Globalisations: Traditions, Transformation, Transnationalism

INDRANEEL SIRCAR
University of Wales — Aberystwyth
E-mail: isircar@ssl.berkeley.edu

"Globalisation" has permeated across disciplines, starting with literature focusing on financial interconnectedness, but spreading to work on culture, philosophy and international relations. Despite the challenge from realists, the political, financial and cultural traits of an interconnected world cannot be denied. The globalist literature is not homogeneous, but rather, draws from different traditions. The following discussion divides the literature into two main traditions. The "liberal" tradition draws on liberal and neoliberal institutionalism, which gave rise to transnational relations and complex interdependence theories in the 1970s. Although there are many parallels between current notions of "globalisation" and earlier notions of "complex interdependence", the fragmentation and reconstitution of space is where "globalisation" diverges from the earlier literature. However, much of the world does not have this access to technologies that facilitate this "spatial compression", and is thus neglected by this "liberal" literature. This critique is put forward by the second tradition in the "globalisation" literature, a "historic-materialist" or "critical" tradition originating with Marx and Engels. Influenced by formulations such as Wallerstein’s "world systems" theory, this critical literature highlights examples of the ills of "globalisation". It characterises "globalisation" as "marginalisation" and "exploitation", and also reveals the discourse and ideology behind the term. The word "global" connotes all that is universal and natural, so that the processes of the market seem to be irreversible, inevitable, and beyond human agency. However, by taking a transformative perspective on "globalisation", it is possible to demystify the concept, and bring back human agency. One opportunity to do this is with a reassessment of transnationalist literature, such as Risse-Kappen’s framework that lays bare the interplay between domestic, international and social forces. Thus, the "subject" is brought back in, empowering individuals to transform current notions of "globalisation".

Key words: GLOBALIZATION, TRANSNATIONALISM, TRANSNATIONALIZATION

Introduction

The term that has permeated across a multitude of disciplines at the twilight of the last “millennium” is that of globalisation. That which started as a study of the interconnectedness of financial markets has proliferated to international relations, politics, military, fast food, and the Internet. It has been ascribed to ozone holes, hamburgers, and global terrorism. The concept of “globalisation” seems to apply to everything, so it is challenging to examine if in fact it means anything. The following discussion will present a study of the literature surrounding this term. Any discussion about globalisation begins with an examination of its existence. Adherents to realism, the prevailing paradigm in international politics, posit the foundation of unitary state action determining the trajectory of the world. Globalisation challenges this notion, since determinants of world politics come not only from the traditional centres of power, but also financial markets, media, pressure groups, and so on. Some of the findings by those studying the changes in financial interconnectedness have found that there is little change. However, to wish away the term and to not engage in the debate about the changes in the world system cannot be sustained without rejecting a plethora of literature across disciplines.

Once the existence of “globalisation” is put forward, the discussion focuses on the different traditions within the literature. The literature cannot be reduced to one, coherent cor-
pus, but rather, represents different “globalisations”. The scheme put forward in the following sections distinguishes between “liberal” and “historic-materialist” (or Marxist) formulations.

The first type has its origins in the institutionalist literature. This led to the work of Keohane and Nye, starting with their definition of transnationalism as processes that cross national borders (contrary to realist formulations), and leading to their formulation of complex interdependence. Complex interdependence has three components. First, there is greater importance for non-military issues in “security” policy because of issues in new areas such as environmental, narcotic and terrorist threats. Secondly, the effectiveness and role of military action is reduced. Finally, there are “multiple channels” by which transactions and interactions occur between individuals. This literature was the forerunner of liberal globalist literature. There are some “hyperglobalist” works that predict the dismantling of the states system and the “end of history” (as proposed by Francis Fukuyama), but these sorts of formulations are often easier to attack by realists, since hyperglobalists only present a caricature of the globalist literature. It is more fruitful to examine moderate definitions of globalisation. The one used is proposed by Held and McGrew (1998). Although there are parallels between this definition of globalisation and the earlier literature, the diverging point is the spatio-temporal feature of globalisation. Globalisation, through the advent of technologies, compresses space, and questions traditional boundaries of communities. The Internet, satellite communication, and cable news channels have altered the connections between diasporic communities, as well as facilitating the coordination within new communities, such as human rights activists, students and environmentalists.

However, the importance of technology upon which “space” becomes “hyperspace” is crucial, since much of the world does not have access to these technologies. Since appreciation of “globalisation” depends on access, the term leads to the marginalisation of much of the world.

This sort of critical view is examined in the second tradition of the globalist literature, which has its origins in the writings of Marx and Engels. This literature is based on a tenet of capitalist exploitation in the world economy. Later frameworks have been suggested by Immanuel Wallerstein, of a “world systems” theory based on a capitalist world economy in which the “core” exploits the “periphery”. Case studies of oil companies in Nigeria, and various calculations of global flows have shown that the “global” phenomenon is localised and uneven, due to the twin features of marginalisation and exploitation. Moreover, the meaning of the word “global” connotes that which is natural or universal. This reifies market forces and depicts the exploitation of the “developing world” as inevitable and beyond human agency.

The final section attempts to provide routes for transformation, and empowerment of marginalised and exploited individuals. Possible examples include laying bare agency in development, such that largely ignored individuals from the “Third World” can be active in their own development. This sort of transformation rests on “bringing the subject back in” (Hay and Marsh, 2000). A source for a useful framework is suggested by re-examining the transnationalist literature. By using Risse-Kappen’s (1995) updated account of transnational relations, it is possible to recover context and agency by investigating the interplay between domestic, international and social networks, providing an opportunity to transform the concept of “globalisation”.

**Globalisation: Challenging Realism**

The guiding principle of the international states system and the prevailing paradigm in international relations is that of neorealism, which focuses on the relationship between states
as crucial, not the character within them. Thus, Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (Waltz, 1979) criticises attempts to develop international relations by focusing within states as *reductionist*. However, there have been many challenges to the notion of the impermeable state border demarcating the frontier between “inside” and “outside”. In the 1950s and 1960s, John Herz wrote about the “rise and demise of the territorial state”. In particular, Herz focused on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and its effects on the traditional notions of state sovereignty, territory and security (Youngs, 1996:61–62). In the 1970s Keohane and Nye (1971) developed theories of *complex interdependence* that challenged the notion of the unitary state, claiming instead that relations were based on multiple channels of interaction. The most recent challenge to the state-centric paradigm has been the elusive concept of globalisation.

The concept is elusive since the word has been co-opted by different literatures. Cerny (1996:135) comments that the word “is an inherently heterogeneous and fuzzy phenomenon.” The term *globalisation* has been used in international political economy (Germain, 2000), international relations theory (Clark, 1999; Clark, 1997), and philosophy (Maclean, 2000). Moreover, the endorsement for the term varies within the literature, with some strong critics. In particular, adherents to realist notions of the international reject the challenge of globalisation. Scholte (1996:50) notes that according to this *conservative* viewpoint, “social relations are and/or should be organized in terms of territorial units ... with limited interdependence between them.” Moreover, buying into globalist myths is *dangerous*, since it would neglect the power politics that is prevalent in the world, and lead to imprudent policy. The conservative claim that the world is not witnessing a new era of global interdependence seems to be supported by other (though not *realist*) sceptical economic literature. Hirst and Thompson (1996:2) have found that the so-called global economy is “not unprecedented” by comparing FDI figures, and that the international economy was more open between 1870 and 1914. Linda Weiss’s findings also seem to show that globalisation is overstated. In particular, external pressures, such as war, affecting a state’s autonomy is nothing new (Weiss, 1998:190). However, such protests cannot undermine the reconceptualisations of social organisation in a globalising world. As Ruggie replies, rejecting that globalisation even exists is “baffling and bizarre” (Scholte 1996:50).

With the starting point of the existence of globalisation, it is useful to think of “globalisations” rather than a single “globalisation”. An instructive distinction to use has been suggested both by Scholte (1996) and R. J. Barry Jones (2000:253) to organise the adherents of globalism. On the one hand, liberal globalisation that traces its intellectual roots from liberal institutionalism and interdependence, which is leading towards a borderless world. On the other hand, some of the historic-materialist (or critical) globalist literature derives from Marxist influences, through Wallerstein’s “world systems” theory, with globalisation as the resulting mechanism to perpetuate capitalist marginalisation and exploitation. Of course, the demarcation between “liberal” versus “historic-materialist” globalisation does not attempt to formulate a definitive framework for all globalist literature, but rather presents a convenient conceptual tool.

**Liberal Traditions**

The origins of the liberal tradition of globalisation can be traced to Rousseau’s stag hunt, deducing the negative outcome of individual self-interested behaviour. The minimisation of such behaviour can be affected by the establishment of institutions that regulate the actions of the “hunters” to provide more positive results. For example, Robert Putnam (1993:28) found that the establishment of regional governments in Italy led to the “ideological depolarisation” of politics in Italy, leading to greater co-operation. The shift in the ideology of the elite was not caused by a change in the composition of these institutions, but 107
rather, the regional governments themselves affected the individual politicians that comprised them. In fact, Putnam (1993:8) wrote that “[i]nstitutions influence outcomes because they shape actors’ identities, power and strategies.

The principles of institutionalisation can be extended beyond local governments to include actors that cross state boundaries. This starting point of the cross-border “stag hunt” gave rise to a new concept of transnationalism in the 1970s. The definition put forward by Keohane and Nye (1971:xv) suggests that “transnational relations” are interactions and organisations whose influence crosses national boundaries. A more complete definition of transnational is put forward by Thomas Risse-Kappen: “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organ[s]ation” (Risse-Kappen, 1995:3). The crucial feature in both formulations is the challenge to the realist notion that states are unitary actors (Keohane and Nye, 1987:407). Important interactions occur at many different levels, contrasting with the “billiard-ball” model of the states system suggested by realist frameworks, suggesting a more “networked” geometry criss-crossing state boundaries. The establishment of these institutions gives rise to more significant sub-state actors in the international system, from trade unions to revolutionary movements.

The principle of transnational interactions led to the formulation of “complex interdependence” by Keohane and Nye. There are three features to “complex interdependence”. First, the international is characterised by multiple channels, not only the traditional interstate interactions of soldiers and diplomats, but also international organisations, official and unofficial meetings between sub-state entities, and so on. Second, there is no policy hierarchy. That is, traditional formulations of policy centred on the “high politics” of military security and national defence. However, with the complicated interactions between various sub-state actors, the boundary between “domestic” and “foreign” becomes complicated, such that other traditionally “low” political issues such as environmental and economic issues become more important. The third component of “complex interdependence” follows from the second. Since other types of interaction are crucial, such as economic synchronisation across borders, there are several routes to address conflicts, such that the role of military force is reduced (Keohane and Nye, 1987:407—412).

Later literature on globalisation draws upon the interdependence literature of the 1970s to examine the changing permeability of state borders. As mentioned before, there is no single “globalisation”, but rather, several “globalisations”, even within the liberal tradition. The definition of globalisation put forward will not represent the “hyperglobalist” position. Such literature asserts that the globalisation challenge will weaken the prevailing state system, and lead to the organisation of politics away from state-centric Westphalian norms (Held and McGrew, 1998:220). For example, Cerny argues that “globalization has undermined the sovereign and inclusive character of the national-level political association and the character of the national state as civil association” (Cerny, 1996:135). However, such viewpoints only represent an extreme “straw man” of globalisation that is easy to attack by traditional realists. This literature represents the utopian end game of the Enlightenment project of spreading liberal rationality around the globe. Such formulations defeat orthodoxy and backwardness through “market forces, electoral multiparty democracy, techno-scientific rationality, national self-determination and international cooperation” (Scholte, 1996:51). A well-known formulation of this sort is Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” hypothesis. Fukuyama writes that the liberal democracy and economic liberalism are the pinnacle of social organisation (Youngs, 1996:64—65), and represent a universal end-point for human development, “the end of history.” As Scholte notes, many of these hyperglobalist accounts “exaggerate the extent of deterritorialization,” which postpone seriously considering the globalist challenge to the prevailing realist paradigm (Scholte, 1996:51).
Thus, it is more fruitful to address more moderate definitions of the term. Held and McGrew (1998:220) define globalisation as an historical process that transforms the organising principles of social interactions and transactions through intercontinental or trans-regional networks. Crucially, globalisation challenges (without necessarily defeating) the exclusivist notions of territorial sovereignty. The contemporary sense of the word includes increased global flows and institutions in a changing spatio-temporal context.

An initial examination of the differences between Held and McGrew’s definition and the earlier interdependence literature shows strong parallels. Globalisation has led to the reformulation of military organisation from unilateral wars of conquest to “cooperative” security arrangements between states. Entities such as NATO survived beyond the Cold War, since this organisation (controversially) transformed away from the traditional military alliance to protect borders, towards security obligations beyond its borders. More importantly, notions of “security” have been extended beyond traditional state-to-state military conflicts. Other significant threats, such as environmental, narcotic and sub-state terrorist concerns challenge the prevailing policy hierarchy. Moreover, the interconnectedness between states financially due to increased global flows leads to a greater importance of international co-ordination in other realms (Held and McGrew, 1998). The complexities of national policy echoes the absence of a policy hierarchy, posited by Keohane and Nye two decades before. Moreover, the interconnectedness between regions, and the security cooperation within regions reduces the effectiveness of unilateral state military action against another state. As illustrated in the Gulf War, unilateral military action can be met with overwhelming cooperative military action. Again, Keohane and Nye’s “complex interdependence” suggested mutual interdependence leading to a decreased military role. For example, the cooperation politically and economically within Western Europe has made military conflict unlikely between the nations that stood on opposite sides during the Second World War. Cooperative institutions have led to the regional demilitarisation of France, Germany and Britain (Keohane and Nye, 1987:410). Although there are parallels between the formulation of military power between globalisation and interdependence, the most significant similarity is that of “multiple channels”. In other words, the most important parallel is the notion that state borders are permeable, and that the international system is more complicated than the traditional realm of diplomats and soldiers. The actions of multi-national corporations (MNCs), social movements, supra-national bodies, etc. are significant in the trajectory of world politics. For example, arguably the greatest failure of the realist paradigm was not anticipating the collapse of the “Iron Curtain” and the end of the Cold War. The final battleground of the Cold War was not at the state level, but rather, ideational factors, transnational dissident movements brought about a seismic shift in the politics of Eastern and Central Europe (Risse-Kappen 1995:4). This confronts the realist claim that only “states” and interstate “structures” matter (Waltz, 1979). Both the globalist and interdependence literatures also focus on financial interconnectedness. In particular, the locus of “power” is said to be shifting from governments to markets, from billiard-ball non-interacting populations to extensive financial networks that traverse national boundaries. The rise of MNCs (which represent around 70 per cent of the world’s trade) has increased global interconnectedness. Global financial interconnectedness has rendered obsolete the notion of the irrelevance of “the price of tea in China”. On the contrary, financial bulls and bears in one part of the world have a “knock-on” effect, such as the collapse of the Thai currency leading to a global economic recession. Other transnational movements such as the human rights regime have presented a significant challenge to the exclusive legitimation of state action upon its citizens. Thus, the “multiple channels” politically and financially challenge the notion of the unitary state.

Although Held and McGrew’s definition of globalisation largely coincides with the older formulations of interdependence theories, the terms are not equivalent. As Clark points out, the difference between “interdependence” theories and globalisation is that the
former focuses on negotiating borders, while the latter “transcends” them (Clark, 1999:102). This distinction is put forward by Scholte (1996:49), who posits that global relations are not “links at a distance across territory but circumstances without distance and relatively disconnected from particular location [emphasis in original].” Recall the definition proposed by Risse-Kappen; transnational relations are “regular interactions across national boundaries [emphasis added].” Thus, even the moderate globalist formulations, such as Held and McGrew, mention a spatio-temporal component to globalisation. They mention a financial reality that “transcends” national borders (Held and McGrew, 1998:228). Most importantly, as Roland Robertson’s significant work on globalisation defines the term as “the compression of the world” (Robertson, 1992:8, quoted in Brown 1995:54). Thus, a discussion about such formulations of globalisation is also a discussion about the changing relationships between space, territory and community. The term brings into question the representation of space. The discourse of globalisation brings into question the demarcation of “inside/outside”, “us/them”, “domestic/foreign”, etc. Electronic mail traverses the globe in nanoseconds, while international financial market transactions are reduced to electronic pulses that never touch “soil” (Scholte 1996:49). The word “global” is a spatial term (Brown, 1995:8), but also connotes a social aspect, in which everyone has the potential to communicate with others in a globalised “hyperspace”. Such a concept challenges the notions of social interaction within a neighbourhood, and within one’s “cultural” group. On the contrary, the compressed world has fragmented and reconstituted community. Advances in information technology and the so-called “CNN factor” in media have closed the gap between diasporic communities and their “homelands”. For example, South Asians living in the Northern California’s Silicon Valley, themselves an artefact of the global labour market, are connected to “home” by means of internet news, satellite news channels, and even the latest test cricket happening as well as family and friends living half a world away. Another example is the power of the new opportunities to constitute alternative communities, not based on territorially-dependent notions of “nation” and “neighbour”, leading to communities based on class, ideology, vocation, such as a worldwide community of students or environmentalists.

**Historical-Materialist/Marxist Traditions**

Although there is much literature by moderate liberal globalists, there are also more pessimistic depictions of globalisation. In particular, “historic-materialist” globalisation has a different intellectual genealogy from its liberal counterpart. The first signs of this type of globalisation can be traced back to the *Communist Manifesto*. In describing the relationship between the “bourgeois” and “proletariat”, Marx and Engels conclude that:

“The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country... In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations... It [capitalism] compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production...” (Marx and Engels, 1998:39—40).

The *Communist Manifesto* regards the spread of capitalist modes of production not as the spread of rational civilisation that will lead to a liberal democratic “end of history”, but rather, the global exploitation of the working class by the bourgeoisie.

Influences of this work can be found in Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world systems” theory. Wallerstein starts by positing a capitalist mode of production in the world economy. That is, the economy is controlled by those who operate under the tenet of accumulation. This accumulation is driven by the core/periphery relationship. The “core” is defined as the locus of the owners of the modes of production, while the “periphery” are the producers. There are flows of capital from the “periphery” to the “core”, such that the success of the “core” is dependent on the exploitation of the “periphery”. (Wallerstein, 1987:501—513) Although the flow of capital and benefits can largely be charted along a North-South axis, the theory need

not be applied on a statist basis. Elites in so-called peripheral areas of the world can be co-opted into the bourgeoisie to exploit labour within their own states, and some parts of “rich countries” have high unemployment and poverty, resulting in social marginalisation tantamount to the creation of “internal Third Worlds” (Cox, 1996:26). Thus, world proposed by this Marxist thread of the literature can be characterised by marginalisation and exploitation.

Such marginalisation and exploitation produces uneven effects of the so-called “global” phenomenon, and is addressed in critical accounts of globalisation. The benefits of “globalisation” are largely concentrated in the Triad (North America, Western Europe, and Japan), as investment continues to be concentrated in these parts of the globe, and there is little diffusion of this growth to the rest of the world (Weiss, 1998:176). Similarly, Hirst and Thompson (1998:2) found that foreign direct investment (FDI) is concentrated in the Triad, so that “capital mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment from the advanced to developing countries”. Similar conclusions were reached by Andreas Busch (2000:38—39) who found that correlations of economic growth are regional rather than global. In 1990, 85 per cent of direct investment flows was directed to other parts of the “Western world”. Moreover, examining FDI stocks suggest that the situation is actually becoming less global, i.e. more concentrated in the Triad (Busch, 2000:39). The visibility of this asymmetrical development is staggering. The last few decades have heralded an unprecedented level of growth in the Triad, 1.31 billion people live on less than US$1 per day, and 39 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa is below the poverty line (Mittelman, 2000:74—75). The uneven patterns of development can also be illustrated in the access to technology. Three-fourths of the world does not have access to a telephone. Without having access to the electronic “hyperspace” upon which much of the revolutionary compression of space is taking place (telecommunications, information technology, media, etc.), much of the world is being left out, so that “globalisation” is in fact a means of “marginalisation” (Mittelman, 2000:90—107). Areas outside the Triad are not only described by being left out of the “hyperspace”, but these parts of the world are also being exploited by the “core”. The “global” phenomenon has, to quote the Communist Manifesto, extracted “raw materials from the remotest of lands” (Marx and Engels, 1998:39). For instance, there has been extensive work documenting the practices of oil companies in Nigeria, especially in Ogoniland. Thus, globalisation is also the practice of “exploitation”.

An important component of globalisation addressed by this literature is the ideological aspect of the word. Globalisation is often described with respect to the technological medium upon which the transformations are taking place. Scholte’s assertions of transcending boundaries rest on satellite communications, electronic financial transfers and mobile telephones (Scholte, 1996:47—49). By equating globalisation with the technological media upon which the spatio-temporal transformation takes place, the spatialisation of global processes is less about a borderless world, and more about a world with barriers against those who have little technological access. Another feature of the discourses of globalisation compounds the marginalisation of the many: the word “global” connotes the whole, encompassing the universal and natural (Youngs, 1996:60; Cox, 1996:30n). Those without access are not only outside the “core”, but are banished from the social universe, “nature”, itself. The importance of the equation of “global” with “nature” is crucial in understanding globalisation as ideology. Globalisation, even with all of its imperfections, is all but inevitable. Cox (1996:26) states, the carriers of “power” over the last three centuries, allegedly have little autonomy, and the choice facing state leaders is one of joining the globalisation “hyperspace” by transforming into competition states or be banished from the whole.

1 As an example of this, see Manby (2000).
Transformation and Transnational Relations

To end the discussion about globalisation by only contrasting between a liberal genealogy of the term and the neo-Marxist thread does not discuss the area for reform, transformation, and empowerment for individuals against some of the shortcomings of globalisation. One cannot just conjure away the concept as mere “globaloney”, but rather one should engage in the term towards a more “critical theory of globalisation” (Scholte, 1996:52—53). The opportunity for the empowerment of individuals relies on harnessing the positive effects of increased interaction between individuals while laying bare the ill effects of taking on board a global outlook. The former includes consciousness for ecological concerns, humanitarian aid, coalition building across national borders, and political pressure on oppressive regimes, such as the extensive anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, as mentioned before, globalisation has marked the growing inequality between a small industrialised “core” and a large “periphery” both exploited and marginalized.

Cox (1996:26—27) highlights the contradictions in globalisation as the first step in transformation. There are three areas of contradiction discussed by Cox. First, as mentioned before, globalisation connotes the “whole”, but it renders much of the world outside the Triad invisible. Secondly, globalisation tolls the death-knell of state power, yet global financial, political and social processes are enforced by the state. Contrary to Falk and Camilleri’s “end of sovereignty”, evidence exists that states such as Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan act as “catalytic states” facilitating global networking through domestic policy (Weiss, 1998:204). Finally, globalisation has led to the disempowerment of civil society, and the separation between individuals from political institutions.

Critical writings tend to just focus on critiquing the negative and revealing the ideology of globalisation, whilst not providing possibilities for the restructuring of the global. However, transformation is not just deconstruction, and some of the literature does suggest routes to reconstruction. Most importantly, any mode of reconstruction must challenge the ideology that globalisation is somehow natural, inevitable and irreversible. The key to recovering those invisible to current notions of globalisation relies on the ability of heretofore ignored individuals to challenge the spatialisation of “global” to be more inclusive. One possibility would reconceptualise the directionality of development. That is, current development of resources, intellectual and material, seems to emanate from the Triad to the “developing” world. However, development should take a more dialogic approach, such that those for whom the development is targeted are critical agents for their own improvement, and not objects of imposed donor-dependent organisations. The objective of any such scheme is to recover the invisible, and to reveal the agency behind allegedly “inevitable” globalisation. This demystification of globalisation can be done by “bringing the subject back in.” As Hay and Marsh (2000:13) suggest, globalisation is “the product of human interaction, the product of subjects making history”. In other words, global processes are not external to human input, but are shaped by them. Laying bare the mechanisms of action in the world holds states, leaders, and businesses more accountable for so-called “irreversible” processes and provides a route to reconceptualise current notions of globalisation.

A valuable intellectual tool in this reconceptualisation would be the re-examination of some of the older literature. In particular, transnationalism, which just served as the basis for later interdependence theory, can be used to demystify globalisation external to the prevailing states system. Risse-Kappen\(^2\) puts forward a reworked notion of transnational. In earlier literature, the term was ill-defined, referring to anything that was not state-to-state interaction. This sort of simplified view categorised phenomena such as peace movements, MNCs

\(^{2}\) In the aptly-titled *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.*
and cultural diffusion as “transnational”, which was broad, and thus a very fuzzy term (Risse-Kappen, 1995:7—8). Moreover, Risse-Kappen suggests that even more recent attempts to examine transnational relations neglects a theory about the state, and thus, like its predecessors, cannot connect transnationalism with policy, and cannot study the impact of transnational actors on different types of domestic structures and international institutionalisation, and the balance between societal and state networks (Risse-Kappen, 1995:16—24). Thus, unlike the homogenising (or “globalising”) effect of looking at either liberal or historical-materialist notions of globalisation, transnationalism puts forward a more nuanced concept of the relationship between identifiable agents, and leaves room for different contexts depending on the different relations between domestic structures, international organisations, and social networks. Such a framework answers the contradictions enumerated by Cox. First, transnationalism examines how the relationship between domestic, international and social unevenly affect different parts of the globe. Secondly, transnationalism focuses on identifiable processes and actors, and thus, does not underestimate the role of state networks in certain situations. Finally, transnationalism does not formulate separate “society” and “domestic government” realms, but shows that depending on the context, the two are interlinked and not characterised by alienation.

Conclusion

Thus, the examination of the globalisation phenomenon focused on two threads within the literature. Both challenge the neorealist notion that the state is a unitary actor in the international system, and the only actor that counts.

Before examining the globalist literature, it was instructive to mention the conservative challenge to any transformation in the international system at all, and neglecting traditional power politics is dangerous. Although there is some empirical evidence that the levels of global flows is not unprecedented, to try to wish away globalist phenomena was described by Ruggie as “baffling and bizarre.”

The two literatures investigated can broadly be labelled “liberal” and “historical-materialist.” The first thread has its origins with the liberal concepts of institutionalisation to minimise zero-sum prisoners’ dilemmas between actors. The regional governments in Italy illustrate how institutions not only coordinate actions between actors, but also shape their identities. If this sort of cooperation is extended to wider fields, either supra-nationally or sub-nationally, the realist model of unitary “billiard-ball-like” states interacting only through the “high” politics of diplomats and soldiers is challenged. In particular, combining this cooperative institutionalism with a relaxing of the requirement of the unitary state, the importance of transnational relations becomes visible. This notion of transnationalism was the foundation for interdependence theory put forward by Keohane and Nye (1987). The formulation of “complex interdependence” has three components. First, because of the changing nature of “security” away from purely military connotations, there is no clear policy hierarchy, such that traditional “low” politics such as environment and finance can be as important as national defence. Second, because of the shift away from traditional notions of security and military to more cooperative “security communities”, the role and effectiveness of military action is reduced. Third, the interaction is based on multiple channels, not just state-to-state diplomatic and military power politics. The interdependence literature was the harbinger of the liberal globalist literature.

There is great variety within the liberal globalist literature. More “hyperglobalist” works predict the end of geography, and the dismantling of the state system, or a progressive move towards the proliferation of Western rationality and liberal democratic principles, Fukuyama’s “end of history” hypothesis. However, it is more instructive to examine more moderate formulations of globalisation. The definition of Held and McGrew (1998) seems to echo
the earlier literature. However, the point of divergence, as explained by Scholte, is that globalisation represents a whole new formulation of the spatialisation of social relations. Communications, media, the Internet, etc. have compressed space in ways that fragment and bring into question traditional notions of community, neighbourhood, and identity.

However, noting that globalisation is dependent upon a cyber- or hyperspace upon which space is contracted highlights the technological component of much of the globalist literature. Much of the world does not even have access to a telephone, so they cannot participate in the global phenomenon, the “hyperspace” constructed through new technologies. This sort of marginalisation is examined in the second body of literature, a historical-materialist (or Marxist) thread that can be traced back to the writings of Marx and Engels. A more recent framework is put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein, and suggests that the world economy is capitalist, and that the organisation of labour is between “core” accumulators and “peripheral” labour, the former being exploited for services and materials. Thus, the second aspect of globalisation in this literature is exploitation. This formulation is supported by the growing gap between the Triad and “developing world”, and evidence of exploitation by TNCs in certain parts of the world. A further feature of globalisation is the strong component of discourse and ideology. The term “global” suggests that such frameworks apply to everything in the universe of social relations, so that those not included become invisible. Moreover, the concept of globalisation and market forces as irreversible and inevitable implies state inability and powerlessness.

However, by moving beyond this critical body of literature, it is possible not only to reveal the ideological and practical problems associated with globalisation, but also to provide possibilities for its reconstruction. For example, demystifying the global flows from the developing to “developed” world as mediated through human agency allows for previously ignored individuals to be empowered in their own development. The opportunities for reconstruction are those that bring back “agency”. By taking a more sophisticated look at some of the transnationalist literature, it is possible to move away from the broad formulations of the 1970s and put forward transnational relations that preserve both agency and context. The formulation suggested by Risse-Kappen (1995) is especially useful, investigating the interplay between domestic structures, international institutions and social networks between identifiable actors in different contexts, creating a more complex framework to study global relations. Thus, there is an opportunity to move beyond the current formulations by revealing human agency and empowerment.
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"Globalizacija" se probila u različite discipline, počevši s literaturom koja se usredotočuje na financijsku isprepletenost te se proširila na radove o kulturi, filozofiji i međunarodnim odnosima. Uprkos napadu realista, političke, financijske i kulturne značajke isprepletnosti svijeta se ne mogu poricati. Globalistička literatura nije homogenog vrsta iz različitih tradicija. Ova rasprava dijeli literaturu na dvije različite tradicije. "Liberalna" tradicija potječe iz liberalnog i neoliberalnog institucionalizma koji je omogućio nastanak teorija o transnacionalnim odnosima i kompleksnim uzajamnim odnosima 1970-ih. Premda postoje mnoge paralele između današnjeg i ranijeg istraživanja "globalizacije" i ranijih značenja kompleksnih, isprepletenih odnosima, "globalizacija" se razlikuje od ranijih radova u području fragmentacije i rekongruiranja prostora. Međutim, velik dio svijeta nema pristup tehnologijama koje potiču "prostornu kompresiju", što je zanemarno u "liberalističkim" radovima. Ova kritika je posebno istaknuta u današnje tradicije radova o "globalizaciji", "histo­rijsko-materijalističkoj" ili "kritičkoj" koja počiva na Marxu i Engelsu. Ova kritička tradicija, pod utjecajem formulacija poput Wallersteinove "teorije svjetskog sistema" ističe primjere nedaća "globalizacije". Ona karakterizira "globalizaciju" kao "marginalizaciju" i "eksplotaciju" te također otkriva disku i ideologiju iza pojmova. Riječ "globalno" konotira sve što je univerzalno i prirodno, tako da se irišni procesi čine ireverzibilnim i neminovnim kao i iza mogućnosti ljudskog djelovanja. Međutim, preuzimajući transformativnu perspektivu moguće je demističirati koncept "globalizacije" te ponovno uvesti ljudsko djelovanje. Jedna od šansa je to učini jest ponovna primjena radova o transnacionalizmu, poput okvirnog rada Risse-Kappen koji otkriva međugru domaćih, međunarodnih i društvenih snaga. Na taj način je u analizu vraćen "subjekt", individualni akter koji je sposoban transformirati trenutna značenja "globalizacije".

**Ključne riječi:** GLOBALIZACIJA, TRANSNACIONALIZAM, TRANS-NAČIONALIZACIJA