

# *The Quality of Governance in Public Administration Reforms in New Democracies: Bulgaria and Romania*

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Since the fall of the communist regimes in Southeastern Europe (SEE) in 1989, the democratic path many of the region's countries had embarked upon was an uncharted road for the governments of the time. Faced with both internal and external pressures to catch up with the West, SEE governments were forced to take up the task of radically reforming the economic and political structures of their countries, as well as with restructuring their own internal ways of doing things. This paper evaluates and applies several theories of quality of governance in the context of SEE transition to democracy and European integration. The paper draws some tentative conclusions about which theories of the quality of governance are applicable to SEE, and elucidates to what extent the Bulgarian and primarily Romanian governments still have to reform their administrative

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systems. Measures adopted for improving the quality of governance in SEE became akin to a carrot-and-stick approach for SEE governments, as the availability of badly needed foreign aid to support their economies was made conditional upon reaching different milestones on the democratic path. In this transition context, reforming the public administration system proved a burdensome task, especially since some of the SEE governments viewed public administration as their own backyard and thus resisted reform pressures. Bulgaria and Romania are selected as the primary case studies because of their status of slow reformers when compared with their neighbours in the region.

*Keywords:* quality of governance, public administration reform, Southeastern Europe (SEE), EU conditionality

## 1. Introduction

The fall of the communist regimes in Southeastern Europe (SEE) at the beginning of the 1990s made the new leaders of the region turn their eyes towards the more developed Western Europe in order to adopt such models of government and governance in their own countries. This reform process could not, however, be financially sustained from within because of the poor state of the SEE economies after the fall of communism. Therefore, the elected governments of SEE had to attract foreign funds and investments in order to improve the overall situation in their countries. However, the Western donors, largely international organizations and institutions, made these funds available to SEE only upon achieving several reform milestones and benchmarks. Thus, the incentive for democratic reforms in SEE was sustained and fuelled by the western promise of financial assistance conditioned upon these reforms. Governance indicators (such as the World Bank indicators) and various country ratings released by international organizations became benchmarks that governments in SEE had to achieve in order to attract the amounts of funds needed for their development.

Nevertheless, the level of commitment to the reform by the new political elite differed widely among SEE countries, and in turn this political will, or lack thereof, affected the development path of SEE countries. Thus, countries, and implicitly the governments, which showed more commit-

ment to the reform process could benefit from even more funding which sped up their development. Conversely, foreign donors and investors were more reluctant to bring their money to the SEE countries that showed less commitment to democratic reforms, and, consequently, these countries developed more slowly than their counterparts. While low levels of the elites' commitment to reform has been used extensively as a weapon in political battles fought in SEE since the fall of communism, one has to keep in mind that the governments implementing such reforms are democratically elected, and thus accountable to the voters.

The issue of the pace of civil service reform in SEE is significant. In countries where the bureaucratic system is large, the lack of political will to reform the state apparatus can be explained by the fact that civil servants make up a relatively large proportion of the electorate and thus could mobilize and vote out an incumbent government threatening to undermine their interests. In such countries, the governments have a stronger incentive to resist outside pressure for downsizing their bureaucracy and making it more efficient, because of the risk of being replaced by the opposition forces less keen on civil service reform. Hence, Romania and Bulgaria are selected as case studies, because of their status of slow reformers in SEE due to a relatively large size of the civil service in these countries. Another justification for treating Bulgaria and Romania as slow reformers is that, unlike other SSE countries with similar histories, they failed to meet the European Union benchmarks for entry into the EU in 2004, and as the Sigma and OECD reports have shown, they also exhibited a very slow administrative reform process even after 2004. Moreover, Romania and Bulgaria are amongst the very few EU member states that still provide very low levels of remuneration to their civil servants. As such, has Romania become a unique case through which corruption, nepotism, the problem of transparency and accountability, and the general malaise especially of the SEE reform system can be observed. The low level of salaries civil servants receive becomes a very important aspect of the overall governance of the country, as defined and measured by the World Bank (WB). This paper tackles the aspects referring to the overall incentive structure with which the Romanian government tries to stimulate its civil servants through a reward system. Additionally, the paper also refers to the problem of a politicized and oversized bureaucracy that is malfunctioning for objective reasons, primarily related to low remuneration and insufficient incentives to remain loyal to the public sector.

This paper builds from the theory of the concept of governance presented by the WB (2001) and examines the trends of governance indicators for

the cases of Romania and Bulgaria. It will then proceed by showing the WB governance indicators for the two countries. The data are to be used for two purposes: first to draw regional comparisons on the performance of SEE countries in the light of the EU conditionality mechanism; and second to theoretically check the growth trends of these indicators against the observed ones so as to make comparisons between Romania and Bulgaria for each of the six World Bank indicators.

## 2. Theory and Expectations

The current literature dealing with the quality of governance varies considerably in its conceptualization of distinct, though related, criteria on which it examines the notion of good governance in a country. These criteria vary, depending on the author, from administrative reform process, to meeting some economic benchmarks via social development, such as successful implementation of criminal and civil laws, in comparison with EU countries. However, a key observation in the literature is that the definition of the quality of governance needs tightening in order to serve as a useful concept in its relationship to both (a) public administrative reform implementation and (b) explaining failures of reform implementation.

Therefore, this paper considers the World Bank's definition of good governance, as »the process and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised: (i) the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (ii) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently, and to formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and, (iii) the respect for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them« (2001). It follows that the flow of foreign aid coming from the EU into Romania and Bulgaria is expected to have occurred as a result of the overall increase of the quality of governance in both countries. It is crucial to state that foreign aid is conditioned on the quality of governance. The increase is especially expected to occur in the capacity of governments to formulate policies, but also to manage resources efficiently. However, the implementation process for the formulated policies appears to be lagging behind in the analysed countries. Thus, Romania is expected to score comparatively lower than its SEE neighbours for the WB indicator measuring the ability of the government to implement policies. The indicator used by the WB for this measurement – government effectiveness – is thus expected

to have slightly lower values for Romania than for the other countries in SEE. Moreover, for the Bulgarian case, it is expected that the growth trend observed for the quality of governance indicators is higher than for Romania. This expectation comes from the fact that Bulgaria faced a severe political and economic crisis in the mid 1990s, which is the beginning of the period covered by this study. As the two countries joined the EU at the same time, in January 2007, it could be reasonably expected that they scored relatively the same in indicators for the quality of governance. However, since Bulgaria faced a crisis that did not occur in Romania, the levels of these indicators for the beginning of the studied period are expected to be lower for Bulgaria. The expectation is thus that the growth rate of indicators for Bulgaria is higher in later years than the growth rate for Romania. This would imply that Bulgaria has recently been catching up and even surpassing Romania in the quality of governance indicators, whereas it was lagging behind at the beginning of the study period, in the mid 1990s.

In addition to reform implementation, another reason for examining the quality of governance in Romania and Bulgaria is the direct link between governance quality and political stability, insofar as a slight decrease in the indicators referring to the stability of the political system is associated with increased uncertainty faced by political parties, which induces a slower reform rate of governance. For instance, in the early 1990s, before the period studied here, Romania had yet to undergo a significant turnover in the political leadership, meaning that the successor communist party had enjoyed almost complete political control over the newly established democratic system. What had happened was rather a slight ideological realignment of the ruling elite from the extreme left, characterizing it during communism, towards the centre-left as a result of the democratic shift of the country. The peaceful transfer of power to a right and centre-right coalition following the 1996 general election was expected to bring an increase in the indicators of political stability. However, since the coalition government had proven to be divided, the government became exposed to threats from within, thus reducing the levels of political certainty in the country. Moreover, the frequent splits within parties, either in power or in opposition, increased the overall level of political instability, resulting in the fact that in all subsequent elections none of the parties had clear control of the parliament. This relative surge in the level of internal uncertainty faced by political parties in Romania is expected to be reflected in a very slow growth, or even a negative growth in the governance indicator related to political stability.

Moreover, this paper expresses compelling support for political turnover and meritocratic procedures in evaluating the quality of governance, and finds vindication of the theory of Dahlström et al. (2001), in which they link a *higher* meritocratic recruitment to a *stronger* quality of governance. They also state that the meritocratic recruitment of public employees 'capture[s] the effect of the bureaucratic professionalism' (2001: 10). This paper agrees with this line of argumentation, and emphasizes a stronger need for political turnover.

However, in the case of Romania, the post-transition time is marked with a situation where the successor communist party enjoyed almost complete political control over the newly established democratic system. A high degree of politicization has been recognized in the literature as a key factor of political instability (see Weber, 1978; Goodnow, 1990). The focus on a strong turnover in support of a better quality of governance can also be found in the literature on representative bureaucracy. A strong mutual relationship between the bureaucracy and the public reflects representative bureaucracy, which is defined as good governance.


The literature on representative bureaucracy argues that 'public bureaucracies must be representative of the people they serve' (Evans, 1974: 628). This broad definition of the concept of representative bureaucracy can be investigated through various means. Since *passive* bureaucracy can be rather easily achieved in emerging democracies, whereas *active* faces the challenge of patronage and clientelistic networks that are still present in both Romania and Bulgaria, the focus here is on this important distinction.

Summarizing, this paper concentrates on the following three aspects while examining the *quality of governance* in Romania and Bulgaria: (1) the necessity of administrative reforms and implementation, (2) the incentive structure, referring to the problem of increasing the remuneration of civil servants, and (3) the necessity of political turnover and meritocratic procedures that are positively linked to the higher quality of governance.

### 3. Data and Analysis

#### 3.1. Comparison of the Levels of Government Effectiveness in SEE

Figure 1: Government effectiveness in SEE – 2007 (World Bank)



The government effectiveness indicator (WB: new results in 2007) is especially important in assessing the overall development of SEE because of the effect of EU conditionality mechanism in the region. In this respect, the EU played an important part as an actor facilitating the development of the countries in this region. However, the role of the EU has always been limited to making EU funds available to its member and candidate countries to use for specific projects. Thus, while the EU makes funds available for the region as a whole, it is up to the national governments to use these funds efficiently. Referring to the necessity of reform implementation in evaluating the *quality of governance*, as stated above, this paper finds that government effectiveness indicator reflects the quality of the civil service, the quality of the government's policies, their implementation and the government's commitment to such policies. This indicator

is particularly useful in understanding the performance of the states in Southern and Eastern Europe. Relatively lower levels of government effectiveness in Romania and Bulgaria can thus account for a limited capacity of these countries to absorb the funds made available to them by the EU after their accession. The low levels of benefits from EU funding appear consistent with the lower percentile levels achieved by Romania and Bulgaria in the government effectiveness indicator. Moreover, the tedious process of civil service reform, which took place in Romania and Bulgaria, can account for the lower levels of government effectiveness, and subsequently for their relatively poor performance in making use of EU funds.

The first and most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Figure 1 is that Romania and Bulgaria rank below the other EU member states in the region (Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland) in their government effectiveness. Such a ranking appears to corroborate the decision of the EU to allow the two countries to join the block later than the others. As the EU does not explicitly use the World Bank's indicators as the criteria for membership, the match between the lower rankings of Romania and Bulgaria and their later accession justifies the study of the WB quality of governance even under the EU conditionality mechanism. However, the degree of misfit between EU decisions and WB indicators is apparent from the fact that Croatia, which is still an EU candidate country, ranks higher than both Romania and Bulgaria over four governance indicators: political stability, government effectiveness, the rule of law and control of corruption. Further analysis of the underlying causes of low ranking in government effectiveness in Romania is presented below.

It was not until 1999 that any change, however little, occurred in the state administration structures or indeed in the administrative practices of the Romanian bureaucracy. Pre-transition practices continued to have a substantial lingering effect on the post-transition period, with virtually no civil service reform. The turnover rate of personnel remained generally stagnant, although some ministries expanded whereas others contracted. As a consequence, there are some pre-transition era bureaucrats who remain in power today, thereby making a lingering effect of old clientelistic networks an abiding feature. Furthermore, the low turnover rate creates significant difficulties in the professionalisation of ministerial staff, insofar as new, young professionals are not inducted into the ministries. In evaluating the quality of governance on the basis of Dahlström et al.'s criterion, it is clear that Romania did not fulfil crucial criteria of success in achieving greater professionalism via a meritocratic recruitment process.



Moreover, the ties between bureaucrats and politicians present another problem to the civil service administration in Romania to date, which tends to blur the demarcation line meant to separate bureaucrats from politicians. Autonomy from political control is effectively absent. A related problem of corruption also continues to exist due to the lack of clear demarcation between the administrative and private spheres of Romanian bureaucracy. Corruption also comes with patronage. Symbiotic interaction between politicians and bureaucrats shows that there is a problem insofar as there is a lack of autonomy of civil servants from political control (Michalak, 2008).

There was also the problem of wage compression that was rather serious, especially in the pre-1999 era, and it has become exacerbated over time, since the fall of communism. In fact, the ratio of the highest- to lowest-paid employees was 4.5 in 1991, and because of across-the-board cost of living adjustments, the ratio had fallen to 3.7 by 1994, thereby further reducing the incentive for talented young professionals to join the Romanian civil service (Nunberg, 1999: 76).

Most significantly, there is a lack of transparency in the implementation of the Civil Service Reform Act promulgated in 1999, which has remained almost completely unimplemented. In spite of the requirement that an independent agency must be set up for its implementation, the agency was established in the year 2000, and it has remained operationally ineffective to date, thereby hampering the implementation of this piece of legislation in Romania. Essentially, the Agency lacked the teeth required for enforcement of the salient features of the 1999 reform law. Moreover, the recruitment of civil servants continues to be based on political influence and lacks sufficient transparency. There is a wide discretion enjoyed by the high-ranking civil servants who continue to hire and promote unprofessional staff, and exhibit arbitrary and capricious behaviour in promotion and salary determination of the civil service staff (see Romanian Civil Service Barometer, 2004).

Corrupt practices of the civil service personnel in Romania remain a major problem. Some (former) members have been convicted of offenses involving organized crime, the activities of which continue to haunt the country. The 2008 Monitoring Report states: »A continuing effort needs to be made to develop administrative capacity. Serious staff shortages in the public ministry may call for emergency measures such as a temporary re-assignment of posts. Some elements of the recruitment procedure need to be improved to attract suitably qualified recruits.« (EU Commission Report, 2008).

In addition, the 2008 Monitoring Report of the European Commission (EC) has charged Romania with the task of speedily solving a large number of unsolved mafia killings since the fall of communism, at the risk of facing EU funding withdrawal that had already been imposed on Bulgaria, effective October 2008.

Thus there have been, and continue to exist, serious nation-wide, problems of highly inadequate civil service reform in Romania. This is, without doubt, a non-trivial issue that warrants serious examination.

Another important problem of the Romanian bureaucracy is how to create a professional civil service. The Romanian administration depends on the existing civil servants for providing professional training to new civil servants. This is a serious problem because attracting, retaining and developing new professional civil servants have been one of Romania's main problems during the civil service reform. An even bigger problem is that young professionals can obtain much higher remuneration outside the Romanian bureaucracy, and possibly even outside Romania, as a matter of accuracy. It is the Romanian state's responsibility to recruit and keep the young professionals. Table 1 shows that public servants' salaries cannot compete with the salaries in the private and state-owned commercial sectors, especially at the senior managerial level. It can be said that directors-general in the public service earn dramatically less than directors in all three types of companies. The strongest attractions for young civil service professionals are consulting offers, partly initiated by the EU.

Table 1: Salaries by Type of Employer, 1994 (currency: Lei)

Position	Public Service	Regies autonomes	State Commercial Company	Private Commercial Company
General Manager	n.a.	290,006	496,668	950,000
Economist I	n.a.	164,708	288,793	400,000
Computer Analyst	n.a.	173,183	278,793	340,000
Judicial counsellor	n.a.	176,360	276,048	600,000
Director general	233,900	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Advisor specialist	180,260	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: World Bank, 1994

The distinct growth patterns in the ministries affect their value of the persistence of old structures variable in different ways. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the share of old timers is 16 per cent while it is 62 per cent in the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of European Integration is in between, with 39 per cent of the original civil servants. It is estimated that the share of old timers in 1999 was as high as 48 per cent, but it has significantly decreased during the reform period due to the implementation of policy measures (Michalak, 2008: 32).

However, the problem of retention of capable officials is not limited to ministerial employees. Since the legal framework of Romania views judges as civil servants, the judicial branch of government is faced with the same obstacles to the reform as public administration. Therefore, the failed implementation of a meritocratic system for the administrative system also affects the judicial system. The coupling of what is supposed to be an independent branch of government with the state administrative apparatus may prove hurtful for the retention capacity of the judiciary. Since the employees in this governmental branch are paid less than executive employees, judges have lower incentives to improve their competences because they are not as well remunerated as their governmental counterparts. Moreover, since the judges' base wage is lower, they are also more susceptible to corruptive behaviour in order to increase their personal incomes.

Another issue that stands out is that the judicial branch is independent in terms of oversight, with only internal control mechanisms being in place. This makes the implementation of a coherent meritocratic system difficult to achieve, because the competence objectives cannot be accurately measured and interpreted from external sources. If reform is attempted towards implementing a merit-based payment method without external control, the judges will become vulnerable to suspicions of setting meaningless objectives that are designed to increase salaries artificially, without any tangible increase in terms of better performance. Thus, the recent trend of closing the salary gap between judges and executive employees may be viewed as an instance of successful lobbying without tangible improvements in performance (see Table 1).

### 3.2 Comparison between Trends in Romanian and Bulgarian Quality of Governance Indicators

Figure 2: Romania and Bulgaria in 2007





Figure 3: Romania and Bulgaria in 1996



The differences observed in Figure 2 and Figure 3 serve to draw useful comparisons between the countries this paper is primarily concerned with. Using the percentile ratios provided, one can track the changes that occurred in Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, as the numbers in the charts are percentiles of all countries in the world, one can also observe how the two countries performed by comparison with the other countries studied by the WB.

On average, it can be observed that the ranking of Bulgaria has improved more than that of Romania, as the increase in its percentile ratios is higher than the Romanian ones, and it could be cautiously added that this appears to support the hypothesis of a faster catch-up rate in the quality of governance in recent years. However, an analyst should keep in mind the severe economic and political crisis Bulgaria faced during 1996, so some of the very low percentiles of 1996 can be explained by this event. For Bulgaria, the highest growth for a single indicator can be observed for government effectiveness where the percentile ratio moved from 15 to 60. The very low percentile for the year 1996 can have occurred due to the political crisis whereby the government lacked the ability to formulate sound policies and lacked the credibility that it could commit to such policies. However, as the Bulgarian government managed to surpass its Romanian counterpart, it could be concluded that the improvements in its effectiveness occurred as the result of a healthy reform process.

The low percentile for the 1996 value of the corruption control indicator in Bulgaria can also be partly attributed to the political crisis of that year. Unlike the government effectiveness indicator, the ratings for Bulgaria have not increased so much and this indicator is the only one where Romania still ranks higher percentile-wise.

The only two indicators where the results are counterintuitive are regulatory quality and the rule of law. Thus, in terms of regulatory quality, Romania has improved from ranking in the 35<sup>th</sup> percentile to the 66<sup>th</sup> percentile (i.e. 31 percentile growth), while Bulgaria has increased from the 54<sup>th</sup> percentile to the 70<sup>th</sup> (i.e. 16 percentile growth). A probable explanation for this sharper increase in Romanian regulatory quality could be the defective legal system in place during communism. The highly personalized communist rule of the Romanian dictator Ceausescu is thus expected to have been translated into the poor quality of the legal framework. As a real change of political leadership had yet to occur in Romania before 1996, it could be inferred that the political leaders had little incentive to reform the legal framework. On the contrary, the more relaxed nature

of the communist rule in Bulgaria is expected to have been translated into a better quality of the Bulgarian regulatory framework. Moreover, the negotiated nature of the transition from communism to democracy is also expected to have produced a higher incentive for changing the legal framework in Bulgaria before 1996. These two factors may account for the higher percentile observed for the regulatory quality indicator at the 1996 level. As both Romania and Bulgaria had to reform their respective legal systems in order to implement the EU *acquis communautaire*, statistically equal level of the regulatory quality indicator is understandable. Thus, the factors accounting for the initially lower level of regulatory quality in Romania can also be used to explain the sharper increase observed in the ratio for this indicator.

The other indicator that does not confirm the theoretical expectations presented is the rule of law. The percentile ratios of both Romania and Bulgaria are particularly interesting, as the values for this indicator have remained constant in Romania, and even slightly decreased for Bulgaria. This data warrants further investigation, and the only explanation this paper ventures to propose is that the overhaul of the legal system that occurred as a result of the EU integration process may have led to a *not invented here* syndrome, whereby new legislation is viewed as imposed from above and is thus less likely to be properly enforced.

In a regional context, the government effectiveness indicator is important because of the rankings obtained by the other countries in the region. Given that all of the countries in CEE are or have been subject to the EU's conditionality mechanism, it is important to note that two EU candidate countries, namely Croatia and Turkey, have ranked higher than either Bulgaria or Romania for this indicator. Such a ranking comes to prove that civil service reform is an important avenue for research in the Eastern European context, even though most of the countries in the region have become members of the EU.

Moreover, the extent of administrative capacity can also be judged by examining the extent of implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In Romania, the FOIA was passed in 2001, but again the question arises whether the Law was actually implemented. In 2004, the Romanian Academic Society surveyed 500 public institutions from 96 localities, and checked how the main requirements of the Law were fulfilled in the legal timeframe. The FOIA requires that access to public information by public authorities should be granted at request. Implementation is considerably lower in rural areas than in urban areas. The survey reveals

that the level of compliance with the FOIA decreases in cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants, and drops seriously in rural areas. With regard to the FOIA requirement that “each institution must produce and make available *ex officio* a list of documents of public interest”, the survey shows that the list was available in a rather small number of institutions (about a third of the total). Furthermore, the interviews conducted in the Ministry of Agriculture and Education show that, on average, only 16 per cent of the bureaucrats could actually show the list of public documents (Michalak, 2008). The problem of implementing the FOIA is but one of many, though very significant, cases and an illustrative example of the extremely limited administrative capacity in Romania (Michalak, 2008).

## 4. Conclusion

In conclusion, using the World Bank’s definition of the *quality of governance*, this paper focuses primarily on (1) successful administrative reforms and implementation, (2) incentive structures of the civil servants and (3) political turnover and meritocratic procedures, for evaluating SEE. It presents first a comparative analysis of Romania and Bulgaria, as well as a more in-depth analysis of Romania insofar as they are representative for SEE.

There are some general conclusions that can also be drawn from the empirical findings of the examination of the civil service reform process, and from its determinants for the improvement in the quality of governance in Romania. Every Eastern European country has its particular initial conditions, including those that pertain to its bureaucratic structure. All socio-economic and political systems have some characteristics of inertia, which keeps them from undergoing a rapid change of the bureaucratic structure. South Eastern Europe has, however, experienced a radical change as a consequence of the collapse of communism in Europe. There are powerful forces in each of these countries that tend to resist the reform, and, at the same time, there are forces that favour it. No bureaucracy is completely independent of capture from politicians or from civil society actors – it is merely a matter of degrees of independence.

However, the reform in post-transition period is inevitable in order to improve the quality of governance. In a newly established democracy, the citizenry demands it, and as the process of democratization progresses in these countries, the politicians have to comply. The bureaucrats thus have

to change the manner of conducting administrative tasks, and perform them with greater transparency and impartiality than they were accustomed to, even though they are subject to capture from both politicians and civil society actors.

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THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION REFORMS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:  
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA

Summary

*Since the fall of the communist regimes in Southeastern Europe (SEE) in 1989, the democratic path many of the region's countries had embarked upon was an uncharted road for the governments of the time. Faced with both internal and external pressures to catch up with the West, SEE governments were forced to take up the task of radically reforming the economic and political structures of their countries, as well as with restructuring their own internal ways of doing things. This paper evaluates and applies several theories of quality of governance in the context of SEE transition to democracy and European integration. The paper draws some tentative conclusions about which theories of the quality of governance are indeed applicable in SEE, and elucidates to what extent the Bulgarian and primarily Romanian governments still have to reform their administrative systems. Measures adopted for improving the quality of governance in SEE became akin to a carrot-and-stick approach for SEE governments, as the availability of much needed foreign aid to support their economies was made conditional upon reaching different milestones on the democratic path. In this transition context, reforming the public administration system proved a burdensome task, especially since some of the SEE governments viewed public administration as their own backyard and thus resisted reform pressures. Bulgaria and Romania are selected as the primary case studies because of their status of 'slow reformers' when compared with their neighbours in the region.*

Keywords: quality of governance, public administration reform, Southeastern Europe (SEE), EU conditionality

## KVALITETA UPRAVLJANJA U REFORMAMA JAVNE UPRAVE NOVIH DEMOKRACIJA: BUGARSKA I RUMUNJSKA

### Sažetak

Od pada socijalističkih režima u jugoistočnoj Europi 1989., put prema demokraciji, za koji su se odlučile mnoge od zemalja u regiji, bio je još neotkriven. Suočene s unutarnjim i vanjskim pritiscima da dostignu zapadnu Europu, vlade zemalja jugoistočne Europe morale su preuzeti zadatak radikalne reforme gospodarskih i političkih struktura svojih država, ali i promijeniti način na koji su one same obavljale poslove. Rad ocjenjuje i primjenjuje nekoliko teorija kvalitete javnog upravljanja u okviru demokratske tranzicije zemalja jugoistočne Europe i europskih integracija. Iznosi nekoliko tentativnih zaključaka o tome koja se od teorija kvalitete javnog upravljanja može uistinu primijeniti na države jugoistočne Europe te se pojašnjava koliko još vlade Bugarske i Rumunjske moraju reformirati svoje upravne sustave. Mjere za poboljšanje kvalitete javnog upravljanja što se primjenjuju u jugoistočnoj Europi postale su nalik pristupu »mrkve i batine«, budući da se vladama zemalja na tom prostoru pristup prijeko potrebnim financijskim sredstvima za podršku nacionalnim gospodarstvima uvjetuje postizanjem raznolikih ciljeva na putu demokratizacije. Reformiranje sustava javne uprave pokazalo se teškim zadatkom u tranzicijskim vremenima, posebice zbog toga što su mnoge vlade smatrale javnu upravu »vlastitim dvorištem« i zbog toga se opirale pritiscima izvana. Bugarska i Rumunjska izabrane su za studiju slučaja zbog toga što su kasnile u usporedbi s ostalim državama u regiji i stoga dobile epitet sporih reformatorica.

Ključne riječi: kvaliteta javnog upravljanja, reforme javne uprave, jugoistočna Europa, uvjetovanost u EU