SUSPENSION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT OF SCIENTIFIC NAIVETY

Janko M. Lozar*

University of Ljubljana – Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy
Ljubljana, Slovenia

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ABSTRACT
The article addresses the negative judgements on natural sciences, however persistent and frequent they may be, found scattered in the philosophical texts of the two founding fathers of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It first presents these harsh views and then, by assuming the phenomenological method, advocated by both philosophers, endeavours to suspend these judgements in favour of a phenomenologically more adequate description of the scientific comportment, trying to do justice to its non-philosophical excellence. The basic claim of the treatise is that Husserl’s and Heidegger’s criticisms should only be understood in the defensive sense of procuring a firm and safe ground for theoretical comportment, bios theoretikos. Such an approach, however, begs for a phenomenological description of the intrinsic excellence of science, which might be phenomenologically most accurately understood as most rigorous practical comportment, as bios praktikos.

KEY WORDS
phenomenology, science, Husserl, Heidegger, suspension

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*Corresponding author; ḫ: janko.lozar@ff.uni lj.si; +386 1 241 1494;
Faculty of Arts, Aškerčeva 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
INTRODUCTION

Ever since Husserl’s harsh criticism of science, and his strong admonitions against the crisis inherent in European sciences, phenomenology and phenomenologists have been more or less single-mindedly repeating and further deepening the insights into the erroneuousness and potential danger of science for the fate of European culture. Martin Heidegger, one of the most promising, as well as subversive of Husserl’s students and assistants, and the later main proponent of phenomenology, despite his decided philosophical departure from his teacher and mentor, sticks to the same line of argumentation.

Since then, phenomenology, despite its undeniable vivacity and growth of research, has shown surprisingly little interest in addressing at least the peculiarly strongly opinionated nature of these claims, let alone to suspend these judgements and try to go back to the “thing itself”, i.e. the truth of natural sciences in their own specific openness to the world and its respective ontological status. To put it differently, despite principled commitment to the rigorous basic method of suspending all judgements, prejudices, truths acquired and handed down, phenomenology has by and large failed to do so in the case of supposed, or better presupposed, inherent erroneuousness and naivety of natural science’s objectivism and dualism. The reproach of dualism is based on Husserl’s insight into the intrinsically mathematical character of science. Husserl based his criticism on the founder of modern sciences, Galilei, as the 10th and 11th chapter of his Crisis clearly show. He begins with the following criticism [8; p.60]:

“One can truly say that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges with Galileo. A consequence of this, along with mathematization, which was too quickly taken for granted, is [the idea of] a self-enclosed natural causality in which every occurrence is determined unequivocally and in advance. Clearly the way is thus prepared for dualism, which appears immediately afterward in Descartes.

In general we must realize that the conception of the new idea of ‘nature’ as an encapsulated, really and theoretically self-enclosed world of bodies soon brings about a complete transformation of the idea of the world in general”.

So we see that the reproach of dualism rests on Husserl’s premise that the main culprit for the dualistic approach of science is the mathematization of the world of (mathematically calculable) bodies. If the world is in advance understood more geometrico, according do geometrical laws, then the world of bodies to be explored is totally abstracted from the scientific subject, who remains irrelevant for the subject matter to be scientifically explored. In other words, if mathematical laws are invested into the world as its underlying truth, the scientist is fatefully and essentially separated from it, having no constitutive relation to this self-enclosed world of bodies. From here, the equation of objectivism of sciences with dualism becomes clearer. As it, likewise, becomes clearer why scientists of today do not accept this critical claim without any reservations.

Admittedly, it is not difficult to see the reasons why both Husserl and Heidegger strived so zealously to distance themselves from (natural) science. Firstly, ever since its beginnings, it has been the very nature of philosophy and philosopher to pay heed to the whole, to take care of everything, as the Greek saying meleta to pan, attributed to the ancient Periander (628-588 BC), seems to clearly intimate. This is how Heidegger appropriates this saying, using it to reveal the true nature of doing philosophy: “From the time when the essential configuration of Western history begins to unfold, a saying is handed down to us that goes meleta to pan, “Take into care beings as a whole” [das Seiende im Ganzen] – that means, consider that
everything depends upon the whole of beings. Always consider the essential, first and last, and assume the attitude that matures us for such reflection” [4; p.3]. At the very beginning of the book (collection of lectures), titled Basic Concepts, Heidegger explains what philosophy as the creator of basic concepts should mean: “‘Basic concepts’ means this: that it does not treat of particular regions of beings, nor of the corresponding sciences that investigate them individually” [4; p.1]. But it is not primarily the “regionality” issue, the question of the broadness of scope of investigation, that separates the two and brings the philosopher to a sceptic halt. A much more decisive factor for their negative and worriedly critical distance from natural sciences can be surmised from the cultural-historical fact that, from the 19th century onwards, Europe and European culture in general have witnessed an astoundingly growing prevalence, and success, of sciences, while the power and renown of philosophy has been progressively diminishing. The same fate, one might add, befell theology, which has – for the last couple of centuries – been pushed more and more to the fringes of cultural and scientific attention.

HUSSERL’S CRITICISM

It is primarily for these two reasons, one stemming from the intimate nature of philosophy itself, and the other from the victory of sciences on the competitive field of the socio-cultural arena, that Husserl and Heidegger viciously assault sciences. Now it is time to take a closer look at their criticisms. We shall start with Husserl and his purported detection of the crisis of European sciences. In his last great work (to have been published during his lifetime), The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, we find quite an array of concepts critically unleashed upon science. The first one, already present in the title, is the supposed crisis of sciences, which gets attention in the very beginning: “A crisis of our sciences as such: can we seriously speak of it? Is not this talk, heard so often these days, an exaggeration” [8; p.3]? Indeed, the rhetorical question raised at the very beginning, is a rewarding one, begging the preliminarily tentative answer that Husserl’s detection of the crisis of sciences might very well be an exaggeration.

But before we delve into this issue, let us see what this crisis, according to Husserl, is all about. In Part II, titled “Clarification of the Origin of the Modern Opposition between Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental Subjectivism”, Husserl quite aptly discusses the modern-age struggle between Objectivism and Subjectivism as the main battlefield on the terrain of modern culture. The title of Chapter H, “The Life-World as the Forgotten Meaning-Fundament of Natural Science”, clearly intimates what the most obvious, and general, reason for this crisis of sciences is: “In geometrical and natural-scientific mathematization, in the open infinity of possible experiences, we measure the life-world – the world constantly given to us as actual in our concrete world-life – for a well-fitting garb of ideas, that of the so-called objectively scientific truths. […] Mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or the garb of symbols of the symbolic mathematical theories, encompasses everything which, for scientists and the educated generally, represents the life-world, dresses it up as "objectively actual and true" nature” [8; pp.51-52].

In failing to gain a proper entrance into the original phenomenal realm of the lifeworld, the highly acclaimed objectivity of science, which only sticks to its garb of ideas or mathematical theories, deserves a proper denigration of having nothing to do with the truth of reality, and becomes no more than a “so-called objectivity”, or an objectivity written in parentheses. In unsuccessfully endeavouring to reach for the actual and possible sensible plena of the concretely intuited shapes of the life-world, Husserl continues, “no one was ever made conscious of the radical problem of how this sort of naiveté actually became possible and is still possible as a living historical fact” [8; p.52].
Lifeworld, for Husserl, is a concept related to the primordial phenomenality of one’s life in the world, a phenomenality that cannot be addressed properly without relating it to subjective experience, wherein the lifeworld comes to its proper delineation. Since the truth of the (primordial) lifeworld is subjective and experiential, it always necessarily evades the exactness of mathematical laws, especially because it is always pregiven. Mathematical truth of the world is thus always only an approximation to lifeworld. Thus, according to Husserl, science, despite its earnest of efforts, is forgetful of its own meaning-providing ground. Its objectivity or objective validity of truth is only a purported one, and by sticking to the method or garb of mathematical theories, which it throws over the lifeworld, betrays a hard-to-believe naivety. In short, the natural science’s endeavour of determining the truth of nature is but a process of dressing (it) up.

Even though, every now and again, Husserl throws in a word of warm praise for science, the unseriousness and superficiality of science is even further aggravated by its relativity and non-rationality: “Mathematical natural science is a wonderful technique for making inductions with an efficiency, a degree of probability, a precision, and a computability that were simply unimaginable in earlier times. As an accomplishment, it is a triumph of the human spirit. As for the rationality of its methods and theories, however, it is a thoroughly relative one. It even presupposes a fundamental approach that is itself totally lacking in rationality [8; p.295]. The reproach of relativity and lack of rationality of natural science, one has to admit, are quite incomprehensible and impossible to corroborate. If we set aside the non-sensical reproach of lack of rationality: isn’t the objectivism of sciences, with objectivity resting on mathematical laws, closer to the absolute rather than to the relative of subjective experience?

And last but not least, the dualism, the psycho-physicality of its approach, which was, as unfortunate as this may be, inaugurated by the transcendentalist Descartes and his “non-transcendental” theory of the two substances (res cogitans and res extensa), also betrays a deafness to reason, if we stick to the etymology of the word absurdity: “But it was not merely in the inauguration of this idea that Descartes was the founding father of the modern period. It is highly remarkable at the same time that it was he, in his Meditations – and precisely in order to provide a radical foundation for the new rationalism and then eo ipso for dualism – who accomplished the primal establishment of ideas which were destined, through their own historical effects (as if following a hidden teleology of history), to explode this very rationalism by uncovering its hidden absurdity [8; p.74].

Inherent crisis, forgetfulness, naivety, non-rationality, relativism, and even absurdity – the concepts applied here are all but respectful, and an exaggeration. An exaggeration, which calls for what Husserl himself would phrase as “absolute freedom from prejudice, [freedom] gained through the unsurpassable radicalism of the full transcendental epoche, that makes possible a true liberation from the traditional temptations” [8; p.263]. Indeed, in what follows, we shall try to stick to this absolute freedom from prejudice and liberation from traditional temptations in case of Husserl’s harsh judgement on natural sciences’ absurdity and irrational naivety. And there is a passage in Husserl’s Crisis book, which opens a crack in Husserl’s otherwise absolutely harsh treatise of sciences 131): “Is it not the case that this hypothesis, which in spite of the ideality of scientific theories has direct validity for the scientific subjects (the scientists as human beings), is but one among the many practical hypotheses and projects which make up the life of human beings in this life-world – which is at all times consciously pregiven to them as available? Do not all goals, whether they are ‘practical’ in some other, extrascientific sense or are practical under the title of ‘theory’, belong eo ipso to the unity of the life-world, if only we take the latter in its complete and full concreteness” [8; p.131].
Exactly so. Which is why accusations of naivety, relativity, absurdity and lack of rationality are – we might assume a bit harsher stance against Husserl here – misplaced. Let there be no room for doubt here: his criticism, levelled at objectivistic and dualistic philosophy, which brings about the absurdity of thinking human mind or psyche analogously to natural things, is surely entirely justified. The sciences are not intrinsically destructive. What is worthy of criticizing, is the uncritical acceptance of the universal validity/objectivity of scientific truths, even from other disciplines, philosophy included. Where Husserl’s criticism becomes less justified or understandable, however, is his attack against the methodological rigour of natural or positive sciences in their own field of work.

It could very well be that the most probable and understandable reason for this awkwardness of Husserl’s ambiguous, yet still prevalently negative approach to science could very well be found in his need to make philosophy the strictest, most rigorous of all sciences, attempting to exceed the rigorousness of mathematical natural sciences. In this, competitively understood sense, Husserl’s criticism, although still being unviable, at least becomes understandable.

HEIDEGGER’S CRITICISM

With Heidegger, the phenomenological criticism of sciences, as we know, takes a different turn. He no longer sets himself a task of making philosophy the most rigorous of all sciences, but instead says that philosophy cannot, and must not be, considered science at all: “Philosophy is actually not a science, not even the purest and most rigorous. We can only say: […] Philosophy is the origin [Ursprung] of science, and exactly because of this not a science – not even the original science” [6; p.18]. Still harsher is his judgement in the second part of the book, where he, in addressing the difference between science and philosophy, says: “The idea of a scientific philosophy is as senseless as the thought of a round cross” [6; p.221]. Heidegger’s claim, in other words, is that philosophy studies that which sciences take for granted: the ontological truth of entities studied. The subject matter of sciences and of philosophy is thus to be distinguished by the ontological difference: the difference between entities (Seienden) and the being of entities (Sein des Seienden). Positive sciences study entities of various kinds, while philosophy studies the – scientifically forgotten – being of entities [6; p.223].

Yet despite the difference of approach, when compared to Husserl, Heidegger’s charges against science are no less harsh. Despite his insistence on the non-scientific character of philosophy, he still assumes, and thus reassumes, the rigorous task of criticizing natural sciences. In his case, as his philosophical story goes, science doesn’t think (1; pp.7-8): “For it is true that what was said so far, and the entire discussion that is to follow, have nothing to do with scientific knowledge, especially not if the discussion itself is to be a thinking. This situation is grounded in the fact that science itself does not think, and cannot think – which is its good fortune, here meaning the assurance of its own appointed course. Science does not think” [1; pp.7-8].

If we can defend this harshness by reminding ourselves that, for Heidegger, even philosophy and philosophers are yet to truly begin to think, our defence fails miserably when attempting to provide justification reasons for the judgements exposed in the following. In his The Question Concerning Technology, where no less than the fate of modern human kind is at stake, Heidegger says that “sciences, in exploring nature, man, history and language, cannot in this exploration represent the truth of their subject matters, and by doing so betray an impotence” [3; pp.175-176]. In Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, where the scientific status of (Schelling’s) philosophy is under scrutiny, and compared to the truth of the positive sciences, he writes the following: “The intention of scientific questioning
leads to what it already includes at its incipience as a prejudice” [5; p.138]. A page latter, where Heidegger addresses the issue of the scientific principle of mechanism, he discloses science as a fundamental error in that it uncritically assumes the principle of investigation, which “is already justified by one’s getting somewhere with its aid. One always gets somewhere of necessity with the principle of mechanism, therefore it cannot be demonstrated specifically in its truth in this way. The truth of a principle can in general never be demonstrated by success” [5; p.138].

Science is, to continue this road down into the abysm, a failure, because of its “failure to recognize that every true beginning of principles of investigation must be […] grounded in the essence of truth itself” [5; p.139]. And the final, if not ultimate judgement, to be found in the chapter “The Thing”, where Heidegger undertakes the task of rescuing the long lost richness of things, caused by none other than the science’s technological calculative and manipulative understanding of things as but exploitable disposables. Due to the un-reflected shift of the truth of being (enframing, Gestell), which holds its full swain in modern sciences, “science’s knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, the sphere of objects, already had annihilated things as things long before the atom bomb exploded” [2; p.168].

To repeat what we have already intimated: is this alleged annihilation of things an exaggeration? An atom-bomb exaggeration? Despite his determined endeavours to separate the (ontological) domain of philosophy from the (ontical) domain of science, which he demands in many a text ever so adamantly, science is a domain of impotence, prejudice, fundamental erroneousness, failure and the ultimate danger of the annihilation of things. We might, and indeed should, ask ourselves why not rather stick to the claim that science does not think its own openness and its own manner of being within the world as strictly as the thinking of being does?

**BACK TO NATURAL SCIENCES**

In his *Crisis*, Husserl strikes against science and scientific investigation with his strongest weapon, drawing our attention to the total lack of rationality, or better yet, its obliviousness of the subjective realm: “It even presupposes a fundamental approach that is itself totally lacking in rationality. Since the intuitively given surrounding world, this merely subjective realm, is forgotten in scientific investigation, the working subject is himself forgotten; the scientist does not become a subject of investigation [8; p.295].

In a very similar fashion, in his *Origin of the Work of Art*, when thinking the truth of truth, Heidegger lists various happenings of truth (in art, religion, politics, philosophy etc.), yet science is not to be found among them, because (1971, 60) “ […] science is not an original happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened, specifically by apprehending and confirming that which shows itself to be possibly and necessarily correct within that field.” Science, in other words, has not yet arrived at the essential truth or disclosure of what is.

It is high time we start going “back to the thing itself”, which has witnessed such strong-minded critical scrutiny by both founding fathers of phenomenology, back to the positive elements of science. In both phenomenologists, science does not do what philosophy (proper) does: reflect on the manner of givenness of objectivity in the unavoidable correlation with the investigating subjectivity, or heedfully think the truth of being of objectivity, from out of the ontological truth of Dasein.

As we have already intimated earlier, there is an element in both Husserl and Heidegger, which might shed some (just) light on the positive character of science. Both Husserl and
Heidegger, each in their own context, bespeak a peculiar mode of givenness, and a peculiar comportment of consciousness/Dasein, in which what is given is always already pregiven, or given unthematically and prereflectively [9; p.26] and inconspicuously [7; p.71]. Could we not attribute this mode of being to the investigating scientist? Indeed we could. And this brings us closer to one of the stronger, and potentially dangerous contentions of this article: science is a practice rather than theory proper. This contention immediately begs the following question: are we not here doing the same as Husserl and Heidegger were doing? If Husserl says science is naively forgetful, and Heidegger that science does not think, is not our contention that positive science is not a theory – essentially the same, insulting, too harsh and lacking in heedfulness for the alterity of science? We surely hope not. The reason for our high hopes is the motivation for this judgement: by thinking the truth of science as highest possible (untheoretical, or better pre-theoretical) practice, might we not evade the fixated criticisms (such as Husserl’s and Heidegger’s) and concentrate on the most exquisite truth of positive science?

In classical phenomenology, the traditional definition of truth as correspondence of propositions and things, or as adequacy of thought and things, has witnessed severest possible criticism, both in Husserl and Heidegger. Yet, if we are to be true phenomenologists, the justification for this should not become solidified into a fixed self-evidence. The truth as correctness of correspondence of my “inner” representation with the thing “out there” should, and for a very good reason, remain a truth. Strikingly different from the truth of transcendentally necessary correlativity and truth as unconcealment (aletheia), but still a viable truth. What kind of a truth then? In order to draw nearer the possibility of a positive character of correspondence theory of truth, we first have to exercise a phenomenological shift of directing attention back to ourselves and the truth of our own pre- or non-philosophical, practical comportment. After having done this, we can, from out of intuition, support the claim that the truth as correctness of correspondence of the subjective and the objective is the practical truth of our rational life. It is both the truth of our everyday, pre-scientific and pre-philosophical life, and the truth of positive scientific comportment, both situated in the practical rationality, and which is not uprooted from the practicality of life, as is the theoretical rationality, swirled into the hermeneutic circle of reflexivity as its only form of practice.

For practical comportment, be it everyday or scientific, things are always out there as either handy (practically rational) or unhandy (practically irrational or unreasonable). Practical rationality, in perfecting the practical goodness of life, seeks the best possible access to outer and inner goods by endeavouring to perfect, and thus make most efficient, the skill of handling and manipulating reality. This is how it – practically – reserves itself time to gather itself before it addresses the practical matters at stake. In taking its time, what awaits to be addressed and tackled, rests in itself out there. With a peace of mind of its own, by not paying attention to the mode of givenness of the explorer and of what is to be explored, it procures itself enough time and space, and peace and quiet, to perfect a hypothesis, which is expected to find its acceptance or rejection only later, after it has been tested on the outer, empirical reality.

Strictly speaking, in positive science, we cannot speak of theory and theories, but, more appropriately, of hypotheses. Why not? Theory is, and has been since its very beginnings in ancient Greece, a deviation from the normal practicality of life, a weird reflexive self-awareness with its own specific truth (as the truth of conditions of possibility of reality), markedly different from the truth of either positive scientific or prescientific comportment. The weirdness, or unusualness, of the philosophical comportment consists in philosophy’s having little or no time for its own practical applicability. If it wants to produce its own theory in the fullest, it relates to previous theoretical results rather than to the practical import of its basic tenets, and remains in this manner wilfully caught in the circle of understanding.
Suspension of phenomenological judgement of scientific naivety

itself in relation to another theory, be it acceptable and calling for further elaboration, or unacceptable and calling for a revision. Likewise, though vice versa, science, as a cultural praxis, has little or no time for its own theoretical presuppositions. If it wants to produce efficient methodological tools for successful manipulation of reality, it needs to evaluate and examine previous hypotheses, formulate its own hypotheses, and strive for the confirmation of their efficiency, in relation to reality.

We now see more clearly that, although a theory cannot be applied directly to the outer reality, it still remains applicable to it, but through science: in providing the theoretical tools for science, the tools which positive science may, or may not, use in order to perfect its tools for the most proper, and positive, manipulation of its ‘research material’. This might be the sole practicality of philosophy. And with this, an open realm becomes clearly visible, a realm where science and philosophy actually do, and should overlap, and develop their respective ‘response-ability’ for their import to the common grounds of the lifeworld.

Positive science need not be thrown into this mind-blowing reflexive circularity of thinking the thought through the thinker – or a long lineage of thinkers – because positive science is already moving in its own specific practical circularity of practical application of its reality-related hypotheses, which is why it holds on to pre-acquired and presupposed philosophical notions. This sentence could very well serve as a paraphrase for Heidegger’s (hermeneutically circular) claim that, in its truth of being, Dasein always cares for being. This is the science’s primary starting point and its ultimate point of return, its presupposed self-evidence. Are we, as phenomenologizing subjects, really justified to say no to such a presupposition? No, the path to a better life practice, to a more sovereign mastery of the world and life, to a more perfected well-being, the path of perfecting the usefulness of actual-practical and hypothetical-abstract tools is not a good path to take?! Of course, the path of fruitfully intertwining the rationality of positive science and philosophy has already been taken decades ago, as witnessed, for example, in many a study and research projects by cognitive scientists [9-12]. Cognitive science is thus a rewarding example of a successful intertwining of theory and practice, where the phenomenological, strictly theoretical insights are invested into the scientific manipulation of cognitive reality.

Whoever uses the science’s pre-theoretical comportment as a grudge against science is either wrong about science – and oblivious of its actual ontological status – or demands too much from it. Still today, the practice of positive science enjoys an unusually negative reputation of being the one to blame for the potential world destruction. Yet, what can we actually have against the basic strife for better life practice, which is grounded in rational corroboration of the practicality of the life path? The culprit for potential disaster cannot be the ‘dangerous’ positivity of positive sciences. Especially if we are, in criticizing the perilous epistemological or ontological forgetfulness of science, at the same time hypocritically enjoying, as we all are, the numerous goodies and the wellbeing provided to humanity by none other than sciences.

It now becomes obvious why we need to distinguish between the truth of positive science and that of philosophy: the primary reason for (thinking) this distinction is that, with it, we bring the responsibility for the meaningfulness of the entirety of being back to where it has always belonged: to philosophy. The practical way of being, scientific or everyday life, is expected to (practically hermeneutically) expect from itself the best possible practical way of being; that it, at the right moment, states or does what corresponds most fittingly to the anticipated, recollected or presupposed practicality. If positive science is to acquire the best possible skills of practicality – and the same goes for our everyday life – the existence of things independent of ourselves, existing in themselves, should never really be openly questioned and undermined. Nor can it be, to be hermeneutically just to the situation in question, undermined
at all. Try undermining the independent existence of a wrench in a debate with your car mechanic, lying under your car and trying to unscrew the hardly reachable screw; try interfering in the same manner with a physicist who is trying desperately meticulously to perfect the equation for an efficient solution to the best possible energy efficiency of a material, try explaining to him that the ontological truth of his material is intimately related to the shift of understanding of nature at the beginning of modern age in Descartes, and you’ll see how ‘unfair’ you’ll get with it.

The traditional theory of truth as adequacy of proposition and thing, we now see clearly, stands meaningfully on the ground of the practical existence of the world, things and people. And this it does absolutely justifiably and legitimately. Obviously, this contention, introducing a certain inadequacy into the phenomenological tradition of the theory of truth, does come as quite a surprise. The evidence of this inadequacy stems from the very whirlwind of the circularity of the theoretical comportment of a philosopher. The truth as representation is the legitimate practical truth of the practical way of being, be it scientific or not, resting in the self-evident homeliness of the lifeworld. This is the truth of the representational rationality.

The prevalent acts of consciousness in practical rationality are representational recollection and anticipation: the most skilful preparation for a practical encounter with what lies ahead as a task, a task of bringing the impractical or less practical to practical and handy and usable – for living a better life. This is the truth of practicality: practical representation, which is different from the truth of theoretical representation. Yes, practical comportment has to do with constituted objectivity and is blind as regards the role of the constituting subjectivity in it. Husserl is right in this. Yet, this blindness is absolutely no obstacle for it. Quite the contrary: what constitutes a real obstacle for practical comportment or thinking is the very self-reflexivity of the cognizing subject, who thinks herself as essentially and constitutively correlated with the constituted object-pole of experience. For practical comportment, practical-scientific things, as well as the carrier of practice, are, and should be, inconspicuous, as Heidegger would put it. Practical science, if it is to pursue its practical goals most efficiently, need not think the truth of the scientist. Positive science, with its theory of representation, may rest on the ground of ontological dualism, as was clearly and compellingly explicated by Husserl, who then started levelling dire criticism of the so-called dualistic crisis of science. It may rest on this self-evident ground of the world because science is practical knowledge. And not only one type of practical knowledge among many others, but the most rigorous practical knowledge of them all. Husserl’s and Heidegger’s criticism are justifiable only in the sense that they both endeavour to secure the position of philosophy in its own panoramic truth-production. Position, which was actually threatened by poor empiricism as non-reflected, weak idealism, which had the unhealthy ambition of becoming the sole, and last philosophy.

The last couple of decades, however, have seen a drastic change in the science’s philosophical “behaviour”. Science seems to have clearly heard the critical voice of Husserl’s phenomenology and started taking into account the methodological insights, which has resulted in the philosophical enrichment of science. As Varela has put it ingeniously: “Every good student of cognitive science must … attain a level of mastery in phenomenological examination in order to work seriously with first-person accounts. But this can only happen when the entire community adjusts itself – with a corresponding change of attitude in relation to acceptable forms of argument … To the long-standing tradition of objectivist science this sounds anathema, and it is. But this is not a betrayal of science: it is a necessary extension and complement. Science and experience constrain and modify each other as in a dance. This is where the potential for transformation lies” (13; pp.346-347). And we might only ask
ourselves here: would we not have been witness to an even richer mutual influence of phenomenology and science, had not both Husserl and Heidegger assumed such an over-exaggerated and overly oppositional stance against science?

CONCLUSION

Philosophy is all about meleta to pan, about caring for the entirety. Is it not high time, especially after such a long period of strong-minded criticism of sciences, that it starts to think natural sciences in their specific – different from philosophy – openness to the world, to think its specific excellence without resorting to its demonization and blaming it for all the sorrows of the world? This paper is a humble attempt at a reconciliation of philosophy and science. An engaged attempt at an affirmation of their irreducible differences, which is perhaps the only proper way of caring for everything: in the mutual inquisitive openness from out of the midst of it all, the original openness of cosmos, the beautifully ordered entirety, inviting us human beings to approach its infinite abundance from various angles. In the end, it turns out that the age-old, ancient and even pre-ancient, i.e. Pre-Platonic, cosmo-centric cultural paradigm might prove the best possible future for us human beings, as intimated in the concluding rhetorical question: is not the world rich enough for the co-existence and mutual enrichment of philosophy and science?

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