THE CASE OF GENERAL ANTE MOŠKOV
1945-1947 OR GENERAL ANTE MOŠKOV AND
THE SO CALLED USTASHI GOLD 1945-1947¹

Ante DELIĆ* 

Similarly to many other former Independent State of Croatia [NDH]² officials, after retreating to Austria, General Ante Moškov was not a mere passive observer of future developments but rather directed his activity, under the newly created circumstances, against the recently established Yugoslav Communist regime. Also, Moškov was the first among the former high NDH officials, who, after the war, publicly took an oppositional stand towards his quite recent leader, Poglavnik Ante Pavelić. In doing so, he was not motivated by any principled political reasons, but rather by the discord around the evaluation of Pavelić’s role, primarily from the viewpoint of the crash he had experienced. Closely connected to Moškov is also the issue of the so called Ustashi gold, taken out of Croatia during the retreat, which really marked the most his post-1945 activities. This period of his second emigration is the subject of the present paper. Based on the available bibliography, as well as the available both domestic and foreign archival sources – some of which have so far been unknown and as such have never been used – the present paper tries to additionally enlighten some unknown and controversial episodes from Moškov’s postwar activities.

Key Words: Ante Moškov, Ante Pavelić, the so called Ustashi gold, the Vatican, Krunoslav Draganović, Western allies

¹ Ante Delić, Ph. D., Department of Teachers and Preschool Teachers Education of the University of Zadar, Zadar, Croatia

² The present article constitutes a considerably expanded talk from the 5th Congress of Croatian Historians: Crises, Conflicts, and Solidarity in the Historical Perspective, Zadar, October 5-8, 2016.

³ In further text we shall use the original Croatian abbreviation for the Independent State of Croatia – NDH.
Introduction

Similarly, to many other former Independent State of Croatia [NDH] officials, after the breakdown of NDH and the retreat to Austria, General Ante Moškov was not a mere passive observer of future developments but rather directed his activity, under the newly created circumstances, against the recently established Yugoslav Communist regime.

To begin with, we should state some short biographical notes about the (Home-Guard) General and Ustashi Colonel Ante Moškov: He was born in Špiljari, Municipality of Kotor [Montenegro], on July 7, 1911. Among the members of the Croatian international emigration, he was a close associate of Poglavnik Ante Pavelić. After the establishment of NDH, he was appointed commander of a Battalion by the Poglavnik. In the summer of 1942, he was appointed Commander of Poglavnik’s Bodyguard Brigades of the Ustashi Militia. He bore the title of a Knight. In October 1944, he was appointed Commander of the 1st Croatian Shock Division. Towards the end of January 1945, he became the Commander of Poglavnik’s Bodyguard Corps /tjelesnog zbora/, whereas, just before the retreat, towards the beginning of May 1945, he was in charge of V. Maček’s safe departure to emigration. He himself also made a retreat to the West, where he stayed until the spring of 1947, when he was extradited to the Yugoslav authorities and sentenced to death.3

The period of Moškov’s second emigration has so far in Croatian historiography been the subject of research in a paper which constituted “an attempt of providing elements for a more comprehensive consideration of his person and deed.”4 Also, some issues from Moškov’s post-war activities were treated within the context of other topics associated with him.5

An unquestionable starting point of Moškov’s postwar activity (and not only his) is his attitude towards the quite recent Commander and former Poglavnik, Ante Pavelić. That is why at the very beginning we must present the relationship between Moškoa and Pavelić after the breakdown of NDH. Eventually, the breakdown was going to be the main cause of their discord.

4 Ivica Hrastović, “Ante Moškov - Uloga u stvaranju i propastii NDH”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 31/1999. no.1: 127. The paper deals with Moškov’s activity prior to, during, and after the breakdown of NDH, while – on pages 145-149 – it treats his postwar activity and his role in the fate of the so called Ustashi gold.
5 For more information see: Ante Delić, “Djelovanje Ante Pavelića 1945.-1953. godine”. Doctor’s thesis, (University of Zadar, 2016), pp. 68-76 and 86-89; Jere Jareb, Žlato i novac NDH izneseni u inozemstvo 1944. i 1945., (Zagreb, 1997), passim. The realizations resulting from this research have been expanded in the present paper based on some new sources.
Moškov and Pavelić after the Breakdown of NDH

One of the main presuppositions of the postwar gathering and activity – on anti-Yugoslav and anti-Communist basis – was the discord among the Western allies.\(^6\) It was the main presupposition that was counted upon, and without which all the plans were doomed to failure ahead of time. Of course, the fundamental axiom was that most Croats want their own state and that their attitude is anti-Communist. It was no less important to establish the exact situation in the country, because, without it, no serious plans could be made, all the more so since, after the retreat – to Italy and Austria – rumors were being spread among the refugees about the activity of Vjekoslav Luburić, Rafael Boban, Delko Bogdanić, Franjo Sudar, and other high officials who supposedly “have strong forces at their disposal” in the homeland.\(^7\) Of course, it should be mentioned that not all transitions (after NDH breakdown), be they individual or collective; ordered by or associated with the former NDH leadership, were motivated by military-political causes. There were undoubtedly those who wanted to learn the fate of their families; some were demoralized, most were hungry, etc.

General Moškov and Colonel Erih Lisak\(^8\) were the first among the high NDH officials who decided to return to Croatia, although separately. Not only were they the two highest ranking officials, but, during the war, they were both also close associates of Pavelić, who spoke to them in Austria after the breakdown of NDH, and before their return to the country. The fact that there were no reliable data whatsoever, whereas, on the other hand, rumors abounded\(^9\), gave rise to numerous questions in the minds of regular soldiers and high officials alike. Most probably, Moškov returned to the country upon his own initiative.

---

\(^6\) “The latent conflict within the antifascist coalition between USA and Great Britain, on the one hand, and USSR on the other, was feeding the hope of the Ustashis. (…) Their joint anti-Communism was supposed to be the foundation of a brand new alliance. That is what the NDH leadership was building their optimism upon.” (Z. Radelić, *Križari*..., p. 63. See also: Katarina Spehnjak, *Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945.-1948.*, (Zagreb, 2006).

\(^7\) Z. Radelić, *Križari*..., pp. 83-84.

\(^8\) Lisak was arrested in Zagreb on October 2, 1945. (Nikola Milovanović, *Kroz tajni arhiv Udbe* I, (Belgrade, Sloboda, 1988), p. 131, and Z. Radelić, *Križari*..., p. 87.). He was put on trial together with Archbishop Stepinac, in order for the intended compromising of the Catholic Church to be more effective. He was sentenced to death. According to that which Moškov heard in Italy: “Allegedly, Lisak came to Kaptol [The main seat of the Catholic Church in Croatia, located in its capital Zagreb, *note by the translator*], all worked up, he told the Bishop’s Secretary that he wanted to talk to Stepinac at once. Upon seeing him, Stepinac allegedly asked him: ‘Why are you here?’, and Lisak responded: ‘I came to tell you that we cannot count upon the English at all.’ Stepinac allegedly replied: ‘Did you really have to come from abroad in order to tell me that?’ Pećnikar used to recount this as some sort of accusation against Lisak for losing his temper.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov’s police file, 151.)

\(^9\) For example, see: V. Nikolić, *Tragedija se dogodila u svibnju*..., II, p. 181.
Namely, given the fact that he knew the exact place where Pavelić was staying in Austria, before taking any further steps, Moškov wanted to talk to him and hear his opinion on recent events and the current situation. Since, at the time, Pavelić was still an authority on the former NDH military and political officials, it was not easy to go past him when planning any kind of military-political activity.

According to the sources available, Moškov met with Pavelić twice in Austria. He was speaking about these meetings and talks, among other things, in the postwar phase, before the Yugoslav Communist investigators. We must stress the fact that, given the conditions and circumstances under which they were given, these declarations by Moškov should be taken with extreme caution. Moškov stated that his motivation for wanting to speak to Pavelić were the newly created circumstances regarding the extradition of Croatian civilians and soldiers. Since he did not know where Pavelić was located, Major Frane Šarić took him to see Pavelić. During the first meeting with Pavelić in Langreith (two days after Pavelić’s arrival to Langreith), Moškov wanted to know what Pavelić thought of the extraditions, and Pavelić, incredulously, claimed: “That it must be the deed of an English commander who was acting on his own.” As regards the extradition of a part of the NDH Government, Pavelić did not believe that they were handed over by the British, but assumed that “they had fallen into the hands of Partisans”. As a proof, he stated the fact that

---

10 “Frane Šarić told me that Pavelić was staying with his family at a villa between Salzburg and St. Gilgen, and that he had already visited him there several times. (...) Šarić came back from Pavelić the same day, while he went there to bring some flower, for it seems they had none.” (HR-HDA-1561. The Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, State Security Service (RSUP SRH, SDS), 013.0.58. Ante Moškov’s police file, 89.)

11 “Ante Moškov, Home-Guard General, was in prison at the same time. He was in the cell no. 37 in front of which there would always be blood after the interrogation.” (Željko Rukavina, “Sudbina ‘TOHO-a’ /O Tajnoj organizaciji hrvatske omladine/”, Zatvorenik, 2/1991 (Zagreb), no. 10-11: 21.) Some statements by Moškov – obviously selected by some other criteria, and not by the principles of a scientific paper methodology – given before the Yugoslav authorities are published in: Ante Moškov, Pavelićevo doba. Edited and expanded with footnotes by Petar Požar, Split 1999. The said book may serve history undergraduates as a blatant example of pretentious and selective approach to the investigated subject. As formerly observed by other investigators: “It is a compilation of texts by Moškov and interrogation records, prepared in a most problematic manner, with numerous errors by the editor.” (Tomislav Jonjić, Stjepan Matković, “Novi prilozi za životopis Mile Budaka uoči Drugoga svjetskog rata”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 40/2008, no. 2: 426. Footnote no. 2.)

12 See Footnote 9.

13 J. Jareb, Zlato i novac, p. 302.

14 J. Jareb, Zlato i novac, p. 302. Moškov spoke about the extraditions also with minister Sušić who: “is very depressed and – upon my question how come they did not accept the army and extradited some although Pavelić said that everything would be all right and that the English would certainly accept the army and the refugees – said to me: ’I don’t know, I don’t know, terrible, terrible’. Then he went on telling me how he also thought, especially at first, after he had intervened with the English, that everything was all right, but later he immediately realized that
the British had released the ministers who were detained in Spittal: “The news was fresh, and he had it, while some of them later crossed over to the American zone /Artuković/.”

In the part of Moškov’s statement when he speaks about the first meeting with Pavelić, one may detect his inner state after the breakdown, comprising mostly of disappointment and hopelessness. All of this was probably the main reason for his parting with Pavelić:

“All things considered, I was having a pretty hard time back then. (...) I began to realize what was his [Pavelić’s, that is] role before and during the NDH. I started doubting the integrity of all his intentions, of his entire political work, both in the former emigration and in the NDH. Still, I wanted to talk to Pavelić once again and ask him openly about certain things.”

Through Moškov, Pavelić sent the first political message to his close associates, former high military and political NDH officials. However, it would appear that Moškov informed the former officials of the Pavelić’s message only two months later, saying that it was Pavelić’s opinion: “That the entire political battle is now taken over by dr. Maček and that he has not only to be given free hand, but also assisted in that.” The hopes in the change of Maček’s political direction were, among other things, additionally heated up by the statements of his associates, such as the Colonel of the Croatian Peasant Protection (Hrvatska seljačka zaštita in Croatian) Milan Pribanić, who was negotiating the cooperation with Kavran and Sušić, and stated that he: “knew for a fact that Maček was on the stand of NDH.”

Pavelić’s message to Maček is understandable in the light of the fact that NDH leadership, just before the breakdown, was counting also on Maček’s activities directed towards the Croatian national independence involving things were completely different and retired at once.” (J. Jareb, Zlato i novac..., p 304.) Pavelić’s daughter Mirjana said on the subject: “It was not easy for us to leave Europe. Back in Austria, at the very beginning, Dad was thinking about turning himself in to the American authorities. He thought they were democrats. He was deeply affected when he heard about Bleiburg and the extradition of the entire Government. He felt it was an aggression against all things Croatian, a firm bond between the Allies and Communism. That is why he left. He always said that he was prepared to stand up for our fight before an international forum. However, he was deeply disappointed with both the Americans and the English.” (“Ante Pavelić potpuno je uspio!”, Globus, May 22, 1992, no. 76: 32.)

15 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov’s police file, 94.
17 “On one occasion, in the emigration, Sušić told me that, before leaving, Maček received in Zagreb 1,000 gold pieces for his personal needs, i.e. that he had financial means abroad.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 015.7/11., Božidar Kavran police file, 15-16.)
Western allies. In other words, the message to Maček is the result of previous agreements.

Namely, the same day when it was decided to leave Zagreb and retreat to the West, Moškov brought the Zagreb Archbishop A. Stepinac who was: “The first man since the beginning of the war who spoke to Dad [Maček, that is] without the presence of the Ustashi.”

Two days later, Maček was approached by Moškov himself, who spoke to him for two hours. Apart from informing him that the Government made a decision to retreat, Moškov asked Maček to “leave the country”, for in his hands was “now the salvation of Croatia and the Croatian people.” Later, when he was already in emigration, Moškov claimed that he was the only witness of some talks with Stepinač, as well as of those between Pavelić and Maček, before leaving the country.

The extent to which the British policy was counting upon Maček at the time, as well as before, is well illustrated by Churchill’s demand from May 1945, – to “inform him of Maček“, because he did not follow his activities during the war.

Moškov and Šarić went together also to the second meeting with Pavelić. They did not meet on the same spot, “but in a nearby small wood, to which Pavelić came alone.” On that particular occasion, Moškov accused Pavelić “that the Croatian cause was badly managed from the beginning, that the huge capital he had in his hands from day one was ruined and that he held him personally responsible for that.” The second and last postwar conversation between Moškov and Pavelić took place towards the beginning of July 1945. Since the extent of tragic events known as the Bleiburg tragedy and the Way of the Cross were somewhat known by then, Pavelić, through Moškov, warned the former officials of the Government, the Ustashi movement, and the Army to “abstain from public work at the moment, and keep a low profile”, and that he himself [Pavelić’s, that is] did the same after he had heard of the extradition of a part of the NDH Government to Yugoslavia.

---

20 Moškov allegedly stated the following on Maček: “True, he never really spoke out about his final political goal, but he said that he was going abroad and that he was going to work for Croatia and the Croatian people.” (I. Hrastović, “Ante Moškov - Uloga u stvaranju i propasti NDH”, 138.)
21 I. Hrastović, “Ante Moškov ...”, 137. Moškov ”was able to conclude from everything that Maček was counting with the army that was with the English as a military force for achieving his political goals” (Ibid., 138.)
23 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, 94.
24 J. Jareb, Zlato i novac..., Footnote no. 36, p. 306.
Moškov was talking about Pavelić’s thoughts on how “the Yugoslavia as it used to be will surely not be established again. (...) The previous emigration lasted 12 years; if this one should last 12 months, it shall be a lot.” As regards the return to the country, Pavelić declared himself ready to return, but pointed out that “everything must have head and tail.”

Pavelić was discussing Šarić’s and Moškov’s suggestions that he should come back to the country with them, along with his other associates. They proposed to him to “run over the border” with an armed group of officers, and with trucks. After that, they would find a place to stay and start acting. They were persuading him that “the border is not secured at all, that there are no organized authorities of any kind in the country, that the people are very much against the Partisans and that the circumstances are ripe for return.” Pavelić opposed both the proposal and the manner of returning, pointing out that “this is no way to enter the country; someone must go first and check the situation there, and, when they return, maybe something could be done.” Moškov told him that he shall do it, but never informed him of anything later. Despite his publicly known opinion of Pavelić, it is interesting to point out that, at the beginning, Moškov was familiar with Pavelić’s address in Austria, but did not denounce him.

Eventually Moškov gave up his initial plan of crossing the border, and entered the country illegally. When he came back to Austria, he told Sušić that he “managed to organize the providing of data and information from the country on how to cross the border by an objective factor.” Then, based on these data, it shall be possible to plan future activities. The data will be arriving to Trieste, which is why Moškov must cross over to Italy. As regards the situation in the

---

26 “We also spoke about how they (The Main Headquarters) went with just anyone, without any liaison. He [Pavelić, that is] told me that there was no point in waiting anymore, because Russians were approaching.” (B. Krizman, Pavelić u bjekstvu, pp. 120, 123).
27 HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., Božidar Kavran police file, 38. According to some sources, the meeting was also witnessed by “Joso Rukavina (the Military Police Commander)”. (HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., 013.2.25a, Drago Jilek police file, 35.)
28 HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., Božidar Kavran police file, 38. After the extradition of a part of the NDH Government “we realized that our hopes of soon returning to the Homeland have failed.” (“Prof. Dolores Bracanović: Na povlačenju s državnim poglavarom”, an interview by Tomislav Jonjić, Politički zatvorenik, May 1997., no. 62: 12).
29 “He learned from Pavelić that he [Kavran, that is] told me that, initially (while Kavran had no connection with him [Pavelić, that is]) the following kept in touch and knew his whereabouts: Kirin, Lisak, and Moškov.” (HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., 013.2.25a, Drago Jilek police file, 52-53.)
30 Talking about a certain psychosis among the emigrants, being among the motives for transferring to the country, Moškov is probably partially referring to his own feelings and motives for crossing the border: “(...) people who found it very hard to live and watch what was going on in emigration, and who were under the influence of false news on massive fights in the homeland.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, 152.)
country, Moškov said that “it is ripe for action and that disarming the present army in the country shall be a joke compared to disarming the former Yugoslav army.” Subsequently, Moškov claimed that the data from the country were coming regularly to Trieste, “but it was all ruined by Lisak’s case and his arrest.” In his postwar declaration, Moškov stated that he went back to Austria after he saw “from the newspaper articles as well that all the news of fighting, the areas, and the like, were untrue”, and met with Kavran and Sušić on September 30, 1945.

The Fate of the so called Ustashi Gold

Two decades ago, a still fundamental and unavoidable research was published, which – primarily through original documents – speaks of the issues of the Croatian state assets that were taken out of the country during and at the end of the World War II. It is a collection of documents entitled Zlato i novac Nezavisne Države Hrvatske izneseni u inozemstvo 1944. i 1945 /Gold and Money of the Independent State of Croatia taken Abroad in 1944 and 1945/, published by Jere Jareb, DSc. Already based on this research (twenty years ago!) it has been presented and proven that various claims and confabulations on one of the inexhaustible topics of the Yugoslav state propaganda are without any serious grounds whatsoever. Unfortunately, even today, these propaganda topics are often being recycled in various both domestic and foreign pieces.

When it comes to Ante Moškov’s activity after the breakdown of NDH, the said topic is quite unavoidable, for (due to various circumstances), the fate of the said assets are closely associated with his name. Namely, Pavelić and Moškov did not disagree only on the time and manner of returning to the country, or on the level of the self-critical analysis of some political decisions and developments during the NDH, but also regarding Moškov’s role in managing state assets taken out of Croatia in May 1945. Namely, the gold was under the care of Frane Šarić who – together with Moškov and Major Marko Čavić – hid it near Radstadt, and they refused to hand it over to Pavelić.

33 HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., Božidar Kavran police file, p. 22.
34 Z. Radelić, Križari..., p. 89., and J. Jareb, Zlato i novac..., p. 308.
35 The said papers reveal a selective and uncritical approach to the sources, as well as unfamiliarity with the basic bibliography. Among those better known, I should like to single out the following: Mark Arons - John Loftus, Unholy Trinity. How the Vatican’s Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets, (St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998); Uki Goni, The real Odessa. How Peron Brought the Nazi War Criminals to Argentina, (London-New York, 2002), and Pino Adriano – Giorgio Cingolani, La via dei conventi. Ante Pavelic e il terrorismo ustascia dal Fascismo alla Guerra Fredda, (Ugo Mursia Editore, 2011).
36 J. Jareb, Zlato i novac NDH ..., pp. 348-356.
At the very beginning, when we talk about the so called Ustashi gold, we must point out above all that the said term – quite uncritically taken over until the present day – has been forged after 1945 by Agitprop, in compliance with the policy of changing history after the needs of the newly established authorities, while, really – according to that which we have learned so far – it is mostly the case of Croatian national assets.

According to the available data, just before NDH breakdown, the Croatian National Bank /Hrvatska državna banka – HDB/ had on its accounts in Swiss banks 1.338,87 kilograms /approximately 2.9522,083 pounds/ of gold and around 2,750,000 Swiss francs. The entire volume of gold (1.338,87 kilograms - 2.9522,083 pounds) consisted of a part (358,42 kg – approximately 790,31 pounds) delivered by the Reichsbank to HDB for covering transit traffic (transportation of German troops and war necessities over NDH territory), while the remaining 980,45 kg /approximately 2161, 89 pounds/ was the gold that HDB took over from the vault of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia National Bank in Sarajevo. The said assets were blocked by the Swiss Government on December 20, 1944. On July 10, 1945, they were transferred from HDB’s account in Switzerland to that of the Yugoslav National Bank /Jugoslavenska Narodna banka/. Therefore, the most part of NDH’s state assets ended up in the Yugoslav National Bank quite soon after the war had ended. Also, we must point out that HDB did not own any assets confiscated from Croatian citizens.

Rather more complex is the fate of a considerably smaller part (which is the object of numerous confabulations in bibliography), taken out of Croatia on May 7, 1945, and consisting of around 290 kg /approximately 640 pounds/ of gold, larger volumes of foreign currency, a great philatelic collection of the Directorate of the Post, and a smaller volume of precious stones, in two trucks and the automobile of Minister Mirko Puk. Until the present day, the fate of the truck with 18 cases of the philatelic collection has not been established, after it was left on the road in Austria. Puk’s automobile, with 2 cases of gold and a rather large amount of foreign currency, was attacked by Partisans who probably confiscated the valuables. The second truck reached Austria together with the “controversial” assets, which ended up in the hands of former high NDH officials. The second truck was transporting 12 cases of gold, foreign currency, and a smaller amount of precious stones. One case was distributed by the Ustashi among themselves, while the rest was stored at the Franciscan friary in Wolfsberg. In July, two cases of gold were taken by the priest, Dr. Krunoslav Draganović, who took them to Rome, while the rest was moved

37 “Department for agitation and propaganda”, in countries under Communist rule.
38 J. Jareb, Zlato i novac NDH …, pp. 357-359.
39 Draganović found out in Carinthia /Koroška/ “That hidden in Wolfsberg are 400 kg /ca. 880 pounds/ of the Croatian National Bank gold, and a backpack of foreign banknotes and other valuables.” Out of that, he took 40 kg /ca. 80 pounds/ with him. (For more information see: Miroslav Akmadža, Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima, (Zagreb, 2010),
and buried in the vicinity of Radstadt. And so, finally remaining were 8 cases of gold (the total of 180 kg – *ca. 397 pounds*) and a casing of precious stones, which – according to the so far investigation – remained after Moškov and Šarić had moved the gold to Austria in July 1945.40

Furthermore, when it comes to this smaller part of the assets taken out of Croatia on May 7, 1945, dr. Jere Jareb has established that most of it was owned by the Croatian National Bank – around 55% of the gold. The remaining 45% came from the State Treasury deposit, and it indubitably contained some assets by Croatian Jews, as well as those confiscated from Croatian citizens.41 Namely, it is unquestionable that the assets were owned by the Directorate for Public Order and Security; however, it has not been established until this day how much of the assets was turned over by the Directorate to the State Treasury. In other words: How much of the said 45% pertains to the Jewish assets that were taken abroad, remains an issue open to further investigation. Another thing that should be investigated and could assist in answering the question of the confiscated assets’ fate is the part that was stored at Kaptol42 no. 9, and confiscated in 1946. Namely, it is well known that, just before the breakdown of NDH, all assets were “packed into 46 cases, 32 cases out of which (containing gold and valuables, *note by the author*) were stored at the Franciscan friary on Kaptol in Zagreb, while 14 were taken to exile”. Until this day, 22 records are missing on the valuables listed after they had been found in 32 cases on Kaptol, on January 25, 1946.43 The insight into the said records would most certainly provide more accurate conclusions on these confiscated assets as well. However, the fate of the said assets is yet to find its investigator.

Let us go back to the smaller part of 8 cases of gold (ca. 180 kg = *ca. 397 pounds*), which ended up in the hands of former high officials in Austria towards the end of July, and whose faith has remained unclear until the very present day.

---

40 For more information see: J. Jareb, *Zlato i novac NDH* ..., pp. 348-358. “The gold was being distributed among Croats and it was the Croats who spent it. Not a single *penny* of the gold was deposited to the Bank of Vatican or any other state bank.” (*Ibidem*, p. 358.)

41 “Among the National Treasury deposits, kept at the Croatian National Bank vault, there were also valuables confiscated from certain citizens (Jews, Serbs, and Croats), during their arrest, the assets confiscated from the Directorate of Economy due to black market transactions; the assets confiscated by the Croatian Border authorities during the attempt of their bringing into or out of the country. While researching the documents, I came upon a case of the famous solicitor from Zagreb, dr. Nikola Kać, who died in Argentina, and who, on several occasions, donated a certain amount of gold coins to the Croatian state for the needs of the Croatian Army. Therefore, the issue of Jewish contribution and confiscation of the assets of Croatian citizens will have to be investigated in detail...” (J. Jareb, *Zlato i novac*..., p. 359.)

42 The main seat of the Catholic Church in Croatia, located in its capital Zagreb, *note by the translator*.

In the sense of Pavelić’s message that high officials should now “keep a low profile”, Moškov, Božidar Kavran, and Lovro Sušić decided the following while storing the state assets in Austria, in mid July 1945:

“If, for any reason whatsoever, Poglavnik is no longer able to work and manage national issues, and dr. Maček takes over the leadership in the national cause of establishing a Croatian state, as he is expected to, then all the stored assets shall have to be given to him, at his disposal.”44

After the agreement with Pavelić that the assets should be transferred to a safe place, on July 14, 1945, Šarić and Moškov transferred them to a location known only to them.45

In the circumstances after NDH breakdown, material assets were an important precondition of a future organized endeavor. This was clear to all the interested parties, while Moškov probably thought that the gold in his hands shall be a major asset in combinations which he had with Maček. Certainly, we have to point out that Moškov, in all likelihood, had in mind exclusively the continuation of anti-Communist activities, and not the insurance of his own future existence. It remains an “open issue, how far he has progressed in this intention of his.”46 Moškov wrote a memorandum to Maček, from the standpoint that Maček “is now the only one capable of managing the Croatian cause in front of the outside world.”47 However, in spite of numerous hopes and expectations, Maček held on to his previous political attitude.48

Moškov’s response to the inquiry why he had disposed of the gold on his own comprised the following two arguments: The first one regarded safety, while the other consisted in the fact that he saw that Sušić was “being

44 “The stored assets will have to serve primarily for general national purposes, and especially the military-political work, when the time comes. We do not know yet, how the circumstances shall evolve.” (J. Jareb, Zlato i novac..., p. 314.)
45 Moškov made an agreement “with Šarić that the gold should not be taken anywhere until further notice, and especially not to Pavelić, and that it should remain hidden until the situation is completely cleared and until it shows who has the right to dispose with it.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police files, p. 93.)
46 Sušić observes: “However the silence of HSS / Hrvatska seljačka stranka – The Croatian Peasants Party/ leaders when it comes to the state assets is most conspicuous, whereas they otherwise do not miss far smaller occasions, even those invented, to come after the Ustashi most fiercely.” (J. Jareb, Zlato i novac..., p. 323.) It is possible that, by this remark, Sušić had in mind HSS’s member Pernar, to whom Moškov allegedly promised “to turn over the gold, if he helps him to save himself.” (HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., 013.2.25a, Drago Jilek police file, 119.)
47 J. Jareb, Zlato i novac..., p. 318.
48 “Especially the news of his contact with King Peter and the people from his entourage, completely shook what little hope was left in me in Maček, and, through him, in the entire HSS.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 160.)
careless”. He promised to give Kavran two thousand gold pieces for Pavelić, after which he was supposed to talk to him [Pavelić, that is]. After stalling the delivery, Moškov eventually turned over to Kavran 1,037 gold pieces. Sušić was convinced that the rest of the gold “might as well be forgotten”, while Pavelić, having heard what had happened, “remained silent and then told Sušić to take over the gold pieces and establish a committee.” Regarding the proposal that he should personally take the acquired gold pieces, because they are “a part of the 2000 which were originally intended for him (his needs and possible work)”, Pavelić refused, saying “That he shall not be taking the money for himself.” In other words, the assets were supposed to “serve primarily for the general national purposes, and particularly the military-political work, when the time comes. We do not know yet, how the circumstances shall evolve.”

During the investigation, Moškov stated that he turned over to Kavran, “together with Šarić, around 800 gold pieces, and was given a receipt by him”, while he said to Sušić and Kavran, when delivering the gold pieces, that he intends to return to Italy and bring along “a certain volume to be used for assisting refugees, as well as for promoting the Croatian cause, but not in the manner as it has been so far, but rather by posing a limit regarding everything backed up by Pavelić.” Two days after, in the morning, Moškov passed to Italy, Tarvisio, with Šarić, and that same day continued to Conegliano, whereas Šarić went back to Graz in order to transfer his family.

The said developments involving the state assets gave two blows to the organization and activity of the nationalist wing among the political emigrants. First of all, it was quite clear even to the most uninformed that, without material means, there could be no serious ventures, and second, it was the first serious opposition to Pavelić after the war, i.e. the first example of a clear anti-Pavelić...

---

49 Moškov stated that “he personally saw for himself, during an identification by the Austrian police, that Sušić was careless, which gave rise to the concern that – if he [Sušić] were to be arrested – he would give out most easily where the gold was stored.” (HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., Božidara Kavran file, p. 43.)

50 “As Sušić was hesitating, Pavelić advised him to talk to Džaferbeg Kulenović or Ivica Frković, and have one of them take over.” However, Frković and Kulenović also did not want to “take over the concern over the gold, and so asked Sušić to take it [the gold] over”, while they shall be his “advisors”. (HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., Božidar Kavran police file, p. 45.)


53 “After that, Kavran showed me a letter by Pavelić where it said that Šarić and myself should hand over the gold to Kavran, or else we shall be put on trial before the Ustashi court. I refused, saying that I do not acknowledge neither Pavelić nor any other Ustashi court, and that he should be most careful about what he does. After that I went to Italy together with Šarić and took along 850 gold pieces.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 97.)

54 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 97.

activity on the part of a former high NDH official. The latter has complicated things even more and caused turmoil when it comes to Pavelić’s relations with his quite recent former associates. Old discords were being strengthened and new ones opened, which was actually a realistic development, given the fact that, as the time passed, many assumed that Pavelić had already played his part. However, the fact that certain individuals took an opposing stand towards Pavelić did not mean that, in an opportune moment, they would not be prepared to make use of his name.

The Hiding of Moškov in Italy: Contacts with the Americans and the Fate of the Gold

Concerning Moškov’s stay and hiding in Italy, it has so far been reconstructed based on the postwar statements given to Yugoslav authorities by Moškov himself and other prisoners. Namely, as regards his arrival to Gemona, during the investigation Moškov stated that he went over to Italy “in a transport”, in which there were “other Croats as well, but I was separated from others because I stayed in a railroad car where there were really only Italians. (...) The next day I met this friar, Fr. Ivo, I can’t think of his last name at

56 Regarding Pavelić, Moškov “took a stand quite opposed to everything that he and those who still remained with him were trying to maintain and realize. I condemned every single case of the so called ‘ID distribution proving the patriotism of individuals, and opposed the monopolization of Croatian patriotism, which was the practice of some in the first emigration, during NDH, and finally in the new emigration. The monopolization – a term which I was using all the time – was being performed by Pavelić and his entourage.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, pp. 158, 159.)

57 “Pavelić and his group firmly believed that all those who were not under their influence were standing by me i.e. that I was the cause why there were people who did not obey.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 160.)

58 Sušić states that he heard – when it comes to turning over the assets of the NDH Consulate in Vienna – “that Moškov acted as the go between, using Poglavnik’s authority (sic!) (...) the main amounts were given to the Croatian Red Cross, headed by Rev. Cecelja. The money was indeed distributed to the refugees, then to Moškov and Frane Šarić, and finally to ing. Bažo Vučković for the HSS leaders (dr. Pernar, dr. Torbar and dr. Reberski).” (J. Jareb, Zlato i novac, pp. 326-327.)

59 Back in Austria, Moškov heard “that whoever among us is going to Italy should go by way of Gemona, and absolutely should not go to Udine, because there they verify right away who is Italian and who is not. In Gemona, there are several our friars with whom we can stay overnight and then continue the journey by train wherever one wishes to go. One should only inquire for padre Giovanni /Ivo/ for he was the most kind to the passers-by. (...) In his words, Padre Ivo left Zagreb some ten days after the Partisans had entered it, via Trieste. He belongs to the Dubrovnik friary, and, according to his own words, during the war he was taking care of food provision for Konavje. Approximately 35 years old, medium built, red faced, with a characteristic [unreadable] in his eyes. He stayed at the friary in Gjemona. While I was in Gemona, he went to Trieste, and once in Rome, and then he went by Fermo as well.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, pp. 121, 122, 128.) It is hard to believe that Moškov was not
the moment, and asked him about the circumstances in Italy in general, and Gemona in particular, for it was my intention to stay there for a while due to the liaison I was expecting via Trieste. (...) He [Fr. Ivo, that is] was personally acquainted with the English Governor who was in Gemona and from whom he would acquire permits when he was going somewhere.” Fr. Ivo is personally acquainted with the American military chaplain “who is Croat by origin”. Also, while speaking to Moškov, Fr. Ivo told him about himself that he was “the best informed” about the circumstances in Italy, “that he comes into contact with many of our people and hears almost all the news.” Moškov asked Fr. Ivo to try and arrange him – via the Governor – a “safe stay in Gemona”, because he intended to stay for a longer while. He registered as an Italian, because he spoke the language, and so he presented himself as a refugee from Zadar.

In this sense, we find of interest the so far unknown, unsigned testimony shedding a new light on Moškov’s hiding in Italy, which makes part of Pavelić’s legacy under the title: “Memories. In Gemona – Italia”. In all likelihood, the author of the testimony is the Franciscan, dr. Branko Marić, a close associate of Pavelić beyond 1945. It is visible from the “Memories” that they were compiled after Marić had left Italy and moved to Madrid. I did not manage to establish whether the 4 pages of the text are merely a chapter of more extensive memories, but it would appear that they were written subsequently as a testimony for clearing up a different topic. In his postwar statement, Moškov does not mention Marić, who states in his text that he had spoken to Moškov in Gemona, after his transfer to Italy around mid-October 1945. Marić writes that, after the arrival of other emigrants from Austria, whom he then accommodated in the Franciscan friary in Gemona, “one evening General Moškov also appeared with his two soldiers. He said that he was assisted by an American officer who took him to Italy in his car, but it cost him quite a bit!”

---

60 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 122.
63 “I believe I left on October 16 or 17 1945” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, p. 122.)
64 The Pavelić legacy (in further text, we shall be using the original Croatian abbreviation: OP), Folder Fr. Branko Marić, text “Memories. In Gemona – Italia”. 1. A copy in possession of the author.
other words, an entirely different version from the one Moškov himself stated about his crossing over to Italy.

Regarding the part of the gold that Moškov took with him to Italy, Marić writes:

“I helped carry into the room some very heavy backpacks. I ask the soldier: ‘What, in God’s name, is this heavy, my brother?’ He says: ‘General has bought flints for the lighters, it’s sold well in Italy, and there are some other things too, so it’s heavy.’”

Regarding the part of the assets that Moškov transferred to Italy together with Šarić, he stated during the investigation that it was 850 gold pieces which he deposited into the “bank exchanging 100 pieces because I had no money at all, while I intended to find a place to stay and buy a small car or a motorcycle so that I can move about independently of regular traffic.” Shortly after, “I was arrested by the English in Venice, in a manner remaining somewhat of a mystery to me until the very present day”. The British have simply found out about the part of the gold deposited in the bank “because I had upon me the receipt of the bank vault at Casa di risparnio Conegliano Veneto. There were still around 760 gold pieces inside and, I believe, around 100,000 liras.” During the interrogation, Moškov would not reveal the whereabouts of the rest of the gold and other valuables. However, according to his subsequent realizations, his close associate Šarić, who was arrested together with him in Venice and detained in the same prison (but not in the same cell!) was “after 4–5 days transferred from this prison to the Mestre prison”, and “just before Christmas of 1946 came out of prison.”

Same as other high officials, Moškov was particularly interested in “getting into contact with an American, so that I may find out how they are looking at things.” All the more so, since Fr. Ivo told him that he could connect him with an American officer who, allegedly, “acted as an observer when the English refused to accept our army at the Austrian border. I asked him to try and bring that American by all means, so that I may hear what he has to say.”

66 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, p. 97. Moškov was interrogated in Rome by Major Clissold. Draganović found out from the “Ally circles” that “Gen. Mc. Lean is conscientious and good, but that Major Clissold was fiercely pushing the matter as if it were his own.” (HR-HDA-1805, The Krunoslav Draganović Collection, Folder 16. “The fight for seven Croatian lives”, added by hand on page 24.) “...on the other hand took action about the same thing: Braco Tomljenović with Ivica Gržeta, Krešo Župan, and several others. The result of their action was that Frane Šarić was released from prison, in the same manner as Frković and Balen, whereas they did not succeed in taking Moškov out.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 015.7/11. Mimo Rosandić police file, p. 126.)
67 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 124. Regarding contacts with Western intelligence services, see also: Mate Frković, “Nepoznate stranice iz poslije-
The meeting was soon arranged and Moškov asked the American “about the issue of not having accepted the army”, upon which he [the American] “was surprised that we in Croatia didn’t know that it had been decided that the troops who fought against the Partisans would be delivered to them. He said that it was the “Tito-Alexander’ agreement”.

After some time, while Moškov was in Conegliano, the said “American Major stopped while travelling from Udine, looked for me and inquired me about the entire war period, as well as for the previous emigration.” Apart from that, he wanted to know the news from Croatia to which Moškov responded “that there were no news”, and asked the American about the information he had: “He told me that many were running from Yugoslavia and that everybody says that a great mess and a great dissatisfaction reign there. I told him that I too have heard such news.” That same day, they met again at a dinner and Moškov asked him “whether he knows with whom he is speaking”, upon which the American wrote on a piece of paper “correctly my exact name”. He repeatedly claimed that “I should not be afraid at all”, and, if he so wished, he would accommodate him “in the zone where their troops are staying.” Upon Moškov’s inquiry, the American replied his name was “Person” [which was obviously not his real name, note by the author]. It was Moškov’s last meeting with “Person.”


68 After the meeting “They (the American chaplain, the American officer “whom they were calling ‘Major’”, and Fr. Ivo, note by the author) went on to Venice.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 125.)

69 “I decided not to accept after all, although I told him I was going to think about it, given my attitude towards Pavelić and the news coming from his surroundings about me all the time, and given his connection with the Americans.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 125.)

70 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, 126. It is possible that “Person” and “Peri” are really one and the same. Jilek’s testimony supports Moškov’s statement that the initiative for the meeting came from Peri: “According to Rover’s statement, Žubrinič associates Peri with Moškov. Peri himself requires to contact Moškov, and so Žubrinič takes him (Peri) to Kordeljano to meet with Moškov. Moškov was staying at a hotel in Kordeljano at the time. Peri was not independent yet, because he had a Colonel for boss, while he himself was a Captain. Peri met with Moškov several times. I know through Rover, while Rover learned it in confidentiality from Žubrinič, that Peri asked Moškov to give him young and reliable Ustashi officers, so that he (Peri) can get them into the country through “Unra”. These Ustashi officers would be sneak into Yugoslavia, either as permanent “Unra” officials, or as advanced “Unra’s” transport staff. The plan was to organize an intelligence network through these officers. According to Žubrinič’s words, Moškov did not do anything in this regard.” (HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., 013.2.25a, Drago Jilek police file, p. 32.) “... And the combination in the case of an Anglo-American war, told to me by the American Major Person, was that Croats should – in case of war – fight by stirring an uprising in the country, as other peoples have done, who were under Communism, and so enable the victory of America over the Communist Russia. I also stated my opinion that us Croats should open our eyes, since we have had quite a lot of experience, and that no further victims should be created, or engage in a war and die until the
It remains an open issue to which extent Moškov’s intention to present such a version of the talk with the American officer was, among other things, motivated by the current international position of Yugoslavia i.e. its strained relations with the West.

Moškov asked Marić to connect him with the Commander of the British man-of-war stationed in Venice, because “There was a Franciscan who went to celebrate Mass on the ship once a week”. When he came back from the meeting, Marić was under the impression that Moškov “did not have much hope in the connection, but was rather preparing to go south on his own.” Apart from that, Moškov sent a letter from Gemona to Maček, and it was probably the memorandum mentioned by Sušić. According to Marić, two Moškov’s soldiers:

“went missing and reappeared again in 8-10 days. I have already started speaking more intimately with the General. (...) One day, Gen. Mošk(o)v and I went for a walk. He tells me how, right upon arriving to Gemona, he sent a letter to Dr. Maček, asking him to intervene for our people with the high political factors, and put himself at his disposal along with all his men. I sent the letter through my two soldiers, he says. Though I was hoping that everything would be all right and that Maček would keep these two soldiers with himself for guard and service, he took the letter, and told them to go back where they came from. He didn’t even give them any money for hotel or food. Luckily, they had a paid return ticket, so that they were able to come back; they suffered on the journey, because I gave them only the bare necessities. That was the end of my first mission...”

Judging from Moškov’s words to Marić on how “we must now seek another way”, Maček’s reply was not a positive one for Moškov. Moškov “complained about Maček and his passivity and obstinacy.” He pointed out that “HSS did not represent or conduct its policy according to the needs and wishes of the moment of peace arrives, when we should come with the forces that are relatively preserved and not exhausted. I literally said that Croats, in the intended war against Russia, should not pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the English and the Americans, and that, at the moment, Croats should neither individually nor collectively sacrifice themselves by vouching for certain people and groups that have special goals and only care about gaining power.”

71 OP, “Memories. In Gemona – Italy”. 2. “It was somewhere at the beginning of May, 1946. Before that, it /Conegliano/ was the point farthest to the south that I have reached in Italy.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58. Ante Moškov police file, p. 133.)
Croatian people, but according that which others were giving and offering or creating.”

Sušić felt that Moškov saw later how questionable Maček’s benevolence towards him really was, and so “found himself covering only half of the way, which brought him back to Austria in the summer of 1946. However, there he started hesitating once again and finally went his own way.”

The Efforts of Krunoslav Draganović regarding Moškov’s (Non-)Extradition

Similarly to the issue of the Croatian national assets, the role of the priest Krunoslav Draganović – who was staying in Rome since 1943, performing various diplomatic and humanitarian tasks and was the leading person when it came to the care of Croatian refugees in Italy (both during and after the war) – was the topic of many papers, among which those scientifically grounded are the rarest. The image we still today often come across about Draganović

74 “There were no messages from his (Maček’s, note by the author) side, he only said that I should best retire somewhere, and he was condemning Pečnikar very much.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, 110-111.) “Maček will come to the Gathering [Sabor] to Chicago on September 2. And nobody knows yet what he wants. If he is compplotting with the Chetnicks, he might as well stay where he is...” (Archives of the Široki Brijeg Franciscan friary: Legacy of Fr. Dominik Mandić, Vol. 3, m. 1, f. 284. Fr. D. Zrno to Dominik Mandić on August 12, 1946).

75 J. Jareb, Zlato i novac, p. 323. The same opinion was given to Kavran also by Mime Rosandić in the fall of 1946: “It was Rosandić’s opinion that Moškov wanted to put himself, together with the gold, at the disposal of Maček, but, once he became aware that Maček was not doing anything, he went to Austria and tried to talk to Pavelić.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, Božidar Kavran police file, p. 54.) In the investigation, Moškov stated that, towards the beginning of August, 1946, he came to Austria to clear the rumors on how he had allegedly misappropriated the gold. (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, p. 96.)

76 Draganović was also the secretary of Bratovština Sv. Jeronima, within Hrvatski papinski zavod Sv. Jeronima: “I was appointed as advisor to the Croatian mission with the Holy See (of no diplomatic character). (…) Apart from working for the mission, as regards charity work, I worked most closely with “Caritas Zagrebačke nadbiskupije” and The Croatian Red Cross, which I really also represented, especially after the Italian armistice i.e. Italy’s crossing over to the side of the Western Allies on 8/9/1943. My field of work was Central Italy, all the way to the frontline, while the Northern part was the area of the former Croatian Minister of Health, dr. Ivo Petrić, with several excellent assistants” (V. Nikolić, Pred vratima domovine, (Zagreb 1995), Book 2, pp. 298-299.)

77 In the past years, there have been some developments, so that a Collection of Papers on Draganović has been published, entitled: Krunoslav Stjepan Draganović – svečenik koji je vjerovao u prisutnost Božju u Crkvi te duboko cijenio vjeru svojega naroda: zbornik radova s međunarodnoga znanstvenog simpozija o Krunoslavu Stjepanu Draganoviću povodom 110. obljetnice rođenja i 30. obljetnice smrti održanom na Katoličkom bosiličnom fakultetu u Sarajevu od 8.-10. 11. 2013. godine, Darko Tomašević, Miroslav Akmadža, eds. (Sarajevo: The Catholic Divinity College, Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 2014). Regarding Draganović’s role in the postwar hiding of Pavelić, See: A. Delić, “Djelovanje Ante Pavelića 1945.-1953. godine”: 148-158.
results from the fact that, after 1945, primarily for political reasons, Draganović became the target of the Communist Yugoslavia's propaganda machinery. It is precisely from this source that many authors until this very day are taking the assumptions for their theses on the person and deed of K. Draganović. The fact is that Draganović did engage in politics, apart from his humanitarian and charity work. On the other hand, the question is to what extent it was possible to separate these three activities under the existing circumstances.

During his lifetime, Draganović claimed that he had “the power to pull people out of various Italian camps, for whom I had visas, so that they were able to emigrate to certain countries. I used this power extensively. I pulled hundreds; thousands – to be precise – people from camps and enabled them to emigrate.” The same testimony was left by Fr. Dominik Mandić, who was – among other things – also the steward of the Franciscan Order in Rome:

“… I personally was doing everything in my power to save exiled Croats; to help them during their stay in Italy, and to get them across the sea as soon as possible, so that they could begin a new life. For those who were in a particular danger, we tried to find shelters in monasteries and Church-owned buildings. I loaned many of them substantial sums from the money belonging to the Order, in order to get them across the sea. Apart from working through Bratovština sv. Jeronima, in order to help the exiled Croats and support various institutions I had founded for their benefit, I spent over US$ 100,000 of the Order’s money …”

When it comes to Draganović and the hiding of Gen. Moškov in Italy, so far the only known fact is the one given by Draganović himself in one of his statements to the Yugoslav authorities: That he was trying to protect Moškov from extradition, after he was arrested, together with Šarić, on October 23, 1946 by the Field Security Service. On the other hand, according to the testimony of Fr. B. Marić, Draganović helped Moškov also to hide near Loretto,

---

78 See footnote 35. “In most cases they are anti-Catholic works, in which excerpts and ‘data’ on the activity of the Catholic Church in Croatia during WWII and in the postwar period serve solely to strengthen the main theses on the responsibility of the Church as a whole and Pope Pius XII in particular for his alleged lack of resistance to Nazi crimes, as well as the alleged postwar hiding and saving of Nazi war criminals, among which also the Ustashi.” (M. Jareb, “Između mitova i činjenica: odnos Krunoslava Draganovića prema poglavniku Anti Paveliću”, 302.)

79 “That is the area, therefore, located between politics and humanitarianism”. (M. Akmadža, Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima, p. 145.)

80 V. Nikolić, Pred vratima domovine, II, p. 327 and K. Mirth, Život u emigraciji, p. 58.

81 V. Nikolić, Pred vratima domovine, I, pp. 190, 191.

82 For more information see: M. Akmadža, Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima, pp. 158, 164.

83 FO 371/67398, Memorandum on the Ustasa Organisation in Italy, p. 3.
as Marić found out during a pilgrimage there. 

In his statement, Moškov said that he never saw Draganović while he was in emigration, let alone that he was helped by him personally while hiding.

The Croatian State Archives keep a part of Draganović’s legacy (on Bleiburg and The Way of the Cross), comprising also the document entitled: “Circumstances in Italy after the War”, one among the subtitles being: “The Fight for Seven Croatian lives”. The latter text describes the case of the extradition of a group of seven Croats, among which there was also Moškov. Draganović himself is the unquestionable author of the text, who wrote the following on the circumstances of Moškov’s arrest in Venice:

“The city was swarming with spies and haters of everything that is Croatian, in some foreign ethnic groups. Moškov stayed a while in Austria, and then in Northern Italy. He came to Venice only for a short while, in a small company of Croats. A stupid woman, who took parading across St. Mark’s Square and pleasant life in front of a luxurious coffee shop to liking, kept delaying the group, otherwise in a hurry, all the way until some spies recognized Gen. Moškov and arrested him with a great fuss.”

However, during the investigation, Moškov gave a somewhat different version of his own arrest:

“Two Englishmen in uniforms and one in civilian clothes approached us (...). One could tell that we were denounced, because they did not raid the café, where there were many guests, but came directly to us, although we were sitting in a corner of the hall, while others were not being identified at all nor did they pay any attention to them. As soon as we reached the Office of the Commander /F. S. S./, they immediately searched us and took everything away, (...) after which they took us to the Santa Maria Maggiore, run by the Italians. (...) From his interrogation (at the F. S. S., note by the author), I could immediately tell that the room where I stayed in Conegliano had been searched, along with the Conegliano bank safe.”

84 “He was in a cabin in the suburbs of Loretto. He was doing well and living quite nicely, only, he was in a constant fear for himself. He was under the patronage of Rev-Dragan(ović)”. (OP, Fr. B. Marić, ”Memories”, p. 3.)

85 “... I never saw Draganović or Pečnikar in the emigration. I only met Draganović once in the country as well, while he was located at the Institute of Colonization, regarding an estate in Donji Miholjac, where I intended to accommodate a cavalry division and provide food for it.” (...) “As regards priests, in Italy I only saw the aforementioned Fr. Ivo and another one who spent only two days in Gemona under the name of padre Alesandro, whereas Fr. Ivo called him padre Slavko.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, pp. 154-156.) He told Kavran, on the other hand, “that in Italy he associated with Draganović, Oršanić, Žank, and others.” (HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., Božidar Kavran police file, p. 22.)


87 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, p. 145.
Among Moškov’s associates and friends, it was no secret that Draganović was making great efforts in order to free him from prison:

“In the meantime, Draganović and Žubrinić organized the deal of getting Moškov and Franjo Šarić from prison through the Pope (...). The effort through the Pope was not successful in the case of Moškov, because he had told the English that he was associated with the American secret service in Trieste, through someone named Pery. That was the main reason why the Pope gave up on any further intervention.”

Draganović states that, while extraditing Moškov and others from his group, the American side took the following stand:

“(…) To us, General Moškov – is a war criminal, whereas the other six are not, and we do not agree. We can see that that they took the steps which the English did not accept, but rather extradited the men. Later, after a repeated intervention, the Americans will say that we denied our consent. (…) We do not know really if anybody was extradited by the Americans from Italy, we always see the English before us (…)”

Moškov between Washington and London

The report from mid May 1946 reveals the kind of data that Western services had on Moškov before his arrest, stating the following:

“adversary of the English and Americans; now represents himself as a friend of the English and Americans; at present one of the main Ustashi leaders but has adjusted his policy so that it satisfies both the Ustashi and HSS; enjoys a good reputation with HSS because during the Independent Croat State secretly maintained contact with HSS political leaders and protected them from persecution; maintains good relations with Dr. Macek; during the Independent Croat State was appointed for liaison duties between State and Church, performing his duties to the satisfaction of both State and Church; maintains good relations with clerical circles; regarded as courageous, energetic, and as fairly intelligent; has made one illegal trip to the vicinity of Zagreb in December 1945; at present is resident in northern Italy.”

---

89 M. Akmadža, Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima, p. 158.
90 TNA: PRO, WO 204/11574, Croat Emigre Resistance Leaders, 18 May 1946, p. 3.
Without any doubt, the Western intelligence services were gathering data from Croatian informers as well. After Moškov had returned from Croatia, in the fall of 1945, it was estimated that he was:

“strengthening his hold on the more active and youthful Legitimist circles in the DP camps, running his own private intelligence service in Croatia and financing his needs by helping himself to the gold and other valuables which had been brought out of Croatia in May 1945 and hidden in Austria.”

The Allies dealt with Moškov more after his arrest i.e. when the issue of meeting the Yugoslav request for extradition was raised. Different views of the British and the American side, when it comes to fulfilling Yugoslav requests for extraditions, are of an earlier date, while Moškov’s case is merely one in the series of causes due to which different views of the Allies regarding the issue came to the surface once again.

A confidential report was sent from the British Embassy in Washington on April 24, 1947 to the authorities in London regarding the opposite policies of the American and the British Government towards Yugoslav requests for the extradition of war criminals. The State Department once again took a most negative stand towards Yugoslav requests for the extradition “of alleged quislings.”

Namely, on the one hand, the British side was pointing out that the methods “of ignoring completely a large number of applications” are – in the long run – bad for the Allies themselves, and that it is both in the British and the American best interests to turn over the “agreed quislings with greater energy and dispatch.” On the other hand, however, the State Department was appreciating British arguments, but did not share “our misgivings”, and pointed out that Yugoslav justice “is such a complete travesty” compared to that in the West, that the extraditions were “tantamount to the passing of death sentences.” The Americans added “that they are considering establishing a cut-off date after which no further applications whatsoever for the surrender of alleged war criminals.”

---

91 FO 371/67398, Memorandum on the Ustasa Organisation in Italy, p. 3.
92 For example, the British side did not treat equally requests for the extraditions of Ustashi and those for the extradition of Chetniks. While the former were considered terrorists to be extradited even when their extradition has not been required, they had “moral obligations” towards the latter. For more information see: Bernd Robionek, Croatian Political Refugees and the Western Allies: A Documented Survey from the Second World War to the Year 1948., (Berlin, 2010), pp. 165-166. The American side pointed out that the requests for extradition aim primarily at eliminating political opponents. See: Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, vol. IV, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State”, April 4, 1947, p. 785.
93 “We therefore decided recently to take the whole question up with the State Department at working level in an attempt to make them adopt a more positive approach to this problem.” (FO 371/67376, R 5696, British Embassy, Washington to Foreign Office, 24/4/1947).
criminals will be entertained." For the British, the proposal "has at least the merit from our point of view that it might provide a means of forcing the State Department to make up their minds about the many outstanding cases (nearly 600) which we have communicated to them." The British complained that the State Department did not respond to a single one of "our written representations" concerning extradition requests. Quite exceptionally, "they only make up their minds in urgent individual cases as a result of constant pressure from us."94

At the British Embassy in Washington, they feel that there is no doubt that the State Department "at all levels greatly regret the past assurances which they have given to the Yugoslav Government about effecting surrenders and wish to wash their hands of the whole business at the earliest possible opportunity". The proposal was made to send to the American ally a complete list with the names of those who have not been extradited yet. Although such a move was nothing new, "it would at least be some attempt to provide satisfaction to the Yugoslavs". A conclusion is reached in the end that the continuation of the so far American policy would not bring any results, which is why it is suggested that the British ambassadors to Belgrade and Rome, as well as the Political Advisor at Leghorn, "should not discuss this question with their United States colleagues for the time being."95

In all likelihood, owing to the perseverance of K. Draganović96, on April 26, The Holy See State Secretariat dispatched a note, via the British ambassador to Vatican, who forwarded it to London only three days later, while it was officially registered at the Foreign Office on May 6. The note lists a larger number of persons than those who were supposed to be extradited with Moškov, while Moškov himself is among the four for whom it is said that the "following men are highly esteemed and honored, but are in danger by reason of high position which they have held." The Vatican concludes:

"Asserting that these men would most willingly stand trial before an international or impartial Court, the appellants express the

94 FO 371/67376, R 5696, British Embassy, Washington to Foreign Office, 24/4/1947, 1-2. "When the location of wanted persons is not known it is almost impossible to get the State Department to take any interest whatsoever." (Ibid., 2.)


96 "Through our tentacles, we have been informed by the British Commission for War Criminals – I have appointed him, a Jew, Šeniver (?), the only way for the people to be saved – if not all of them, at least one or another chosen by you – is for the Vatican to send a telegram to the English Commander of Trieste, and tell him the following: The innocence of so and so has been proven, stop the extradition. I then go to Vatican and say that. They listen in astonishment and say that it is not possible. I tell them that it is not impossible (...) We cannot do it – they say – and invoke protocol as a reason: They can speak to the English Queen or the Foreign Minister, but not to the Commander of Trieste. I tell them: I'm not leaving here until such a telegram is sent. (...) And we kept arguing like that for an entire hour, when monsignor Kerol, an American, came out and said: We have found the way, the telegram is being sent as we speak." (M. Akmadža, Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima, p. 164.)
conviction that a trial in Yugoslavia, under present circumstances, would be summary and unjust.”

The Vatican note was commented by the Foreign Office as follows: “With the exception of Moskov and Devcic there are no outstanding monsters in the Vatican note.”

Apart from interventions via the Vatican, among others, Draganović turned also to the American Cardinal Spellman, who was “a personal friend of Roosevelt's”, and Spellman showed “full interest i.e. expressed much sympathy.”

According to the realizations of the British ambassador to Washington dated April 28, Ante Moškov “has already been handed over.” The Ambassador points out that: “we appear to have most background information”, regarding Moškov and others to whose extradition both the American and the British Government have consented, but, “we hesitate in existing circumstances (…) to reply to enquiries such as Cardinal Spellman's without further guidance from you”. The Ambassador warns that a particular caution is necessary, given the influence of the “Yugoslav-American groups in this country.”

Regarding the reply to Cardinal Spellman, after two weeks, the Ambassador was advised by the Foreign Office to stick to the attitude that the extraditions were performed in compliance with the agreement “that traitors and collaborators are to be forcibly repatriated for trial where a prima facie (underlined in the original text, note by the author) case against them is established by the Yugoslav Government.” Also, it should be added that, after a detailed investigation, and taking into account the information in possession of the British side “we consider that a prima facie (underlined in the original, note by the author) case is established.”

In order to find a common language with regard to different stands of the British and the American Governments on the extradition of the “alleged Yugoslav war criminals”, two days later, the British ambassador informed London of the “proposed visit by General Hilldring, which will be an opportunity to point out that – if the American and the British Governments in their handling of the problem of Yugoslav refugees (…) lay themselves open to charges of bad faith and of “sheltering war criminals” they run the risk of offering excuses to unenthusiastic countries of increasing the difficulties of securing full

97 FO 371/67376, R 6058.
98 FO 371/67376, R 6058, note on the file wrapper.
100 FO 371/67376, R 5734, From Washington to Foreign Office, 4/28/1947. “There are signs that they may renew pressure in Congress and with the State Department before long and we should be wise to avoid, as far as possible bringing grist to their mill.” (Ibid.)
support for I.R.O. and the pursuance of a reasonably generous resettlement program on the part of the Latin American countries and perhaps also of the Dominions.  

Drago Jilek also tried to intervene on Moškov’s behalf through Peri, whom we have mentioned before, however: “[Peri] told us that Moškov caused him certain inconveniences by his indiscretion with the English (in prison). He told us that Ante Moškov’s fiancée (Seka Tomljenović) also came to him and asked him to intervene on his behalf. He (Peri) claimed that he did intervene, but was not able to achieve anything, since the decision on Moškov’s extradition had allegedly already been made.” Dr. Branko Jelić, who was in England at the time, also intervened for Moškov and the others through a law firm. For Moškov, it was stated that he was the “Head of M. Pavelic’s bodyguard but never accused of any form of brutality or inhumanity.”

From the prison in Rome, Moškov wrote to “Pernar asking him to do something and also let Maček know and ask him to kindly intervene”. Apart from that, he also approached “our priests in St. Jerome /Madjerac/ and asked for the attached letter to be delivered to Professor Perović or anyone who is good with Madjerac.” In his letter, he exaggerated his “relationship with Stepinac, and I think I wrote that the Stepinac trial could be repeated if I am extradited, believing that Vatican would really become interested in that way and make an effort to stop my extradition.” However, there were no results.

The Pending Extradition

Moškov’s name is on the top of an undated document with the list of persons who are “at present on their way by train from Rome to the Yugoslav frontier and will be handed over to the Yugoslav authorities about April 28th.” Next to each name, there are brief excerpts from the CV, or merely the offices

103 Seka was the nickname of Marijana Tomljenović, the sister of Josip Tomljenović, Ustashi lieutenant-colonel.
104 HR-HDA-1561. SDS RSUP-a SRH., 013.2.25a, Drago Jilek police file, p. 25.
105 “(...) Dr. Jelic, the Ustasi Leader who is controlling the emigration of Croat quislings. There is, of course, no reason why we should account for our actions to him. (...) Dr. Jelic has a number of influential and parliamentary friends who appear always to be willing to stand up for his views.” (See more in: FO 371/67376, R 6011.) Moškov found out “that he - Branko – was very closely associated with the English, that he was in contact with Krnjević and that - according to the information at his disposal – the war between Anglo-Americans and Russians was imminent.” Jelić “excludes any possibility of Pavelić returning again, which is why efforts should be made to present Pavelić such as he really is and make it impossible for the Anglo-Americans to count upon him.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, p. 134.)
106 “I received no answer from Pernar, only greetings and that he was very sorry that I (was?) in prison.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, p. 148.)
they held during NDH. It is interesting, though, that for Moškov no concrete incriminating data are listed:

“Commander-in-Chief of Pavelić’s Bodyguard. Commander of the 1st Croat Assault Division formed in October 1944. Decorated by Pavelić and promoted General in December 1944. He was one of Pavelić's earliest supporters having been in exile with him in 1933.”

The execution and procedure of the extradition itself of the group in which Moškov found himself as well, were in the competence of the Central Mediterranean Forces General Headquarters which appointed three British soldiers/guards per prisoner, with the following note: “Every precaution will be taken to prevent escape or suicide. Authority is given for the use of handcuffs, straight-jackets, or – as a last resort – the use of firearms, to prevent escape.”

---

107 FO 371/67376, R 5699, “YUGOSLAV QUISLINGS DUE TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE YUGOSLAV GOVT.” The undated typed document lists 9 names, in the following order: Ante Moškov, Viktor Tomić, Vladimir Kren, Vladimir Židovec, Vilim Peroš, Živan Kuveždić, Lt. Colonel Janko Vernić-Turanski, Danijel Uvanović, and Mîlîvoj Magdić. It was subsequently established that the Ustashi Lt. Colonel Tomić should be taken off the list because he “died in Rome on 7 April” (FO 371/67376, R 5941, 25.4.1947.); more precisely, died “of pneumonia and consumption” (FO 371/67376, R 5964, 3.5.1947.) “When he was told that he was going to be given over to the Yugoslav authorities, he committed suicide by cutting his wrists.” (Tko je tko, 401.) Also, the name of the Minister in NDH Government Živan Kuveždić was later crossed as well, because the State Department required his case to be “held pending further investigation”. (FO 371/67376, R 5941, 25.4.1947.) Still, Kuveždić was extradited towards the beginning of July 1948. (Tko je tko, 223.) Draganović lists Ivo Kren, and not Vladimir, who was extradited in July 1948. (Tko je tko, 207-208.)

108 “AFHQ functioned as a combined staff, but for administrative purposes, U.S. components were responsible to Headquarters North African Theater of Operations, United States Army (NATOUS), from February 14, 1943 (NATOUS redesignated Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, MTOUSA, November 1, 1944); and British components were responsible to General Headquarters Central Mediterranean Forces (CMF), from October 1, 1945. Headquarters MTOUSA and General Headquarters CMF formally separated from AFHQ, October 1, 1945, leaving AFHQ to consist of a small interallied staff responsible for combined command liquidation activities. AFHQ abolished, effective September 17, 1947, by General Order 24, AFHQ, September 16, 1947.” (https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/331.html)

109 FO 371/67376, R 5699. 2. “At the critical moment, a meeting was held at the English College in Rome in Monseratto Street, where talks were conducted among several Croatian representatives, the London Cardinal Griffin, and the Labor Party deputy Stokes, later to become the Minister of Labor. (...) A delegation of Croats flew from Chicago to Washington and was received by Deputy State Secretary Dean Acheson (Acheson, note by the author). They submit their memorandum and meet with a lot of understanding. (...) The following American Government Telegram arrives: Moškov himself is considered a war criminal. Washington does not recognize the remaining six as war criminals. They are not to be extradited to Tito. The Chairman of the English Commission general Maclean responds: It is not our custom to receive orders from the American Embassy. The fate is sealed.” (HR-HDA-1805, The Krunoslav Draganović, Collection, Folder 16. "The Fight for Seven Croatian Lives", pp. 24, 25).
Except for Kuveždić and Tomić, all the rest were extradited on April 27, apart from Moškov who “attempted suicide and was removed from train at Rimini”\(^{110}\), and transported to a hospital until he was well enough to be extradited:

“I saw, however, that all the attempts towards my non-extradition, including the former ones in Rome, were in vain. That is why I tried to commit suicide, but was timely discovered by the guards, because – as I found out later – the blood from my cut wrists poured out from my prison compartment to the passage outside. Unconscious, I was taken to hospital in a place called Ricione and received a blood transfusion. After recovery, they kept all my belongings, including my suit, and transported me to Udine and then, by automobile, from Udine to the border, where I was extradited.”\(^{111}\)

According to British sources, Moškov was extradited to the Yugoslav authorities on April 30, 1947; according to Draganović, on 2 May, whereas, “according to later news from the American Commander of Gorica, Gen. Moškov was extradited only on May 8; it is not known, why so late.”\(^{112}\)

There is an interesting memorandum sent by the British Embassy in Belgrade to London after Moškov’s extradition:

“We have heard nothing of the fate of Moskov and the others who were handed over with him. In view of his record and the information under torture that he could give we would not be surprised if Moskov at any rate were by now dead, and the same may be true of the others. (…) We have always been convinced that there is only one way of balancing the injustice of Yugoslav legal procedure with the obvious justice of punishing the Moskovs and Koradas. This is simply to conduct our examination of wanted men in such a way that we have in practice no doubt of the guilt of those whom we decide to hand over. Your recent instructions to Vienna are on just these lines and have our full support. But we feel certain that we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that once we have handed over a man it is useless to concern ourselves with his fate.”\(^{113}\)

\(^{110}\) FO 371/67376, R 5941.

\(^{111}\) HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, p. 147.

\(^{112}\) FO 371/67376, R 5941 i R 5964. “Further Quisling also attempted suicide but proceeded with party.” (FO 371/67376, R 5964. 26.4.1947.) Moškov tried to save himself by escaping as well: “When, after the American response, which shall be mentioned later, it became quite clear that America also considered Moškov to be a war criminal, there was no other resort for him but to try to save himself by escaping. The escape was organized by Gen. Moškov’s heroic fiancée M. T, but, alas, Moškov fell into a canal and was apprehended again. His moving letters, written in prison on different pieces of paper, still exist to this day.” (HR-HDA-1805, The Krunoslav Draganović, Collection, Folder 16. “’The Fight for Seven Croatian Lives’, pp. 23, 26).

\(^{113}\) FO 371/67398, R14458, British Embassy Belgrade to Foreign Office, 22/10/1947.
Later, Draganović found out the reason beyond Vatican’s failed intervention: “The English Commander of Trieste received a telegram, put it in his pocket, handed over the men immediately, and sent the following telegram to Vatican: Your telegram came late.”\footnote{M. Akmadža, \textit{Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima}, p. 164.} He called irrational the policy according to which “democratic West could become a blind weapon for executing the sentence of the Communist Party”. It was not a matter of justice, but rather the last word was spoken by “politics; political commitments, that which was considered opportune, interests, - everything before justice and humanity.” Draganović points out that, by handing over Moškov and the others “not a single man was handed over to whom any crime against humanity, committed either in peacetime or in wartime, could be proven at a fair, unbiased court.”\footnote{“We are under the general impression that - more or less – everybody from this group of seven men were handed over in the absence of other, more adequate persons.” (...) “Not only the frightful Bleiburg, but also many extraditions of “war criminals” shall remain a heavy stain on postwar English politics, a wound on the conscience of the responsible English politicians, who caused this very grave breech of human and democratic principles; breech of justice and humanity.” (...) “One of the protests after the tragic events near Bleiburg received an angry response of the then Foreign Affairs Minister Bevin: ‘No hundred thousand people were handed over to Tito’s Communists! Merely around fifty Ustashi criminals.’ – Nobody in his right mind would mistake the Labor Party member Bevin for a Communist. And yet he responded in such a manner, and, which is much worse, did what he did. That is why we are talking about the stain on the English postwar politics and the wound on the conscience of the politicians responsible.” (HR-HDA-1805, The Krunoslav Draganović Collection, Folder 16. “The Fight for Seven Croatian Lives”, pp. 23-24, 27-28).}

The basic principle of official Vatican’s, as well as Draganović’s activities, was supported by the opinion that it was necessary to “save the lives of refugees against winter and cold and prevent extradition and unfair trial to the people who were somehow compromised by the former regime, because it was no longer a matter of justice, but of savage and cruel revenge.”\footnote{Milan Simčić, “Krunoslav Draganović i njegov odnos s Državnim tajništvom Svete Stolice u razdoblju 1943.-1960.”, \textit{Zbornik radova s međunarodnoga znanstvenog simpozija o Krunoslavu S. Draganoviću…}, p. 221.} In other words, murderers, butchers and thieves “will not be prosecuted, but will not be protected wither”. Draganović’s goal was “in principle, to gain the interest of Ally authorities through Vatican, so that the Vatican may explain to them the need to establish a limit between political guilt and that personal or genocidal.” Of course that “we shall not advocate anyone openly, and then say that he was guilty of genocide, but we still ask you to protect him. I believe there are no such cases.” However, when it comes to political guilt, the following attitude is taken: “it is not up to you to judge, you may continue saving peacefully, because Church has done so, and – if you will – the Synagogue as well.”\footnote{M. Akmadža, \textit{Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima}, pp. 154-155.}

In his investigation, J. Jareb raised the following question: “Did the English, while handing over Moškov, hand over to Yugoslavia also the data and the
assets that were in his possession?”. The otherwise well informed Draganović claims that, after Moškov’s arrest “the English found in his safe at a bank in Gamona near Udine several thousand gold coins”. Based on the British sources, we are able to answer the question with even more precision: After Moškov’s arrest, the British found “31 packages each containing one hundred coins, one package containing seventy coins, one package containing 23 coins, 1,494 dollars in United States currency, 75 diamonds.” The British Political Adviser at Leghorn considered that the “valuables would appear property of Yugoslav Government”, however, he asked for urgent instructions from the Foreign Office, in order to resolve the issue of disposing with the said assets before the trial to Moškov begins. Four days later, the following instruction arrived: that it was Moškov’s “personal property” and as such “should be handed over to the Yugoslav authorities”, together with Moškov.

Eventually, the gold buried by Moškov and Šarić in Austria was dug out by Moškov’s associate, the Ustashi Major Marko Čavić (after Moškov and Šarić ended up in prison), who took it with himself, left Italy with some others by boat, and went to live in Argentina. In his investigation study, D. Jilek does not mention Marko Čavić, but states that: “Frane Šarić took the opportunity while Moškov was in prison in Rome and went to Austria on four different occasions, and then came back to Italy, thus transporting the rest of the gold.” M. Frković supposedly estimated the remaining gold at US$ 70,000.

J. Jareb concludes: “One thing is for sure: all the gold, precious stones, and foreign currency, ended up in the hands of exiled Croats who spent it all. Only the philatelic collection of the Zagreb Post Directorate ended up in the hands of foreigners.”

121 FO 371/67376, R 5965/97/92, From Foreign Office to Leghorn, 5/7/1947.
122 “Marko Čavić travelled along with his family, Josip and Ivica Tomljenović and their families, and probably also Ante Godina. It is impossible to establish for sure whether, on their way to Argentina, they stayed for a while in Brasilia, where they were assisted by Ing. Tomislav Bulat. In any case, they soon arrived to Argentina, where the Čavićs and the Tomljenovićs began living in Cordoba, and Godina in Mendoza.” (J. Jareb, *Zlato i novac...*, 355.) “I know that, until my arrest, the gold remained buried near Radstadt – approximately at least 170-180 kg /ca. 375-397 pounds/, as well as a large number of very small diamonds. Apart from me, no one knew where the spot was except Marko Čavić and Franjo Šarić.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Ante Moškov police file, pp. 97-98.) Moškov was not the only one who eventually found Šarić suspicious: “Pavelić told Kavran that he suspects Franjo Šarić of having something to do with Kirin’ arrest, because, apart from him and Lisak, nobody knew his whereabouts.” (HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Drago Jilek police file, p. 35.)
123 HR-HDA-1561. RSUP SRH, SDS, 013.0.58., Drago Jilek police file, pp. 119-120.
In the end, we should mention once again the fact that was observed by earlier investigators as well: It is obvious that Moškov's file kept at The Croatian State Archives /HDA/ in Zagreb is not complete i.e. there are many documents lacking, starting from the data regarding Moškov's extradition, to the accusation and verdict. The insight into Moškov's complete file shall help answer some questions about his fate after he was handed over to the Yugoslav Communist authorities.

Conclusion

The postwar activity of General Ante Moškov is marked by an active anti-Yugoslav and at the same time anti-Pavelić attitude, although the latter conflict was caused by their personal disagreement, primarily as a result of the breakdown of NDH. Disposing on his own with a part of the Croatian national assets taken abroad, Moškov to a large extent tied the hands of his quite recent sympathizers, who did not reject Pavelić under the newly created circumstances. At the same time, in this way he isolated himself on his own from the possibility of taking part in a wider Party political organizing among the Croatian political emigration. He thus became an extremely interesting target to many in his closer surroundings due to the fact that he disposed of the state assets. The latter probably explains the reasons for his arrest in Italy, as well as his subsequent fate.

Zusammenfassung


Bibliography

Archives


HR-HDA-1805, The Krunoslav Draganović Collection

The National Archive: Public Record Office /Further: TNA: PRO/, London, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966

Literature

“Ante Pavelić potpuno je uspio!”, Globus, May 22, 1992, no. 76: 32

“Prof. Dolores Bracanović: Na povlačenju s državnim poglavarom”, an interview by Tomislav Jonjić, Politički zatvorenik, May 1997., no. 62

Aarons, Mark; Loftus, John, Unholy Trinity. How the Vatican’s Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets, (St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998)


Akmadža, Miroslav, Krunoslav Draganović - Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima, (Zagreb, 2010)

Ante Moškov, Pavelićeva doba (Split, 1999)

Delić, Ante “Djelovanje Ante Pavelića 1945.-1953. godine”
A. DELIĆ: The Case of General Ante Moškov 1945-1947 or General Ante Moškov and the so called ...


Foreign Relations of the United States, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, vol. IV, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State”, April 4, 1947. (Washington, D.C., 1947)


Hrvatski iseljenički leksikon [The Croatian Emigration Lexicon] http://fotoimago.hr/Flip%20PDF/index.html#p=800

Jareb, Jere, Zlato i novac NDH izneseni u inozemstvo 1944. i 1945., (Zagreb, 1997)


Jonjić, Tomislav; Matković, Stjepan, “Novi prilozi za životopis Mile Budaka uoči Drugoga svjetskog rata”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 40/2008, no. 2


Krizman, Bogdan, Pavelić u bijestvu (Zagreb, 1986)

Maček, Andrej; Škrabe, Nino, Maček izbliza, (Zagreb, 1999)

Milovanović, Nikola, Kroz tajni arhiv Udbe I, (Belgrade, Sloboda, 1988)

Mirth, Karlo, Život u emigraciji (Zagreb, 2003)

Nikolić, Vinko, Pred vratima domovine, vol. 2 (Zagreb 1995)

Nikolić, Vinko, *Tragedija se dogodila u svibnju.*, vol. II (Zagreb, 1995)


Robionek, Bernd, *Croatian Political Refugees and the Western Allies: A Documented Survey from the Second World War to the Year 1948.*, (Berlin, 2010)


