstances, data-driven performance assessment against *ex-ante* specification of performance needs to be the main basis for the performance assessment of civil servants.

At present, there are some popular methods used in the performance appraisal process like: (a) Management by objectives; (b) 360-degree appraisal; (c) Behavioural observation scale; and (d) Behaviourally anchored rating scales. However, considering the peculiar nature of Indian society, politics and work culture in Indian bureaucracy, these methods are not useful or fully effective in Indian bureaucracy. There has to be an innovative system and one that is most suited to Indian working ethos. Therefore, based on the study of the existing system of confidential reports in Indian bureaucracy and the rationale given above, some reforms in the performance appraisal system in Indian bureaucracy are suggested below.

4. Suggested Reforms

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission was established by the Government of India in 2005, which submitted its report in 2007. It dealt extensively with all aspects of administrative reforms, and in the eleventh chapter, it specifically analysed the practice of performance appraisal in India. Most of the suggestions mentioned here are from this report. The system of confidential reports in bureaucracy should follow a two-in-one objective of »development or optimisation of the policies and programmes of the organisation through development and optimisation of the performance« and »potentiality of the officers concerned«. It should, therefore, adopt the people-production approach in place of the present judgmental one. There should also be equal emphasis on improvement in the present performance of an officer as on his development or sprucing up for the proper shouldering of future responsibilities.

On the basis of the realities mentioned above, the Government of India tried to introduce certain reforms in performance appraisal system by way of redrafting the appraisal form. Nevertheless, these changes were minor and did not bring about substantial change in the way appraisal forms are written by the bureaucrats. An outline of a model system of performance appraisal is suggested below, devised by the author himself on the basis

of the study of the forms of confidential reports existing in various state governments described in the earlier section.

For the purpose of assessing performance, the whole body of public servants may be classified into three categories or levels only, namely:

- (a) Non-supervisory clinical and technical staff who work at the operational or cutting-edge level and the nature of whose functions is performance of given primary tasks according to given procedures, methods, rules, techniques etc.
- (b) Supervisory staff other than heads of offices, projects, departments, etc., who are responsible for the work of small or uni-dimensional units or sections, and
- (c) Heads of offices, projects, institutions, regions, departments etc, who hold more or less independent charges of their offices, projects etc, and who have closer association with the policy-making process of public authorities.

There should be separate forms for these three levels of officers according to the above-mentioned nature of their functions and responsibilities. These forms would be common to all departments since the basic activities, attitudes and skills underlying their apparently different functions, would be common in all departments for officers of a common level.

Each form, however, should consist of the following components:

1. Ephemeral roll or critical incident records;
2. Performance report including self-assessment;
3. Potential report.

The ephemeral roll or critical incident record is a record of memory joggers about all noteworthy events, good and/or bad, that indicate some significant achievement or failure, or quality or deficiency of the subordinate officer.

It should begin with a brief job description of the officer concerned and note down the targets given and standards prescribed for the performance of the subordinate officer from time to time. In addition to the memory joggers mentioned above, it should also include reports the subordinate officer might like to make regarding his/her achievements from time to time. The ephemeral roll will thus give the reporting officer timely opportunities to discuss with the subordinate officer his work and give him timely developmental feed-back so that his/her present work improves. It will also provide the reporting officer with complete, balanced perspec-

tive and realistic information about the performance of the subordinate officer during the entire previous year to enable him/her to write his confidential report in an objective and fruitful manner.

The existing rules of some state governments, (for example, Maharashtra), do provide for the maintenance of ephemeral rolls by the reporting officers, but since they do not make it compulsory, not many officers bother to maintain them. However, from the developmental point of view, the value of ephemeral rolls can hardly be overestimated and hence they should be made an integral part of the system of performance appraisal in public administration. It is in fact the base of a healthy appraisal system.

Performance report is a matter-of-fact statement of the quality and quantity of the work done by the subordinate officer during the past year. At first, the subordinate officer should himself/herself give his/her self-assessment with reference to the targets given to him/her and the standards prescribed and then mention the level of qualitative and quantitative achievement with explanations wherever necessary. The reporting officer should then give his/her own assessment and comments on the self-assessment of the subordinate officer. Under rules of the Government of Maharashtra, a self-assessment form has been prescribed on these lines. It requires the subordinate officer to mention the targets given and standards prescribed for him/her. However, since in most cases targets and standards are not prescribed beforehand, the self-assessment report misses its essential feature and becomes only a self-laudatory essay of the subordinate officer.

The soundness of the performance report will depend upon the soundness of the ephemeral roll. It is only when the ephemeral roll is properly maintained, and the targets and standards are prescribed beforehand, that the performance report can be adequate, realistic, objective and reliable.

The other part of the system is the potential report. It assesses the potentiality of an officer. Some subjective element, therefore, is likely to creep into it. It should therefore be separated from the performance report.

The assessment of potentiality of an officer is essential to plan his career development. It should assess the capacities of the officer on the following four well-known points:

1. What he achieves i.e., usual quality and quantity of his work,
2. How he works i.e., the style and method of his working.
3. What he knows i.e., his knowledge of his job and related areas,
and
4. What he is i.e., his quality as holder of office.

Details of these points will differ for the three levels of officers mentioned above to suit the requirements of their positions.

Just as performance report grows out of the ephemeral roll, the potential report should grow out of the performance report. In other words, it should be a projection on abstract level of the personality that manifests itself through the performance report. The element of subjectivity will diminish considerably if this approach is followed.

In almost all state governments, reports of both performance and potential are written by reporting officers and then commented upon by still superior officers called reviewing officers.

The reviewing officer is expected to scrutinize the remarks and comments of the reporting officer so as to make the total report fairly realistic and reliable. However, in some State governments the reports go to a number of still higher officers, each one of whom is empowered to comment on them. This makes the system cumbersome and results in delays in communication. As has been already pointed out, feed-back loses its relevance and effectiveness if it is considerably delayed. Whatever remarks, adverse or appreciative, need to be conveyed should be decided upon and conveyed by the reviewing officer himself.

The report should not normally go beyond two levels of officers. If, however, there is any representation, it should be dealt with at the third level and if there is an appeal on the decision of the third level, it should be finally disposed of at the fourth level. Ninety percent of the cases however should end at the second level itself. This brings us to the question whether confidential reports (C.R.) or performance appraisal reports should be kept as a secret or open document. Modern management theory is in favour of open appraisal. This however might not fit into the present-day ethos and culture of public administration in India. Thus, a via-media would be helpful.

The ephemeral roll should be kept-open and it should enable the appraisee to know his strong and weak points as understood by his superior officer. Nothing will, therefore, come to him as a big surprise when any communication is sent to him later on. Since things would have been discussed at the time of writing the ephemeral roll, there would be fewer occasions for representation by the aggrieved appraisee.

Another important point that needs to be stressed in the discussion of the appraisal system in bureaucracy is the appropriate number of subordinate officers about whom their superior officer should write confidential report. In many departments, the number of subordinates for whom their superior

has to write confidential report is alarmingly high, sometimes going into hundreds. Writing of so many confidential reports by one person becomes practically impossible. The whole system then reduces itself to mere formality. Normally, no reporting officer should be required to write confidential reports for more than a manageable number of subordinates, say ten.

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) appointed by the Government of India in 2005 also examined this issue in depth and gave some valid suggestions. Some of these suggestions given in Chapter 11 of the ARC Report are in tune with the suggestions already given above (Gov, 2007: Chapter 11).

The Administrative Reforms Commission observed that the appraisal system should be more consultative and transparent and that performance appraisal systems for all the services should be modified on the lines of the recently introduced Performance Appraisal Rules for the All India Services. In other words, the present secrecy or closed-door policy should be done away with. This demands expansion of the scope of the present performance appraisal system of its employees to a comprehensive performance management system (PMS).

As regards the forms, the Commission suggested performance appraisal formats to be made job specific. In other words, the appraisal format prescribed for civil servants should have three sections, viz.; (a) a generic section (standard or common) that meets the requirements of a particular service to which the officer belongs, (b) another section based on the goals and requirements of the department in which he/she is working, and (c) a final section which captures the specific requirements and targets relating to the post that the officer holds. In addition to this, it is necessary that the appraisal form should provide the reporting officer with multiple options on the level of performance against which he/she would indicate numerically the level at which the officer reported upon has performed.

The Commission has recommended that the reporting officer, at the beginning of the year, has to set quantitative/physical targets in consultation with each of the Government servants, whose reports he/she is required to write. Performance appraisal is meant to be a joint exercise between the Government servant reported upon and the reporting officer. While fixing the targets, priority should be assigned item-wise, taking into consideration the nature and the area of work. The Confidential Report is initiated by the Government servant to be reported upon, who gives a brief description of his/her duties, specifies the targets set for him wherever applicable, achievements against each target, shortfalls, if any, constraints encountered and areas where the achievements have been greater.

Performance appraisal should be a process that ought to be carried out throughout the year. There should be provisions for detailed work-plan and a mid-year review should be introduced for all Services. Performance measurement should be based on outcomes rather than only on outputs. Further, common people or the stake-holders should also be involved in the process by way of »Citizens' feedback« so that performance of bureaucrat can be assessed particularly at the cutting edge.

It is observed that the subordinates do not have any idea about filling the appraisal form nor the officers have competence to enter their comments in it. Therefore, it is suggested that the government should formulate detailed guidelines to guide the reporting and reviewing officers for assigning numerical ratings for their subordinates. It is also necessary that »Training Modules« for implementing performance management systems should be designed and introduced as a part of training programmes for civil servants.

In implementing PMS in government, it must be emphasized that the PMS should be designed within the overall strategic framework appropriate to the particular ministry-department-organization. It is also necessary to link individual contributions to strategic objectives of the organization. Thus, each ministry or government department should customize its own PMS as per its own set up and requirements.

In this regard, PMS should also take care of the individual inclination or capacity of a bureaucrat. One of the objectives of PMS is to groom a bureaucrat to specialise in a particular field or area. After a particular length of service, the bureaucrat should be able to identify his/her own area of expertise and accordingly the government should give him postings; say for example, agriculture, finance, education and so on. A well-designed PMS will help the seniors to identify the liking or expertise of the juniors and subsequently career of the juniors can be shaped or developed properly. This will also lead to match the goals of the bureaucrat with those of the ministry/organisation creating a better working atmosphere.

Another suggestion that has come from different sources is that annual performance agreements should be signed between the departmental minister and the secretary of the ministry/heads of departments, providing physical and verifiable details of the work to be done during a financial year. There is also a trend of human resources business process outsourcing (HR BPO). Human Resource Outsourcing refers to the process in which an organisation uses the expert services of a third party (generally professional consultants) to take care of its HR functions while HR man-

agement can focus on the strategic dimension of their function. The second ARC also recommended that the actual performance should be assessed by a third party – say, the Central Public Services Authority – with reference to the annual performance agreement. The details of the annual performance agreements and the result of the assessment by the third party should be provided to the legislature as a part of the performance budget/outcome budget. This will bring about impartiality and objectivity in the PMS. It will also help the bureaucrat against whom there is any adverse remark in the report. The authority mentioned above can act as a semi-judicial body to scrutinise the adverse remarks independently.

Indian bureaucracy is like a juggernaut and its problems too are complex. However, in spite of all shortcomings, it is widely recognized that the bureaucracy in India has contributed to stability in terms of maintenance of peace, the conduct of fair elections, managing disasters and the preservation of the unity of the nation. There is no denying the fact that the civil service has played an important role in preserving unity, providing stability and maintaining order in a vast country prone to various conflicts – ethnic, communal, regional, etc. (Potter, 1973).

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission also took cognizance of the ailments and inherent defects in performance appraisal system in Indian bureaucracy. The basic flaw, it observed, is the absence of values or norms in bureaucrats. The current set of »enforceable norms« includes the Conduct Rules, typified by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules of 1964 and analogous rules applicable to members of the All India Services or employees of various state governments. There is no Code of Ethics prescribed for the civil servants in India although such Codes exist in other countries. A comprehensive Civil Service Ethical Code should be conceptualized with a clear and concise statement of the values and ethical standards that a civil servant should imbibe. These values should reflect public expectations from a civil servant with reference to political impartiality. Following values should invariably be a part of the Code:

- a. Commitment to the Constitution
- b. Adherence to the highest standards of probity, integrity and conduct
- c. Impartiality and non-partisanship
- d. Objectivity
- e. Commitment to the citizens' concerns and public good
- f. Empathy for the vulnerable and weaker sections of society.

The above ethical values will also reflect in the implementation of performance appraisal system in a transparent, fair and consultative manner. This is the need of the hour in reforming the performance appraisal system in India.

The World Bank has also assessed the Indian bureaucracy in a report in the following words: »The civil service in India, the legendary »steel frame« of the British Raj, is today battling against onslaughts to its relevance. The strengths of the civil service in India lies in its extraordinary pool of skills and talents, its field experience, its extensive networking, its appreciation and overview of the functioning of the government at the cutting edge, its understanding of delivery systems for development, awareness of the formal and informal socio-economic networks in the field, its »can deliver« attitude, its role in national integration, its ready adaptability to new and unfamiliar situation and tasks, and its social orientation, bolstered by intense competition among the officers«.

The present-day system of confidential reports in India is primarily a tool of control, a legacy of the British rule. Unless it is given a developmental orientation with some fundamental systemic changes as explained above, it would not meet the present-day needs. The design given above is an effort to give that orientation.

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PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL IN INDIAN BUREAUCRACY:
NEED FOR SYSTEMIC REFORMS

Summary

This paper explores the performance appraisal system in government in India and suggests some systemic reforms. In India, government is the major employer. Performance of the government is the sum of the performances of the individuals or the constituents through whom it functions. A review of the bureaucracy's performance is crucial today to bring refinement, improve quality and get better results. Performance appraisal would help the Indian civil servants to know their own strengths and weaknesses. The system of performance appraisal in India is a tool of control rather than of development. It is vague, subjective, control-oriented, cumbersome, sometimes biased, and devoid of basic guidelines. It is suggested that the performance appraisal system should follow two-in-one objective – development of the policies & programmes through optimization of performance and potentialities of the officers. Secondly, it should be future-oriented rather than merely control-oriented. There should be proper classification of the bureaucracy as per the level and separate forms should be devised for each category. All forms, however, should invariably contain some common components – record of critical incidents, self-assessment component and report of potentialities. There should be clear guidelines for all officers regarding the targets and standards. It should be development-oriented, time-bound, and confined to two levels.

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OCJENJIVANJE SLUŽBENIKA U INDIJSKOJ JAVNOJ UPRAVI: POTREBA ZA SISTEMSKIM REFORMAMA

Sažetak

Rad se bavi sustavom ocjenjivanja službenika u indijskoj javnoj upravi te predlaže neke sistemske reforme. U Indiji je država glavni poslodavac. Uspješnost države suma je uspješnosti rada njezinih službenika i sastavnica kroz koje djeluje. Pregled rada službenika danas je ključan za dotjerivanje javne uprave, poboljšanje kvalitete i postizanje boljih rezultata. Službenicima ocjenjivanje pomaže da spoznaju svoje dobre i loše strane. Sustav ocjenjivanja službenika u Indiji je više sredstvo kontrole nego razvoja. Nejasan je, subjektivan, usmjeren na kontrolu, glomazan, katkada pristran i bez temeljnih smjernica za rad. Predlaže se da sustav ocjenjivanja slijedi dvojaki cilj – razvoj javnih politika i programa kroz optimizaciju rada i potencijala javnih službenika. Sustav bi trebao biti usmjeren na budućnost, a ne samo na kontrolu. Trebala bi postojati odgovarajuća klasifikacija radnih mjesta u javnoj upravi prema razini, a za svaku bi kategoriju službenika trebao postojati zasebni formular za ocjenjivanje. Međutim, svi bi formulari trebali imati određene zajedničke sastavnice: popis incidenata koje je službenik imao na poslu, formular za samoocjenjivanje te izvještaj o potencijalima službenika. Također bi za sve službenike trebale postojati jasne smjernice koje opisuju ciljeve i standarde. Sustav bi trebao biti okrenut razvoju uprave, vremenski ograničen (bez otežanja davanja ocjene u nedogled) te limitiran na dvije razine.

Ključne riječi: javna uprava – Indija, ocjenjivanje službenika, povjerljivi izvještaji, upravna reforma