

Zastupajuće i označiteljske prakse stvaratelja arhivske građe

UZ TEKST IZABRANE ILUSTRACIJE UMJETNIČKIH
DJELA TROJE SUVREMENIH UMJETNIKA, MAGDALENE
ABAKANOWICZ, HAIMA STEINBACHA I VITA HANNIBALA
ACCONCIA, PO SLOBODNOM IZBORU AUTORICE TEKSTA,
PREDSTAVLJAJU DUHOVIT PRILOG UMJETNIČKE
POLEMIKE SA SAMORAZUMLJIVOŠĆU PAMĆENJA
I NJEGOVA OZNAČAVANJA. RADOVI APELIRAJU NA
NEOGRANIČENU PROTEŽNOST ZNAKA I OZNAČITELJA,
PROŠLOG I SADAŠNJEG, OTKRIVENOG I RASKRIVENOG
U PROSTORU I VREMENU, A TIME I U ARHIVIRANJU,
HISTORIOGRAFIIRANJU I RECEPCIJI.

NATAŠA
LAH

REPRODUCTIONS OF ARTWORKS BY THREE
CONTEMPORARY ARTISTS – MAGDALENA ABAKANOWICZ,
HAIM STEINBACH, AND VITO HANNIBAL ACCONCI – HAVE
BEEN SELECTED BY THE AUTHOR AS A HUMOROUS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE ARTISTIC POLEMICS AGAINST
THE SELF-UNDERSTANDABLE CLAIMS OF MEMORY
AND ITS SIGNIFICATION. THESE ARTWORKS EVOKE
THE UNLIMITED EXTENSION OF THE SIGN AND THE
SIGNIFIER, THE PAST AND THE PRESENT, THE REVEALED
AND THE DISCLOSED IN SPACE AND TIME, AND THUS
ALSO IN ARCHIVATION, HISTORIOGRAPHIZATION, AND
RECEPTION.

Representative and Signifying Practices: The Authors of Archival Materials

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SAŽETAK: Nadaje li nam se i sama umjetnost danas kao „novi arhiv“ pamćenja? Je li se zauzimanjem takve pozicije (ili aktivnosti) uplela u stari, do danas neprevladani prijemor između moderniteta i „otvorenog horizonta“ pamćenja svekolike povijesti? Ukoliko postoji mogućnost pozitivnog odgovora na oba pitanja, cilj nam je ukazati kako se ono što poznamo kao pamćenje jedinstvene povijesti (umjetnosti) razvilo pod utjecajem sasvim različitih tipova pamćenja, jer su različita vrijednosna ishodišta formirala kulturne strategije kao i umjetničke prakse. Naša je pretpostavka kako se upravo povijest kulture nameće kao mogući izvor razumijevanja svake konceptualizacije, prethodeći time institucionalizaciji bilo kojeg fundusa. I bez obzira je li takvo stanje stvari raskrinkala moderna umjetnost, sasvim je sigurno da se do danas prijemor o krimenu „objektivnog“ pamćenja nije razriješio. Uzimajući u obzir da se navedenim ograničenjima historiografskih izvora može oponirati mirenjem tradicije i aktualnosti na razini punog uvažavanja njihovih suprotnosti, gdje samorazumijevanje kulturne i umjetničke baštine uzmiče pred hermeneutikom povijesti, odnosno teorijom razumijevanja umjetničkih praksi. Da se u naznačenom obliku mirenja prošlosti i sadašnjosti ne radi o paradoksalnoj situaciji pomogao nam je razumjeti Hans Georg Gadamer kroz prizmu filozofije umjetnosti kojega ćemo ukratko sagledati kako se horizonti sadašnjosti i povijesti samo prividno čine odvojeni. Namjera je također, u kontekstu takve argumentacije, ukazati kako je modernitet, otvorivši novu i epohalno značajnu temu zbiljnosti zaborava, raskinuo tek s tradicijom njezine samorazumljivosti, premda je pamćenje ostalo integralnim dijelom tkiva svake sadašnjosti. Utoliko, i umjetničke prakse, i recepcijske, muzealske ili teorijske, neprestano vrše svoje konceptualizacije hermeneutičkim, živim, situacijskim čitanjima na uvid.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: arhiv pamćenja, konceptualizacija arhivske građe, institucionalizacija fundusa, hermeneutika, otvoreni horizont prošlosti i sadašnjosti, označiteljske prakse

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SUMMARY: Does even art offer itself today as a “new archive” of remembrance? And has it, by taking this position, intervened in the old, hitherto unsurpassed controversy between modernity and the “open horizon” of remembering the various facets of history? If there is a possibility of answering both questions affirmatively, our aim is to show in which way what we know as remembering the unique (art) history has evolved under the impact of rather different types of remembrance, as the different starting points for evaluation have shaped various cultural strategies as well as art practices. Our hypothesis is that it is cultural history as such that imposes itself as a possible source of understanding all conceptualization, thus preceding the institutionalization of all archival holdings. And, regardless of whether modern art has exposed this state of affairs, it is most certain that the controversy over the *crimen* of “objective” memory has not yet been solved. Thereby one should take into account that these limitations of historiographic sources can be overcome by bringing together tradition and the present on the level of paying utmost respect to their disparity, where the self-image of cultural and artistic heritage would cede way to the hermeneutics of history, that is, to the theory of understanding art practices. Hans Georg Gadamer has helped us understand that the given form of reconciliation between the past and the present is not paradoxical in itself, and it is through the lens of his philosophy that we will take a brief look at how these two horizons are only seemingly separate. Our intention is, moreover, to use this argumentation to show that modernity, by raising a new subject of epochal significance – that of the reality of oblivion – has only broken the link with the tradition of its self-understanding, whereas memory has remained an integral part of the texture of all present. In this sense, the practices of art and reception, be they museological or theoretical, are incessantly involved in their own conceptualizations by offering hermeneutical, living, situational interpretations.

KEYWORDS: archive of remembrance, conceptualization of archival materials, institutionalization of archival holdings, hermeneutics, open horizon of past and present, signifying practices

Rumunjski kulturni antropolog Vintilă Mihălescu jedan je od svojih duhovito pisanih kratkih eseja započeo riječima francuskog sociologa i teoretičara društvenih promjena Michela Wieviorka: *Povijest pripada pobjednicima, a memorija poraženima*¹. Problematizirajući odnos između povijesti i sjećanja, on se bavio sukobom stajališta među stanovnicima jednog malog rumunjskog sela u pitanjima identifikacije njihovih zajedničkih, rodovskih korijena. Prikazao je tipično atribucionističko nadmetanje između pripadnika mladih naraštaja domicilnog stanovništva koji su bili predstavnici većine i eksponenti Povijesti, s potomcima starijih naraštaja, koji su bili pripadnici manjine i njegovatelji zajedničkih sjećanja na eponimske junake. Prijemor se temeljio na zastupanju različitih stajališta o pitanju njihova izvornog, zajedničkog podrijetla, a time i na osjećaju identiteta, odnosno na identifikaciji zajedničkih predaka. Dokazna građa povjesničara-atribucionista, temeljila se na arhivskom potencijalu registraturne građe (u konkretnom slučaju bilješke o povijesti lokalnih obitelji) iz kojeg se formirao službeni arhivski fond, na takav način da su se odabrani fragmenti smjestili u mrežu realnih datuma i događaja tvoreći „povijesni mit“ koji naposljetku ima potencijal sumnjive vjerodostojnosti kakvim raspoložu i legende sačuvane u sjećanjima i predaji. Dobra je strana te situacije mogućnost interaktivnog popunjavanja praznina koje osvjetljavaju antagonizmi različitih „vjerodostojnosti“, jer se u međusobnim sukobima suprotstavljenih strana potiču uvijek nova istraživanja, onemogućujući da bilo koji mit postane

Romanian cultural anthropologist Vintilă Mihălescu has opened one of his witty short essays by quoting the French sociologist and theoretician of social change Michel Wieviork: *History belongs to the winners, memory to the defeated*.¹ By discussing the relationship between history and memory, he has dealt with the conflict of opinions among the inhabitants of a small Romanian village concerning the identity of their common kinship roots. He has demonstrated the existence of a typical attributional competition between the representatives of the younger generation among the local population, who were the majority and the exponents of History, and the elderly, who were in minority and cultivated a common memory of their eponym heroes. The conflict concerned advocating different visions of their common origins, and therefore a different feeling of identity or of identifying their common ancestors. For the attributionist historians, the evidence was based on the archival potential of registry materials (in this specific case these were notes on the history of local families), which served to form the official archival holdings by placing the selected fragments into a network of actual dates and events, resulting in a “historical myth” that eventually had the potential of dubious credibility, such as demonstrated by the legends perpetuated in memory and tradition. An advantage of such a situation is the possibility of interactively filling the gaps indicated by the antagonism of different “credibilities”, as the conflicts perpetually encourage new research, making it impossible for any

argument stvarnosti i nedvojbeni kulturni realitet. Uočena dihotomija između povijesti i sjećanja lako se može preslikati s područja rasprave o etnicitetu na mnoga druga područja društvenog života (uključujući i pitanje o vrijednosnim ishodištima u formiranju kulturnih strategija i umjetničkih praksi kroz povijest), kao što se i konflikt među njima, predočen primjerom malog rumunjskog sela, može preslikati na velike urbane sredine različitih antropogeografskih značajki. S obzirom da u takvim prijeporima službena politika (ili barem prevladavajuća povijesna paradigma) jednima „na terenu“ dosuđuje prednost, diskvalificirajući druge kao marginalnu pojavu, ona ujedno (politika/paradigma) institucionalizira otvorene registraturne nizove, zatvarajući ih u sustave fondova koji će budućim naraštajima svjedočiti povijest vlasti i društvene moći, prije negoli povijest kakva je doista i bila. Navedena je priča tek crtica velike teme o prijeporu moći i znanja, odnosno o utjecajima različitih tipova pamćenja u sustavu koji poznamo kao pamćenje povijesti. Francuski filozof Michel Foucault oštro je kritizirao društvene mehanizme moći koji su po njegovu mišljenju kreirali znanstvene paradigme kroz povijest, ispisavši time povijest ideja kakvu poznamo. Dijagnosticirajući selektivno pamćenje (ili ciljanu zaboravljivost) s opasnim posljedicama, predložio je da svoje istraživačke napore preusmjerimo s područja povijesti ideja na područje arheologije znanja². Njegov prijedlog, međutim, implicira ozbiljnu teškoću ako nam je cilj prevladati pogled na povijest ljudskoga znanja kroz

prizmu „uniformiranih“ paradigmi što su ne samo stvarale, nego i arhivirale povijesnu zbilju. Mogli bismo to i fukoovski parafrazirati pa reći: zakopavale je, našoj arheološkoj praksi na izazov i novi teret pamćenja. Za razliku od povijesti ideja, kako je predloženo, arheologija znanja ne mari za pojedince i njihovu prošlost, jer joj je stalo do „iskapanja“ neosobnih struktura spoznaje. Iskopine će nam pokazati, kaže Foucault, da su i prirodoslovci i ekonomisti i gramatičari koristili ista pravila za tvorbu svojih ideja. Budući da su njihova pravila bila ista, smatra filozof, nisu bila iskazana autentično. Upućeni smo time na istraživanje povijesnih raznolikosti (uključujući marginalno i marginalizirano), i na iskapanje svih onih krhotina što ih paradigme nisu tako brižno „arhivirale“ za cjelovit uvid u nekim, tada budućim vremenima. No, krhotine što su u povijesti bile lišene paradigmatškog legitimiteta nemoguće je, čini se, skupiti i rekonstruirati bez interpretativnog udjela stvaratelja novih znanja. Slikovitije rečeno, arheološke će iskopine ljudskih znanja Netko kasnije opet usustavljivati u obrasce dostupne građe (knjiga–udžbenik–enciklopedija–muzej–dokumentaristički centar...) kako je to činio i Netko raniji, u ime povijesti. Uvažiti nam je, naime, recepcijske prakse stvaratelja građe, koje ćemo koristeći formulaciju Marite Sturken i Lise Cartwright opisati kao prakse gledanja (*practices of looking*)³, bez obzira radi li se o istraživanju povijesti ideja ili o arheologiji znanja. Prakse gledanja, za razliku od pasivnog, neutralnog primanja primjenjuju i provode u djelo određene načine i postupanja gledanja. Stvaratelj građe je time

aktivni recipijent prošlosti, što u kontekstu „viđenja“ podrazumijeva prepoznavanje. A što to recipijent prepoznaje (izdvaja), zavisno je od njegove „treniranosti“ u odnosu na produkcijski i teorijski kontekst onoga što prima. Prakse gledanja, za razliku od gledanja samog, utoliko podrazumijevaju intencionalno gledanje. Problem je, čini se, star koliko i svijet, a pitanje je samo koje su ih epohe i koji pojedinci prepoznali kao „uznemirujuće prakse izdvajanja“. Na primjer, čini se da su, baš kao i Foucaulta, slične brige morile i Aristotela. Drevni je Stagiranin (IV. st. pr. n. e.) prepoznao ograničenja historiografiranja, osjetivši, kao i Foucault, potrebu ne toliko za revizijom (bilo je prerano) koliko za isticanjem razlike u načinima povijesnog pamćenja. Izgledno, obojicu je mučila vjerodostojnost svjedočenja povijesti, i za obojicu je od posebnog značenja u tom kontekstu bila „norma“ koja formalizira pamćenje svjedočeći prirodu svjedočenja, prije negoli povijest. Pritom je za Foucaulta paradigmatška norma predstavljala oblik interpersonalnog reprezentiranja, temeljenog na moralnim,

ideološkim i političkim pristupima, dok je za Aristotela ona bila pozitivnog predznaka, nadređena pojedinačnim pitanjima koja spoznajno objedinjuje. Najkraće rečeno, upravo je historiografiranje kao postupak izdvajanja, a potom i usustavljivanja izdvojenog, slabost i ograničenje koje u oba slučaja uznemiruje. U IX. poglavlju knjige *Poetika* (Ποιητικός)⁴ Aristotel je dao svoj doprinos razumijevanju raskola koji nastaje u domeni povijesnog pamćenja (pamćenja povijesti) suprotstavivši različite učinke historiografskog na jednoj te pjesničkog i filozofskog predmetnog područja na drugoj strani. Pjesništvo je vidio kao „ozbiljniju stvar“ blisku filozofiji zbog njezine zaokupljenosti općim, dok je historiografiju po njemu ograničavala usmjerenost na pojedinačno. Slaveći opće vrijednosti (norme), kojima su pojedinačne stvari podređene kao njihova puka oprimjerenja, pojmovno je reflektivnu snagu umjetnosti i filozofije suprotstavio ograničenjima historiografskih izvora. Radi se o posebnoj vrsti ograničenja, razumijevanju kojeg

MAGDALENA ABAKANOWICZ, 80 POZADINA, 1976.–80., JUȚA I SMOČA
KOLEKCIJA MUZEJA MODERNE UMJETNOSTI „PUSAN“, JUŽNA KOREJA

MAGDALENA ABAKANOWICZ, 80 BACKS, 1976-80, JUTE AND RESIN,
COLLECTION OF THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART PUSAN, SOUTH KOREA

myth to become an argument of veracity and an unquestionable cultural reality. The observed dichotomy between history and memory can easily be transposed from the field of ethnicity debates to many other areas of social life (including the issue of starting points for evaluation when creating cultural strategies and art practices throughout history), in the same way as the conflict between them, illustrated on the example of a small Romanian village, can be transposed to large urban settings with various anthropo-geographic features. Regarding the fact that, in such controversies, the official policy (or at least the prevailing social paradigm) gives advantage “in the field” to one party, disqualifying the other as a marginal phenomenon, this (policy/paradigm) also institutionalizes open registry series, enclosing them into systems of archival holdings that will, for the future generations, witness to the history of governance and social power more strongly than it could be done by history as it actually happened. This story is only a minor contribution to the great subject of controversy between power and knowledge, that is, the impact of various types of remembrance in the system that we know as historical memory. French philosopher Michel Foucault fiercely criticized the social mechanisms of power that had, in his opinion, established scientific paradigms throughout history and created the history of ideas as we know it. Having diagnosed that selective memory (or purposeful oblivion) had dangerous consequences, he suggested that we should turn our research efforts away from the history of

ideas and toward the archaeology of knowledge.² His proposal, however, implies a serious problem if our aim is to overcome the view on the history of human knowledge through the lens of “uniform” paradigms that have not only created, but also archived historical reality. One may also paraphrase it in Foucault’s style by saying that they have buried it, challenging our archaeological practice and imposing a new burden of memory. Unlike the history of ideas, as has been suggested, the archaeology of knowledge is not concerned with individuals and their history; instead, it seeks to “dig out” the impersonal structures of knowledge. Its finds will show us, Foucault says, that the natural scientists, economists, and linguists all use the same rules in formulating their ideas. Since their rules are the same, according to the French philosopher, they are not expressed in an authentic manner. We are therefore directed to explore historical differences (including the marginal and the marginalized) and to dig out all those fragments that the paradigms have not “archived” too carefully, in order to enable a more complete insight in some other, at this time future age. However, fragments that have been deprived of paradigmatic legitimacy in history seem impossible to collect and reconstruct without an interpretative involvement of the authors of new knowledge. More pictorially speaking, there will always be a later Somebody who will systematize the archaeological finds of human knowledge into certain modes of available materials (book-handbook-encyclopaedia-museum-documentation centre etc.) in the same



way as it has been done by an earlier Somebody in the name of history. One must, namely, take into account the reception practices of the authors of archival materials, which may be described, borrowing a formulation from Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright, as the “practices of looking,”³ regardless of whether we are dealing with the research on the history of ideas or the archaeology of knowledge. These practices of looking, unlike the passive, neutral reception, apply and implement certain modes and procedures of looking. The author of archival materials thus becomes an active recipient of the past, which in the context of “looking” implies recognition. And what the recipient will recognize (select) depends on his or her “training” with regard to the production and theoretical context of the object of reception. Therefore, the practices of looking are distinct from mere looking insofar as they imply intentional looking. Apparently, this issue is as old as the world, the question being only which epochs and which individuals have identified them as the “unsettling practices” of distinction. For example, it seems that Aristotle was plagued by the same concerns as Foucault. The ancient Stagiran (4th c. BC)

recognized the limitations of historiographizing, feeling the need, same as Foucault, not so much to revise (it was too early for that), but rather to emphasize the difference in the modes of historical memory. Apparently, both of them were tormented by the veracity of testifying about history, and both attached a particular importance to the “norm” in that context, which would formalize memory by testifying to the nature of the testimony rather than the history itself. Thereby the paradigmatic norm for Foucault was a form of impersonal representation, based on moral, ideological, and political approaches, whereas for Aristotle it was positive in its premises, superior to the individual questions that it cognitively encompassed. Briefly, it is precisely historiographizing, as the procedure of selecting and then systematizing what has been selected, that is the weakness and the limitation that appears unsettling in both cases. In the 9th chapter of his *Poetics* (Ποιητικός),⁴ Aristotle offered his contribution to the understanding of the schism that emerged in the domain of historical memory (memorizing history) by juxtaposing various effects of the historiographic subject field on the one hand, and the poetic and

može pomoći pogled na etimologiju i definiciju riječi *fundus*. Etimološki, riječ *fundus* dolazi od latinskog *fundare*, što znači: utemeljiti, dok se pojam definira kao temelj (neke zgrade), kao blago ili zaliha (kakvog kulturnog dobra), odnosno, anatomski, kao dno neke tjelesne šupljine (želudac, maternica, mozak, oko, itd.) postavljeno nasuprot njezina otvora. U prenesenom smislu, *fundus* je samo osnova za gradbu kakve strukture ili za ispunjavanje sadržajem koji će dobiti svoj puni smisao u organskoj cjelovitosti onoga što okuplja ili nosi (anatomija, arhitektura), ili, ako se radi o sadržajima s područja kulturnih dobara (baštine), u interpretaciji prikupljenih sadržaja. S obzirom da je predmet našeg interesa povijest kulture, polazimo od pretpostavke da svakoj institucionalizaciji *fundusa* prethodi neka konceptualizacija građe, prilikom čega se izdvajanje vrši na razini skrivanja, koliko i reprezentiranja, te da je skriveno integralni dio prikazanoga. Razumijevanju takve cjeline, vjerujemo, prethodi razumijevanje ciljeva samog koncepta *fundusa*, koji u pravilu polazi od već spomenute pretpostavke interpersonalnog reprezentiranja, skrivajući (isključujući) one elemente (uvjetno rečeno registraturne građe) koji bi strukturu koncepta činili ranjivijom, dovodili je u pitanje, ili bi signalizirali potrebu za revizijom ponuđene (izdvojene, reprezentirane) cjeline. Dakle, arhiviranje u tom kontekstu razumijemo kao oblik konceptualizacije koji baštinu prilagođava suvremenoj upotrebi prošlosti, kako je to predložio Brian Graham u studiji pod naslovom: *Baština kao znanje: imovina*

*ili kultura?*⁵ Preciznije, Graham takav koncept vidi kao socijalnu konstrukciju, zamišljenu, određenu i artikuliranu unutar kulturne i ekonomske prakse. Tako je, na primjer, često citirana latinska izreka *Historia est magistra vitae* neutemeljena u iskustvu suvremenog čovjeka. Izdvojena iz cjeline Ciceronova djela „Orator“, izreka zastupa progresističku ideju povijesnog razvoja, čiji je ugled usmrćen na poprištu velikih ljudskih stradanja tijekom XX. stoljeća. Postpovijesni će čovjek lakše razumjeti smisao tog fragmenta ako ga sagleda unutar izdvajanjem devastirane cjeline izvornika. Ciceron, naime, prema izvorniku, postavlja pitanje: *Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritas, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia, nisi oratoris, immortalitati commendatur?*⁶ Radi se o tome, sugerira nam prijevod E.W. Suttona,⁷ da povijest doista svjedoči prolaznost, osvjetljava stvarnost, oživotvoruje sjećanja, daje smjernice ljudskom postojanju, naviješta davninu..., ali, ona sama po sebi nije, kako uobičajeno izdvajamo, „učiteljica života“, nego je govornik taj koji (ne)može povijest učiniti besmrtnom. Bez posrednika, bez interpretatora, bez glasa koji pronosi njezina svojstva, povijest je nijema, prije negoli govorom ovjekovječena. Dokumentiranje time uključuje i upotrebu dokumenta, a izdvajanje dokumenata uvijek novo svjedočenje suvremenosti. Problem je postao sveobuhvatan, a povijest gotovo nevidljiva. U tako opisanom svijetu i suvremena se umjetnost uključila u aktivnost „činjenja stvari vidljivima“,⁸ pribjegavši, kako piše Groys, ne-umjetničkoj aktivnosti

HAIM STEINBACH, *RIBEŽI ZA SIR*, 1990., KAŠIRANI OBJEKT OD DRVA I METALA,
KOLEKCIJA NSW MUZEJA (NEW SOUTH WALES), SYDNEY


HAIM STEINBACH, *CHEESE GRATERS*, 1990, LAMINATED WOODEN AND METAL
OBJECT, COLLECTION OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES MUSEUM, SYDNEY

philosophical one on the other. He considered poetry to be “more serious” among the two, closer to philosophy owing to its concern with the generic, whereas historiography, according to him, limited the focus on the specific. By celebrating the generic values (norms), to which the specific things are subjected as their mere exemplifications, he conceptually juxtaposed the reflexive power of art and philosophy on the one hand, and the limitations of historiographic sources on the other. It is a specific type of limitation, and in order to understand it, one may resort to the etymology and definition of the word *fundus*. Etymologically, the term *fundus* comes from the Latin verb *fundare*, which means “to found,” and the noun itself is defined as the “foundation” (of a building), treasury or reserve (of a cultural good), or anatomically, as the bottom of a cavity (stomach, uterus, brain, eye, etc.) positioned opposite to its opening. In a metaphorical sense, *fundus* is merely a base for constructing any kind of structure or filling it in with a content that acquires its full sense only in the organic wholeness of what it encompasses or carries (anatomy, architecture), or, if it concerns content from the field of culture (heritage), through an interpretation of the accumulated materials. Regarding the fact that the subject of our interest is the history of culture, we will start from the premise that any institutionalization of the *fundus* is preceded by some sort of conceptualization of the material, whereby the selection is performed on the level of concealment as much as representation, which means that the

concealed is an integral part of the presented. Understanding such a whole, we believe, is preceded by understanding the aims of the very concept of *fundus*, which usually starts from the abovementioned premise of interpersonal representation, concealing (excluding) those elements (conditionally speaking, the registry materials) that would make the structure of the concept more vulnerable, challenge it, or signal the need of revising the suggested (selected, represented) whole. In other words, archiving in this context is understood as a form of conceptualization that makes the heritage the contemporary use of the past, as has been suggested by Brian Graham in his study on *Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture?*⁵ More precisely, Graham sees such a concept as a social construct, which is imagined, defined, and articulated within a particular cultural and economic practice. Thus, for example, the often quoted Latin saying *Historia est magistra vitae* is actually not based on the experience of the modern man. As a selection from the whole of Cicero’s *Orator*, it advocates a progressivist idea of historical development, the reputation of which has been destroyed on the battlefields of enormous human suffering during the 20th century. The post-historical man will understand the sense of the fragment more easily if considering it within the original as a whole, before being devastated by selection. In the original work, namely, Cicero raises the following question: *Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritas, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia, nisi oratoris, immortalitati*

dokumentiranja životnih formi, da bi time postala samo jedan u nizu oblika života. U tom opiranju od zaborava autentičnosti i od „nevidljivosti“ koja nastaje arhiviranjem, muzealizacijom, stvaranjem fondova, turističkom ili političkom, pa i povijesnoumjetničkom konceptualizacijom – svejedno, suvremeni umjetnik nastoji izmaknuti svakom obliku arhiviranja djela, stvarajući umjesto djela simultane nizove osobnih arhiva koje interpretira izdvajanjem, da bi izmaknuo manipulaciji s više ili manje uspjeha. Time je artificijelnost doista uzeta kao eksplicitna tema, a umjesto umjetnog života (svuda oko nas) pukom se dokumentiranju udahnjuje život da bi ono postalo stvarnost po sebi. No ovdje, ipak, treba uzeti u obzir da *stvarno može biti definirano tek u usporedbi s muzejskom zbirkom*.⁹ Jer, svako kolekcioniranje ulazeći u život prerasta u muzej, *stvarajući nešto što do sada nije bilo sakupljano*.¹⁰ Imajući to na umu, Tomislav Šola, na primjer, predlaže koncept trajne i koherentne baštine („od dinosaura do Andya Warhola“), kako bi se iz svjedočanstva prošlih događaja, ljudi, ideja, situacija i djela prenio

ukupan informacijski potencijal vjerodostojnih znanstvenih činjenica, etički relevantnih i kvalitetnih. Šola smatra da će mnemozofija¹¹ kao treća muzeološka paradigma i moderna teorija uopće smijeniti analitičku paradigmu koja nije dopuštala da se stvari prikažu onakvima kakve jesu: međusobno temeljito isprepletenima. Šola time zastupa svojevrsnu inačicu „hermeneutike prošlosti“ koja bi sa svojim načelima interpretacije bila *sposobna dekodirati i dati značenje naslijeđenim znakovima*.¹² Šolin je prijedlog, čini se, najuže povezan s idejom „hermeneutičkog obrata“ koji je afirmirala filozofija umjetnosti Hansa Georga Gadamera. Početak moderne umjetnosti, naime, za Gadamera označava prekid s tradicijom samorazumljivosti umjetničkih sadržaja i potrebu za širenjem teorijskog horizonta na područje cjelokupnog ljudskog života i kulture. Time se aktualnost moderniteta, kao nova zbiljnost zaborava, sučelila s hermenutičkim zahtjevom otvorenog horizonta temeljenog na „pamćenju i sjećanju“ (*Horizontweiterung*). Nametnulo se pitanje: u kojoj mjeri



*commendatur?*⁶ As suggested by the translation of E.W. Sutton,⁷ it is that history “bears witness to the passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives life to recollection and guidance to human existence, and brings tidings of ancient days,” but is in itself not, as often suggested, “life’s teacher” – instead, it is the speaker who can(not) make history immortal. Without an intermediary, an interpreter, a voice that speaks of its properties, history remains mute rather than being immortalized in speech. Thus, documentation implies the use of documents, and the selection of documents is always a new testimony of the contemporary. The problem has become all-encompassing and the history almost invisible. In a world thus described, the contemporary art has also joined the activity of “making things visible” by resorting to, as Groys says, the non-art activity of merely documenting life forms,⁸ which has turned it into yet another form of life. By resisting the oblivion of authenticity and the “invisibility” created by archiving, musealizing, and creating a *fundus*, as well as the touristic or political, or even art-historical conceptualization – be it as it is – the contemporary artist seeks to evade all forms of archiving the artwork by creating,

instead of an artwork, a simultaneous series of personal archives, which he or she interprets by means of selection in order to avoid manipulation, with greater or lesser success. In this way, the artificiality indeed becomes an explicit subject, and instead of artificial life (everywhere around us), simple documentation is endowed with life in order to become reality in its own right. However, one must keep in mind that “the real can be defined only in comparison with the museum collection.”⁹ All collecting, namely, gets transformed into a museum by becoming life, by creating “a sum of all things not having been collected yet.”¹⁰ Keeping that in mind, Tomislav Šola has, for example, proposed the concept of permanent and coherent heritage (“from the dinosaurs to Andy Warhol”) in order to gather the total informative potential of credible scientific facts, ethically relevant and reliable, from the testimonies of past events, people, ideas, situations, and actions. In his opinion, mnemosophy¹¹ as the third museological paradigm and a modern theory in itself, will supplant the analytical paradigm, which has been preventing us from showing things as they really are: crucially intertwined. Thus, Šola advocates a sort of variant of

i na koji način povijesno pamćenje (prošlost) možemo koristiti u označiteljskim praksama moderne epohe zaborava? Pitanje nas upućuje na korjenitu povezanost prakse izdvajanja s davanjem novih značenja naslijeđenim znakovima i vodi pretpostavci da je zatvaranje fonda, kao jedan od postupaka (uvijek) nove označiteljske prakse, u suštini hermeneutički susret prošlosti i aktualnosti. ……… Zorno oprimjerenje tako postavljenom pitanju i problemu nalazimo u književnosti s početka 19. stoljeća. Njemački prirodoslovac i pisac francuskog porijekla, Adalbert von Chamisso, potaknut osobnim iskustvom prisilnog napuštanja domovine Francuske (*lieux de mémoire*) nakon Revolucije i post revolucionarnom idejom prokletstva pamćenja (*Damnatio memoriae*), 1813. godine je napisao „Čudnovatu priču Petra Schlemihla“. Njegov junak Schlemihl, čije ime u židovskoj i jidiš pripovjedačkoj tradiciji utemeljenoj na Talmudu označava čovjeka zaboravljenog od sreće, prodao je vragu svoju sjenu. Sjena je predstavljala Schlemihlovo kolektivno pamćenje, pa je društvenu i privatnu besprizornost čovjeka bez sjene nadomjestio radeći kao slobodni znanstvenik, prirodoslovac. Analizu tog književnog djela filolog Herald Weinrich zaključuje riječima: „*Sretne li, miroljubive znanosti, u kojoj, sa sjenom ili bez nje, razmišljajući o prošlosti ili zaboravljajući je, čovjek može jednako dobro postojati i kretati se svijetom!*“¹² No, može li mu takvo, scientificistički određeno i u odnosu na povijest neutralno postojanje i kretanje osigurati i „duhovnu slobodu“ umjetničkog stvaralaštva i razumijevanja umjetnosti bez

obzira na vrijeme njezina nastanka? ……… Jer umjetnost, za razliku od znanosti, ima „karakter prošlosti“, tvrdi hermeneutičar Gadamer, pozivajući se na staro načelo Hegelova spekulativnog idealizma. Gadamerovo djelo u tom smislu zastupa ideju sveobuhvatnosti nasilno suprotstavljenih strana tradicije i moderniteta. On izriječno tvrdi da je to …*što možemo hodati, s tim horizontom otvorene budućnosti i neponovljive prošlosti, bit onoga što nazivamo „duh“, te da je Mnemozina, muza pamćenja, muza usvajanja u prisjećanju, koja u tome vlada, ujedno i muza duhovne slobode*¹⁴. I sam je bio svjestan kako Hegelovo načelo povijesnog karaktera umjetnosti ishodi iz samorazumljive integracije zajednice, društva, Crkve i samorazumijevanja umjetničkog stvaraoča u 18. stoljeću, te da od narednog stoljeća takva samorazumljivost gubi teorijski integritet. Od 19. stoljeća, naime, svjedočimo da umjetnici više ne žive u zajednici, nego je stvaraju, čime se predstavljaju kao „novi spasitelji“ (*Immermann*), dok se …*pojam djela upućuje na zajednicu, sferu zajedničke uporabe, a time i na zajedničko razumijevanje, na komunikaciju u razumljivosti*.¹⁵ Dakako, ne na razini zajedničke uporabe mehaničkih umijeća, koja se kao proizvodna znanja od umjetnosti razlikuju, od Aristotela nadalje, nego upućivanjem na opće vrijednosti. Time nas Gadamer postavlja pred paradoks otvorenog horizonta aktualnosti, odakle motrimo naznačenu temu i položaj posthistorijske umjetnosti „zaborava“. No, stvar je u tome da po Gadamerovu stajalištu *ne postoji poseban horizont sadašnjosti, kao što ne postoje historijski horizonti koje bi trebalo*

steći. Štoviše, razumijevanje je uvijek proces stapanja tih horizonata koji tobože postoje zasebno.¹⁶ ……… Problem koji se otvara kao paradoksalan susret otvorenog horizonta i aktualnosti u teoriji umjetnosti od 19. stoljeća nadalje naznačen je već u mitologemskim izvorima pripovijesti o tumačenju smisla onih sadržaja koji povezuju ontološke s egzistencijalnim temama. Takva proturječnost nije rijedak slučaj kad su u pitanju tumačenja ideja iz djelovanja mitskih heroja i bogova. Etimologija riječi ἐρμηνευτική blisko je povezana s ulogom mitskog glasnika Hermesa (grč. Ἑρμης, lat. Mercurius) koji personificira tumačenje u dugom vremenskom razdoblju, i na širokom zemljopisnom području, varirajući ikonografski uzorak (sliku) i temu (značenje) svoga obliča. Simbolizirao je vještinu provođenja ideja u djelo, u tome kadikad praktičan do potkupljivosti. Obuven u krilate sandale vješto je svladavao udaljenost između bogova i ljudi, posredujući u njihovoj komunikaciji. Taj se mitski medijator s lakoćom mogao vinuti do svetinja, i s jednakom lakoćom koristiti prijevaru i lukavstvo da bi s njima trgovao. I kao što su krilate sandale simbolizirale njegovu mobilnost i posredništvo, s janjetom na leđima predstavljao je dobrog pastira (*Hermēs kriophóros*), kakvim ga opisuje Evanđelje po Luki, da bi uprizorilo Isusa (*Pastor bonus*) kao promicatelja ljubavi u svome stadi. Kršćanstvo mitologemsku vrijednost Hermesove zadaće još suptilnije uvodi u pojmu Evanđelja, iz grčke riječi *Ευαγγέλιον*, što je složenica pojmova eú (dobro) i áγγελος (vjesnik, glasnik), utjelovljujući time posredništvo i razmjenu ideja

između neba i zemlje, boga i čovjeka, te ideje i djelovanja u pojmu „Navještenje“, implicirajući time njegovu nedvojbenost. Politehnički su nadarenom Hermesu, dodajmo tome, prijevodi drevnog Cezarova zapisa iz sedamnaestog poglavlja šeste knjige Komentara galskog rata (*Commentarii de Bello Gallico*; 58.–50. g. p. n. e.) osigurali i status „izumitelja cjelokupne umjetnosti“. Otkud sva ta slojevita višeznačnost i višesmislenost? Poslužimo li se riječima Friedricha Georga Jüngera, *problem je u tome što …simbol ne misli samoga sebe, već nešto drugo; on je znak koji svoje odnošenje i značenje nalazi u nečem drugom i to drugo zastupa. Znak i simbol upućuju na nešto što je izvan riječi, i time oduzimaju riječi njenu izvornu snagu; riječ se upotrebljava neizravno (…)* Riječju je moguće manipulirati. Riječ može svemu služiti. Značenja joj se mogu dodijeliti ili uskratiti. Može postati znak i za nešto drugo. Ona postaje izgovor, zasjeda, zaklon. S njom, i samo s njom, može se varati i lagati, jer bez jezika nema ni varanja ni laži.¹⁷ ……… Proturječnost tumačenja u odnosu na znak koji tumači, počevši od uloge glasnika u mitu o Hermesu, pokazala se u novovjekovnoj paradigmi kao nepremostiv paradoks otvorenog horizonta pamćenja i sjećanja (fiksiranog označavanja ili teksta) i aktualnosti (aktivnosti pripisivanja novih značenja). Među svim značenjskim oblicima, odnosno iskazima koji podliježu interpretaciji, hermeneutika se najviše bavila govorom i njegovim fiksnim oblikom – tekстом. U njezinu povijesnom razvoju smjenjivale su se alegorijske interpretacije pergamske škole, historijsko-gramatička metoda

the “hermeneutics of the past” that would be able, with its interpretative principles, to “decode and give meaning to the inherited signs.”¹² ……… Šola’s proposal seems most intricately related to the idea of the “hermeneutical turn” as proposed by the philosophy of art of Hans Georg Gadamer. For him, the beginnings of modern art were indicated by a break with the tradition of self-understandable artistic content and the need of broadening the theoretical horizon to include the entire human life and culture. Thus, the current quality of modernity, as the new reality of oblivion, has been faced with the hermeneutical demand of an open horizon based on “memory and remembrance” (*Horizontenerweiterung*). This has imposed the question to which extent and in which way historical memory (the past) can be used in the signifying practices of the modern epoch of oblivion? This question leads us further to the fundamental connectedness between the practice of selection on the one hand, and assigning new meanings to the inherited signs on the other, allowing us to presume that completing a *fundus*, as a procedure of (always) new signifying practice, is in its essence a hermeneutical encounter between the past and the present. ……… An illustrative example of the question and problem thus formulated can be found in early 19th-century literature. German-based natural scientist and writer of French origin, Adalbert von Chamisso, motivated by his personal experience of having been forced after the Revolution to leave his homeland, France (*lieux de mémoire*), and by the post-revolutionary idea of

damnatio memoriae, wrote in 1813 his *Peter Schlemihls wundersame Geschichte* (“Peter Schlemihl’s Miraculous Story”). His hero, Schlemihl, whose name comes from the Jewish and Yiddish narrative tradition based on the Talmud, is a man who has fallen out of luck and therefore sells his shadow to the Devil. The shadow, however, represented Schlemihl’s collective memory, which is why he exchanges the social and private deprivation of a shadowless man by becoming a free natural scientist. Philologist Herald Weinrich ended his analysis of this literary piece by exclaiming: “Ah what a happy and peaceful science it is where a man can equally well exist and move about the world with or without his shadow, thinking of the past or forgetting it!”¹³ But can such a scientifically determined and historically neutral existence and movement also ensure the “spiritual freedom” of artistic creation and the understanding of art regardless of the time of its production? ……… For unlike science, art has a “character of the past,” according to the hermeneutical philosopher Gadamer, who evokes the old Hegelian principle of speculative idealism. Gadamer’s work, in that sense, endorses the idea of an all-encompassing character of the forcibly opposed poles of tradition and modernity. He has explicitly stated that “in our daily life, we proceed constantly through the coexistence of past and future. The essence of what is called ‘spirit’ lies in the ability to move within the horizon of an open future and an unrepeatable past. Mnemosyne, the muse of memory and recollective appropriation, rules here as

the muse of spiritual freedom.”¹⁴ He is well aware of the fact that the Hegelian principle of the historical character of art originated in the self-understandable integration between the community, the society, the Church, and the self-image of the 18th-century artist, and that from the following century onwards this self-image would begin to lose its theoretical integrity. From the 19th century, namely, artists would no longer live in the community; instead, they would create it, thus emerging as the “new saviours” (*Immermann*), while the “concept of the work points toward the sphere of common use and common understanding as the realm of intelligible communication.”¹⁵ To be sure, that did not happen on the level of the common use of mechanical skills (which had differed from art since Aristotle by belonging to production skills), but by evoking some common values. Thus, Gadamer brings us before the paradox of the open horizon of the present, whence we observe the given topic and the position of the post-historical art of “oblivion”. However, the point is that, according to Gadamer, “there is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which have to be acquired. *Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves*.”¹⁶ ……… This problem, which has since the 19th-century art theory taken the form of a paradoxical encounter between the open horizon and the present, was implied already in the mythologemic sources of prehistory, in the interpretation of the meaning of those issues which linked the ontological subjects with


the existential ones. This contradiction is far from rare when it comes to interpreting ideas on the basis of the actions of mythical heroes or gods. The etymology of the word ἐρμηνευτική is closely related to the role of the mythical messenger Hermes (Gr. Ἑρμης, Lat. Mercurius), who personified this interpretation over a long period of time and a broad geographical area, varying the iconographic pattern (image) and the theme (meaning) in his figure. He symbolized the skill of translating ideas into actions, and was often practical to the point of corruptibility. Wearing his winged sandals, he was easily overcoming the distance between gods and men, acting as an intermediary in their communication. This mythical intermediary could effortlessly rise up to the sacred spheres and equally readily use delusion and cunningness in order to trade with them. And while the winged sandals symbolized his mobility and his mediating role, he could also represent a good shepherd with a lamb on his shoulders (*Hermēs kriophóros*), as he is described in the Gospel of Luke, which uses the figure to represent Jesus (*Pastor bonus*) as the promoter of love in his flock. The Christian mythologemic value of Hermes’ task is even more subtly introduced through the notion of the Gospel (Gr. *Ευαγγέλιον*, coined from the terms eú (good) and áγγελος (messenger, herald), thus embodying the role of an intermediary and the exchange of ideas between heaven and earth, God and man, idea and action, in the notion of “evangelization”, implying its certainty beyond all doubt. One should add that the translations of Cesar’s ancient note

aleksandrijske, srednjovjekovna hermeneutika kao učenje o pravilima egzezeze (vodeće sve do 18. st.), dok su se u renesansi uglavnom savladavali hermeneutički problemi rada na tekstovima stranog jezika. Velika sinteza klasičnog njemačkog idealizma i njezin pogled na svijet stremili su ovladati posebnostima historijskog u odnosu na individualno. Iz tog razdoblja su na Gadamera posebno utjecale hermeneutička kritika Friedricha Schlegela i zahtjev za interpretacijom „nejezičnih“ umjetnosti G. W. F. Hegela. U duhovnim naukama (*Geisteswissenschaften*) Wilhelma Diltheya formulirao se znanstveni zahtjev hermeneutičke metode, dok je za Martina Heideggera „fenomenologija postojanja“ (*Dasein*) hermeneutika u izvornom značenju, kojom se označava tumačenje. Problem metode u tom kontekstu naročito se aktualizirao ukazivanjem na različite znanstvene i filozofske hermeneutike. Husserl je smatrao da su prirodne znanosti interpretativne, Dilthey je naglašavao oštru razliku između znanstvenog objašnjenja i humanističke interpretacije, a humanistika je opet na različite

načine varirala svoje metode interpretiranja. Kako bilo, metoda je proizlazila uvijek iz neke filozofske pozicije svodive na dva temeljna ishodišta, po kojima se hermeneutika shvaća kao teorija tumačenja ili pak kao vještina razumijevanja. Gadamerova razmatranja u „Istini i metodi“ vodila je misao da je jezik sredina u kojoj se „Ja“ i „Svijet“ pokazuju u izvornoj supripadnosti. Iz toga slijedi da hermeneutika koju razvija ne može biti učenje o metodi duhovnih nauka, nego pokušaj sporazumijevanja oko toga što duhovne nauke jesu. Univerzalna hermeneutika treba polaziti od toga da je onaj koji želi razumjeti povezan sa stvari koja predajom dolazi do govora. Time je hermeneutika smještena „između“ prošlosti i sadašnjosti, nemajući za cilj razvijanje postupka razumijevanja, nego razjašnjenje uvjeta pod kojima do razumijevanja dolazi. Time pravi hermeneutički događaj nije jezik kao jezik, niti jezik kao gramatika, niti kao leksik, nego je dolaženje do riječi onoga u predaji rečenog. A razumijevanje koje ide k djelovanju mora i samo biti djelujuće. Hermeneutika se, po Gadamerovoj interpretaciji, ne

postavlja nekom svojom metodom naspram objekta koji spoznaje, jer je ona sama ta metoda koja tjera smisao da progovori, ne govoreći umjesto smisla. Dijalektici iskustva time prethodi otvorenost za iskustvo i dijalektici odgovora mogućnost postavljanja pitanja. Time hermeneutika postaje praktična filozofija, a susret tradicije i aktualnosti stvara „hermeneutičku situaciju“ u kojoj se nalazimo okrenuti prema tradiciji da bismo razumjeli aktualnost. Drugim riječima, ahistorična aktualnost „stapa“ se s historijskom sviješću u jedan „veliki horizont“ ...*koji se iznutra pokreće i koji nadilazeći granice sadašnjosti, obuhvaća historijsku dubinu naše samosvijesti.*¹⁸ Umjetnost u tom procesu ima iznimnu ulogu. Njezina je tipična odlika upravo „hermeneutička situacija“ koju ne odlikuje susljednost, nego istovremenost i zastajanje što nam se obraća nagovarajući nas na razgovor i sudioništvo. Radi se zapravo o izmjeničnoj igri povlačenja i nastupanja, zadržavanja i prolaženja, ali i suparništva, sve po uzoru na kretanje samog života (kao „igra valova“, „igra svjetla“ itd.)¹⁹. Gadamer, pozivajući se na Platonovu maksimu da je zadaća filozofske dijalektike „učiti gledati zajedno prema jednome“ (Fedar 265d), upućuje na antropološke osnova ljudskog iskustva, u prvom redu na pojmove igre, simbola i svetkovine. Igra je u tom kontekstu elementarna funkcija života bilo da njezine elemente nalazimo u religijsko-kulturnim ritualima, bilo kao „slobodan impuls“ u umjetnosti. Radi se o kretanju bez ciljne svršnosti, što proizlazi iz karaktera „viška“ i teži prikazivanju, Uloga uma u ljudskoj igri otvara se

discipliniranjem igre. No, igra uvijek zahtijeva suigru pa je u osnovi komunikacijsko djelovanje u kojem se briše granica između „onoga tko se igra“ i „onoga tko promatra“ igru. U takvoj situaciji imamo Nešto, ni smisleno, ni pojmovno, ni svrhovito, Nešto, dakle, što je samo „propisalo“ sebi kretanje. No, djelo i dalje postoji, premda se nije zatvorilo u obraćanju. I upravo će se hermeneutički identitet djela utemeljiti u (prividno neuhvatljivom) jedinstvu prošlog i sadašnjeg putem razumijevanja. No, ako (moderno) djelo ništa ne „znači“, niti „kazuje“, što je tu za identificirati, odnosno razumjeti? Aktivnošću ispunjenja slobodnog prostora koji nam je djelo ostavilo, kaže Gadamer, odgonetamo odgovor i to se zove „iskustvo umjetnosti“. Radi se dakle o postignuću refleksije, na što nas upućuje moderna umjetnost oslovljavajući nas upravo neodređenošću upućivanja. Ispunjava nas time sviješću o važnosti te o istaknutom značenju onoga što imamo pred očima, i onoga o čemu smo potaknuti misliti. A tu funkciju nazivamo simboličkom. Za Gadamera, međutim, postupak umjetničkog simboliziranja nije zastupanje od nečeg što je izvan djela. To nije ikonografski simbolizam konačnih vokabulara, nego je simboliziranje smisla, jer simboličkoj reprezentaciji u umjetnosti nije potrebna ovisnost o „zadanim stvarima“. Dapače, činjenica da ono što imamo reći o samom djelu postoji jedino u njemu samome predstavlja, po Gadameru, opći zahtjev umjetnosti, a ne samo nužan uvjet moderne umjetnosti. Radi se o strukturalnom karakteru umjetnosti koji je obuhvatan u zahtjevu na zajedništvo. U tako postavljenom



VITO HANNIBAL ACCONCI, GRAD OD RIJEČI, 2001., DIGITALNA SKULPTURA, GALLERIA MICHELA RIZZO, VENEČIJA
VITO HANNIBAL ACCONCI, CITY OF WORDS, 2001, DIGITAL SCULPTURE, GALLERIA MICHELA RIZZO, VENICE

from Chapter 17 in Book 6 of his *Commentaries on the Gallic War* (*Commentarii de Bello Gallico*; 58–50 BC) also ensured him the status of the “inventor of all art.” Where does all this multilayered ambivalence and multiplicity of meaning come from? Quoting Friedrich Georg Jünger, “the problem is that a symbol does not think itself, but rather something else; it is a sign that finds its relation and signification in another, and represents that other. The sign and the symbol evoke something beyond the word, depriving the word of its original power; the word is used indirectly (...) A word can be manipulated. A word can be used for anything. Its meanings can be added or subtracted. It can also become the sign of something else. It becomes an excuse, an ambush, a shelter. With it, and only with it, one can cheat and lie, as without language there is no cheating and no lying.”²¹⁷ The contradiction between interpretation and the sign it interprets, beginning with the role of the harbinger in the Hermes myth, has revealed itself in the Early Modern Period as an unbridgeable paradox of the open

horizon of memory and remembrance (fixed signification or text) on the one side, and the present (the activity of assigning new meanings) on the other. Among all these forms of meaning, or statements subject to interpretation, hermeneutics has been dealing most intensely with speech and its fixed form – the text. Its historical evolution has included the allegorical interpretations of the Pergamon school, the historical-grammatical method of the Alexandrians, and the medieval hermeneutics as a teaching on the rules of exegesis (prevalent until the 18th century), whereas the Renaissance was mostly concerned with solving the hermeneutical problems related to working on texts in foreign languages. The great synthesis of German classical idealism and its worldview aimed at mastering the specificities of the historical in relation to the individual. Concerning that period, Gadamer was especially influenced by the hermeneutical critique of Friedrich Schlegel and by G. W. F. Hegel’s demand for an interpretation of “non-linguistic” arts. The “sciences of the mind”

(*Geisteswissenschaften*) of Wilhelm Dilthey in particular formulated a scientific demand for the hermeneutical method, while for Martin Heidegger the “phenomenology of existence” (*Dasein*) was hermeneutics in its original meaning, as a discipline signifying interpretation. The problem of method was treated in this context primarily by evoking various types of scientific and philosophical hermeneutics. Husserl was of the opinion that the natural sciences were interpretative, Dilthey emphasized the sharp distinction between scientific explanation and humanistic interpretation, and the humanities varied their forms of interpretation in different ways. In any case, the method always resulted from a philosophical position that could be reduced to two basic sources, according to which hermeneutics was understood either as a theory of interpretation or as an art of understanding. Gadamer’s reflections in *Truth and Method* were guided by the idea that language was a setting in which “I” and “the World” revealed their original belonging to each other. What resulted from that was that the hermeneutics he had elaborated could not be a doctrine on the method of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, but an attempt at understanding what they actually were. Universal hermeneutics should start from the thought that the one who seeks understanding is related to the object that comes to word through tradition. Thus, hermeneutics was placed “between” the past and the present, as its aim was not to develop a procedure of understanding, but to explain the conditions under which that

understanding happened. Therefore, the true hermeneutical event was not language as language, or language as grammar or lexis, but the coming to word of what had been told in the tradition. And an understanding that aims at action must itself be an acting one. According to Gadamer, hermeneutics does not posit itself with a method of its own against the object it seeks to know, as it is in itself the method that compels the meaning to speak, instead of speaking for it. The dialectics of experience is thus preceded by openness for experience, while the dialectics of response is preceded by the possibility of asking questions. In this way, hermeneutics becomes practical philosophy, while the encounter between the tradition and the present creates a “hermeneutical situation” in which we find ourselves when turning to the tradition in order to understand the present. In other words, the ahistorical present “merges” with the historical consciousness into the “one great horizon that moves from within and that, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness.”²¹⁸ Art plays an exceptionally important role in this process. Its typical feature is precisely the “hermeneutical situation” that is not characterized by subsequence, but by simultaneity and repetitiveness that invites us to converse and to participate. It is, in fact, a to-and-fro movement, backwards and forwards, modelled upon the movement of life itself (such as the “play of waves”, “play of light”, etc.).¹⁹ Evoking Plato’s maxim that the task of philosophical dialectics is to “collect a

simboličkom reprezentiranju zahtjev za hermeneutičkim traženjem identiteta djela upućuje nas da „učimo sricati“ abecedu i jezik onoga tko nam nešto predstavlja s namjerom sudjelovanja u zajedničkom postignuću. … Zajedničko postignuće, što je ujedno i treća točka antropologijskog utemeljenja iskustva „hermeneutičke situacije umjetnosti“, protivljenje je izolaciji koje se prikazuje kao svetkovina. Kao ceremonijalni čin, ili bacanje iz profanog u mitsko vrijeme (u terminima Mircea Eliade)²⁰, svetkovina se uprizoruje u formi običaja (ako nije puka navika reda), svečanim govorom i svečanom šutnjom. Takva intencija sjedinjenja u iskustvu umjetnosti sprečava raspadanje u zasebne razgovore ili izolaciju u pojedinačne doživljaje. I kao što Gadamerov pogled na „stapanje“ povijesnog horizonta s aktualnošću nadilazi prividnu paradoksalnost u susretu tradicije i moderniteta, modernost se raskriva kao prirodan slijed povijesti, ničim prekinut, do li dugotrajnom i turbulentnom tranzicijom metodâ i predmetnih područja istraživanja. Od tumačenja prema razumijevanju, i(li) od teksta prema iskustvu. … Dakle, naslijede nas samo po sebi ne uznemiruje, koliko to čine interpretativna i interpretirajuća načela te norme i paradigme njegova konceptualiziranja u odnosu na antropologijska utemeljenja „označavanja“ i „čitanja“. Među takvim „izdvajanjima“ ponajviše nas uznemiruje krhkost i promjenjivost značenja imanentna zastupajućim i receptivnim strategijama stvaratelja građe, bili oni javne institucije, umjetnici, teoretičari, kustosi...U svakom slučaju, policentrična nam perspektiva

naslijeđa, zrcaleći čitav niz samorazumijevajućih interpretacija, sugerira potrebu za sporazumijevanjem, kojima je „znanstvenost“ samo metodološki aspekt označiteljske artikulacije. Imajući pri tom na umu da svakoj „hermeneutici prošlosti“ prethodi razumijevanje „hermeneutičke situacije umjetnosti“ te da je pamćenje duboko proželo našu epohu zaborava, uznemirujući situaciju (samo prividne) znanstvene neutralnosti.

¹ Vintila Mihailescu, *Svakodnevnica nije više ono što je bila. Beleške jednog balkanskog antropologa u doba tranzicije*, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd, 2002.

² Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Routledge, London, 1972.

³ Marita Sturken, Lisa Cartwright, *Practices of Looking*, Oxford University Press inc., New York, 2001.

⁴ Aristotel, *O pesničkoj umetnosti*, Kultura, Beograd, 1955.

⁵ Brian Graham, “Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture?”, *Urban Studies*, Vol. 39, Nos 5–6, 1003–1017, 2002.

⁶ Izvor: Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De oratore* II, IX, 36, William Heinemann Ltd & Harvard university press (London, Cambridge Massachusetts), 1967., str. 224-225; Preuzeto s: Internet Archive, University of Toronto Libraries, <https://archive.org/details/cicerodeoratore01ciceuoft> (15. 5. 2014.)

⁷ *And as History, which bears witness to the passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives life to recollection and guidance to human existence, and brings tidings of ancient days, whose voice, but the orator’s, can entrust her to immortality?*

⁸ Prema: Boris Groys, *Učiniti stvari vidljivima: Strategije suvremene umjetnosti* (ur. Nada Beroš), Zagreb, Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, Biblioteka Refleksije, 2006.

⁹ Isto, 106.

¹⁰ Isto, 107.

¹¹ U slobodnom prijevodu „mudrost pamćenja“, za razliku od mnemopoetike, temelji se na spoznajnom konceptu, a ne na umjetničkom perspektivizmu.

¹² Tomislav Šola, *Eseji o muzejima i njihovoj teoriji : Prema kibernetičkom muzeju*, ICOM, Zagreb, 2003.

our eyes, and what we have been encouraged to reflect upon. And that is the function we call symbolic. … For Gadamer, however, the procedure of artistic symbolization does not mean representing something that is beyond the artwork. It is not the iconographic symbolism of finite vocabularies, but the symbolization of meaning, as symbolic representation in art does not need to depend on any “given thing.” On the contrary, the fact that what we can say about the artwork as such exists only in itself is, according to Gadamer, the universal demand of art, rather than the necessary condition of modern art. It is the structural character of art, comprehensive in its demand of community. In symbolic representation thus understood, the demand of hermeneutically seeking the artwork’s identity instructs us to “learn to spell” the alphabet and the language of the one who presents something to us, with the aim of participating in a common achievement. … This common achievement, which is also the third point in the anthropological foundation of the “hermeneutical situation of art,” means opposing the isolation that is presented as a ritual. As a ceremonial act, or a transfer from a profane time into a mythical one (using the terminology of Mircea Eliade),²⁰ the ritual is enacted in the form of a custom (unless it is a mere habit of arrangement), a festive speech or a festive silence. This intention of unification in the experience of art prevents its dissolution into separate conversations or its isolation in individual experiences. And as Gadamer’s view on the “merging” of the historical horizon with the present surpasses the apparent paradox

number of disparate things into one” (Phaedrus 265d), Gadamer has indicated the anthropological foundations of human experience, primarily the notions of play, symbols, and rituals. In this context, play is an elementary function of life, be it when we find its elements in religious and cultic rituals, be it as a “free impulse” in art. It is a movement that is not completed in a particular goal, which results from its character of “surplus” and its aiming at presentation. The role of the mind in human play opens with disciplining that play. However, play always demands co-play, which means that it is an essentially communicational activity, in which the borderline between the one “playing” and the one “watching” the play is blurred. In such a situation, there is something that is neither meaningful nor conceptual, or even purposeful, something that has, therefore, “prescribed” its own movements. However, the artwork is still there, even though not completed in an address. And it is precisely the hermeneutical identity of the artwork that will be founded in the (apparently elusive) unity of the past and the present through understanding. But if a (modern) artwork does not “mean” or “tell” anything, what is there to identify or understand? By filling the free space that the artwork has left, Gadamer says, we disclose the answer and that is called “experiencing art.” Thus, it means achieving reflection, which is what modern art instructs us to do through the indefiniteness of its instruction. It fills us with the awareness of the importance and the outstanding meaning of what there is in front of

¹³ Harald Weinrich, “Vergessener Schatten und neues Gedächtnis (Chamisso)”, u: *Lethe: Kunst und Kritik des Vergessen*, Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, München, 1999., 153.

¹⁴ Hans Georg Gadamer, *Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest*, Philipp Reclam jun., Stuttgart, 1977., 12.

¹⁵ Isto, 16.

¹⁶ Hans Georg Gadamer, *Warheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, Mohr Siebeck Verlag, Tübingen, 2010., 311.

¹⁷ Friedrich Georg Jünger, “Mit i jezik”, u: *Mit, tradicija, suvremenost*, Nolit, Beograd , 1972., 871.

¹⁸ Isto kao 16, 309.

¹⁹ Hans Georg Gadamer, “Umjetnost slike i umjetnost riječi”, u: *Slika i riječ*, Institut za povijest umjetnosti, Zagreb, 1997., 59.

²⁰ Prema: Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*, HMH, Boston, 1968.

in the encounter between the tradition and modernity, modernity is here disclosed as a natural sequence of history, uninterrupted by anything except the long-term and turbulent transition between the methods and the subject fields of research. It means proceeding from interpretation to understanding, and/or from the text to experience. … In other words, heritage does not unsettle us as such; instead, what unsettles us is the interpretative and interpretatizing principle, as well as the norms and paradigms of its conceptualization in relation to the anthropological foundations of “signification” and “reading”. In such “selections”, the most unsettling element is the fragility and mutability of meaning, which is inherent to the representative and receptive strategies of those who create the materials, be it the public institutions, artists, theoreticians, curators, or someone else. In any case, the polycentric perspective of heritage, which reflects a whole series of self-understanding interpretations, suggests a need of communication, where “scholarship” is merely a methodological aspect of signifying articulation. Thereby one should keep in mind that every “hermeneutics of the past” is preceded by understanding the “hermeneutical situation of art,” and that memory has thoroughly permeated our epoch of oblivion, disturbing the situation of (merely apparent) scholarly neutrality.

¹ Vintilă Mihailescu, *Svakodnevnica nije više ono što je bila. Beleške jednog balkanskog antropologa u doba tranzicije* [Everyday life is not what it used to be: Notes of a Balkan anthropologist in the age of transition], trans. Biljana Sikimić (Belgrade: Biblioteka XX vek, 2002).

² Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004).

³ Marita Sturken, Lisa Cartwright, *Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁴ Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. George Whalley (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997).

⁵ Brian Graham, “Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture?” *Urban Studies* 39/5-6 (2002), 1003-1017.

⁶ Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De oratore* II, IX, 36 (London and Cambridge, MA: William Heinemann Ltd & Harvard university press, 1967), 224-225; quoted from: <https://archive.org/details/cicerodeoratore01ciceuoft> (last accessed on May 15, 2014).

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ Boris Groys, “Art in the Age of Biopolitics: From Artwork to Art Documentation,” trans. Steven Lindberg, in *Catalogue to Documenta 11* (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 108-114.

⁹ Boris Groys, “On the New”, <http://www.uoc.edu/artnodes/espai/eng/art/groys1002/groys1002.html> (last accessed on May 15, 2014).

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ In rough translation, the “wisdom of memory”, unlike mnemopoetics, is based on a cognitive concept rather than artistic perspectivism.

¹² Tomislav Šola, *Eseji o muzejima i njihovoj teoriji: Prema kibernetičkom muzeju* [Essays on museums and their theory: Towards a cybernetic museum] (Zagreb: ICOM, 2003).

¹³ Harald Weinrich, “Vergessener Schatten und neues Gedächtnis (Chamisso)” in *Lethe: Kunst und Kritik des Vergessens* (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1999), 153.

¹⁴ Hans Georg Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful*, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 10.

¹⁵ Ibid., 13.

¹⁶ Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 317.

¹⁷ Friedrich Georg Jünger, “Mythos und Sprache,” in *Die Wirklichkeit des Mythos*, ed. Kurt Hoffman (Munich: Droemer/Knaur, 1965).

¹⁸ Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (as in n. 16), 304.

¹⁹ Ibid., 108.

²⁰ Cf. Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (Boston: HMH , 1968).