


MODERNIZATION DISCOURSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS

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The paper proposes to analyze how the discourse of modernity has been providing for the historical reproduction of capitalist relations of production in the spheres of ideology, politics, science and culture, thereby maintaining the historical continuity of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism in disguised ideological forms. Particular emphasis is put on the historical analysis of the formation of post-WWII modernization discourse in social sciences as a politically grounded project and dominant scientific and cultural paradigm, whose ideological and explanatory matrix provided for the exclusion of the actual, given material relations of socio-economic, cultural and artistic production from the scientific analyses of the real historical processes. Particular importance is given to analysing the manner in which the categories of modernity and modernism were conceptually appropriated by and interpolated within different forms of scientific, cultural and artistic production, in order to reveal the ideological mechanism underlying the processes of reconfiguration of ideological-political space in post-Yugoslav countries. Hence, the notion of historical revisionism is being taken as the key category underlying the analysis of current historicist interpretations of socialist historical legacy, which are premised on the general reductive presupposition that socialism historically had ensued exclusively from the so-called Western modernity project. By hypostatizing merely the modernist substratum of the entire historical legacy of Yugoslav socialism, the historicist formalism actually fits the current ideological matrix underlying the different forms of the ideological distortion and symbolic appropriation of socialist historical legacy, which we refer to as yet another form of historical revisionism. Moreover, the manner in which the historical phenomenon of Yugoslav antifascist memorials has recently been subjected to reductive formalist interpretations particularly indicates the extent to which a modernist-oriented historicism has been effective at converting them into depoliticized objects of revisionist historicization.

Keywords: *development, developmentalism, historicism, historical revisionism, ideology, modernity, modernization, modernization discourse, socialism, Yugoslav antifascist memorials*

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to prevailing ideological claims underlying a substantial portion of recent scientific interpretations and artistic production considering the historicization of “actually existing socialisms”, and the historical legacy of socialist memorial culture in particular, in this article we will argue that the historical existence of Yugoslav self-management socialism did not stem exclusively from the so-called Western modernity project. Moreover, the categories of modernity or modernism themselves will not be considered herein as the point of departure for the analysis of the historical significance of Yugoslav antifascist memorials, or to put it the way it was stated in the Symposium’s Call for Papers:¹ “... as the socio-political base whose (ideological) superstructure the monuments were supposed to be”. Instead, our interpretation tends in the opposite direction, to the use of key categories proposed by the general topic of the Symposium, in that these categories will be considered as constitutive elements of the ideological formation known as *modernization discourse* or *modernization paradigm*.

In other words, instead of taking the ideology of modernity as an object of analysis exterior to the process of allegedly pure theoretical comprehension, as a free-floating category which is a part of the autonomous realm of “reality”, we shall make an attempt to transform it into an object or the “content” *interior* to the process of theoretical comprehension.²

¹ International Symposium Socialist Monuments and Modernism, held on 6th–7th November 2015 in Net.culture club MaMa, Zagreb, Croatia (see: <http://www.blok.hr/en/vijesti/simpozij-socijalisticki-spomenici-i-modernizam>).

² Contrary to the idea which regards human knowledge as the entity separated from the material world, we take as our point of departure the general presumption that the theoretical and practical aspects of scientific knowledge are always-already fundamentally determined by the complexity, dynamics and intensity of the incessant transformations of the material basis of production of theoretical framework of scientific knowledge (which affects the way in which the formal-logical system of scientific knowledge is being both internally organized and externally interrelated to the real historical processes of the production of scientific knowledge). Therefore, we may remark that inasmuch as the manifest forms of scientific knowledge may vary its basic content, they are nevertheless already-always determined by the dynamic *tendential* (that is to say, *not strictly* determined) laws of functioning of the complex social-economic structure of a concrete, given “reality”, which predominantly, though not exclusively, determines the overall formal-logical framework

Hence, the critical examination of ideological functions of modernization discourse, i.e., the modernization-development paradigm in social sciences and humanities, implies the reconsideration of its conceptual framework precisely through the reexamination of its historical background and political functions of the key categories of historical-political discourse of Western modernity in order to reevaluate the basic knowledge assumptions, conceptual apparatus, and political *raison d'être* of the modernization discourse in social sciences. The reassessment of the process of historical formation of the discourse of Western modernity is, therefore, aimed at detecting the manner in which the production and deployment of its key categories is carried out within the discursive field of the modernization-development paradigm in the 20th century

of scientific knowledge. Here, the concept of *the relative autonomy* of human practice (be it economy, politics, ideology, science, culture, or arts, *etc.*) underlies the theoretical approach that we propose to analyze the issues of socio-historical determinism. Contrary to neo-Hegelian historicist hypostatization of the immanent causality of the totality of social relations and its unilinear teleological historical development, we would rather assert the concept of structurally determined relationship between different forms of social practices and historical temporality, as is defined in the works of Althusser (Althusser and Balibar 1970; Althusser 1990). Given the premises of the conceptual scheme that we propose here, the very term *modernity*, as well as a series of respective categories derived from it, cannot be seen as self-referential categories that are utterly independent from the very material conditions of the production of a particular form of scientific practice, that is to say from the contradictions that are inherent to the processes of production of any type of human practice, including science, but are nevertheless determined by the materially-based structural processes of production of life, rather than by the immanent causality of the historical development of particular social formation (Marx 1904): “We know that knowledge – in its strong sense, scientific knowledge – is not born and does not develop in isolation, protected by who-knows-what miracle from the influences of the surrounding world. Among these are social and political influences which may intervene directly in the life of the sciences, and very seriously compromise the course of their development, if not their very existence. We are aware of numerous historical examples. But there are less visible influences that are just as pernicious, if not still more dangerous, because they generally pass unnoticed: these are *ideological* influences. It was in breaking with the existing ideologies of history – at the end of a very arduous critical labour – that Marx was able to found the theory of history; and we know, too – from Engels’s struggle against Dühring and Lenin’s against the disciples of Mach – that, once, founded by Marx, the theory of history did not escape the onslaught of ideologies, did not escape their influence and assaults.” (Althusser 1990:11–12).

social sciences and humanities,³ whose latent, non-scientific purpose is to legitimize and, thus, reproduce the hegemonic ideological narrative of Western modernity discourse as the birth place of various forms of neo-colonialism as well as the ideological means for maintaining the historical continuity of Western imperialism after WWII and nowadays (Larrain 1989).

The paper, therefore, proposes to analyze the manner in which the ideologue of modernity provides for the historical reproduction of capitalist relations of production⁴ in the spheres of ideology, politics,

³ As one of the dominant theoretical perspectives in post-WWII social sciences and humanities, theories of social development and modernization were designed as a particular theoretical paradigm concerning the studying of the issues of historical determinism and societal development. Being the general conceptual framework, the modernization-development paradigm has strategically enabled a meta-theoretical constitution of the modernization-development discourse in social sciences, ramifying in various theoretical and sub-theoretical branches, among which globalization theories and theories of social transition have been the most prominent over the last couple of decades (Linz and Stepan 1996). Given its meta-theoretical position within the substantial portion of 20th century social sciences, theories of modernization and social development should be considered as a distinct theoretical paradigm rather than a mere theoretical perspective in the narrower sense of the term, because in as much as any other scientific paradigm, it presupposes the existence of fundamental scientific ideas shared among social scientists regarding the commonly recognized general object of scientific investigation and its research field, upon which the consensus of the scientific community is founded, regarding the evaluation of the strategic goals of scientific inquiry, the modalities of theoretical articulation, and the research methods of one general social science or the assembly of different scientific disciplines. In particular, the modernization-development paradigm in social sciences and humanities of the second half of the 20th century originates from the classical 19th century positivism, i.e., functionalist-evolutionist systemic theory of societal development (Comte 2009; Durkheim 1983). The key category, namely that of social development, is based on the presupposition that every social change is the outcome of the evolutionary process of a complex differentiation of social structure, which in turn causes the functional specialization of the entire social system. The process of differentiation causes progressive unilinear transformation of existing social structures of the so-called traditional society (Lerner 1968) through a more or less synchronized development of different spheres of the social system, which enables the formation of the functionally balanced modern social system which represents the next, higher stage of historical and socio-economic development of traditional society (Lipset 1960; Lerner 1968).

⁴ The capitalist mode of production is characterized by the exclusive appropriation by one class of means of production that are themselves the product of social labor (Marx 1993).

social sciences, culture and arts, thus maintaining the historical continuity of imperialism and colonialism in the guise of the historically variable ideological-political forms. (ibid.). By historically variable forms of imperialism and colonialism we mean the historically differing economic, political and ideological articulations of the process of capitalist expansion, which provide for the reproduction of relationships of economic exploitation, political oppression and social inequality peculiar to the capitalist mode of production and its social relations of production in a given socio-economic formation.⁵ As we detail in the following pages, our

⁵ Furthermore, the very prefixes *neo* or *post*, which are commonly attached to the terms imperialism and colonialism, attest to the inherently changeable character, i.e., the different historical forms, of imperialism and colonialism, because the history of capitalism has always been all about the ceaseless transformations of its economic, political and ideological forms, which support and maintain relations of exploitation, inequality and oppression. This means that throughout the centuries imperialism had been taking on historically differing historical (economic, political and ideological) forms in order to ideologically justify and politically support an ever-expanding “nature” of the capitalist system, that is, the unhampered process of *reproduction of the conditions of the production of surplus value*, thereby maintaining the continuity of economic exploitation. Depending on the chosen theoretical framework, many authors dealing with issues of the structure and history of the process of capitalist expansion established their own classifications of different historical forms of imperialism and colonialism, considering the analyses of the processes of accumulation and reproduction of capital. In this regard, see the classical works of Hilferding (Hilferding 1981), Lenin (Lenin 1950), Luxemburg (Luxemburg 1951), Mandel (Mandel 1967), or Bukharin (Bukharin 1972). Hand in hand with the particular type of accumulation and reproduction of capital, there had been a variety of overlapping ideological-political forms of imperialism and colonialism throughout the modern history of capitalism. This means that different economic, political and ideological forms of imperialism vary historically in accordance with: (1) the particular *type of capital* (be it either the mercantile capital, as it used to be the case during the period of the so-called classical European colonialism from the early 16th to late 19th century [Wallerstein 1988]), or speculative finance capital which particularly gained momentum from the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards; in the interim, there was the dominance of the so-called state monopoly capitalism as the new organizational pattern of capitalist relations of production [Braverman 1974]; herein, we should take into consideration that the classification of the dominant type of capital within the particular mode of production should not be taken at face value, as the different types of capital had actually been productively coexisting for centuries [Marx 1971]); (2) *the prevailing mode of production* (the new forms of capitalist accumulation brought by the invention of new technological and organizational forms of

aim is to reveal how the ideological formation of rationalist-enlightenment discourse of Western modernity had been *ideologically* underlying and, thus, historically articulating the reproduction of imperialism and colonialism in the disguised form of post-WWII theories of modernization and social development. Moreover, by taking the phenomenon of current revisionist interpretations of the historical legacy of socialism as a specific example of the ideological mechanism in question – in particular the modernist-oriented historicist interpretations of Yugoslav antifascist memorial culture – we strive to reveal the universal pattern of historical reproduction of imperialism and colonialism lying behind one of its manifold phenomenal manifestations, that is to say, in its actual shape in the current historical moment. The ideological mechanism in question is particularly noticeable in various forms of the prevailing formalist historicist interpretations of 20th century socialism, as though it had historically ensued exclusively from the so-called Western modernity project, as it has recently been shown in the case of modernist-oriented interpretations of antifascist memorial culture of socialist Yugoslavia. Moreover, the manner in which the historical phenomenon of Yugoslav antifascist memorials (YAM) has recently been subjected to ideologically distorted interpretations, particularly indicates the extent to which a modernist-oriented historicism has been effective at converting them into depoliticized object of revisionist historicization.⁶ The

the production process); and (3) the corresponding *ideological forms* underlying the whole structure of socio-economic relations of exploitation and oppression. Hence, the prefixes *neo* or *post* point out not just to the temporal dimension of the historical development of different forms of colonialism and imperialism; they, nonetheless, above all denote the processes of transformation of *the structure* of the particular *historical forms* and *sub-modalities of the capitalist mode of production*, beyond historicist interpretations of the historical development of capitalism as either a linear or multi-linear succession of different historical periods mechanically following one after the other as a series of evolutionary sequences or historical stages in accordance with the ultimate historical aim (*telos*) or originary essence of the (capitalist) history (for the typical example of this type of historicist interpretations see Chase-Dunn and Anderson's *The Historical Evolution of World Systems* (Chase-Dunn and Anderson 2005).

⁶ Among many other examples, the following lines taken from the article of the rather emphatic title *Haunting Relics of a Country That No Longer Exists: Discover the incredible history behind Yugoslavia's otherworldly monuments* that was published in an influential magazine *National Geographic*, sum up the typical formalist simplifications that are

procedures of ideological distortion include various forms of culturalization, aestheticization, romanticization, exoticization, glorification, and, last but not least, commodification.⁷ Thereby, the entire historical-political legacy of the Yugoslav social self-management system and its antifascist memorial culture has been deprived of its real historical significance.⁸

peculiar to the current ideological bias concerning the prevailing popular representation of Yugoslav anti-fascist memorials in a modernist-oriented fashion: “Hundreds of bizarre futuristic monuments appear out of place jutting from the varied landscape of the former Yugoslavia — ghostlike echoes of a country that no longer exists. (...) the bold abstract artworks built during the 1960s and 1970s were intended to spread their country’s ideals and values to the masses across all the land. (...) The unique style of the Yugoslavian monuments — which looked to Western modernism for inspiration — is objectively much different from the representative art found in its Soviet neighbors. After all, Yugoslavia was an anomaly: a socialist state that allowed free travel to the West and promoted ‘self-management’, unlike the repressive Soviet Union. (...) These incredible memorials offer any visitor a glimpse into the former Yugoslavia’s remarkable history. It may take effort to get to know the complicated region, let alone find the monuments, but the effort is definitely worth it. These monuments form the very essence of Yugoslavia.” [see: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/destinations/europe/former-yugoslavia-monuments/?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social&utm_content=link_fbt20170829travel-yugoslaviamonuments&utm_campaign=Content&sf109990014=1 (accessed September 28, 2017)].

⁷ One of the most blatant examples of a world-scale commodifying effect of the ideological distortion of YAM’s historical meaning, which has been globally affecting the reception of socialist Yugoslavia’s memorial culture in the domain of arts, popular culture, media, social activism and popular imaging in the last decade, is the work of Belgian photographer Jan Kempnaers (Kempnaers 2015).

⁸ The specific philosophical concept laying behind the syntagm “real historical significance”, i.e., the concept of *real* (or *actual*) *history*, is that of the historical-materialist theory of history and the dialectical method as is defined in the works of Marx and Engels (Marx and Engels 2004; Marx 1976a, 1993), later to be rearticulated especially by Althusser (Althusser and Balibar 1970; Althusser 1990). The following lines are meant to expose the conceptual premises which the critique of the ideology of modernity rests upon in this article. At the same time, the reference is aimed at conceptually supporting the abovementioned assertion that the formalist historicist interpretations of the historical legacy of socialism – in particular the current modernist-oriented historicist interpretations of the historical legacy of Yugoslav antifascist memorial culture – are imbued with the prevailing ideology of historical revisionism (as it will be shown in the rest of an article). Thereby, we defend a particular (i.e. materialistic and dialectical) understanding of the

THE HISTORICAL-POLITICAL CONTEXT AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERNIZATION-DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

Representing the conceptual derivation of the universalistic ideological formation of the rationalist-enlightenment discourse of Western modernity, the term modernity denotes multilinear historical processes of socio-economic development of Anglo-European societies from the late 15th

history underlying these assertions against the prevailing revisionist misconceptions about the historical character of YAM (regardless of their nominal ideological prefixes). These misconceptions quite often result in ideological objections of supposedly being adherent either to (neo)positivism or philosophical idealism, which is, nevertheless, by no means accidental and usually goes hand in hand with a certain “spontaneous philosophy of the scientists” (Althusser 1990:69–167), and which is to be criticized in this article as the discourse of historical revisionism. As for the problematic of the theoretical opposition between the real and the concrete, between “essence” and form of appearance, Althusser criticizes “(...) Hegel’s illusion that the real is the result of the thinking synthesizing itself within itself”. In short, he goes on to explain that “the concrete does not actually originate that way, only *the thought of the concrete*. Therefore, the real subject is outside the mind, and the real history of society may or may not correspond to the order of thought.” Regarding this issue, Althusser also adds on to Marx’s critique of Young-Hegelians in the following remark: “In the *1857 Introduction*, Marx writes: ‘the whole, as it appears [*erscheint*] in the mind as a thought-whole [*Gedankenganze*], is a product of the thinking mind, which appropriates [*aneignet*] the world [*die Welt*] in the only [*einzig*] mode [*Weise*] possible to it, a mode which is different from the artistic [*künstlerisch*], religious or practico-spiritual [*praktisch-geistig*] appropriation of this world’ (*Grundrisse*, p. 22). Here the issue is not to penetrate the mystery of the concept of *appropriation* [*Aneignung*] beneath which Marx expresses the essence of a fundamental relation of which knowledge, art, religion and practico-spiritual activity (...) appear as so many distinct and specific modes (*Weise*). The text does indeed lay stress on the specificity of the mode of theoretical appropriation (knowledge) with respect to all the other modes of appropriation which are declared to be distinct from it in principle. But the expression of this distinction reveals precisely the common background of a relation-to-the-*real-world* against which this distinction is made. This clearly indicates that knowledge is concerned with the real world through its specific mode of appropriation of the real world: this poses precisely the problem of the way this function works, and therefore *of the mechanism* that ensures it: this function of the appropriation of the real world by knowledge, i.e., by the process of production of knowledges which, *despite*, or rather *because* of the fact that it takes place *entirely in thought* (in the sense we have defined), nevertheless provides that grasp (of the concept:

to the late 20th century (Dussel 1998).⁹ In order to conceptually encompass the all-pervasive character of the term modernity ramifying in many of its conceptual derivations, in this article we will use a more comprehensive synthetic term *themodernization discourse*. The reconsideration of the broader meta-theoretical background of modernization discourse in the social sciences and humanities therefore entails determining the general historical-political framework within which it can be possible to define the ideological foundations of the modernization-development paradigm in social sciences as the conceptual derivation of the universalistic discourse of Western modernity. Furthermore, defining the historical and political conditions that gave rise to the institutionalization of the modernization-development paradigm in the social sciences and humanities can enable us to shed light on the instrumental character of the modernization discourse in providing Anglo-European colonial powers with scientific legitimization of their imperialist hegemony over the non-European world in the epoch of classical colonialism, as well as in the historical period of 20th century neo-colonialism and nowadays. In other words, we shall try to outline how the ideogeme of modernity and the terms derived from it – such as the more general category of *modernism* and a series of ensuing sub-categories of modernization, development, developmentalism, growth, transition *etc.* – had been functioning as the ideological foundation and a political dispositive of the historical development of capitalism during the second half of the 20th century in particular. Particular importance will be given

Begriff) on the *real* world called its appropriation [*Aneignung*]. This poses on its true terrain the question of a theory of the production of a knowledge which, as the knowledge of its object (an object of knowledge, in the sense we have defined), is the grasp or appropriation of the *real* object, the real world.” (Althusser and Balbar 1970:54). For further reading on the problematic of the dialectical method *vis-à-vis* the theoretical opposition between the abstract and the concrete see: [(Marx and Engels 2004:41–48); (Lenin 1958:357–358); (Milios et al. 2002:21–23)].

⁹ According to Jameson’s historical overview of the genesis of the concept of modernity, the use of the term *modern* dates “(...) as far back as the 5th century AD”, denoting “(...) a break in the Christian theological tradition; (...) it signifies a fundamental dividing line between henceforth classical culture and a present whose historic task lies in reinventing that culture. It is this break that is crucial in the endowment of the term ‘modern’ with the specific meaning it has continued to bear down to our own time.” (Jameson 2002:17).

to the critical analysis of the manner in which the categories of modernity and the ensuing terms were conceptually appropriated by and interpolated within different forms of scientific, cultural and artistic production in the time-period before, during and after the 1990s civil wars for the historical legacy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), in order to reveal the ideological mechanism underlying the processes of reconfiguration of the geo-strategic and ideological-political space in the region of former socialist Yugoslavia.

Namely, in the aftermath of WWII the modernization discourse was institutionalized as the economical-political doctrine of *developmentalism*, i.e., *the modernization-development paradigm* in social sciences, within the system of ideological state apparatuses¹⁰ of the so-called developing

¹⁰ Due to the lack of space, we will try to give here a rather schematic outline of one of Althusser's key concepts, namely that of (theory) of ideology. Starting from the presumption that in order to reproduce itself every social formation inevitably has to maintain the reproduction of the material conditions of production, i.e., the reproduction of the means of production and the existing relations of production, Althusser proposes the theoretical concept of ideology [that is, as Althusser put it, "ideology *in general* and not a theory of particular ideologies, which, whatever their form – religious, ethical, legal, political – always express *class positions*" (Althusser 1971:159)], which rests upon two key notions: the one of Repressive State Apparatuses (RSE), which exist as a unified entity and belong to the public domain of society (government, military, police), and the other of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), which are dispersive and plural, hence they operate within the private domain of the society (church, educational system, family, media, political parties, trade unions, cultural ventures *etc.*). The RSE and ISAs are mutually interwoven in maintaining conjointly the hegemony of ideology of the ruling class, in that the difference between repressive and ideological state apparatuses is that "RSA functions by violence whereas ISAs function by ideology", while the point of the functional intersection between the two in this respect is that "(...) every State Apparatus – whether repressive or ideological functions both by violence and by ideology." (Althusser 1971:159). This means that: "The ruling class who holds RSAs can also easily decree ISAs. In order to hold State power for a long period, the ruling class should at the same time exercise its hegemony over and in the ISA." (Althusser 1971:146). Nevertheless, when proposing that RSA "functions first *by repression* then by ideology", whereas, inversely, ISAs "function massively and predominantly *by ideology*, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic" – Althusser makes an important distinction here in order not to confuse the RSA with ISA, concluding that "There is no such thing as a purely

or newly independent countries. Under the guise of modernization and development theories, developmentalism gained its ideological influence over the academic system of knowledge production in the respective countries, having the capacity to migrate across various scientific disciplines

ideological apparatus”, nor there is a pure repressive apparatus (Althusser 1971:160). The reproduction of ideology is, therefore, maintained by RSA which is “(...) secured by its unified and centralized organization under the leadership of classes in power, whereas ISA is secured in contradictory forms by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class (Althusser 1971:149). According to Althusser, the particular feature of ideology is that *it has no history*: “[...] a theory of ideologies depends in the last resort on the history of social formations, and thus of the modes of production combined in social formations, and of the class struggles which develop in them. In this sense it is clear that there can be no question of a theory of ideologies in general, since ideologies (defined in the double respect: regional and class) have a history, whose determination in the last instance is clearly situated outside ideologies alone, although it involves them.” Contrary to “regional or class” definition of ideologies, Althusser proposes that “(...) if a theory of ideology *in general* really is one of the elements on which theories of ideologies depend, that entails an apparently paradoxical proposition (...): *ideology has no history*” (of its own). (Althusser 1971:149–150)]. In terms of the structure of ideology, the basic feature of ideology *in general* is its omnipresent and structural character; thus, it has to be studied synchronically. In terms of function, the concept of ideology is predicated upon the notions of *the imaginary* and *denegation* which Althusser borrows from Lacan and Freud respectively; in accordance with the premise that ideology operates within the realm of the imaginary, hereof Althusser notes that: “Ideology is a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”, meaning that those “world outlooks” do not “correspond to reality”. Even though these outlooks “constitute an illusion”, they nonetheless “constitute allusion” (Althusser 1971:162). Also, “(...) If the *ideology* does not express the total objective essence of its time (the essence of the historical present), it can at least express current changes in the historical situation reasonably well by effect of slight internal displacements of accent: unlike a science, an ideology is both theoretically closed; and politically supple and adaptable. It bends to the interests of the times, but without any apparent movement, being content to *reflect* the historical changes which it is its mission to assimilate and master by some imperceptible modification of its peculiar internal relations. (...) Ideology changes therefore, but imperceptibly, conserving its ideological form; it moves, but with an immobile motion which maintains it *where it is*, in its place and its ideological role. It is the immobile motion which, as Hegel said of philosophy itself, reflects and expresses what happens in history without ever running ahead of its own time, since it is merely that time *caught* in the trap of a mirror reflection, precisely so that men will be *caught* in it too” (Althusser and Balibar 1970:141–142). [For further explanation of the concept of ideology and ideological state apparatuses see: (Althusser 1971:57–192)].

and different socio-economic, cultural and artistic practices. Therefore, the key to understanding the ideological effects of post-WWII modernization discourse on the production of scientific knowledge, hegemonic cultural *topoi*, and art forms and practices is to analyze it as a politically grounded project and the dominant scientific and cultural paradigm whose ideological and explanatory matrix provided for the exclusion of the actual, given material relations of socio-economic, cultural and artistic production from the analyses of the real historical processes.

Regarding the historical and political context in which the modernization-development paradigm in social sciences had emerged and gained its influence over the system of scientific knowledge production, cultural practices and art forms, it is important to state that the analysis of the ideological functions of the discourse of Western modernity is inseparable from its historical and political background. In terms of its political background, the modernization-development paradigm in social sciences was devised in the historical context of post-WWII bipolar setting of international relations as the constitutive part of the doctrine of *developmentalism*, i.e., the programmatic agenda of the United States foreign policy that was aimed at broadening global US hegemony while simultaneously diminishing the United Soviet Socialist Republics maneuver space in the overlapping spheres of influence.¹¹ The introduction of the doctrine of developmentalism on the global scale included the strategic design of the economical-political platform comprising a set of economic policies and a series of legal acts aimed at directing economic and political processes in the so-called developing countries in accordance with US political and economic objectives.¹² The strategic program

¹¹ See the inaugural speech of the President of the USA Harry S. Truman at: <http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/harry-s-truman/inaugural-address-1949.php>].

¹² The institutional introduction of the modernization and development discourse in the so-called developing countries, or “newly industrializing” or “newly emerging states”, initially coincided with the implementation of US financial aid programs aimed at rebuilding Europe after WWII. The underlying political agenda of the post-WWII US macro-economic model that was introduced firstly in post-war Europe, however, was to simultaneously expand the US market outside of national economy borders, while preserving its productivity pace through maintaining a steady growth of domestic economy.

was backed up by the particular theoretical model of economic growth and social modernization development, devised by the pioneers of the development economics doctrine (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Rostow 1960) and the neoclassical development theorists (Bhagwati 1985; Krueger 1979).¹³ In terms of the specific ideological and political functions of the modernization-developmental discourse in social sciences, the key notions of modernization and development theories directly corresponded to the prevailing political and economic categories of a given historical period, such as historical progress, economic growth, political modernization, societal development, industrialization, urbanization *etc.* As an active complement of the US development policy programs of economic and

In order to fulfill these strategic tasks, a number of programs and government bodies were established to distribute US foreign aid overseas on the basis of a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements and contracts with national governments of countries included in the US sphere of influence: “The misnomer ‘foreign aid’ is what we call those measures whereby the United States helps itself by helping others [Cf. 3d Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, xiii (1952)]. Their constitutional sanction is the same as for social security and arms for our military forces, namely, the power to spend funds of the Treasury to ‘provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.’ [U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8; *Helvering v. Davis*, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)]. The statutory prototype is the wartime Lend-Lease Act [STAT. 31 (1941), as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 411–423 (1946)], appropriately described in the heading as ‘An act to promote the defense of the United States’. In every year since the end of World War II Congress has responded to the needs of a disrupted world with at least one new ‘foreign aid’ act. Each one has authorized the use of funds of the U.S. Treasury to pay for goods and services needed by specified friends and allies around the globe who could not pay in foreign exchange. Each new law stemmed from a specific problem in our foreign relations. All were based on the same premise that strong and healthy friends are our best assurance of success in meeting threats to peace and making the United Nations work as an effective instrument of world collaboration [See: Report of U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, SEN. REP. No. 1490, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 12–17 (1952); speech of President Truman before the National War College, Dec. 19, 1952, 28 DEP’T STATE BuLL. 43, 44; First Semi-Annual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program 15 (1950)].” (Cardozo 1953:161).

¹³ Although the origin of the modern concepts of economic growth and societal development could be traced back to the classical political economy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries’ works of Smith, Ricardo, Mill or Say (Smith 2008), its historical evolution nevertheless had taken various, often mutually contesting directions, which could be generally separated into two major theoretical strands, or rather systems of thought, namely that of liberal economics and historical materialism.

technical-technological aid to the developing or “newly industrializing countries” in the fields of industry, economy, trade, culture and education, the modernization-development paradigm directly influenced the academic systems of developing countries by importing social value patterns *via* introduction of the new theoretical framework in social sciences in order to conform the existing ideational systems of the respective societies to the developmental pattern of Western capitalist societies. Modernization discourse thereby enabled the practical substantiation of one of the basic ideological premises of modernization and development theories, namely the underlying ethnocentric Western comprehension that the radical break with the traditional normative value patterns, alongside with the adoption of the liberal-democratic principles of capitalist social system, is the necessary precondition for the future economic growth and societal progress, and in the same time the key indicator of progressive modernization of underdeveloped or developing countries (Rostow 1960:4–16). Being structurally entrenched within the institutional framework of the US political and academic system as the dominant theoretical paradigm in social sciences, the modernization-development doctrine was conceptually underpinning the hegemonic set of abovementioned categories of the political discourse of liberal democracy and capitalist economy, thereby positively correlating with the strategic goals of *Point Four program of technical aid to developing nations*¹⁴ and the overall strategy of post-WWII politics of the US to dominate the formally decolonized world of Southern Europe, Middle East, Eastern Asia and Latin America (Leish and Catton 1968:923).

In spite of the declarative announcement of the end of the centuries-long European colonialism,¹⁵ still there were hidden neo-colonial interests of former Emperies lurking behind the declarative principles of scientific objectivity and humanist ideas of universal progress and the development of humankind. Therefore, the continuation of the struggle for the new rearrangement of the spheres of influence over traditional colonial dominions

¹⁴ [<https://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpapeer/point4.htm>; <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d304> (accessed December 27, 2016); (Cardozo 1953: 170)].

¹⁵ UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [see:<http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml> (accessed August 3, 2017)].

entailed the use of a different tactical means for achieving strategic primacy in the areas rich in industrial resources and cheap labor force for the sake of reproduction of the system of late industrial capitalism. In this respect, the protagonists of the modernization discourse in social sciences and development doctrine were given a strategic role in the process of imposing the post-WWII US economic-political influence and the consolidation of the position of former European colonial powers.¹⁶ It is precisely in this way that the new forms of Western colonialism were historically introduced in the aftermath of WWII, thereby enabling the restoration of the former European colonial system led by the newly proclaimed global superpower, “(...) in spite of the formal recognition of political independence of the newly emerging countries, which became the victims of indirect and subtle forms of domination by political, economic, social, scientific, military or technological means.” (Brown 1974:123).

THE IDEOLOGEM OF MODERNITY BETWEEN EUROPEAN HISTORICISM AND HISTORICAL REVISIONISM

Considering the modernization discourse in the social sciences and humanities as the theoretical paradigm rather than a formal set of different scientific theories, notions, terms or categories, one may say that the referential historical framework regarding different modes of either scientific appropriation, cultural implementation or politically pragmatic utilization of the categories ensuing from the ideologeme of modernity is not exclusively confined to the Cold War period.

Moreover, the underlying causes of a centuries-long permanence of the idea of “natural” legitimacy of imposing Western socio-economic models and the respective cultural patterns to non-European societies should not be sought solely in the utilitarian character of strategies for achieving

¹⁶ Some thirty-five decades later, the Washington think-tank bureaucrat of neo-conservative provenance, Francis Fukuyama, had made a claim (that): “The last significant Universal History to be written in the twentieth century was not the work of a single individual, but rather a collective effort on the part of a group of social scientists — mostly American — writing after World War II, under the general rubric of ‘modernization theory’.” (Fukuyama 1992:68).

provisional economic and political interests, but also in a historically generated necessity of the West for its own self-determination as the bearer or the subject of universal historical development, i.e., “(...) of unitary and progressive history of mankind.” (Fukuyama 1992:69). In this sense, the historical origin of Western universalism and its hegemonic discourse of modernity should be partially sought for in the intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment project of modernity. The hierarchy of values that was imposed to the non-European world during the colonial conquests between the 16th and 18th centuries entailed the prevailing belief of the existence of universal knowledge or a universal method for its acquisition (Descartes 1960). Namely, from the outset of the epoch of Western economic-political globalization in the early 16th century onwards, any phenomenon of religious, cultural, political or economic specificity of the non-European world was regarded as the form of particularism endangering the hegemonic universalistic project of the West.¹⁷ This was due to the Western exclusivist

¹⁷ In his attempt to define “the origin on ‘the myth of modernity’”, Dussel notes that: “the modern philosopher departs from a belief in European common sense that situates itself in the ‘life world’ and that manifests itself in descriptions such as those of Kant with respect to the Enlightenment: ‘Enlightenment is man’s emergence from himself-incurred immaturity [*Unmündigkeit*]. (...) Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large proportion of men... nevertheless gladly remain immature for life.’ This ‘immaturity’ [*Unmündigkeit*], which is culpable (i.e., self-incurred), will also be posteriorly applied by Hegel in a global historical vision to Africa, Latin America, and even Asia, finalizing his judgment with the well-known eurocentric conclusion: ‘World history travels from east to west; for Europe is the absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning (...). Just as Europe is the center and end of the Old World — i.e. absolutely the west — so also is Asia absolutely the east (...). The western part, which includes Germany, France, Denmark, and Scandinavia, is the *heart of Europe* (...)’. From this narrow, ethnocentric point of view, modernity inherits an eurocentric point of departure. Commenting on the Hegelian position, Habermas writes: ‘The key historical events in establishing the principle of subjectivity are the *Reformation*, the *Enlightenment*, and the *French Revolution*.’ For Hegel the south of Europe is only valid as the Italian Renaissance (Spain is outside history, and with it, Latin America, which is not even periphery). For Hegel the culmination of modernity is found in Germany and France, or in England: ‘And the English have undertaken the weighty responsibility of being the missionaries of *civilization* [*Zivilisation*] to the whole world.’ Modernity, in its *emancipatory rational nucleus*, is a departure or exit [*Ausgang*] of reason [*Vernunft*] out of a state of ‘self-incurred immaturity’ in order to reach the universality of the equality of all persons as such. Against, in contrast, the background of a global horizon, this modernity

intellecion of its own historical, political and cultural autoreferentiality that is deeply entrenched in the fundamental ideological dichotomies: civilization vs. barbarianism, modernity vs. tradition, progressiveness vs. backwardness *etc.*, from which stems a centuries-long autoreferentiality and permanence of the universalistic discourse of Western modernity.

As one of the key ideological categories of the 20th century, the ideologeme of modernization (along with a set of respective terms such as development, growth, prosperity or progress) was predicated upon arationalist epistemology of the Enlightenment discursive formation, having a particular emphasis on the process of rationalization and the ideal of acquiring objective knowledge and truth. This particular feature of the universalistic Western discourse of modernity provided the modern social sciences with the necessary conceptual consistency that is in the same time inclusive enough to encompass methodologically versatile and yet conceptually and logically homologous interpretations of various objects of scientificknowledge.¹⁸ Due to the historical predominance of the ideological

is born. [...] Modernity is born when Europe (the peripheral Europe of the Muslim and Ottoman world), begins its expansion beyond its historical limits. Europe arrives in Africa; in India and Japan, thanks to Portugal; in Latin America, and from there to the Philippines, thanks to the Spanish conquest. That is to say, Europe has become itself ‘center’. The other races and cultures now appear as ‘immature’, barbarous, underdeveloped. It is thus that the second moment of modernity is inaugurated, no longer as an *emancipatory rational nucleus* but as a *irrational sacrificial myth*.” (Dussel 2007:51–52).

¹⁸ Predicated upon Foucault’s notion of discursive formation (Foucault 2000, 2004) and Gramsci’s notion of hegemony (Gramsci 1971), Said’s discursive analyses of Orientalist discourse point out to the sublime character of the systemic autoreferentiality of the hegemonic universalistic discourse of West *vis-à-vis* Orient taken as the particular object of Westerners’ knowledge about the non-European world, as well as the object of exercising the European imperial power over it: “Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. [...] My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment

formation of the discourse of Western modernity that was peculiar to the centuries-long imperial Anglo-European domination across the world– the different forms of theoretical articulation of the modernization paradigm in the 20th-century social sciences (i.e., modernization theories, theories of social change, theories of globalization or transitology) were internally organized as a differentiated, and yet sufficiently coherent assemblage of scientific knowledge and relatively consistent analytical tools by means of which it was possible to conceptually integrate a seemingly “natural” unfolding of different historical periods and epochs with their ostensibly inherent socio-economic structures into a meaningful narrative of the universal development of world history.

EUROPEAN HISTORICISM AND THE HISTORICAL PERMANENCE OF THE HEGEMONY OF THE DISCOURSE OF WESTERN MODERNITY

As for the broader intellectual background of the modernization-development paradigm in the 20th-century social sciences, it was precisely the intellectual tradition of European historicism that provided a renewed epistemological basis for the historical perpetuation of the modernization meta-narrative in the modern social sciences and humanities.¹⁹ In spite of

period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity ‘the Orient’ is in question.” (Said 1978:3).

¹⁹ When tracing the historical and political conditions that gave rise to modern European historicist paradigm as well as its subsequent conceptual ramifications and political appropriations by the late 19th- and early 20th-century French positivism, Barros notes (that): “There are no great disagreements among historians about the moment in the history of the Western historiography that a new historiography, already identified as scientific, began to emerge. In fact, this new historiography, which started to appear at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century, constitutes one of the greatest novelties of the second modernity, contextualized by the generalization of the industrial revolution

its nominally anti-imperialist intellectual character, the late 19th-century European historicism enabled the rearticulation of the classical *topoi* of the universalistic discourse of Western modernity within theoretical corpus of social sciences and humanities. This may come as a rather paradoxical claim bearing in mind a centuries-long historical coupling of the universalistic discourse of Western modernity and European imperial politics of colonial domination in non-European world (Sala-Molins 2006).

According to the most prominent thinkers of the classical European historicism, such as Vico (Miner 2002; Croce 1913), Hegel (Hegel 1889), von Ranke (Beiser 2011) or Dilthey (Dilthey 1988), the history of mankind, although complex and indented in its unfolding, could nevertheless be understood as a unilinear current of the historical development which conjuncts all disparate historical periods and epochs into a complex, but coherent unity.²⁰ Considering the specificities of modernization paradigm's

in Europe and by the social-political world that emerged after the French Revolution and Restoration. [...] a new scientific history will have to deal with this paradox: despite the significant advances it will bring to History theory and methodology, great part of the historians will still try to meet the interests of the ruling power, particularly those related to the consolidation of the state-nations and the European bourgeoisie. [...] While the French Positivism of the 19th century can be seen, in general, as a conservative configuration of the Enlightenment heritage, German Historicism, on the other hand, with its ramifications in other European countries and the Americas, must be understood in direct relation with the State-National affirmation context. Thus, historicism can also be viewed, in the beginning and during great part of the 19th century, as part of an equally conservative context. However, the interests which it represents more directly are not those of the industrial bourgeoisie while dominant class, but the interests of the great states, of the state bureaucracy that finances its historiographic projects.” (Barros 2012:391–392).

²⁰ In his attempt to reveal the kernel of the centuries-long historical persistence of self-evident autoreferentiality of European Orientalism and its interconnectedness with modern European historicism, Said notes (that): “(...) in the methodological assumptions and practice of world history – which is ideologically anti-imperialist – little or no attention is given to those cultural practices like Orientalism or ethnography affiliated with imperialism, which in a genealogical fact fathered world history itself. Hence the emphasis in world history as a discipline has been on economic and political practices, defined by the processes of world historical writing, as in a sense separate and different from, as well as unaffected by, the knowledge of them which world history produces. The curious result is that the theories of accumulation on a world scale, or the capitalist world state, or lineages

conceptual apparatus and European knowledge on non-European societies and cultures (the so-called indigenous peoples, ahistorical peoples, underdeveloped or developing countries, Third World, transitional societies and many other 20th-century terms denoting an antithetic character of the fundamental ideological dichotomy of modernity *versus* traditionalism in all of its variable forms) – it implies that one universal world history which unites the whole of mankind reaches its climax in Anglo-European West (Hegel 1889; <http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/harry-s-truman/inaugural-address-1949.php>). In contrast to this privileged and homogeneous knowledge perspective, any distinct phenomenal manifestation of heterogeneous non-European particularities that were omitted from the procedures of historical record and recognition were temporarily left out until the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, when they were gradually taken back to the history through anthropology, ethnology, political economy, linguistics and psychoanalysis (Clifford 1988).²¹ This subsequent

of absolutism (a) depend on the same displaced percipient and historicist observer who had been an Orientalist or colonial traveler three generations ago; (b) depend also on homogenising and incorporating world historical scheme that assimilated non-synchronous developments, histories, cultures and peoples to it; (c) block and keep down latent epistemological critiques of the institutional, cultural and disciplinary instruments.” (Said 1993:69).

²¹ Aimed at redefining the very epistemological basis of the corpus of knowledge of social sciences and humanities, Foucault suggests the possibility for the reestablishment of the new social role of the traditional humanist disciplines, which entails the conceptual rearrangement of the existing epistemological matrix, putting a particular emphasis to ethnology and psychoanalysis in this respect: “One can imagine what prestige and importance ethnology could possess if, instead of defining itself in the first place – as it has done until now – as the study of societies without history, it were deliberately to seek its object in the area of the unconscious processes that characterize the system of a given culture; in this way it would bring the relation of historicity, which is constitutive of all ethnology in general, into play within the dimension in which psychoanalysis has always been deployed. (...) One can imagine the similar importance that a psychoanalysis would have if it were to share the dimension of an ethnology, not by the establishment of a ‘cultural psychology’, not by the sociological explanation of phenomena manifested at the level of individuals, but by the discovery that the unconscious also possesses, or rather that it *is* in itself, a certain formal structure. (...) the dimension of ethnology that relates the human sciences to the positivities in which they are framed and the dimension of psychoanalysis that relates the knowledge of man to the finitude that gives it its foundation.” (Foucault 2005:414–415).

recuperation of the so-called non-historic peoples, of marginalized histories and rebellion practices coincided with the establishment of world history as a modern scientific discipline whose main 20th-century protagonists were such intellectual figures as the abovementioned Braudel and his *Annales* School, Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein 1988, 2011) with his world-system theory, and Perry Anderson's (Anderson 1976) historicization of theoretical and political legacy of diamat and historical materialism, to name a few.

In an attempt to make the historical analysis of the epistemological fundamentals that provide the historical permanence of the politics of representation of non-European otherness more concrete, one may notice that European historicism's particular trait was its surmounting of the narrow ethnocentric model of universalistic politics of representation that was typical for the historical period of European colonial expansion spanning from the late 15th century up until the first half of the 20th century, thus becoming the conceptual bearer of a far more comprehensive world view considering the asymmetric relationship between Europe as the metropolis and the rest of the world.²² Even though the conceptual

²² When establishing the delineation between the two main intellectual traditions within modern European historicism, namely that of the French historicist tradition, later to be appropriated by the late 19th-century French universalist-oriented positivism, on the one hand, and a more nationally oriented tradition of 19th-century German historicism, on the other hand, Barros (Baross 2012) traces the “relativist aspects of historicism” back to the late 18th century works of J. B. Vico and J. G. Von Herder, the common predecessors of both French and German branch of modern European historicism, who “(...) considered the need to write a particularizing history capable of apprehending the uniqueness of each people. Similarly, Historicism could have hardly been developed, mainly its methodological base, without the contribution of some German theologians and philologists who had already leaned over the problems regarding the interpretation of texts and the inevitable articulation of these texts with specific historical contexts and writers' viewpoints. (...) when we mention this relativist aspect of Historicism, we refer to the way it deals with historiographic objects, recognizes the particularities of the studied societies, and realizes that the sources also constitute a discourse of a time and a place. In this relativist way of dealing with historical sources and understanding societies – or by adopting this ‘relativist focus’, so to speak – lied its advancement, its novelty regarding the universalist schemes that the Positivism inherited from the Enlightenment; however, already dispossessed of its revolutionary character.” (Barros 2012:393).

framework of modern historicism implicitly entails the representational model of non-Western otherness that is not necessarily negatively oriented towards the phenomenon of otherness itself,²³ some of the basic persistent presuppositions on the non-Western Other's specific position and status in the universal history of mankind were still out of sight of European historicism.

Namely, in terms of its methodology the very idea of designing the concept of world history entails comprehension of the structure and development of economic practices and political forms from a broader world-system historical perspective. Although European historicist studies of peripheral and semi-peripheral societies concern the analyses of certain forms of historical-political domination and economic exploitation, such a conceptual perspective nevertheless remains blind to the historical fact of a direct interconnectedness between the relations of historical inequalities and various forms of domination and subordination, on the one hand, and political forms of imperialism, on the other hand. Thereby, fundamental ideas and practices constituting the ideological formation of the discourse of Western modernity were functionally incorporated into the historicist conceptual matrix, although without a significant reflection on their structural connection with the historical forms of imperialism and colonialism. Therefore, this blind spot of European historicism provided for modernization-development paradigm, which is considered herein as

²³ “During the 16th century there were three theoretical positions before the fact of the constitution of the world system: (1) that of Gines de Sepulveda, the *modern* Renaissance and humanist scholar who rereads Aristotle and demonstrates the natural slavery of Amerindian, and thus confirms the legitimacy of the conquest; (2) that of the Franciscans, such as Mendieta, who attempt a utopian Amerindian Christianity (a ‘republic of Indians’ under the hegemony of the Catholic religion), proper to the third Christian-Muslim interregional system; and (3) Bartolomé de las Casas’s position, *the beginning of a critical ‘counterdiscourse’ in the interior of modernity* (which, in his work in 1536, a century before Descartes’ *Le Discours de la Méthode*, he titles *De unico modo* [The only way], and shows that ‘argumentation’ is the rational means through which to attract the Amerindian to the new civilization). Habermas speaks of ‘counterdiscourse’, suggesting that it is only two centuries old (beginning with Kant). Liberation philosophy suggests instead, that this counterdiscourse begins in the sixteenth century, perhaps in 1511 in Santo Domingo with Anton de Montesinos, decidedly with Bartolomé de las Casas in 1514.” (Dussel 1998:28).

the meta-theoretical framework of a substantial portion of modern social sciences, to preserve anew its internal logical coherence and historical persistency of its representational model in the entirely different historical conditions and, henceforth, to transpone itself from one historical epoch to another in disguised conceptual forms.

The appropriative and recuperative power of the discourse of Western modernity, that is, its ability to repeatedly master its object of study through a particular representational model, remains intact within a ubiquitous epistemological formation of a modern historicism, while at the same time the fundamental power relations that produce the totalizing representational model of non-Western otherness are being unrecognized within historicist framework and therefore utterly invariable. In spite of very dynamic processes of regrouping in the international political arena in any given moment, the possibility of creating the counter-knowledge that could reveal the relations of domination which solidify an immutable image of historically progressive West *versus* submissive and passive rest of the world keeps on being preserved within the epistemological field of historicism (Barros 2012:391–419). Thus, the repertoire of an imagery of the universalistic discourse of Western modernity and its explanatory and representational power keeps on being consolidated and articulated anew (Said 1978).

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF HISTORICAL REVISIONISM *VIS-À-VIS* HISTORICAL LEGACY OF SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

When considering the scientific and cultural-artistic approaches to studying and researching the issues of the historical legacy of socialist Yugoslavia over the course of the last three decades, one may notice the lack of an adequate systematic treatment of this relevant field of scientific interest. This lack of a systematic treatment could only partially be seen as the outcome of an institutional erosion of the remains of the former development-research sector in socialist Yugoslavia, but is nevertheless primarily and structurally caused by the dominant paradigm shift in social sciences and humanities by the end of the 20th century. The ideological and theoretical turn of social sciences from the Marxist paradigm to the (neo)

liberal paradigm of modernization theories and transitology has caused a set of cumulative changes within the system of scientific knowledge production. This shift has incited, among other things, the change of the prevailing attitude of the scientific community towards the strategic objectives and the prevailing idea of the social role of scientific activities in the face of altered historical-political circumstances of the post-Cold War period. This was particularly visible in the domain of social sciences in socialist Yugoslavia successorcountries.

The new social function of social sciences and humanities in the altered historical conjuncture at the turn of the centuries entailed the strategic revision of the existing conceptual framework and redefinition of the criteria for the selection of relevant areas of scientific interest and research objects. Specific content of these changes in the conceptual framework of post-Yugoslav humanities was crucially determined by the discursive hegemony of historical revisionism at the turn of 1980s and 1990s, which was the ideological constituent of the process of establishing the new social-political system in the former Yugoslavia successorsates. Consequently, certain scientific research areas have been favored at the expense of other objects of scientific interest which have lost their importance (Kuljić 2002).

Among other research topics, the effects of the ideological shift in social sciences in post-Yugoslav countries have been particularly noticeable in the revision of the scientific approach to the issues of Yugoslav self-management system as well as to the key processes and social-political actors of historical development of socialist Yugoslavia, insofar as the revised scientific approach to studying Yugoslav historical legacy was in the same time a concrete political stake of the opposing sides claiming the ideological precedence over antagonistic interpretations of historical-political significance of Yugoslav socialism in the process of establishing post-Yugoslav nation-states. In conjunction with ideological state apparatus, that is the education system, mass media, cultural, art and religious institutions, the revision of scientific discourse on the historical legacy of socialist Yugoslavia has profoundly influenced the constitution of the dominant narrative model that regulates structural conditions under which the formation of any statement, either scientific or popular, considering Yugoslav legacy, is being regulated. Systematic political appropriation of

the historical discourse on socialist Yugoslavia resulted in the establishment of the regime of public discourse which fundamentally structures the revised forms of production of the prevailing ideas, knowledge, and symbolic imagery on the entire historical legacy of Yugoslavia that enables even trivial statements on socialist Yugoslavia in everyday communication to work as the ideological discourse *par excellence*.

This specific manner of the discursive treatment of Yugoslav legacy simultaneously produces and mirrors the ideological consensus on different issues of the historical past, which could be traced in everyday public discourse as a set of negatively connoted stereotypes with a strong anti-socialist, anti-Yugoslav, and anti-self-management resentment, but also in various forms of uncritical glorifications, culturalizations, aesthetizations, and exoticizations of socialist Yugoslavia. In the domain of social sciences, a systematic devalorization of Yugoslav historical legacy as the subject of scientific research has, nevertheless, efficiently provided for the previously existing theoretical premises to be expelled from the conceptual schemes of scientific knowledge, underlying an unbiased comprehension of the causal relationship between the current so-called “post-Yugoslav condition”, on the hand, and the socio-economic processes and historical events that preceded it, on the other hand.

ON THE IDEOLOGEME OF MODERNITY IN THE HISTORICIST INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-PHYSICAL AND ARCHITECTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

Detrimental effects of the systematic distortion of the imagery of socialist Yugoslavia’s historical-political legacy are also mirrored in the current scientific, and cultural and artistic discourse on the historical significance of modern cultural heritage in post-Yugoslav societies. For instance, when speaking of the hegemony of the modernist discourse in the disciplinary domain of architecture, spatial planning, the so-called urban studies, art history or cultural activism – which is visible in the form of various pre-theoretical receptions, uncritical appropriations as well as inappropriate interpolations of the category of modernity and the respective notions of social modernization and development into their conceptual

schemes – it is nevertheless important once again to stress that it considers one of the central theoretical categories of the dominant scientific paradigm in the 20th century social sciences and humanities that is imbued with the ideological baggage of vulgarized neo-conservative neo-Hegelianism *a la* Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1992) or Huntington (Huntington 1996).

When deployed by a certain type of urbanology as an analytical tool for studying a particular spatial-architectonic context (be it urban studies, architecture, planning or urban activism), the procedure of interpolating the key categories of the hegemonic discourse of Western modernity into a particular field of study always-already functions within a framework of the fundamental ideological dichotomy West/East, modernity/traditionalism, progressiveness/backwardness, development/underdevelopment, urban/rural *etc.*²⁴ The recent trend of historicization of the spatial and architectural development of socialist Yugoslavia may be reconsidered as though it is being a rather paradigmatic example of ideologically distorted use of this theoretical concept as an analytical tool (see: Kulić and Mrduljaš 2012). This kind of approach to the interpretation of the historical past

²⁴ The variety of different forms of this fundamental ideological dichotomy owes its conceptual persistence and historical perpetuation to the system of the division of labour that is responsible for a number of respective alienating separations in various domains of human practice, including the spatial dimension of social relations of production. The following excerpt from Marx and Engels's *The German Ideology* considers the real basis of one of the most persistent historical forms of the fundamental ideological dichotomous divisions, namely that between the urban and the rural: "The existence of town implies, in the same time, the necessity of administration, police, taxes, etc; in short, of the municipality, and thus of politics in general. Here first become manifest the division of the population into two great classes, which is directly based on the division of labour and on the instruments of production. The town already is in actual fact the concentration of population, of the instruments of production, of capital, of pleasures, of needs, while the country demonstrates just the opposite fact, isolation and separation. The antagonism between town and country can exist only within framework of private property. It is the most crass expression of the subjection of the individual under the division of labour (...). Labour is here again the chief thing, power over individuals and as long as the latter exists, private property must exist. (...) The separation of town and country can also be understood as separation between capital and landed property, as the beginning of the existence and development of capital independent of landed property – the beginning of property having its basis only in labour and exchange." (Marx and Engels 2004:69).

proves to be an insufficient attempt to reinterpret a particular historical form of functional specificity of societal organization's spatial forms in a concrete social system. Moreover, entirely irrespective of the specific *conjunctural* character of any given spatial form of societal relations within historically specified social circumstances, it is constitutively incapable of comprehending this historically given functionality in no other way but to define it *vis-à-vis* its distance towards the normative ideal, or rather a scientific myth of modern city or modern society.²⁵

Namely, according to the abovementioned Rationalist-Enlightenment epistemological premises, the universal world history holds its intrinsic intelligibility, a natural current of its evolution, the dynamics of its unilinear progression and, above all, its finite end or ultimate *telos* that navigates its rational-purposeful unfolding and, henceforth, its own universal mission of spreading the civilization across the world. Such a conceptual matrix of world history development inevitably entails immediate exclusion and annihilation of any heterogeneity or particularity if it cannot be functionally incorporated into the all-encompassing universalistic discourse of Western modernity and social modernization. Hence, as a rule, any phenomenon that deviates from the normative prescriptions of the modernization-development paradigm remains utterly unrecognized in the historicist hypostatizations of the local version of the so-called process of *unfinished modernization*. Thus, it is being explained either as a deviation, or an aberration, or the rupture of the continuity of “natural” evolution of the overall social development

²⁵ As opposed critically both to the ideological conformity of idealist philosophy and the abstract materialism in favor of devising the materially based objective knowledge of the history of social formations, Marx argued in *Capital* that social forms and the processes of historical development are contingent and not necessary, that they are also intrinsically historical and by no means natural, that they are contradictory and transient but not everlasting: “It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the earthly kernel of the misty creations of religions than to do the opposite, i.e., to develop from the actual, given relations of life the forms in which they have become apotheosized. The latter method is the only materialist, and therefore the only scientific one. The weakness of the abstract materialism of natural science, a materialism which excludes the historical process, are immediately evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions expressed by its spokesmen whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own speciality.” (Marx 1976a:493–494, note 4).

of Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is deemed a functional sub-process or a mere historical sequence *vis-à-vis* the universal process of world-historical development led by advanced capitalist countries that are considered to be the historical emanation and the political subject of this universal historical process. Regarding the ideological functions of the conceptual matrix of the modernist-oriented historicism, one may say that the traditional concept of the history of sciences is still profoundly steeped in the ideology of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, i.e., in a teleological and therefore idealist rationalism. Althusser and Balibar in *Reading Capital* have shown that:

“The history of reason is neither a linear history of continuous development, nor, in its continuity, a history of the progressive manifestation or emergence into consciousness of a Reason which is completely present in germ in its origins and which its history merely reveals to the light of day. We know that this type of history and rationality is merely the effect of the retrospective illusion of a given historical result which writes its history in the ‘future anterior’, and which therefore thinks its origin as the anticipation of its end. The rationality of the Philosophy of the Enlightenment (...) is merely an ideological conception both of reason and of its history.” (Althusser and Balibar 1970:45).

In this way, recent historicist interpretations of the singularity of architectural and spatial-physical development of Yugoslav self-managed society have sought to explain it, albeit wrongly, as a more or less consistent process of customizing the local specificities and particularisms to the universal course of civilization development. The symptomatic lack of an accurate definition of the historical specificity of the Yugoslav revolutionary project and the idiosyncratic structural imprint it has left in the spatial-architectural dimension of self-managing societal relations is compensated for by the reductionist hypostatization of peculiarly Yugoslav historical condition of *in-betweenness*. What is meant by the ideologeme of *in-betweenness* is precisely the historical abidance in the state of being stuck between historical development and underdevelopment; progressiveness and backwardness; West and East; i.e., between the relative retardation of self-management socialism, on the one hand, and an indisputable progressiveness of capitalism that is regarded both as the engine and the

emanation of the universal historical development, on the other hand.²⁶ In this manner the ideological matrix of the modernization discourse is being solidified and perpetuated at the expense of the concrete analyses of the structure of social relations of production within the historical system of self-management socialism in Yugoslavia.

For these reasons, such schematic interpretations of the historical development of architectural typologies and spatial-physical structure of self-managing social relations in socialist Yugoslavia are being constitutively devoid of the possibility to properly comprehend the specificities of the process of differentiation of social relations' spatial forms within a given system of societal organization, which historically emerged precisely as the outcome of *conjunctural* overlapping of the concrete structure of social relations and respective socio-economic processes in a given historical sequence. Instead, this quite specific process of the material production of societal forms in the spatial-architectural domain of the system of self-managing social relations in socialist Yugoslavia is being exclusively considered from the progressivist historicist viewpoint of the unattained or partially attained standards of developed capitalist societies, which is expressed in depictive terms and syntagms such as “semi-modernization”, or “modernization without modernity”, or “unfinished modernization”. As a matter of fact, this structural explanatory deficit that is intrinsic to historicist interpolations of the conceptual apparatus of modernization discourse into the analysis of spatial-physical and architectural development of socialist Yugoslavia²⁷ is, nevertheless, ideologically necessary to connote the

²⁶ It is no coincidence that one of the first interdisciplinary projects after the breakup of SFRY which was dedicated to studying the historical legacy of the spatio-physical and architectural development of socialist Yugoslavia was symptomatically given the title: “Unfinished Modernization: Between Utopia and Pragmatism” (see: Kulić and Mrduljaš 2012).

²⁷ Over the course of the last decade there has been an emergence of a number of conferences, art works, exhibitions, book-releases *etc.*, dedicated to the historicization of various historical phenomena, dimensions and processes of social development of socialist Yugoslavia in a modernist-oriented fashion. Among many other accomplishments of this kind we will just point out to the most exemplary cases of a modernist-oriented historicist approach to the interpretation of spatio-physical and symbolic aspects of the historical legacy of architectural development in socialist Yugoslavia: [(Kulić and Mrduljaš 2012); (Zinganel *et al.* 2013); (Vockler 2008); (Grandits and Taylor 2010)], to name a few.

capitalist ideologeme of modernity for the sake of promoting the normative ideals of social modernization *via* reductive formalist comprehension of the actual structure of the material production of societal life in a given historical-political system.

In this sense, the historicist intellection of the processes of spatial-physical structuration and architectural development of the Yugoslav self-managed society always functions as the mode of ideological appropriation of the historically specified mode of production of social relations of production within a particular historical sequence of a given historical-political conjuncture (i.e., the concrete social-economic structure of self-managing social relations of production in a given historical sequence). As a rule, this kind of historicist appropriation is predicated upon the analytical framework of the modernization paradigm through the revisionist use of the modernization paradigm's conceptual apparatus, by which it strives to conceal and justify the procedures of the symbolic appropriation of the real historical processes, that is, the socialist mode of social relations of production which historically emerged as a purposeful product of social labor within the self-managing socialist society in a particular social-historical conjuncture. It is precisely this basic ideological mechanism from which ensues the ubiquitous modernization discourse on the discrepancy between the planned and the really existing, or between theoretical ideals and the real objectification of self-management doctrine in practice, which ends up in hypostatization of the abovementioned descriptive term like "unfinished modernization", that is to say, the state of *in-betweenness* that is peculiar to socialist Yugoslavia (i.e. the *interregnum* between East and West, underdevelopment and development, backwardness and progress, "utopia and pragmatism", and similar ideological dichotomies). Consequentially, the real historical processes of the materially-based development of the Yugoslav self-management society are being approached by this type of interpretative procedures as the formal object of knowledge having no linkage whatsoever with the concrete historical analyses of the social relations of production in a given historical sequence.

When applied to the case of Yugoslav antifascist memorials, the interpolation of the ideologeme of modernity uncovers itself as yet another form of the prevailing ideology of historical revisionism, albeit with anominally progressive ideological prefix.

HISTORICAL REVISIONISM AND YUGOSLAV ANTIFASCIST MEMORIAL CULTURE

Before addressing the issue of how the discourse of historical revisionism has particularly been affecting the ideological distortion of the historical legacy of Yugoslav Antifascist Memorials (YAM), we shall try to outline the historical importance and symbolic meaning of Yugoslav antifascist memorial culture. While pinpointing the necessity to reevaluate the real historical significance of antifascist memorials across today's Europe, one ought to be aware that we are arguably dealing with one of the most important terrains of an irreconcilable ideological conflict over the real economic and political interests over the last decades.²⁸ Therefore, the

²⁸ In spite of the fact that the genesis of the discourse of historical revisionism in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has had its endogenous dynamics, it nevertheless coincided with identical tendencies in other socialist countries, particularly during the 1980s, when historical revisionism gained its momentum (Kuljić 2002). This was the period marked by intellectual-political debates among the protagonists of the ideology of anti-communist dissidence, whose polemics over the symbolic, geo-cultural and historical-political differences between mutually opposing concepts of Eastern-Central and South-Eastern Europe *vis-à-vis* “actually existing socialisms” had made the overture for the 1990s reevaluation of the symbolic map of the geo-political space dominated by the USSR. The political legacy of the Cold War set of dichotomous ideological divisions between East and West, totalitarianism and free world, communism and liberal democracy *etc.*, was substantially innovated during the 1990s civil wars for Yugoslav legacy through the essentialization of historical, cultural and confessional differences between Yugoslav peoples, which was enabled by the revival of Balkanist and Orientalist discourse in the political, scientific and public discourses in SFRY successor states (Todorova 2009). The 1990s civil wars in the former SFRY, thus, were represented by ideological state apparatuses in respective countries as cyclical historical clashes of the endemic primordialisms of *Hommo Balcanicus*, while the simultaneous process of primitive accumulation of capital was normalized within the discourse of social sciences as the transition from pre-modern, totalitarian, authoritarian – that is to say, socialist society – to liberal, politically pluralist, free-market oriented, i.e., capitalist socio-economic system. By obscuring the underlying socio-economic and political causes of the 1990s Yugoslav wars, the newly established dominant discourse in post-Yugoslav social sciences paved the way for the delegitimization of the Marxist critique of political economy in favor of establishing a liberally oriented theoretical paradigm, thereby enabling the culturalist discourse of identity politics to become the overall ideological framework of revisionist cultural interpretations of the entire historical legacy of socialism, including the antifascist memorial culture of the People's Liberation Struggle (PLS) of socialist Yugoslavia.

ideological formation that has reared its head after the break-up of socialism in the disguised form of revised interpretations of the 20th-century socialist history should be taken as a cautionary reminder that the evaluation of the shift in the historical interpretation of socialism and its consequences for the future, does require remembering what is conceptually indispensable to understanding this shift (Badiou 2007). While attempting to grasp the diverse effects of the profound interpretative shift that could be traced in the prevailing attitude towards the historical past over the last decades, it is nevertheless important to accurately define the historical character of Yugoslav Peoples' Liberation Struggle (PLS) during WWII, which has been deliberately distorted and concealed by an ever-increasing array of biased revisionist interpretations of the history of Yugoslav socialism (Karamanić 2008).

Namely, the entire geo-cultural space of the Balkan peninsula, i.e. the region of South-Eastern Europe, has always been an insufficiently explored treasury of archeological and historical heritage. Due to a centuries-long process of economic-political colonization and oppression imposed from the outside (Glenny 2012), modern South Slavic peoples who speak the same language have never reached a historical position which will enable them to independently devise the system of a timely and consistent recording of historical events, and thereby to create a fully developed material culture of their own historical experience, although they have been residing for centuries in an area rich in sediments of ancient history, Middle Ages and modern times. When contemplated from the twofold perspective of the Braudelian conceptual scheme of historical development (Braudel 1993), namely both from the perspective of the so-called conjunctural history (*histoire conjoncturelle*) and event history (*histoire événementielle*), the historical specificity of the memorial culture of Yugoslav PLS, taken as a distinct historical *stratum* on the Balkan peninsula, reveals itself precisely in the fact that Yugoslav antifascist memorials symbolically denote the sole historical period, both in terms of the modern epoch and the entire written history of South Slavs, in which Yugoslav people, united by the politics of universality in the joint struggle against Nazi-fascism, have independently won the victory over the historical right to choose their own path of emancipation from colonial oppression, thereby becoming the historical and political subject of the universal struggle against Nazi-fascism as the

peculiar ideological-political form of the 20th-century imperialism and colonialism.²⁹

Over the last decades, this indisputable historical fact has been subjected to revision and concealment, up to the point of criminalization of the libertarian tradition of Yugoslav people through the overt attempts to annihilate its material and symbolical existence (Delač and Šimunković 2013) for the sake of the restoration of the *ancien régime* which Yugoslav peoples liberated themselves from over the course of their *anti-fascist, anti-colonial, and anti-capitalist struggle* for national emancipation and social liberation during WWII.³⁰ As a historical record about the most important protagonists, events, and sites of Yugoslav peoples' revolutionary struggle

²⁹ When analyzing the historical development of capitalism, a number of theoreticians commonly consider the ideology of Nazi-Fascism as a peculiar exceptionality, in terms of a specifically German "irrational" ideology of biological racism or nationalist primordialism. Nevertheless, if we accept the assertion that WWII as well as WWI were predominantly wars fought for the reassignment of influence over colonial dominions among European colonial powers, as well as for the redistribution of resources and wealth which were accumulated during centuries of classical European colonialism – the racist ideology of German national-socialism was nonetheless just another, albeit ideologically and politically different, historical form of 20th century imperialism and colonialism. This particular historical case shows well that imperialism and colonialism can take on different ideological and political forms. Even though the ideological matrix underlying Nazi-German imperialism was radically opposed to the Rationalist-Enlightenment ideology and modern liberal democracy, it had nonetheless provided for an unhindered reproduction of 20th century industrial capitalism under the disguised ideological and political form of national-socialism. So, even such a type of political ideology that is ontologically, let alone politically opposed to modern liberal democracy could provide for the unhindered historical perpetuation of the capitalist structure of economic, political and social relations of exploitation and oppression, which we refer to as imperialism and colonialism respectively.

³⁰ Here, it is important to stress the tripartite historical-political character of Yugoslav People's liberation struggle, namely that of anti-fascist, anti-colonial and anti-capitalist dimension of Yugoslav Peoples' struggle for national liberation and social revolution, in that these historical dimensions of the National Liberation Movement led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have all too often been deliberately omitted from the research perspective of liberally oriented historiography for the sake of concealing its genuine historical-political substantiality, while claiming its peculiarly totalitarian character (see: Komelj 2012:55–79).

for liberation from Nazi-fascism and the European colonial system, the memorial legacy of the PLS represents one of the most important layers of historical and symbolical legacy of socialist Yugoslavia and at the same time the material testimony of the universal world-historical struggle against the ideology of hatred that sought to rebuild and consolidate an oppressive system of rule of man over man.

Bearing in mind all the abovementioned, the importance of efforts to cultivate an affirmative approach towards the issue of the historical legacy of Yugoslav anti-fascist, anti-colonial and anti-capitalist struggle during WWII is even more induced today by the forceful wave of historical revisionism that manifests itself in various forms of ideological revision of the entire historical legacy of socialist Yugoslavia, aiming at a simultaneous consolidation of the archaic political form of nation-state and the restoration of capitalist social relations in SFRY successor states, including the revaluation of the historical legacy of Yugoslav antifascist memorial culture.

THE CASE OF YUGOSLAV ANTIFASCIST MONUMENTS

Regarded from the strictly formalist point of view, it is nonetheless true that Yugoslav antifascist monumental plastics is characterized by a variety of art forms, styles and aesthetic narratives, spanning from the vernacular eclecticism of socialist realism to the canonized monumentalism of abstract forms of modernist narrative, i.e., the so-called socialist aestheticism or socialist modernism. Individual artistic approaches to the thematization of the historical dimension of Yugoslav antifascist monuments (YAM), as well as the aesthetic forms of its symbolization varied in accordance with the type of particular historical content they were meant to symbolically represent, i.e., important events, sites and personalities of the Peoples Liberation Struggle in WWII. In spite of the diversity of formal styles of individual artistic expression, the topic of Yugoslav social revolution and the national liberation from Nazi-fascism had, nevertheless, remained the prevailing motif of memorial sculpture in Yugoslavia, its historical origin, its ideological constituent and a permanent principal motif of artistic production from which stemmed a purposeful idiosyncrasy of artistic production in terms of iconography and symbolic meaning of YAM, which were considered as the organic sequel of the revolutionary task in postwar period.

If we leave aside for a moment this formalist art historian's depiction of YAM's formal traits, which strives to hypostatize the phenomenon of YAM as the artifact holding in itself the idea of the relative autonomy of art (Bürger 1984), we are nonetheless supposed herein neither to defend the assertion, nor to provide the proof that there exists such a thing as a pure, intact kernel of history that is petrified in the phenomenon of YAM. Instead of considering it as an object of historical analysis that is consistent in itself, which means that it holds a cryptic message whose content is waiting to be deciphered as something that virtually embodies the unique historical truth that YAM are conveying to us nowadays, we would, on the contrary, propose that it should be considered as an inconsistent object in itself in order to escape the ideological position that has the potential to endlessly perpetuate itself within the discourse of the relative autonomy of arts, even to the point of an obviously nonsensical, though ideologically effective statements³¹— for instance, the abovementioned attempts at

³¹ In order to defend our assertion from the expected objections coming from the ideologically biased misinterpretations, let Althusser and Balibar be given the space herein to support our thesis by means of their own interpretation of Engels' original theoretical insights: "When, in *Anti-Dühring*, Engels writes that 'Political economy is... essentially a *historical science*, because it deals with material which is *historical, that is, constantly changing*', he touches the exact spot of the ambiguity: the word '*historical*' may either fall towards the Marxist concept or towards the ideological concept of history, according to whether this word designates the *object of knowledge* of a theory of history, or, on the contrary, the real object of which this theory gives the knowledge. (...) [but even] the theory of political economy is affected in its concepts by the peculiar *quality* of real history (its 'material' which is '*changing*'). (...) Engels (...) introduces history (in the empiricist-ideological sense) even into Marx's theoretical categories. (...) his insistence that Marx could not produce real *scientific definitions* in his theory because of the properties of his real object, because of the *moving, changing nature* of a *historical reality which in essence rebels against any treatment by definitions, whose fixed and 'eternal' forms can only betray the perpetual mobility of historical development*. In his Preface to Volume Three of *Capital*, Engels, quoting Fireman's criticisms, writes: 'They rest upon the misunderstanding that Marx wishes to *define* where he only *develops*, and that in general one might expect fixed, cut-to-measure once and for all applicable definitions in Marx's works. It is self-evident that where things and their inter-relations are conceived, not as fixed, but as changing, their mental reflections, *the concepts, are likewise subject to change and transformation*; and they are not encapsulated in rigid definitions, but are *developed* in their *historical or logical process of formation*.'" (Althusser and Balibar 1970:113–114).

representing YAM as non-terrestrial UFO-like objects in the middle of the nowhere (Kempnaers 2015).³² In other words, there is no such thing as a historical object whose original historical meaning is waiting to be revealed by the allegedly unbiased researcher following the research procedures of objective scientific knowledge, be it either a historian, or an artist, or a cultural or political activist and the like. In this way, the very object of historical analysis keeps on being perceived as an immovable historical object that is frozen in historical past, while the subject of such a distorted scientific interpretation or artistic representation keeps the aureole of a neutral, ideologically unbiased stance beholding the objective truth of the object itself that seems to be allegedly unattached to the concrete political interests in the present time.³³ Nevertheless, this obsessive, almost necrophiliac-like, recurrent return to the past for the sake of conserving the fiction about the possibility to symbolically recuperate the specific point of the historical break in the dimension of historical temporality nowadays (i.e. the liberal-leftist fetishization of a particular historical event such as Yugoslav social revolution or the historical sequence of the PLS during WWII, which are symbolized by YAM), fail to take into consideration the fact that the potential for petrification of historical experience is always-already ingrained in the very procedure of the symbolization of history, that is, the pretention of the historical past itself in the present time that is aimed at becoming a conserved remembrance of the future.³⁴

³² As the most popular example of the ideological distortion of YAM's historical meaning, Kempnaers' photo-work *Spomenik* (Kempnaers 2015) succeeded in reaching the tipping point which caused a global proliferation of various artworks and symbolic interventions dedicated to YAM. Among many other works of this kind, see the typical examples: <http://contemporarybalkanart.com/brutalism-architecture-helped-build-national-identity-former-yugoslavia/>; or: <http://pogledaj.to/drugestvari/socialist-architecture-as-a-vision-of-modern-emancipated-society/> (accessed January 25, 2017).

³³ "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question. Man must prove the truth, *i.e.*, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question." (Marx 1976b:63).

³⁴ "(...) it is a peculiarity of every *ideological* conception, especially if it had conquered a scientific conception by diverting it from its true meaning, that it is governed by 'interests' beyond the necessity of knowledge alone. In this sense, *i.e.*, on condition that it is given

In spite of the attempt to present itself as the ideological antipode to the classical *Blut und Boden* historical revisionism, the formal historicist interpretations of the partial and fragmentary aspects of the history of Yugoslav socialism in the modernism-oriented fashion are nevertheless also acting as a particular discursive form of a revisionist mythologization of socialism in the current ideological *milieu*. In the case of YAM, this type of approach to interpreting the historical past entails the reductive formal analyses *pars pro toto* of the particular features of a rather multifunctional system of Yugoslav antifascist memorials, such as the formalist art history analysis of the monumental plastics, i.e., the dominant aesthetic narratives, sculptural forms and styles, or individual artistic approaches *etc.* By focusing the analyses solely on the commemorative and aesthetic dimensions of YAM, the modernism-oriented historicist interpretations of the memorial inheritance of socialist Yugoslavia neglect the rich complexity of miscellaneous social functions the system of YAM has had in Yugoslav society. The reductive character of the formalist analyses of YAM in a modernism-oriented fashion, which reduces the complexity of the memorial culture of Yugoslav antifascism to a variety of its particular formal facets, comes as no surprise since the ideological and explanatory matrix of the modernization discourse, as is previously shown in this work, intrinsically provides for the exclusion of the actual, given material relations of socio-economic, cultural and artistic production from the analyses of real historical processes, including the systemic analyses of the historical formation of the system of antifascist memorials in Yugoslavia after WWII and its manifold social functions, which were organically interwoven with the structure of social relations in Yugoslav self-managing society.

For the historicist formalism is neither concerned with, nor has it the adequate conceptual capacity to reveal the truth of the historical and political *subjectivity* of Yugoslav socialist revolution (Badiou 2007; Stojanović et al. 2003) and its respective symbolic artifacts beyond the customary historiographic interpretations based upon the presupposition on the existence of empirically verified research procedures of the objectively existing historical past. Quite the contrary, by acting in the form of the culturalist digging up the political corpse of SFRY, with the particular emphasis on hypostatizing merely the modernist substratum of the entire historical legacy of Yugoslav socialism, historicist formalism actually fits

the current ideological matrix underlying the different forms of symbolic appropriation and, quite often, of lucrative utilization of socialist historical legacy, which we refer to as yet another form of historical revisionism, regardless of its nominally positive ideological prefix.³⁵ This is noticeable in the leftist nostalgic mourning over neglected modernist heritage of YAM as the lost object of their libidinous investment; the same ideological mechanism also could be observed in the current state policies as well as in the so-called heritage or memory activism which are aimed at protection and conservation of YAM under the label of modern cultural heritage.

Notwithstanding the fact that the scientific investigation of the historical linkages between socialism and modernism is a fairly legitimate and a well established procedure of the interpretation of the historical past, still there are certain questions left to be answered considering the revisionist character of the modernism-oriented historicism. For if we remain exclusively within the formalist framework of historicist interpretations of socialism from the modernist point of view – which is premised on the reductive general presupposition that historically socialism had ensued exclusively from the so-called Western modernity project – then by the same token the corresponding conclusion could be drawn that fascism and nazism were also the historical emanation of modernity, in the last instance.³⁶ Hence the question what makes the essential difference between Nazi-fascism and

the object of which it speaks without knowing it, historicism is not without theoretical value, since it gives an adequate description of an essential aspect of all *ideology*, which takes its meaning from the *current* interests in whose service it is subjected.” (Althusser and Balibar 1971:141).

³⁵ “Although the modern autonomous cultural sphere has been established as being ‘beyond’ the political struggles and as basically a-political; although the oblivion of the socio-historical mechanisms of its emergence has always been one of its constitutive moments; and although its very production was a manoeuvre in the historical rise of the new classes, and the basis of a new class-compromise, culture has nevertheless always defined itself in opposition to the existing political sphere – whilst now, culturalisation is a mechanism of the destruction of political sphere.” (Močnik 2006).

³⁶ Moreover, if we take this claim at face value, we are only one step away from falling into the revisionist ideological stance that strives to equate socialism with Nazi-fascism under the common denominator of the ideologem of totalitarianism (see: Komelj 2012).

socialism *vis-à-vis* modernity as the cultural formation (Williams 1990) or modernism as the canonized aesthetic narrative in this respect (Jameson 2002); could *differentia specifica* be defined exclusively *via* formal analyses of the stylistic, iconographic and architectural-typological appropriations of the aesthetic narrative of modernism, as suggested by historians of art and architecture in their reductive historicizations of the PLS's memorial culture and spatial-physical or architectural development of socialist Yugoslavia respectively?³⁷

Assuming that any discourse of the historical past – in contrast to its primary intention, expectation or that what is commonly believed to be its original purpose – is actually being constituted in any given moment as the ideological-political dispositive that is implicitly aimed at reconfiguring the actuality of socio-political relations in the present time — it is nonetheless necessary to scrutinize the concrete effects of historicization procedures in the current moment, all the more so giving the ongoing situation that is characterized by an ideological hegemony of the discourse of historical revisionism. In this respect, we can assert that there is none of the procedures of historicization that is a-political *a priori*, regardless of the formal ideological prefix attached to it or a myth of scientific objectivity. Moreover, in order to reveal the hidden ideological mechanisms underlying the recent scientific and cultural-artistic interpretations considering Yugoslav historical legacy and YAM in particular, it seems far more appropriate particularly to analyze the very phenomenon of an ever-increasing interest in a modernist substratum of the rich historical legacy of SFRY and of socialism in general; to reveal the underlying conditions which gave rise to this ideologically symptomatic trend over the course of the last decade or so, and to inspect the latent political role that modernism-oriented historicist discourse has actually been playing in the current ideological-political constellation characterized by the all-pervasive hegemony of historical revisionism, beyond the reductive analytical framework of historicism.

³⁷ “(...) the architecture along with its accompanying theories never create isolated fields which should be analyzed thoroughly in great detail; these do matter only insofar as they are being put under scrutiny in order to see to what extent and how they are being trapped in the economy, politics and institutions.” (Foucault 2004:79).

Hence, the intellection of history can be recuperated in no other way but precisely by articulating itself as the act of *practical thought*, beyond any type of historicist formalism, whether the latter may be ideologically affirmative or negatively oriented towards the historical legacy of YAM; for it is only by means of it that vanishing of the subjectivity of either a historical notion, or the particular historical event, or the historical artifact respectively could be forestalled in real history.³⁸ Moreover, the customary attribution of the epithet “anti-fascist” to the phenomenon of Yugoslav antifascist memorials along with the explanatory reductive fetishization of its modernist dimension, without duly taking into consideration the anti-capitalist and anti-colonial dimension of the memorial culture of the revolutionary project of socialist Yugoslavia, reveals itself as a politically impotent euphemism in terms of narrowing, or even utterly neglecting, the real historical-political importance of the historical legacy of socialism *en general* as well as of its memorial legacy in particular. Otherwise, the lack of an active counter-argumentation *vis-à-vis* the increasing power of ideology of historical revisionism will keep enabling the consolidation of the revisionist discourse which justifies and legitimizes the historical reproduction of imperialism and neo-colonialism disguised in modified ideological-political forms nowadays.

³⁸ “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question. Man must prove the truth, *i.e.*, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question. (...) The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [*Selbstveränderung*] can be conceived and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice*.” (Marx 1976b:61).

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NELAGODNOST U DISKURSU MODERNIZACIJE

Ovaj rad analizira način na koji je diskurs modernosti omogućavao historijsku reprodukciju kapitalističkih odnosa proizvodnje u sferi ideologije, politike, znanosti i kulture, održavajući pritom historijski kontinuitet imperijalizma i neokolonijalizma Zapada u pruršenim ideološkim oblicima. Polazi se od historijske analize nastanka diskursa modernizacije u društvenim znanostima nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata kao politički utemeljenog projekta i dominantne znanstvene i kulturne paradigme, čija je ideološka i eksplanatorna matrica omogućavala isključenje realnih, datih materijalnih odnosa društveno-ekonomske, kulturne i umjetničke proizvodnje iz znanstvene analize realnih historijskih procesa. Posebna se pozornost polaže na analizu načina na koji su kategorije modernosti i modernizma konceptualno prisvojene i interpolirane unutar različitih oblika znanstvene, kulturne i umjetničke proizvodnje, kako bi se razotkrili ideološki mehanizmi iza rekonfiguracije ideološko-političkog prostora postjugoslavenskih zemalja. Stoga se pojam historijskog revizionizma shvaća kao ključna kategorija u analizi aktualnih historicističkih interpretacija socijalističkoga historijskog naslijeđa, koje se temelje na općenitoj reduktivnoj pretpostavci da socijalizam historijski slijedi isključivo iz takozvanoga projekta moderne Zapada. Hipostazirajući isključivo modernistički sloj čitavoga historijskog naslijeđa jugoslavenskoga socijalizma, historicistički formalizam zapravo se uklapa u aktualnu ideološku matricu koja je u pozadini različitih oblika ideološkog iskrivljenja i simboličkog prisvajanja socijalističkoga historijskog naslijeđa, što smatramo još jednim oblikom historijskog revizionizma. Štoviše, način na koji je historijski fenomen jugoslavenskih antifašističkih memorijala odnedavna podvrgnut reduktivnim formalističkim interpretacijama upućuje na to koliko ih je modernistički orijentiran historicizam učinkovito pretvorio u depolitizirane objekte revizionističke historizacije.

Ključne riječi: razvoj, developmentalizam, historicizam, povijesni revizionizam, ideologija, modernost, modernizacija, diskurs modernizacije, socijalizam, jugoslavenski antifašistički memorijali



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