

Actions to Enhance Global Security – Focus on WMD and Terrorism*

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Under the auspices of the European Leadership Network (ELN), the World Academy of Art & Science (WAAS) and the Dag Hammarskjöld University College of International Relations and Diplomacy, a group of experts propose to present a set of recommendations to the conference.

Politicians are distracted with the ongoing economic crisis and instability. While understandable, this is far from being the only challenge facing the world as we have been discussing today. If we are to seize the opportunities of the future, then we have to address the legacy of the past and nowhere is this more evident than in defence and security issues. The blunt truth is that security policies in the Euro-Atlantic region, in the NATO's back yard, remain on Cold War autopilot, strategic nuclear forces remain to be launched in minutes, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons remain in Europe, a missile defence debate remains stuck in neutral, while new security challenges such as cyber, conventional, prompt strike force, and space remain contentious and inadequately addressed. The truth is that this legacy contributes to the tensions and mistrust across the Euro-Atlantic region and needlessly drives up risks and, most importantly, at a time of unprecedented austerity drives up the cost of defence. But this is about more than guns and butter. The likelihood of a major war in Europe may have practically disappeared since the end of the Cold War but this legacy with its attendant mistrust undermines any effort to build a true partnership in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond to meet the challenges of the 21st century, including what we are focusing on in this session, WMD and global terrorism. The *status quo* legacy divides our continent and sets both Europe and Russia up for a future of failure and even worse, a future of irrelevance in the 21st century.

The overwhelming conclusion of our experts' deliberations is that we need a new approach, a new paradigm for the 21st century which is not dependent on what has wor-

ked in the 20th century. Among other things, we considered the recommendations of Building Mutual Security, the report of deliberations by a group of experts and political leaders brought together by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the European Leadership Network, the Munich Security Conference and the Russian International Affairs Council which was published on April 4. The report analysis, its key findings and matrix of steps for a new cooperative global security discussion commended itself to our participants and we recommend that it be given serious consideration by our political leaders.

The world faces unprecedented challenges to global and human security. The threats facing the world are interconnected and interdependent. Current crises destroy human capital and harm as well as humiliate human dignity. The frustration resulting from unfulfilled expectations provides fertile grounds for terrorism. Mistrust and tensions reinforce each other. War and violence make all the problems and threats worse. Under these circumstances it is easy to lose sight of the existential threat posed by the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

We must recognize the progress that has been made in reducing the number of nuclear warheads by about 75 per cent since the end of the Cold War. And that number is decreasing still. But at the same time, we must acknowledge our collective failures. The number of nuclear armed states has increased, and this proliferation has taken place in the most unstable regions and in some of the unstable regimes of the world. The CTBT is still not ratified and stalemate prevents progress on the FMCT. We know terrorists are striving to obtain access to nuclear weapons and materials. Although the world has succeeded in avoiding the use of these weapons for the past 68 years, there is no assurance that this record of no use will be maintained in the future as the present very dangerous confrontation with North Korea should make evident.

We are far from being able to guarantee the security of existing nuclear weapons and materials. Recent experience in both North Korea and Syria demonstrates that a deterrence strategy based on the threat of use of WMD has failed to deter both threats of use and actual use of WMD. Inconclusive evidence has emerged suggesting that chemical weapons have been used. If it is true, it will be a very serious precedent and maybe also the breach of a red line followed by impunity. New thinking is called for and the NATO has a special obligation to take the lead in that thinking.

Before coming to specific proposals, we would do well to ponder some fundamental questions related to nuclear weapons. Answers to these questions will reflect our willingness to take the courageous actions necessary to address the threats that they pose.

- Is there presently a problem that nuclear weapons solve that is a greater danger than the weapons themselves?
- Can a non-proliferation regime based on the premise of “do as we say and not as we do” be sustained?

- When the world's most powerful military alliance in human history claims a need for these deployments for security, what message does a weak state in a dangerous region hear?
- Do the weapons provide prestige or military value?
- Can the resources of the NATO not come up with a better way of enhancing security and thus set an example that can truly be emulated by all nations?

Now for our specific proposals, which are by necessity limited to a small number of priorities, but as my presentation suggests, are part of a longer list of necessary steps:

1. Reduce the role of NW in the NATO Strategic Concept and national security doctrines of NWS members of the Alliance.
 - a. Elimination of US non-strategic NW from Europe;
 - b. Build-up of the non-nuclear aspects of the NATO security concept and exploring ways to provide US assurances of commitments without stationing of NW in Europe;
 - c. Committing not to use NW against a non-nuclear-weapon state under any circumstances.
2. Make NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation more productive and report on its results in the spring of 2014; the US and Russia to engage in negotiations on further reductions in nuclear arsenals, including all types of nuclear weapons.
3. Demonstrate good faith commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons and, in this regard, engage seriously and constructively in the deliberations of the Open-Ended Working Group on taking forward the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which will commence its substantive work in Geneva on May 14, 2013.
4. Call on NPT depositaries and co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction to exert all efforts to convene the Conference on the zone, as mandated by the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as soon as possible. Also, call upon the states in the region to engage constructively with the Facilitator (Ambassador Jaakko Laajava) and with each other to agree on modalities and the agenda of the Conference at an early date.
5. Reaffirm that any use of chemical and biological weapons is unacceptable.

The NATO is in many ways a unique structure. One of the three pillars of the NATO is Science for Peace and Security. Scientific research is among the most important generators of our global fast changing world. The world is no longer a bipolar confrontation, but our common global home. The NATO should and can fulfil a role of a significant actor guaranteeing global and human security.

