KÁLLAY’S DILEMMA ON THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING A MANAGEABLE IDENTITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1882-1903)

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This paper will explore the ideas and problems of forging a common Bosnian identity during more than twenty years of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To that effect the influence of Austrian “civilizing missionaries,” notably Benjamin Kállay, the Joint Minister of Finance (in effect the governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina), on the three principal Bosnian communities, political elites, and intelligentsia is overriding. This paper will examine how the idea of Bosniak identity interacted with the realities that were already put into place at the time of the Austro-Hungarian occupation in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

Insights offered by a close reading of Kállay’s books and writings go a long way in explaining his intellectual formation in Hungary, the broadening of horizons that attended his first diplomatic mission in Belgrade, and the ways in which his appetite for history and culture affected his liberal worldview and statecraft. The paper discusses the circumstances that inspired Kállay to perceive Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country that, for a culturally oriented person like himself, offered a paradigm of how to “build the new upon the old…to retain the ancient traditions of the land vilified and purified by modern ideas.” The author utilizes the existing literature on the topic, most prominently Tomislav Kraljačić’s and Robin Okay’s books on Kállay, and other authors’ insights into Bosnian Muslims experience under Austrian occupation, variety of literature and sources in relevant languages of the area, as well as Kallay’s own writings.

**Key words:** Benjamin Kállay, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austrian occupation, Bosniak identity

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Introduction

Some seven years after the death of Benjamin von Kállay, Count Lujo Vojnović, a Yugoslav nationalist of a conservative bent (very rare among proponents of Yugoslavist ideology) asked the following question in his usual depressed cast of mind:

Does anybody know where is the resting place of Bosnian viceroy Benjamin Kállay? Has he survived at least in the memory of those whose horizons he truly wished to broaden, although in the service of unharmonized state creations and non hegemonized cultural communities? Not a bit.¹

The end of the nineteenth century in Austria-Hungary was marked by a very ambitious project: an attempt at forging a common Bosnian identity, an aspect of Habsburg “civilizing mission” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as administered by Benjamin Kállay, Austria-Hungary’s Joint Minister of Finance. I shall analyze Kállay’s attempts to fashion a new Slavic national identity (Bosniak identity) within Bosnia and Herzegovina out of diverse parts (mainly religious, but in part linguistic) of Bosnian regional identity. His effort, in many ways similar to that of the Croatian Illyrianists of the previous generation (1833-1848), sought to find a common denominator for his projected integration. Unlike the Illyrianists, however, who utilized the “Illyrian” language (štokavian dialect common to most Serbs and Croats), Kállay worked with an ongoing, though undefined, feeling among all Bosnians that they belonged to the same land.

Austro-Hungarian experimentation in Bosnia was a direct consequence of the Congress of Berlin (1878), whereby the representatives of the Great Powers turned Ottoman Bosnia to Habsburg administration. Though still officially a part of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia was occupied by the Monarchy’s military forces in a difficult campaign that lasted from July to October of 1878. Joint military administration of the province was not a long-term option for both constitutional and financial reasons, especially as it was difficult to fit the newly acquired province within the existing dualist system. Not surprising, there was opposition to the acquisition in both Austria and Hungary, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, showing deep divisions along national lines. The implications of the occupation for the Croats and the Monarchy’s Slavs in general were significant, as the Hungarians, more so than many Austrians, did not wish to add more Slavs to the Monarchy. The decision that Bosnia and Herzegovina should become a Reichsland, literary a possession of the Crown, rested with Emperor Franz Joseph I, who was interested not only in the acquisition and enlargement of his dynastic domains, but prepared for the annexation of Bosnia from the beginning of his reign. Significantly, the Emperor was

at the head of a court faction that had clear designs on Bosnia since the begin-
ing of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian revolt that started in 1875.2

These designs were not to be blocked by the bureaucracies in Vienna and
Budapest. After several years of meandering a decision was reached that a Bos-
nian Bureau should be created in the Common Ministry of Finance as the
highest administrative and legal authority that would rule Bosnia until the end
of Austro-Hungarian occupation. The Minister of Finance became officially
the head of Bosnian administration, with concentrated executive, legislative,
judicial and administrative powers that could, in effect, not be challenged.
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Reichsland resembled the Ottoman administra-
tive model, which it in fact followed, though with far greater number of offi-
cials than was the case under the Porte.3 The personification of the new system
was Benjamin von Kállay.

I. Enters Kállay

Born in Pest in 1839 to a noble family with lineage that went back to the
times of Árpád, Benjamin von Kállay (Hung. Béni Kállay de Nagy-Kálló) was
a talented, extremely versatile and diligent young man. His widowed moth-
er granted him the best liberal education a student could get in the promis-
ing times of mid-nineteenth century. Young Béni’s command of several area
languages, including Russian, Ottoman Turkish, and Greek, was admirable.
Possibly of Serbian parentage on his mother’s side,4 Kállay also managed to
learn Serbian from the Serbs of Szentendre – that “rich and independent Sent-
Andreja, which once was the first and most important Serb community after
the migration of [Patriarch Arsenije III] Čarnojević, and the northernmost
Serbian settlement” in Hungary, an island that “floats in the Hungarian sea.”5
Mihály Táncsics, a well-known Serb revolutionary writer, who was among Kál-
lay’s many teachers, apparently stirred the young man’s imagination and got
him acquainted with the rudiments of Serbian history and language. Kállay
later proceeded to study history and law, as well as some natural science and
economics.

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3 While the Ottomans managed to rule the whole province (the vilayet) with some 120 of-
officials, during the Austro-Hungarian times the number of civil servants rose steadily from 600
in 1881 to 7,379 in 1897 (Kállay’s report) and to 9,533 in 1908. Quoted in Peter F. Sugar, Indus-
4 Although it was generally considered that the source of his interest in Slavic studies was his
mother Amalija, née Blašković of Ebeck, her family’s Serbian roots cannot be traced with any
certainty. Tomislav Kraljačić, Kalajev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini (1882-1903) (Sarajevo, 1987),
p. 46.
5 Jovan Skerlić, as quoted in Ante Malbaša, Hrvatski i srpski nacionalni problem u Bosni za
Early in his life, Kállay translated John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, an obligatory reading for the nineteenth-century liberal-conservatives in the post-1848 Hungarian political elite and consequently devised strategies for his personal advancement. This might have been a youthful preparation for a life in the civil service modeled on the English example and informed by the work of Gladstone, Tennyson and Taine. Indeed, very early in his career, Kállay acquired a reputation for expertise in Balkan issues. This prompted Count Gyula Andrássy, the Common Minister of Foreign Affairs, to appoint Kállay a general consul of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade, where Kállay served from 1869 to 1875. In addition to his various duties (as well as considerable pleasures) at his first diplomatic post he continued to study Serbian history as well as contemporary political and economic relations of all the countries of the region. The product of this work was his *Geschichte der Serben*, which was published in Vienna in 1878. The summer of 1871, Kállay spent travelling through Bosnia on Andrássy’s orders, and afterwards contributed an extensive memorandum about the state of affairs in that Ottoman province. As a political conservative and a member of the Hungarian parliament who closely connected to the Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy, Kállay advocated Andrássy’s oriental policies and the need for Balkan expansion, against the largely Turcophile Hungarian public opinion. He went back to diplomatic service in 1878, and was appointed Joint Minister of Finances in 1882. A member of Hungarian Academy of Arts and Sciences from 1883, his scholarly interest informed his policies in Bosnia, where he carried on as a relentless *Kulturträger*, a kind of a ruthless cultural transmitter, immensely enjoying the part. His efforts at establishing the major Bosnian cultural institutions, however, were hampered by Bosnia’s complex identity – the multiplicity of allegiances that divided her people and obstructed a simple and straightforward path of progress.

II. The Path of History

I see a country that has been called Bosnia since 1200, I see a nation, which has always called itself “Bosnian” … I hold, therefore, to an old historical tradition which reflects, not only historical line of events, but in particular the whole substance of this nation, and I will always call it ‘Bosnian’.

Benjamin von Kállay

There is no question that Kállay was convinced of Bosnia’s separate identity and historical development. In his reading, the “old Bosnian Slavic element

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6 Mustafa Imamović, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnji politički razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine od 1878. do 1914* (Sarajevo, 1976), n. 31, p. 63.

7 Quoted in Kraljačić, p. 81.
had only been overlaid by Oriental deposits and must gradually reemerge. He believed firmly in the historical separate identity of Bosnia, which until the fifteenth century had formed quite a distinctive organism in the western Balkans and had never been attached to the power centers of Hungary.\(^8\) If it were possible to reawaken the old Bosnian self-consciousness, based on separate historical identity, it would be possible to lift this conservative feeling to a level of a new Bosnian nation, separate from both the Croat and Serb identities. This, in turn would shatter the Croat and Serb designs on Bosnia and consolidate the Austro-Hungarian rule in the area.

Kállay set out to shape a new unitary Bosnian nation through an aggressive policy of historical and identity education, standardization of language, and the use of common symbols. In the debates at the Austrian delegation, he dismissed the notion that the introduction of the “Bosnian (Bosniak) nation,” was his own invention. He insisted that the specific Bosnian political development could be traced to Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus and his tenth-century work *De administrando imperio*, as well as through the whole medieval period.\(^9\) His views on historical development of Bosnia and Herzegovina were also backed by a substantial support of academic research conducted in many areas of the country.

At the same time Kállay did not waver from manipulating history to Hungary’s specific advantage. His choice for the coat-of-arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the case in point. In 1889, after a prolonged and very fierce debate, it was decided that Bosnia, because of political sensitivities and general lack of a common heraldic traditions, should be represented by a coat of arms consisting of a red arm holding a sable on a golden field or (shield). These were actually the arms of the Rama region in southern Bosnia, which since the twelfth century sporadically appeared in the armorials of the Hungarian kings.\(^10\) Kállay’s dualist loyalties were always closely followed by his willingness to accommodate the needs to extend the realm of Hungarian political nation.

The standardization of Bosnian language was a particular project of Benjamin Kállay, because aside from linguistic complexities, the language question played an important cultural, social, and above all political role in securing the Austro-Hungarian rule. Although the language of the population was common to majority of inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the language problem emerged in two distinctive ways. First, as a direct consequence of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a need to attract competent Austro-Hungarian civil servants to establish, not only loyal, but highly quali-
fied state administration. Although the knowledge of the language(s) of the area was a prerequisite for civil service, in practice German language quickly became the language of administration, and was spoken by the mass of bureaucrats that rushed to Bosnia in the first years after the occupation. After withdrawal of the military administration of General Josip Filipović, whose pro-Croat sentiments incited opposition of the local Serbs, many Croat civil servants returned to Croatia. In their place Kállay’s administration employed Germans, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Jews who were inclined to accept a more neutral, Bosnian course of action.11

Second, the introduction of Bosnian language into official use (in particular as a language of instruction, administration and judiciary) created a lot of resentment among the members of distinct ethnic communities (in particular among Serbs and Croats), who rightly perceived Kállay’s preference for the use of Bosnian language as part of his efforts to thwart the development of Serb and Croat national movements in the country. Kállay defended his linguistic policies claiming that these were most valuable for the people of Bosnia, and most in line with the Bosnian literary traditions. Moreover, during his first visit to Bosnia in the 1870s, he noticed that the locals used the term Bosnian when referring to their language.

To make certain that his language policies would be generally accepted Kállay employed the influential and widely recognized experts of the time. He managed to persuade Vatroslav Jagić, “today the first among Slavic scholars, not only in Austria, but in the whole world,” to testify in his favor. This well-known Croatian linguist, who taught at universities in Zagreb, Odessa, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and, ultimately, Vienna, encouraged Kállay’s linguistic policies by supporting the Bosnian name of the official language, which he at the same time considered unique, but not significantly different from Serbian and Croatian. This tentative support was provided as a deferral of competing linguistic claims that were dominating the debates in Bosnia from the first days of the occupation. Encouraged by this support, Kállay himself claimed Bosnian loyalty: “we, Bosnians, and I call myself that as well, can be satisfied with that term.”12

Although the majority of Serbs and Croats were not persuaded, the fact remains that the introduction of the Bosnian language had favorable consequences for the integration of minority Jewish population into the majority population. Aside from a “Sephardic Israelite Religious Community” that was established as a Kultursgemeinde (religious community) only four years after the occupation, there was a community of Ashkenazi Jews that came from Hungary, Galicia, the Czech lands, as well as from other parts of the Monarchy. Clearly,

11 Dževad Juzbašić, Jezičko pitanje u austro-ugarskoj politici u Bosni i Hercegovini pred Prvi svjetski rat, (Sarajevo, 1973), pp. 9-12.
12 Quoted in Kraljačić, p. 239.
the Austro-Hungarian rule suited entrepreneurial abilities of the Jews in general. Moreover, the policy of introducing local language into the curriculum of all religious (as well as public) schools had the effect of integrating the Jews more fully into the Bosnian environment. To illustrate the point: in 1899-1900 academic year 64% of Jewish children enrolled in elementary school, as opposed to only 6% of Muslim, 13% of Orthodox and 22% of Catholic children.

The language issue was closely connected with the educational policy, which was one of the most pronounced policies of the Austro-Hungarian administration, and which in line with general directions devised for Bosnia and Herzegovina intended to educate loyal and capable subjects of the Monarchy. With this idea in mind, Kállay attempted to introduce a modern school system, but at the same time he wished to proceed gradually and with the highest regard for the confessional sensitivities of diverse communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was clear that the existing network of schools was insufficient to turn underprivileged peasants into members of a strong middle class, but the slow progress in that department was frustrating. There are different views of Kállay’s efforts: while it was true that during his mandate some 178 state schools were built and opened (at a rate of 8 per year), the financial means that accompanied this effort were far from adequate to accommodate the needs of the Bosnian population and the actual number of pupils hardly rose during the length of his regime. The only exception to this rule was the establishment of a teacher-training college in 1886, which aimed to educate mostly local students.

A particular problem for Kállay’s modernization efforts was the inclusion of women in the educational curricula. Although several schools for women were opened in Sarajevo, Mostar and in Banja Luka in 1880s and 1990s, they were rarely attended by Serbs, and Muslim girls did not attend them at all. Therefore, special measures were devised to catch the attention of young women from Muslim families and persuade them to participate in the “European way of life.” Kállay’s wife, Countess Vilma Bethlen von Kállay, whom the opposition dubbed “the Queen’s Deputy,” animated the Sarajevo social scene by inviting wives and daughters of influential Muslim families to participate at her soirées at the Hotel Hungaria, in the Ilidža district, a fashionable spa center on the outskirts of Sarajevo. She organized concerts to sponsor charitable causes, and invested a lot of energy and means to host elaborate parties. Always very sensitive not to trespass on the customs of the land, Countess Kállay and her daughters welcomed Muslim women into their quarters, which were decorated to resemble the discreet women’s quarters of a Muslim home.

13 Note a rapid growth of the Jewish population in Sarajevo: from around 2000 for most of the 19th century, it rose to 2618 in 1885, 4058 in 1895 and 6397 in 1910. In the whole of Bosnia by 1900 there were 9311 Jews. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York, 1994), p.113. Information on school attendance: Kraljačić, p. 258.
The guests attended in great numbers, and Countess Kállay was determined that such amicable gestures would contribute to change and progress of “the civilization of the East.” She even reported on these events on the pages of the state-sponsored magazines *Nada* (Hope) and *Bošnjak* (Bosniak).15

There was a certain paradox associated with Kállay’s efforts that promoted the establishment of Bosnian cultural institutions. Kállay believed that these institutions were helpful in introducing Bosnia to the dualist Austro-Hungarian scheme, whereby Bosnia was represented as a unique entity with its own distinctive history, which stemmed from its own specific culture. Kállay thought it his mission to prevent Bosnia from allying with the competing centers of attraction in the neighborhood, most especially with Serbia and Montenegro. Consequently, the insistence on the separate cultural and historical development of Bosnia was a part of his overall political agenda. This does not mean, however, that he was unaware of awkward consequences of cultural and national awakening among the Bosniaks (Bosnians), in particular when it came to their likely confrontation with the already active Serbian national movement. His attitude towards the Croat claims (the Croatian historical right) to Bosnia, too, was unfavorable, but he considered it easier to accept and accommodate the long-term Croat claims within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The most visible manifestation of Kállay’s cultural mission in Bosnia was the foundation of *Zemaljski muzej* of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Bosnisch-hercegovinisches Landesmuseum*, Land Museum) in 1888. This expensive undertaking was to incite research into the historical roots of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its unique development. Kállay spared no effort to bring together the most capable and prominent crew of mostly young professionals from the different regions of Habsburg Monarchy who managed to reorganize the existing collections and in a relatively short time transform the Museum into a recognized scholarly and cultural center, which quickly gained popularity among citizens of Sarajevo.16 The most admired were the exhibited archeological excavations, as well as the ethnographic and the natural history collections. In 1889 Museum started publishing its journal, *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja Bosne i Hercegovine*, (Herald of the Land Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina) which has been in print for more than 100 years, and which became the most important source for the study of Bosnia’s history, archeology, and ethnology. The Museum director was Constantin (Kosta) Hörmann, a committed bureaucrat from Croatia, who was not only a representative of the government educated in “Habt-Acht-Spirit,”17 but also a dutiful collector of Muslim folk songs

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and traditions. The publication of his two books of folk songs coincided with the opening of the Museum. In his work on Bosnian literary traditions, Hörmann's forcefully implemented Kállay's vision of Bosnian Muslims as the heirs to medieval Bosnian nobility. He also presided over the publication of Nada, a relatively short-lived, but generously funded and government-sponsored literary magazine, whose contributors included the most prominent authors, notably the Croatian poet Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević.

Such political interventionism in culture did not pass unnoticed and it was criticized, most extensively by the Serbs. A Serb oppositional newspaper in Sarajevo referred to Kállay's era in Bosnia and Herzegovina as “the era of policing the scholarship in Bosnia”:

Expensively assorted and illustrated works, with valuable scholarly content, mounted and ordered scientific excursions, learned congresses at Glasinac and at various spas; all of these are manifestations of the rental role that the police have imposed on scholarship. Hence, the role of science became barbarous amidst horse races and clay pigeon shooting.\(^\text{18}\)

On the other hand some people did not mind such vibrant cultural investments. Those were a part of new social stratum appearing in urban centers of Bosnia, most prominently in Sarajevo. A generation of newcomers, administrators, professionals, entrepreneurs, merchants, engineers from different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, from the Czech lands to Galicia or Austria proper, who once settled in Bosnia, were interested in participating in the new culture and to consume its products at the same level they were accustomed to or had pretensions to in their homeland. The vast network of public libraries, reading-rooms, as well as bookstores, musical societies, chorus-singing, literary magazines and artistic colonies mushroomed in the last decade of the nineteenth century, during Kállay’s administration.\(^\text{19}\)

The idea of seamless Bosnian identity, however Hungarian inflected, was challenged by Kállay’s distinct practice toward Bosnia’s three ethno-confessional groups – Bosnian Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats. Tomáš G. Masaryk, a noted Czech member of the Reichsrat, criticized Kállay’s regime in Bosnia precisely on this account. He noted that Kállay ignored the condition of the Christian serfs on the Muslim-owned estates (the agrarian question) and favored unnecessary police repression. In Masaryk’s view, the authorities’ attitude towards three confessions was notably lopsided: “they are afraid of the Muslims, they doubt the Serbs, as for the Catholics, they believe that they are eo ipso loyal to the government. Therefore, there is a tendency to comfort the Muslims, and (if at all possible) to exert pressure on the Serbs. Only the Catholics were entitled to their rights.”\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) Risto Besarović, *Iz kulturne i političke istorije Bosne i Hercegovine*, (Sarajevo, 1966), p. 11.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., pp. 11-25.

\(^{20}\) Ante Malbaša, *Hrvatski i srpski nacionalni problem u Bosni za vrijeme režima Benjamina*
The confessional question was important, in Masaryk’s view, because “in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is the question not only of religion but simultaneously that of nationality (ethnicity). The authorities would at once like to ban the Croat and Serb nationality (ethnicity)” and at the same time they were promoting the Bosnian nationality. 21 Masaryk called the forging of the Bosnian (Bosniak) ethnicity the “inner lie of the system.” 22 He baited Kállay by quoting his own *Geschichte der Serben*, in which Kállay glorified the strength of the Serbian state idea. This was not just a passing sting, as Kállay’s historical work was frequently invoked in opposition to his political and governmental practice. Vladimir Ćorović, a noted Bosnian Serb historian, even claimed that Kállay banned his “History of Serbs,” giving rise to the legend of Kállay’s self-censorship. In fact, some overzealous members of Kállay’s administration banned Gavrilo Vitković’s Serbian translation of Kállay’s book. They did it preventively because Vitković commented on some of the Kállay’s points, and also fearing that Kállay’s earlier appraisal of all Bosnian inhabitants as Serbs could harm his new mission of forging the Bosnian language and identity. 23

Considering divisions among the major national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was perhaps surprising to experience as little open conflict among them during Kállay’s regime. In 1897 an English observer found it strange that the Christians

bear so little hatred for their former oppressors, and the explanation lies probably in the fact that they are all of the same race. Whatever the reason may be it fully bears out the contention of all who have studied the country in Turkish times, that … the deplorable condition of the people was due to agrarian rather than to religious causes, and that if these causes could be removed, the ill-feeling engendered by them would gradually die out. 24

III. Bosnian Kolo at Allée des Nations

Kállay’s symbolic politics on behalf of Bosnian ethnicity received an international audience as a result of the government decision to include a Bosnian Pavilion in the Austro-Hungarian representation at the World Exhibition

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21 Ibid., p. 122.
22 Ibid., p. 123.
24 Quoted in Malcolm, p. 149.
(Exposition Universelle) in Paris in 1900.\textsuperscript{25} As stated in the promotional materials, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

which was until recently torn apart by uprisings and revolutions, in which different classes of society were in conflict, entered the era of prosperity after the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, when it was handed over to be governed by the Austrian administration, which in turn brought peace and order to the land. It was a civilizing effort and perfect reorganization of the last twenty years, and it will be remembered forever, in gratitude to that great man, who was entrusted with reconstruction of this small and unfortunate province: Mr. Benjamin Kállay, the Minister of Finance of Austro-Hungarian Empire. His work is not limited to the economic improvement of the land, but it was also streaming toward raising intellectual and moral standard of population, by opening many schools. To that should be added agrarian and commercial institutions, roads, railway, that were built and that contributed to the general development and progress.\textsuperscript{26}

The Exposition on a whole was an expensive affair. Austria spent 7.5 million French francs on its presentation, more than all the other countries represented at the Exhibition, Hungary having contributed additional 2.5 million francs. As a contemporary noted, the original was the blue-and-white ornamented Bosnian pavilion, which was among most unique and at the same time the only one representing Slavs from the Monarchy. It was an ornate and a bit whimsical building, situated between the Austrian and Hungarian pavilions, close to the Serbian pavilion at the Allée des Nations. It was an edifice reminiscent of a house of Husein kapetan Gradaščević, the redoubtable Dragon of Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslim hero of the anti-Ottoman movement of the 1830s. The interior was designed and painted by Alfons Mucha, Czech Art Nouveau painter, whose illustrations informed the public on Bosnian history. An interactive exhibition presented not only arts and crafts of Bosnia, but there were also women and men dressed in variety of Bosnian folk costumes, who were actually spinning and weaving and produced carpets in the traditional fashion. A Bosnian store exhibited original Bosnian products. In an original Bosnian coffeehouse, situated in a secluded garden, the visitors were offered Bosnian refreshments, accompanied with a small orchestra that played traditional tunes. Ćiro Truhelka, a custodian of the Sarajevo Land Museum, who was himself engaged in the presentation of Bosnian ethnographic

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\textsuperscript{25} Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented at several exhibitions in the 1890s, most notably the millennial exhibition in Budapest (1896), the Brussels International Exposition (1897) and the Vienna Jubiläums Ausstellung (1898). Truhelka, pp. 69-70.

\textsuperscript{26} Jasna Šamić, Pariz-Sarajevo 1900: Svjetska izložba i Bosanski paviljon (Sarajevo, 2001, pp. 130-131.)
and archeological collection at Paris, in vain countered the criticism on the expense of this effort and claimed that

Bosnia, was formerly a Balkan country, a country that had no civilization, enjoyed no comfort, and was of no attraction for foreigners – a country that was a dark spot on the map of European continent; and the exhibition showed her in the proper light, as a segment of Oriental romance, filled with natural beauties, full of interesting products of home manufacture and artisan craft, full of natural treasures and historical monuments, and all of it was presented in a modern framework in the eye of civilized Europe.27

It was an instant success. Truhelka expected tourists to flock to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as indeed happened, and that Kállay would be credited as the first person to grasp the importance of tourism for national branding. Fifteen members of the Bosnian delegation were awarded prizes. Indeed, the French president Émile Loubet visited the Bosnian Pavilion. Under the circumstances, it stands to reason that the Bosnians were compelled to dance the kolo, the joyful circle dance, along the Seine.

The Paris events that presented Bosnia as an orientalist dream had an immediate effect on a most unlikely person. H.R.H. Muhammad Ali Pasha, a brother of H.R.H Abbas Pasha II of Egypt decided to visit Bosnia following his visit to Paris, and several other European cities in summer of 1900. Accompanied with a small entourage, Prince Muhammad started his journey in Vienna, and entered Bosnia in September. His travelogue testifies of the “intention of visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina first, thereby easing the way to the other countries of Eastern Europe, which are on a lower cultural and civilizational level, indeed of lesser authority and much poorer then Bosnia. She was the first step on the stairs that would lead me to my planned goal.”28

A Viennese student himself, Prince Muhammad Ali Pasha was acquainted with Kállay’s older son and had a very favorable view of Minister Kállay and his attempts to improve Bosnian infrastructure and introduce reforms in the country. During his brief stay in Sarajevo, he witnessed with dismay, the dissatisfaction of Muslims and Serbs with the Austrian administration. They claimed that the Austro-Hungarian government was extremely coercive and aggressive, and that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot wait to be included into a state under the Turkish flag. Prince Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha concluded that this must be the result of the government’s incapacity to distribute its power evenly in all parts of the realm.29

27 Truhelka, pp. 70-1.
29 Ibid., pp. 46-7.
Conclusion

Is it possible to program a common culture as a part of a planned national integration ideology for a new territorial possession? Is it possible, given careful planning, time, energy, financial means, and an army of implementers, to forge a new identity for a land of complex history and multifaceted national make-up? That was not uniquely Kállay’s dilemma, but is nevertheless a uniquely modern one. A direct, if cynical, answer could be that it is possible to do all of this in the absence of all alternatives to such an endeavor.

Kállay was contending against a line of development that half a century before his Bosnian effort had produced the national integration processes among the Croats and Serbs. Both Croat and Serb nationalisms considered Bosnia and Herzegovina a central part of their national territory; Serbs on linguistic grounds, Croats on historical and legal. Moreover, the Croat and Serb integration processes had already gained ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the time Kállay started promoting his Bosnian national project. The remnant of Bosnian regional consciousness that he used as the base for his project was mainly located in the Muslim elite, the great repository of Bosnian identity and the great prize for the Serbs, Croats, and Kállay. Had Kállay and his successors had more time and in the absence of competing claims, his project might have had a chance. It was possibly more grounded in tradition than the competing projects. The logic of nationalism, however, is counter-traditional.

Count Vojnović perceived Kállay as a melancholic and disenchanted with his service to the Habsburgs. He thought him bored, both in Vienna and in Sarajevo, no less than in Belgrade at his debut as a consul general. (From his Belgrade diary, however, we know that he was too busy to be depressed. He enjoyed his duties and quite a few indiscretions among the Belgrade diplomatic corps): “Industry, sense of duty, and the great aims on which he fixed all of his exceptional abilities were insufficient to remove the melancholic traits that could plainly be detected on his brow.” Vojnović’s reflections on Kállay included the following thought:

Perhaps in the depths of his soul he inquired if his fatherland, which so gaily and proudly gave ostentatious display of its occidentalism, still found interest in this bold enterprise in this oriental hornet’s nest. His friend tried to convince us that he often consoled himself with the words of Imre Madách, the poet of The Tragedy of Man (Az ember tragédiája, 1861), “Fight on and believe.” In fight and belief he presented himself to the Great Judge.\(^{30}\)

Kállay died in Vienna on July 13, 1903. *The New York Times* obituary was rather brief:

\(^{30}\) Vojnović, Savremenik, 1911, 45.
“Vienna, July 13 – M. Benjamin von Kallay, for a long time Austro-Hungarian Finance Minister, died to-day, after a brief illness. He was born in 1839 and was the author of several historical works.” Comforting for historians, perhaps not so for politicians.

Zusammenfassung

Kállaysches Dilemma: Zur Herausforderung des Aufbaus einer nachhaltigen Identität in Bosnien und Herzegowina (1892-1903)


Schlagwörter: Benjamin von Kállay; Bosnien und Herzegowina; Österreich-Ungarn; bosnische Identität

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