

Umjetnost linije ili o populizmu



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The art of
the front or
on populism

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SAŽETAK: Polazište teksta je želja za dovođenjem u suglasje suvremenih teorijskih interesa za bavljenje temom populizma (prije svega crpljeno iz rada Ernesta Laclaua) s recentnijim teorijskim pristupima tumačenju Narodnooslobodilačke borbe kod nas (prije svega ona Darka Suvina), a sve to na terenu specifičnih estetičkih rasprava o realizmu/modernizmu koje su obilježile razdoblje pred Drugi svjetski rat. Tekst se pritom ne vodi željom za nekim konačnim teorijskim razjašnjenjem nego upravo ukazivanjem na teorijsku i historiografsku kompleksnost političkih pojmova poput naroda, razdoblja poput modernizma ili „događaja” poput NOB-a. U drugom dijelu teksta, nalazi i razotkriveni slojevi se pokušavaju promijeniti na specifično i uže polje povijest našeg eksperimentalnog kazališta i njegovih, u naknadnoj valorizaciji, zaboravljenih „trenutaka” poput kazališta NOB-a ili kazališnog djelovanja Bogdana Jerkovića.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: populizam, kriza, teška vremena, plebejsko nasljeđe, narodna fronta, NOB, nečisti modernizam, Bogdan Jerković, Darko Suvini

Ovaj je rad potaknut jednom aktualnošću i jednom „vječnom“ dilemom iz dva, kako se to lakonskim rječnikom ruskih formalista kaže „susjedna niza” – onog političkog i umjetničkog. Aktualnost se tiče rasprava o populizmu uslijed ekonomske krize, a onda i krize demokracije. Vječno se pitanje pak tiče politike umjetnosti i veze formalnih aspekata umjetničkog djela i njegova političkog apela. No upuštanje u takvu temu iziskuje i neku vrstu upućivanja na terminološke manjkavosti i probleme koji proizlaze iz ovog svojevrsnog kontrasta – pogotovo kad je riječ o populizmu. Manjkavost se nerijetko očituje u parcijalnoj primjeni termina populizam: s jedne strane njegovoj ekskluzivnosti na isključivo desne političke pokrete ili pak generalizaciji na sve radikalne pokrete i s lijeva i s desna.¹ Odatle dolazi i osnovni poticaj i potreba za sortiranjem grmlja argumenata na konkretnom povijesnom primjeru. Najbolje ga je možda prikazati konkretnim autorskim tekstovima, političkim događajima i nevidenom lakoćom spajanja tih dvaju momenata. ……… Naime, već je primjetno da u političkoj teoriji posljednjih godina, pa možda i cijelo desetljeće, raste² interes za populizam i za različite pristupe tom fenomenu posebice u trenutku ekonomske krize i povećane društvene nejednakosti. Zanimljivo je, uvidom u recentne zapise, doći do zaključka da se matrica rasprave i argumentacije nije previše pomaknula od vremena kraja devetnaestog stoljeća i „pozitivističke“ moralne

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SUMMARY: The initial incentive of this text is derived from a wish to harmonize contemporary theoretical interests engaged with the subject of populism (primarily based on the work of Ernesto Laclau) with the more recent theoretical approaches and interpretations of the People's Liberation Struggle (with a special focus on Darko Suvini's work), within the field of specific aesthetic debates on realism/modernism which marked the period before World War II. The intention of this text is not to bring forth some final theoretical resolution, but rather to indicate theoretical and historiographical complexities of political concepts such as “the people”, periods like modernism or “events” such as the People's Liberation Struggle (NOB). In the second part of the text, the discoveries and uncovered layers are applied to a specific and narrower field of the history of our experimental theater and – in a subsequent appraisal – its forgotten “moments” such as the NOB theater or Bogdan Jerković's theatre work.

KEYWORDS: populism, crisis, desperate times, plebeian legacy, Popular Front, People's Liberation Struggle (NOB), impure modernism, Bogdan Jerković, Darko Suvini

This article has been inspired by one current and one “eternal” dilemma from the two, in the laconic words of Russian Formalists, “adjacent sequences” – from the political and the artistic one. The current dilemma concerns the economic crisis followed by the crisis of democracy, which initiated the discussion on populism. In turn, the eternal dilemma concerns the politics of art and the link between the formal aspects of the work of art and its political appellation. However, before we go any further, it is necessary to note the terminological deficiencies and problems arising from making this kind of a contrast – especially when it comes to populism. Its deficiencies can be frequently observed in the partial application of the term populism: on the one hand, in its exclusive ascription to the right-wing political movements and, on the other hand, in its generalization to all radical movements from the political left, as well as from the political right.¹ It is from where the main initiative and the need to sort out these heaps of arguments on the basis of specific historical examples originates. It might be best to represent it via specific texts, political events and the unparalleled ease of linking these two phenomena. ……… Namely, the growing interest² in populism and the development of various approaches to this phenomenon in political theory has been noted in the last couple of years – maybe even a decade – especially in the time

osupnutosti iracionalnim i nezrelim masama koje slijede demagogiju i odbijaju racionalnu i informiranu deliberaciju. Jedina je razlika u tropima koji ispunjavaju logičku i retoričku matricu, što će reći da je današnja rasprava uokvirena u tzv. umjerenjački diskurs. No karakteristika „straha od masa“ i njihova iracionalnoga političkog ponašanja ostaje, kao što pokazuje i ovaj citat: „populizam polarizira društvo, svoje političke protivnike i ‚strane elemente‘ u društvu stigmatizira u ime ‚moralne većine‘, potiče netoleranciju, potkopava demokratske političke institucije i nameće simplificirana pseudorješenja koja teže autoritarnoj transformaciji društva”.³ Godine 1895., još pod dojmom Pariške komune dvadesetak godina ranije i sa sve jačim radničkim pokretom, francuski psiholog Gustave Le Bon piše svoju *Psihologiju gomila* u kojoj narodne mase slikovito uspoređuje s insektima, a retoričare koji ih privlače sa svjetlom prema kojem se insekti postrojavaju.⁴ Ova metafora, osim što upućuje na specifične episteme devetnaestog stoljeća koji su pod utjecajem razvoja tehničkih i prirodnih znanosti olako i društvo poistovjećivali sa zakonitostima tih područja i disciplina, otkriva i osuđujući, moralizatorski stav prema masama. Daljnji izvod tropa iz tog pozitivističko-moralizatorskog registra dovodi do učestalog poistovjećivanja masa i njihove apelacijske snage (odnosno u ovom slučaju snage socijalizma) sa zarazom koja se prenosila

transklasnom ravni, što je Le Bona dovelo do lakonskog zaključka da su socijalističke tendencije danas (kraj 19. st., op. a.) prisutnije među srednjim klasama nego među narodom te da se šire jednostavnom zarazom i ogromnom brzinom.⁵ Taj registar i izniman interes za kritikom političkih tendencija koje su se formirale kroz sindikate, prve socijalističke grupe, pobune ili jednostavnu inklinaciju narodnih masa da izađe na ulice Ernesto Laclau određuje kao manifestaciju „velikog straha društvenih znanosti 19. stoljeća“ od populizma, odnosno psihologije masa.⁶ Taj argentinski teoretičar i jedan od najznačajnijih *analitičara diskursa* u kritičkom pregledu literature o populizmu u svojoj knjizi *On Populist Reason* zaključuje da su se rasprave i pristupi populizmu često vodili impresionističkim, a ne analitičkim pristupom, završavajući nerijetko u nekoherentnoj tipologiji svrstavajući različite povijesne pojave „populizma“:

**U OVOM ĆU SE RADU BAVITI
POPULIZMOM KAO „RETORIKOM ZA
TEŠKA VREMENA“ SPAJAJUĆI LACLAUOVU
„ANTIMORALIZATORSKU“ I DISKURZIVNU
ANALIZU POPULIZMA KOJA U PRVI PLAN
STAVLJA NJEGOV RETORIČKI, ODNOSNO
PERFORMATIVNI I APELACIJSKI ASPEKT
KOJI UPRAVO U INSTRUMENTALIZACIJU
RETORIKE VIDI POPULISTIČKU
RACIONALIZACIJU POLITIKE.**

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of economic crisis and increasing social inequalities. By reviewing recent texts on the subject, it can be concluded that, interestingly enough, the basic outline of the debate and the arguments put forward have not much changed since the end of the 19th century and the positivist moral dumbfounded response to the irrational and immature masses that easily succumb to demagoguery and reject rational and informed deliberation. The only difference is in the tropes which fill the logical and rhetorical matrix, which is to say that today's debate is framed within the so-called moderate discourse. However, the “fear of the masses” and their irrational political behaviour is something that remains unchanged, as illustrated by this quote: “Populism polarizes the society; its stigmatizes its political opponents and ‘foreign elements’ in the society in the name of the ‘moral majority’; it encourages intolerance, undermines democratic political institutions and imposes simplified pseudo-solutions that tend to bring about an authoritarian transformation of the society.”³ In 1895, still under the influence of the Paris Commune which happened twenty years earlier and the growing labour movement, the French psychologist Gustave Le Bon wrote the book *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* in which he vividly compared the popular masses with insects who are drawn to the light wielded by rhetoricians like insects to a flame.⁴ In addition to revealing specific 19th century epistemes which were,

**I WILL EXAMINE POPULISM AS
“THE RHETORIC FOR DESPERATE TIMES”,
CONNECTING LACLAU’S “ANTI-MORALIZING”
AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF POPULISM –
WHICH FOREGROUNDS ITS RHETORICAL, I.E.
ITS PERFORMATIVE AND APPELLATE ASPECT
IN WHICH THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF
RHETORIC IS REGARDED AS THE POPULIST
RATIONALIZATION OF POLITICS.**

under the influence of technical and natural sciences, too eager to apply the laws of these scientific fields and disciplines to society, this metaphor also exposes a judgmental and moralizing attitude toward the masses. Arising from the positivist and moralizing register, the subsequent derivation of this trope frequently equated the masses and their power of appellation (i.e. the power of socialism, in this particular instance) with a contagion that had been transmitted across social classes which led to Le Bon's laconic conclusion that the socialist tendencies at that time (the end of the 19th century, A/N) were more widespread amongst the middle classes than amongst the people and that they were spreading as a simple contagion at a tremendous speed.⁵ This register and the considerable interest in critiquing political tendencies that were formed within the labour unions, the first socialist groups, or revolts and simple

od američkog populizma kraja 19. i početka 20 stoljeća, preko ruskog narodnjaštva do peronizma u Argentini – u ladice bez jasnog kriterija i metodološke konzistentnosti.⁷ Ta je analitička nekonzistentnost dijelom razlog zašto se populizam danas doživljava u izrazito negativnom kontekstu kao svojevrsni iracionalni pol političkog djelovanja i promišljanja; kao kočničar modernizacijskih procesa, kao „opasni eksces“ koji dovodi u pitanje funkcioniranje „racionalne zajednice“ koja je u osnovi tog procesa.⁸ U ovom ću se radu baviti *populizmom* kao „retorikom za teška vremena“ spajajući Laclauovu „antimoralizatorsku“ i diskurzivnu analizu populizma koja u prvi plan stavlja njegov retorički, odnosno performativni i apelacijski aspekt – sa zgodnim analitičkim izvrućem (zlobnici bi rekli – svojevremeno postteoretičarima) koji upravo u instrumentalizaciji retorike vidi populističku racionalizaciju politike. Pritom kao dobar oslonac služi i stav Kennetha Minoguea, koji koristeći se primjerom američkog populizma s prijelaza 19. u 20. stoljeće govori o populizmu kao „nepromišljenoj racionalizaciji teških vremena“.⁹ Kao što i Laclau u svojem već citiranom tekstu iz 1977. razjašnjava, „rast populizma povijesno je povezan s krizom diskursa dominantne ideologije, što je pak dio jedne opće društvene krize“ s vrlo jasnim brojčanim pokazateljima osiromašenja i povećanja razlika¹⁰, niske integracije masa u politički život ili pak dokidanja mehanizama te integracije

poput smanjena članstva u sindikatima, ograničenom pristupu obrazovanju i slično. Mnoštvo je povijesnih primjera u različitim kontekstima koji pokazuju takve i slične krize te populistički odgovor na njih u različitim ideološkim oblicima – što pak, opet slijedeći Laclaua, ovisi o tome na koji način krizu proživljava dominantni blok i blok kojim se dominira te koji su oblici odgovora na to krizno stanje. Tu se onda kao dva antitetična povijesna slučaja obično daju primjeri nacizma (kao populizma dominantnog bloka u trenutku ekonomske i socijalne krize koji se služi rasizmom i represivnim aparatom da bi ugasio revolucionarni potencijal masa) i različitih lijevih povijesnih pokušaja i „fuzija narodno-demokratske (*popular-democratic*) ideologije i socijalističke ideologije“ u koje Laclau otvoreno svrstava i Tita, navodeći ga (uz Maoa i Talijansku komunističku partiju) kao najznačajniji primjer naprednog (*advanced*) uvođenja demokratske ideologije u ideologiju radničke klase.¹¹ To „originalno stapanje“ buržoasko-demokratskih i proleterskih elemenata u slučaju NOB-a i druge Jugoslavije postaje kompleksnije uvođenjem *narodnih* pitanja *nacija*, odnosno naroda i narodnosti, često retorički kondenziranih kroz populističke parole o bratstvu i jedinstvu, koje su možda najslikovitije izražavale racionalnost koja se krije iza stvaranje jedne takve države.¹² No to je tema za jednu drugu raspravu koje ćemo se ovdje dodirivati tek lapidarno kako bismo razriješili

inclinations of the popular masses to take it to the streets, Ernesto Laclau defines as the manifestation of “the great fear of the nineteenth-century social sciences,” that is, the crowd psychology.⁶ This Argentinian theorist and one of the most important discourse analysts in his critical overview of literature on populism, in his book *On Populist Reason*, concludes that the discussions about and approaches to populism often adopted an impressionist, rather than an analytical approach which led to the development of an incoherent typology of grouping different historical occurrences of “populism” – from the US populism in the late 19th and early 20th century, through the Russian peopleism (Narodniks) to Peronism in Argentina – into categories without applying a clear criterion or consistent methodology.⁷ This analytical inconsistency is partly the reason why populism is today perceived in an extremely negative fashion: as an irrational counterpart of political action and thought; as the brakeman of modernization processes; as a “dangerous excess” which calls into question the functioning of a “rational community” which is the prerequisite of this process.⁸ In this article, I will examine *populism* as “the rhetoric for desperate times”, connecting Laclau’s “anti-moralizing” and discourse analysis of populism – which foregrounds its rhetorical, i.e. its performative and appellative aspect – with a neat analytical twist (as cynics would say – typical for post-

theorists) in which the instrumentalization of rhetoric is regarded as the populist rationalization of politics. What also consolidates the point that I am trying to bring across is Kenneth Minogue’s claim – drawing from the example of American populism at the turn of the 19th century – that populism is “the impetuous rationalization of desperate times.”⁹ As Laclau explains in his above-cited text from 1977: “The emergence of populism is historically linked to a crisis of the dominant ideological discourses which is in turn part of a more general social crisis,” accompanied by indisputable numerical indicators of the rising impoverishment and increased disparities¹⁰, the low integration of the masses into political life and the abolishment of the political integration mechanisms such as the reduction of union membership or limiting the access to education etc. There are numerous historical examples within different contexts that exhibit such and similar crises and the populist responses which can take different ideological forms – which in turn, following Laclau, depends on how the crisis is experienced by the dominant block and the block which is being dominated and what the responses are to the crisis. Two antithetical historical examples are usually mentioned: Nazism (as the populism of the dominant block in the time of economic and social crisis which utilizes racism and the repressive apparatus in order to smother the revolutionary potential of the masses) and various left-wing

neke terminološke nedoumice. Ono je što nas ovdje zanima reprezentacija naroda, ali i apelacija narodu kroz možemo reći – pragmatične kulturne politike u vremenu NOB-a, ali prije toga i kroz slične povijesne primjere koje je, smatram, potrebno navesti da bismo srušili neke mitove o uskom shvaćanju umjetničkog polja i njegova reprezentacijskog dosega. Pritom stalno treba imati na umu specifičnost ratnog konteksta (i povijesnog, ali i prostornog s obzirom na to da je selo mjesto primarne kohezije NOB-a i ratnog djelovanja) Narodnooslobodilačke borbe, što onda uvelike utječe i na stilsko-formalne aspekte jezika, ili, opet formalističkim rječnikom rečeno – umjetničkih sredstava te borbe. Međutim, da bismo uopće shvatili koliko su se ta dva „kontrastna“ aspekta – politički i umjetnički – prožimala, potrebno je napraviti koji analitički i vremenski korak nazad da se predoči sva živost rasprave o tim pitanjima i da se utvrde

**ONO JE ŠTO NAS OVDJE ZANIMA
REPREZENTACIJA NARODA, ALI I APELACIJA
NARODU KROZ MOŽEMO REĆI – PRAGMATIČNE
KULTURNE POLITIKE U VREMENU NOB-A, ALI
PRIJE TOGA I KROZ SLIČNE POVIJESNE PRIMJERE
KOJE JE, SMATRAM, POTREBNO NAVESTI
DA BISMO SRUŠILI NEKE MITOVE O USKOM
SHVAĆANJU UMJETNIČKOG POLJA I NJEGOVA
REPREZENTACIJSKOG DOSEGA.**

**WHAT INTERESTS US HERE IS THE REPRESENTATION
OF THE PEOPLE, BUT ALSO THE APPELLATION
TO THE PEOPLE BY – AS IT MIGHT BE SAID – THE
PRAGMATIC CULTURAL POLICIES AT THE TIME OF THE
NOB, AND EVEN IN TIMES BEFORE THAT. THEREBY,
SIMILAR HISTORICAL EXAMPLES SHOULD ALSO BE
MENTIONED WHICH, I BELIEVE, ARE NECESSARY
TO BE RECALLED IN ORDER TO DISPEL THE MYTHS
ABOUT THE NARROW UNDERSTANDING OF THE FIELD
OF ART AND ITS REPRESENTATIONAL REACH.**

historical attempts and “fusions between popular-democratic ideology and socialist ideology.” In the latter category, Laclau includes Tito (together with Mao and the Italian Communist Party) as the most prominent example of the *advanced* incorporation of democratic ideology into the working-class ideology.¹¹ This “original merging” of the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian elements in the case of the People’s Liberation Struggle (NOB) and the second Yugoslavia, became more complex with the incorporation of *people’s national* issues – i.e. the issues of nations and nationalities – often rhetorically solidified within populist slogans of brotherhood and unity which, perhaps, most vividly expressed the kind of rationality that laid behind the creation of such a state.¹² But that is a subject for another discussion which will

parametri u kojima su se *dogadali* narod i umjetnost. To činimo ne da bismo prilagodili vlastiti kritički aparat kategorijama političke urgentnosti rata, nego da bismo upozorili da kritički aparat uvijek iznova treba mijenjati s obzirom na kontekst o kojem se govori. Vrlo je teško, naime, estetičke parametre avangardne umjetnosti grada i mirnodopskog razdoblja postaviti kao aršine rasprave o umjetnosti u gerilskim uvjetima ratnog djelovanja.

Svijet se raspada

Drugi svjetski rat svakako je predstavljao jednu takvu krizu ili kako Minogue više poetski kaže: „teško vrijeme“, transformaciju koja je iznjedrila i Narodnu frontu kao jednu vrstu transklasnog, antifašističkog i demokratskog apela protiv prepoznate fašističke prijetnje. Narodna se fronta ostvarivala ili kao konkretan koalicijski sporazum u sastavljanju vlasti tridesetih (primjerice u Francuskoj ili Španjolskoj) ili kao urgentni oblik reakcije na fizički rat – poput onoga na prostoru Jugoslavije – stvaranjem Narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta koji je, iako vojno, logistički i politički vođen Komunističkom partijom Jugoslavije, kadrovski pa i ideološki (u samom ratu) uvelike zasnovan na narodnofrontaškim principima ili kako Darko Suvin kaže – na principima „plebejske revolucije“.¹³ Duga je povijest tog *plebejskog* nasljeđa koje u sebi spaja ili sakuplja sve različite

only be touched upon in order to resolve some terminological ambiguities. What interests us here is the representation of the people, but also the appellation to the people by – as it might be said – the pragmatic cultural policies at the time of the NOB, and even in times before that. Thereby, similar historical examples should also be mentioned which, I believe, are necessary to be recalled in order to dispel the myths about the narrow understanding of the field of art and its representational reach. The specificity of the war context (historical and also spatial, since the village was the place of the primary cohesion of the NOB and its war efforts) of the People’s Liberation Struggle should be borne in mind since it significantly influenced the style and the formal aspects of language, or in the Formalists’ words – the artistic means of that struggle. However, to even comprehend the extent to which these two “contrasting” aspects – the political and the artistic – permeated each other, it is necessary to take an analytical and temporal step back in order to present all the intricacies of this lively debate and to establish the parameters under which the people and art were *happening*. We are not doing this in order to adjust our critical apparatus in correspondence to the categories of the political urgency of war, but rather to issue a warning that the critical apparatus should always be readjusted in relation to the context at hand. In fact, it is extremely difficult to set the aesthetic

povijesne punktove otpora oblicima opresije bez obzira na to na kojem stupnju razvoja bila svjetska povijest ili kapitalizam. Teška vremena i krize u kojima se javljaju ti *plebejski* odgovori iznjedrili su različite oblike općenja-otpora i različite jezike koji su se tradirali i prenosili u slojevima nečitkima, teško vidljivima ili pak potpuno nevidljivima službenoj monološkoj historiografiji. Rjeđa je pojava da su ti glasovi prenijeti, odnosno predstavljeni kroz umjetnost koja je kasnije kanonizirana kao visoka, a ako ne visoka, onda svakako reprezentativna za određene kulturne kontekste, često ulazeći i u javne prostore i institucije postajući njihovim ornamentom u vremenu nakon krize: od Franka W. Brangwyna koji u zgradi suda u Clevelandu slika slavnu scenu potpisivanja Magne Carte,¹⁴ ali ovaj put s motivima seljaka, sitnih obrtnika, povratnika iz rata – koji su inače izostavljeni iz sličnih prikaza, preko Diega Riverera koji u nacionalnoj palači u Ciudadu de Mexicu iscrta guste murale „narodne“ *Povijesti Meksika* sa svim njezinim bunama, ratovima i akterima iz naroda, do našeg primjera i Krste Hegedušića čija je *Seljačka buna – Anno Domini 1573*. donedavno krasila ceremonijalni ulaz u Ured predsjednika RH u Vili Zagorje da bi je maknuli zbog „zastrašujućeg prizora“ i „slike pune mrtvaca, ubijenih seljaka i plemića na konjima, uz ples smrti“.¹⁵ Rat kao najstrašniji izraz krize i teškog vremena bio je najčešći motiv različitih svjetovnih interpretacija plebejskog svijeta ili pak alegorija koje se daju interpretirati u tom ključu.

parameters of the urban avant-garde art during peacetime as a standard for the discussion about art under the conditions of guerrilla warfare.

The world is falling apart

The Second World War certainly represents such a crisis or, as Minogue said more poetically: “a desperate time.” This was a transformative event which gave rise to the People’s Front as a cross-class, anti-fascist and democratic appeal against the fascist threat. The People’s Front was realized as a concrete coalition agreement in the formation of governments in the nineteen-thirties (in France and Spain), or it took the form of an immediate reaction to the material realities of war – such as in Yugoslavia – with the establishment of the People’s Liberation Movement (NOP). Although the NOP was militarily, logistically and politically led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, its organization and ideology (during the war) was mostly based on the peopleism and frontist principles or as Darko Suvin says – on the principles of a “plebeian revolution.”¹³

..... This *plebeian* legacy has a long history; it consists of a combination or a collection of all historical points of resistance to oppression, regardless of the historical or capitalist stage of development. These *plebeian* responses emerging during desperate times and crises have generated various forms of

Kao takvi slučajevi u povijesti umjetnosti ostale su zabilježene grafike Albrechta Dürera, poput one za *Spomenik poraženim seljacima* iz 1526. što je njegova refleksija na seljačke ratove ili pak ranije grafike iz 1510. – *Čovjekov pad*.¹⁶ Njome se tematizira klasični biblijski trop „protjerivanja iz raja“ koji talijanska feministička povjesničarka Silvia Federici tumači kao „protjerivanje seljaka s njihove zajedničke zemlje“ uslijed ograđivanja i kriza koje su manifestirale prelazak u novu fazu

TEŠKA VREMENA I KRIZE U KOJIMA SE JAVLJAJU TI PLEBEJSKI ODGOVORI IZNJEDRILI SU RAZLIČITE OBLIKE OPĆENJA-OTPORA I RAZLIČITE JEZIKE KOJI SU SE TRADIRALI I PRENOSILI U SLOJEVIMA NEČITKIMA, TEŠKO VIDLJIVIMA ILI PAK POTPUNO NEVIDLJIVIMA SLUŽBENOJ MONOLOŠKOJ HISTORIOGRAFIJI. RJEĐA JE POJAVA DA SU TI GLASOVI PRENIJETI, ODNOSNO PREDSTAVLJENI KROZ UMJETNOST KOJA JE KASNIJE KANONIZIRANA KAO VISOKA, A AKO NE VISOKA, ONDA SVAKAKO REPREZENTATIVNA ZA ODREĐENE KULTURNE KONTEKSTE, ČESTO ULAZEĆI I U JAVNE PROSTORE I INSTITUCIJE POSTAJUĆI NJIHOVIM ORNAMENTOM U VREMENU NAKON KRIZE.

PLEBEIAN LEGACY HAS A LONG HISTORY; IT CONSISTS OF A COMBINATION OR A COLLECTION OF ALL HISTORICAL POINTS OF RESISTANCE TO OPPRESSION, REGARDLESS OF THE HISTORICAL OR CAPITALIST STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. THESE PLEBEIAN RESPONSES EMERGING DURING DESPERATE TIMES AND CRISES HAVE GENERATED VARIOUS FORMS OF COMMUNICATING RESISTANCE AND DIFFERENT LANGUAGE REGISTERS WHICH WERE CONVEYED AND TRANSMITTED IN LAYERS UNINTELLIGIBLE AND ALMOST IMPERCEPTIBLE, OR COMPLETELY INVISIBLE TO THE OFFICIAL MONOLOGIC HISTORIOGRAPHY. THERE ARE FEW EXAMPLES WHEN THESE VOICES HAVE BEEN HEARD AND TRANSFERRED, THAT IS, REPRESENTED IN ART WHICH WAS LATER CANONIZED AS HIGH ART, AND IF NOT AS HIGH ART, THEN CONSIDERED AS BEING REPRESENTATIVE OF PARTICULAR CULTURAL CONTEXTS AND EXHIBITED IN PUBLIC SPACES AND INSTITUTIONS BECOMING THEIR ORNAMENTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS.

communicating resistance and different language registers which were conveyed and transmitted in layers unintelligible and almost imperceptible, or completely invisible to the official monologic historiography. There are few examples when these voices have been heard and transferred, that is,

proizvodnje i prvobitnu akumulaciju kapitala, a što njemački povjesničar Peter Blickel naziva „revolucijom običnog čovjeka“.¹⁷ U isti tijek plebejske reprezentacije spada i žanr-slikarstvo Pietera Bruegela Starijeg kroz dugotrajnu Nizozemsku revoluciju koja slijedi nakon seljačkih ratova u Njemačkoj, a kojim se „bilježe“ i u različitim ključevima tumače ratna pustošenja, ali i prigodničarske prakse seoskog stanovništva. I u književnosti i kazalištu elizabetanske i jakovljevske Engleske, kriza i plebejske pobune našle su svoje mjesto. U suvremenim interpretacijama, pogotovo nakon što primat u šekspirologiji preuzima materijalistički pristup, jedna od zadnjih Shakespeareovih

**TO JE VJEČNO PLEBEJSKO
PROKLETSTVO ILI NEŠTO TREZVENIJIM
RJEČNIKOM REČENO – VJEČNA
PLEBEJSKA UVJETOVANOST (U SMISLU
CONDITIO HUMANA) KOJA JE SVOJ
REPREZENTACIJSKI VRHUNAC I TEORIJSKU
ARTIKULACIJU DOŽIVJELA UPRAVO U
MODERNIZMU I BAŠ OKO RASPRAVA NA
„ESTETIČKOJ LJEVICI“, KOJA SE JEDNAKO
KONTRADIKTORNO I KOMPLEKSNO
ODNOSILA PREMA PUČKOSTI, PLEBEJSTVU
I POPULIZMU KAO POLITIČKOJ STRATEGIJI
TEŠKIH VREMENA.**

tragedija – *Koriolan* – tumači se kao reprezentacija kontradikcija imanentnih plebejstvu – između sklonosti političkoj pobuni i prevratu, ali i konzervativnosti očuvanja poretka i stalnom pogledu usmjerenom prema romantiziranoj prošlosti. Ili pak, u ovom slučaju mnogo važnije – kontradikciji koja proizlazi iz njihova jada ili materijalnog stanja koje ih ujedinjuje u masu usmjerenu prema mijenjanju poretka i slike svijeta, ali istovremeno i tu masu fragmentira na partikularne priče koje pokušavaju nadići taj egzistencijalni jad „otimajući jedni drugima od usta“.¹⁸ To je vječno plebejsko prokletstvo ili nešto trezvenijim rječnikom rečeno – vječna plebejska uvjetovanost (u smislu *conditio humana*) koja je svoj reprezentacijski vrhunac i teorijsku artikulaciju doživjela upravo u modernizmu i baš oko rasprava na „estetičkoj ljevici“, koja se jednako kontradiktorno i kompleksno odnosila prema pučkosti, plebejstvu i populizmu kao političkoj strategiji teških vremena.

Narodna fronta i nečisti modernizam

U desetljeću priprema za Drugi svjetski rat, nakon pobjede nacista, većina njemačke intelektualne ljevice završila je u emigraciji, odakle su doprinosili jednoj od najvažnijih estetičkih (a i političkih) debata u 20. stoljeću čija aktualnost ni danas nije zamrla, kao što nije zamrla ni nemogućnost zauzimanja jasnih

**THE UNAVOIDABLE PLEBEIAN CONDITIONING
(IN THE SENSE OF *CONDITIO HUMANA*)
WHICH REACHED ITS REPRESENTATIONAL
APOGEE AND THEORETICAL ARTICULATION
IN MODERNISM WITHIN THE DISCUSSIONS
LED ON THE “AESTHETIC LEFT” AND WHICH
TOOK ONE AND THE SAME CONTRADICTORY
AND COMPLEX APPROACH TO POPULARITY,
PLEBEIANISM AND POPULISM AS THE
POLITICAL STRATEGY OF DESPERATE TIMES.**

represented in art which was later canonized as high art, and if not as high art, then considered as being representative of particular cultural contexts and exhibited in public spaces and institutions becoming their ornaments in the aftermath of the crisis. These scarce instance include: Frank W. Brangwyn's famous mural of the signing of Magna Carta at the Courthouse in Cleveland,¹⁴ but this time depicting peasants, small artisans and war veterans – who are not usually included in similar representations, Diego Rivera's dense murals of the “people's” *History of Mexico* – depicting all its revolts, wars and folk figures – at the National Palace in Mexico City, and our own Krsto Hegedušić's *Peasants' Revolt – Anno Domini 1573* which, until recently, adorned the ceremonial entrance to the Office of the President of Croatia in Villa Zagorje, to be removed because of its “horrifying scenes” and “images filled with dead people,

murdered peasants and noblemen on horseback, with Danse Macabre.”¹⁵ War, as the most horrifying expression of a crisis and desperate times, was the most common motif of various secular interpretations of the plebeian world or even of allegories which can be interpreted under the same framework. Such examples, recorded in art history, include Albrecht Dürer's graphic works: *Monument to the Vanquished Peasants* created in 1526 as his take on the peasants' wars, and his earlier engraving from 1510 – *The Fall of Man*.¹⁶ It employs the classical biblical trope “the expulsion from the Garden of Eden,” which the Italian feminist historian Silvia Federici interprets as “the expulsion of peasants from their common lands” due to the land enclosures and the crises which marked the transition into the new phase of production and the initial accumulation of capital, and what the German historian Peter Blickle calls “the revolution of the common man.”¹⁷ The genre painting of Pieter Bruegel the Elder belongs to the same strain of plebeian representations. Under different frameworks, he “recorded” and interpreted the devastations of war, as well as the festive practices of the rural population during the long-lasting revolution in Netherlands, following the peasants' wars in Germany. The crisis and plebeian revolts appeared even within the literature and theatre of the Elizabethan and Jacobean England. In contemporary literary theory, especially after cultural materialism became the dominant approach in Shakespearean studies, one of the

pozicija u toj raspravi, što je svakako jedna od karakteristika koje pridonose i njezinoj današnjoj živosti. Rasprava o realizmu i modernizmu (kako smo je primili posredno u engleskom prijevodu ili njemački *Expressionismusdebatte*) uključivala je najvažnije njemačke marksističke mislioce: Györgya Lukácsa, Ernsta Blocha, Bertolta Brechta, a onda posredno i Theodora Adorna i Waltera Benjamina.¹⁹ I dok se iz te rasprave može izvući mnogo pitanja koja bi u današnjem kontekstu golicala raspravu, za ovaj konkretan slučaj nećemo ulaziti u pitanja *mimesisa*, teorije odraza pa onda i totaliteta i različitog razumijevanja *formalizma*, nego ćemo staviti fokus na dva momenta koja nam se čine važnima za ovaj tekst. Jedan se tiče već mnogo puta spominjanog naroda i njegove interpretacije u kontekstu lijevih umjetničkih praksi modernizma, posebice u vremenu krize, Narodne fronte i Drugog svjetskog rata, a drugi umjetničke medijacije, odnosno posredovanja. Taj je moment na određeni način zaokupljao sve ove autore te dobiva posebno značajno mjesto u zaključnom dijelu ovog teksta, u kojem otvaram teme partizanskog kazališta koje je u povijesti našeg kazališta u vrijeme tranzicije ostalo nepravedno zapostavljeno.²⁰ Rasprava je započeta u osvit Kominternina „odobravanja“ Narodne fronte kao službene političke linije u trenutku u kojem u Njemačkoj na vlast dolazi Hitler, dok u Italiji već gotovo deset godina vlast drže fašisti, a u Mađarskoj je stabilan Horthyjev režim, nastao kao monarhistički

i desni odgovor na neuspjelu Mađarsku sovjetsku republiku. Iako odbijena kada je 1928. György Lukács predlaže u svojim *Blumovim tezama*, nastalima upravo kao lijeva strategija rušenja Horthyjeva režima, Narodna fronta prihvaćena je kao politička tendencija, ali i kao mjesto oko kojeg se vode užeestetičke rasprave. Tako će jedna od točaka „sukoba“ u *Raspravi o realizmu i modernizmu* biti upravo narod i „umjetničko predstavljanje kontradikcija“ sustava kroz različite umjetničke forme, ili u ovom slučaju stilske formacije. Međutim, kao priređivač ove rasprave na engleskom jeziku Fredric Jameson primjećuje da ovi eseji i prilozi diskusiji marksističkih autora „predstavljaju najvišu točku narodo-frontaške kulturne rasprave“, ali je, nažalost, taj dio koji tematizira narod istovremeno i „najslabija točka dvaju eseja“ kojima se ta rasprava otvara.²¹ Sve započinje Lukácsevom primjedbom Blochu da su ekspresionizam, odnosno avangardni pravci,

JEDNOJ OD NAJVAŽNIJIH ESTETIČKIH (A I POLITIČKIH) DEBATA U 20. STOLJEĆU ČIJA AKTUALNOST NI DANAS NIJE ZAMRLA, KAO ŠTO NIJE ZAMRLA NI NEMOGUĆNOST ZAUZIMANJA JASNIH POZICIJA U TOJ RASPRAVI, ŠTO JE SVAKAKO JEDNA OD KARAKTERISTIKA KOJE PRIDONOSE I NJEZINOJ DANAŠNJOJ ŽIVOSTI.

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last Shakespeare's tragedies – *Coriolanus* – is interpreted as the representation of contradictions immanent to plebeians – i.e. as the juxtaposition between their inclination to political revolts and upheavals and their conservative preservation of order, along with their constant fall-back to romanticized past. In this case, far more important is the contradiction arising out of their misery and material circumstances which, on the one hand, united the masses determined to change the order and the image of the world while, on the other hand, fragmenting the masses into idiosyncratic particularities who attempted to overcome their existential despair by “snatch[ing] the wretched crumbs from each other’s mouths.”¹⁸ This is the plebeian curse which can never be lifted or, to express it in a more rational manner – the unavoidable plebeian conditioning (in the sense of *conditio humana*) which reached its representational apogee and theoretical articulation in modernism within the discussions led on the “aesthetic left” and which took one and the same contradictory and complex approach to popularity, plebeianism and populism as the political strategy of desperate times.

The popular front and impure modernism

In the decade preceding World War II, after the Nazis came into power, most of the German intellectual left ended up in exile from where they contributed to one of the most important aesthetic (and political) debates of the 20th century. To this day,

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AESTHETIC (AND POLITICAL) DEBATES OF THE 20TH CENTURY. TO THIS DAY, ITS RELEVANCE HAS STILL NOT DIMINISHED, WHILE THE PERSISTENT INABILITY TO ADOPT A CLEAR POSITION IN THIS DEBATE IS CERTAINLY ONE OF ITS KEY FEATURES CONTRIBUTING TO ITS PRESENT-DAY VIBRANCY.

its relevance has still not diminished, while the persistent inability to adopt a clear position in this debate is certainly one of its key features contributing to its present-day vibrancy. A debate on realism and modernism (in English translation or, in the original German, *Expressionismusdebatte*) entangled the most influential German Marxist thinkers: György Lukács, Ernst Bloch, Bertolt Brecht, and then, indirectly, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin.¹⁹ While we could draw a lot of issues from this debate which could, within today’s context, spark off numerous discussions, we won’t engage the issues of *mimesis*, the theory of reflection, the totality or various notions of *formalism* in this text. We will, however, focus on the two issues that seem important for this article. One issue concerns the already mentioned people and how they were interpreted within the context of the left-wing modernist art practices, especially during the time of crisis, the Popular Front and World War II.

otuđeni od naroda i objektivno elitistički, na što Bloch odgovara: „Potpuna je neistina da su ekspresionisti bili otuđeni od običnog puka svojom silnom arogancijom. Ponovno, potpuno suprotno. U grupi Plavi jahač oponaša se oslikavanje stakla iz bavarskog Marnaua, zapravo – oni su bili prvi koji su ukazali na ovu dirljivu i tajnovitu narodnu umjetnost.“²² Kasnije, u istom eseju, Bloch dodatno „bogat“ svoju argumentaciju o vezi narodne umjetnosti i avangardnih pokreta navođenjem i „čeških, letonskih i jugoslavenskih umjetnika iz 1918. koji su u ekspresionizmu naišli pristup mnogo bliži njihovoj narodnoj umjetnosti nego bilo koji drugi umjetnički stil“.²³ Međutim, ovu gotovo prirodnu vezu, kako je opisuje Bloch – naroda, avangardnih umjetničkih pravaca i lijevih političkih tendencija ne treba uzimati zdravo za gotovo. Svaki je od ta tri pojma proturječan i iziskuje specifičnu kontekstualizaciju da bi ga se ispitalo i podvrgnulo analizi.

**ZA BRECHTA NI PUČKOST NI REALIZAM NISU
NORMATIVNE OPISNE ESTETSKE KATEGORIJE,
NEGO ODREĐENA FORMALNA SREDSTVA KOJA SE
MIJENJAJU OVISNO O ONOME ŠTO BI SE MOGLO
PRIKAZATI TE ŠTO BI SE I KAKO MOGLO RAZUMJETI.
DRUGIM RIJEČIMA, DIO RETORIKE KOJA NE BJEŽI
NI OD VLASTITOGA POPULISTIČKOG ASPEKTA I
APELA U VREMENU KRIZE.**

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**FOR BRECHT, POPULARITY AND REALISM WERE
NOT NORMATIVE DESCRIPTIVE AESTHETIC
CATEGORIES, BUT RATHER SPECIFIC FORMAL
DEVICES WHICH CHANGE DEPENDING ON WHAT
COULD BE REPRESENTED AND WHAT AND HOW
IT COULD BE UNDERSTOOD. IN OTHER WORDS,
THEY BELONG TO A RHETORIC WHICH DOES NOT
SHY AWAY FROM ITS OWN POPULIST ASPECT AND
APPELLATION IN THE TIMES OF CRISIS.**

The other issue addresses how people were mediated through art – the mediation which, in a certain way, preoccupied all of these authors and which holds a central place in the final section of this text, where I broach the subject of partisan theatre which has been unjustly left out from the historiography of our theatre during the transitional period.²⁰ The debate was initiated in the wake of the Comintern’s “approval” of the Popular Front as its official strategy during the time of Hitler’s ascendancy to power in Germany, while the fascists in Italy had already been in power for almost ten years and Hungary was in the firm grip of Horthy’s regime, which emerged as a monarchist and right-wing response to the unsuccessful Hungarian Soviet Republic. Although rejected at first in 1928 when it was proposed in György Lukács’s *Blum Theses* as a left-wing strategy of taking down Horthy’s regime, the Popular Front was accepted as a valid political tendency, also becoming a point of

Lakonski zaključujući da se jugoslavenski ekspresionizam opskrbljuje narodnom kulturom, a kako bi se pokazala njegova politička tendencija ili bliskost narodu, Bloch prije svega ne uzima u obzir žanrovske pojavnosti ekspresionizma i razlike između, primjerice, likovnih i književnih formi u ekspresionističkim artikulacijama. Drugi problem proizlazi iz samoga „nacionalnog“ odnosno narodnog pitanja u Jugoslaviji i dvostrukog tretmana narodne tradicije u modernizmu jugoslavenskog prostora. Jedan je tretman tzv. „aktivističkog ekspresionizma“ koji su možda najbolje artikulirali Miroslav Krleža i August Cesarec, koji u svojim esejima *Hrvatska književna laž*, odnosno *Mistifikacija jedne etike* jasno daju do znanja da pozivanje na narod i narodnu baštinu kroz različite umjetničke forme nije nužno iskaz progresivnih političkih težnji i formalnih aspekata djela. Drugi je tretman u Jugoslaviji poslije Prvog svjetskog rata prikazan kroz izgradnju i invenciju tradicije jugoslavenskog nacionalizma, tzv. „vidovdanske ideologije“, u kojoj se narod homogenizira oko konzervativnih načela održavanja monarhije i poretka. Cesarec u okretanju narodnoj folklornoj tradiciji vidi postupak nacionalističke (ali i etatiističke, u svakom slučaju – desne) patologije mita o Kosovskom boju, glorifikacije feudalnog heroizma i u konačnici zapreku spoznavanju klasnih razlika, svojevrstan mehanizam hegemonog skrivanja određenih društvenih i uže ideoloških proturječnosti.²⁴ Ovi Cesarčevi zapisi pokazuju koliko je pojam

interest in particular aesthetic discussion. Thus, one of the points of “conflict” in *A Debate on Realism and Modernism* were the issues concerning people and “the artistic representation of contradictions” through various art forms or, in this case, stylistic formations. However, as the editor of this debate in English, Fredric Jameson notes, these essays and contributions of the Marxist authors “represented one of the high points of popular-frontist cultural debate,” but adds that, unfortunately, “both essays are the weakest at precisely that point” which initiated the debate in the first place.²¹ It all started with Lukács’s objection to Bloch, claiming that Expressionism, i.e. avant-garde movements are alienated from the people and objectively elitist, to which Bloch replied: “Moreover, it is untrue that the Expressionists were estranged from ordinary people by their overwhelming arrogance. Again, the opposite is the case. The Blue Rider imitated the glass paintings at Murnau; in fact they were the first to open people’s eyes to this moving and uncanny folk-art.”²² Later on in that same essay, Bloch further “enriches” his argument on the relationship between folk-art and avant-garde movements by mentioning “Czech, Latvian and Yugoslav artists [who], about 1918, all found in Expressionism an approach that was infinitely closer to their own popular traditions than the majority of other artistic styles.”²³ However, this almost natural alliance – as Bloch characterized it – between the people, avant-garde movements and left political tendencies should not

naroda i narodne kulture kompleksan ne samo u političkom smislu nego i u smislu posredovanja tog problema kroz različite umjetničke prakse, što su ova dva autora prije svega imala na umu pišući svoje kritike. Najekstenzivnija kritika „desnog“ naroda i najjasnije uokvirivanje plebejske tradicije u okviru lijeve umjetnosti dolazi iz kruga autora s kojima je ovo poglavlje i otvoreno. Njemački dramatičar i kazališni teoretičar Bertolt Brecht narodnoj kulturi posvetio je nemali broj redaka u svojim

**ONA KLASIČNA PODJELA NA FORMALISTIČKI
MODERNIZAM ODVOJEN OD TRENUTAČNIH
POLITIČKIH POTREBA NARODA I LIŠEN
NEKE VRSTE POPULISTIČKE APELATIVNOSTI
NASUPROT TENDENCIOZNOM SOCREALIZMU
POLITIČKE LINIJE KOMINTERNE TOBOŽE
BLISKOM NARODU I NJEGOVOJ PERCEPCIJI
UMJETNOSTI – NE STOJI, KAO ŠTO NE STOJI
NI PERSPEKTIVA BINARNOG POGLEDA NA
UMJETNOSTI TOG DOBA. SKLONIJI SAM
OPISNIM TERMINIMA UMJETNIČKE PRODUKCIJE
TOGA VREMENA KOJU, PRIMJERICE, FREDRIC
JAMESON NAZIVA „NEČISTOM ESTETIKOM“
MODERNIZMA KOJA U TAKO „GUSTIM“ I „TEŠKIM
VREMENIMA“ BIVA „INFICIRANA“ I PLEBEJSTVOM
KOJE GRADI POVIJEST.**

**THE CLASSICAL DIVISION INTO FORMALIST
MODERNISM DIVORCED FROM THE CURRENT
POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE AND DEVOID
OF ANY KIND OF POPULIST APPELLATION VERSUS
TENDENTIOUS SOCIALIST REALISM ASSOCIATED
WITH THE POLICY OF THE COMINTERN AND
SUPPOSEDLY CLOSER TO PEOPLE AND THEIR
PERCEPTION OF ART – CANNOT BE SUSTAINED,
AND NEITHER CAN THE BINARY APPROACH TO
ART OF THAT PERIOD. PERSONALLY, I PREFER
THE MORE DESCRIPTIVE TERMS OF THE ART
PRODUCTION OF THAT TIME WHICH, FOR
EXAMPLE, FREDRIC JAMESON CALLS “THE
IMPURE AESTHETICS” OF MODERNISM WHICH
IN SUCH “DENSE” AND “DESPERATE TIMES” GOT
“INFECTED,” WHILE THE PLEBEIANS WERE THOSE
WHO MADE HISTORY HAPPEN.**

be taken for granted. Each of these three concepts is full of contradictions and demands specific contextualization for it to be examined and analysed. In his brief conclusion that the Yugoslav Expressionism incorporates popular culture in order to demonstrate its political tendency or its inclination toward people, Bloch does not take into account the generic

zapisima, ali i u svojem umjetničkom djelovanju, posebice u ranoj, ekspresionističkoj fazi, donekle rušeći onu Lukácsevu tezu o „ozbiljnosti“ i „narodnoj otuđenosti“ lijevog modernizma. Za artikulaciju odnosa lijevih umjetničkih tendencija prema narodu i narodnoj kulturi ključan je Brechtov tekst *Pučkost i realizam*, nastao 1938. u emigraciji, u trenutku već spomenutih rasprava oko Narodne fronte. Taj je kontekst bitno odredio putanju *Pučkosti i realizma*, kao i činjenica da je *das Volk* (narod, puk) kao termin i kao koncept zauzeo ključnu poziciju u nacističkoj ideologiji od koje se Brecht sklonio u svojem danskom azilu. Još od romantizma i konačnog učvršćivanja dotad fragmentirane nacije, podijeljene između različitih manjih ili većih vizija budućnosti koje su zapravo odražavale dinastijske geopolitičke taktike na europskoj karti, pojam *das Volk* nije samo bio puka politički neutralna i općeprimjenjiva kategorija. Od romantičarskog nacionalizma koji je svoju ornamentiku često tražio i nalazio u pučkoj prošlosti, *das Volk* pa onda i izvedenice *das Volkstum* i *volkstümlich* imale su svoje konkretne političke ostvaraje od Konzervativnog revolucionarnog pokreta dvadesetih do nacizma tridesetih. Iako danas *das Volkstum* možemo prevoditi i kao ukupnost narodne baštine, pa i kao folklor, taj je pojam ipak značajno određen svojim prvotnim organskim devetnaestostoljetnim nabojem koji je svoj vrhunac doživio kroz nacističko doslovno brojenje krvnih zrnaca i

manifestations of Expressionism and differences between, for instance, visual arts and literary forms within expressionist articulations. Another problem arises from the “national” or the issue of nations in Yugoslavia and the duality of the popular tradition in Yugoslav modernism. One approach to the issue came from the so-called “Activist Expressionism,” which is perhaps best articulated by Miroslav Krleža and August Cesarec who, in their essays – *The Croatian Literary Lie* [*Hrvatska književna laž*] by the former author, and *The Mystification of an Ethic* [*Mistifikacija jedne etike*] by the latter – clearly state that evoking the nation and national heritage through various art forms is not necessarily an expression of progressive political aspirations or the formal aspects of the art work. The second approach, adopted in Yugoslavia after World War I, was manifested through the establishment and the invention of tradition of Yugoslav nationalism – the so-called “Vidovdan ideology” – which homogenized the people around conservative principles of maintaining the monarchy and the regime. Cesarec interprets this turn to national folk tradition as the expression of nationalist (and also statist, but in all accounts – a right-wing) pathology of the myth of the Battle of Kosovo, the glorification of feudal heroism and, finally, as an obstacle in acknowledging class differences – a kind of a mechanism of hegemonic masking of certain social and, in particular, ideological contradictions.²⁴ These Cesarec’s writings reveal the range of

detaljnu antropometrijsku razradu u politici rasne higijene. Njemačko-hrvatski univerzalni rječnik donekle se drži te povijesti pojma i *das Volkstum* prevodi kao „narodno obilježje i narodno biće“, što bi bio naš najbliži ekvivalent. U tom kontekstu za Brechta pučkost (*die Volkstümlichkeit*) ima izrazito negativno značenje, zaraženo dominantnom ideologijom ili još gore – iskorišteno za pridobivanje puka na svoju stranu povijesti. U ovoj kratkoj dekonstrukciji i dekontaminaciji pojma on ukazuje na tu njegovu romantičarsku herderovsku auru svetosti i vječnosti nepromjenjivih svojstava puka sa svim njegovim običajima i navikama koja je kroz njemačku povijest iskorištena kako bi stvorila ideološku krivotvorinu apstraktnog jedinstva jednog naroda: „Povijest mnogih krivotvorenja koja su poduzimana s tim pojmom pučkosti *duga je i zamršena povijest, povijest klasnih borbi* (istaknuo M. K.). Mi se ovdje nećemo upustiti u nju. Mi samo želimo zadržati u vidu činjenicu krivotvorenja kada govorimo da nam je potrebna pučka umjetnost i time

**NARODNOOSLOBODILAČKU BORBU TREBALO
BI GLEDATI U KONTEKSTU OVOG NAŠIROKO
ELABORIRANOG ODNOSA LIJEVE MISLI
PREMA NARODU – KAO SVOJEVRSTAN
POLITIČKI I PRAKTIČNI OSTVARAJ PRIMJERICE
BRECHTOVIH I LACLAUOVIH TEZA.**

**THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION STRUGGLE
(NOB) SHOULD BE VIEWED WITHIN
THIS THOROUGHLY ELABORATED
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEFT
INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE PEOPLE – AS
A KIND OF A POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL
REALIZATION OF, FOR EXAMPLE,
BRECHT'S AND LACLAU'S THESES.**

complexities weighing on the concepts of the people and popular culture, not only in the political sense but in the sense of mediating these issues through a variety of art practices which Cesarec and Krleža primarily intended to bring across in their critiques. The most extensive critique of the “right-wing” appropriation of the people and the most coherent framing of the plebeian tradition within the left-wing art originated from the authors mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The German playwright and drama theorists Bertolt Brecht dedicated a significant portion of his writing to popular culture, as he also did in his art practice – especially in his early expressionist phase – shattering, to an extent, Lukács' thesis on left modernism as being “serious” and “estranged from the ordinary people.” Brecht's text *Popularity and Realism* from 1938, which he wrote in exile during the onset of the aforementioned debates about the Popular Front, is essential for articulating the

mislimo na umjetnost za široke mase naroda, za mnoge koje mali broj tlači, za „narode same“, za masu proizvođača, za masu koja je tako dugo bila objekt politike a koja treba da postane njen subjekt“.²⁵ Pučko, tj. narodno napokon dobiva svoj politički sadržaj i gubi statičnost koji mu je pridavala desnica postajući strukturalni element povijesti sa svim svojim kontradikcijama. Za Brechta pučko nije nužno konzervativno, atavističko i antimodernističko, nego kao što Gramsci primjećuje, upravo ambivalentno, s jedne strane kontaminirano time da uvijek predstavlja neki fiksirani, „fosilizirani sloj“ prošlosti, a s druge strane napredni spontani oblik života koji je toliko zaokupio Brechta i njegov kazališni rad²⁶. Iz tog iskustva rada s *pukom* donosi svoje zaključke, a na klasične građanske optužbe o primitivnosti odgovara da je riječ o svakako drugačijoj vrsti primitivnosti od one od koje pate buržoaski umjetnici, a „ne čini se dobro da se odbacuje jedan stil prikazivanja zbog nekoliko nesretnih stilizacija, i to stil koji nastoji da izljušti bitno i omogući apstrakciju“.²⁷ Za Brechta ni pučkost ni realizam nisu normativne opisne estetske kategorije, nego određena formalna sredstva koja se mijenjaju ovisno o onome što bi se moglo prikazati te što bi se i kako moglo razumjeti. Drugim riječima, dio retorike koja ne bježi ni od vlastitoga populističkog aspekta i apela u vremenu krize. Brechtova nam je argumentacija važna iz nekoliko razloga. Prvo – kako bi se jasno raščistili odnosi politike, estetike i naroda kao pojma koji je u jednom povijesnom „teškom vremenu“ i

relationship of the left tendencies in art toward the people and popular culture. The context in which it was written significantly determined the tone of *Popularity and Realism*, together with the fact that *das Volk* (the people) as a term and concept came to occupy the central position in Nazi ideology from which Brecht fled into exile to Denmark. Since Romanticism and the final consolidation of the hitherto fragmented nation, divided between various smaller and larger projections for the future which actually reflected the dynastic geopolitical tactics on the map of Europe, the concept of *das Volk* was not merely a politically neutral and all-encompassing category. From national romanticism which often sought and found its ornamentation in the popular past, *das Volk* and its derivatives *das Volkstum* and *volkstümlich* were politically actualized in the Conservative Revolutionary movement in the 1920s and Nazism in the 1930s. Although nowadays *das Volkstum* is translated as the totality of national heritage and even as folklore, this term is still essentially filled with its original nineteenth-century organic charge which culminated with the Nazis literally counting blood cells and the detailed anthropometric development within the politics of racial hygiene. The German-Croatian dictionary acknowledges that history of the term to an extent, translating *das Volkstum* as “national characteristic and national identity” which corresponds to its nearest equivalent in Croatian.

vremenu krize zaokupio i umjetnike i teoretičare, ali nerijetko – tek lapidarno. Te drugo – da bismo pokazali da modernistički formalni aspekti, poput npr. montaže ili specifične semiotike tijela²⁸ (koja je vođena sličnim principima kao i montaža u filmu) nisu nastali u historijskom vakuumu i eksperimentalnim uvjetima visokog modernizma, nego s jasnim političkim, dugoročnim agitacijskim i didaktičkim ciljem revolucije (percepcije) uz jasnu pripadnosti političkoj ljevici,²⁹ što je pokazao i Brecht svojim radom i upravo navedenim fragmentom o narodnoj, odnosno pučkoj umjetnosti. Drugim riječima, ona klasična podjela na formalistički modernizam odvojen od trenutačnih političkih potreba naroda i lišen neke vrste populističke apelativnosti nasuprot tendencioznom socrealizmu političke linije Kominterne tobože bliskom narodu i njegovoj percepciji umjetnosti – ne stoji, kao što ne stoji ni perspektiva binarnog pogleda na umjetnosti tog doba. Skloniji sam opisnim terminima umjetničke produkcije toga vremena koju, primjerice, Fredric Jameson naziva

U SLUČAJU PARTIZANSKE BORBE TI SPECIFIČNI GOVORNI ŽANROVI MOŽDA SU NAJVIŠE DO IZRAŽAJA DOŠLI U KAZALIŠNOM RADU, JER JE TO IMPROVIZIRANO KAZALIŠTE U „IMPROVIZIRANOJ“ REVOLUCIJIIMALO SVOJU JASNU APELACIJSKU I POLITIČKU FUNKCIJU, A DA PRITOM NIJE BILO LIŠENO ELEMENATA (NEČISTOGA) MODERNISTIČKOG JEZIKA.

IN THE CASE OF THE PARTISAN STRUGGLE, THESE SPECIFIC GENRES OF SPEECH WERE PERHAPS MOST PRONOUNCED IN THEATRE WORK BECAUSE THIS IMPROVISED THEATRE WITHIN THE “IMPROVISED” REVOLUTION HAD A CLEAR APPELLATE AND POLITICAL FUNCTION, WITHOUT BEING DEVOID OF ELEMENTS OF (IMPURE) MODERNIST LANGUAGE.

In this context, popularity (*die Volkstümlichkeit*) for Brecht holds an extremely negative meaning, infected by the dominant ideology or even worse – used to lure the people to side with their version of history. In this brief deconstruction and decontamination of the term, Brecht points to its romantic Herderian aura of sacredness and the eternal and immutable properties of the people – with all their customs and habits – which have been exploited throughout German history in order to create an ideological falsification of an abstract unity of one nation: “The history of all the falsifications that have operated with this conception of *Volkstum* is a long and complex story that is part of the history of the class struggle. We shall not embark on it but shall simply keep in mind the fact of such forgery whenever we speak of our need for popular art, meaning art for the broad masses of people, for the many oppressed by the few, ‘the people proper’, the mass of producers, that has so

„nečistom estetikom“ modernizma koja u tako „gustim“ i „teškim vremenima“ biva „inficirana“ i plebejstvom koje gradi povijest.³⁰

Zaboravljena pretpovijest eksperimenta

Narodnooslobodilačku borbu, kao što sam već ranije dao naslutiti u uvodu i kroz nekoliko tekstualnih *intermezza* o NOB-u, trebalo bi gledati u kontekstu ovog naširoko elaboriranog odnosa lijeve misli prema narodu – kao svojevrsan politički i praktični ostvaraj primjerice Brechtovih i Laclauovih teza. U tom ratu narod postaje protagonist jedne „improvizirane revolucije“ kojoj nije prethodila dugotrajna analitika kao u sovjetskom slučaju, nego je bila neposredna i trenutačna.³¹ Njezino „narodnjaštvo“ i „frontaštvo“ do te je mjere poštivano da vrhovništvo Komunističke partije „nije bilo otvoreno prikazivano, nego tek naznačeno“.³² A narod koji je postao temeljni protagonist i nositelj revolucije „nije bio herderovski etnički skup ujedinjen jezikom i povijesnom tradicijom“ koji sam već ranije istakao kao metu Cesarčeve, Krležine i Brechtove kritike.³³ Ovaj narod-protagonist u *impromptu*-revoluciji, iako rođen u kriznim i teškim vremenima, ne mogu osloboditi karakteristike svojevrsne *ludičnosti* koja je u modernim revalorizacijama postala karakteristika *općeg naroda* i njegove kulture (Bahtin, Huizinga, Burke). Kroz tu narodnu revoluciju stvorio se „poseban vid općenja“, odnosno posebni „žanrovi govora“ koje Bahtin

long been the object of politics while it should have been its subject.”²⁵ The popular, i.e. the folk, finally acquired its political content and lost its static quality imposed from the right, thus becoming a structural element of history with all its contradictions. For Brecht, *the popular* is not necessarily conservative, atavistic or anti-modernist but, as Gramsci noted, it is ambivalent. On the one hand, it is contaminated by its predicament to always represent some fixed and “fossilized strata” of the past, while on the other hand, it represents the progressive and spontaneous form of life which is what engrossed Brecht and his theatre work.²⁶ It is on the basis of his experience of working with *the people* that he drew his conclusions, while, to the classic bourgeois accusations of primitivism, he responded that this certainly was a different kind of primitivism than the one which ailed the bourgeois artists. Moreover, “it does not do us any good to reject one representational style on the merits of few unfortunate stylizations, while it is the same style which strives to unveil what is important and enable abstraction.”²⁷ For Brecht, popularity and realism were not normative descriptive aesthetic categories, but rather specific formal devices which change depending on what could be represented and what and how it could be understood. In other words, they belong to a rhetoric which does not shy away from its own populist aspect and appellation in the times of crisis. ……… Brecht’s arguments are important to us for several reasons.

inače prišiva kriznim vremenima smjehovne kulture renesanse i srednjeg vijeka.³⁴ U slučaju partizanske borbe ti specifični govorni žanrovi možda su najviše do izražaja došli u kazališnom radu, jer je to improvizirano kazalište u „improviziranoj“ revoluciji imalo svoju jasnu apelacijsku i političku funkciju, a da pritom nije bilo lišeno elemenata (nečistoga) modernističkog jezika. O tome da agitacijsko i populističko kazalište u jeku

PLEBEJSKI I GERILSKI ASPEKT TOG KAZALIŠTA, KOJI STALNO POTENCIRA I DARKO SUVIN, U NAKNADNIM SE VALORIZACIJAMA IZGUBIO, OSTAJUĆI (TEK) ZABILJEŽEN KROZ RAD JEDNOG KAZALIŠNOG AUTORA KOJEM OVIM ZAKLJUČKOM POSVEĆUJEM POZORNOST, NEPRAVEDNO IZOSTALU U DOMAĆOJ TEATROLOGIJI. RIJEČ JE O BOGDANU JERKOVIĆU KOJI SE U SVOJOJ REPLICI TIJEKOM RAZGOVORA ZA TEMAT PROLOGA (BR. 27 I 28) IZ 1976. ZALAŽE ZA „ČVRSTO DRUŠTVENO I JASNO ORIJENTIRANO KAZALIŠTE“ KOJE PREDSTAVLJA „KOLEKTIVIZACIJU CIJELE GRUPE“ I „SPAJANJE DVIJU SREDINA: RADNIČKE I KAZALIŠNE – A KOJE SE MEĐUSOBNO POTPUNO NE POZNAJU“ DOK ONI „KOJI STVARAJU PREDSTAVU IMAJU ISTE PROBLEME KOJE IMA I DRUŠTVO U KOJEM DJELUJU“.

THE PLEBEIAN AND GUERRILLA ASPECT OF THIS THEATRE, WHICH DARKO SUVIN ARDENTLY EMPHASIZES, DISAPPEARED FROM SUBSEQUENT VALORISATIONS, PRESERVED (ONLY) IN THE WORK OF ONE THEATRE AUTHOR TO WHOM I PAY ATTENTION IN THIS CONCLUSION – THE ATTENTION THAT THE NATIONAL THEATRE STUDIES HAVE UNJUSTLY DENIED HIM. I AM TALKING ABOUT BOGDAN JERKOVIĆ WHO, IN HIS RESPONSE IN THE INTERVIEW FOR THE FEATURE ARTICLE IN PROLOG (NO. 27/28) IN 1976, ADVOCATED FOR “A STRONGLY AND CLEARLY SOCIALLY ORIENTED THEATRE” WHICH REPRESENTS “THE COLLECTIVISATION OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE” AND “CONNECTS THE TWO GROUPS: THE WORKERS AND THEATRE MEMBERS – WHO ARE COMPLETELY UNFAMILIAR WITH ONE ANOTHER”, WHILE THOSE “WHO CREATE PLAYS SHARE THE SAME PROBLEMS WITH THE SOCIETY IN WHICH THEY WORK.”

First of all – in order to clarify the relationship between politics, aesthetics and the people as a concept which, at one “desperate time” in history, caught the artists’ and theorists’ attention, but often – only tersely. Second of all – in order to show that the formalist aspects of modernism, e.g. montage and the semiotics of the body²⁸ (guided by similar principles as film montage) have not been created in a historical vacuum and under experimental

rata nije gubilo vlastite avangardne elemente svjedoči iskaz glumca Braslava Borozana, sudionika tzv. Kazališta narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije: „To kazalište se zaista dešavalo na avangardni način među partizanskom publikom, kao dio njenog vlastitog dnevnog života, inkorporirano tako da je odražavalo subjekt i objekt bez distance što je stvara pozornica sa zavjesom i rampom. Prema tome partizanska publika nije *doživljavala* kazalište, nego je s njim programatski *živjela*. Jer, shvatimo, nikakvo kazalište u ratu nije moglo biti dramatičnije od samog rata, a tragični patos se u stvarnosti uzdizao do svenarodnog bola koji je obuzimao cjelokupnu osjećajnost čovjekovu.“³⁵ Ono što je boljka takvog „plebejskog“ kazališta, a posebice u ratnim uvjetima, njegova je povijest koja ostaje nezapisana pa danas o ovom tipu kazališta možemo govoriti tek na osnovi ovakvih polumemoarskih iskaza glumaca ili drugih sudionika u radu različitih agitprop divizija koji se prisjećaju „improviziranog gerilskog teatra kratkih formi, s mnogo pjesme i plesa, ali i kratkih skečeva.“³⁶ Tako se i naša teatrologija površno mogla baviti ovim razdobljem domaćeg kazališta, ne nalazeći u njemu političke i estetičke aspekte koji bi ga svrstali uz liniju razvoja domaćega eksperimentalnog kazališta koje svoj vrhunac doživljava tijekom sedamdesetih i osamdesetih, a u naknadnim mu se interpretacijama daju korijeni iz prijeratnih

conditions of high modernism, but with a clear political, long-term agitational and didactic goal of bringing about the revolution (of perception) with a clear affiliation with the political left,²⁹ which Brecht demonstrated in his work and in the above-cited extract about the people’s, i.e. popular art. In other words, the classical division into formalist modernism divorced from the current political needs of the people and devoid of any kind of populist appellation *versus* tendentious Socialist Realism associated with the policy of the Comintern and supposedly closer to people and their perception of art – cannot be sustained, and neither can the binary approach to art of that period. Personally, I prefer the more descriptive terms of the art production of that time which, for example, Fredric Jameson calls “the impure aesthetics” of modernism which in such “dense” and “desperate times” got “infected,” while the plebeians were those who made history happen.³⁰

The Forgotten Prehistory of the Experiment

The People’s Liberation Struggle (NOB), as I have already suggested in the introduction and the textual *intermezzos* on the NOB, should be viewed within this thoroughly elaborated relationship between the left intelligentsia and the people – as a kind of a political and practical realization of, for example, Brecht’s and Laclau’s theses. During that war, the people

avangardnih praksi.³⁷ Pritom se i u kazališnim praksama i njihovim sistematizacijama i analizama zanemaruju epizode partizanskog kazališta dijelom i zbog eksplicitne političke obojenosti i populizma, a vjerojatno i nedodirljivog statusa koji je Narodnooslobodilački rat zauzeo u novoj državi, zajedno s pripadajućim organizacijama poput SUBNOR-a, što je mnogim sudionicima u eksperimentalnim kazališnim pokušajima, pretpostavljam, bilo odbojno.³⁸

Plebejski i gerilski aspekt tog kazališta, koji stalno potencira i Darko Suvin, u naknadnim se valorizacijama izgubio, ostajući (tek) zabilježen kroz rad jednog kazališnog autora kojem ovim zaključkom posvećujem pozornost, nepravedno izostalu u domaćoj teatrologiji. Riječ je o Bogdanu Jerkoviću koji se u svojoj replici tijekom razgovora za temat *Prologa* (br. 27 i 28) iz 1976. zalaže za „čvrsto društveno i jasno orijentirano kazalište“ koje predstavlja „kolektivizaciju cijele grupe“ i „spajanje dviju sredina: radničke i kazališne – a koje se međusobno potpuno ne poznaju“ dok oni „koji stvaraju predstavu imaju iste probleme koje ima i društvo u kojem djeluju“.³⁹ Povodom smrti Bogdana Jerkovića, koji ove rečenice izgovora dok vodi kazališnu grupu u ondašnjoj tvornici Končara, Darko Suvin reći će: „cijeli je život bio naprosto tabuiziran od glavnih hrvatskih teatar, kao periferički ekscentrik sumnjive vrijednosti“.⁴⁰ Međutim „u terminima teatarske povijesti, to je linija za koju se može pretpostaviti da vuče korijen (da

ne idemo u plemenske spektakle) iz helenskih satirskih igara, italičkih atellanskih farsi, srednjovjekovnog teatra misterija i mirakula, te kulminira u plebejskom humanizmu Renesanse, a zatim, nakon njenog poraza, u fabularno i agenski šabloniziranoj, ali gestovno i mimički rafiniranoj *commedia dell'arte*“.⁴¹ Ta umjetnička linija, ali i politička pozicija koja se iza nje krije, potpuno je zaboravljena u domaćem eksperimentalnom kazalištu koje je velikim dijelom depolitizirano ili su mu se, čak, adekvatno pronašli temelji u građanskom kazalištu između dva svjetska rata.⁴² Plebejsko je nasljeđe potpuno zaboravljeno, kao i njegovo ostvarenje u najvećoj nekazališnoj improvizaciji naših naroda i narodnosti – Drugom svjetskom ratu čije se kazalište doživljava kao isključivo populističko i tendenciozno – ali bez umjetničke tendencije.

**TA UMJETNIČKA LINIJA, ALI I POLITIČKA
POZICIJA KOJA SE IZA NJE KRIJE,
POTPUNO JE ZABORAVLJENA U DOMAĆEM
EKSPERIMENTALNOM KAZALIŠTU KOJE JE
VELIKIM DIJELOM DEPOLITIZIRANO ILI SU
MU SE, ČAK, ADEKVATNO PRONAŠLI TEMELJI
U GRAĐANSKOM KAZALIŠTU IZMEĐU DVA
SVJETSKA RATA.**

became the protagonists of this “improvised revolution” which was not preceded by lengthy analytics as in the case of the Soviets, but it was rather direct and instantaneous.³¹ Its “popular-frontist” principles were honoured to the extent that the leadership of the Communist Party “was never openly presented, but merely implied.”³² While the people who have become the main protagonists and the torchbearers of the revolution “were not Herder’s ethnic group unified under the common language and historical tradition,” the concept which was, as I have already stated, heavily criticised by Krleža, Brecht and Cesarec.³³ Although born out of a crisis and desperate times, this people-protagonist could not discharge its ludic quality within this *impromptu*-revolution – a quality which has been viewed as characteristic of the *common people* and their culture in its modern revaluations (Bakhtin, Huizinga, Burke). “A particular kind of communication,” that is, the particular “genres of speech” – which Bakhtin usually attributed to the times of crisis within the culture of laughter during the Renaissance and the Middle Ages³⁴ – were developed within this people’s revolution. In the case of the Partisan struggle, these specific genres of speech were perhaps most pronounced in theatre work because this improvised theatre within the “improvised” revolution had a clear appellate and political function, without being devoid of elements of (impure)

modernist language. The statement of the actor Broslav Borozan, the participant of the so-called People’s Liberation Theatre of Yugoslavia, supports the claim that the agitation and populist theatre in the midst of war did not lose its avant-garde elements: “This theatre was truly realized in an avant-garde way among the partisan audience, as a part of their daily lives; it was incorporated in such a way that it reflected the subject and the object without the distance created by a stage with a curtain and ramp. Therefore, the partisan audience did not *experience* theatre, but they programmatically *lived* with it. Because, you have to understand, no theatre which existed during the war could have been a match to the drama of war, while the tragic pathos of reality which ascended to the nationwide pain engrossed all human emotions.”³⁵

¹ Kao primjer uzimimo leksikografsku natuknicu *populizam* u Hrvatskoj enciklopediji gdje nailazimo na konkretno navođenje povijesnih primjera populističkih pokreta (koji se često izostavljaju u stručnim tekstovima o populizmu) uz isticanje populističkih karakteristika protivljenja „dominaciji elita“ te zastupanje „poboljšanja socioekonomskoga položaja srednjih i nižih klasa“; izvor: <http://www.enciklopedija.hr/Natuknica.aspx?ID=49512> (zadnji pregled: 1. travnja 2015.). I u ovom lapidarnom slučaju ekstrakcije u cilju kratke bibliografske jedinice dolazi do generalizacije ili jednostranog prišivanja populizma isključivo „antidemokratskim, rasističkim i nacionalističkim usmjerenjima“ (ibid.) ili pak u današnjem europskom političkom kontekstu „radikalno desnim strankama“. Riječ je gotovo o tendenciji u europskoj politologiji da se „većina znanstvene literature o populizmu bavi tim fenomenom na (radikalno) desnoj strani političkog spektra“ (Augustin Derado, „Populizam i kriza demokracije“, u: *Amalgam. Časopis studenata sociologije*, br. 6-7, 2014). O drugoj vrsti „manjkavosti“, odnosno generalizacije u bilješci (3).

² Kao inicijalni trenutak aktualiziranja ove teme u političkoj teoriji uzima se ipak nešto raniji datum i konferencija na fakultetu London School of Economics održana 1967. (više o tome u: Ghita Ionescu i Ernest Gellner (ur.), *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, London, Macmillan, 1969). Kasnija aktualizacija populizma u raspravama povezana je s postmarksističkim i poststrukturalističkim teorijskim tendencijama, a kao mjesto njihova raspramsaja i aplikacije uzimaju se izborni uspjesi (relativno) lijevih političkih pokreta u Južnoj Americi, od bolivarizma u Venezueli do lijevog peronizma (kirhnerizma) u Argentini i odnedavno slične tendencije u europskim zemljama teže zahvaćenima krizom i mjerama štednje. Više o tome u Cas Mudde i Cristóbal, „Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America“, *Government and Opposition*, god. 48, br. 2, 2012, Cambridge University Press, London, 147-174.

³ Citat preuzet iz teksta Nenada Zakoška „Zauzdani populizam: fenomen Milana Bandića“ u: *Političke analize*, god. 1, br. 1, 6-10. Kao jedan od recentnih

primjera navodim i raspravu između Catherine Fieschi i Phillippea Marlièrea na mrežnoj stranici [opendemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net). Izvori: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/catherine-fieschi/plague-on-both-your-populisms>, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/philippe-marli%C3%A8re/demophobes-and-great-fear-of-populism>, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/philippe-marli%C3%A8re/populism-and-enchanted-world-of-%E2%80%98moderate-politics%E2%80%99> (zadnji pregled: 10. travnja 2015.).

⁴ Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, New York, Macmillan, 1896, str. 109. Riječ je o drugoj studiji Le Bonova ciklusa bavljenja „narodnim masama“ i političkim pojavama 19. stoljeća. Nakon *Psihologije naroda* (1894) i spomenute *Psihologije gomila*, slijedi *Psihologija socijalizma* (1896) te u konačnici *Francuska revolucija i psihologija revolucije* (1910). Knjige su ubrzo nakon izlaska u Francuskoj bile prevedene na svjetske jezike s obzirom na „aktualnost teme“. Ostaje zanimljiv izdavački podatak da je *Psihologija revolucije* svoje prvo izdanje na ovim prostorima imala 1919., a *Psihologija gomila* godinu dana poslije, upravo u vremenu uspješnih i neuspješnih revolucija poslije Prvog svjetskog rata.

⁵ Usp. Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Socialism*, New York, Macmillan, 1899, str. 51.

⁶ „The grande peur of the nineteenth-century social sciences“ (prev. M. K.) u: Ernesto Laclau, *On populist reason*, London, Verso, 2005, str. 19.

⁷ Usp. Ernesto Laclau, *On populist reason*, London, Verso, 2005, str. 6. Riječ je o zadnjoj Laclauovoj knjizi o ovoj temi kojom se počeo baviti još u ranijem dijelu svojega opusa tekstem „Towards a Theory of Populism“, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, New Left Books, 1977. U njemu donosi sličnu kritiku, ali tada aktualnih rasprava o argentinskom (i općenito latinskoameričkom) populizmu.

⁸ Ibid. 4.

⁹ Američki populizam javlja se kao reakcija na tešku ekonomsku i socijalnu situaciju kojom je posebno bilo pogođeno agrarno područje Juga SAD-a i Velike nizine. Riječ je o vremenu nagle industrijalizacije, smanjenja cijena hrane odnosno poljoprivrednih proizvoda, ali povećanja troškova proizvodnje i rasta

The problem of such a “plebeian” theatre, especially in wartime, was that its history remained unwritten, so today, our examination of this type of theatre is limited to the almost autobiographical testimonies of actors and other participants of various agitprop divisions who recall “the improvised guerrilla theatre of short forms, with an abundance of song and dance, as well as short sketches.”³⁶ Thus, these circumstances enabled theatre studies to superficially address this period of our national theatre without finding any political or aesthetic aspects that would have connected it with the development of national experimental theatre – in its heydays during the nineteen-seventies and eighties – while, in subsequent interpretations, its origins have been ascribed to the pre-war avant-garde practices.³⁷ In addition, the partisan theatre is also disregarded in theatre practice and excluded from its systematizations and analysis partly because of its explicit political proclivities and populism, and probably partly because of the irreproachable status held by the People’s Liberation War within the new state, together with its respective organizations such as the Associations of Battlemen of the People’s Liberation War (SUBNOR), which many participants in the experimental theatre – I suppose – found reprehensible.³⁸ The plebeian and guerrilla aspect of this theatre, which Darko Suvin ardently emphasizes, disappeared from subsequent valorisations,

preserved (only) in the work of one theatre author to whom I pay attention in this conclusion – the attention that the national theatre studies have unjustly denied him. I am talking about Bogdan Jerković who, in his response in the interview for the feature article in *Prolog* (No. 27/28) in 1976, advocated for “a strongly and clearly socially oriented theatre” which represents “the collectivisation of the group as a whole” and “connects the two groups: the workers and theatre members – who are completely unfamiliar with one another,” while those “who create plays share the same problems with the society in which they work.”³⁹ On the occasion of Bogdan Jerković’s death, who uttered these sentences while leading a theatre group in the former Končar factory, Darko Suvin said: “He was tabooed his whole life from all major Croatian theatres and considered as a peripheral eccentric of questionable worth.”⁴⁰ However, “in terms of the history of theatre, it can be assumed that this tendency in art is rooted in (not to broach the subject of tribal spectacles) Hellenic satyr plays, Italic Atellan farces, Medieval mystery and miracle plays, culminating in the plebeian humanism of the Renaissance, and after its decline, in commedia dell’arte with its stock characters and themes, but refined in gestures and mimicry.”⁴¹ This tendency in art, but also the political orientation which hides behind it, have been completely forgotten within the national experimental theatre

kreditne zaduženosti malih poljoprivrednih gospodarstava. To je kao rezultat imalo pauperizirano i proletarizirano selo američkog Juga. U tom se kontekstu na dvostranačkom američkom političkom polju pojavljuje populistička stranka, odnosno People's Party, koja se uspijeva nametnuti kao treći stranački faktor otvorenom kritikom banaka, retorikom koja se temelji na stilskim figurama antiteze poput: bankari/korporacije *versus* poljoprivrednici (u američkom slučaju pojam seljak ne opstoji u političkom diskursu) i radnici (više u: Howard Zinn, *A People's History of The United States*, New York, Harper Perennial, 2001., 286-297 i Kenneth Minogue, „Populism as a Political Movement“, u: Ghita Ionescu i Ernest Gellner (ur.), *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, London, Macmillan, 1969., str. 208.

¹⁰ Laclau, *Politics and Ideology*, 175.

¹¹ Ibid. 174.

¹² Usp. Darko Suvin, *Samo jednom se ljubi: Radiografija SFR Jugoslavije*, Beograd, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Beograd, 2014, str. 314.

¹³ Ibid. 317.

¹⁴ Ne treba izostaviti da Brangwyn radi ovaj mural za vrijeme vlasti populističkog gradonačelnika Tommyja Johnsona u industrijskom gradu s izraženom socijalističkom tradicijom i sindikalnim pokretom. Više u: Peter Linebaugh, „Icon and Ideal“ u: *The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008, 195-196.

¹⁵ Izvor: <http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/komentari/311184/Je-li-Hrvatska-jedina-drzava-s-predsjednikom-duhom.html>; (zadnji pregled: 10. travnja 2015.) i <http://www.jutarnji.hr/kolinda-iz-kabinet-a-maknula-jakog-murtica-i-stavila-vedrog-sebalja/1336608/> (zadnji pregled: 24. travnja 2015.)

¹⁶ O tome da ovo „seljački“ treba shvatiti uvjetno i da je doista bila riječ o jednoj širokoj pobuni „nižih slojeva“ govori i podatak da su se umjetnici tog razdoblja aktivno svrstali na „plebejsku“ stranu i postajali dio te „mase“. O napuštanju „umjetničkih laboratorija“ i odlasku u rat tijekom šesnaestog stoljeća ekstenzivno piše talijanski povjesničar umjetnosti Paolo Thea u *Gli artisti e Gli „Spregeveli“*. 1525: *la creazione artistica e la guerra dei contadini in Germania*, Milano, Mimesi, 1998.

¹⁷ Prema: Silvia Federici, *Kaliban i veštica. Žene, telo i prvobitna akumulacija*, Beograd, Burevesnik, 2013, 82. i 83.

¹⁸ Bertolt Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre*, ur. John Willett, London, Methuen, 1964, str. 252.

¹⁹ Prijevod na engleski doprinosu taj raspravi uz kritički komentar Fredrica Jamesona (ur.) u Theodor Adorno i sur., *Aesthetics and Politics*, London/New York, Verso, 1977.

²⁰ Osnovni je razlog i institucionalni gubitak interesa za ovaj dio naše povijesti, zatim činjenica da nije riječ o politički neutralnom problemu te u konačnici postpolitičko razumijevanje totalitarizma kao narativa o dva zla: nacističkom i komunističkom, čime pisanje o posljednjem nije akademski profitabilno pa makar bila riječ o kazalištu.

²¹ Ibid. 14.

²² Ibid. 24.

²³ Ibid. 26.

²⁴ Usp. August Cesarec, *Rasprave, članci, polemike: nacionalni, socijalni i kulturni problemi Jugoslavije*, Zagreb, Zora, 1971, str. 37.

²⁵ Bertolt Brecht, *Dijalektika u teatru*, Beograd, Nolit, 1979, str. 177.

²⁶ Usp. Antonio Gramsci, „Bilješke o folkloru“ u: *Folkloristička čitanka*, Zagreb, AGM, 2010, str. 61.

²⁷ Brecht, *Dijalektika*, 181.

²⁸ Pritom mislim prije svega na rad Sergeja Eizenštajna i njegov razvoj montažnih postupaka, što je postalo temeljno formalno-jezično sredstvo svih žanrova lijeve avangarde, uključujući i Bertolta Brechta, na koga se odnosi druga aluzija. Kroz svoj tu teoriju gestusa Brecht razvija specifičnu teoriju glume i semiotike tijela. Iako mu je prvotni izvor inspiracije ipak pekinška opera i azijsko kazalište, njegovo je shvaćanje pučkosti uvelike utjecalo i na tematiku njegovih drama, ali i ovaj teorijsko-dramaturški aspekt.

²⁹ Fredric Jameson, „Reflections in Conclusion“ u: Theodor Adorno i sur., *Aesthetics and Politics*, London/New York, 1977, str. 207.

³⁰ „Impure aesthetics“, u: Fredric Jameson, *Brecht and Method*, London/New York, Verso, 1999, str. 4.

which has, in turn, been largely depoliticised. Moreover, its origins have been conveniently identified in bourgeois theatre between the two World Wars.⁴² Its plebeian legacy has been completely forgotten, as well as its achievement in the largest non-theatrical improvisation ever staged by our people and nations – the Second World War, whose theatre is considered purely populist and tendentious, having no artistic tendencies.

¹ Let us take, for example, the lexicographic entry on *populism* in the Croatian encyclopaedia which mentions concrete historical examples of populist movements (which are often omitted from academic texts on populism), and emphasises the characteristics of populism such as opposing the “domination of the elites” and advocating for “the improvement of socioeconomic circumstances of the middle and lower classes”, source: <http://www.enciklopedija.hr/Natuknica.aspx?ID=49512> (Accessed on April 1, 2015). Even in this succinct excerpt written with the intention of creating a short bibliographic entry, there is a generalized and unilateral ascription of populism to exclusively “anti-democratic, racist and nationalist orientations” (ibid.), or in today’s European political context, to the “radical right-wing parties.” We can even consider it a tendency in European political science that “most of the scientific literature on populism deals with this phenomenon only within the (radical) right of the political spectrum” (Augustin Derado, “Populizam i kriza demokracije” in *Amalgam* - the magazine of sociology students, Vol. 6-7, 2014). On the other kind of “deficiency” or generalization see note (3).

² A somewhat earlier date and the conference held at the London School of Economics in 1967, can be considered as the initial moment of this issue’s inception into political theory (see more in: Ghita Ionescu & Ernest Gellner (eds.), *Populism:*

Its Meanings and National Characteristics, London Macmillan, 1969). The later revival of populism is tied to the discussions related to post-Marxist and post-structuralist theoretical tendencies. Its reignition and application accompanied the electoral successes of the (relatively) left-wing political movements in South America: from Bolivarianism in Venezuela to the left-wing Peronism left (Kirchnerism) in Argentina and, more recently, the similar tendencies appeared in the European countries severely affected by the crisis and austerity measures. See more in: Cas Mudde & Cristóbal, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America”, *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2012, Cambridge University Press, London, pp. 147-174.

³ Quote from Nenad Zakošek’s text, “Zauzdani populizam: fenomen Milana Bandića” in *Političke analize*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 6-10. As one of the more recent examples, we should mention the discussion between Catherine Fieschi and Philippe Marlière on the website opendemocracy.net. Sources: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/philippe-marli%C3%A8re/demophobes-and-great-fear-of-populism>, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/catherine-fieschi/who%E2%80%99s-afraid-of-populist-wolf>, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/philippe-marli%C3%A8re/populism-and-enchanted-world-of-%E2%80%98moderate-politics%E2%80%99> (Accessed on April 10, 2015).

⁴ Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, New York, Macmillan, 1896, p. 109. This is the second study from Le Bon’s series on “popular masses” and the 19th century political phenomena. After the publication of *The Psychology of Peoples* (1894) and the aforementioned *The Crowd*, he also published *The Psychology of Socialism* (1986) and, finally, *The French Revolution and the Psychology of Revolution* (1910). After their release in France, the books were translated into other world languages because they dealt with “topical issues.” An interesting publication detail is that *The Psychology of Revolution* was first published in this region in 1919, while *The Crowd* was released a year later, during the successful and unsuccessful revolutions following the First World War.

⁵ Cf. Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Socialism*, New York, Macmillan, 1899, p. 51.

⁶ “the *grande peur* of the nineteenth-century social sciences” (trans. M.K.) in Ernesto Laclau, *On populist reason*, London, Verso, 2005, p. 19.

³¹ ibid. Suvin, 315.

³² ibid. 316.

³³ Usp. Boris Buden, „Još o komunističkim krvolicima...“ u: *Prelom*, br. 3-4, 2003, 51-57.

³⁴ Usp. Mihail Bahtin, *Stvaralaštvo Fransoa Rablea: i narodna kultura srednjega veka i renesanse*, Beograd, Nolit, 1978, str. 18. U ovom je kontekstu instruktivno i čitanje Petera Linebaugha koji se pišući o povijesti jednog praznika iz lijeve tradicije – Prvog maja, poziva i na njegove pretkapitalističke temelje u slavlju plodnosti, vegetacije i proljeća – uz jak izvedbeni element kroz likove Jack-in-the-Greena i Kraljice maja. Razvojem kapitalizma slavlje postaje progon, a progon postaje klika otpora koja se na kraju i ostvaruje kroz povijesno ustoličenje Prvog maja kao simbola borbe masa za bolje životne i radne uvjete. Tako da ono što je prvotno nastalo kao vitalističko narodno slavlje nije nužno nevezano uz otpore mase u novim povijesnim slučajevima – pa tako i ovdje; Peter Linebaugh, *The Incomplete, True, Authentic and Wonderful History of MAY DAY*, izvor: <http://www.midnightnotes.org/mayday/green.html> (zadnji pregled: 14. travnja 2015.)

³⁵ Braslav Borozan, „Avangardno i inovacije u kazalištu NOB-a“, u: *Dani Hrvatskog kazališta: Hrvatska dramska književnost i kazalište od predratnih revolucionarnih previranja do 1955.*, Split, Književni krug, 1983., str. 48.

³⁶ Iskaz Jure Kaštelana, prema Suvin, 316.

³⁷ Usp. Marin Blažević, *Izborni poraz: novo kazalište u hrvatskom glumištu od Gavelle do...*, Zagreb, Disput, 2012.

³⁸ O heterogenosti i kontradikcijama (s obzirom na vrijedeće politike i poredak) domaćega eksperimentalnog kazališta možda najbolje govori prvi temat priređen u njihovu čast u časopisu *Prolog*, br. 27 i 28, 1976, str. 5-12.

³⁹ ibid.

⁴⁰ Darko Suvin, *O Bogdanu, o sjećanju, o teatru kao utopijskoj radosti*, Gordogan, br. 25, 2010.

⁴¹ ibid.

⁴² U pregledu temelja hrvatskoga novog kazališta, eksperimentalne i avangardističke temelje tog kazališta, Blažević vidi prvenstveno u radu Branka

Gavelle. Darko Suvin pak u svojem nekrologu Bogdanu Jerkoviću upravo smatra da je gavelizam hrvatskog kazališta priječio razvoj mladih glumaca nakon povratka iz amaterskog partizanskog kazališta: „To nije bila jedna od mnogih škola, nego isključivi put kojim je mladi glumac (nakon spontanog partizansko-amaterskog vala, iz kojeg su došla neka od naših najboljih glumačkih imena) mogao ući u hrvatske teatre, dakle stopostotni monopol. Tu se radi o dobroj austrijsko-apsolutističkoj tradiciji po kojoj je svaka škola bila stup režima (jer su škole tradicionalno bile za izabrane koji će sutra biti dio vladajuće klase, najviši srednji ili niži)“, ibid. 201.

⁷ Cf. Ernesto Laclau, *On populist reason*, London, Verso, 2005, p. 6. This is the last Laclau's book on this subject which he already tackled within the earlier part of his oeuvre, i.e. in the text “Towards a Theory of Populism”, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, New Left Books, 1977, where he provided a similar critique on the, then current, debates concerning the Argentinian (and Latin American, in general) populism.

⁸ Ibid. 4.

⁹ The American populism arose in response to the difficult economic and social circumstances, which particularly affected the agricultural South of the United States and the Great Plains. This was the period of rapid and intensive industrialization, reducing the costs of food and agricultural products, while increasing the production costs and the growth of indebtedness of small farms. In result, the American South was pauperized and proletarianized. In this context, within the US two-party system, the populist party or the People's Party emerged and managed to impose itself as a third party option with its outspoken criticism of banks utilizing the antithetical rhetorical devices such as: bankers/corporations *versus* farmers (in the US, the term *peasant* does not exist in the political discourse) and workers (see more in: Howard Zinn, *A People's History of The United States*, New York, Harper Perennial, 2001., 286-297 and Kenneth Minogue, “Populism as a Political Movement” in Ghita Ionescu & Ernest Gellner (ed.), *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 208).

¹⁰ in: Laclau, *Politics and Ideology*, 175.

¹¹ Ibid. 174.

¹² Cf. Darko Suvin, *Samo jednom se ljubi: Radiografija SFR Jugoslavije*, Beograd, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Beograd, 2014, p. 314.

¹³ Ibid. 317.

¹⁴ We should also mention that Brangwyn made this mural under the populist mayor Tommy Johnson, in the industrial city with a strong socialist tradition and the labour union movement. See more in: Peter Linebaugh, “Icon and Ideal” in *The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, 195-196.

¹⁵ Source: <http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/komentari/311184/Je-li-Hrvatska-jedina-drzava-s-predsjednikom-duhom.html>; (Accessed on April 10, 2015.) and <http://www.jutarnji.hr/kolinda-iz-kabineta-makiula--jakog--murtica-i-stavila--vedrog--sebalja/1336608/> (Accessed on April 24, 2015).

¹⁶ That this term “peasant” ought to be understood conditionally and that it truly was a wide-spread rebellion encompassing “the lower classes” is supported by the fact that the artists actively sided with the “plebs” and became a part of the “masses”. The abandonment of the “artists’ laboratories” and going to war during the sixteenth century was extensively discussed in the book by an Italian art historian Paolo Thea *Gli artisti e Gli ‘Spregeveli’. 1525: la creazione artistica e la guerra dei contadini in Germania*, Milan, Mimesi, 1998.

¹⁷ According to: Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch, Autonomia 2004*, pp 116

¹⁸ Bertolt Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre*, ed. John Willett, London: Methuen, 1964, p. 252.

¹⁹ The English translation contributes to this debate with a critical afterword by Fredric Jameson (ed.) in Theodor Adorno et al., *Aesthetics and Politics*, London/New York, Verso, 1977.

²⁰ The main reason for this omission is the lack of institutional interest for this part of our history, then the fact that it is not a politically neutral issue and, ultimately, the post-political understanding of totalitarianism as a narrative of two evils: the Nazism and Communism, making the writing on the latter issue academically non-profitable even within the context of theatre.

²¹ Ibid. 14.

²² Ibid. 24.

²³ Ibid. 26.

²⁴ Cf. August Cesarec, *Rasprave, članci, polemike: nacionalni, socijalni i kulturni problemi Jugoslavije*, Zagreb, Zora, 1971, p. 37.

²⁵ Bertolt Brecht, *Dijalektika u teatru*, Belgrade, Nolit, 1979, p. 177. [English translation from: Bertolt Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre*, Marc Silberman, Steve Giles & Tom Kuhn (eds.), London/New York, Bloomsbury, 2015, pp. 201-202].

²⁶ Cf. Antonio Gramsci, “Bilješke o folkloru” in *Folkloristička čitanka*, Zagreb, AGM, 2010, p. 61.

²⁷ Brecht, *Dijalektika*, p. 181.

²⁸ I primarily refer to the work of Sergei Eisenstein and his development of the methods of montage which became the fundamental formal language technique of all the left avant-garde genres, including the work of Bertolt Brecht who is alluded to in the subsequent segment. Through his theory of *gestus*, Brecht developed a specific theory of acting and the semiotics of the body. Although his initial source of inspiration was the Peking opera and Asian theater, his understanding of the concept of *popularity* has greatly influenced the themes of his plays, as well as this theoretical and dramaturgic aspect.

²⁹ Fredric Jameson, "Reflections in Conclusion" in Theodor Adorno et al., *Aesthetics and Politics*, London/New York, 1977, p. 207.

³⁰ "impure aesthetics", in: Fredric Jameson, *Brecht and Method*, London/New York, Verso, 1999, p. 4

³¹ Ibid. Suvin, p. 315.

³² Ibid. p. 316.

³³ Cf. Boris Buden, "Još o komunističkim krvolicima..." in: *Prelom*, No. 3-4, 2003, 51-57.

³⁴ Cf. Mihail Bahtin, *Stvaralaštvo Fransoa Rablea: i narodna kultura srednjega veka i renesanse*, Beograd, Nolit, 1978, p. 18. In this context, it is instructive to read Peter Linebaugh who writes about the history of one holiday from the left tradition – May Day, referring to its pre-capitalist origins in the festival of fertility, vegetation and spring – which had a strong performative element in the form of the characters Jack-in-the-Green and May Queen. By the development of capitalism, the festival became a persecution, and the persecution became the seed of resistance which finally sprouted out through the historic establishment of the May Day as a symbol of the struggles of the masses to achieve better living and working conditions. Thus, what has originated from vitalist folk festivals is not necessarily unrelated to the new historical instances – same as in this case; Peter Linebaugh, *The Incomplete, True, Authentic and Wonderful History of MAY DAY*, (Accessed on April 14, 2015).

³⁵ Braslav Borozan, "Avangardno i inovacije u kazalištu NOB-a", in *Dani Hvarskog kazališta: Hrvatska dramska književnost i kazalište od predratnih revolucionarnih previranja do 1955*, Split: Književni krug, 1983, p. 48.

³⁶ Stated by Jure Kaštelan, according to Suvin, p. 316.

³⁷ Cf. Marin Blažević, *Izboreni poraz: novo kazalište u hrvatskom glumištu od Gavelle do...*, Zagreb, Disput, 2012.

³⁸ The heterogeneity and contradictions (in view of the current policies and the political order) of the national experimental theatre is, perhaps, best addressed in the special feature on the subject in the magazine *Prolog* No. 27 i 28, 1976, pp. 5 – 12.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Darko Suvin, *O Bogdanu, o sjećanju, o teatru kao utopijskoj radosti*, Gordogan, No. 25, 2010.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² In his study on the foundations of the new Croatian theatre, Blažević attributes its experimental and avant-garde roots to the work of Branko Gavella. On the other hand, in the eulogy written for Bogdan Jerković, Darko Suvin claims that it was the Gavellian inclination of the Croatian theatre which impeded the development of young actors upon their return from amateur partisan theatres: "This was not just one of many schools, but the only way a young actor could take (after taking part in the spontaneous partisan amateur wave from which some of our best actors originated) in order to become a part of the Croatian theatre; so, this was a complete monopoly. This was a part of the good-old Austrian absolutist tradition where schools were one of the pillars of the regime (because schools were traditionally only for those selected few who would later become members of the ruling class, of its upper, middle or the bottom echelon)," *ibid.* 201.

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