SOUTHEASTER EUROPE (SEE) – INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES BATTLEFIELD?

Miroslav Tuđman¹
Gordan Akrap²

ABSTRACT: SEE marked the twentieth century because of the numerous crises and conflicts that permanently marked regional, European and world history. In order to understand processes in SEE, in order to protect their own national interests, with the aim of taking control over those processes in the area, many countries have sent members of their own intelligence and security agencies that operate in the SEE. During the aggression against Croatia and occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian and Serbian intelligence agencies were active in SEE, but with the different positions and in the different roles. Some partner agencies tried to mediate between the two intelligence communities in order to establish contacts and start conversations. However, only the liberation of Croatian and B&H area by military means, changed the attitude of Serbia, and led to the establishment of contacts of national intelligence community.

KEYWORDS: intelligence, Southeastern Europe, Croatia, Homeland war, international intelligence cooperation

¹ Miroslav Tuđman (b. 1946, Belgrade) Professor of Information Science at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb. Deputy Director of the Office for National Security (UNS) and Director of the Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) from 1993 to 1998, and from 1999 to 2000. Contributed to various scientific projects, published fifteen books and over two hundred papers; editor of a dozen of proceedings. Active in research, both in the field of information science, and national security, and intelligence.

² Gordan Akrap (b. 1966) graduated on Zagreb Faculty of electronics and computing in 1994. In 2011 he received a PhD at the University of Zagreb, in the field of Information and Communication sciences. The title of his PhD was ‘Informational strategies and operations in public knowledge shaping’. He had an active role in Homeland war. During his career in diplomatic and security structures of Croatia he completed a number of professional courses, including Diplomatic Academy. He is active in research of national and regional security, intelligence and history of Homeland War. He published a number of books and papers in journals and proceedings.
**Introduction**

Sometimes it is difficult to objectively observe and describe events such as wars in SEE that dramatically marked the end of the twentieth century. Especially when the author(s) were a direct participant in some of those events. Direct and objective evidence-based facts are the foundation on which future generations should learn, to prevent repeating the mistakes of the past. Our generation was forced to live history day-by-day. We did not have a time to learn and practice. In times of crisis and armed conflict, mistakes can be very expensive. In this paper, we are presenting a brief overview of the process that marked the SEE region for many years. This process, the creation of nation-states, Western Europe has experienced before. The state of unfinished and unsettled peace, unresolved national issues and territorial claims of individual policies, (i)direct involvement of various national policies led by different national interests, led to a crisis and wars that marked the twentieth century. In this paper, for the first time in public, we describe, to the extent that it can be written, the process of establishing contacts between Croatian and Serbian intelligence community. Croatia already in 1994 accepted the offer of partner intelligence agency to be a mediator in a process of establishing contacts between Croatian and the Serbian side. However, it took more than 12 months for Serbian side to accept this initiative. These meetings were another indication of decreasing the tensions and necessity to solve problems and disputes by negotiation rather than weapons. We are convinced that this is the lesson that future generations need, and have, to learn. Just as it is necessary for states in the south of Europe to invest additional efforts in order to integrate into the EU and become guarantors of regional and supra-regional stability.

**Balkanization**

During the last few centuries, SEE was the scene of conflict between many international factors and imperial policies led by various national, political, ethnic, and economic and security interests. These conflicts were, very often, in a function of gaining the dominance in other geographical areas. For the purposes of this study, we divided conflicts in two main groups according to the priority interests of the actors involved:

- The primary conflicts in which entities from the SEE are involved and
- Secondary conflicts in which entities outside of SEE are, in some way, involved; those entities treat the SEE as an area of secondary interest, but through the activities in
this region they are trying to achieve a significant advantage in another geographical/political area, better to say, the political dominance in the international community.

History of SEE is a history of numerous armed conflicts that caused significant boundary changes, and as a consequence population migration. When we talk about migration, we do not refer exclusively to the spatial migration. We are talking about population mobility in the political and religious affiliations that become the basis of some future conflicts.

Because of the frequent changes of political situation in SEE, the political dictionary got a new term: Balkanization. According to Encyclopedia Britannica\(^3\), the term Balkanization refers to:

‘Division of a multinational state into smaller ethnically homogeneous entities. The term is also used to refer to ethnic conflict within multiethnic states. It was coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation that followed the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Balkans.’

States from SEE arose and fell, and some of them have even disappeared from the European and world political stage. The aggressors with their imperial politics, in most cases, tried to assimilate conquered nations from SEE. However, conquered nations successfully, mostly through armed conflicts, returned to the political scene restoring their national (and any other) identity and their statehood.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the SEE region was dominated by the Austrian and the Ottoman Empire. Unresolved national issues in these political formations, along with other internal and external causes, resulted with conflicts and wars that led to their degradation, the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, and Austria-Hungary in the early twentieth century. The nations that have been occupied for centuries, returned to the political scene. However, in this geo-strategically important area, interests of other politically, militarily and economically more powerful factors, did not disappear. They wanted to preserve the control and supervision over the situation in SEE. Moreover, their influence and their way of dealing with the problems, led to some political solutions that proved as temporary, and that led to new conflicts.

In times of conflict, the need to collect and process data and information intensifies. Each involved side was trying to learn as

---

much as possible about the opponent and his intentions. It was the nineteenth century when the process of making the foundation for future Intelligence and Security Community (ISC) in some countries in the SEE region started.

In the twentieth century, SEE experienced intense activity of three totalitarian systems: Nazism, Fascism and Communism. One of their common, maybe the key, feature was the organization of a strong and repressive ISC in order to achieve complete control of the mind and the soul of affected populations. That resulted in the restraint of the democratization of the international order.

Nonetheless, nineteenth and twentieth century were centuries of European and global integration (integration on internal and making colonies on international level) that occurred simultaneously with the dissolution of great empires and the creation of a growing number of states on the territory of SEE: ‘...

During the time of the industrial revolution and the increasing degree of cultural and technical integration of Europe (and the world), number of independent states in Europe in 1871 constantly increased. After the unification of Germany and Italy, there were only 14 states, 20 in 1914, and 26 in 1924. After the Second World War that number climbed to 33.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia

After the Second World War, the situation in SEE looked like it calmed. In this area, as the only one in Europe, states of all three main political blocs had mutual borders: NATO, Warsaw Pact (WP) and Non-aligned movement. In the central part of the SEE was Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY or Yugoslavia), a multiethnic country with communist totalitarian regime on power. Communist rulers (Tito, Hoxha, Ceausescu, Zivkov, Kadar) created their own, modeled on the Soviet Cheka, ISC carrying out terror against people that tried to support free and democratic elections together with the freedom of speech. Imposing communist ideology as a basis for building a society and the state, communists did not hesitate to organize mass arrests, torture, imprisonment and even liquidation of their political opponents in the country and abroad. History has shown us that the communist regimes, to which repression against their own citizens is/was a normal behaviour, cannot successfully hold on power. The only question is the way how those systems will fail. Or peacefully or during the armed conflict.


5 Franjo Tuđman: ‘Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi’, München – Barcelona : Knjižnica Hrvatske revije, 1981., page 238. Today EU has a 28 member states. There are, now, more then 50 states in the European continent.
The disintegration of Yugoslavia was, unlike some other multi-ethnic communist states (Czechoslovakia, USSR) marked by armed conflicts. This process briefly may be described as a process that ends where it began:

- Kosovo,
- Slovenia,
- aggression against Croatia,
- occupation of B&H,
- Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),
- Montenegro,
- Kosovo.

Due to the crisis development and the threat of contagion of the crisis beyond its borders, Yugoslavia became a particularly important area of interest to Intelligence and Security (IS) agencies, both from the West and those from the East of Europe. However, since the east European states (mostly members of WP) in the 1990s went through their internal catharsis caused by the collapse of WP, their activities, in and against the Yugoslavia, were significantly smaller than the Western impact (excluding the Soviet Union) to the events in the former Yugoslavia. Since the crisis in Yugoslavia threatened regional and European stability and security, many countries were seeking answers about the causes of such a crisis, its development and consequences towards immediate and wider neighbourhood, and the ways how they can protect, or expand, their national interests. In the process of fulfilling those tasks, IS agencies were involved.

It is normal to raise a question whether the IS agencies, were able to correctly assess future developments, brutal disintegration, of Yugoslavia. According to available documents⁶, and conversations with witnesses (relevant persons from leading NATO member IS agencies) from that time, it is possible to assume that the IS agencies, in their short-term and long-term analyzes, accurately predicted inevitable disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, driven by different political interests in accordance with different strategies and visions of a new international order, the political elite of the majority of member states of the then European Community and NATO, have not adopted such reports as a necessity. They, almost to the end of

---

the 1991, and some even later, supported the survival of Yugoslavian existence\(^7\). Therefore IS agencies cannot be held responsible for wrong decisions of the politicians nor the IS agencies should take actions to prove that they were right, and that the political elite failed. In the current democratic systems, legally and legitimately elected government is responsible for mistakes in managing the state. Only voters in elections or some state institutions in accordance with applicable constitutional and statutory provisions (e.g. the Constitutional Court) can decide, in those cases, about the future of political elite in power.

Some governments admitted, in the middle and at the end of 1991 (often due to the public pressure), that Croatia was exposed to the brutal aggression. Croatia accepted all the conditions from the international community in which Croatia confirmed the expressed intention that it wants to be a responsible member of the international community. Support to the process of preserving Yugoslavia was withdrawn. The process of international recognition of those republics of former Yugoslavia that wished to be an independent state, started. It was the process, which was years before announced by some key IS agencies of NATO member countries.

**New Croatian administration**

The new democratically elected Government of Croatia came to power in mid 1990s. Government found a number of problems that were hampering effective seizure of power and the organization of society and state in accordance with the new, democratic, principles. Croatia, as a part of Yugoslavia, had a very limited right to organize their own defence system. Expecting a loss of power in Croatia, federal and republican communist (civilian and military) authorities took some actions immediately before and after the election that prevented effective defence organization. Justice, security and police system, like most other institutions on the republic level\(^8\), were strongly influenced by the

\(^7\) Paradigmatic example was behaviour of Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, based in Belgrade from 1989 to 1992. His memories toward the disintegration of Yugoslavia began with: ‘This is the story of villains - the bastards who are to blame for the destruction of multiethnic Yugoslavia ... ’ (Warren Zimmerman, ‘The Sources of a disaster’, New York: Harper, 1997, page 11). Zimmerman stands by his convictions despite the fact that CIA estimates about the disintegration of Yugoslavia were made before the first democratic and multi-party elections in Yugoslavia, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Zimmerman was familiar with those CIA reports. Zimmerman said that he invested all of his efforts that such estimates cannot be realised.

\(^8\) Republic of Croatia was one of the eight (six republics and two autonomous provinces) components of SFRY that has (according to Constitution) equal (political) rights. Their institutions had an authority/jurisdiction to act within their own borders, what was...
Communist Party, which, after 45 years, in elections in April 1990 lost power. International political contacts of a new Government were week. For 45 years Communist party was building a personnel system mainly based on party loyalty of employees, not on their expertise and professionalism. Therefore the new government found exclusively communist cadre in all institutions.

Croatia was threatened by the external (Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), Serbia and Montenegro) and internal aggression (rebel Serbs and the Yugoslavs within Croatia). Croatian government had only jurisdiction over the republic’s State Security Service (SSS)⁹, civilian counter-intelligence agency (which was, almost completely, filled by the Communist party loyal cadres). Croatian leadership decided to start a process of creating an effective defence system started by setting short- and long-term goals (from the new Constitutional and legal foundations of a new democratic system, international recognition, the reintegration of all occupied territories to the process of stabilization of the whole region).

Immediately after taking power in late May 1990, the issue of lustration was one of the questions that marked that time, just as it is today. However, the policy of reconciliation and unity in defence of the democratic constitutional order, national sovereignty and territorial integrity for the benefit of all its citizens, postponed implementation of lustration for some other time. In the case of the implementation of the lustration immediately after taking power in May 1990, with absolute certainty we can say that Government would found themselves in a situation known in medicine: The operation was a success, but the patient died. In the event that the lustration conducted immediately after elections, administrative system would have collapsed, there would be strong internal divisions, and government would not be able to function effectively. Defence against forthcoming aggression could not be possible. Those forces (combined by the Federal and Serbian institutions), which later led an attack against the new government will be able, by use of violent methods, to successfully overthrown Croatian government. At the end, the lustrated persons would lustrate those who started lustration. Croatia would remain a part of new Yugoslavia (without Slovenia) but under the political leadership of Slobodan Milošević and other creators of Greater Serbian politics.

Each process begins and ends with people, with those who have the vision, can make plans, manage and control individual

---

⁹ State Security Service of the Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (counterintelligence agency)
processes at macro and micro levels. As an illustration of the existing personnel in key positions in the military and security systems, some statistical data are listed. National structure of the YPA officer corps in 1990, in relation to the national composition of Yugoslavia by the census is shown in Table 1\textsuperscript{10}.

For the non-Serbs more disturbing was ethnic composition statistic of employees in Croatian SSS at the end of 1990 as shown in Table 2. At the key management positions, particularly in the regional headquarters, were the persons that come to those positions mostly from the highest regional communist party and government bodies.

**Organizing new ISC in Croatia**

Since the organization of the new ISC was one of the important segments of organizing an effective defence, the new Croatian government set very clear goals and objectives that lead to the construction of a new, democratic and efficient ISC:

- The preservation of the constitutional order, territorial integrity and security for all citizens,
- Democratization and de-politicization (de-communisation) of previous security system,
- Support for regional stability,
- The fight against terrorism and organized crime (OC) and
- Assistance and protection of members of international forces engaged in missions in SEE countries.

Unlike Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia have fundamentally changed the approach to structuring their own ISC with respect to methodology, applied resources and their goals and objectives. The application of ISC violence, especially against those who think differently, who criticize the Party in power, was abandoned and strictly forbidden. The newly adopted Constitution guaranteed the full freedom of thought and expression to every person. Spoken and written words treated as verbal offences. Totalitarian communist system convicted tens of thousands of people. Verbal offence act was one of the key subjects of communist ISS and it was abolished immediately after new government takes power. The rights to have a different opinion become one of the fundamental human rights.

The process of creation of a new Croatian ISC, in accordance with the new aims and objectives, was based on new principles:

\textsuperscript{10} According to: Domazet-Lošo, D., Hrvatska i veliko ratište, Udruga sv. Jurja, Zagreb, 2002., page 43
• Loyalty to the Constitution and the constitutional order, democracy, patriotism,

• Organization of ISC (even during the immediate state of war and threaten to the existence of the State) in accordance with the principles of similar systems in NATO member countries (primarily U.S.) and Israel,

• A clear division of responsibilities between civilian and military intelligence and security agencies,

• The organization of an effective institutional system of control and supervision over the legality of the ISC work,

• IS agencies were no longer allowed to act as instruments of political violence.

IS agencies ceased to participate actively in the conduct of policy, they were no longer the ‘sword and shield in the hands of the Party’\(^\text{11}\). Symbiosis between the Party and the IS agencies from communist totalitarian time (when, lower level Party officials were employees/agents of the IS agencies, while at higher levels of decision-making process, Agencies were guided by the Party’s central bodies) was cut. Based on new principles and standards of democratic societies, initial process of transformation from communist to a new Croatian ISC was finished at the end of 1993, beginning of 1994.

**Activities of different IS agencies in SEE**

SEE region during the time of crisis in the former Yugoslavia, drew direct attention of a large number of IS agencies. In accordance with their own national interests, many members of various national ISS flooded SEE:

• States from SEE,

• States that considered the region of SEE as a part of their own national interests,

• States that were not directly present in the SEE region but, incited by the existing processes in the region, tried to realize their national interests,

• States that had their representatives in various military and civilian international peacekeeping missions in SEE.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) was of particular interest to a number of ISC (mentioned below) for different reasons (for example, in a relatively small area, members of many ethnic and religious communities lived together, therefore this area could

\(^\text{11}\) This was a phrase that was interpreted a mission of ISC in Communist Yugoslavia, as well as in other communist countries (eg. GDR) where the ISC was created on the model of the Soviet Cheka.
serve as a testing field of the effectiveness of different information and media strategies and operations). Many states directed activities of their ISC, in accordance with their needs, toward and in the B&H:

- Neighbouring states (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro),
- States that had taken responsibilities over the some parts of B&H according with the Dayton division into three zones (British, American, French),
- States that had had their representatives in national and international organizations in B&H and in SEE, and which acted toward B&H,
- States of Islamic origin that wanted to gain advantage over the Muslims from B&H on there side (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia).

Conflict between Shiite and Sunni policies in B&H is still visible. Sunni journal published in B&H, SAFF, recently accused two Iranian diplomats that were expelled from B&H that their only task, as 'members of Iranian intelligence' was 'spreading Schism and promoting Iranian culture.'12 The same accusation expands to all Iranian diplomats in B&H because, according to SAFF, 'the only Iranian diplomatic mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to spread Schism.' Unknown author ends with the following words13 'Unfortunately Shiite spies have managed to build a solid network of collaborators among Bosniaks. Consequences of their actions all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina will felt'.14

Establishing a new Croatian ISC and some child diseases

During the Croatian Homeland war, Croatia successfully carried out the transformation of the inherited ISC constructed on the foundations of the communist regime. New ISC was built according the standards of multi-party democracy in contemporary Europe. New ISC was apolitical, professionalized with new staff matured in the war. New agencies, with clear goals and tasks, responsibilities and authorities, were recognized and accepted in the international professional community as equal partners. As an illustration, we can mention the fact that the Croatian Intelligence Agency (HIS), civilian foreign intelligence service, in the late 1999 had partner relations with twice as many foreign agencies than the Yugoslav Federal State Security

12 'Jedini zadatak iranskih špionja u BiH je širenje šizma', SAFF, number 340 from 17 May 2013 (7 redžeb 1434), front page and unsigned text on page 10.
Service (SDB) managed to establish during their 45 years of existence.\(^{15}\)

However, during the process of creating a new ISC, some problems that became serious challenges to the leadership, occurred. Perfect system does not exist. There is no system, no matter how well it is organized, that individuals cannot compromise. Likewise, high-quality individuals who find themselves at the right time in the right place can badly organized system transfer into good and effective system without compromising human rights.

Croatian ISC suffered from certain childhood diseases. However, the system had the power to solve majority of them using their internal forces. Those situations, together with agencies experiences, leadership used to learn and to change what was necessary to change. However, the challenges for the ISC came from outside, by some opposition politicians who attempted to discredit ISC, blaming at that time the Government. Those attempts to discredit the ISC and the Government were in accordance with the interests of certain international (national, multinational, private) entities\(^{16}\). It was hard for ISC to provide an effective response, especially during the time of Croatian Homeland war. It is legitimate to ask why the Croatian ISC, although it recognized the threat (planners and implementers) did not prevent their negative effects. The answer is simple: because the new ISC was apolitical, and it ceased to be a political police with executive and judicial powers like it had during communist governments. The ISC was not above the politics and politicians, the ISC did not affect the conduct of politics like the one during the communist regime.

Despite all the challenges it faced, after the military operations and the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories in the beginning of 1998, Croatian ISC successfully began process of transformation from war- to a peacetime ISC. Priorities were changed. In the period of transformation, the system successfully maintained a high level of professionalism in their activities, including those connected with protection of interests and safety and security of members of the international, civil and military, forces in their missions in SEE. Croatian ISC conducted a number


\(^{16}\) An illustrative example is the text ‘Croatia’s Intelligence Services’ (Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1994, pp. 404-409 ), author Marko Milivojevic, member of the Research Unit in South Eastern Studies at the University of Bradford. The presentation was not made on facts. It was based on theses of Greater Serbian propaganda: the Croatian ISC was made in alliance and under the control of Germany, by analogy cooperation between Nazi and Ustasha regime during the Second World War.
of joint operations with key NATO member states, especially in the second half of the 1990s. NATO was particularly interested in the protection of Stabilization force (SFOR) (previously Implementation forces - IFOR) units in their missions in B&H. Several joint operations (Croatia-NATO member countries) were running during five-year cooperation period (1994-1999) aiming to collect necessary information for the protection of SFOR/IFOR troops. At the end of 1999, it was confirmed by some of the highest NATO military officials that during that period, more than 60% of all the useful information that arrived at NATO headquarters in Brussels, or to the SFOR Headquarter in B&H, were obtained through the cooperation with the Croatian ISC.

**Regional ISC cooperation**

One of responsibilities of Croatian ISC was to act in a sense to prevent escalation of military activities by aggressors, to stabilize the situation and to stop the wars in the SEE region. In this sense, leadership of Croatian ISC accepted, in 1994, offer of an influential partner agency to be a mediator to establish a contact with the Serbian State security department (RDB).

Croatian leadership accepted this offer because:

- Attempt to establish contact with the Serbian side was supposed to lead to a gradual improvement in relations between the Croatia and Serbia,

- To show that Croatia considered Serbia responsible for the aggression against Croatia, and that ending the war and resolving the crisis peacefully and quietly, stabilizing situation in B&H, and peaceful reintegration of occupied parts of Croatia was the priority of all priorities for the Croatian ISC,

- To show that Croatia had a policy that seeks reconciliation and coexistence.\(^{17}\)

However, although the Croatian side accepted the proposal, Belgrade (then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) showed no interest in establishing a relationship between two ISC’s. Belgrade, obviously, counted on the military, rather than political, solution in Croatia and B&H. After the Croatian armed forces operations, ran together with the Croatian ISC during 1995, after

---

\(^{17}\) At the meeting of the heads of Croatian and partner agencies, which had a major impact on the Serbian RDB, Croatian side was asked about possibility to establish contacts with Serbian side. Partner agency had their interests to come to the cooperation between the Croatian and Yugoslav/Serbian authorities. Croatian side warned that Croatia is interested in establishing cooperation, noting that this cooperation will not come because Belgrade is not interested in a political solution of the conflict. Our estimate found to be true. It contributed to the reputation of the Croatian authorities, but this did not help in finding a political solution for occupied Croatian territory neither termination of the war in B&H.
Concrete cooperation between the two ISC’s was not able even after the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region at the beginning of 1998. Especially in the area of the common struggle against OC. Croatian ISC was fully reorganized in accordance with the new democratic principles, while the Serbian ISC almost completely retained the structure, personnel, and methods and tools that they had at the time of communist regime. Serbian ISC went through some changes during 2000, and especially after the assassination (in 2003) of at that time Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic. Those changes opened the possibility of establishing better cooperation of two ICS’s in different fields in accordance with the common national, and international, interests.

In B&H, during the 1990s, three parallel IS structures were created by three entities: Bosnians, Croatians and Serbians. Croatian ISC established a partnership with the IS agency of Croatians from B&H. During the 1990s, there were no attempts to establish a relationship with the IS agency of Bosnian Serbians. Bosniak (Muslims from B&H) side did not have an interest to establish relations with the Croatian ISC before Washington agreements (signed in March 1994). This Agreement created the preconditions for the establishment of relations between Investigation and Documentation Agency (AID), intelligence and security service controlled by B&H Muslims) and Croatian intelligence agency. At that time head of AID, Nedzad Ugljen, came to Zagreb, Croatia, with a proposal to establish cooperation with the Croatian intelligence agency. Croatian leadership approved that cooperation, only if it will be in accordance with the signed Washington agreements. It seemed that Nedzad Ugljen was genuinely interested in the cooperation between the agencies based on those agreements. Unfortunately, Ugljen was killed in 1996, in the inter-Bosniaks political conflicts. Cooperation between Croatian intelligence agency and AID, until the end 1990’s, remained in the shadow of political murders that have rocked the AID and tore the relationships in the Bosniak intelligence and political conflicts.

After the change of government in Croatia’s parliamentary elections held in January 2000, new government launched a new process of reorganization of Croatian ISC. This process took several years. It was aimed to abolish ISC model, which was established in 1990s. However, the implemented changes did not lead to any further system efficiency. They resulted in the reduction of intelligence activities abroad to a minimum. After 2000, almost all potential of Croatian ISC focused on counter-
intelligence activity (dealing with the internal problems of organized crime and corruption).

Conclusion

Unfinished wars and unstable peace were the main characteristics of the SEE unstable areas in the last two centuries. Conflicts in this area were, very often, in a function of the conflicts of different imperial policies and international actors in order to create global domination or additional benefits in some other geographical areas. It is also clear that the reasons or excuses of some conflicts were in the existing national myths and prejudices that ignore historical facts. Myths and prejudices (such as the motto *All Serbs has to live in one state*, equalization of Yugoslav communism with Western democracies, communist claims that the question of national issues in multinational Yugoslavia were resolved, the position that one of the reasons of the wars in Yugoslavia were *eternal mutual hatred between Croats, Serbs and Muslims*) interfere with rational thinking. They are disabling the process of learning on mistakes and disabling the activities that such mistakes, which can inevitably lead to new conflicts and destruction, did not repeat. Albert Einstein once said, 'It is easier to break an atom than a prejudice.'\(^{18}\)

With Croatian entry in EU, part of the SEE remained isolated and surrounded by EU member states. The question is what might be the future of those states (Serbia, B&H, Montenegro, FYROM, Albania and Kosovo). Can the crisis and instability in these states, either individually or in some form of integrated action, cause large-scale crisis? Could the crisis be the cause of some new divisions according to some Russians predicts\(^{19}\): further changes of state borders, not only in the SEE region but Europe as a whole?

In the process of stabilizing and normalization of the SEE region, one of the main roles, individually and in cooperation with others, has to have a national ISC’s. They have to become serious and reliable partner in international intelligence community, as if it was in the case of Croatian ISC.

Croatian integration into the EU is a clear signal of a direction in which other states within SEE need to move if they want to prevent the recurrence of unwanted past. Integration is also an indication that ‘small’ partners can become important and that real

---


\(^{19}\) Политинформация, Россия поменяет Кавказ на Белоруссию и Украину; Карта №2 - Центральная Европа; Опубликовано 09 Июля 2012 г., http://eg.ru/daily/politics/32691/ (accessed June 10, 2013)
and serious cooperation with regional and global partners can lead to successful results. Small ISS can become reliable partner in demanding situations. As retired US general Stanley McChrystal said in a recent interview: ‘It’s all about teams. Nobody wins the war alone’. 20

References

9. ‘Jedini zadatak iranskih špijuna u BiH je širenje šiizma’, SAFF, number 340 from 17 May 2013 (7 redžeb 1434)
11. Milivojevic, M. ‘Croatia ’s Intelligence Services’, Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1994, pp. 404-409,
12. Quote by Albert Einstein: http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/118236-it-is-harder-to-

---


Table 1. Comparisons of national composition by the census in Yugoslavia and national composition in officer’s corps in YPA in 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>% in census</th>
<th>% in YPA</th>
<th>difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>+ 174 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>- 64 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>+ 270 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs²¹</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenians</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>- 38 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Comparisons of national composition by the census in Croatia and national composition of Croatian SSS at the end of 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>% in census</th>
<th>% in SSS</th>
<th>difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>- 65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>+ 242 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+ 800 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations**

AID - Investigation and Documentation Agency
(intelligence agency of Bosnian Muslims in B&H until the 1996)

B&H – Bosnia and Herzegovina

²¹ Due to the differences in census in different republics in former SFRY, it is not possible to have an exact number of population which said that they are, by the nationality, Yugoslavs which was imaginary nationality created by the Communist party of Yugoslavia.
GDR – German Democratic Republic (former East Germany)

HIS - Croatian Intelligence Agency

IS – Intelligence and security

ISC - Intelligence and Security Community

Party (Communist) – Yugoslavian league of communist

SDB – acronym for both Federal and Serbian State Security Service (until 1992)

SEE - Southeaster Europe

SSS - State Security Service

WP - Warsaw Pact

YPA - Yugoslav People's Army