

TRADICIJA I KULTURNE INSTITUCIJE U BIH U RALJAMA ETNONACIONALIZMA I NEOLIBERALIZMA

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TRADITION AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE JAWS OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM

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SAŽETAK: Neoliberalna politika, rušeći komunizam, inaugurirala je novu vrstu nevidljivog nasilja, koja se više ne izražava jednomnom strategijom državne politike, koja je ideološkom svemoći i centralizmom kontrolirala kulturnu politiku; ona podmuklo, sveopćom ravnodušnošću i indolencijom, što se očituje u politici spektakla i zabave, zarade i profita, uništava bilo kakvu svijest o općem dobru, što ima za poraznu posljedicu sistematsko urušavanje institucija kulture Bosne i Hercegovine, značajnih za njenu opstojnost, kao što su, na primjer, Nacionalna umjetnička galerija, Zemaljski muzej, Kinoteka, Nacionalna biblioteka itd. Tako je pad Berlinskog zida označio ne samo završetak Hladnog rata i pad komunizma, nego i nestanak država usmjerene kulturne politike, koja nije dopuštala, makar planskom i centralističkom kulturnom politikom, srozavanje svijesti o općem kulturnom dobru i ružiranje kulturnih institucija od općeg državnog značaja. Postkomunistička država je, nasuprot tome, postala simbol-sinonim za represivni mehanizam moći, koja limitira kreativnost pojedinca, a onda i sve ono što označava opće kulturno dobro zajednice, implicitno, proglašava suvišnim i nepotrebnim.

Proces normalizacije-tranzicije u postkomunističkim zemljama odredila su dva u osnovi suprotstavljena mehanizma: jedan je princip kolektivnog identiteta, zasnovan na etničkim imaginacijama, a drugi na oslobođenoj ekonomiji i slobodi tržišta; oni bi, navodno, slobodnom razmjenom, *pacifikacijom dugovjekovnih etničkih konflikata* trebali povezati sve građane na „našim prostorima“. Pa, iako su ta dva principa inkompatibilna, ona se, kao šizoidna braća blizanci, postavljaju skupa i oba određuju sudbinu institucija od općeg značaja za tradiciju i budućnost BiH. Jedna tendencija vodi tome da se one podijele unutar etničkih teritorija, a druga da se uspostave kao samofinancirajuće institucije, koje bi se onda usmjerile prema popularističkoj kulturi zabave i spektakla. Etnonacionalističke fantazije, koje proglašavaju povratak na zlatno doba herojske prošlosti, time, ustvari,

više ruše samu tradiciju, nego što je njeguju; isto tako, tendencija rušenja tradicije može se prepoznati kao globalni proces s kojim se suočavaju muzeji diljem svijeta, u korist festivalske kulture zabave i spektakla.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: muzeji, galerije, tradicija, tranzicija, etnonacionalizam

Nakon pedesetogodišnje epohe socijalizma – od 1945. do 1991. godine – građani su bivše Jugoslavije „bačeni“, 1990-ih godina prošlog vijeka, u proces tranzicije, koji je, navodno, trebao normalizirati, pročititi, urediti i svesti na realnu mjeru i mogućnost društveno-političku svijest, koja je vjerovala da se snagom socijalne solidarnosti i revolucionarne volje može izgraditi novo, pravedno društvo, zasnovano na principu univerzalne radničke solidarnosti i jednakosti. Projekt komunizma je, otvaranjem tog procesa, proglašen velikom iluzijom, koja je, u nastojanju da stvori raj na zemlji, stvarala pakao, a stvaranje novog čovjeka, koji bi, vrlinom i snagom volje, stvorio novo i pravedno društvo, počelo se prepoznavati jedino u realnosti Gulaga, ili Golog otoka. Tranzicija uostalom i znači izlazak iz projekta zasnovanog u vjerovanju i nadi da je ljudska priroda kompatibilna s principom univerzalne pravde, slobode, itd. Nevidljiva moć tranzicije, za razliku od komunističkih nastojanja da se historija konstituira i odredi prema nekom uzvišenom cilju, upravo je u njezinoj navodnoj samoočiglednosti; ona se očituje kao najtvrdra realnost, što vlastitu legitimaciji crpi iz „normalnog toka istorije“, koja više ne teži da se, u okviru velikih naracija, podredi nekom uzvišenom cilju, utopijskom

HISTORIJSKI MUZEJ BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, SARAJEVO,
2013. FOTOGRAFIJA DRAGANA ANTONIĆ

HISTORICAL MUSEUM OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
SARAJEVO, 2013. PHOTO BY DRAGANA ANTONIĆ

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SUMMARY Having deposed communism, the neoliberal policy inaugurated a new type of invisible violence, which is no longer expressed through the unidirectional strategy of state politics, which would control cultural policy with ideological omnipotence and centralism. Instead, it has cunningly, with overall indifference and indolence, which is manifested in the politics of spectacle and entertainment, gain and profit, destroyed all awareness of the common good. Its disastrous consequence is a systematic demise of cultural institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, crucial for its existence, such as National Art Gallery, Regional Museum, Cinematheque, National Library, etc. Thus, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked not only the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism, but also the disappearance of states with a focused public policy, which had not allowed, despite their planned and centralised cultural policies, any decrease in awareness about the common cultural good, or the ruin of cultural institutions of universal public importance. Contrary to that, the post-communist state has become a symbol or synonym for a repressive mechanism of power, which limits creativity in individuals and implicitly proclaims all that represents the general cultural good in a community to be obsolete and unnecessary.

The process of normalization or transition in the post-communist countries has been defined by two essentially opposed mechanisms: the principle of collective identity, based on ethnic imagination, and another based on liberated economy and freedom of the market. These should allegedly, in free exchange and by *pacification of centuries-long ethnic conflicts*, connect all people in “our Region.” And even though these two principles are mutually incompatible, they are juxtaposed like a pair of schizoid twins and jointly determine the fate of institutions that have a crucial importance for the tradition and future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One tendency leads to their separation according to different ethnic territories, and another to their restructuring as self-financing institutions that are forced to serve the populist culture of entertainment and spectacle. The ethno-nationalist fantasies, which proclaim a return to the golden era of heroic past, thus destroy the tradition rather than cultivating it; and the tendency of destroying the tradition can also be recognized as a global process which museums throughout the world are facing today, pushed into the background for the sake of festival culture of entertainment and spectacle.

KEY WORDS: museums, galleries, tradition, transition, ethnonationalism.

After a fifty-year long period of socialism – from 1945-1991 – the citizens of former Yugoslavia were “thrown” into the process of transition in the 1990s, which was supposed to normalize, clarify, arrange, and reduce to a normal level and possibilities their social and political awareness, which was that the power of socialist solidarity and revolutionary will could build up a new and just society, based on the principle of universal solidarity and equality of the working population. In inaugurating that process, the project of communism was denounced as a huge illusion, which had created hell while trying to create paradise, while the creation of a new man, who could build up a new and just society with his virtue and willpower, was now compared only to the realities of Gulags or Goli Otok. After all, transition means abandoning the project based on confidence and hope that the human nature was compatible with the principles of universal justice, freedom, and so on. Its invisible power, contrary to the communist efforts to constitute and define history in accordance with some sublime goal, is manifested precisely in its alleged self-evidence: it is expressed as hard-core reality, drawing its legitimacy from the “regular flow of history,” which no longer strives to serve any sublime goal or utopian belief in a classless paradise on earth in the framework of master narratives, but turns to the “realistic possibilities of man” and his natural, egotistic impulses: desire for success, freedom unhindered by any external obstacle, and so

vjerovanju da se stvori besklasni raj na zemlji, već da se obrati „realnim mogućnostima čovjeka“ i njegovim prirodnim egoističnim nagonima: želj za uspjehom, za slobodom u kojoj ne postoji niti jedna vanjska prepreka... Za razliku od komunističkog vjerovanja, koje bi trebalo da odredi samu historiju, da je podredi svome transcendentalnom cilju, tranzicija, dakle, pušta historiju da se ona sama kreće vlastitim tokom, bez bilo kakvog usmjerenja i cilja. Ali, pri tom obratu, nameću se pitanja: nije li i sama normalizacija unutar tranzicije, ustvari, samo jedna konstrukcija? U kom pravcu odista ide tranzicija, kada se oslobađa utopijskog projekta? Da li je ona zbilja oslobođena utopija ako i kada ruši samu utopiju? Koliko je komunističkog iskustva u samom mehanizmu njegova prevladavanja? I još: da li je očiglednost, u kojoj se inzistira na odsutnosti ideologije, ustvari, samo drugo, prikriveno lice nje same, koja svojom navodnom ne-prisutnošću i odsutnošću, oglašava svoju istinsku prisutnost i svoju apsolutnu moć?

**NIJE LI I SAMA NORMALIZACIJA UNUTAR
TRANZICIJE, USTVARI, SAMO JEDNA
KONSTRUKCIJA? U KOM PRAVCU ODISTA
IDE TRANZICIJA, KADA SE OSLOBAĐA
UTOPIJSKOG PROJEKTA? DA LI JE ONA ZBILJA
OSLOBOĐENA UTOPIJA AKO I KADA RUŠI
SAMU UTOPIJU? KOLIKO JE KOMUNISTIČKOG
ISKUSTVA U SAMOM MEHANIZMU NJEGOVA
PREVLADAVANJA?**

**ISN'T THIS NORMALIZATION WITHIN THE
TRANSITION A MERE CONSTRUCTION?
WHAT IS THE DIRECTION TAKEN BY THE
TRANSITION WHEN LIBERATED FROM THE
UTOPIAN PROJECT? IS IT TRULY A LIBERATED
UTOPIA IF AND WHEN IT DESTROYS THE
UTOPIA ITSELF? HOW MUCH COMMUNIST
EXPERIENCE IS PRESENT IN THE MECHANISM
OF ITS OVERCOMING?**

on. Contrary to the communist belief that man should determine history and subject it to his transcendental goal, the transition lets it flow in its regular way, with no particular direction or target. This turn, however, raises some questions. Isn't this normalization within the transition a mere construction? What is the direction taken by the transition when liberated from the utopian project? Is it truly a liberated utopia if and when it destroys the utopia itself? How much communist experience is present in the mechanism of its overcoming? And again: is this self-evidence, so much insisted upon in the absence of ideology, just another, hidden face of it, as it uses its alleged non-presence and absence in order to announce its true presence and its absolute power? It is generally believed that the communist system in Yugoslavia, as in the rest of the Eastern Bloc, collapsed spontaneously, in a blitz-act of popular will, which at a given moment momentarily deposed the ossified, bureaucratic communist system. One should, however, neither overlook nor avoid the following

Uvriježeno je mišljenje da se komunistički sistem u Jugoslaviji, jednako kao i u čitavom Istočnom bloku, srušio spontano, kao neki blic-događaj narodne volje, koja je u datom času, momentalno, svrgnula okoštali, birokratski sistem komunizma. No, ni ovdje se, također, ne može ispustiti iz vida, niti olako zaobići pitanje: nije li se upravo u tom trenutačnom spontanitetu dogodio i neki vid nevidljive prisile, koji i nije, u samom tom događanju, bio toliko vidljiv i očigledan? Tim prije što je i sama tranzicija, u mnogolikim svojim aspektima, upravo svojom samoevidentnošću, jedan veoma opskuran proces o čijim je negativnim posljedicama teško i govoriti. Iako se predstavlja kao „povratak na normalu“, ona sama sadrži u sebi, u logici svoje izvedbe, više revolucionarnih elemenata nego i sama komunistička ideja prekida s tradicijom. Ona je, proglašavajući ljudsku prirodu egoističnom, te da, shodno tome, sve treba da počiva na zdravoj konkurenciji na slobodnom tržištu,



question: Wasn't there an aspect of invisible enforcement in that momentary spontaneity, which was merely not that visible or manifest in the event itself? Especially since the transition, in its various aspects, is in its self-evidence a rather obscure process, with negative consequences that are still difficult to estimate. Even though presented as a "return to the normal," it contains in itself, in the logic of its performance, even more revolutionary elements than the communist idea of breaking up with the tradition. By proclaiming human nature as something egotistic, which should therefore enjoy free competition on the free market, where the warrior instinct to conquer is transformed into marketing success, it has probably created a greater utopia-illusion than communism ever did in the territory of Yugoslavia. And eventually, the call for returning to the normal contains more destructive elements, both against the tradition and against the establish social norms, and they no longer originate from some political imperative, from above, as was the case with the one-

gdje se ratnički nagon za osvajanjem pretače u uspjeh na tržištu, stvorila možda veću utopiju-iluziju nego što ju je, na našim postjugoslavenskim prostorima, stvarao komunizam. I, naposljetku, u promociji povratka na normalu sadržano je više rušilačkih elemenata, kako spram tradicije tako i spram uvriježenih normi društva, koji više ne dolaze od nekog političkog imperativa odozgo, kako se to događalo u jednopartijskoj komunističkoj vlasti, već odozdo. Upravo zato je i sam otpor prema vlasti bio veći i žešći u vrijeme komunizma, nego u tranziciji, kada se i stječe puna sloboda u kritici same vlasti i iskazivanja vlastitih uvjerenja: tranzicijska vlast se ustvari i manifestira odozdo, kao unutrašnji uljez, koji se prihvaća kao vlastito tijelo, kao vlastito političko biće koje se slobodno iskazuje.

No, ako je komunistička praksa sadržavala imperativ vjerovanja i uvjeravanja, kao i centralističko nastojanje da se samo društvo uniformira, tranzicijska fantazija ne poznaje čvrstu granicu između

centra političkog djelovanja i otrgnute periferije, koja se ne uklapa u sistem; granica između njih postaje razlivena i rastezljiva, te se, u nedostatku čvrste definicije sistema, temeljnih premisa, politička volja objelodanjuje kao sveprisutna: političko se, na neprimjetan način, ukotvljuje u nepolitičnom. Proglašavajući egoistični ljudski interes kao pokretački i razvoja i ljudskog prosperiteta, ona se time uglavljuje u privatni interes, koji je, živeći samog sebe kao punu autonomiju u odnosu na opće dobro, određen novim mehanizmom vlasti, pa i same kontrole.

Upravo u tom svjetlu, svjetlu učinaka i posljedica tranzicije, treba promatrati i zatvaranje kod nas u Bosni i Hercegovini kulturnih institucija od općeg društvenog značaja, muzeja i galerija, kao i fenomen sveopće društvene apatije i političke paralize. Naime, i u suvremenom svijetu, posebno s ekspanzijom kulturne industrije i telekomunikacijske kulture, prisutno je povlačenje svijesti o općem kulturnom dobru; ono je kod nas s tranzicijom i navodnim



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THE NATIONAL
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AND HERZEGOVINA,
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party communist system, but from below. It is for this reason that resistance against the authorities was stronger and more vigorous at the times of communism than in the transition period, although now the citizens enjoy complete freedom in this respect, with the possibility of voicing their convictions. In fact, the transitional authorities come from below, as an intruder from within accepted as the society's own body, its own political being that is freely expressed.

But whereas the communist practice implied an imperative of beliefs and convictions, and a centralistic effort to create a uniform society, the transition fantasy does not know any firm border between the centre of political action and the severed periphery, which does not fit the system; the borderline between them becomes fluid and flexible, and in the absence of any clear definition of the system and its basic premises, the political will is manifested as omnipresent: quite inconspicuously, the political gets anchored in the apolitical. By presenting the egotistic

human interest as the *spiritus movens* of development and human prosperity, it gets embedded in private interest, which, presented as absolute autonomy with regard to the common good, is determined by the new mechanism of power and control. It is in this light, the light of effects and consequences of transition, that one should see the closing of cultural institutions of universal social significance, such as museums and galleries, here in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the phenomenon of general social apathy and political paralysis. In the contemporary world, particularly with the expansion of cultural industry and telecommunication culture, one can observe a decline in the awareness of the common cultural good; in this Region, it has acquired dramatic proportions with the transition and the supposed liberation of the cultural market, which affirms the politics of culture as a festival spectacle, with gain and profit as its imperatives. It is not only that this entertainment populism, in its whirl based on instant-culture, does not get involved with any

oslobađanjem kulturnog tržišta, koje afirmira politiku kulture kao festivalskog spektakla, čiji je imperativ zarada i profit, dobilo dramatične razmjere. Ne samo što se zabavni populizam u svome vrhlogu, koji počiva na instant-kulturi, ne upušta, niti ulazi u društveno-historijske procese, nego se tranzicijskim procesima ukidaju i zatvaraju kulturne institucije koje su opće kulturno i društveno dobro, a koje je komunizam stvarao, čuvao i njegovao. A muzeji i galerije nisu samo slijepi nosioci kulturne baštine, niti umrtvljeni arhiv; oni, uistinu, omogućuju stalno i uvijek novo odmotavanje tradicije, njeno novo iščitavanje, koje nije zasnovano na statičnoj slici svijeta, već na stalnom otvaranju novih horizonata, koji izrastaju i ispoljavaju se iz potencijala tradicije. Na žalost, ne postoji politička volja – ona je danas dobrano u rukama etnonacionalističke mafije – da se održavaju neprofitabilne kulturne institucije, koje bi prenosile tradiciju, ne samo kao skup uokvirenih zakona koje treba slijediti, nego kao poticaj za slobodu, rezoniranje i autonomno odlučivanje o samome sebi. Štaviše, ni Kantova ideja o tome da pojedinac treba da je slobodan i da, nezavisno od bilo kakvog autoriteta, odlučuje o samome sebi, nije ostvarljiva bez same predaje ili tradicije, koja mu omogućuje

i njezino nadvladavanje.¹ Zacijelo, tradicija profilira naše odluke i kada se od nje oslobađamo, ili kada je prevladavamo.² Jer: ako je politika oslobođene ekonomije odredila politiku prema našim kulturnim institucijama, onda je riječ o tome da slobode i nema, zato što je nemoguće zamisliti slobodu bez zajedništva, bez drugog, bez svijesti o općem dobru. Napokon, ako se prije, za vrijeme komunizma, kontrola slobode uspostavljala mehanizmima države, centralističkog reda i zakona, onda se danas kontrola slobode uspostavlja kroz rasklimanu i kaotičnu državu: nebriga, zapuštenost, indolentnost postaju nova strategija same vlasti, koja se više ne uspostavlja nekim centralističkim sustavom, nego disperzijom, mrežom nefunkcionalnosti, protiv koje se teže buniti nego protiv uređenog sustava, makar i centralističkog.

Bauk etnonacionalizama

„Povratak na normalu“ se kod nas desio i preko nacionalnih fantazija, koje su proglasile mitsku regeneraciju vremena i povratak iskonskoj kulturološkoj matrici. Naime, politički vakuum koji se stvorio povlačenjem vjerovanja u budućnost, koje je zauzimalo povlašteno mjesto moći, trebalo je, nakon pada komunizma,

A MUZEJI I GALERIJE NISU SAMO SLIJEPI NOSIOCI KULTURNE BAŠTINE, NITI UMRTVLJENI ARHIV; ONI, UISTINU, OMogućUJU STALNO I UVIJEK NOVO ODMOTAVANJE TRADICIJE, NJENO NOVO IŠČITAVANJE, KOJE NIJE ZASNOVANO NA STATIČNOJ SLICI SVIJETA, VEĆ NA STALNOM OTVARANJU NOVIH HORIZONATA, KOJI IZRATAJU I ISPOLJAVAJU SE IZ POTENCIJALA TRADICIJE.

MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES ARE NOT ONLY BLIND REPOSITORIES OF CULTURAL HERITAGE, THEY ARE NOT DEAD ARCHIVES; ON THE CONTRARY, THEY MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE TRADITION TO UNFOLD AGAIN AND AGAIN IN NEW WAYS, TO BE REINTERPRETED IN WAYS THAT ARE NOT BASED ON A STATIC IMAGE OF THE WORLD, BUT RATHER ON A PERMANENT OPENING OF NEW HORIZONS, WHICH EMERGE FROM THE TRADITION'S POTENTIAL AND MANIFEST THEMSELVES IN IT.

SENADIN

MUSABEGOVIĆ

socio-historical processes; the transition processes also abolish and close cultural institutions that are a common cultural and social good, and which communism had created, maintained, and protected.

Museums and galleries are not only blind repositories of cultural heritage, they are not dead archives; on the contrary, they make it possible for the tradition to unfold again and again in new ways, to be reinterpreted in ways that are not based on a static image of the world, but rather on a permanent opening of new horizons, which emerge from the tradition's potential and manifest themselves in it. Unfortunately, there is no political will – as it is today largely in the hands of an ethno-nationalist mafia – to maintain non-profitable cultural institutions that would transmit the tradition not only as a set of ready laws that must be obeyed, but as an impetus for freedom, for reasoning and independently deciding about one's own fate. For even the Kantian idea that the individual should be free and decide about his fate independently from any authority is hardly possible without the tradition, which also allows for its own overcoming.¹ Obviously, the tradition

shapes our decisions even when we liberate ourselves from it or surpass it.² For if the politics of liberated economy has determined the policy against our cultural institutions, then there is no freedom at all, as freedom cannot be imagined without community, without the awareness of the common good. Eventually, if in the past, during the communist rule, freedom was controlled through state mechanisms, with their centralistic order and law, then today it is controlled through a cranky and chaotic state. Negligence, carelessness, and indolence have become the new strategy of the authorities, which are no longer manifested in a centralistic system, but in dispersion and a network of non-functioning, which is more difficult to fight against than it would be the case with an ordered system, even if a centralistic one.

The spectre of ethno-nationalisms

“Return to the normal” occurred in this Region through national fantasies as well, which proclaimed a mythical regeneration of time and a return to the original cultural matrix. The political vacuum created after the decline of trust in the future, which

popuniti, trebalo je, zapravo, da nešto stane na to upražnjeno mjesto. Zagovrnici etnonacionalizma nisu oklijevali da tu prazninu ugrabe i nasale i da, istovremeno, vjerovanje, koje je bilo upravljeno i kretalo se prema budućnosti, smijene i postave na njegovo mjesto vjerovanje u povratak na „zlatnu prošlost“. Tome je, nesumnjivo, doprinijela i činjenica razočaranja u budućnost, odnosno: kada su kolektiviteti izgubili nadu u budućnost, prošlost im se ponudila kao izvjesnost i mogućnost.

Stoga se svaka nakana mijenjanja budućnosti za etnonacionalizam nametnula kao nepromišljena zabluda, pa, u neku ruku, i grijeh i izdaja svetog osjećanja pripadanja mesijanskom kultu pretka, u kojem je okupljena sva mudrost svijeta. U skladu s tim, kult se stvaranja novog čovjeka preinačio u arhaiski kult junaka, koji ne treba više da revolucionarnim konfliktom dijalektički mijenja svijet, već da ratničkom snagom prođe kroz proces kulturološke purifikacije, te se, na taj način, ujedno i vrati svome izvoru, duhovnome središtu i zavičaju. Tako se, na primjer, u srpskom nacionalizmu ne teži nekom novom društvu unutar procesa modernizacije, već arhaičnog obnovi srednjovjekovnog Dušanova carstva, preskačući i

zaobilazeći pitanje: na koji način se uopće možemo vratiti nečemu što smo već izgubili? Zar taj povratak na prošlost nije, sam po sebi, nemoguća misija, te je, kao evidencija i izvjesnost, također, utopija, koja ima manje realnih mogućnosti nego vjerovanje da se nešto može promijeniti u budućnosti? Na isti način, u etnonacionalizmu postoji destruktivni diskontinuitet spram komunizma, a koji je, ustvari, po mnogim svojim karakteristikama i sam kontinuitet. Zapravo, etnonacionalizam uspostavlja novi mit kolektiviteta, koji nije više utemeljen na općoj proleterskoj solidarnosti, bratstvu i jedinstvu, već na partikularnoj solidarnosti spram svog kolektiviteta, koji se, u značajnoj mjeri, temelji na bratoubojstvu. Kolektivistički mit se, dakle, sačuvao, ali je promijenio ruho, i njegovoj fantaziji južnoslavenski narodi su se nastojali sačuvati i zaštititi i od napada tranzicijskih zakona neoliberalnog tržišta. Mit o vlastitoj naciji, kao o jednoj familijarnoj kući, zemlji očeva i predaka, čiji nalog o vlastitoj samostalnosti i autonomiji treba mi živi da ispunimo, ugnijezdio se u balkanskoj svijesti kao novi politički imperativ. Nesumnjivo je da je jedan od razloga raspada Jugoslavije sadržan u velikodržavnim nacionalnim aspiracijama, protkanim

NAPOKON, AKO SE PRIJE, ZA VRIJEME KOMUNIZMA, KONTROLA SLOBODE USPOSTAVLJALA MEHANIZMIMA DRŽAVE, CENTRALISTIČKOG REDA I ZAKONA, ONDA SE DANAS KONTROLA SLOBODE USPOSTAVLJA KROZ RASKLIMANU I KAOTIČNU DRŽAVU: NEBRIGA, ZAPUŠTENOST, INDOLENTNOST POSTAJU NOVA STRATEGIJA SAME VLASTI, KOJA SE VIŠE NE USPOSTAVLJA NEKIM CENTRALISTIČKIM SUSTAVOM, NEGO DISPERZIJOM, MREŽOM NEFUNKCIONALNOSTI, PROTIV KOJE SE TEŽE BUNITI NEGO PROTIV UREĐENOG SUSTAVA, MAKAR I CENTRALISTIČKOG.

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EVENTUALLY, IF IN THE PAST, DURING THE COMMUNIST RULE, FREEDOM WAS CONTROLLED THROUGH STATE MECHANISMS, WITH THEIR CENTRALISTIC ORDER AND LAW, THEN TODAY IT IS CONTROLLED THROUGH A CRANKY AND CHAOTIC STATE. NEGLIGENCE, CARELESSNESS, AND INDOLENCE HAVE BECOME THE NEW STRATEGY OF THE AUTHORITIES, WHICH ARE NO LONGER MANIFESTED IN A CENTRALISTIC SYSTEM, BUT IN DISPERSION AND A NETWORK OF NON-FUNCTIONING, WHICH IS MORE DIFFICULT TO FIGHT AGAINST THAN IT WOULD BE THE CASE WITH AN ORDERED SYSTEM, EVEN IF A CENTRALISTIC ONE.

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had occupied a privileged position of power, was to be filled after the fall of communism: in fact, something was needed to replace that belief. The proponents of ethno-nationalism did not hesitate to snatch and colonize that gap, and at the same time they substituted a belief that was directed and moving towards the future through belief in a “golden past.” This process was undoubtedly supported by the fact that people had become disappointed with the future, in other words: when the collectives lost their hope in the future, the past offered itself as a certainty and an option.

Thus, ethno-nationalism has denounced all intention of changing the future as a reckless error, and even sin and betrayal of the sacred feeling of belonging to a messianic cult containing all wisdom of the world. In accordance with that, the cult of creating a new man was transformed into the archaic cult of the hero, which should no longer dialectically change the world in a revolutionary conflict, but undergo the process of cultural purification with warlike determination and thus return to its source, its spiritual centre, and its homeland.

Thus, for example, Serbian nationalism has not attempted the creation of a new society within the process of modernization, but an archaic restoration of Dušan’s medieval empire, overlooking and avoiding the question how one could even return to something that has been lost. Isn’t that return to the past an impossible mission in itself, and thus also a utopia, which is less realistic as a possibility than the belief that something could be changed in the future? By the same token, there is a destructive discontinuity in ethno-nationalism with regard to communism, which is actually continuity in many of its features. In fact, ethno-nationalism has established a new myth of collectiveness, which is no longer based on universal proletarian solidarity, brotherhood, and unity, but on particular solidarity with one’s own collective, which is largely based on fratricide. The collectivist myth has thus remained preserved, but has changed its appearance, and through its fantasy the peoples of former Yugoslavia have tried to protect and defend themselves from the attack of transitional laws of the neoliberal market. The myth of one’s nation as a family house, the land of fathers and ancestors, whose mandate of

DANAS SE BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA, U KOJOJ SE, POSLIJE DAYTONSKOG SPORAZUMA, RAT SAMO ZAUSTAVIO I ZALEDIO, A ČIJA NEDOVOLJNO UGAŠENA VATRA I DALJE TINJA, NALAZI U SITUACIJI KOJA NIKADA NIJE POSTOJALA U NJEZINOJ HISTORIJI: PODIJELJENOST TERITORIJA NA NACIONALNOJ OSNOVI NOVA JE POLITIČKA FORMULA KOJA JE NASTUPILA U BOSNI POČETKOM 1990-IH GODINA. ALI, U TOJ NOVOJ POLITIČKOJ FORMULI POSTOJI I JEDAN PARADOKS, KOJI SE ODNOSI UPRAVO NA SAMU TRADICIJU I NACIONALISTIČKU VIZIJU POVRATKA NA SVETU PROŠLOST. NAIME, ETNONACIONALIZAM PROPAGIRA POVRATAK NA ZLATNU PROŠLOST, A SVJEDOCI SMO ČINA DA SE MUZEJI I GALERIJE, U KOJIMA JE TA ZLATNA PROŠLOST UPRAVO ARHIVIRANA, UKIDAJU I ZATVARAJU.

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SENADIN
MUSABEGOVIĆ

TODAY, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, IN WHICH THE WAR WAS SIMPLY STOPPED AND FROZEN BY THE DAYTON AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH ITS INSUFFICIENTLY STIFLED FIRE STILL SMOULDERS, IS IN A SITUATION THAT NEVER BEFORE EXISTED IN ITS HISTORY: THE TERRITORIAL DIVISION ON NATIONAL GROUNDS IS A NEW POLITICAL FORMULA, WHICH EMERGED IN BOSNIA ONLY IN THE EARLY 1990S. BUT THERE IS ALSO SOMETHING PARADOXICAL IN THAT NEW POLITICAL FORMULA, AND THAT PARADOX REFERS TO THE TRADITION AS SUCH AND THE NATIONALIST VISION OF RETURNING TO THE SACRED PAST. FOR ETHNO-NATIONALISM ENDORSES A RETURN TO THE GOLDEN PAST, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE WITNESS THE DEMISE AND CLOSING OF MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES AS THOSE PLACES IN WHICH THAT GOLDEN RETURN TO THE TRADITION IS MERELY AN INVENTION

nacionalističkim fantazijama o „izabranom narodu“, čije je mesijansko poslanje u stvaranju poretka zasnovanog na svojoj vjeri, na svome jeziku, na svojoj zemlji, u svome narodu, u svojoj državi. Ali to „svoje“, kao novo osjećanje kolektivnog sopstva, trebalo je preokroiti, pri čemu je najbolji način prekreiranja vlastitoga identiteta – rat. Učvršćivanje osjećanja pripadnosti svojoj vjeri, svom jeziku, zemlji, narodu i državi dogadalo se 1990-ih godina u ratnom diskursu. Stoga je i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini, vođen oko podjele zemlje, a podržavan velikodržavnim interesima susjednih država – Srbije i Hrvatske, više počivao na novom kreiranju kolektivnog sopstva nego na povratku na arhaično, prahistorijsko sopstvo. Danas se Bosna i Hercegovina, u kojoj se, poslije Daytonskog sporazuma, rat samo zaustavio i zaledio, a čija nedovoljno ugašena vatra i dalje tinja, nalazi u situaciji koja nikada nije postojala u njezinoj historiji: podijeljenost teritorija na nacionalnoj osnovi nova je politička formula koja je nastupila u Bosni početkom 1990-ih godina. Ali, u toj novoj političkoj formuli postoji i jedan paradoks, koji se odnosi upravo na samu tradiciju i nacionalističku viziju povratka na *svetu prošlost*. Naime, etnonacionalizam propagira povratka na zlatnu prošlost, a svjedoci smo čina da se muzeji i galerije, u kojima je ta zlatna prošlost upravo arhivirana, ukidaju i zatvaraju. Ne govori li to i o jednoj drugačijoj osobini etnonacionalizma, o tome, zapravo, da je povratak tradiciji za njega samo jedna

invenција? Tim prije što ni jedna tradicija bilo kojeg naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini ne počiva na čvrstom identitetu, koji *nas* jasno i sasvim pouzdano prepoznaje i dijeli od *njih*. Jer, u historiji Bosne i Hercegovine tradicija poznaje mnogostrukost utjecaja, njihovu međuprožetost, tako da fiksirana čvrsta granica, što konstituira samozatvoreni identitet, nije nikada ni postojala. A kada se početkom 1990-ih godina javila kriza unutar same zajednice, tada se osjetila i potreba za stvaranjem političkog identiteta zasnovanog na jasnome sopstvu, gdje je politizacija granice trebala kreirati i proizvoditi identitet. No, to novo političko sopstvo, iako izazvano krizom, i samo je počelo generirati novu krizu, tako da se kriza, nastala 1990-ih godina, njenim djelovanjem uopće nije ni prevladala. Stoga, iako se zaklinje u svetu prošlost, etnonacionalizam je istodobno i ruši, zato što ona ne počiva na živoj tradiciji, već na mitskom ospoljavanju „svoje tradicije“, koja treba da se stvrde i okošta u nepromjenjive vrijednosti, prema kojima treba imati odnos idolopoklonstva i u kojem je kolektivna istina bitnija od univerzalne. Zapravo, nacionalistička euforija govori o zlatnom dobu prošlosti, a to je, ustvari, mit o Edenu, o raju koji je postojao prije samog stvaranja svijeta, gdje povratka na prošlost, već sam po sebi upućuje na svoju nemogućnost, zato što sama prošlost tada postaje utopija, odnosno religiozna fantazija u nacionalističkom ruhu, u kojoj se onda bliska prošlost nastoji isključiti, izbaciti, zaboraviti, kao što je to, na primjer, slučaj

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HISTORIJSKI MUZEJ BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, SARAJEVO, 2013.
FOTOGRAFIJA DRAGANA ANTONIĆ

HISTORICAL MUSEUM OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, SARAJEVO,
2013. PHOTO BY DRAGANA ANTONIĆ

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independence and autonomy we who are living today should fulfil, has been embedded in the consciousness of the Balkan peoples as the new political imperative.

One of the reasons of the fall of Yugoslavia has undoubtedly been the fantasies of nation and statehood, permeated by nationalist fantasies of the “chosen people” whose messianic mission in creating an order has been based on its own religion, its own language, its own territory, its own people, and its own state. But that “own”, as the new feeling of the collective self, was to be redrawn, whereby the best way of redrawing one’s identity was – war. This assertion of the feeling of belonging to one’s own religion, language, land, people, and state was taking place in the 1990s through the war discourse. Therefore the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, aimed at dividing the land, and supported by the expansion pretensions of the neighbouring countries – Serbia and Croatia – was more about creating the new self than about returning to the archaic, primordial one. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the war was simply stopped and frozen by the Dayton Agreement, although its insufficiently stifled fire still smoulders, is in a situation that never before existed in its history: the territorial division on national grounds is a new political formula, which emerged in Bosnia only in the early 1990s. But there is also something paradoxical in that new political formula, and that paradox refers to the tradition as such and

the nationalist vision of returning to the sacred past. For ethno-nationalism endorses a return to the golden past, but at the same time we witness the demise and closing of museums and galleries as those places in which that golden return to the tradition is merely an invention? All the more so as none of the ethnic traditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina used to rely on a firmly defined identity, which would have reliably recognized *us* and separate us from *them*. In the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the tradition consists of multiple influences with their interconnectedness, so that there was never a fixed borderline between them to constitute self-enclosed identities. But when in the early 1990s a crisis emerged within the community, this created a need of constructing such political identities based on the clearly defined selfhood, where the politicization of the border would serve to generate them. But that new political self began itself to generate a new crisis, before the original crisis from the early 1990s could not be overcome. Therefore, even though swearing by the sacred past, ethno-nationalism destroys it at the same time, since it is not based on a living tradition, but on a mythical expression of one’s “own tradition,” which must be condensed and petrified into unchangeable values, to be venerated as idols, in which the collective truth is more important than the universal one. In fact, the nationalist euphoria speaks of the golden past, which is in fact, the myth of Eden, a paradise

s iskustvom zajedničkog življenja južnoslavenskih naroda za vrijeme Titova socijalizma.

Isto tako, etnonacionalizam nastoji da svoju prošlost ispere i razdvoji i da je tako ispranu podijeli u zasebne nacionalne parcele. Iz same tradicije se isključuje onaj strani „uljez“, otjelotvoren u drugom, u drugom narodu, u strancu, a uistinu – događa se isključenje njih samih. Iz vlastite tradicije posebno se briše iskustvo neprijatno za „sopstvenu“ nacionalnu prošlost. Srpski je nacionalizam, na primjer, proglasio sve ono što dolazi iz iskustva Otomanskog imperija neprijateljskim, stranim, tamnim vilajetom, pa čak i mitskom Golgotom, dok su neke, posebno religiozne bošnjačke elite svoj duhovni centar prepoznavale u Istanbulu, a nastanak Bosne i Hercegovine locirale u vrijeme Otomanskog imperija, zanemarujući tako činjenicu da njen historijski i državni legitimitet počinje sa srednjovjekovnom državom. Srpski pisac Stanislav Vinaver je u svom predgovoru za *Hiljadu i jednu noć* duhovito primijetio da mu oni jezični čistunci koji bi htjeli da iz jezika isključe sve tuđice, a s obzirom da veliki broj riječi u „našem jeziku“ vuče korijen iz turskog jezika, kao što su to, na primjer, jetra, bubreg..., djeluju kao ljudi koji bi iz stvarnog ljudskog organizma izbacili njegove organe. Ta opaska je, moglo bi se reći, imala u Bosni i Hercegovini svoje bolno otjelotvorenje 1990-ih godina, kada se prekrajalo novo političko sopstvo etničkim čišćenjem, odnosno navodnim humanim preseljenjem;

UMJETNIČKA GALERIJA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE,
SARAJEVO, 2013. FOTOGRAFIJA DRAGANA ANTONIĆ

ART GALLERY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
SARAJEVO, 2013. PHOTO BY DRAGANA ANTONIĆ

that existed before the creation of the world, where return to the past implies its own impossibility, as the past becomes a utopia, a religious fantasy in a nationalist attire, in which the more recent past is to be excluded, expelled, and forgotten, as has been the case with the experience of the Yugoslav people living in a joint state during Tito's socialism.

At the same time, ethno-nationalism seeks to purify and separate its past, and to divide it, thus purified, into various national packages. The foreigner or "intruder" is excluded from the tradition, embodied in the Other, another nation or member of another ethnic group, although what really happens is – the exclusion of oneself. Experiences that are embarrassing for one's "own" national past are particularly carefully erased from one's tradition. Thus, Serbian nationalism has proclaimed everything related to the experience of Ottoman Empire as belonging to the enemy, the foreign and dark *vilayet*, or even a mythical Golgotha, whereas some particularly religious Bosnian Muslim elites have adopted Istanbul as their spiritual centre, and dated the emergence of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the epoch of the Ottoman Empire, ignoring the fact that its historical legitimacy and its statehood can be traced back to the medieval state. In his preface to a translation of *A Thousand and One Nights*, Serbian writer Stanislav Vinaver remarked wittily that those linguistic purists who would like to exclude all loanwords from

iza koga je, izbacivanjem ljudskih tijela, bilo to da se izbrusi tradicija u svojoj izvornoj čistoći.

Upravo zbog toga su pojedine kulturne institucije i muzeji u Bosni i Hercegovini postali više predmet političkog spora nego nekog jedinstvenog i nepristranog pristupa njima. Tako je, na primjer, Muzej „Sarajevo 1878–1918“, koji se prije rata zvao „Muzej Mlade Bosne“, a koji je simbolizirao herojstvo Gavrila Principa, koji je, ubojstvom austrougarskog prijestolonasljednika i njegove bremenite supruge, doveo do Prvog svjetskog rata – u današnjem kontekstu poprimio i druga značenja. Naime, za srpski nacionalizam Gavrilo Princip i njegova gesta pobuna su protiv imperijalne okupacijske vlasti, te se on veliča kao heroj i mučenik za narodnu pravdu, dok je u bošnjačkom i hrvatskom nacionalizmu on terorist, hajduk, koji je presjekao prosvjetiteljsku misiju legalnih vlasti.

U prvom slučaju, sasvim se zaobilazi i zanemaruje činjenica da je Gavrilo Princip ubio, doduše nenamjerno, i prijestolonasljednikovu



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language seem to him like people who would like to empty the human organism from all of its organs, regarding the fact that a large number of words in "our language" originates from Turkish – among others, words for liver or kidneys. One might say that this remark was painfully actualized in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, when the new political self was being reinvented with the help of ethnic cleansing and allegedly humane translocation of people, the purpose of which was to polish the tradition in its original purity by expelling human bodies.

It is for these reasons that certain cultural institutions and museums in Bosnia and Herzegovina have become a subject of political contestation instead of a unified and objective approach. Thus, for example, "Sarajevo 1878–1918" Museum, which used to be called "Museum of Young Bosnia" before the war, meant to symbolize the heroic deed of Gavrilo Princip, who had murdered the Austrian heir to the throne and his pregnant wife, which eventually led to World War I – acquired additional meaning in the present-day context. Namely, for Serbian nationalism,

ženu Sofiju, za koju neki tvrde da je bila trudna, te da je ostvarenje nacionalnih prava u sprezi s nasilnim činom ubojstva, u kojem se netko bez suda proglašava krivim, pravno, pa i etnički, nedopustiv čin, tim prije što terorizam nije uspio svrgnuti nikoga s vlasti, niti promijeniti postojeći poredak. Samo je nedugo, nakon tog čina, počeo Prvi svjetski rat, u kojem je, isto tako, stradao i srpski narod, a čije krvave posljedice su generirale i Drugi svjetski rat. U drugom se, pak, slučaju gubi iz vida činjenica da je austrougarski prijestolonasljednik Franz Ferdinand došao u Sarajevo da prisustvuje vojnim manevrima, koji ne predstavljaju misiju edukacijskog prosvjetiteljstva, nego militantnu prijetnju susjednim državama, pa i samom teritoriju na kojem se manevi izvode, te da je Austro-ugarski imperij, koji je židovski pisac Joseph Roth nazvao „vrtom naroda“, bio, i pored svog multinacionalnog karaktera, okupacijsko-kolonijalna vlast na ovim prostorima.³ Stoga, spor oko tradicije nije u tome što postoje nekompatibilne istine, te što svaka tradicija počiva na jednoj perspektivi, koja isključuje drugu, kao da odista postoje tri vjerodostojne istine – srpska, hrvatska i bošnjačka. Po tom modelu, svaka istina i princip solidarnosti prvo mora uključiti vlastitu zajednicu, pa tek onda otvoriti mogućnost komuniciranja s drugom zajednicom,

kao i s drugom kulturom. Iako etnonacionalne fantazije tradiciju proglašavaju kao zaokruženo iskustvo, esencijalistički nepromjenjivo, a u čijem autoritetu je skupljena historijska mudrost, i u kojem svaki član zajednice prepoznaje svoje mjesto i funkciju, ona je, ipak, više korištena kao invencija koja markira vlastitu teritorijalnu i kulturološku granicu iz koje treba isključiti drugog i drugu kulturu.

Tako, rekonstrukcija i ponovna izgradnja džamija, crkava, kao i drugih sakralnih objekata, nerijetko služi tome da se istakne vlastita nacionalna veličina, koja demonstrira svoju dominaciju nad drugom kulturom, po cijenu da se veličina rekonstruiranih vjerskih objekata, ili drugih artefakata, ne uklapa ni u urbani, ni u prirodni kontekst u kojem je smještena, niti izražava kontinuitet sa vlastitom tradicijom; one, kao takve, više služe tome da budu prijetnja drugoj kulturi kojoj se obraćaju, nego istinski doprinos vlastitoj. Crkva svetog Petra i Pavla u Mostaru, na primjer, koja je izgrađena u neoromaničkom stilu 1867. godine za vrijeme Otomanskog imperija, a koja je barbarski strušena tijekom ratnih događaja u 1992. godini, poslije rata rekonstruirana je kao monumentalna građevina, koja sa svojim glomaznim zvonikom visokim 107 metara poništava njena prijašnja estetska, pa i

I AKO ETNONACIONALNE FANTAZIJE TRADICIJU PROGLAŠAVAJU KAO ZAOKRUŽENO ISKUSTVO, ESENCIJALISTIČKI NEPROMJENJIVO, A U ČIJEM AUTORITETU JE SKUPLJENA HISTORIJSKA MUDROST, I U KOJEM SVAKI ČLAN ZAJEDNICE PREPOZNAJE SVOJE MJESTO I FUNKCIJU, ONA JE, IPAK, VIŠE KORIŠTENA KAO INVENCija KOJA MARKIRA VLASTITU TERITORIJALNU I KULTUROLOŠKU GRANICU IZ KOJE TREBA ISKLJUČITI DRUGOG I DRUGU KULTURU.

EVEN THOUGH ETHNO-NATIONAL FANTASIES PROCLAIM THE TRADITION AS A COMPLETE EXPERIENCE, ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGEABLE, WHICH CONTAINS HISTORICAL WISDOM GATHERED IN ITS AUTHORITY, IN WHICH EACH MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY RECOGNIZES HIS PROPER PLACE AND FUNCTION, IT IS ACTUALLY USED AS AN INVENTION DEMARCATING ITS OWN TERRITORIAL AND CULTURAL BORDER IN ORDER TO EXCLUDE THE OTHER AND HIS CULTURE.

Gavrilo Princip and his gesture symbolize rebellion against the authorities of imperial occupation, which is why he is celebrated as a hero and martyr for national justice, whereas for the Bosnian Muslim and Croatian nationalisms he was a terrorist, a bandit who interrupted the enlightenment mission of the legal authorities. In the former case, one entirely overlooks and neglects the fact that Gavrilo Princip also killed, albeit unintentionally, the Archduke's wife Sophie, who is claimed by some to have been pregnant, and that the accomplishment of national rights combined with a violent act of murder, in which someone was proclaimed guilty without even being judged, is a legally and also ethnically impermissible, all the more so because terrorism has never succeeded in deposing a ruler or changing the current social order. The only achievement was that soon after that act World War I began, in which the Serbian people suffered as well, while its bloody consequences generated the circumstances for World War II. In the latter case, again, one overlooks the fact that Archduke Franz Ferdinand came to Sarajevo to be present at the military manoeuvres, which does not seem like a mission of educational enlightenment, but a militant threat directed at the neighbouring countries and even the territory where they

are performed. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, nicknamed "the garden of peoples" by Jewish writer Joseph Roth, was despite its multinational character a force of occupation and colonialism in this Region.³

Therefore, the conflict around the tradition is not caused by the fact that there are incompatible truths, and that each tradition relies on a single perspective, excluding the others, as if there were really three credible truths – Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian Muslim. According to that model, every truth and principle of solidarity must first include one's own community and only then open up the possibility of communicating with another community or another culture. Even though ethno-national fantasies proclaim the tradition as a complete experience, essentially unchangeable, which contains historical wisdom gathered in its authority, in which each of its members recognizes his proper place and function, it is actually used as an invention demarcating its own territorial and cultural border in order to exclude the Other and his culture.

Thus, the reconstruction and rebuilding of mosques, churches, and other sacral objects often serves the purpose of emphasizing one's national greatness, demonstrating one's domination over

religiozna svojstva, te postaje više simbol nacionalne snage i moći, s kojim se šalje implicitna poruka drugom o kolektivnoj neuništivosti naroda. Izgradnja pravoslavnih crkve nadomak Potočara, isto kao i na privatnom posjedu Fate Orlović, sigurno nije zov i nalog autentične srpske i pravoslavne kulture i tradicije. Mnoge džamije, koje su srušene tokom rata 1990-ih godina, restaurirane su, a da se pritom nisu poštovala autentične mjere i proporcije; tako, na primjer, Turhan Emin-begovoj džamiji u Ustikolini, koja je sagrađena 1448. godine, nelegalno i nepropisno je produžena munara sa 37 na 60 metara, zbog čega je Komisija za očuvanje nacionalnih spomenika BiH podnijela i tužbu. Čuvena izreka gradonačelnika Trebinja, u toku bombardiranja Dubrovnika, da će oni sagrađiti „stariji i ljepši Dubrovnik“ od onoga koji se ruši, upravo očitava odnos etnonacionalizma ne samo prema drugoj kulturi, već i prema svojoj vlastitoj. Jer, etnonacionalizam odista kao i da nastoji da sagrađi vlastitu tradiciju, „ljepšu i stariju“ od one koja im je dodijeljena; oni kao da se, ustvari, stide svoje vlastite prošlosti i tradicije.

Sedam institucija, koje su trenutno u krizi, ne potcrtava neku monumentalnu herojsko-nacionalnu ahistorijsku veličinu, koja u svojoj snazi nadilazi bilo koji historijski determinizam; one u sebi nose iskustvo o međupročimanju tradicije, njezinoj mnogostrukosti. A, etnonacionalizam ne priznaje bilo kakav diskontinuitet u samoj tradiciji, niti susret, pa ni sudar heterogenih

kultura, nego inzistira na glamuroznoj, monumetalnoj prošlosti, u kojoj se apologetski pristupa vlastitim historijskim veličinama, koje kroz palanačku prizmu postaju još „ljepše i starije“. Kritička svijest spram „sopstvene prošlosti“, o kojoj govori Nietzsche, etnonacionalizam je sasvim zaobišla.

Sprega neoliberalizma i etnonacionalizma

Iako bi etnonacionalizam i neoliberalizam trebali biti dva suprotna i suprotstavljena procesa – jedan inzistira na individualizmu, fluidnosti, brzini, slobodnom kretanju ljudi i kapitala, antiutopijskom projektu..., drugi na kolektivizmu, čvrstoj tradiciji, ahistorijskom vremenu, uređenom simboličkom poretku, u kojem svatko prepoznaje vlastito mjesto i položaj..., oni, ipak, u tranziciji nalaze svoj zajednički jezik. Može se čak reći da moć, koja paralizira društvo i zatvara njene kulturne institucije, čini permanentni kaos s kojim se vlada ljudima upravo u raspolućenosti i nelogičnom spoju tih dvaju procesa. Ako je to tako, onda slijedi neizbježno pitanje: kako je zbilja taj nelogični

A, ETNONACIONALIZAM NE PRIZNAJE BILO KAKAV DISKONTINUITET U SAMOJ TRADICIJI, NITI SUSRET, PA NI SUDAR HETEROGENIH KULTURA, NEGO INZISTIRA NA GLAMUROZNOJ, MONUMETALNOJ PROŠLOSTI, U KOJOJ SE APOLOGETSKI PRISTUPA VLASTITIM HISTORIJSKIM VELIČINAMA, KOJE KROZ PALANAČKU PRIZMU POSTAJU JOŠ »LJEPŠE I STARIJE«.

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ETHNO-NATIONALISM DOES NOT ACCEPT ANY DISCONTINUITY IN TRADITION, NOT EVEN AN ENCOUNTER OR A CLASH OF HETEROGENEOUS CULTURES; INSTEAD, IT INSISTS ON A GLAMOROUS, MONUMENTAL PAST, IN WHICH ONE APPROACHES ONE'S HISTORICAL GREATNESSES IN AN APOLOGETIC WAY, WHICH THROUGH THIS PAROCHIAL PRISM BECOME "MORE ANCIENT AND MORE BEAUTIFUL."

another culture, even if the size of these reconstructed religious buildings does not fit the urban or the natural context in which it is placed, and it even fails to express the continuity of one's tradition; instead, they are used to threaten the other culture, which they are actually addressing, instead of being a genuine contribution to one's own. For example, the church of St Peter and St Paul in Mostar, which was built in 1867, in the Ottoman epoch, in the neo-Romanesque style, and was then barbarically demolished in 1992, during the war, was reconstructed after the war as a monumental building, whose heavy, 107-metre high belfry counters its former aesthetic and even religious features, becoming instead a symbol of national strength and power, used to send an implicit message to the Other about the collective indestructibility of the people. The construction of an Orthodox church near Potočare, same as the one on the private property of Fata Orlović, was certainly not answering the call and mandate of the authentic Serbian and Orthodox culture and tradition. Many mosques that were demolished during the war of the 1990s were later restored without respecting their original measurements and proportions; this, Turhan Emin-bey's mosque in Ustikolina, originally built in 1448, obtained an illegally built *munara* that was prolonged from 37 to 60 metres, completely against the regulations, which earned it an official complaint by the Commission for the Protection of National Monuments in Bosnia

and Herzegovina. The famous statement by the mayor of Trebinje during the shelling of Dubrovnik, namely that they would build a "more ancient and more beautiful Dubrovnik" than the one they were destroying, reflects well the attitude of ethno-nationalism not only towards another culture, but also towards one's own. For ethno-nationalism indeed seems to be building its own tradition as "more ancient and more beautiful" than the given one; it seems, in fact, to be ashamed of its own tradition.

The seven institutions that are currently in crisis do not represent some monumental, heroic importance that would surpass all historical determinism; but they embody an experience of the interconnectedness of tradition, and of its variety. Ethno-nationalism does not accept any sort of discontinuity in tradition, not even an encounter or a clash of heterogeneous cultures; instead, it insists on a glamorous, monumental past, in which one approaches one's historical greatnesses in an apologetic way, which through this parochial prism become "more ancient and more beautiful." The critical awareness of the "self-overcoming" past, of which Nietzsche wrote, has completely failed to affect ethno-nationalism.

spoj tih dvaju procesa uopće moguć? Oni jedan drugog, kao dva šizofrena brata blizanca, potpomažu i učvršćuju, i to, paradoksalno, međusobnim isključivanjem. Naime, sprema između šizofrene deteritorijalizacije kapitalizma i paranoične reteritorijalizacije centralističkih država, a o kojoj govore Deleuze i Guattari, uobličila se, poslije pada Berlinskog zida, u novim odnosima.⁴ Uvriježeno je, naime, mišljenje da deteritorijalizacija stvara, kao svoju kontrareakciju, reteritorijalizaciju, odnosno da se, zbog globalizacijske logike kapitalizma – brisanja geografskih granica, poništavanja legitimiteta lokalnih kultura i tradicionalne vlasti i autoriteta – stvaraju, kao kontrareakcija, snažne centralističke poluge moći, koje nastoje fiksirati vlastitu granicu spram vanjskog svijeta, primjerice – Sjeverna Koreja, i da sačuvaju tradiciju – fundamentalizam, što je, posebno u slučaju postkomunističkih društava, nadišlo svoju binarnu suprotstavljenost i isključivost. Naime, ta kontrareakcija, kao čvrsta granica, koja odvaja jedan sistem od drugog, ma koliko oni bili povezani bipolarnom isključivošću Berlinskog zida, kada su, za vrijeme Hladnog rata, i jedan i drugi trebali onog drugog kao neprijatelja, kako bi legitimirali svoj vlastiti sistem⁵, danas je fluidnija, nevidljivija i, samim tim, sveprisutnija. Ethnonacionalizam nije proglasio rat kapitalizmu, niti mu je on više potreban da kroz radikalnu isključivost samog sebe legitimira; naprotiv, on samo na implicitnom, simboličkom nivou stvara iluziju zaštite od

kapitalizma i funkcionira kao neka kolektivna utjeha, a, uistinu, on odista uvodi i implementira kapitalizam.

Suvremena moć je, dakle, u tome što deteritorijalizacija i reteritorijalizacija idu skupa, čak, čini se, slijepljene, a iz sive zone same granice koja je između njih, iz njezina udvostručenja, upravo i nastaje svekolika moć kontrole koja paralizira sve institucije. No, iako etnonacionalizam u svojoj političkoj fantaziji naciju ne identificira s apstraktnom idejom institucionalne solidarnosti, već s konkretnom idejom familijarnog bratstva, a stanovanje na određenoj zemlji s izgradnjom dugovjekovnog doma u kojem su utkani snovi predaka i sinova koji tek treba da se rode, a tradiciju predstavlja kao esencijalistički obrazac u kojem se može pronaći utjeha i zaštita od svakodnevne nesigurnosti, ipak se građani, u svakodnevnoj realnosti, nisu nikada osjećali toliko isključenim, izoliranim i odvojenim od vlastite nacionalne familije i vlastitog doma kao u postkomunističkoj eri. Štaviše, i sama kolektivna identifikacija, kada se predstavlja u fantaziji populizma, apstraktna je, ustvari,

ETNONACIONALIZAM NIJE PROGLASIO RAT KAPITALIZMU, NITI MU JE ON VIŠE POTREBAN DA KROZ RADIKALNU ISKLJUČIVOST SAMOG SEBE LEGITIMIRA; NAPROTIV, ON SAMO NA IMPLICITNOM, SIMBOLIČKOM NIVOU STVARA ILUZIJU ZAŠTITE OD KAPITALIZMA I FUNKCIONIRA KAO NEKA KOLEKTIVNA UTJEHA, A, UISTINU, ON ODISTA UVODI I IMPLEMENTIRA KAPITALIZAM.

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When neoliberalism meets ethno-nationalism

Even though ethno-nationalism and neoliberalism should be two contrary and opposed processes – one insisting on individualism, fluidity, speed, the free movement of humans and capital, the anti-utopian project, and the other one on collectivism, steady tradition, non-historical time, and a firm symbolic order, in which everyone knows his own place and position, in the transition period they find a common language. It may even be said that power, which paralyzes the society and closes its cultural institutions, produces a permanent chaos, in which it rules over people by means of divisions and the illogical combination of these two processes. If it is so, then the question is inevitable: how is this illogical combination of the two processes even possible? Like two schizophrenic twins, they support and corroborate each other, and they paradoxically do it by means of mutual exclusion. The combination of schizophrenic de-territorialisation of capitalism and the paranoid re-territorialisation of centralist states, as discussed by Deleuze and Guattari, has materialized itself, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the new relations.⁴ It has been generally believed that de-territorialisation creates re-territorialisation as its counter-reaction, or rather, that owing to the global crisis of the logic of capitalism – the erasure of geographic borders, the abolishment of the legitimacy

ETHNO-NATIONALISM HAS NOT DECLARED WAR TO CAPITALISM, AND IT NO LONGER NEEDS IT TO LEGITIMIZE ITSELF BY MEANS OF RADICAL EXCLUSIVENESS; ON THE CONTRARY, IT CREATES THE ILLUSION OF PROTECTION AGAINST CAPITALISM AND FUNCTIONS AS SOME SORT OF COLLECTIVE COMFORT ONLY ON THE IMPLICIT, SYMBOLIC LEVEL, WHILE ACTUALLY INTRODUCING AND IMPLEMENTING CAPITALISM.

of local cultures and the traditional power and authority – they create strong centralistic levers of power as a counter-reaction, which seek to fix their own border against the outer world – e.g. North Korea – and to preserve their tradition by means of fundamentalism, which surpasses even its binary opposition and exclusion especially in post-communist societies. Namely, that counter-reaction, as a firm border separating one system from another, however much they may have been linked by the bipolar exclusiveness of the Berlin Wall, when both sides needed the other as an enemy during the Cold War in order to legitimize their own systems,⁵ has today become more fluid, more invisible, and by that very token omnipresent. Ethno-nationalism has not declared war to capitalism, and it no longer needs it to legitimize itself by means of radical exclusiveness; on the contrary, it creates the illusion of protection against capitalism and functions as some sort of collective comfort only on the implicit, symbolic level, while actually introducing and implementing capitalism. Contemporary power is therefore a combination of de-

konstrukcija, koja funkcioniše kao prazna ljuštura. Sama tradicija funkcioniše na retoričkom nivou, zato što je „sveti“ princip egoizma, zbog kapitalističkih apetita, urušio sve tradicionalne veze koje počivaju na čvrstom autoritetu i karizmi, koji zna što je dobro, a što loše, što je istina, a što laž.

Nije moć etnonacionalizma, dakle, u tome što on odista uspostavlja stabilan, čvrst, autoritativni sistem, iz kojeg je izgnana svaka kaotičnost; naprotiv, njegova moć je upravo u tome što on odista ne uspostavlja sistem koji sam propagira, zato što – jaz, raskol utopijske vizije i realnosti, stvaraju šizoidnu, maglovitu granicu, koja i omogućuje njegovo funkcioniranje. S druge strane, neoliberalizam, navodno, uspostavlja princip slobode, individualnog poduzetništva i deklarativno nastoji da slobodnom konkurencijom pacificira sve ratničke nagone koji su postojali među „zavađenim narodima“ tokom devedesetih godina, ali je evidentno da se ono što su njegova obećanja ne ispunjava. Uostalom, njegova moć i jest u tome da ne realizira svoje vlastite pretpostavke!

Mišljenje da kapitalizam traži svoju vlastitu negaciju ili u terorizmu, ili u nacionalnoj državi, ili, pak, u fundamentalizmu, ne objašnjava dovoljno jasno vezu između kapitalizma i etnonacionalizma. Ona se nalazi u prisutnosti koja se ostvaruje u neprisutnosti, odnosno u podvojenoj granici koja ne uspostavlja transparentno ono što je izvan, a što unutra, i koja, svojom raspolučenošću, stvara

permanentni racionalni kaos, na kojem se zasniva i na kojem počiva i novi sistem kontrole.

Suočeni smo s činjenicom da su danas mnogi gradovi u Bosni i Hercegovini etnički podijeljeni – Mostar, Sarajevo, Gornji Vakuf, Goražde... Frapantna činjenica je u tome što je ta granica, koja je između njih, nevidljiva. Istina, postoji ulica, ili rijeka koja razdvaja jedan dio grada od drugog, ali jasna demarkacijska linija između njih ne postoji; ona je, iako administrativno, moglo bi se reći, dobro funkcionira, više uvriježena u glavama i svijesti građana, nego u toposu na koji se odnosi i koji pretpostavlja. Ako je granica Berlinskog zida bila čvrsto utemeljena, neprobojna, zaštićena žicom i carinicima, onda su ove, etničke granice, fizički neutemeljene i precizno topografski neodredive. Ali, kao takve, one su dublje ukotvljene u svakodnevni život ljudi nego što je to bio i sam Berlinski zid. Za vrijeme trajanja Berlinskog zida bilo bi, čini se, suludo zamisliti neku granicu na ulicama Mostara, Sarajeva ili drugih bosanskih gradova; ona je u to vrijeme mogla biti samo produkt neke iracionalne fantazije. A ako postoji zid, kao granica, onda to, u isti mah, znači da postoji i volja da se on, kao zabrana, prekorači i premosti. No, u slučaju da taj zid ne postoji, da on nije sazidan kao zabran koji treba prekoračiti, onda to

SUOČENI SMO S ČINJENICOM DA SU DANAS MNOGI GRADOVI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI ETNIČKI PODIJELJENI – MOSTAR, SARAJEVO, GORNJI VAKUF, GORAŽDE... FRAPANTNA ČINJENICA JE U TOMU ŠTO JE TA GRANICA, KOJA JE IZMEĐU NJIH, NEVIDLJIVA.

WE ARE FACED WITH THE FACT THAT TODAY MANY CITIES AND TOWNS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARE ETHNICALLY DIVIDED: MOSTAR, SARAJEVO, GORNJI VAKUF, GORAŽDE... THE REMARKABLE FACT IS THAT THE BORDER DIVIDING THEM IS INVISIBLE.

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territorialisation and re-territorialisation, even their adhesion, and the grey zone between them, duplicated, emerges as a multifaceted power of control that paralyzes all institutions. But even though ethno-nationalism in its political fantasy does not identify nation with the abstract idea of institutional solidarity, but rather the concrete idea of familial brotherhood, living in a particular territory and constructing a durable home in which the dreams of ancestors and sons who are yet to be born are equally interwoven, while the tradition is presented as an essentialist pattern in which one can find comfort and protection from everyday insecurity, people have never before felt so excluded, isolated, and separated from their own national family and their own home as in the post-communist era. Moreover, the collective identification itself, when presented through the fantasy of populism, is in fact an abstract construction, which functions as an empty shell. The tradition itself functions on a rhetorical level, because the “sacred” principle of egotism, owing to the capitalist appetites, has destroyed all traditional links based on firm authority and charisma, which knows good from bad, and truth from lies. Thus, the power of ethno-nationalism is not in the fact that it establishes a stabile, firm, and authoritative system, from which all chaos has been expelled; quite on the contrary, its power is that it does not actually establish the system it endorses, because the

gap, the abyss between the utopian vision and the reality, creates a schizoid, blurred border, which makes its functioning possible in the first place. But then again, neo-liberalism allegedly does establish the principle of freedom and individual entrepreneurship, declaratively seeking to pacify, by means of free competition, all warlike drives that emerged between the “peoples in conflict” during the 1990s; however, it is evident that it does not fulfil these promises. After all, its power resides in not answering to its own premises!

The opinion that capitalism seeks its own negation either in terrorism or in the national state, or perhaps in fundamentalism, does not explain sufficiently clearly the link between capitalism and ethno-nationalism. It resides in presence actualized through non-presence, that is, in the double border that does not show transparently what is inside, and what outside, and which in its polarity creates a permanent rational chaos, which is what the new system of control is based and relies on.

We are faced with the fact that today many cities and towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina are ethnically divided: Mostar, Sarajevo, Gornji Vakuf, Goražde... The remarkable fact is that the border dividing them is invisible. To be sure, there is a street or a river separating one part of the town from another, but there is no

znači da je granica zakovana unutar samih ljudi i njihove svijesti. Mišljenje da nekompatibilne kulture i ne mogu komunicirati jedna s drugom, ili da je „dugovjekovna mržnja balkanskih naroda“ logično rezultirala stvaranjem podjela i takvih granica, nailazi na niječni odgovor same historije: granica nikada u povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine nije stvarala podijeljene gradove.

A što i o čemu, zapravo, svjedoči sama granica? Ne svjedoči li ona o tome da postoji unutrašnja podijeljenost koja se može prepoznati u odnosu između etnonacionalizma i liberalizma, tranzicije i komunizma, tradicije i modernosti, vlastite tradicije i tradicije drugoga? Stoga, ono što se može sada istaći, kao neka zajednička osnova koja se nalazi u njenom svakome narodu, jest u riječi – unutrašnja raspolućenost. Dakle, ne samo da im je prošlost zajednička, niti je rat nastao zbog njihove unutrašnje sličnosti, već im je zajedničko breme unutrašnje raspolućenosti. Stoga su i prošlost i tradicija neophodne da bi se njihova sadašnja, unutrašnja raspolućenost mogla prepoznati i imenovati.

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clear demarcation line between them: even though functioning quite well administratively, one might say, it is more embedded in the heads and minds of the citizens, rather than in the topos which it refers to and presupposes. Whereas the border of the Berlin Wall was firmly based, impenetrable, protected by barbed wire and by border officers, these ethnical borders are physically vague and hard to define topographically. But as such, they are deeply anchored in people's everyday life, just as the Berlin Wall once was. While the Berlin Wall still existed, it would have been crazy to imagine some sort of border in the streets of Mostar, Sarajevo, or other Bosnian cities and towns; at that time, it could have been only a product of some irrational fantasy. And if there is a wall as a border, it also means that there is a will to surpass it as a prohibition, to step over it and create a bridge. But if the wall is not there, if it has not been built as a fence that must be crossed, then it means that the border has been sealed inside the people, inside their minds. The conviction that incompatible cultures cannot even communicate with one another, or that the "centuries-long hatred between the Balkan peoples" has logically resulted in creating divisions and borders, meets with the negative answer of history as such: there were never borders dividing townships in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And what is a border anyway? Is it not an evidence of some inner

¹ U svom spisu „Odgovor na pitanje: šta je prosvjetenost,“ Kant o tome postavlja pitanja i daje odgovore i danas veoma aktualne i poticajne. Vidjeti u: Immanuel Kant, *Um i sloboda*. Posebno izdanje časopisa *Ideje*, Beograd, 1974., 41–49.

² Hans Georg Gadamer, *Istina i metoda*, Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1978.

³ Slučaj sarajevskog atentata nije samo teroristički akt, pa ni samo herojski čin, mada se u njemu sve te odlike mogu naći, koliko nesretna odluka da se „narodna sloboda“ izbori na jedan pogrešan način, a čije krajnje konzekvence, najvjerojatnije, ni sam atentator, kao ni drugi članovi „Mlade Bosne“ i zavjereničke grupe, nisu predvidjeli.

⁴ O tome lucidno pišu Gilles Deleuze i Félix Guattari u: *Anti-Edip*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, 1990.

⁵ Vidjeti: Susan Buck-Morrs, *Svet snova i katastrofa – Nastanak masovne utopije na Istoku i Zapadu*, Beogradski krug, Beograd, 2005.

divisions that can be identified in the relationship between ethno-nationalism and liberalism, between transition and communism, between tradition and modernity, between one's own tradition and the tradition of the Other? Therefore, what one may conclude here is that the common inherent trait of all peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, in a word, their inner polarity. Not only is their past common, not only the war did not result from their inner similarities, but they share the common burden of inner polarity. Therefore, both past and tradition are crucial to recognize and identify their inner polarity.

¹ In his essay "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" Kant asks questions and gives answers that are still very topical and thought-inspiring today. Originally published in *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 4 (1784), 481-494.

² Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* Continuum, London, 2004.

³ The Sarajevo murder was not merely an act of terrorism, and not merely an act of heroism, although the traits of both can be found in it, but an unhappy decision to fight for "national freedom" in a wrong way, with eventual consequences that even the murderer himself, or the members of "Young Bosnia", most likely could not foresee.

⁴ As relevantly discussed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in: *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Continuum, London, 2004.

⁵ See. Susan Buck-Morrs, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* MA: MIT Press, Cambridge, 2002.